UN fears ‘massive’ COVID transmission in Ethiopia’s Tigray

/0 Comments/in , , /by

NAIROBI, Kenya (AP) — The United Nations fears “massive community transmission” of COVID-19 in Ethiopia’s troubled Tigray region, fueled by displacement and the collapse of health services, as humanitarian workers finally begin to access the region two months after fighting began. Hospitals have been looted, even destroyed.

A new U.N. report based on the first on-the-ground assessments confirms some of the grim concerns around Tigray’s some 6 million people since the conflict erupted Nov. 4 between Ethiopian forces and those of the Tigray region.

The crisis has threatened to destabilize one of Africa’s most powerful and populous countries and pull in neighbors like Sudan. Tigray leaders dominated Ethiopia’s government for nearly three decades before Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed came to power and sidelined them amid sweeping reforms that won him the Nobel Peace Prize.

Abiy has rejected international “interference” in the conflict even as the U.N. and others pleaded for weeks for unhindered access to Tigray as food, medicines and other supplies ran out.

Now COVID-19 has emerged as the latest source of alarm. “Only five out of 40 hospitals in Tigray are physically accessible,” the new U.N. report issued Thursday says. “Apart from those in (the Tigray capital) Mekele, the remaining hospitals are looted and many reportedly destroyed.” It does not say who did the looting.

COVID-19 surveillance and control work was interrupted for more than a month in Tigray, and that, along with the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people, “is feared to have facilitated massive community transmission of the pandemic,” the report says.

Ethiopia has one of the highest COVID-19 caseloads on the African continent with more than 127,000 confirmed infections. While its rate of daily cases has declined in recent weeks, officials have not said whether they have been receiving any data from the Tigray region.

“Health facilities outside of major cities are nonfunctional and those in the major cities are partially working with limited to no stock of supplies and absence of health workers,” the U.N. report says.

The report also says the Tigray region remains volatile. “Localized fighting and insecurity continues, with fighting reported in rural areas and in the peripheries of Mekele, Shiraro and Shire among other locations, as of last week,” it says.

The overall humanitarian situation is “dire,” the U.N. says, with food supplies “very limited” and widespread looting reported. “Only locally produced food items are available and at increasing prices, making basic goods unaffordable.” Most Tigray residents are subsistence farmers, and the conflict disrupted the harvest.

Two important camps hosting tens of thousands of refugees from nearby Eritrea remain unreachable — another source of alarm as the presence of Eritrean troops has been confirmed in Tigray.

No one knows how many thousands of people have been killed in the conflict. At least five humanitarian workers have been killed.

Abiy Ahmed and the Consolidation of Ethiopia’s Dictatorship

/0 Comments/in , , /by

As Ethiopia heads toward the delayed elections tentatively now rescheduled for June 5, 2021, Ahmed’s fight not only undercuts his chief rival, who happens to be Tigrayan but enables him to use emergency powers to further erode democracy.

Source: National Interest | Michael Rubin

Africa has, for decades, been a democracy success story albeit one too often ignored in the West. When Ronald Reagan took office, U.S. exports to Africa accounted for only four percent of total U.S. exports and the share of American investment in Africa was even less. Strip away Morocco from the mix, and the proportion of U.S. trade with the continent’s then-fifty-two countries was even less. Freedom was a rare commodity. Freedo House’s Freedom in the World survey for 1983–84 ranked only Botswana, Mauritius, and Nigeria free among African countries. South Africa’s Apartheid regime and Ethiopia’s Derg were both stains on the continent.

As the Cold War ended, democracy bloomed where, for decades, authoritarians had it smothered. In 1990–91, Freedom House listed sixty-five free countries. A decade later, it counted eighty-six free countries. The democratic revolution in Africa contributed to the change. Benin went from a Soviet-style police state to a free state. Cape Verde Ghana, Mali, newly-independent Namibia, and post-Apartheid South Africa also ranked as free states.

Far more countries moved from not free to partly free. Ethiopia, the continent’s second-largest country by population, was one of them. In 1991, longtime Marxist dictator Mengistu Haile Mariam fled the country for Zimbabwe exile. Meles Zenawi took over as a transitional leader and embraced ethno-federalism in order to end the decades of ethnic conflict which Ethiopia had suffered. In May 1995, Ethiopia had its first multi-party elections. Some opposition parties boycotted the polls which many observers nonetheless deemed fair despite ruling authorities taking advantage of state resources. Government harassment of opponents continued, however, and the outbreak of war with Eritrea in 1998 further impeded political liberalization. While the 1995 constitution was progressive, the reality of its implementation often was not. In 2010, against a broad global backdrop of democratic backsliding, Freedom House returned Ethiopia to the ranks of the not free and observed, “Ethiopia’s trajectory has also been negative for a number of years, as Prime Minister Meles Zenawi has persecuted the political opposition, tilted the political playing field, and suppressed civil society.” In 2012, Freedom House returned Ethiopia to the ranks of the unfree. In 2018, it listed Ethiopia in the company of Venezuela, Turkey, and Yemen as having among the most precipitous declines in freedom over the previous decade.

It was perhaps for this reason that the 2018 rise of Abiy Ahmed to Ethiopia’s premiership captivated international diplomats. He succeeded Hailemariam Desalegn who was the first leader in Ethiopia’s history to step down voluntarily. At just forty-one-years-old, Ahmed represented generational change. He came from a security service background, but had a reputation as a reformer. Such optimism about Ahmed’s intentions grew when he sought to end the decades-long stand-off with Eritrea, an initiative which won him the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize in recognition of “his efforts to achieve peace and international cooperation, and in particular for his decisive initiative to resolve the border conflict with neighboring Eritrea.”

There are no shortage of Nobel Peace Prize embarrassments but Ahmed is quickly positioning himself to be among the Norwegian Nobel Committee’s biggest regrets. In hindsight, what the Nobel Committee saw as a bold gamble for peace appears more a premeditated agreement to bury one hatchet to wield another. The Ethiopia-Eritrea border war was likened to a fight between two bald men fighting over a comb. With the border settled, Ahmed could then begin his own assault in conjunction with Eritrean forces on Ethiopia’s northern Tigray region as Ahmed seeks to recentralize Ethiopia and reverse the autonomy enjoyed by Ethiopia’s ethnically diverse regions and enshrined in the 1995 constitution.

The casus belli appears to be a dispute between the Tigray region and Ahmed’s government about his unilateral efforts to expand his mandate. In June 2020, Ahmed announced that he was postponing elections. Supporters said prudence against the backdrop of the coronavirus merited the extension of his term while opponents warned that abrogating the constitution opened the door to reconsolidate dictatorship. In Tigray, the regional government did not recognize the extension of Ahmed’s term and moved forward with its own elections which Ahmed deemed “illegal.” Tigrayan authorities responded by arguing that Ahmed’s condemnation was meaningless as his constitutional mandate expired in October 2020. Perhaps fearing that Tigray’s political defiance could spread to Ethiopia’s other region, in November 2020, Ahmed ordered Ethiopian Defense Forces to occupy Tigray and oust its elected government. The Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front, one of the key forces which overthrew the Derg, dug-in to defend their Tigray’s local autonomy and to stymie rumors plans to transfer territory from their region to neighboring Amhara.

It has been a brutal fight. Ethiopian forces cut off communications to the regional capital Mekelle as Ethiopian forces marched on the city and reportedly subjected it to an artillery barrage. Despite Ethiopia’s repeated denials, Ahmed appointed his own mayor who now admits that Eritrean forces also joined the fighting, a fact the U.S. intelligence community now acknowledges. Eyewitness accounts describe Ethiopian and Eritrean forces summarily executing civilians and looting property. For Ahmed, power motivates, and for Eritrean dictator Isaias Afwerki, cash does. Few having tasted liberty are willing to forfeit it easily, however, and so unrest continues. On Dec. 27, Ethiopia reportedly lost a general.

Like many self-described reformers before him, Ahmed has grown addicted to power. He is not alone. In Somalia, President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo has likewise moved to undermine federalism and restore dictatorial control akin to what Somalia experienced during his uncle Siad Barre’s regime. What makes Ahmed so dangerous is that well-meaning Norwegians bestowed him with the mantle of peacemaker. As Ethiopia heads toward the delayed elections tentatively now rescheduled for June 5, 2021, Ahmed’s fight not only undercuts his chief rival, who happens to be Tigrayan but enables him to use emergency powers to further erode democracy.

It is time for Western countries and African democracies to speak directly about the dangerous path down which Ahmed has sent Ethiopia. Ethiopia is a diverse country, so a centralized dictatorship simply will not work. As Ahmed seeks to substitute nationalist polemics for competence, he appears ready to pick fights not only with Egypt and Sudan, but with Kenya as well. Ahmed’s growing dependence on China increasingly appears less about development and more about finding a backer who will bankroll Ethiopia’s further slide into autocracy. Simply put, increasingly it appears that Ahmed is not the youthful, reformist alternative to Eritrea’s Isaias, but rather his pupil. Isaias brought tragedy to Eritrea. The international community should not be blind as a power-hungry Ahmed risks the same with Ethiopia.

Michael Rubin is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and a frequent author for the National Interest.

Suspected Chinese hackers stole camera footage from African Union

/0 Comments/in , , /by

Source: Reuters | Raphael Satter

WASHINGTON (Reuters) – As diplomats gathered at the African Union’s headquarters earlier this year to prepare for its annual leaders’ summit, employees of the international organization made a disturbing discovery.

Someone was stealing footage from their own security cameras.

Acting on a tip from Japanese cyber researchers, the African Union’s (AU) technology staffers discovered that a group of suspected Chinese hackers had rigged a cluster of servers in the basement of an administrative annex to quietly siphon surveillance videos from across the AU’s sprawling campus in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia’s capital.

The security breach was carried out by a Chinese hacking group nicknamed “Bronze President,” according to a five-page internal memo reviewed by Reuters. It said the affected cameras covered “AU offices, parking areas, corridors, and meeting rooms.”

“We cannot estimate the quantity and value of the data which have been stolen,” the memo continued, adding that while AU technicians had managed to interrupt the flow of data, the hackers could easily regain the upper hand.

“We are still weak to prevent another attack,” the memo said.

The alert, drafted in late January and circulated to senior officials, provides a glimpse of how world powers are jockeying for influence and visibility at the continent’s paramount pan-African organization. Some American and European officials have voiced concern as Beijing has stepped in to meet the AU’s needs – part of an Africa-wide shift that has seen China become the continent’s top creditor. Chinese workers built the AU’s showpiece new conference center in 2012 and Chinese technicians still help maintain the organization’s digital infrastructure.

The Chinese mission to the AU said in an email that “the AU side has not mentioned being hacked on any occasion” and that Africa and China are “good friends, partners and brothers.”

“We never interfere in Africa’s internal affairs and wouldn’t do anything that harms the interests of the African side,” the email said.

Repeated messages sent to AU spokesperson Ebba Kalondo asking about the January breach were marked as “read” but went unanswered.

Longstanding doubts over Beijing’s role at the AU spilled into the open in 2018, when French newspaper Le Monde reported here that AU employees had found that the servers at the new conference center were sending copies of their contents to Shanghai every night and that the building itself had been honeycombed with listening devices.

Both the AU and the Chinese government vehemently denied the report at the time, but a former AU official told Reuters the article in Le Monde was accurate and had put officials there on high alert over cyberespionage.

The former official said the latest breach was discovered following a tip from Japan’s Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT), which in a Jan. 17 email alerted AU officials to unusual traffic between the international organization’s network and a domain associated with Bronze President.

Koichiro Komiyama, who directs the global coordination division of Japan’s CERT, confirmed to Reuters that he sent the warning after a fellow researcher discovered the malicious traffic while picking through the hacking group’s old infrastructure.

The AU memo said that, within days of Komiyama’s email, the AU’s information technology team had traced the suspicious traffic to a set of servers in the basement of the organization’s Building C – part of an older complex across the road from the new conference center.

The memo said the hackers were able to siphon off “a huge volume of traffic” from the servers by hiding it in the regular flow of data leaving the AU’s network during business hours, even pausing their data theft during lunch.

Secureworks, an arm of Dell Technologies Inc which has been tracking Bronze President since 2018, confirmed that the malicious domain identified by Japan’s CERT was linked to the hackers.

Secureworks researcher Mark Osborn said his company had seen strong evidence that Bronze President operated from China, adding that it had been detected in several espionage campaigns targeting China’s neighbors, including Mongolia and India.

Any official protest over the spying is unlikely, according to the former AU official. He said China plays a critical role in keeping the organization running, including during an incident in June when part of the AU’s network was knocked out by a power failure and Chinese technicians swiftly repaired the damage.

For that reason, the former official expects that the surveillance camera incident – like the listening devices reported in 2018 – would be swept under the rug.

“Attacking the Chinese, for us, it’s a very bad idea,” he said.

 

Reporting by Raphael Satter; editing by Jonathan Weber and Edward Tobin

Somalia: America’s Next “Afghanistan?”

/0 Comments/in , , /by

Source: 1945.com | Edward Chang

On March 3, 1994, the United States military accomplished what has become unthinkable today – complete a total withdrawal from an ongoing conflict.

After the political fiasco wrought by the Battle of Mogadishu on October 3 the year prior – immortalized in the book and motion picture adaptation Black Hawk Down – President Bill Clinton ordered an end to the American military intervention in Somalia, which began late in the George H.W. Bush administration as a part of an international humanitarian effort. Somalia had been wracked by civil war since the fall of the incumbent Communist military dictatorship in 1991, leading to a state of near-anarchy and brutal civil war to fill the power vacuum.

27 years later, it is deja vu all over again as U.S. troops once again find themselves leaving Somalia at the orders of outgoing President Donald Trump. Only this time, it is not a withdrawal, but a relocation. Most of the approximately 700 troops in Somalia are being re-deployed to friendlier countries in the region, including Africa Command’s in-theater forward headquarters, Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti. Meanwhile, a small number of troops will remain in Somalia to continue a mission begun in the mid-2000s, during one of the most intense cycles of the War on Terror.

In other words, America’s military posture in the Horn of Africa remains largely unchanged.

Though the public is less aware of U.S. military involvement in Somalia versus Afghanistan and Iraq, it is no less emblematic of America’s difficulty in ending the “endless wars.” The humanitarian intervention, which began in December 1992, was ultimately the first foray into a country the U.S. still cannot quit. Less than 10 years after the ’94 withdrawal, Somalia was again being eyed as a target in the War on Terror. Through three administrations, covert military actions were taken through the intelligence community, special operations forces, and mostly unmanned airstrikes, an effort that dramatically escalated during the Trump administration.

The ultimate benefit of these operations remains in doubt. In December, the Justice Department announced it had charged Cholo Abdi Abdullah, an operative for Somalia-based jihadist militant group al-Shabaab, an al-Qaeda affiliate. Abdullah had been arrested in 2019 in the Philippines for plotting a 9/11-style terror attack on the U.S., using a hijacking and a commercial airliner as a missile. Some commentators cited the plot to criticize Pres. Trump’s decision to withdraw from Somalia.

However, the plot not only ensued despite the military offensive against al-Shabaab in Somalia, but much of it was also orchestrated far from the group’s “safe haven.” It is not clear how authorities were alerted to and thwarted the plot, but the fact it went as far as it did despite such intense counter-terrorism efforts is troubling. Anecdotal evidence from one journalist suggests the offensive approach to terror in Somalia is actually having a counter-intuitive effect, making al-Shabaab more capable of implementing terrorism overseas.

There is plenty of room for debate on these questions. However, there exists something of a consensus that al-Shabaab constitutes the next big terror threat to the U.S. This consensus first publicly emerged during the Obama administration, when the group carried out the Westgate mall attack in Nairobi, Kenya on September 21, 2013. During the next few years, concerns increased that al-Shabaab could strike the American homeland, possibly through sympathizers in places like Minnesota, where a large Somali-American community exists. In early 2015, the Mall of America was specifically cited as a target of attack by the group, and numerous Americans have been arrested and charged with aiding al-Shabaab.

More recently, Michael Rubin of the American Enterprise Institute compared threats against the U.S. made by Hassan Dahir Aweys, an Islamist leader associated with al-Shabaab, to statements made by Osama bin Laden in the 1990s, culminating in the devastation of 9/11. The group has racked up quite the death toll, attempting an airline bombing in 2016, executing a dual truck bombing in October 2017 that killed over 500, a January 2020 attack that killed three Americans and destroyed multiple aircraft and ground vehicles, and numerous other deadly incidents, including one already in 2021.

What this all points to is a jihadist group that is becoming increasingly dangerous and as active as al-Qaeda, Hamas, and ISIS. Like the former, but not the latter two, al-Shabaab clearly has global designs and appears to possess the fundamental capacity necessary to attempt such attacks, along with potential insiders in the U.S.

Judging the likelihood of a devastating terrorist attack by al-Shabaab on U.S. soil is something of a fool’s errand since nobody wants an attack to happen and such a likelihood can only be assessed in the event an actual plot is put into play. What has become clear is that if a major terror attack were to occur on U.S. soil that can be traced back to al-Shabaab, then this would make Somalia a primary focus of American foreign policy once more. The withdrawal of troops from the country would appear, in retrospect, to have been a serious mistake and military intervention in the country would again escalate.

In fact, a war in Somalia is virtually assured in response to a successful al-Shabaab operation. Unlike Afghanistan 2001, U.S. forces are already in-theater and would have the support of a friendly regime in Mogadishu. This makes military retaliation much easier to facilitate. A massive ground intervention, like the one seen in Afghanistan and Iraq, or even Somalia back in the days of George H.W. Bush, is unlikely and unnecessary, given the existing footprint, the non-necessity of regime change, and the lack of a conventional military threat. This war will instead involve larger numbers of intelligence operatives and special operations forces on the ground, accompanied by precision airstrikes, a sophisticated approach that has become the choice of policymakers seeking to fight terror at as low a cost as possible with as great an impact as possible.

But this also means the U.S. will find itself fighting in Somalia for a long time. The bitter experience of the last 20 years has proven that insurgency, militancy, and terrorism are extremely difficult, if not impossible, to eradicate and the cost of waging endless war adds up over time. It seems a small price to pay for safety, but as memory of the last terror attack recedes amongst the public, questions about the mission will surely rise. Meanwhile, that same memory of the last attack will make policymakers reticent about withdrawing troops from Somalia, just as they are unwilling to withdraw troops from Afghanistan and Iraq today, even with public sentiment firmly in the “withdrawal” camp.

For now, the U.S. should proceed with its Somalia exit. Meanwhile, it ought to be hoped the fight will continue successfully in the cloak-and-dagger world to avoid terrorists from drawing America back into another endless war.

Edward Chang is a defense, military, and foreign policy writer. His writing has most prominently appeared in The American Conservative, The Federalist, The National Interest, and Spectator USA. Follow him on Twitter at @Edward_Chang_8.

 

China Has Been Spying on the African Union Headquarters

/0 Comments/in , , /by

Beijing has gone out of its way to gain information on African leaders in order to compel and coerce them into supporting China’s international goals.

Source: National Interest | Joshua Meservey

Last week, a report emerged that hackers, probably from China, had been filching security camera footage from inside the African Union headquarters building in Ethiopia. Several years ago, AU technicians discovered that the building’s Huawei-provided servers were daily exporting their data to Shanghai, and that the walls of the Chinese-built headquarters were peppered with listening devices.

It is a strange way for Beijing to treat a continent whose rulers have emerged as key backers of its international agenda. Yet the Chinese government’s spying, which almost certainly extends far beyond the African Union headquarters, may in fact be one of the reasons why African rulers are willing to defend Beijing’s increasingly indefensible actions.

Beijing’s opportunities for eavesdropping in Africa are vast. Chinese companies—many of which are state-owned, all of which are legally obliged to cooperate with the Chinese Communist Party on intelligence matters—have built at least 186 government buildings in Africa, including presidential residences, ministries of foreign affairs, and parliament buildings. Huawei has built more than 70 percent of the continent’s 4G networks and at least fourteen intra-governmental ICT networks, including a data center in Zambia that houses the entirety of the government’s records.

The report—now confirmed by two other media outlets—that broke the original story of the Chinese government’s AU spying demonstrates what Beijing can do with a structure one of its company builds. The AU’s compromised ICT system was also provided by Huawei, whose equipment is often swiss chees-ed with security vulnerabilities that make them easily exploitable. Given Huawei’s links to China’s Ministry of State Security, it beggars belief that Beijing lacks anything less than an excellent idea of how to access those backdoors.

Beijing has many reasons to take advantage of the spying opportunities its companies’ activities in Africa provides. It can eavesdrop on the sensitive conversations they have with their non-African counterparts, and the Chinese government might be able to gather useful economic information it can pass to its many companies operating on the continent.

Yet as the Chinese government becomes more aggressive internationally, it likely increasingly values the information it gathers in Africa for its use in maintaining and expanding African decisionmakers’ support for Beijing’s global agenda. African states are consistent apologists for the Chinese regime’s oppression of its ethnic and religious minorities, vote frequently with Beijing at the United Nations (often in opposition to the United States), and usually back Chinese candidates vying for leadership of important international agencies.

Recent bombshell revelations demonstrate Beijing’s commitment to influencing foreign leaders. A Chinese spy named Christine Fang spent years developing personal ties with local politicians primarily from California. Fang arranged donations for, and even managed to place at least one intern with, U.S. Rep. Eric Swalwell, who is now a current member of the sensitive House Intelligence Committee (Swalwell cut ties with Fang after receiving an FBI briefing about her spying).

In early December, Director of National Intelligence John Ratcliffe wrote of a Chinese influence campaign aimed at “several dozen“ Congressmen and Congressional aides. China, in fact, targets Congress six times more frequently than does Russia, according to Ratcliffe. Meanwhile, a branch of the Chinese Communist Party known as the International Department, which is responsible for cultivating sympathy for the CCP with foreign politicians, claims to have ties with over 600 political groups in more than 160 countries.

African leaders, of course, do not need to be persuaded to accommodate China on certain issues. Many of their countries face a massive infrastructure gap, and Beijing is often happy to open its wallet for infrastructure projects. Affordable Chinese products, especially tech such as smartphones, are popular on the continent as well.

Yet the Chinese government spends a lot of time and energy trying to influence African leaders to support Beijing’s agenda at a level beyond what simple concern for their countries’ national interests would prompt. These charm campaigns include everything from bribery to throwing up flashy infrastructure projects during election times to lavishing “no-strings-attached” aid on rulers to feed their patronage networks.

The information that Beijing appears to be hoovering up daily is of obvious use for those kinds of influence operations. It could offer insights into an official’s habits, personality, and proclivities that would help Beijing effectively cajole or coerce him or her. A key element of Christina Fang’s approach was to get as close as possible to her targets; electronic surveillance access to a target’s most sensitive haunts would offer the sort of extensive surveillance a human spy could only dream of.

China has built access to African leaders that will be impossible to roll back in the immediate term. Washington, however, can begin building a response that is as patient and far-seeing as China’s strategy has been. One element of that must be complicating what is currently Beijing’s almost unfettered surveillance access to Africa.

Joshua Meservey is a Senior Policy Analyst specializing in Africa and the Middle East at The Heritage Foundation.

U.S. Military Base Penetrated By Somali Militants

/0 Comments/in , , , /by

Military Watch | Dash-8 Spy Plane and C-146 Transport Destroyed

The Somali militant group Al Shabab launched a successful attack on a U.S. military base in Kenya, the Manda Bay Airfield, on January 5th. The attack follows longstanding tensions between the group and American forces in the region, and amid at time when the U.S. is expanding its military presence in East Africa. A spokesman for U.S. Africa Command stayed regarding the attack: “U.S. Africa Command acknowledges there was an attack at Manda Bay Airfield, Kenya and is monitoring the situation.” The attack was eventually repelled with four militants killed, but they succeeded in neutralising multiple American aircraft on the ground including a C-146A Wolfhound tactical transport and a Dash-8 spy plane. The Dash-8 is equipped with synthetic aperture radar capable detecting ground targets across an area nearly two miles wide, depending on its fight altitude, and also deploys a sensor turret with electro-optical and infrared cameras. Al Shabab claimed it had inflicted heavy casualties on U.S. and Kenyan forces, but this has yet to be confirmed. Al Shabab has been designated a terrorist organisation by a number of Western states, including, Australia, Canada, the United States, New Zealand and Britain, as well was by the United Arab Emirates and Singapore.

Situation Report EEPA HORN No. 47 – 07 January 2021

/0 Comments/in , , /by

Europe External Programme with Africa is a Belgium-based Centre of Expertise with in-depth knowledge, publications, and networks, specialised in issues of peace building, refugee protection and resilience in the Horn of Africa. EEPA has published extensively on issues related to movement and/or human trafficking of refugees in the Horn of Africa and on the Central Mediterranean Route. It cooperates with a wide network of Universities, research organisations, civil society and experts from Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Djibouti, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Uganda and across Africa. Key in-depth publications can be accessed on the website.

Military situation (as confirmed per 6 January 2021)

  • A video has emerged of the head of the Ethiopian Northern Command, General Belay, saying that the Eritrean Soldiers in Tigray had not been invited and were undesirable. It is the latest statement by an Ethiopian Federal official which confirms the presence of Eritrean troops in Tigray.
  • The General Belay is blaming the TPLF for starting the conflict and stopping the ENDF from guarding the border against Eritrean intrusion. Eritrea has provided major support to ENDF forces during the invasion of Tigray. This has been confirmed by the Ethiopian government as well.
  • Satellite images have spotted fires near Hitsats refugee camp in central Tigray. Fighting has been reported in the area, including between Tigrayan and Eritrean forces.
  • Fighting between ENDF-allied forces and Tigray regional forces has also been reported near Inda Aba Guna, near Shire, Tigray.
  • Further fighting between the ENDF and Tigrayan forces has closed the road between Mekoni and Mekelle. According to reports, several buses filled with ENDF soldiers were ambushed.
  • Sudanese and Ethiopian forces have clashed in the contested border region again. The Sudanese army says it repulsed two attacks carried out by Ethiopian forces. They specifically praised Sudanese paratroopers for repelling the attack.
  • The Sudanese army says that the attacks were carried out by the regular Ethiopian army. They say heavy weaponry was used during the attacks and so they have ruled out miliamen as the assailants. Sudan also says it has captured an Ethiopian soldier.

Regional situation (as confirmed per 6 January 2021)

  • The Ethiopian boundary commission has accused Sudan of breaching the agreement. Both countries have also accused each other of beginning the conflict. Both have also said that they want a peaceful resolution of the conflict.
  • The new round of GERD dam negotiations seem to have failed. The first meeting on Sunday 3 Jan has so far been the only one that has taken place. Sudan has demanded a greater role for AU experts.
  • Egypt has reaffirmed the need to reach an agreement before the summer.

Situation in Tigray (as confirmed per 6 January 2021)

  • The interim mayor of Mekelle, who recently made comments about Eritrean soldiers having to leave Tigray, has said that he was merely repeating the comments of General Belay. Another official, Mulu Nega, has said that the interim mayor did not have the authority to discuss the situation and that “corrective measures” had been taken.
  • The BBC reported that the government had pledged to repair the shelled Al Negash mosque. It was recently restored by Turkey and severely damaged in December by artillery shelling.
  • A convoy transporting 35 tons of relief supplies arrived in Mekelle on Friday.
  • Photos have emerged of the looted hospital in Adwa. Hospitals in Tigray are running out of supplies.
  • January 7th is Christmas according to the coptic calendar. Prime Minister Abiy, and many religious leaders have been holding speeches to celebrate the holiday.

Situation in refugees (as confirmed per 6 January 2021)

  • Eritrean opposition broadcast, Radio Erena, is reporting that Ethiopian authorities are refusing permits to leave (exit permits) for hundreds of Eritrean refugees. These refugees are mostly part of family reunion programmes and have been approved by the IOM. It is not clear why the exit is being refused.
  • The International Rescue Committee (IRC) has said that many new refugees are arriving in Sudan. The many more refugees has resulted in overcrowding in Um Rakuba. They require more resources to ensure proper health standards and avoid epidemics of diseases, including Covid-19.
  • The IRC says that there are an unusually high number of unaccompanied children among the refugees. The IRC is enacting better protection programmes to take care of them. Children are especially at high risk of exploitation. They are often severely traumatized as well.
  • The SudanTribune reported that the ENDF has deployed more troops to the Sudanese border to prevent refugees from crossing over into Sudan. Ethiopian refugees in Sudan currently exceed 63 thousand.
  • The Norwegian Refugee Council Director in Sudan, William Carter, corroborates this and says that Ethiopia is also pushing Sudan for immediate repatriation of civilians that did manage to get to Sudan.
  • The Ethiopian minister of foreign affairs spokesman has said that the last details are being worked on with regards to repatriation of refugees from Sudan to Ethiopia. The spokesman said that it will start soon. Many refugees in Sudan have stated to media that they will not go back and will not feel safe.

International Situation (as confirmed per 6 January 2021)

  • US Treasury Secretary Mnuchin has met with Prime Minister Hamdok, the Chairman of the Sovereign Council General al-Burham and various other ministers. They discussed economic opportunities for Sudan through the Abraham Accords, Sudanese debt repayment and the GERD dam negotiations.
  • The Abraham accords were signed between Israel, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and other arabic countries in the region. Sudan officially joined the accords on 6 January, paving the way for normalisation of relations between Israel and Sudan.

Disclaimer:

All information in this situation report is presented as a fluid update report, as to the best knowledge and understanding of the authors at the moment of publication. EEPA does not claim that the information is correct but verifies to the best of ability within the circumstances. Publication is weighed on the basis of interest to understand potential impacts of events (or perceptions of these) on the situation. Check all information against updates and other media. EEPA does not take responsibility for the use of the information or impact thereof. All information reported originates from third parties and the content of all reported and linked information remains the sole responsibility of these third parties. Report to info@eepa.be any additional information and corrections.

Links of interest

https://addisstandard.com/news-analysis-we-dont-want-it-north-command-chief-on-eritrean-army-in-tigray-says-army-didnt-let-alienforces-in-full-speech/
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-55530355
https://www.rescue.org/press-release/thousands-more-fleeing-conflict-ethiopia-arrive-eastern-sudan-irc-scales-emergency
https://sudantribune.com/spip.php?article70296

Situation Report EEPA HORN No. 47 – 6 January 2021

/0 Comments/in , , /by

Europe External Programme with Africa is a Belgium-based Centre of Expertise with in-depth knowledge, publications, and networks, specialised in issues of peace building, refugee protection and resilience in the Horn of Africa. EEPA has published extensively on issues related to movement and/or human trafficking of refugees in the Horn of Africa and on the Central Mediterranean Route. It cooperates with a wide network of Universities, research organisations, civil society and experts from Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Djibouti, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Uganda and across Africa. Key in-depth publications can be accessed on the website.

Military situation (as confirmed per 5 January 2021)

  • The Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) claims that it has killed 100 ENDF soldiers near Abraha Atsbeha, North of Mekelle. It also claims to have destroyed 2 tanks.
  • A source reports that heavy fighting is taking place between TPLF and Eritrean combatants near Endabaguna and Kisadgaba. Reportedly TPLF forces launched an attack on looting Eritrean soldiers. Endabaguna is the location of the reception center for refugees from Eritrea in Central Tigray.
  • Tigray Media House reported that a senior ENDF officer died of his wounds in Hospital. Colonel Dejene was ambushed by TPLF while traveling from Maychew to Korem two weeks ago.
  • Additional ENDF forces moving to Tigray reportedly consist of 8 tanks and troops in vehicles.
  • Pictures have appeared online, identified as Eritrean soldiers in Idaga Hamus (allegedly).

Regional situation (as confirmed per 5 January 2021)

  • The Prosperity Party Chair of Tigray, the ruling party of Ethiopia, has become the second official to confirm that there are Eritrean troops in Tigray. In a statement on Tigray Television, the regional broadcast, Nebeye Sehul said that Eritrean soldiers fighting in Tigray were probably deserters seeking better lives in Ethiopia. Nebeye says that the government is investigating.
  • Reported that on the 38th Extraordinary Assembly by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) there was an expectation that Ethiopian PM Abiy would invite the AU Commission Chair Moussa Faki Mahamat to visit Tigray. The trip, however, had to be erased from the final communique. Ethiopia rejects “any foreign intervention” in a crisis that it says is purely domestic.
  • The Communique of the IGAD 38th Assembly welcomed the agreement by Ethiopia of 29th November 2020 allowing “unimpeded, sustained and secure access” for humanitarian support. Such “unimpeded access” has not yet been realised, despite UN and humanitarian organisations urging they need access.
  • The United Nations says that access to Tigray has improved slightly, but it remains critically challenged. Insecurity and bureaucracy are constraining the aid that can be provided. It has been able to access the main cities, but cannot access rural areas and Hitsats and Shimelba refugee camps.
  • The UN reports that in East Sudan the first refugees have been transferred from the Village 8 reception centre to the new camp in Tunaydbah, Sudan. Um Rakuba camp has approached full capacity.
  • UNHCR spokesperson, Andrej Mahedic, states that more than 30% of the refugees arriving from Ethiopia are minors, younger than 18, whilst 5% are elderly, older than 60.
  • The head of Egypt’s intelligence service has met with the Sudanese Prime Minister Hamdok as well as the Head of Sudan’s Sovereign Council, General Al-Burhan. They discussed regional developments and the GERD dam negotiations. President Al-Sisi of Egypt and Al-Burhan also spoke on the phone on Monday.
  • Eritrean Minister of Information, Yemane Meskel, informs that Minister of Foreign Affairs, Osman Saleh and Presidential Adviser, Yemane Ghebreab, met Sudan’s Head of the Sovereign Council, General Al-Burhan, delivering a message of President Afewerki.
  • In a press conference Ethiopian Foreign Affairs Minister and Vice President Demeke has said that Ethiopia wants to resolve the conflict with Sudan peacefully. According to him, the clashes in November and December have not changed the strong relationship between both countries.
  • The status of the GERD dam negotiations remains unclear. Sudan has not yet returned to the negotiation table.

Situation in Ethiopia (as confirmed per 5 January 2021)

  • Ethiopian police have released the Reuters cameraman that was arrested a couple weeks ago. No charges have been filed against him.
  • VP Demeke said that the government is currently taking measures to provide food and other supplies to Tigray. He also said that reconstruction efforts are on the way and that telecommunication lines are being restored to the whole region. Telecom, electricity, and full banking access will soon start again.
  • VP Demeke has also said that planning for a 6th general election is on the way in TIgray. The federally appointed interim government has been tasked with organizing it. Opposition parties have been invited to participate.
  • The Ethiopian National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) has arrested 21 individuals for issuing travel documents illegally. Most of them worked at the Bole Airport.

Situation in Tigray (as confirmed per 5 January 2021)

  • A witness has told federal broadcaster ETV that Amanuel Church was shelled. Civilians were seeking shelter inside and were killed as a result of the attack. Amanuel is near the UNESCO site Negash Mosque, Africa’s oldest mosque, which was severely damaged in December as a result of shelling.
  • A list has been published on-line, claiming to contain the names of civilian victims of the war in Tigray. The list has 440 entries and has been assembled using information from different sources. Many of the deaths have not been (officially) confirmed.

International Situation (as confirmed per 5 January 2021)

  • The US Secretary of the Treasury Mnuchin is due to visit Khartoum on 6 January. The aim of the visit is to review the economic situation, as well as the US assistance to Sudan. Mnuchin will also visit other countries in the region such as Egypt, Qatar and Israel.
  • The UN estimates that more than 322 thousand people are Internally Displaced (IDP). The provisional Tigrayan government reported yesterday that it believed there were 2.2 million IDPs.
  • The UN says health facilities outside cities are not operational, while those in cities are in critical need of supplies.
  • The UNHCR has stated that it needs 156 million US$ to meet immediate needs of refugees in Ethiopia, but only US$ 40 million has been pledged.

Disclaimer:

All information in this situation report is presented as a fluid update report, as to the best knowledge and understanding of the authors at the moment of publication. EEPA does not claim that the information is correct but verifies to the best of ability within the circumstances. Publication is weighed on the basis of interest to understand potential impacts of events (or perceptions of these) on the situation. Check all information against updates and other media. EEPA does not take responsibility for the use of the information or impact thereof. All information reported originates from third parties and the content of all reported and linked information remains the sole responsibility of these third parties. Report to info@eepa.be any additional information and corrections.

Links of interest

https://www.tghat.com/victim-list/
https://www.facebook.com/MFAEthiopia/posts/4313919665301910
https://www.unocha.org/story/daily-noon-briefing-highlights-ethiopia-niger-yemen
https://dailynewsegypt.com/2021/01/04/egypts-intelligence-chief-abbas-kamel-met-with-hamdok-al-burhan-hamidati-in-khartoum/

07/01/2021 News and Commentaries – Tigray War

/0 Comments/in , , /by

Tigray war

● Ethiopian army Major-General Belay Seyoum confirms the presence of Eritrean troops in Tigray. Here is an unabridged translation from a YouTube Video.

“Our door, our sovereignty must be guarded by the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF). It is true. The main mission of the ENDF is to safeguard our sovereignty. But we should also think about who stood against safeguarding our sovereignty. Our army was first attacked at the border, then an unwanted foreign force entered our territory. Are we the ones who let it in? No, we don’t want it. Personally, as a defense force, we feel bad. It’s our country. We know the problem that arise. It hurts. But who let them in? Wasn’t it intentional? It was the army defending the border that got killed. Then who would stop them from entering. They came in on their own. I think this should be clear. My conscience does not allow me to ask for help from the Eritrean army. Our problem is ours. We can solve it on our own. We have the capacity to solve our own problem.” 

● Ethiopia blocking Tigrians from fleeing to Sudan. The Ethiopian Federal Army deployed more troops on the border area to prevent people fleeing the war in the Tigray region to cross into Sudan. Sudan Tribune

● Refugees entering Sudan on the rise recently. The head of the emergency room for the housing of Ethiopian refugees in eastern Sudan confirmed on Wednesday the recent increase in the number of Ethiopians seeking refuge and protection in Sudan. Over 60,000 refugees have fled over the border to Eastern Sudan; with thousands having arrived over the weekend. Sudan Tribune

● About 2.2 million people have been internally displaced in Tigray since fighting erupted in November with about half fleeing after their homes were burned down, a local appointed government official said. Reuters

● Ethiopia’s ‘Regional Special Forces’. The northern part of Ethiopia has seen a lot of conflict over the past year. One aspect of the fight is the emergence of ‘special forces’ units on a regional basis. Read more in “Regional Special Forces: threats or safeties?”, The Reporter, January 2, 2021.

● The Special Briefing. Back from the brink: global precedents, OZY.COM

In the early 1990s, more than a million people died in the country’s first civil war, which led to the formation of present-day Eritrea. And this past November, the critical East African nation seemed on the verge of another civil war amid backlash against democratic reforms launched by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed — just a year after he won a Nobel Prize for reopening the Ethiopia-Eritrea border following two decades of tensions. For now, Ahmed has mostly quashed the rebellious Tigray forces, but this could be short-lived.

● Opinion, Courier Journal

Using the pandemic as an excuse, Abiy Ahmed, the Ethiopian prime minister, canceled elections. When the head of the government of Tigray, an internal region of Ethiopia, questioned the legitimacy of Ahmed’s rule that has continued after his term expired, Ahmed sent troops to “seize” Tigray. This caused a civil war, created thousands of refugees and destabilized Ethiopia’s neighborhood.

Metekel, Benishangul Gumuz

● While the Tigray war rumbles on, violence elsewhere is spreading to an extent the central government cannot ignore. How Addis Ababa deals with ethnic violence in the region of Benishangul-Gumuz will determine the country’s future. Foreign Policy

● More than 101,000 people have been displaced due to violence in Ethiopia’s Benishangul-Gumuz regional state since July 2020. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA)

Al-Fashqa, Ethiopia – Sudan border conflict

● Amhara militias are “asserting a renewed aggressiveness on the border [to Sudan] that could result in further provocations … If left unchecked, it represents the kind of ‘low probability, high impact’ scenario that could have devastating and far-reaching consequences.” Bloomberg

● Ethiopia accused Sudanese troops of killing “many civilians” in recent fighting over contested land at the nations’ border. Bloomberg

● Sudan army thwarted two major attacks by Ethiopian militia on Al Fashiqa. Media News Sudan

●  “A force of the Airborne Corps and Military Intelligence responded to an attack launched by Ethiopian forces equipped with heavy weapons.”  Sudan Tribune.

The Horn and GERD

Tigray conflict threatens the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, Power Technology

The outbreak of fighting in Tigray in November 2020 threatens to distract governments from the continuing negotiations. The conflict is between the Ethiopian government and the region’s ruling party, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). Both sides have accused each other of committing atrocities during the fighting. As of December 2020, it is estimated that several thousand people have been killed and up to one million people have been displaced.

War of words over stalled Nile dam talks, Al-Monitor

“Egypt has turned Ethiopia into a [danger zone] to escape its own internal problems, as there are tens of thousands of Islamists inside prisons in Egypt. … It is using such matters to avoid internal Egyptian issues and focus its attention on the GERD.” Dina Mufti, Spokesperson of the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

“Such an offense on the Egyptian state and allegations about its internal affairs is nothing but a continuation of the approach of using a hostile tone and fueling emotions as a cover for Ethiopia’s multiple failures, both domestically and externally.” Ahmed Hafez, spokesperson of Foreign Ministry of Egypt

Ethiopia’s Hydro-Hegemony Has Arrived. National Interest

The dam dispute between Ethiopia and Egypt most often garners international press, but the cases impacting Kenya and Somalia show that the pattern of Ethiopian defiance of international norms cuts deeper. While Ethiopia’s hydro-hegemony predates Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, the Nobel Laureate’s increasing domestic failures have led him to double down on Ethiopian defiance and intransigence. This is his way of presenting himself as a nationalist. Also, this has led Abiy to increasingly lash out at the United States by claiming that U.S. mediation has led to unfair restrictions, power limitations, and back-door colonialism.

Podcast

As Conflicts Mount, Where Does Ethiopia Go from Here? Ethiopia has declared that its main military operation in northern Tigray is over, but fighting persists and existential questions hang over the country’s transition. Adem Kassie Abebe and Alan discussed how Prime Minister Abiy should navigate the troubled waters ahead. The Horn

 

What is next for Abiy Ahmed?

/0 Comments/in , , /by

Source: Global Risk Insight | Anthony Morris

The apparent culmination of the Ethiopian government’s ‘law enforcement operation’ in Tigray poses a number of new questions for the future of Africa’s second-most populous country.

The crisis in Ethiopia, which erupted at the start of November, is the culmination of a period of rising tensions between Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s government and the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF).

The TPLF, who headed the ruling coalition in Ethiopia from 1991 to 2017, had grown increasingly frustrated with Abiy’s federalist brand of politics and their subsequent alienation from power. Tensions reached a boiling point when the TPLF refused to follow the federal government’s order to postpone elections in September. This prompted the Prime Minister to launch an army offensive against Tigray in order to ‘enforce the rule of law’ – a decision which reverberated around the Horn of Africa.

As war ensued, many analysts feared the worst. In particular, there was a belief that Tigray – a highly militarised region hardened by years of war – would be extremely difficult to defeat by force, leading to a drawn-out conflict. There were also concerns that the war would exacerbate deepening ethnic divisions throughout the nation, precipitating a ‘Yugoslavia-style’ breakup of the nation.

On the surface at least, the conflict has defied many of these more fatalistic forecasts. The apparent takeover of Mekelle on the 7 December, came as a surprise to many. But what does this latest development in the conflict mean? Despite the apparent victory for the government, violence and instability will continue to plague Ethiopia – both on the Tigrayan front and elsewhere.

The Tigrayan Front

While the conquest of Mekelle is a significant victory for the government, hostility and violence continue to cast a shadow over Tigray. TPLF leader Debretsion Gebremichael claims that fighting is still taking place ‘in three directions’, including near Mekelle. No TPLF leaders have been captured, and no large-scale disarmament has taken place. The renegade forces may be wounded – but they are still very much alive.

The early forecasts that a war with Tigray would be protracted, therefore, may yet prove to be prescient. Guerrilla-style warfare will likely continue in the region until either a negotiated settlement or a military victory.

Though the Ethiopian government has ridiculed the narrative pushed by a number of experts that there would be a ‘protracted insurgency in the rugged mountains of Tigray’, the region’s terrain is unquestionably a boon for rebel forces. The difficulty of pursuing these rebels through the treacherous relief of the region means that a comprehensive military victory for the government’s forces is most likely out of reach, at least in the near future.

The TPLF have remained resolute, despite the setback of losing Mekelle. According to Gebremichael, they ‘are ready to die in defence of [their] right to administer the region’. Northern Ethiopia will thus likely be mired by sporadic, targeted violence for the foreseeable future unless a negotiated solution is reached. This conflict is far from over.

Deepening National Divisions

The Tigrayan crisis is not the only source of violence or ethno-regional division in Ethiopia. The nation, which has a population of over 100 million people, has a long history of domestic tension.

Ethiopia’s disparate peoples are governed by an ethnic federalist system. While in one respect, this system does alleviate ethnic demands for autonomy, it has a corrosive flipside. The regions created are deeply exclusionary, which creates ‘hard’ borders that incite friction.

These borders have historically been flashpoints for conflict, and over the last year, violence along these borders, and elsewhere, has begun to increase.

This map highlights areas that The New Humanitarian has identified as recent ‘flashpoints’ for internecine violence. The widespread nature of these flashpoints paints a picture of the growing instability that has plagued Ethiopia in recent years. The death of an estimated 222 civilians in Benishangul-Gumuz on 23 December is another devastating instance of the impact of this violence.

The Tigray conflict, alongside this violence and ethno-regional strife, has led to some suggestions that Ethiopia could undergo a Yugoslavia-like collapse. The underlying, unresolved grievances around the country that have built up from years of government domination are an undeniable threat to national unity.

However, these fears of collapse have been somewhat overblown. The risk that Ethiopia undergoes any kind of breakup, or is forced to deal with secessionist wars, is very low. Calls for the maintenance of autonomy are not equivalent to clamours for independence. As Adam Adebe, an Ethiopian constitutional scholar points out, ‘secession is not a popular sentiment, even in Tigray’.

There is also a sense that if secession movements were viable, then they would have launched a military campaign at the height of the Tigray conflict, when the Ethiopian army was most vulnerable.

Violence and instability, therefore, will likely continue. Full-scale ‘Balkanisation’ however, is not on the immediate horizon.

How will the situation evolve?

The critical question for Ethiopia’s future, therefore, seems to be whether Abiy will concentrate yet more power in Addis Ababa, and pursue a more authoritarian system of governance, or whether he will seek a negotiated inclusive settlement with regional leaders. Such a compromise is unlikely to be influenced by external forces; Abiy is firmly within the Ethiopian state tradition that abhors foreign intervention in their internal affairs.

Abiy’s relative youth, both as a politician and a Prime Minister, make forecasting somewhat challenging. There are two realistic paths for Ethiopia’s future, which essentially hinge upon Abiy’s political will and willingness to compromise.

Scenario 1: Inclusive Dialogue

Violence and human rights abuses have lost Abiy a huge amount of support internationally, marking a stunning fall from grace since being made a Nobel Peace Laureate in 2019. While the brutality of his response, particularly the way in which it has caused harm to civilians, should be roundly condemned, the role of the TPLF in creating this conflict cannot be dismissed. The Tigrayan leadership persistently undermined Abiy’s government, and knowingly angled for conflict.

Without exculpating this violence, the general thrust of this argument is that at heart, Abiy is not intent on consolidating his authority through force, and even if he were, his power is not established enough for him to survive as a leader by employing these methods. Though some have argued that Abiy is a unitarian, he has never directly disavowed the system, merely pleaded for its reform.

It is in Abiy’s interest, therefore, to broaden his political base by seeking a negotiated settlement with the disparate ethno-regional factions that dominate Ethiopian politics. The elections, which Abiy has said will be held on 5 June 2021, set a clear calendar for any such negotiations.

If the current instability which plagues the country is to settle down, some form of settlement with opposition groups must be reached before these elections. If not, their results will not be recognised by opposition factions or their supporters, which would likely spark mass protest and violence.

It does, therefore, seem likely that talks will be initiated. A satisfactory settlement is certainly a realistic possibility, but will doubtless be complicated.

Scenario 2: Increased Authoritarianism

Alternatively, buoyed by a symbolic victory in Tigray, or frustrated by unproductive dialogue, Abiy could ignore the growing necessity to compromise, and instead tighten his authoritarian grip over the nation, forcing forward an agenda of political centralisation.

This could have devastating effects for Ethiopia, where political authority relies on some degree of regional autonomy and compromise. Internecine violence, which has gradually grown throughout Abiy’s tenure, will likely spiral out of control.

The longer dialogue is delayed, the greater the potential for violence and instability in Ethiopia. The country’s size and significance means that this is not merely a domestic issue. The fallout of the violence and displacement of the Tigray conflict has already had significant regional consequences. Eritrea has sent troops into Tigray in support of Ethiopia, and has been shelled by the TPLF in retaliation. Tens of thousands of refugees have fled into Sudan, creating the conditions for rising tensions on their border with Ethiopia. Finally, the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops in Somalia could sow the seeds for a resurgence of al-Shabaab.

If he goes down this road, therefore, Abiy would not only threaten the stability of his own country, but his actions could plunge the entire Horn of Africa into chaos.