How War in Ethiopia Impacts Red Sea and Horn of Africa Power Politics: The Battle in Tigray and Beyond

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Terrorism Monitor | Michael Horton

Ethiopia is a key prize in the scramble for influence and power in the Horn of Africa and broader Red Sea region. With its natural resources, population of 110 million, and well-equipped military, Ethiopia has become an African power. The nation’s capital, Addis Ababa, moreover, hosts the African Union headquarters, and the country is one of the few African nations never to be colonized. [1] Ethiopia has accordingly long played an outsized role in African and sub-regional politics.

For much of the last decade, successive Ethiopian governments have navigated treacherous regional and global politics by maintaining relations with diverse geopolitical actors. On the global level, Ethiopia has been—and remains—an important U.S. ally, while China accounts for the largest volume of foreign direct investment into Ethiopia. [2] At the regional level, Ethiopia has avoided becoming entangled in the Gulf’s acrimonious power politics between Saudi Arabia and the UAE and their two main adversaries, Qatar and Turkey. All four of those countries nevertheless provide Ethiopia with financial aid and private investment across multiple areas, especially its important agricultural sector. Turkey and the UAE, despite being regional rivals, also both maintain high-level military-to-military relations with Ethiopia.

The ongoing war in Ethiopia’s northernmost Tigray region will test Ethiopia’s strategy of balancing the interests of outside powers with its own need for domestic investment. At the same time, the war, which began on November 4, will present these same outside powers with new opportunities to enhance their relationship with Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali (East African, November 7). However, those and other outside powers will also have ample opportunity to create instability in Ethiopia if they so choose.

Ethiopian Foreign Policy from Balancing to Entanglement

The war in Tigray pits the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) against the Ethiopian government. The TPLF, which dominated Ethiopian politics for much of the last three decades, is a formidable political and military power in its own right. While the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) has made quick progress in capturing major cities in the Tigray region, this was likely due to strategic withdrawals by the TPLF (Nazret, November 19). Such a strategy aligns with the TPLF’s long history of guerrilla warfare.

Barring some negotiated settlement between the TPLF and the Ethiopian government, the war in Tigray will likely evolve into an insurgency that will spill beyond the borders of Tigray. At the same time, the war in Tigray, even if it is contained to TPLF redoubts in the mountains, will attract the interest of outside powers. This is already the case with Eritrea, which has deployed troops within Ethiopia’s borders to help the ENDF bottle up the TPLF. In addition to its three decade-long battle for independence from Ethiopia, Eritrea and Ethiopia fought over disputed border towns from 1998-2000. Eritrea, which was once allied with the TPLF, is now supporting Abiy Ahmed, who signed a peace agreement with Eritrean president Isaias Afewerki in 2018 that ended the two countries’ longstanding border conflict (Addis Fortune, September 22, 2018).

The involvement of Eritrean forces in Ethiopia’s war in Tigray could be a harbinger of things to come. The UAE, which maintains military bases in Eritrea, may also be aiding Abiy Ahmed’s government. Conflicting and unconfirmed reports, for example, indicate the possible deployment of UAE-operated drones from the UAE base in Assab, Eritrea to Tigray. [3] The UAE, which is locked in a cold war with Qatar and Turkey, could try to enhance its relationship with Ethiopia by supporting its fight against the TPLF at the cost of Ethiopia’s relationship with Qatar and Turkey.

Turkey, however, like the UAE, enjoys excellent military-to-military relations with Ethiopia. Due to Ethiopia’s involvement in Somalia, with which it shares a long and largely unguarded border, Turkey works closely with the Ethiopian military and intelligence services. Turkey also regards Somalia, where it maintains its largest overseas military base, as the lynchpin in its strategy to preserve and grow its influence in the Horn of Africa and Red Sea region (Terrorism Monitor, November 20). In mid-November, Ethiopia withdrew large numbers of troops it had deployed in its ethnically Somali Ogaden region and Somalia itself to redeploy them to Tigray (Somali Affairs, November 3). Somalia-based al-Shabaab, therefore, will benefit from gaps left by the Ethiopian forces, and the relationship between Ethiopia and Turkey may deepen as Ankara seizes on opportunities to help Addis Ababa bolster security along its border with Somalia. Turkey also has greater ability than either the UAE or Saudi Arabia to offer the Ethiopian military what it lacks and most desires: drone technology and the expertise to use it (Terrorism Monitor, October 13).

Further afield, China, which has invested billions of dollars in almost every economic sector in Ethiopia, will act to protect those investments. China will make every effort to support stability in Ethiopia. Given China’s pragmatic foreign policy in Africa and in Ethiopia in particular, this support will be cost-effective and possibly covert. There is little doubt that China will aid Abiy Ahmed’s efforts to contain and defeat the TPLF. However, such aid will, as is customary with Chinese foreign policy, come with strings attached. [4]

Water Wars and Instability

On the other side of the equation, Ethiopia’s regional rivals will view limited instability in Ethiopia as a benefit. Ethiopia has completed its Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and, as of July 2020, began filling the dam’s immense reservoir (Nazret, July 16). Egypt views the dam, which impedes the flow of water into the Nile’s primary tributary, the Blue Nile, as an existential threat. [5] Thus far, the two governments have failed to reach an agreement over how they will share the Nile’s water resources.

Over this summer, Egypt reportedly proposed to build a base in the unrecognized Republic of Somaliland (The East African, July 28). It is unlikely the government of Somaliland will accept the proposal. However, it reflects Egypt’s interest in enhancing its relations with other nations in the Horn of Africa and expanding its military’s regional reach as a way of checking what it sees as growing Ethiopian power.

For its part, Sudan, which will benefit from cheap electricity and flood control provided by the GERD, has been more willing to negotiate with Ethiopia on the dam. However, Egypt wields considerable influence in Sudan. The war in Tigray, especially if it is prolonged, may undermine the Ethiopian government’s ability to press forward with what Egypt views as an uncompromising agreement on GERD and hinder Sudan’s possible accommodation with Ethiopia on the dam.

Ethiopia’s Outlook

Ethiopia’s successful foreign policy, which is based on balancing the interests of rival countries in its natural resources and strategic position in exchange for access and investment, could be compromised by sustained war in Tigray. The TPLF is a sophisticated political and military organization that possesses the knowledge and institutional memory that will allow it to engage rival internal and outside powers. Abiy Ahmed’s government will find it requires more and new types of aid to deal with the challenges posed by the TPLF. Receipt of this aid, be it military or financial, will constrain Ethiopia’s nimble and independent foreign policy.

Notes

[1] Ethiopia was occupied by the Italians from 1936-1941. See Jeff Pearce, Prevail: The Inspiring Story of Ethiopia’s Victory over Mussolini’s Invasion (Skyhorse Publishing, 2014).

[2] In 2019, China accounted for the largest volume of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Ethiopia, followed by Saudi Arabia and Turkey.

[3] There are conflicting and unconfirmed reports in Western media on the possible deployment of UAE-operated drones from the UAE’s base in Assab, Eritrea to Tigray. See, for example: https://www.voanews.com/africa/expert-no-evidence-uae-drones-are-being-used-ethiopias-tigray-conflict; https://www.bellingcat.com/news/rest-of-world/2020/11/19/are-emirati-armed-drones-supporting-ethiopia-from-an-eritrean-air-base/; and https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-conflict-idUSKBN27V05M. While deployment of UAE-operated and Chinese-manufactured Wing Loong II drones would be consistent with the UAE’s deployment of drones over Yemen and Libya, it is unlikely at this stage. What is more likely is that the UAE is using surveillance drones within Eritrean territory to monitor incursions into Eritrean territory by TPLF forces.

[4] This is not to say that other countries providing aid, like the United States, do not also expect some kind benefit in return. However, China is particularly adept at incorporating countries into its financial and political web at relatively minimal expense to the Chinese treasury. See Tom Burgis, The Looting Machine: Warlords, Oligarch, Corporations, Smuggler, and the Theft of Africa’s Wealth (Public Affairs, 2016).

[5] For an overview of the complexity surrounding GERD and downstream riparian environments, see: https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-020-19089-x

Ethiopia’s Long War

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London Review of Book | Maaza Mengiste

I have​ a hazy childhood memory of soldiers breaking into our house. They had come to question my grandfather, who they believed was hiding someone they wanted to arrest. It was not long after the start of the 1974 revolution in Ethiopia that would depose Emperor Haile Selassie and install a military junta led by Mengistu Haile Mariam. The new regime, which called itself the Derg, was hunting down dissidents deemed ‘enemies of the state’. There were nightly gun battles near our home in Addis Ababa between rebel groups and government forces.

I was standing next to my grandfather in the dining area when the door burst open and three soldiers forced their way in. I remember one of them distinctly. He was slender-faced and young, his eyes so wild that he, too, might have been scared. My mind has superimposed his face on the other two men, so that when the memory arises, as it often does, the soldiers are identical triplets screaming at us in unison. My grandmother shouted for me and my grandfather shoved me behind him. I was shaking and I remember his hand reaching back to steady me as I pressed against his leg. I watched the young soldier advance. He pushed my grandfather aside and dropped to his knees on the ground in front of me. He had a downy moustache on his upper lip. He bent close, smiled, and all harshness left his voice: ‘Is there someone else here?’

There was someone else in our house, a stranger hiding in a small room that was normally used for storage. I had been forbidden from going near there, but that hadn’t stopped me. One day, when the door had been left slightly ajar, I peeked in and – if memory serves – made eye contact with an injured man, wrapped in bandages. I knew the answer to the soldier’s question, but I also knew that wasn’t what I should say. I shook my head. The soldiers left and went to another house. In the silence that followed, my grandparents embraced me and assured me we were safe. Then they both insisted we would never talk about what had happened. And we didn’t. I never learned who the man was, or what happened to him.

In the years since, I’ve tried to make sense of that moment. My grandparents are dead. My parents weren’t at home when it happened. There is no one left but me to carry the memory, which has grown heavier over the years. I have had to wade through the many events that separate it from everything that came afterwards. The revolution swept through my family. Some relatives were jailed, others were killed. The Derg didn’t allow funeral rites for those it called enemies. Silence and fear worked together to keep grief so contained that it was not until the summer of 2005, while driving with my mother in Addis Ababa, that I learned I had three uncles who died during the revolution. We were stuck in traffic behind a police truck. Several young men, a few of them with bruised and beaten faces, stared at us from the back of the open bed. ‘I have seen so many of these,’ my mother said. Then she told me about her brothers and the games they used to play. Later, when I asked her to tell me more about her favourite brother, she sang a childhood song, tears running down her face.

A few years ago, I went to see the African Union’s new headquarters in Addis Ababa, an impressive building with a grand auditorium, funded by China. It has a memorial to victims of human rights abuses, which acknowledges that the AU is built on the site of Akaki Prison, Ethiopia’s central jail, known as Alem Bekagn, or ‘Goodbye to the World’. The date of its construction is unclear, but it outlasted a succession of rulers: fascist, monarchical, dictatorial and authoritarian, until it was permanently closed in 2004 under Meles Zenawi. It gained notoriety in 1937 during the Italian occupation, when an assassination attempt on Marshal Rodolfo Graziani led to the retaliatory Yekatit 12 massacre. An estimated 30,000 people were killed during these brutal reprisals. Unknown numbers of innocent people were imprisoned, tortured and executed in Akaki or sent from there to concentration camps.

The details we have from that period come from personal recollections and family stories, but these accounts were largely set aside in 1941, when Haile Selassie reclaimed the throne and the occupation ended. He directed Ethiopians to look to the future, to forgive the Italian invaders and leave the past behind. There was no reckoning with the aftermath of the war. There was no attempt to address – and perhaps alleviate – the deep social and ethnic divisions that continued after the Italians had left and were exacerbated by each successive ruler. Haile Selassie used the prison to hold criminals and political opponents, as did the Derg. (Meles Zenawi used another notorious detention centre, Maekelawi.) The memorial’s website correctly calls it a ‘citadel of oppression’, but despite the decades of deaths and disappearances at Alem Bekagn there has been no attempt at reparative justice to honour those incarcerated there, only the relentless narrative of national progress and uncolonised independence.

Ethiopia has seen nothing comparable to the work that took place in Rwanda after the genocide or in South Africa under the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The perpetrators of the worst crimes of the Derg era have not been properly punished. The stories from this period have been suppressed – partly out of fear and trauma, but also as a consequence of a culturally accepted unwillingness to show weakness. The weight of historical trauma can feel overwhelming. After the Italian occupation and the Derg years, it was easier just to keep moving forward, as my family and so many other families have done. But then in 2018, Abiy Ahmed was named prime minister and with him came unprecedented optimism and the possibility of reconciliation through political reform. To understand the momentousness of that moment, and the disappointment that has followed in its wake, requires a confrontation with the past.

In the 1970s, early in the revolution, Meles Zenawi, then a medical student at Addis Ababa University, fled to Tigray to continue the struggle against the Derg. He joined the armed resistance that was solidifying around a political ideology grounded in ethno-nationalism – the nascent Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). The civil war lasted more than fifteen years; by the time the Derg was overthrown in 1991 the country was shattered – socially, economically, culturally. At least half a million people had been killed. Untold thousands had been imprisoned or had gone into exile, and millions more had lived in fear, suspicion and under constant threat of violence. A decade and a half of censorship and the total suppression of dissent had brought the press to a standstill and constrained all natural expressions of grief, anger and other emotions.

Meles, who led the transitional government set up in 1991, was prime minister from 1995 until his death in 2012. The TPLF dominated a four-party, multi-ethnic coalition, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). Under Meles, Ethiopians saw economic progress and greater freedoms. But those years were tainted by the uneven distribution of wealth, increasing ethnic strife, and government crackdowns on the media, political activists and civil society.

In the months before the 2005 elections, the EPRDF and the opposition Coalition for Unity and Democracy, among others, waged a vigorous and heated campaign across the country. There were televised debates, and the final week witnessed huge rallies. Some polling sites in Addis Ababa were forced to stay open for 24 hours to accommodate the vast queues. On the evening of 16 May, while results were still being counted, Meles declared a thirty-day ban on large gatherings and took direct control of police and militia forces. The EPRDF claimed it had won a majority; the opposition insisted it had won more seats than the official tally. Amid allegations of electoral fraud, young people in cities across Ethiopia defied the ban and demonstrated.

Protests swept the country. On 6 June, government forces arrested thousands of demonstrators, most of them students, in Addis Ababa alone. On 8 June, security forces opened fire on large groups of unarmed protesters, killing at least 22 and wounding more than a hundred. Crackdowns continued, and later that summer, when my mother and I were stuck in traffic behind that police truck full of young men who had clearly been beaten, we were certain we were staring at political prisoners. It wasn’t surprising that the events of 2005 should have taken us back to the Derg years, or that those young men should have reminded my mother of the brothers she had lost. By November, at least 200 people had been killed, 800 wounded and 30,000 arrested, including leaders of the opposition. Thousands fled Ethiopia, many paying traffickers to take them to Libya where they would try to find a way to cross the Mediterranean and enter Italy alive.

Meles’s successor in 2012, Hailemariam Desalegn, faced a vocal and unflinching movement that demanded greater representation and rejected the EPRDF’s development plan for Addis Ababa, which would have encroached on Oromo ancestral land and villages. The Oromo people, Ethiopia’s largest ethnic group, have also been one of its most marginalised and politically underrepresented. The protests, led by young Oromo people, were largely peaceful; they were met with excessive and lethal force. The government crackdown included more restrictions on media freedom. Through it all, the protesters refused to back down, their defiance gaining them worldwide attention. In early 2018, Hailemariam Desalegn resigned.

Abiy Ahmed, an Oromo, was elected by parliament to become the next prime minister. The 41-year-old former lieutenant colonel (and gifted orator) was heralded as a reformist. He released thousands of political prisoners, including journalists and opposition party members. He took steps to improve the relationship between government and opposition groups. He increased the number of women in the cabinet and acknowledged the widespread use of torture by previous administrations. Under his leadership, a truce was declared between Ethiopia and Eritrea. It was an unprecedented series of reforms, unfolded at blinding speed in a country that often moved at a creeping pace. As I watched from New York, where I live, the irony of Ethiopia’s opening up politically as America descended into Trumpism wasn’t lost on me.

In 2019, Abiy was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for ending the twenty-year conflict with Eritrea; within a year, he was in the middle of a new clash with the TPLF, a struggle between the former political power and its successor. After gaining office, Abiy dissolved the EPRDF coalition and merged its constituent groups to form a new Prosperity Party. The TPLF declined to join. The power of regions such as Tigray is enshrined in the Ethiopian constitution, written by the EPRDF in 1994, in order to protect ethnic groups in the event of authoritarian rule. Elections were due to be held in August 2020 but they were delayed last May, in the midst of the worsening pandemic (they are now scheduled for June 2021). The TPLF accused Abiy of governing illegitimately and in September went ahead with unconstitutional regional elections. Tensions grew. The Tigrayan regional government prevented a general appointed by Abiy from taking up his post. Some members of parliament proposed designating the TPLF a terrorist organisation, though so far this has been rejected by the government as a whole.

On 4 November, in response to a TPLF attack on government troops in the Tigray region, Abiy began a military operation against the TPFL. The date seemed familiar. I looked through some old notes and saw that on 4 November 1935, 120,000 Italian troops were advancing towards Mekelle, the Tigrayan capital. Tigray had also been the site of the Battle of Adwa in 1896, when Emperor Menelik II defeated Italy’s first attempt at colonisation. The city – and the region – were symbolic for Mussolini. He was determined that his country’s wounded pride should be satisfied there. The northern highlands of Ethiopia are rocky and mountainous, the population stubborn. Though Mussolini declared victory in 1936, the war wasn’t over. Ethiopian fighters took to the mountains, living in caves and carrying on a guerrilla war that eventually ousted the Italians in 1941.

It is likely that some of the residents of the northern highlands who experienced life under the Derg would have remembered, either from direct experience or family accounts, the bloodshed inflicted by the Italians forty years earlier. It is also likely that some of those who are experiencing today’s conflict carry with them memories from the Derg years. To understand what is happening now requires a long lens, but Ethiopia’s pride in its uninterrupted national durée, as evidenced by references in the Bible, the Iliad, Herodotus’ Histories and other ancient texts, can be an impediment to reckoning with that history. It is not enough simply to preface accounts of the current conflict with ancient historical descriptions.

As the fighting continued last November, refugee camps were filling up. Amnesty International reported a massacre of Amhara civilians in Maicadra by Tigrayan militia, which was followed by news of other civilian massacres, Tigrayan and Amhara. Eritrean soldiers were said to have joined the conflict. Scattered accounts of sexual violence against women and girls hinted at more systematic crimes. The government’s communications blackout made it nearly impossible to ascertain exactly what was happening. In the absence of verifiable details, journalists relied on eyewitness testimony from refugees that painted scenes of horrifying cruelty and humiliation. Some of those accounts were refuted on social media. The present seemed to be as confounding as the past. There could be no doubt, however, about the mass displacements and the terror of ordinary people caught in circumstances beyond their control.

Abiy has stressed repeatedly that this is a conflict, not a war, yet in many respects it has proceeded with all the destructive force of war. The federal government has declared victory in Tigray and some of the one million displaced residents of the region are returning home, though others still feel unsafe. Telephone and internet connections have been partially restored. Security has been tightened and international humanitarian convoys have begun to distribute aid. There is an attempt to return to normal, but in the aftermath of this conflict, other conflicts simmer, waiting to erupt. What exactly is normal?

Everything is at stake in discussions of Ethiopia’s political present; not only our future, but our past. What might justice look like? At such a volatile moment, it seems impossible – and naive – to plead for multilateral discussions, to imagine the potential benefits of negotiation. Yet it is difficult to conceive of another way forward that does not, sooner or later, include more bloodshed. Dialogue would be an unprecedented response to conflict in a nation that has built its identity on confrontation and conquest. It would require the audacity and the optimism of Abiy’s early rule. It would require hope and the willingness and courage to delve into the past. Otherwise, what do we do with all that history – all that rage, all these memories? A young soldier with a slender face. Bruised and beaten men in the back of a truck. The site of a prison, a plaque on a wall. A new conflict shrouded in silence. The question is not where to begin, but how.

UAE: The scramble for the Horn of Africa

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MEMO | The United Arab Emirates is waging a war for influence over the Horn of Africa.

Since the 2011 Arab Spring the United Arab Emirates has been taking an active role in a number of hotspots from Egypt, Libya to Yemen. The Gulf nation has spent $26 billion annually on its defence budget since 2016 and this is expected to increase to $37.8 billion by 2025, according to Research and Markets.

A growing security and war industry with military deployments abroad, US generals often refer to the Sheikhdom as ‘Little Sparta’. As of 2020, The UAE has military bases in Eritrea, Djibouti and Somaliland, which further indicates the importance of the Horn of Africa to Abu Dhabi. The region offers excellent access to the Red Sea, the Mediterranean and the Gulf of Aden, all of which are vital to the Emirates’ economic future as a global trading hub. The military bases ensure Abu Dhabi can see off threats to its interests and secure its influence over East Africa at a time when it is expanding its income streams away from the petrodollar.

The 2015 war in Yemen and the 2017 blockade of Qatar have seen Abu Dhabi take a more aggressive role in East Africa.

Countries in the Horn of Africa have by and large welcomed growing ties with the Arab World, but in 2017 following the breaking of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, Egypt with Qatar, countries across the world were pushed to take sides.

Somalia

Although the 2017 Gulf Crisis now looks like it is coming to an end, the countries in the Horn of Africa have already paid the price for it. Somalia found itself at the unwelcome end of the dispute.

Like other Horn of Africa countries, the Somali government adopted a neutral stance towards the Qatar dispute. The UAE, however, saw Mogadishu as silently in the pro-Qatar camp and Abu Dhabi was not pleased.

In 2017, as President Mohamed Abdul lahi Farmaajo assumed office, reports circulated that Qatar and Turkey had funded his campaign and further claims of officials appointed to prominent positions within Farmaajo’s administration having ties to Doha and Ankara unnerved Abu Dhabi.

The Somali government alleges the UAE is now actively destabilising the country, accusing it of funding opposition forces. These suspicions intensified after Dubai Ports World, DP World, bypassed the central government of Somalia and signed a deal with the semi-autonomous region of Somaliland to develop and operate Berbera port. DP World even brought in Ethiopian investment and gave Addis Ababa a stake in the port.

Mogadishu declared the deal illegal and tried to block it by taking out a complaint with the Arab League. Somaliland leader, Muse Bihi Abdi, said Farmaajo’s government was declaring war by attempting to block the deal. Under the deal, Somaliland stands to get investments of up to $442 million and a separate agreement with Abu Dhabi to allow the UAE’s military bases in the region could bring in a further $1 billion, according to the International Crisis Group.

Decades of civil war and the presence of extremist groups makes Somalia a very fragile country, fears UAE involvement could harm the country are a cause of constant concern for Mogadishu.

Sudan

In 1989, Omar Al-Bashir, a military commander, launched a coup and seized political power in Sudan. By 1993, he declared himself president and his political party, the National Congress, became the dominant political force. The National Congress is Muslim Brotherhood aligned and as such was generally treated with suspicion by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. However, in the 2010s, Al-Bashir’s regime began distancing itself from the brotherhood in order to improve its relations with the GCC countries.

Closer relations with Saudi Arabia and the UAE had a price. In 2015, Riyadh formed a coalition to intervene militarily in Yemen. In 2011, the Yemeni government led by Ali Abdullah Saleh faced mass street protests known as the ‘Arab Spring’, the pressure would force him to step down in 2012. The power vacuum led to large parts of the country being taken over by the Iranian-backed Houthi group. The Saudi-led coalition aimed to crush the Houthis and declared war on them. Sudan became an important member of the war coalition.

In 2018, a popular uprising took place against Omar Al-Bashir and in April 2019 the military forced him from power. The military then formed a new government with civil opposition groups with the aim of transforming Sudan into a fully-fledged democracy and the UAE moved to minimise the potential damage to its interests caused by the revolution.

However, the fall of Al-Bashir means the UAE’s position in Sudan is not guaranteed and some fear the Emirates could try to subvert Sudan’s democratic transition.

Ethiopia

Ethiopia seems to have benefitted hugely from its partnership with the UAE, as the East African country has emerged as a big investment opportunity.

In February 2020, the UAE agreed to invest $100 million to support micro, medium and small scale projects across the country. Additionally, the UAE has pledged to build an oil pipeline between Ethiopia and Eritrea, which will provide the landlocked nation much needed energy.

Indeed this energy deal is possible after the UAE engineered a peace treaty between Eritrea and Ethiopia in 2018. The peace agreement was held up as an example of the UAE’s prowess. Ethiopia managed to gain these benefits while avoiding the polarising effects of the Qatar blockade.

In November 2020, armed conflict broke out in Ethiopia’s Tigray region between government forces and a powerful regional rebel army. The rebels’ leader openly accused the United Arab Emirates of carrying out a drone strike on Tigray, from its base in Eritrea, at the behest of Addis Ababa. While evidence has yet to emerge of the strike, it does indicate there is some local anxiety about the role Abu Dhabi might be playing in this potentially explosive situation.

Ethiopia could cause issues for the UAE and Saudi Arabia, as another close ally of the Gulf States, Egypt, has expressed anger at Addis Ababa’s dam across the River Nile. The Renaissance Dam built by Ethiopia reduces Nile water levels in Egypt, harming its energy, economic and environmental needs. Negotiations to find a solution keep breaking down and regional tensions are high.

The Horn of Africa is the playground for rising UAE aspirations and is a microcosm of what the UAE aims to replicate across the African continent. Much of this is driven by the decline of US influence globally, new regional alliances and powerhouses are emerging to manage international security. However, the UAE does not exercise total control over East Africa and is still in the early stages of developing its reach and influence. The Horn is full of flashpoints and the UAE could either help stabilise or destabilise the region.

Ethiopia accused of using ethnic profiling to target Tigrayans

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Financial Times | Daughter of former PM says she was prevented from leaving country because of her heritage.

The daughter of a former Ethiopian prime minister has accused the government of preventing her from leaving the country because of her Tigrayan heritage, highlighting the ethnic divisions that continue to split the nation in the wake of brutal fighting between government and Tigray forces in the northern region.

Semhal Meles, the 32-year-old daughter of Meles Zenawi, who was Ethiopia’s prime minister for 17 years until his death in 2012, said she was prevented from boarding a US-bound flight from Addis Ababa on Tuesday despite having a valid passport, visa and ticket, in what she called a “curtailing” of her constitutional rights.

In an emailed statement to journalists, she said officials told her she did not have paperwork clearing her for travel, required by anyone who had been previously arrested. Ms Meles was briefly detained by security forces in December.

“To the best of my knowledge I haven’t been included in any wanted list, no arrest warrant has so far been issued against me nor have I appeared in court,” Ms Meles said. “I was illegally and unlawfully profiled.”

Ms Meles’s claims echo those of other Tigrayans, who say they have been prevented from travelling or dismissed from work since the government led by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed launched a military attack on Tigray in November last year. The government said the move was a “law enforcement operation” after the Tigray People’s Liberation Front — which effectively ran the country until 2018, when Mr Abiy took power — attacked federal troops.

Hundreds have died in the fighting and thousands of refugees have fled across the border to Sudan. There have been reports, mostly unverifiable because of a news blackout in Tigray, of atrocities by both sides. Forces loyal to the TPLF have been accused of a massacre of 600 civilians, mainly from rival region Amhara, while refugees have reported executions of civilians by pro-government Amhara militia.

Ms Meles accused Addis Ababa of “the weaponisation of rape and hunger, the targeting of dense urban populations for aerial bombardment, wanton destruction of public infrastructure and widespread looting”.

The government said on Thursday that her account was unreliable. “For three decades, the TPLF has laboured to satisfy an unbridled thirst for absolute power and self-enrichment, fanning flames of ethnic division and hatred,” an official said. “Average Ethiopians . . . have paid dearly for this.”

The government has accused the TPLF of being a “criminal clique”, sponsoring terrorism and fomenting ethnic violence. More than 100 party members have been placed on a wanted list, while senior TPLF officials such as Seyoum Mesfin, Ethiopia’s former foreign minister, have died in unclear circumstances during the conflict.

Mr Abiy’s government has denied targeting Tigrayans on the basis of ethnicity, saying its dispute is with the TPLF. In September last year, the TPLF went ahead with a regional poll that Addis Ababa said was illegal, after the government postponed national elections amid the Covid-19 pandemic.

Before the recent fighting, Mr Meles, who led a guerrilla war that toppled the previous Marxist Derg regime in 1991, was seen as a hero in Tigray. But his legacy remains divisive.

Under his leadership, Ethiopia was widely praised for rapid growth, but the TPLF also oversaw a repressive police state.

The former premier is seen as the father of so-called ethno-nationalism, under which power was devolved to nine ethnically defined regions, an arrangement enshrined in the 1995 constitution. An item of faith for some Ethiopians, the constitution is seen by others as sowing violent divisions.

Ethnic violence, including the burning of churches and mosques, has swelled in Ethiopia since 2016, leading to the internal displacement of 3m people. Mr Abiy has put forward a philosophy of “strength through diversity”, intending to bind Ethiopia under one national identity. But his opponents say this hides an effort to water down regional autonomy and centralise power.

Describing her arrest last year, Ms Meles said 20 federal police officers armed with machine guns arrived at the house in Mekelle, the Tigrayan capital, where she was staying. She was taken to a “makeshift prison” for 48 hours, she said, adding that she was denied access to a lawyer and never told the reason for her detention.

One officer threatened to “sever” her head, Ms Meles said, and along with the son of a former TPLF general who had also been arrested, “we were put on display for members of the federal police and army in an attempt to celebrate the capture of the junta’s children”.

“My dual crime, it seems, is being born into a political family with a Tigrayan identity,” she added.

Ms Meles said the Tigray people viewed November’s operation as an attack on their right to self-determination. “Every Tigrayan family paid a price to enshrine these rights within our constitution,” she said. “And no one here is prepared to betray the sacrifices made by their forefathers.”

Biden Administration Faces Mounting Pressure to Act in Ethiopian Conflict

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The Washington Free Bacon | Millions in peril of starvation in Ethiopia’s Tigray region

Hundreds of protesters gathered outside the State Department Thursday to demand the Biden administration take immediate action in Ethiopia to combat a humanitarian crisis that has left thousands dead.

The protesters called on newly confirmed secretary of state Antony Blinken to prioritize the deteriorating situation in Ethiopia where troops from the federal government—as well as troops from neighboring Eritrea and Somalia—have cracked down on the Tigray region. Protesters said immediate aid is necessary to prevent millions of Tigray residents from starving to death, presenting the days-old Biden administration with its first international crisis. Attendee Makea Araya said the crisis has placed millions in danger and displaced millions more.

“We need international actors, we need the Biden administration to take action and allow humanitarian access into the region,” Araya said.

The conflict puts millions of lives at stake and threatens the religious and cultural heritage of the world’s largest religions. Tensions between Tigray, a region in northern Ethiopia, and the federal government came to a head when Tigray’s leading political party refused to join the Ethiopian government’s new coalition in 2019. In early November, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed sent troops into the region, sparking violent clashes with the region’s militia force. While the crisis has been raging for months, limited information has emerged about its true scale since communications have been cut off in the region and foreign media and human-rights watchdogs have not been able to access the region. Reports of the massacre of religious worshipers in a famous Oriental Orthodox church and violence across the region are mounting, however.

Selome Girma, a protester, told the Washington Free Beacon that 4.5 million people are in dire need of humanitarian aid and are being cut off from the outside world. Tigray has been plagued by several communications blackouts during the months-long conflict, which the government has blamed on cyberattacks. Girma said the United States should lead the way to break the embargo and allow outside observers into Tigray.

“We are asking the United States to please humbly try to get some sort of international investigation of what’s going on in Tigray,” Girma said.

She said religious and cultural history is also in danger of being destroyed in the conflict. The region is home to several major Christian and Islamic historic sites, including the site of the massacre in the Oriental Orthodox church, which is reputed to be the location of the Ark of the Covenant.

The State Department, which did not return a request for comment, has remained vague on how it will approach the crisis. The department has released a statement calling for foreign troops allied with Ethiopia to leave the region immediately. The administration, however, has yet to lay out a strategy in the event that foreign troops remain in the region. The statement also called for “full, safe and unhindered humanitarian access” to the region, but the administration did not elaborate on how it would ensure this access.

Blinken also tweeted about the conflict in November and briefly mentioned the issue during his confirmation hearing, saying that the United States needed to do more in Africa. He called for more humanitarian access and said he was concerned that the violence could destabilize the region.

Ferez Timay, a longtime Washington, D.C., resident who was born in Tigray, said the Biden administration must do more than issue public declarations.

“We want the Biden administration to act soon because as the hours go, the minutes go, it’s the difference between life and death for the people of Tigray,” Timay said. “We want the Biden administration to act right away.”

The White House did not return a request for comment.

France – Official statement on the situation in Ethiopia

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Situation in Tigray

(29 January 2021)

France is extremely concerned by the gravity of the humanitarian and food crisis in Tigray and reiterates its call to the Ethiopian government to facilitate access to the region – including the Hitsats and Shimelba refugee camps – by the UN and humanitarian organizations.

Repeated and consistent allegations of serious human rights violations in the Tigray region cannot be ignored. France urges the Ethiopian authorities to facilitate independent investigations and to take the legal actions they had announced.

France applauds the strong commitment on the part of the United Nations as reflected by current missions in Ethiopia led by David Beasley, Executive Director of the World Food Programme, and Filippo Grandi, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. It hopes these missions will help accelerate the delivery of humanitarian aid to the people of Tigray and the many displaced persons and refugees there. It welcomes EU efforts in Ethiopia and the mission led by Finnish Minister for Foreign Affairs Pekka Haavisto.

France is also concerned by tensions on the border between Ethiopia and Sudan and calls on the two neighboring countries to avoid any military escalation and resolve this dispute through dialogue.

Attack On Civilians In The Benishangul-Gumuz Region

(23 December 2020)

France condemns in the strongest possible terms the attack in the Benishangul-Gumuz region in western Ethiopia that took the lives of more than a hundred civilians, according to the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission.

The perpetrators of these crimes must be prosecuted and brought to justice.

France expresses its solidarity and offers its sincere condolences to the victims’ families. It calls for a return to peaceful coexistence and the rule of law, the only way to break the cycle of violence in Ethiopia.

Meeting between Mr Jean-Yves Le Drian and Mr Demeke Mekonnen, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia

(26 November 2020)

Mr Jean-Yves Le Drian, Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs, had a meeting today with Mr Demeke Mekonnen, Ethiopia’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The Minister took the opportunity presented by the meeting to express our deep concern about the escalation of violence in the Tigray region and the worsening humanitarian situation in Ethiopia and Sudan.

The Minister reiterated our condemnation of the ethnically-motivated violence and our call for measures to be put in place as swiftly as possible to protect civilians.

He supported the United Nations’ calls for humanitarian access to be allowed to the areas affected by the conflict, and expressed France’s support for the African Union chair’s initiative to find a political solution to the crisis.

Situation in the Tigray region

(23 November 2020)

France is concerned by the deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Ethiopia, the Tigray region and Sudan.

It condemns the ethnic violence and calls for the swift institution of measures to protect civilian populations.

France supports the UN’s requests for humanitarian access.

France backs the approach taken by the UN Secretary-General and the initiatives taken by South Africa as Chair of the African Union to resolve the conflict.

Situation Report EEPA HORN No. 72 – 31 January 2021

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Europe External Programme with Africa is a Belgium-based Centre of Expertise with in-depth knowledge, publications, and networks, specialised in issues of peace building, refugee protection and resilience in the Horn of Africa. EEPA has published extensively on issues related to movement and/or human trafficking of refugees in the Horn of Africa and on the Central Mediterranean Route. It cooperates with a wide network of Universities, research organisations, civil society and experts from Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Djibouti, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Uganda and across Africa. Key in-depth publications can be accessed on the website.

Reported war situation (as confirmed per 30 January)

● Fresh reports from the battlefields in Tigray state that second campaign has started with fighting reported in Daero Hafash, Semema, Mahbere Dego, Feresemay, Nebelet, Hawzen, and Edaga Arbi.

● Reported “that Eritrean presence in the second campaign is very high.” The report reads: “The Eritrean troops are present at all the fronts. They use the following tricks: using the Ethiopian flag; changing uniforms to ENDF; sometimes hiding troops in some areas, etc.”

● Except for Hawzen in Eastern zone, fighting is concentrated in the Central Zone of Tigray.

● Report that Eritrea brought 13 trucks of troops via Edagahamus (Eastern Tigray zone) towards Hawzen and Nebelet areas.

● Sources indicated that Eritrean forces and Ethiopian National Defence Forces mobilized 163 military transport cars (‘orals’) of soldiers via Maytsebri to Endabaguna and then into Central Tigray. ● Video from Shire showing 8 big trucks passing by, loaded with Eritrean troops, posted on 29 January.

● Reported that 20 young people were killed by the allied forces in areas between Adidaero and Adi Kokeb in the North Western part of Tigray.

● A list of names of civilian people killed in Irob dated 28/01, put together by the Irob Advocacy Association, shows 52 names; 50 men and 2 women. The list is “not exhaustive”. According to the association all 52 civilians were “killed in their homes and backyards, during the late December 2020 to early January 2021” campaign. The association states that they “did not take part in combat mission.” The civilians were “peasant farmers” and included teenagers.

● The 52 civilians killed in Irob all fall under the administration of Irobland, from the villages of Gammaa Daa/Alitena, Maagauma, Awo, Aggarale, Waratle, Kafna, Addaga-Abbe, Addaga-Dululuho, Addaga-Sassaleri, Massata-Kimbiro, Assagarwa-Ado Dagga, Garabino, Assagarwa and Maytsiaa. The association is located in Kebeke 3, Adigrat, Tigray.

● Report that Eritrean refugees from Hitsats were forcibly sent back to Eritrea by Eritrean forces and these have “settled around Badme area.” The report states that the refugees have been “without enough acces of food, water and shelter” for “more than 45 days.” Among the refugees are young people, mothers and children, the report states.

● A source reports that the price of 100 kg teff is now 8000 Ethiopian Birr, equivalent to €167.00.

● In an interview with Alex de Waal, Mulugeta Gebrehiwot, advisor to the TPLF and Senior Fellow of the World Peace Foundation, states that Seyoum Mesfin, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, Asmelash Woldeselassie, former Ethiopian parliament chief whip and Abay Tsehaye, Ethiopia’s former minister of Federal Affairs were killed: “They were staying in a village, and they didn’t have an army. They were just in a secluded area. They (..) killed them. It was the EPLF that killed them.” The EPLF is a reference to the Eritrean troops of Eritrean President Esayas.

● A source reports on the sadness of losing Seyoum Mesfin killed in this way: “I am not a member of any political party. We know Seyoum and it is not just about power. I sat with him, shared his life experience.” He adds: “He is our symbol of freedom and perseverance. He is a true leader and hero for many. He has sacrificed his whole lifetime for his people. People are in shock. His death is so painful for all of us.”

● In the interview, Mulugeta Gebrehiwot expresses himself clearly on the expectation that the Eritrean forces will remain in Tigray.

● Mulugeta Gebrehiwot states: “They had a meeting last week, it is some information we got from them, among the senior commanders of the army. There was a request from some of the army commanders on how long they are going to stay in Tigray. The response they gave them was, ‘Once we leave Tigray, PP [Prosperity Party] will not stay for one week in Tigray, and therefore we will leave Tigray to Weyane [TPLF] again and it will revive. And therefore, we have to remain there up until PP can pick it up which might take several months to come back.’ That is the answer that they gave them.”

● TMH reports that according to sources from Adigrat, Eritrean troops dismantled a radar which was installed in Adigrat following the Ethio-Eritrean war (1998-2000) and is transported to Eritrea.

● It is reported that soldiers kill those who saw a crime – including rape, or tried to help; this was news that came with people who travelled from Adwa and Aksum to Mekelle.

● A source reports a meeting with a doctor from Aksum who stated that on the day of the Aksum massacre he himself listed 300 bodies. The reflection is that even more than 750 people might have been killed. The community had understood that the Eritrean soldiers were intending to remove the Ark of the Covenant and the community came to protect it, including women and young people. The source states: “This was a massacre.”

● Report that soldiers take revenge on civilians. In some places the soldiers intimidate the people: “For every battle lost they kill five civilans.” In Mekelle there have been many fights. Everytime during the battles in Mekelle and nearby districts they lost, they had been intimidating the doctors and civilian patients. The soldiers intimidate by announcing that they will kill more people in revenge.”

● Reported from a source in Mekelle that young women working in the eating places, cafeterias, restaurants and bars are vulnerable to abuse, due to the curfew at 18:00 a.m., leaving the places open only for the soldiers. The girls have no one to protect them.

Reported International situation (as confirmed per 30 January)

● Qatar demands an investigation regarding the Somali men who had been offered jobs as security men in Qatar but were tricked and sent for training to Eritrea, from where they were sent to fight alongside Eritrean troops in the war in Tigray, Ethiopia.

● France says in a statement that it is “extremely concerned by the gravity of the humanitarian and food crisis in Tigray and reiterates its call to the Ethiopian government to facilitate access to the region – including the Hitsats and Shimelba refugee camps – by the UN and humanitarian organizations.”

● The statement from France reads that “Repeated and consistent allegations of serious human rights violations in the Tigray region cannot be ignored. France urges the Ethiopian authorities to facilitate independent investigations and to take the legal actions they had announced.”

● The French statement applauds the UN action and welcomes the EU efforts.

● Medecins sans Frontières reports that “around 80 or 90 percent of the health centers that we visited between Mekele and Axum were not functional”. The centers had no staff and had suffered robberies.

Disclaimer:
All information in this situation report is presented as a fluid update report, as to the best knowledge and understanding of the authors at the moment of publication. EEPA does not claim that the information is correct but verifies to the best of ability within the circumstances. Publication is weighed on the basis of interest to understand potential impacts of events (or perceptions of these) on the situation. Check all information against updates and other media. EEPA does not take responsibility for the use of the information or impact thereof. All information reported originates from third parties and the content of all reported and linked information remains the sole responsibility of these third parties. Report to info@eepa.be any additional information and corrections.

Links of interest

The People of Irob Mourns The Massacre Of Their Loved Ones – Irob Advocacy Group

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“It is with great sorrow & grief that we share here the incomplete list of Irob civilians killed by Eritrean soldiers during the mass killing campaign in about just 2 weeks of late December 2020 to early January 2021,” the Irob Advocacy Association said in a Tweet on Saturday.

“These civilians [see list of victims here & here] did not take part in combat mission. They were simply civilian farmers – primarily young male adults & teenagers,” the Association said, adding “We cry for justice!”

On January 24, 2001, the Belgian based Europe External Programme with Africa (EEPA) reported that Eritrean soldiers, controlling many districts in Irob land, killed many Tigrayan young men: “We hear Eritrean soldiers told the local elders and parents that, they have orders to kill all male youth older than 15.”

Eritrean soldiers were also seen distributing Eritrean I.D. cards to citizens in Irob, Tigray. Many people had to fled to the mountains and hide in caves, according to EEPA.

The Irob people are an ethnic minority group who are situated in the traditional Agamä Awrajja, Tigray Region, bordered with Afar region of Ethiopia to the East and  Saho of Eritrea to the North. They speak the Saho language, the same language spoken by the Saho people of Eritrea.

The Saho people of Eritrea are indigenous people in Eritrea marginalized by the Eritrean Geovernment who refuses to admit the existence of any indigenous people.

The Irob people were most affected by the outbreak of Ethiopian-Eritrean war of 1998-2000. Next to Badime, Irob became the prime target of Eritrean invasion and the consequent destructive high-tech warfare.

Since Eritrea joined the military offensive against the Tigray regional government launched by the unelected Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Abiy Ahmed, Eritrean forces have been accused of summary execution, rape, looting and burning private and public properties, including refugee camps.

U.S. State Department officials told The Associated Press that they have directly “pressed senior levels” of Eritrea’s government to immediately withdraw from the embattled region. There were no details on how officials in Eritrea, one of the world’s most secretive countries, responded to the Biden administration demand.

The Ethiopia Government, however, has privately told Biden administration that the embattled Tigray region has “returned to normalcy” to which witnesses strongly disagree.

Egypt: Countries must reach binding deal on Nile dam

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MEMO | Amid regional tension over the project, countries along the Nile must reach a legally binding agreement on the filling and operations of the Grand Ethiopia Renaissance Dam (GERD), or Hidase Dam, according to Egypt’s president, Anadolu Agency reports.

Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi made the remarks late Saturday during an official visit to South Sudan’s capital Juba to meet with his South Sudanese counterpart Salva Kiir, according to Egyptian media.

During their meeting, the leaders discussed the issue of strengthening cooperation between the two countries in the field of water resources and irrigation.

They also discussed joint efforts to maximise the utilisation of Nile River resources.

Underlining that that the Nile is the lifeblood of the peoples in the region, Sisi said the river must be a source of cooperation and development for regional countries.

Ethiopia began construction of the over $5 billion hydroelectric dam project in 2011, triggering a drawn-out diplomatic battle with Egypt, which had enjoyed thousands of years of hegemony on the Nile.

Though Ethiopia contributes 85% of the Nile’s waters, a 1959 agreement between Sudan and Egypt gave 55.5 billion cubic meters (bcm) to Egypt and 18.5 bcm annually to Sudan and nothing to Ethiopia.

Foreign meddling as a source of state fragility in Ethiopia

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MEMO Opinion | State fragility is a multidimensional concept that is often characterized by deficiencies in one or more areas of the core functions of the state: legitimacy, authority (competing claimants to power), and capacity (weak capacity to provide basic government functions). State fragility poses a serious problem for many developing countries as it leads to human flight and economic decline. Since 2015, for example, only five countries (Afghanistan, Somalia, S. Sudan, and Syria) have generated over 60 per cent of the 15 million refugees.

In many cases, state fragility is not just due to domestic political tensions, but a result of foreign intrusion into the affairs of countries. External intervention includes, but is not limited to, external support for factions opposed to the government, covert operations by foreign forces to destabilize the government, as well as foreign governments’ influence on outside actors such as multilateral agencies to suspend budget support, foreign aid, and other funding.

Negotiations have been underway between Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan to reach a fair and balanced agreement that preserves the water rights of all three countries. This includes agreement on mechanisms for resolving disputes and ways to coordinate and exchange information regarding the operation of water dams in each country. The parties need to depoliticize their argument and use reliable science-based solutions that do not disadvantage the interests of any party.

While these negotiations are underway, Egypt has resorted to clandestine measures to achieve its narrow objectives. One is to destabilize the Ethiopian regime, for example, by providing financial and military support to political opponents, arming and training militants from Benishangul-Gumuz (the area where the dam is located) to carry out incidences of mass violence to create overall instability in the region. There is also increasing evidence that Egypt has also encouraged the Sudanese government’s takeover of several Ethiopian towns on the border (they made a statement that they support Sudan in its border conflict with Ethiopia). This is all because Ethiopia decided to exercise its legal right to build a dam within its domestic borders. This right is consistent with domestic and international law. Even though 85 per cent of Nile river water originates in Ethiopia, nearly all consumption and use occur downstream in Egypt and Sudan.

In many cases, Egypt has been breaking off the negotiations creating abnormal delays, disregarding the agreed procedures, and refusing to consider adverse proposals or interests. These are actions that amount to breaches of good faith and most likely abuse of the rights of states.

International law obliges states to negotiate disputes in good faith that arise in connection with the use and protection of shared natural resources. The essential nature of the obligation is for the parties to make efforts to strive towards an agreement that reconciles their competing rights of use. Good faith negotiations also include not advancing wholly self-serving legal arguments that undermine the rights of other parties, and not resorting to extra-legal measures to advance your goals.

In negotiations, it is essential to realize that successful negotiation is a joint effort. The use of direct or indirect pressure on other parties will harden positions and derail any efforts to reach an agreement.

Egyptian meddling in Ethiopia’s internal affairs to achieve its narrow goals on the dam is likely to have serious ramifications beyond the existing dispute at hand. Firstly, beyond its potential benefit, the dam issue is personal for most Ethiopians. Millions of citizens contributed out of their meager earnings to build the dam. Any effort by other nations that undermines the completion and use of the dam would be treated as an act of war by most people.

Secondly, Egypt and Ethiopia are important countries in the region with centuries of history and civilization. Their actions set a precedent in the region. It sends the message that if you don’t get your way through negotiation, you can bully your negotiating partner into submission.

Thirdly, such meddling will not achieve its objectives. Given Ethiopia’s anti-colonial past and resistance to foreign aggression, it is likely to harden the country’s position on the dam. This may be the most accommodating Ethiopian government that is willing to resolve disputes through negotiation. Future governments are likely to take the hardline position and resist any future negotiations that compromise their autonomy on the dam.

Fourthly, in spite of their long history and civilization, both countries face severe development challenges: high levels of poverty, income inequality, poor governance, and political instability. They are far behind in extending to their citizens the opportunities to fulfil their aspirations for a better life. The Fund for Peace, which prepares the State Fragility Index for 178 countries, ranks Egypt as the 35th most fragile state behind Angola and Mauritania (Ethiopia is ranked 21st) for 2020. The evaluation is based on social cohesion, economic indicators (economic decline, income inequality, human flight, and brain drain), political indicators (human rights, rule of law, state legitimacy, and public services), and social factors such as demographic pressures, refugees and internally-displaced people and external intervention. Such foreign meddling is not without cost for Egypt, which desperately needs these resources to build schools, infrastructure, and healthcare for its people.

Political observers of the Middle East suggest that such foreign meddling is intended to divert attention away from the critical issues facing the country such as poor governance, democracy, and human rights, and help it to gain some political legitimacy by appearing as a defender of the national interest.

Finally, such actions poison the well of Egypt-Ethiopia relations and create a sense of hostility between the two peoples who have lived peacefully for generations. Most people think that these actions do not reflect the will of the Egyptian people and are solely an act of a rogue regime that is out of touch.

It is time to stop foreign meddling and get back to work to bring about a mutually satisfactory solution by way of compromise, even if it means the relinquishment of strongly held positions and a willingness to meet the other side partway. Any attempt to destabilize your negotiating partner to achieve your goals, or insist upon the complete capitulation of your partner, is bad policy and will not work.