Begge sider hevder de vinner fram i borgerkrigen i Etiopia

NTB-AFP-AP | Stadig flere flykter fra kampene i Tigray-regionen i Etiopia og det er frykt for en sultkatastrofe. Samtidig hevder begge sider at de har vunnet store seire.

Etiopias føderale myndigheter gikk 4. november i gang med en militæroperasjon for å slå ned et opprør ledet av partiet TPLF, som regjerer i Tigray.

– Vi påfører styrkene som angriper oss store tap på alle fronter. Jeg oppfordrer det tigrayiske folk til å drive ut invasjonsstyrkene, sier Tigrays leder Debretsion Gebremichael i en uttalelse.

– TPLFs plan om å dra Etiopia ut i borgerkrig og rive landet i stykker har mislyktes. De er desperate ettersom de er omringet, svarer Etiopias hærsjef Berhanu Jula.

Etiopias statsminister Abiy Ahmed går enda lenger, og hevder det kun er noen dager til konflikten er over. Regjeringen hevder at de rykker fram mot regionshovedstaden Mekele, og er om lag 125 kilometer unna. Nå beveger imidlertid kampene seg fra lavlandet til mer fjellrike områder.

Titusenvis på flukt

Les mer her.

Russia Opening Major Military Base in Sudan

Source: Military Watch Magazine

The announcement of plans for the establishment of a Russian naval base on Sudan’s east coast, which has reportedly been under consideration since 2017 but is thought to have been delayed by a Western backed coup in the African country in April 2019, has given are grounds for speculation that Russia could be planning to reestablish a stronger naval presence overseas by opening further facilities in other vital theatres. Late in 2017 the Head of the Russian Defense and Security Committee Viktor Bondarev suggested that Moscow could consider restoring its military presences in Cuba and Vietnam, referring to these countries as Russia’s “historical partners” on the basis that both hosted Soviet military facilities during the Cold War and relied heavily on Soviet support to counter Western threats. Bondarev stated that restoring the country’s military presence was in the “interests of international security,” as a result of “intensified U.S. aggression.”

Russia’s only foreign military facilities outside the former Soviet Union are in Syria, where the country maintains both a key naval base on the Mediterranean Sea in Latakia province, and the nearby Khmemim Airbase which was established in September 2015 to facilitate a contribution to the Syrian government’s war effort. Facilities in Sudan are expected o be ambitious in size, according to the recently released plans, and will have a capacity for 300 military and civilian personnel and four ships including nuclear vessels, indicating that Moscow is willing to invest in such projects to enhance its maritime power projection capabilities and boost its overseas presence. Facilities in Vietnam and Cuba however would allow Russia to project power to strategically critical regions, the former being the most hotly contested and arguably the most strategically critical in the world today, and the latter placing Russian assets near the American coast – and in a strong position to support nearby Venezuela and Bolivia which are important strategic partners. With Russia gently rebalancing its military towards a greater focus on East Asia, Vietnam is a potentially ideal host for historical, political and geographic reasons. Neither China nor North Korea are expected to allow any permanent foreign military presence on their soil, and facilities on Russian territory are effectively boxed in by the Japanese islands, where there is a heavy U.S. presence, which impede open access to the Pacific.

Regarding to the potential for future foreign military facilities, Victor Bondarev stated: “I believe under the condition of increased tension in the world and frank intervention in the internal affairs of other countries – Russia’s historical partners – our return to Latin America is not ruled out. Of course, this should be coordinated with the Cubans… We should also think about our Navy’s return to Vietnam with the permission of the [Vietnamese] government.” He stressed that such steps would be effective responses to increased U.S. assertiveness in both regions. Bondarev has been far from alone in calls for such action, with his statement coming just hours after the first deputy chairman of the Russian parliament’s upper chamber’s Defense and Security Committee, Frants Klintsevich, called for a reopening of military facilities in Cuba specifically. Given the generally low endurance of post-Soviet Russian surface warships, which are no heaver than frigates, the existence of overseas bases is particularly highly valued. Russia’s most heavily armed Soviet era warships, the Kirov Class nuclear powered battlecruisers, are currently undergoing a comprehensive and very ambitious refurbishment which will allow them to deploy considerable force for port visits across much of the world as required – with these having a higher endurance than any surface combatant fielded by any other country.

In 2016 Russian lawmakers Valery Rushkin and Sergei Obukhov submitted a letter to Russian President Vladimir Putin, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu calling on them to consider the restoration of overseas military bases. This development came two years after the Crimean crisis and the sharp deterioration of relations with the West, and following the establishment of Khmeimim Airbase and beginning of a successful military campaign in Syria in 2015. Amid growing tensions with the Western Bloc, and in light of Russia’s expanding roles in both the Pacific and South America, such plans may well come to fruition – in particular if the upcoming U.S. administration recommits the United States to the Pivot to Asia initiative. A Russian military presence would shift the balance of power in both regions significantly against the favour of Western interests, and whether the facilities are naval or air bases they are likely to deploy a number asymmetric military assets such as hypersonic missiless to compensate for a smaller presence. In Vietnam in particular, it would also provide opportunities for more joint military exercises and potentially increase the appeal of more Russian arms purchases for the Vietnamese military – which is considered a leading client for several next generation weapons systems.

 

FN: Over 27.000 drevet på flukt fra konflikt i Etiopia

Abc Nyheter | FN advarer om en fullskala humanitær krise i Etiopia, der det raser en konflikt i Tigray-regionen.

Den etiopiske regjeringen har satt i gang en militæroffensiv mot Tigray-folkets frigjøringsfront (TPLF).

Nå advarer FNs høykommissær for flyktninger (UNHCR) om situasjonen for de sivile.

– En fullskala humanitær krise er i ferd med å utfolde seg, sa Babar Baloch, talsperson for FN-organisasjonen, på en pressekonferanse tirsdag.

Han sier 4.000 mennesker daglig flykter over grensen til nabolandet Sudan.

(©NTB)

Russia Planning Major Naval Base in Sudan

Source: Military Watch Magazine

New Facility to Service Nuclear Assets

The Russian Defence Ministry is planning to build a naval base on Sudan’s east coast, which would provide the Navy with its second overseas facility after the one on Syria’s  Tartus following the closure of bases in Cuba and Vietnam. The facility was referred to as a “logistical support centre” where “repairs and resupply operations and rest for crew members” can take place, with a draft agreement already having been signed. The facility would have a capacity for 300 military and civilian personnel and four ships, and would be able to accommodate nuclear vessels, making it significantly larger than the Syrian facility at least before its wartime expansion after 2016. It remains uncertain what kind of warships the facility is deigned to accommodate, and whether heavier warships such as battlecruisers will also be accommodated. The base will be located on the northern outskirts of Port Sudan, and Russia will also gain the right to transport “weapons, ammunition and equipment” for the base through Sudanese ports and airports.

Russian Navy Slava Class Missile Cruiser | Military Watch Magazine

 

Sudan’s military establishment has maintained close defence ties with Russia, despite a Western-backed coup in the country in April 2019 ousting the longtime President Omar Al Bashir who was closely aligned with Moscow. Under Al Bashir’s rule Sudan and Russia were discussing the possibility of a naval base from at least late 2017, alongside the potential sale of advanced Su-30SM and Su-35 fighters to the Sudanese Air Force. Al Bashir had personally appealed to Russian President Vladimir Putin in a visit to Moscow in 2017 to help support Sudan against ongoing Western efforts to partition the country through subversion. Sudan has faced serious political and economic crises since the coup, with the country’s political future highly uncertain. The draft agreement for the naval facility stipulates that its establishment “meets the goals of maintaining peace and stability in the region, is defensive and is not aimed against other countries,” with Sudanese forces maintaining the right to use the mooring area. The deal will stand for 25 years after its signing, and could represent a game changer for the balance of power in the Red Sea as Russia establishes a sizeable military presence in the area. Such a development could also give more clout to Sudan’s military establishment, which is thought to be seeking to contain the empowerment of pro-Western elements in the country

Egypt Deploys its Most Advanced Fighters to Sudan For Joint Exercises Amid Political Uncertainty

Source: Military Watch Magazine

The Egyptian Air Force has deployed a contingent of its most capable fighter aircraft, the MiG-29M, to neighbouring Sudan for the Protectors of the Nile 2020 military exercises. This follows a Western-backed coup in Khartoum in 2019 which saw the administration of longstanding Western adversary Omar Al Bashir toppled, with Sudan’s political future still uncertain as nationalist, pro-Western, Islamist and other factions continue to vie for influence. The MiG-29M deployments has been met with a number of different interpretations, including a sign of support for the Sudanese Military amid growing instability internally. The Sudanese Air Force itself operates the MiG-29 as its primary frontline fighter, albeit the older but still relatively modern MiG-29SE variant, which until 2015 had a significant qualitative edge over anything in the Egyptian fleet due largely to its use of active radar guided R-77 missiles. Egypt itself was able to acquire the R-77 from 2015 alongside its MiG-29M jets – providing the most advanced air to air missile in both fleets and Egypt’s only active radar guided missile with a range exceeding 100km.

Sudanese Air Force MiG-29 Fighters Escort Su-24M Strike Fighter | Military Watch Magazine

 

Interoperability between Egyptian and Sudanese air units is expected to be high, and could improve considerably as the two carry out more joint exercises. With Cairo aligning itself closely with Russian since the overthrow of its Western backed Islamist government in 2013, and opposing Western designs in both Syria and Libya, greater Egyptian involvement in Sudan has the potential to tip the balance against of Western interests in the country, reversing many of the gains made since the coup against the Bashir government. While relations between the two East African states have historically been far from positive, with territorial disputes surrounding the Egyptian-held Hala’ib triangle area ongoing, the emergence of common perceived threats to both countries could well lead to the forging of a robust partnership.

Minst 34 drept på passasjerbuss

Dagbladet | Minst 34 personer skal være drept i væpnet angrep på passasjerbuss vest i Etiopia, melder nyhetsbyrået AFP.

En menneskerettighetsgruppe varsler at dødstallene ventes å stige.

Angrepet skjedde lørdag kveld i Benishangul-Gumuz-regionen, der det har vært flere angrep på sivile i det siste.

Det er foreløpig ingenting som tyder på at angrepet er knyttet til den borgerkrigslignende situasjonen i Tigray-regionen nord i landet.

(NTB / Dagbladet)

ሶስቱ የጥፋት ፈረሶችና የኢትዮጵያ ፍጻሜ!

ከዚህ ጦርነት ብኋላ፣ መደምደሚያው ምንም ይሁን፣ ኢትዮጵያ እንደ አገር የመቀጠል እድሏ ዜሮ ሆኗል። አክትሞላታል። ህወሓት ጦርነቱን ቢያሽንፍ እንኳን ተመልሶ አገር በማስተዳደር ረገድ ከእንግዲህ ድርሻ ይኖረዋል ብሎ ማሰብ የዋህነት ነው። ህዝቡም ህወሓትም ያንን እድል/ሁኔታ ዳግም የሚፈልጉት አይመስለኝም። ባንዳዎቹና ግልገሎቹ ከቀናቸውም ኢትዮጵያን ማስቀጠል አይችሉም። ዝርዝሩን አቀርባለሁ።

የኦሮሚያ ብልጽግና፣ የአማራ ብልጽግናና የሻዕቢያ አላቻ ጋብቻ በልጅነቴ እየሰማሁት ያደግሁት የዘንዶ ታሪክ ያስታውሰኛል። እነዚህ ሶስቱ ሀይሎች በተናጠል ከህወሓት አንጻር ሲታዩ ቁጫጭ ናቸው። በጋራ ካልሆነ በተናጠል ህወሓትን መሞከር ቀርቶ ማሰብ የማይታሰብ ነው። ጋብቻቸው ስትራቴጂካል ነው፤ በቅድሚያ በጋራ ተረባርበው ይጥሉታል፣ አንደኛው ለስልጣኑ፣ ሁለተኛው ለመሬቱ ሶስተኛው ለበቀል። ሶስቱም ግን ሌላ የሚያመሳስላቸው አንድ ወሳኝ ባህሪ አለ። ሶስቱም ኤክስፓንሺንስት/ተስፋፊ ና ኦፖርቹኒስቲክ ናቸው። በለስ ቀንቷቸው ህወሓትን ካስወገዱ ወይም ያስወገዱ ከመሰላቸው፣ በማግስቱ ሌላ የመስፋፋትና እርስ በእርስ የመዋዋጥ ጌም ይጀምራሉ፥

1 የኦሮሚያው ብልጽግና ሁለቱን የሚፈልጋቸው ለሚቀጥሉት አስርት አመታት ስልጣን ላይ ለመቆየት መጠቀሚያ ለማድረግ ነው። ካልጠቀለላቸው ይህን ማሳካት አልችልም ብሎ ነው የሚያስበው። ከእርሱ ፈቃድ ውጪ መግባትና መውጣት የማይችሉ፣ ወዶና ፈቅዶ ብቻ ስልጣን የሚሸነሽናቸው አሻንጉሊቶች መሆን የግድ አለባቸው። አለበለዚያ የቀድሞ ጓዶቻቸውን ጉድጓድ ይጋራሉ። በሀሳብ ደረጃ፣ ሶማሊያን፣ ጅቡቲ፣ ኤርትራን፣ ሱዳንን ጠቅልለን በምስራቅ አፍሪካ ታላቅ “አገር” በገዳ አምሳል እንመሰርታለን የሚል ጽንፍ የረገጠ ተስፋፊ አጀንዳ ይዞ የተነሳ ቡድን መሆኑ አይዘነጋም።

2 የአማራ ብልጽግና የመሬት ይገባኛል ጥያቄ በወልቃይትና በራያ አይመለስም። በሰሜን በኩል አሰብን ይጠይቃል። ዳር ድንበሬ ቀይ ባህር ድረስ ነው ይላል። ከኦሮሚያም ሰፋፊ የሚጠይቃቸው ግዛቶችና ከተሞች አሉት። በድሮዋ የኢትዮጵያ ካርታ የሚታየው የአገሪቱ ክፍል በጠቅላላ የአማራ ግዛት ነው፤ የአማራ መሬት ነው ብሎ ያምናል። ጠንካራ ኢኮኖሚና ጠንካራ ሰራዊት በመገንባት ማእከሉን ዳግም መቆጣጠር ይፈልጋል። ወይም መቆጣጠር አለብኝ ብሎ ያስባል። ካለበለዚያ ህልውናው ሁሌም አደጋ ላይ እንደወደቀ ይሰማዋል። እየተሽሎከልለከና በሁለት ሶስት ፓርቲዎች እየተደራጀ ጡንቻውን ማፈርጠም ከህዝብ ያልተሰወረ ስልቱ ነው።

3 ኢሳያስ ህወሓት በተወገደ ማግስት ከኋላ ሆኜ እዘውራለሁ፣ ኢትዮጵያን በእጃዙር እገዛለሁ ብሎ ነው የሚያምነው። እየኮረኮመ የሚያሰራውን ከመጋረጃው ጀርባ በቡችላው አብይ አማካኝነት መሾም መቻል ይሆናል ነው ምኞቱ። ካልሆነ ከወዲ ዜናዊ ጋር የተጀመረው ጸብ በሲዝን ሁለት ይቀጥላል።

አስተዋላችሁ? በመካከላቸው እርስ በእርሳቸውም ሆነ፣ ከነሱ ውጪ ካለው ቡድን ጋር በእኩልነት መኖር የሚያስችል አጀንዳና የስነልቦና ቅድመዝግጁነት የላቸውም። ባህሪያቸው አንዱ ሌላኛውን ውጦ መዘንደድ ነው። ህወሓት በክልል ቆራርጦ ኢትዮጵያን ቢያሳንሳትም፣ በህግ አውቶኖሚውን ለክልሎች ሰጥቷል። ተጠቅመውበታል አልተጠቀሙበትም ሌላ ጉዳይ ሆኖ፣ ካልተመቻቸው እስከመገንጠል ድረስ ልዩ መብት የሚያጎናጽፍ ህገመንግስት ሰጥቷቸዋል። ትናንሽ ግን አውቶኖመስ የሆኑ የፖለቲካ ዩኒቶች (ክልሎችና ልዩ ዞኖች) በእኩልነትና በመፈቃቀድ የተመሰረተ አብሮነት ሲኖራቸው ብቻ አገር በጋራ ያስቀጥላሉ፤ ተብሎ ለ30 አመታት (ግማሹ የኢትዮጵያ ህዝብ የተመረተበት አመታት) ተሰርቶበታል። ኖረውበታልም።

ገሚሱ የኢትዮጵያ ህዝብ ከዚህ የአስተዳደር ሲስተም ውጪ ሌላ የሚያውቀው ነገር የለም። እንደ አይንአር በአንዴ ጠርገህ ልታጸዳውና ሊረሳ የሚችል ጉዳይ አይደለም። እናም በማዕከላዊ መንግስት ይሁንታና ፈቃድ የሚሾሙ የሙስጠፌ፣ የተመስገን ምናምን አይነት ታማኝነታቸው ለአንድ ግለሰብ የሆኑ መሪዎችና ለይስሙላ ብቻ የሚሰየሙ ምክር ቤት ይኖራችኋል፣ ቢባሉ ማናቸውም አሜን ብለው አይቀበሉትም። የቀመሷት ነገር አለች የምትጥም፣ የምትጣፍጥ። ማንነቴን፣ ባህሌን፣ ቋንቋዬን፣ እምነቴን፣ የሚሏት ነገር።

አንዱ ሌላኛውን ሰልቅጦ ለመዘንደድ ሲቧጨቁ፣ ሌላው ለማንነቱ ሲንተጋተግ፣ ሰላም፣ መረጋጋት፣ ልማት፣ አገር፣ ብሎ ነገር ፈጽሞ ያከትምለታል።
ድሕረ ህወሓት የምትኖረው ኢትዮጵያ የፈራረሰች ኢትዮጵያ ብቻ ናት። የታሪክ መጻህፍት ላይ ብቻ የምታገኟት። ፍጻሜዋ ያላማረ። በ21ኛው ክፍለዘመን በእርስ በእርስ ጦርነት እስከዘላለሙ ያሸለበች ኢትዮጵያ።

ይህ እንዳይመጣ ነበር፣ በድርድርና በውይይት አብሮ የሚያኗኑር መላ ፈልጉ፤ ካቃታችሁ ያለው የፌደራሊዝም ስርዓት ይቀጥል ወይስ በሌሎች አማራጮች (ጂኦግራፊ መሰረት ያደረገ ፌደራሊዝም፣ ፍጹም አሃዳዊ ወዘተ) እንተካው ብላችሁ ህዝቡን ጠይቃችሁ በሪፈረንደም ለአንዴና ለመጨረሻ ጊዜ እልባት ያግኝ፤ ብለን ስንመክራችሁ የኖርነው። በመፈቃቀድ ላይ የተመሰረተና የብዙሃን ይሁንታ ያገኘ ስርዓት ከመመምስረት ውጪ ሌላ አምራጭ የላችሁም ስንላችሁ የኖርነው በምክንያት ነው። ኢትኒክ ፌደራሊዝም በጉልበት ተጭኖ ሙሉ ተቀባይነትን እንዳላገኘ ሁሉ፣ አሃዳዊ ስርዓት በጉልበት ተጭኖ ሙሉ ተቀባይነትን አያገኝም። ግማሹን የህበረተሰብ ክፍል ያገለለ ስርዓት ደግሞ መቼም ቢሆን አይጸናም። እናም ከወዲሁ እላለሁ …

ነፍስ ይማር!

ሰ.ነ

 

What’s Happening in Ethiopia Is a Tragedy

By Tsedale Lemma for ©The New York Times

Much of the blame must be laid at the door of the prime minister.

The announcement last week that the government was about to launch a military operation into one of the country’s regions came, to put it lightly, as a shock.

Not only was it very far from the emollient statecraft that won Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed the Nobel Peace Prize last year, it also seemed to shatter the purpose of his premiership. When he rose to power in 2018, Mr. Abiy promised to guide Ethiopia into a new era of peace, prosperity and national reconciliation.

But on Nov. 4, he dispatched the Army to Tigray, one of the country’s 10 semiautonomous regions and home to roughly 6 percent of the population, accusing its leaders — with whom he has increasingly sparred — of attacking a government defense post and attempting to steal military equipment.

And in the days since, Mr. Abiy imposed a six-month state of emergency on the Tigray region, declared its legislature void and approved a provisional replacement. As fighting raged, the internet and telephone networks have been shut down. Hundreds are reported to be dead.

This is a tragedy. Ethiopia stands on the cusp of civil war, bringing devastation to both the country and the wider region. While the situation is volatile and uncertain, this much is clear: Mr. Abiy’s political project, to bring together the nation in a process of democratization, is over. And much of the blame must be laid at his door.

After years of persistent anti-government protests, economic troubles and widespread unrest, Mr. Abiy took over a country on the brink of collapse. At least one million people were internally displaced in 2017, according to the United Nations, as the country was shaken by protests from Oromo and Amhara ethnic groups, who together make up nearly two-thirds of the population. Presenting himself as a reformer, the avalanche of changes promised by Mr. Abiy, who took over in April 2018, seemed to avert the worst of the country’s problems.

But Mr. Abiy overreached. His first cardinal mistake was to sideline the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, for decades the most powerful political force in the country, in the peace he brokered between Ethiopia and Eritrea. By pushing the Tigrayan leadership aside as he sealed his signature achievement, Mr. Abiy made clear the limits to his talk of unity.

That was a taste of what was to come. Last year, Mr. Abiy moved to dismantle the old political order. Going beyond his original remit, he proposed reconfiguring the coalition that had ruled the country for 27 years — the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Front, or E.P.R.D.F., which itself comprised a gamut of regional parties — into a new, single party.

The T.P.L.F., which founded and dominated the coalition, was not keen on the change — but Mr. Abiy went ahead with it regardless, creating a rift with the Tigrayans and undermining the country’s delicate political settlement. Far from minimizing the fallout, Mr. Abiy exacerbated it, removing all ministers from the T.P.L.F. from his cabinet.

By the time the new party was announced, in November 2019, the damage was done. The T.P.L.F., angered by the whittling away of its power and concerned that the country’s federal system was under threat, had not joined. They weren’t alone in their disquiet. In Mr. Abiy’s own region, Oromia, many were skeptical of the new order, while southern Ethiopia splintered into disorder, as multiple administrative zones demanded self-rule. After coming to power on the promise of unity, Mr. Abiy had alienated and frustrated key components of his coalition. Suddenly, he looked vulnerable.

The coronavirus changed the calculus. The all-important national election, scheduled for August, was postponed; the focus became how to mitigate the damage wrought by the pandemic. But the political problems didn’t go away.

In the summer, the killing of a popular Oromo musician — whose perpetrators the government claims were acting under the orders of an armed opposition group, the Oromo Liberation Army, and the T.P.L.F. — set off widespread violence against minorities in Oromia and police killings of protesters, in which at least 166 people died. It also led to a major crackdown against opposition political leaders, including Mr. Abiy’s former ally and now fierce critic, Jawar Mohammed.

Then in September, the Tigray region went ahead with its elections, in defiance of the government’s orders. Since that act of subversion, tensions between the government and the leaders in Tigray, simmering for two years, have been high. Last week, they spilled out into open conflict.

Whether or not it escalates into a civil war, it will leave an indelible mark on Ethiopian politics. What was already a deeply polarized country will become more divided still. But most importantly, it could crush the hopes of a democratic transition. Free speech, civil liberties and due process may fall afoul of the turn to militarism and repression.

In Tigray, the possibility of civilian casualties, indiscriminate attacks and protracted conflict could further deepen grievances; in a region with a long history of resistance to the central state, that might lead to an insurgency. The consequences for the wider region, if the conflict were to spill out to Eritrea, Sudan and Djibouti, could be severe.

Judging by Mr. Abiy’s moves over the past week, not least the replacement of the foreign minister and the leaders of the entire security sector with trusted loyalists, he is not inclined to de-escalate. The leader who once committed “to toil for peace every single day and in all seasons” has been acting more like a commander in chief than a prime minister.

Mr. Abiy has come a long way. War, he memorably said as he accepted the Nobel Peace Prize, was “the epitome of hell.” Now he looks ready to meet it.

Tsedale Lemma (@TsedaleLemma) is the editor in chief of the Addis Standard.

Ethiopia is about to cross the point of no return

With the world’s attention fixated on the United States electionsEthiopia embarked on a civil war last week. In a time span of five days Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, who won the 2019 Nobel peace prize after making peace with Eritrea, ended the democratic transition that he had initiated two years before.

In the early hours of Wednesday last week, Abiy ordered federal troops to launch an offensive against the northern region of Tigray, which borders Eritrea and is home to about 6% of the population. Government airstrikes on military positions in Tigray and a telecommunication shutdown began the same day.

Since then, Abiy’s government has purged Tigrayan officials from government positions, mobilised ethnic militias to join the war and rejected international calls for dialogue with leaders of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF).

On Saturday, Ethiopia’s parliament replaced Tigray’s elected leadership with a caretaker administration. On Sunday, the prime minister appointed some of his close allies as the new heads of national defence, intelligence and the federal police. Until recently, Abiy preached national unity and forgiveness. So why did he start a civil war?

Abiy’s casus belli is an alleged raid on the headquarters of the Northern Command in Mekelle during which, it is claimed, arms were looted and scores killed. The truth is more complicated. First, the war preparations had been underway for weeks. Federal forces and allied troops from other federal states were in fact massed on the border between Tigray and Amhara as early as late October.

Second, the officer corps of the Northern Command is predominantly Tigrayan and Oromo. The command has been in Mekelle for more than a decade. It had put down deep social roots and developed close ties with the TPLF. When Abiy issued the order for an offensive, the command rejected it and reaffirmed its loyalty to the elected leadership in Tigray. A brief firefight between loyalist and dissident troops ensued, which was quickly suppressed.

The Oromo members of the command are believed to be predominantly supportive of the TPLF. Most are disenchanted with the prime minister’s arrest of Oromo leaders and the heavy-handed crackdown in Oromia.

Third, Tigray is estimated to hold the bulk of Ethiopia’s military hardware. The region has enough helicopter gunships, heavy field guns, tanks and armoured personnel carriers to mount a conventional war. The idea they would raid the command armoury and depots for weapons and ammunition is spurious, fantastical, even.

The role of distrust

Abiy distrusts the professional national army. His relations with the rank and file are brittle. His stint in the army as a radioman in the signals corps and cyber-security department was brief and had not given him the depth and network needed to effectively influence it.

This partly explains why he is increasingly reliant on ethnic forces drawn from other regional states to prosecute the campaign in Tigray. So far, the bulk of the federal fighting force is drawn from a plethora of ethnic armies from the regional states. They include Amhara State special forces and liyu paramilitary police from Oromia.

By outsourcing the war to ethnic units — some with axes to grind against Tigrayans — Abiy is playing a dangerous game almost certain to aggravate the conflict and transforming, potentially, what is a centre-periphery contest into a wider ethnic conflagration.

Both the Tigray leadership and the federal government deserve blame for the current crisis, but it is important to understand the wider context.

The speed at which Abiy evolved from political reformer to war prime minister has astonished his friends and foes alike. When he came to power amid popular unrest in March 2018, Abiy gained overwhelming acclaim as a reformer. He released prisoners, welcomed back the opposition and promised to open up the economy. Yet political liberalisation backfired as pent-up ethnic tensions spiralled out of control, destabilising a nation that has long been considered an anchor of stability in the Horn of Africa region.

Opposition arrests

Abiymania” dissipated rapidly when it became clear that the new federal leadership was unable to manage these conflicts. Abiy faced serious political opposition from the outgoing TPLF guard, which had dominated the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front for decades. After he broke with his former colleagues of the Oromo Democratic Party, Abiy faced increasing criticism from Oromo nationalists. They accused him of selling out the Oromo cause; he had many of them arrested in return. Repositioning himself as an Ethiopian nationalist who transcends ethnic cleavages, Abiy created the multi-ethnic, but unitary Prosperity Party that controls all levers of power.

Ethiopia has taken a fatal step towards a full-blown civil war. Armed clashes are now raging on multiple battle fronts. Hundreds of soldiers have died on both sides in less than a week.

Expectations of a swift and clean victory are misplaced. The most likely outcome is a messy and grinding stalemate; and, worse, a protracted insurgency for which TPLF is well-suited. A prolonged conflict is bound to have dire implications. It elevates the prospect of a regionalised and multi-ethnic conflict, risks reversing the economic and development gains made in the past 20 years, and is almost certain to trigger large-scale displacement. Most crucially, it diminishes prospects for furthering democratisation and reduces the chances for credible elections in 2021.

The window for international intervention and mediation is closing very fast. Without a quick, robust and concerted international response to stop the fighting, Ethiopia runs the real risk of crossing the point of no return.

 

Rashid Abdi is a Horn of Africa analyst based in Nairobi, Kenya. Tobias Hagmann is an associate professor in international development at Roskilde University in Denmark. 

ጎራችሁን ለዩ፥ ከህዝብ ወገን ወይስ ከወንጀለኞች ጎን

ሰለሞን ነጋሽ

ጦርነቱ ትክክል ነው፣ ከህወሓት ጋር ነው። ወንጀለኞችን ለህግ ለማቅረብ የሚደረግ ህግ የማስከበር ስራ ነው። ብላችሁ ለምታምኑ ህሊናችሁን እንድትፈትኑት የሚጋብዝ ጽሁፍ ነው። 95 ሚልዮን ለ5 ሚልዮን፣ ይጥፉ ወይስ እንጥፋ፣ ወዘተ በሚል የታወረ እይታ የምታራምዱ ከሆነ፣ ይህን ማንበብ አይመከረም እዚሁ አቁሙ። አላማው ምን ያህሉ በተሳሳተ መረጃ፣ የተሳሳተ አቋም እንደያዘ ለማወቅ ነው። ሁላችንም አቋማችንን እያጠራን እንድንሔድ ይረዳናል።

  1. ህወሓት አታልሎም ይሁን አሳምኖ የትግራይን ህዝብ ከጎኑ አሰልፏል። የትግራይ ህዝብ በፌደራል የተላለፈውን ህግ እያወቀ የክልሉ መንግስት ባዘጋጀው ምርጫ ተሳትፏል። ህወሓትንም መርጧል። የህዝብ ውሳኔ ምን ማድረግ ይቻላል?
  2. አብይ አሕመድ በሁሉም ቦታ ተቀባይነቱን የሚሸረሽር ስራ ሲሰራ ላለፉት ሁለት አመታት ቆይቷል። ኦሮሞው አልተቀበለውም። አማራው እንደ ፔንዱለም ቢወዛወዝም የተቃወመውና ያማረረበት ጊዜ ይበጣል፣ አዲስ አበቤው አልተቀበለውም፣ ወላይታ ሲዳማ ጉራጌ ወዘተ ሁሉም ከአብይ መንግስት ጋር አልተስማሙም። የትግራይ ለብቻው አይደለም። ይህ እውነታ ሰፊ ቅስቀሳና ፕሮፓጋንዳ ሳያስፈልገው የትግራይ ህዝብ በራሱ ጊዜ ከህወሓት ጎን እንዲሰለፍ ዋነኛ ምክንያት ሆኗል። ወዶና ፈቅዶ ከጎኑ ከተሰለፈ ደግሞ እኔ አውቅልሀለሁ አይባልም። ፋሽሽታዊ ባህሪ ነው።
  3. በህገወጥ መንገድ ያለበቂ ምክንያት አብይ አሕመድ ስልጣኑን በራሱ መንገድ አራዝሟል። በዚህ ምክንያት ከህወሓት ጋር ብቻ ሳይሆን፣ ከሌሎች የተቃዋሚ ፓርቲ አመራሮች ጋር መግባባት አልቻለም። በሀሰት ክስ ሁሉንም አስሯቸውም ይገኛል። በተለይ ልደቱ አያሌውን ፍርድ ቤቱ በተደጋጋሚ ነጻ ቢለውም፣ ፈጽሞ ሊፈታው አልፈለገም። ከመስከረም 30 ብኋላ ሰላም እንደማይኖር በመናገሩ ብቻ ቂም ቋጥሮበታል። ልደቱ እንዳለው ታድያ የመጨረሻው ደረጃ ላይ ደረሰን አየን እንጂ፣ ግምቱ የተሳሳተ አልነበረም። (“አደባባይ ውጡ አልል፣ ተኩሱ አልል፣ ምንም አልልም። ዝም ብዬ ነው የማየው” እንዳለው፣ ይኸው እርሱ ምንም ሳይል እኛ ጥቅምት ሳይገባደድ እዚህ ደረጃ ላይ ደርሰናል ።)
  4. በሁሉም የአገሪቱ ክፍሎች ግጭቶች ተስፋፍተዋል። ህወሓት ላይ ማሳበብ እንደማይቻል ባለፉት ጥቂት ቀናት ብቻ ያየናቸው ተደጋጋሚ ግጭቶች በቂ ማስረጃዎች ናቸው። ትግራይ ከተከበበች፣ ኔትዎርክ ከተዘጋና ጦርነቱ ከተጀመረ ወዲህ በሌላ የአገሪቱ ክፍል የሲቪልያን ህይወትን የቀጠፉ ቢያንስ አምስት ግጭቶችን አይተናል። በህወሓት ማሳበብ አይቻልም።
  5. ኢሳያስን እየጋበዘ የጦር መሳሪያ ሲያስጎበኝ፣ አየር ሀይሉን ሲያሳይ፣ ለራሱም ኤርትራ ሄዶ አንዳንድ ሁኔታዎችን ሲያጠና፣ ወሎና ጎንደር ሄዶ ቅድመ ዝግጅት ሲያደርግ እንደከረመ ሁላችንም እናውቃለን። ከህዝብ የተደበቀ እውነታ አይደለም። በራሱ ሚድያ የዜና እወጃ ሆኖ ሰምተነዋል/አይተነዋል። የገንዘብ ቅየራው፣ ወታደሩን ማጓጓዝ፣ ወታደራዊ አመራሩን መቀየር ወዘተ የጦርነት ቅድመ ዝግጅቱ አንድ አካል ነበሩ።
  6. ጦሩን አጓጉዞ፣ ከነ ኢሳያስ ጋር መክሮ፣ ተዘጋጅቶበት ሲያበቃ፣ ኋላ እንደተረጋገጠው በኦሮሞ ነጻ አውጪ ታጣቂዎች የተወሰደውን እርምጃ ህወሓት ላይ ለድፎና ያንን ሰበብ አድርጎ “ምክር ቤቱ”ን በማላቀስ ሲያስወስን የዋለ እለት፣ ጦርነቱን የሚጀምርበት ሁኔታን እያመቻቸው እንደነበር እንገነዘባለን። (ህወሓት የሰሜን እዝ ላይ እርምጃ ወሰደ ስልሚባለው ወሬ ሰለማያግባባን እንተወው። ኦፕሬሽኑን ቀድሞ የጀመረው አማራና ሶማሌ ክልል ላይ እንዳደረገው በአውሮፕላን ኮማንዶ ጭኖ በመላክ የሞከረ ሲሆን ያ ሀይል ላይ ነው እርምጃ የተወሰደው፣ የሰሜን እዙ ከጎናችን ተሰልፏል ባይ ነው ህወሓት። እርሱ ደግሞ እዛ ሲጠብቁ የነበሩትን በተኙበት ወጓቸው ነው የሚለው። ተጣርቶ ማስረጃው እስኪወጣ ድረስ ማንም ሰው እርግጠኛ ሊሆን አይችልም። ለፎቶ ካለው ፍቅር አንጻር ማስረጃ ቢኖረው ኖሮ ይፋ ያደርገው እንደነበር ግን ማስታወስ ያስፈልጋል። )
  7. ጦርነቱ በይፋ ከመጀመሩ በፊት ህዝቡ ላይ የተፈጸሙ ግፎችን በቅድሚያ እንመልከት፥ በጀት መከልከል። የዓለም ባንክና የመሳሰሉ አለም አቀፋ ተቋማት የሚሰጡትን እርዳታ መከልከል። ከስፖርት ውድድር ተጋሩን ማግለል። የኮቪድ ቁሳቁስ ወደ ትግራይ አለመላክ። ከውጪ የተገዙ የተለያዩ ቁሳቁሶች ወደ ክልሉ እንዳይገቡ ማገድ። መንገድ መዝጋት። ነዳጅ እንዳይገባ ማድረግ። በሁሉም ዙሪያ ክልሉን መክበብ። ጦርነት ከከፈተ ብኋላ ደግሞ ተደጋጋሚ የአየር ድብደባ በከተሞች ጭምር ማካሔድ። ከቤታችሁ እንዳትወጡ እደበድባለሁ ብሎ በአደባባይ ማወጅና ህዝብን ማሸበር። ከትግራይ ውጭ ያሉ ተጋሩን ማዋከብ፣ ኢትኒክ ፕሮፋይሊንግና ድንገተኛ ፍተሻ ተጋሩ ላይ ማካሔድ። በጸጥታ መዋቅር ውስጥ የነበሩ የትግራይ ተወላጆች በሙሉ ከስራ ማገድ፣ ትጥቃቸውን ማራገፍ፣ ብሎም ማሰር። ተማሪና የውጭ ዜግነት ያላቸው ተጋሩ ጭምር ወደ ውጭ እንዳይወጡ ማገድ። ከትምህርት፣ ከስራ፣ ከቢዝነሳቸው ማስተጓጎል። ወዘተ
  8. በብሔር የተደራጀ ልዩ ሀይልና ምልሻ እዚህ ጦርነት ውስጥ እንዲገባ አድርጓል። ወደ ብሔር ግጭት ሊያመራ ይችላል የሚል ስጋት በስፋት አለ።
  9. የውጭ ሀይል ማለትም የኤርትራና (ዛሬ ደግሞ የሱዳንም ተጨምሮበታል እየተባለ ነው) ጦርነቱ ውስጥ ጎትቶ ማስገባት።
  10. ለአለም አቀፍ የተኩስ አቁሙ ጥሪ ጆሮ አለመስጠት።

ይህ ሁሉ የተደረገውና እየተደረገ ያለው ጥቂት በህግ የሚፈለጉ ሰዎችን ለመያዝ ወይስ ትግራዋይን ለመስበር? የፈለገውን ያህል ኪሳራ ያስከትል (ትግራዋይ ተሰብሮም ይሁን) ደንታ የለንም ከሆነ መልሳችሁ አንድ ነገር ነው። ጥቂቶችን ለህግ ለማቅረብ ይህን ያህል ርቀት መጓዝ ትክክልና ተገቢ ነው ብላችሁ ከሆነ የምታምኑትና እርምጃውን የምትደግፉት ዝምታችሁ መልስ ይሆናል። እንደነ አቶ ገዱ አንዳርጋቸው “የለም ይህ ትክክል አይደለም፣ እብደት ነው” የምትሉ ከሆነ ደግሞ አቋማችሁን አጥርታችሁ ይህን ጦርነት ለማስቆም ጫና መፍጠር ይጠበቅባችኋል።

በበኩሌ አብይ ህግ አስከባሪ ሆኖ በህግ ሊፈልጋቸው የሚችሉ ወንጀለኞች ይኖራሉ ብዬ አላምንም። ምናልባት የኢትዮጵያ ህዝብ እርሱንና ጋሻ ጃግሬዎቹን ወደ ህግ ማቅረብ የሚፈልገውን ያህል ከህወሓት ባለስልጣና ሌሎችም በህግ ሊጠይቃቸው የሚፈልጋቸው ሊኖሩ ይችላሉ። አሉም። ነገር ግን አብይ ከነሱ ተሽሎ ህግ አስከባሪ ነኝ የሚልበት ምንም የሞራል መሰረት የለውም ብዬ አምናለሁ። በደም የተጨማለቀ በብዙ ወንጀል የሚፈለግ፣ በገለልተኛ አካል ብዙ መጣራት ያለባቸው የህዝብ ጥያቄዎች አሉ። የአማራ መሪዎች ሞት፣ የኢንጅነር ስመኘው ግድያ፣ የነጄነራል ሰዓረ ሞት፣ የአርቲስት ሀጫሉ ግድያ፣ የዜጎች በየቦታው መፈናቀል በየተለይ አዲስ አበባ ዙሪያና ኦሮሚያ፣ የንጹሀን ዜጎች በየቦታው መሞትና ሌሎችም ሁሉም በገለልተኛ አጣሪ ኮሚሽን ተጣርተው ወንጀል ፈጻሚዎች ለፍርድ መቅረብ አለባቸው። አገሪቱ አሁን የገባችበትን ጦርነት ጀስቲፋይ የሚያደርግ በቂ ምክንያት ስለሌለ፣ ወደ ጦርነት የከተቱን  ተጠያቂ ሰዎች ተጣርቶ ለፍርድ ሊቀርቡ ይገባል። እስከዛው ያለ በቂ ምክንያት የተገባው ጦርነት አንድን ሉአላዊ ህዝብ ለማንበርከክ የተቃጣ ወረራና ጥቃት ነው ብዬ ነው የማምነው። ለዚህም ነው ከትግራዋይ ወገኔ ጎን የቆምኩት። ተሳሳትኩ?