ትርጉም የለሽ ምጥ የለም!

/3 Comments/in , /by
አብይ አሕመድ (መሽሬ) ስልጣን እንደያዘ በጥቂት ሳምንታት የህወሓት ባለስልጣናትን ከ4ኪሎ ሲያጸዳ፣ የፓርቲ ፖለቲካ ነበር። ያኔ እኔን ጨምሮ ብዙ ትግራዋይ ግድ አልሰጠንም ነበር። እንዲያውም አብዛኛው ትግራዋይ እንደማንኛውም የተቀረው ህዝብ በደስታ የሰከረበት ግዜ ነበር።
መሽሬ ኢህአዴግን አፍርሶ ህወሓት የሌለበት ብልጽግናን ሲመሰርትም የፓርቲ ፖለቲካ ነበር። የፌደራል ስርዓቱ ሲምቦል ተደርጎ የሚወሰደው የድርቶች ስብስብ/ግንባር፣ ተጨፍልቆ ወጥ መሆኑ ፌደራላዊውን ስርዓት አፍርሶ አሃዳዊ ስርዓት ለመተካት የሚደረግ ርብርብ መስሎ የታየው (ትግራዋይን ጨምሮ ሌሎች የብሔር ፖለቲካ አራማጆች) ስጋቱን ከመግለጹ ውጪ፣ ከፓርቲዎች ሽኩቻ ነጥሎ የሚያይበት ምክንያት አልነበረውም።
ትግራይንና ህወሓትን ያገለለ የኢትዮ ኤርትራ ግኑኝነት ግን ከፓርቲ ፖለቲካ በላይ ነበር። የኢሳያስ የመጨረሻ ግብ በቀል እንደሆነ እያንዳንዱ ትግራዋይ ጠንቅቆ ያውቃል። ትግራይን ያገለለው ሽርጉድ ህልውናው ላይ እንደተጋረጠ አደጋ ቆጥሮታል፣ ከዴይ ዋን ጀምሮ።
ከአመት በላይ የዘለቀው የአማራ የመስፋፋት ፍላጎትና ጦር ጉሸማም ከፓርቲ ፖለቲካ በላይ ነበር። የትግራይ ህዝብ እንደ ኤግዚስቴንሻል ትሬት ያየበት፣ በላይ በኤርትራ በታች በአማራና በስልጣን ፈላጊ ምንደኞች ተቀርቅሮ በእሳት ሊለበለብ እንደሚችል አስቀድሞ ተገንዝቧል።
ለዚህም ህዝቡ ህልውናውን ቀስ በቀስ ከፓርቲው ህልውና ጋር አቆራኝቶ ማየት ጀመረ።
መሽሬ ስልጣኑን በህገወጥ መንገድ አራዝሞ ሌሎችም ምርጫ እንዳያካሂዱ ሲያግድ፣ የትግራይ ብሄራዊ ክልላዊ መንግስት አፈንግጦ ምርጫ አደርጋለሁ ሲል በእርግጥ የፓርቲ ፖለቲካና የስልጣን ሹክቻ ጉዳይ ነው። ነገር ግን ከዛም በላይ ነው፤ የህገመንግስታዊ መብት፣ የሉአላዊነትና የህልውና ጉዳይ ነው።
ፌደራል መንግስት እውቅና አልሰጥም እያለ፣ ህገወጥ ነው እያለ፣ የክልሉ መንግስት ምርጫ አካሂዷል። ህዝብም ተገዶ ሳይሆን ወዶና ፈቅዶ በአደባባይ እየጨፈረ በምርጫ ተሳትፏል። በነበረው የአገሪቱ ሁኔታና የህዝብ ስጋት፣ ህዝቡ ህልውናዬን፣ መብቴን፣ ጥቅሜን ከሌሎች በተሻለ ያስጠብቅልኛል ብሎ ላመነው ድርጅት ድምጹን ሰጥቷል።
እዚህ ላይ ህዝቡ ሁለት ሀላፊነቶችን willingly እንደወሰደ ልብ እንበል፤ አንደኛ የፌደራል መንግስቱን ትዕዛዝ አልቀበልም ብሏል። ሁለተኛ የሚበጀኝን የመምረጥ ህገመንግስታዊ መብቴን እጠቀማለሁ ብሎ የሚበጀውን መርጧል።
ከዚህ ብኋላ ያለው ጉዳይ በሙሉ የፖርቲ ፖለቲካ ሳይሆን የህዝብና የሉአላዊነት ጉዳይ ሆኗል።
ከ2ሚልዮን በላይ ድምጹን የሰጠበት ምርጫ ማንም በምንም መንገድ ሊሰርዝ ሊደልዘው አይችልም። ተገድጄ ነው የመረጥኩት ካላለ፣ ለመገደዱ ማስረጃ ከሌለ፣ በስተቀር ማንም ሰው/ሀይል በምንም መንገድ የህዝቡን ውሳኔና የወሰደውን ሃላፊነት መደለዝ አይችልም። አራት ነጥብ።
ከምርጫው ብኋላ ህጋዊ ክልላዊ መንግስት ነኝ፣ ሳይመረጥ የፌደራል መንግስት ነኝ ለሚለው ህገወጥ ቡድን እውቅና አልሰጥም ሲል፣ የፌደራል “መንግስት”ና የክልሉ መንግስት መውጫ የሌለው ቅርቃር ውስጥ እየገቡ ነበር። አብሮ መስራት አይቻልም። ሁሉንም ያሳተፈ አገር አቀፍ ድርድር አድርጎ ችግሮችን ለመፍታትም የፌደራሉ ማፊያ ቡድን ፍላጎት አልነበረውም። (የኦሮሚያና የአዲስ አበባ ተቀናቃኞቹን ማሰር ችሎ ስለነበር፣ ስልጣኑን ለመቆጣጠር ከግማሽ መንገድ በላይ የተጓዘ መስሎታል። Why’d he retreat?)
እንደመፍትሔ የወሰደው እኔም ለክልሉ መንግስት እውቅና ስለማልሰጥ ግኑኝነቴን በቀጥታ ከወረዳ ጋር አደርጋለሁ የሚል ነበር። ዳሩ ግን እስከ ቀበሌ ድረስ ያለው መንግስታዊ መዋቅር፣ የክልሉን መንግስት የተቆጣጠረው ፓርቲ ነው ያለው። ከወረዳዎች ጋር በቀጥታ ሊገናኝ የሚችልበት አጋጣሚ አለነበረም። ግኑኝነታችን ከክልሉ መንግስት ጋር ነው የሚል ምላሽ ነበር የሚያገኘው።
እዚህ ቅርቃር ውስጥ የገባው የፌደራሉ ማፊያ፣ ለክልሉ መንግስት እውቅና ስለማይሰጥና ወረዳዎችም በቀጥታ ለመገናኘት ሀላፊነት መውሰድ የማችሉ ስለሆኑበት፣ በጀቶችን መቁረጥ፣ የህክምና ቁሳቁስ አለመላክ፣ እርዳታ ማስቀረት፣ ወዘተ አይነት እርምጃ ገባ። ህዝቡም ህገወጥ ነው እየተባለ ምርጫ ተሳትፎ ድምጹን ስለሰጠ፣ አብሮ መቅጣት እንደ አምራጭ ታዬ።
ጉዳዩ የፖለቲካ ጉዳይ ብቻ ሳይሆን የሉአላዊነት ጉዳይ እየሆነ መጣ። የህዝብ አጀንዳ ሆነ።
በዚህ መልኩ ሊቀጥል እንደማይችል ሲያውቅ ቀድሞ ሲዘጋጅበት የቆየውን በጉልበት የማንበርከኩን አማራጭ ገፋበት። አቅሙን ፈተሸ። የኤርትራን አቅም ፈተሸ። ኢሳያስን ጋብዞ አቅሙን አሳየ። በተቀናጀ መልኩ ጦርነት ለመክፈት ዝግጅቶች ተጠናቀቁ።
የሰሜን እዝ አዛዥ ለመቀየር ሞከረ፣ የክልሉ መንግስት ከለከለ።
ዘ ሬስት ኢዝ ሂስትሪ።
ጦርነት ክልሉ ላይና ህዝቡ ላይ ሲከፈት፣ ህግ የማስከበር ጉዳይ፣ በህግ የሚፈለጉ ግለሰቦች የመያዝ ጉዳይ ወይም የፖለቲካ ፓርቲ ጨዋታ አይደለም።
በተለይ ደግሞ የውጭ ሀይሎችን አሳትፎ፣ የተለያዩ በቀል የተጠሙ ቡድኖች አሰባስቦ፣ በሰማይና በምድር ደግሞም ሁሉም አቅጣጫ እሳት እየለቀቁ የገቡበት ጦርነት፣ የህወሓት ባለስልጣናትን ከ4 ኪሎ ሲያባርሯቸው እንደነበረው አይነት የፖለቲካ ፓርቲዎች ጨዋታ አይደለም።
ወገኖቻችን ያለቁበት፣ በአስር ሺዎች የሚቆጠሩ የተፈናቀሉበት፣ እናቶቻችንና እህቶቻችን የተደፈሩበት፣ ንብረቶቻችን የወደሙበትና የተዘረፉበት፣ ከተሞቻችን የበረሱበትና በጄኖሳይድ ንጹሀን የተጨፈጭፉበት፣ ትግራዋይነት ላይ የተከፈተ ጦርነት ነው።
በህግ የሚፈለጉ የግለሰቦች ጉዳይ አይደለም። የፖለቲካ ፓርቲዎች ጉዳይ አይደለም። እንደኮንቬንሽናል ዋር የአንድ ትውልድ ጉዳይም አይደለም። የዘር ማጥፋት ወንጀል ነው!
ይህን ሁሉ እያደረጉም፣ ሲቪልያን ከጦር ቀጠና እንዳይሸሹ መንገድ ዘግተው፣ መላወሻ አሳጥተው፣ ንብረታቸውን እየዘረፉ፣ ቀለባቸውን እየተናጠቁ፣ ከአለም ነጥለው፣ የደረሰባቸውን ግፍ እንዳይገልጹ፣ ሮሯቸውን እንዳያሰሙ፣ ቆልፎ መቀጥቀጥ፣ የፓርቲ፣ የግለሰብ፣ የአንድ ትውልድ ጉዳይ አይደለም።
ለዚህም ነው እያንዳንዱ ጤነኛ ትግራዋይ ይህን በማንነቱ ላይ የተቃጣ የዘር ማጥፋት ዘመቻ በጋራ ለመመከት በጋራ መቆም ያለበት።
ትግራይ ምጥ ላይ ነች።
አንዳንዶች ትርጉም የለሽ ጦርነት ነው ይላሉ። እናት ትርጉም የለሽ ምጥ አምጣ አታቅም። እናት የምታምጠው ለመውለድ ነው። ትግራይ ነጻ ሀገርን ለመውለድ እያማጠች ነው።
ማርያም ጽዮን ብሽልምትኺ ተውፅእኪ ንበላ። ንደግፋ! ኩልና ንረባረብ!

Ethiopia’s Problems Will Not End with a Military Victory

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Substantial efforts are needed to reduce political tensions ahead of elections in 2021.

USIP Publication: Aly Verjee | Tuesday, November 24, 2020

As violence continues over control of the northern Ethiopian region of Tigray, Ethiopia’s future remains unsettled, even if the conflict ends soon. Achieving the federal government’s security objectives in Tigray is unlikely to resolve both new and entrenched political challenges, and already delayed national elections, now expected in 2021, may prove a severe test of Ethiopia’s political order, and consequently affect broader regional stability. Reconciling the electoral process with efforts for reconciliation and national dialogue is now even more imperative.

The Conflict in Tigray

War sometimes starts like clockwork but predicting the date on which a conflict will end often leads to disappointment. Yet from the start of armed hostilities with the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed promised the conflict would be swift and decisive. On November 6, Abiy wrote that “operations by federal defense forces underway in Northern Ethiopia have clear, limited and achievable objectives.” On November 9, the prime minister said the military operation “will wrap up soon,” and the next day, that “our law enforcement operations in Tigray are proceeding as planned: operations will cease as soon as the criminal junta is disarmed, legitimate administration in the region restored, and fugitives apprehended and brought to justice—all of them rapidly coming within reach.” Claims that the conflict will be short-lived have also been echoed by senior American officials: U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia Michael Raynor told journalists on November 19 that “another aspect of this is the Ethiopian government continues to articulate a vision of the military conflict coming to an end fairly soon, a week or two from now.”

Despite limitations on independent reporting and the severing of most communications, the federal government has announced significant military advances, capturing a number of important towns and cities in Tigray, including Shire on November 17, Axum and Adwa on November 20, and Adigrat on November 21. The TPLF has made counterclaims: that it inflicted significant casualties on federal forces in Raya and to have repulsed federal forces in Mehoni and Zalambessa. For the federal government, taking control of the state capital of Tigray, and its largest city, Mekelle, is now the principal remaining tactical military objective.

However, even if Abiy’s military objectives are quickly achieved, experiences of warfare in northern Ethiopia dating back a century suggest that it is much easier to capture territory than it is to hold it. It is unclear what a successful strategy for the federal government will be if it is able to capture Tigray’s urban centers but cannot command the widespread acceptance of Tigray’s people. While the fighting of the last few weeks may have significantly degraded the TPLF’s military capacity, it is unlikely that the federal government can entirely subdue the TPLF as a political entity, which retains the support of a substantial number of Tigrayans. Further, the TPLF’s historic capacity to wage guerrilla warfare from the rural mountains of Tigray may not be definitively eroded by its losses in conventional warfare.

While some in the federal government have indicated that they would accept a refashioned TPLF led by moderates, external efforts to re-engineer the party may well be counterproductive and only risk further alienating some Tigrayan constituencies. Therefore, as focused on their immediate objectives and consequently as reluctant to seek dialogue and compromise as they may be, the parties in conflict may find that a negotiated settlement may ultimately be the only realistic choice, if not imminently, then in the months ahead. Moreover, the federal government must soon confront an even bigger problem in 2021: how to conduct peaceful and credible elections.

The Prospects and Difficulties of Elections

National elections are overdue and are now expected to be held next year. While in February 2020, the National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) announced that elections would be held in August 2020, by the end of March, the Board had decided to indefinitely delay the elections because of the COVID-19 pandemic. As NEBE explained, several important preparatory tasks were unable to be completed in March, meaning that the crucial voter registration exercise, which was expected to register tens of millions of prospective voters, was unable to commence in April.

Beyond the national polls, each regional state of Ethiopia is also due to hold elections for their state legislatures. It was the Tigray region’s decision to proceed with organizing its own elections in September, in defiance of the federal government and without the oversight and participation of the NEBE, that contributed to a deterioration of relations between Tigray and Addis Ababa, and which was a further step toward the violence now occurring.

Even without the impact of COVID-19 and the situation in Tigray, Ethiopia’s next national elections are fraught with difficulty. The polls are expected to be the first competitive elections since 2005 and raise fundamental questions about the future order of the Ethiopian state. Abiy’s new political vehicle, the Ethiopian Prosperity Party, is the national frontrunner, constructed from the former Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front ruling coalition, which was once led by the TPLF. Apart from the TPLF, a number of new opposition political parties are expected to contest the polls.

The challenges faced in administering elections are significant. The first problem is one of election administration, operations and reform: a rush to organize elections in early 2021, as some have suggested, may easily worsen the political situation across the country, as in such a limited time, elections are unlikely to be effectively administered. In May, the NEBE proposed two scenarios on which to base a prospective electoral calendar: the first required 224 days to prepare for and conduct elections, and the second required 276 days. However, at the end of October, NEBE proposed that the elections be held in late May or June 2021, contingent on beginning poll worker training in December and voter registration in January.

As early as December 2018, a USAID pre-elections assessment found that “there is a lack of consensus about specific solutions and timing of reforms in relation to the election cycle, and that information about and support for the reforms is inconsistent. The reform process has been largely elite-driven and concentrated in Addis Ababa, and there is a lack of clarity on a specific road map to achieving the goals set out by the prime minister.” While there has been some important progress since that assessment was made, conducting elections in Ethiopia will be the largest democratic exercise in the country’s history; the technical challenges should not be underestimated and cannot easily be expedited. More recently, NEBE has noted that the possibility of constitutional and electoral reform could also complicate the electoral calendar and has warned, “Preparations for electoral process based on [an] unstable timeline are not advisable. Only once these processes [of constitutional and electoral reform] are completed should an electoral timeline be consulted and announced, and preparations begin in earnest.”

The second, more profound problem in conducting elections concerns broader needs for security, trust, reconciliation, and the ability of Ethiopians to freely engage in open political discourse, debate, and campaigning. Even before the conflict with Tigray, there were more than 1.8 million internally displaced persons in Ethiopia. In May, Amnesty International reported that at least 10,000 people had been “arbitrarily arrested and detained last year as part of the government’s crackdown on armed attacks and violence in Oromia Region,” and in July, that another 5,000 had been arrested following protests the previous month. A number of prominent political figures and journalists were jailed before the Tigray conflict began, and more arrests of journalists have followed this month.

For their part, American officials have asserted that the conflict in Tigray has served to unite Ethiopians. Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Tibor Nagy told journalists on November 19 that “it seems like [the conflict in Tigray] has brought the Ethiopian nation together, at least for the time being, in support of the prime minister …” Ambassador Raynor added that “the rest of the country actually remains quite calm at present, no indications of anyone taking up comparable actions elsewhere, and in fact the opposite. Seemingly both regional governments, federal governments, and large swaths of the people galvanizing around the [federal] government.”

Unfortunately, violence has continued elsewhere in Ethiopia. In a recent tragic incident, the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission reported that at least 34 people were killed in a November 14 attack on a bus in Benishangul. Further, as the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs pointed out on November 20, “Humanitarian partners in Ethiopia are further concerned about the increasing report of violence in Oromia and Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples (SNNP) regions. Violent incidents involving unidentified armed groups have been reported on an almost daily basis, mainly in the Western Oromia region, while several thousand people were reportedly displaced by inter-communal violence in Konso zone, SNNPR on 16 November.” Alas, any short-term increase in perceived or real Ethiopian national unity resulting from the current Tigray confrontation does little to address the problems of arbitrary detention or intercommunal violence elsewhere in the country.

For successful elections to be held, credibly and non-coercively addressing both insecurity and the underlying grievances behind the violence will be essential. An adequate response necessitates efforts at reconciliation, justice, and inclusive dialogue. While wider questions of reconciliation, reform, and elections cannot be the first point on the agenda in any eventual negotiations between the federal government and the TPLF, discussing them cannot be indefinitely avoided, either. More importantly, discussions on such issues must include many more political and civil actors beyond those now in conflict if at least a degree of national consensus is to be achieved. Squaring the electoral preparations and timetable with a plan for reconciliation and national dialogue may thus be imperative for a peaceful future in Ethiopia.

Etiopia risikerer langvarig geriljakrig. Jakt på opprørsledere har startet.

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Aftenposten | Tor Arne Andreassen

Hovedstaden i Tigray er blitt erobret av regjeringshæren. En langvarig geriljakrig kan bli det neste for Etiopia. Flyktninger som kommer til Sudan mangler nesten alt.

Etiopias statsminister Abiy Ahmed erklærte lørdag at «den militære operasjonen i Tigray er fullført». Det gjorde han etter at regjeringshæren hadde tatt kontroll over Mekele, hovedstaden i opprørsprovinsen Tigray.

Men opprørerne i Tigray-folkets frigjøringsfront (TPLF) nekter å gi seg. TPLFs leder Debretsion Gebremichael opplyser til Reuters at deres styrker har trukket seg ut av Mekele, men at de vil fortsette å kjempe. Dermed risikerer man en langvarig geriljakrig.

Gebremichael omtaler opprøret som en kamp for regionens selvbestemmelsesrett. Tigrayene utgjør bare cirka 6 prosent av Etiopias multietniske befolkning. Likevel har TPLF en historie som en dominerende kraft i Etiopias rikspolitikk de siste 30 årene.

Ikke ukjent med geriljakrig

Det fjellrike Tigray har tradisjon for geriljakrig. TPLF kjempet i årevis mot det marxistiske styret til Mengistu Haile Mariam, inntil de fikk ham styrtet i 1991.

– Selv om det er uklart hvor mye det er igjen at sikkerhetsstyrkene i Tigray, kan det være at den væpnede motstanden mot sentralmakten vil bli støttet av regionens myndigheter, partiapparat, inkludert lokale militser og andre nasjonalistiske elementer, sier senioranalytiker Will Davison i tenketanken International Crisis Group til Reuters.

Les mer her.

Etiopisk offensiv mot Tigray fullført lørdag, hevder statsminister Abiy Ahmed

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Aftenposten | Etiopias statsminister hevder opprøret i Tigray-provinsen er slått ned. Men opprørerne forsikrer at de vil fortsette å kjempe.

Granatene regnet over Mekele med en halv million innbyggere, der Tigray-folkets frigjøringsfront (TPLF) har sitt hovedsete.

De etiopiske regjeringsstyrkene har omringet byen. Regjeringen, med fredsprisvinner Abiy Ahmed i spissen, ga hæren ordre om å angripe allerede torsdag.

Lørdag kveld skriver Ahmed på Twitter at den militære operasjonen i Tigray er fullført, melder nyhetsbyrået Reuters.

«Jeg er glad for å fortelle at vi har fullført og avsluttet den militære operasjonen i Tigray-regionen» heter det i Twitter-meldingen til statsministeren.

Meldingen er ikke bekreftet av uavhengige kilder.

Les mer her.

(©NTB)

Sudan sliter med flyktningstrømmen fra Etiopia

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Aftenposten | Sudan sliter med å ta imot titusenvis av etiopierne som har flyktet fra konflikten i Tigray-regionen nordøst i Etiopia.

Over 40.000 etiopiske krigsflyktninger har til nå tatt seg over grensen til Sudan, et av verdens fattigste land.

65 prosent av Sudans 42 millioner innbyggere lever ifølge myndighetene under fattigdomsgrensen. I tillegg er landet midt oppe i en økonomisk krise som følge av koronapandemien.

Delstatene Gedaref og Kassala øst i Sudan er spesielt hardt rammet av den økonomiske krisen. Dette er også områdene de fleste etiopierne på flukt har kommet til, etter at etiopiske regjeringsstyrker 4. november innledet en offensiv mot Tigray-folkets frigjøringsfront (TPLF).

Les mer her.

(©NTB-AFP)

‘Abiy Ahmed had to punish those seeking to break up Ethiopia’ – Djibouti President

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Source: The African Report

The deadly conflict between Ethiopia’s federal government and Tigrayan rebels continues to intensify, especially after Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed issued a warning on Sunday to surrender within 72 hours. But despite international calls for a cease in action, many regional neighbours, including the small state of Djibouti, are supporting the PM’s stance.

With less than five months to go before the presidential election, Djibouti’s head of state takes stock of his efforts to tackle economic and social issues, internal opposition, a war in Ethiopia and the country’s relations with China, France and the United States.

The virus quietly arrived in Djibouti one evening in mid-March 2020, aboard a Spanish military plane that had taken off from Seville. Eight months later, the silent killer continues to lurk in spite of the health authorities’ swift implementation of the “three Ts” (test, trace and treat), with 8% of the country’s population tested to date, i.e., the highest rate in the region.

Economic slowdown

Though the government of this city-state with 1 million residents has taken an optimistic view of the future – it forecasts a return to growth in 2021 – the fallout of the COVID-19 pandemic is weighing heavily on its economy, which was in full swing before it ground to a halt. The Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway line, one of the country’s essential arteries, is running on a reduced schedule, while the stately hotel located in the continent’s largest free zone, just a few kilometres away from the capital, remains hopelessly empty.

But according to Aboubaker Omar Hadi, president of the Djibouti Ports & Free Zones Authority and one of Ismaïl Omar Guelleh’s closest associates, “It’s merely a setback, our fundamentals are strong.”

“Fundamentals”? The former French colony is ideally located along the world’s second-busiest shipping route, a gateway to trade with a wide swath of Africa, backed by a market of 400 million people. Its strategic geographic location is also a coveted spot for foreign military bases. Lastly, it also has political stability going for it: contrary to what happens elsewhere, Djibouti’s elections aren’t highly tense affairs.

Unshakeable calm

These advantages – combined with a government that the opposition calls authoritarian and which, it’s true, prioritises development and the fight against endemic poverty and unemployment over the expansion of freedoms – explain the unshakeable calm of President Guelleh, 73, who has been running the country since 1999.

Although he still refuses to say as much, no one in Djibouti has any doubt that the leader, who welcomed one of our reporters at the presidential palace for a long interview, will stand for re-election next April. He is the clear favourite, as if the exercise were a one-horse race.

Among the numerous Djibouti hub development projects you have launched in recent months in spite of the pandemic, ranging from the new Damerjog oil terminal to the capital’s business district, not to mention the ship maintenance yard, one in particular has attracted a lot of attention: the road corridor connecting the Port of Tadjoura to northern Ethiopia. Are you looking to gain a competitive edge over Eritrea’s Port of Massawa, which underwent a major renovation after the thaw in relations between Addis Ababa and Asmara?

Ismaïl Omar Guelleh: In the long run, yes, we always need to be a few steps ahead. But competition between Djibouti and Eritrea isn’t imminent: connecting Massawa via a modern railway line requires extremely costly and complex rehabilitation, upgrading and construction works given the region’s hilly topography.

Another competitor, one that poses a greater short-term challenge, is the Port of Berbera in Somaliland, in which your former partner, the Emirati company DP World, plans to invest massively.

Massively? I haven’t heard anything of the sort so far, other than project proposals. DP World excels at creating buzz, but then, in the end, nothing happens. You don’t even see the slightest crane in the sky. We are paid to know.

On that note, how is the commercial dispute between Djibouti and DP World, which you sidelined from managing the Port of Doraleh two years back, going?

The court proceedings are still under way in London and will perhaps begin soon in the United States. These people who stubbornly refuse to sit down and have a discussion with us aren’t interested in money. They’re too rich for that. What they want is for their old monopoly status to be fully reinstated. Their attitude stems from a desire to wield geopolitical control over all the region’s ports. But Djibouti isn’t just another square on a chessboard: we will not go back to the way things were.

In mid-September, you launched the Djibouti Sovereign Fund, which will be funded to the tune of $1.5bn over the next decade and whose sole shareholder is the government. Usually, sovereign wealth funds are the prerogative of rich countries. What is the point of the fund?

“We don’t have oil, but we have ideas”: do you remember that French saying from the 1970s? Well, that’s us, too. I asked Lionel Zinsou and Donald Kaberuka to conduct a feasibility study, one that draws on successful sovereign wealth funds, such as those created by Senegal and Singapore.
What we want to do is free ourselves somewhat from conventional debt-driven growth models, pool our domestic resources to create a leverage effect, attract new financing, promote business and job creation, and, lastly, increase our overall wealth.

The Djibouti Sovereign Fund is up and running now. The implementing decrees have been signed. The team is in place and headed by a former Senegalese official specialising in these matters, whom I poached from President Macky Sall with his authorisation. This fund, which I directly oversee, belongs to Djibouti and the Djiboutian people.

The debt Djibouti owes China has for a long time been seen as excessive. Is this still the case today?

Our “Chinese debt” is much lower than what some have said. It amounts to $450m, compared with Ethiopia’s $16bn and Kenya’s $20bn. We have worked really hard on debt restructuring and servicing. The company managing the Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway line, which is the main source of this debt, will be privatised, with Ethiopia and Djibouti retaining ownership of the infrastructure.

Is the railway line profitable?

To make a profit, it needs to reach a frequency of 10 trains a day as soon as possible. That’s our aim. For the time being, because of the COVID-19 pandemic, we are seeing a rate of two to three trains a day.

Youth employment and inclusive growth are the main challenges facing your country, which has a structural poverty rate that encompasses almost 40% of the population. How are you addressing these challenges?

We are constantly working to implement a wide range of measures in the areas of affordable housing, health, education and professional training. The share of the population suffering from what is called “multidimensional poverty” has decreased by more than 15% over the past eight years, especially in rural areas. GDP per capita, which indicates the purchasing power of Djiboutians, has risen by 10% over the same period.

These statistics are encouraging, but we’re not there yet. Our goal is to triple per capita income within 15 years. Social well-being needs to increase in line with our economic growth.

Are you starting to see the beginnings of a middle class?

“Beginnings” is the right word. The cost of living here is high, mostly due to the cost of energy, which is why there are a growing number of wind and solar energy projects.

Ethiopia is a key economic partner for Djibouti. Since Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed took power in 2018, this country of 110 million people is caught between centrifugal forces that threaten its unity. Are you concerned about the situation?

Of course. From the days of the Ethiopian Empire through Meles Zenawi’s leadership, not to mention Mengistu Haile Mariam’s dictatorship, “togetherness” has always been the exception, not the rule, in the country. One group has always dominated another. Ahmed, whose intentions were good, tried to change that. He’s a born optimist, both a politician, military man and very devout evangelical Christian.

But he is coming up against heavy resistance, particularly in the Tigray region, where the population lives under the rule of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front [TPLF]. So, the situation is difficult. That said, our personal and bilateral relations are good.

On 4 November, Ahmed launched a military offensive against the Tigray forces. Was war the only solution?

Let’s try to put ourselves in Ahmed’s shoes. Ethiopia is faced with a major problem: a political organisation known as the TPLF is stripping its federal authority and has structured itself so as to bring the central government to its knees.

Ethiopia’s prime minister has two options to choose from: one, he can negotiate with Tigray’s government, with each party separate and on an equal footing. This can only lead to the partition of Ethiopia, as it will set a precedent under which other regional groups will be able to assert their own secessionist claims. Two, he can restore law and order at the federal level, and punish those seeking to break up the country.

I think Ahmed has taken the second route, which will allow the population to elect their own leaders. That’s why he moved to replace the regional administration and dissolved Tigray’s parliament. It’s clear that as a country that shares its borders with Ethiopia and could thus be impacted by the conflict, Djibouti has one single wish: that peace be restored.

Al-Shabaab, a terrorist group that holds sway in Somalia, is considered al-Qaida’s best organised and most active arm in the world. How is it that this militia continues to pose such a threat, despite the presence of a military mission of 22,000 men – including a contingent from Djibouti – and numerous US drone strikes?

We haven’t yet managed to eliminate the leaders of this terrorist group. But we must, because Al-Shabaab has expanded its influence to the criminal economy, to the extent that it has become a sort of mafia. In the Port of Mogadishu, few containers escape their control: they tax, racketeer, traffic and, more than anything else, corrupt many important figures. They use refugee camps as a recruitment channel, offering young unemployed people food while also indoctrinating, training and arming them.

Legislative elections are scheduled to be held in Somalia in 2021. I fear we will end up with a parliament indirectly controlled by Al-Shabaab because they’ll have bought the support of some of the MPs. The risk that this group poses for the entire region has never been greater.

And Djibouti, with its foreign military bases, is a choice target for these terrorists, who have previously attacked Kenya and Uganda . . .

Yes, that’s clear. They attacked us in 2014. But we’re extremely vigilant, and our intelligence and security agencies are always on high alert.

What gives us the upper hand is that these extremists have virtually no ties to our population: when they try to infiltrate our communities, they are quickly spotted. Also, to get to Djibouti, they have to slip through the net of the Puntland and Somaliland police forces.

Why has the restoration of diplomatic relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea still not had the slightest positive effect on your relationship with Eritrea’s president, Issayas Afeworki?

I met with Issayas in Jeddah in September 2018, but neither the Saudi’s mediation team nor Ahmed’s efforts produced a “peace of the braves”. This is despite the fact that I took the step of releasing 19 Eritrean prisoners of war, which Asmara didn’t want, it seems.

The only explanation I see for this stonewalling is a psychological one: Issayas is unyielding and resentful, and we won’t repeat the exercise. The former Ethiopian prime minister, Meles Zenawi, had warned me: “Once you’re mad at him, he never forgets.”

Several Arab Muslim countries – Bahrain, Sudan and the United Arab Emirates – have announced they are normalising relations with Israel. Will Djibouti follow suit?

No, because the conditions aren’t ripe. We neither have a problem with the Jews as a people nor the Israelis as a nation. Some of them even come to Djibouti on business with their passport, and Djibouti’s citizens have been able to travel to Israel for 25 years now.

However, we take issue with the Israeli government because they’re denying Palestinians their inalienable rights. All we ask that the government do is make one gesture of peace, and we will make 10 in return. But I’m afraid they’ll never do that.

The US has raised concerns about your relations with China on several occasions. It has even been reported that an American general suggested that Beijing had “purchased” the Port of Djibouti. Have these suspicions been cleared up?

They were totally baseless, but I’m not sure they’ve gone away. For instance, we don’t understand why the $25m loan the World Bank promised us in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic has taken so long to materialise. The president of the World Bank, David Malpass, is a US citizen. Is there a causal connection? I wonder.

And yet you agreed to let the US army occupy the largest foreign military base in Djibouti. Don’t these kinds of activities sometimes encroach on your sovereignty?

We see to it that that doesn’t happen, but it’s not always easy. In 2013, we allowed the United States to use the French military’s Chabelley Airfield, located some 10 kilometres from Djibouti-Ambouli International Airport, as a base for their unmanned aircraft. Since then, the base has become exclusively reserved for the US military.

No one can get in, neither us nor the French. It’s a problem we need to sort out.

You’ve often complained that France doesn’t show much interest in Djibouti, including economically speaking. Has that changed since French President Emmanuel Macron’s visit in March 2019?

Not really, unfortunately. In East Africa, the French only seem interested in Kenya and Ethiopia, with mixed results. Of course, the French electric utility company Engie is investing in Djibouti’s solar and wind power sector, and a delegation from MEDEF [a French business confederation] plans to pay us a visit in January. That’s better than nothing.

But I think that Paris should realise that Djibouti is more than just a strategic geographic location. Djibouti also has a position in the global economy. Others have come to this realisation, and an increasing number of young Djiboutians speak English, which is the language of business in our corner of the world.

Djibouti forcefully pushed to get a seat as a non-permanent member on the UN Security Council but was pipped at the post by Kenya last June. How did you feel about that?

We felt it was unfair and that the African Union had failed us, as they weren’t able to handle the problem. Kenya forced its way through, with the complicity of some Southern African countries, by casting aside every best practice. Nairobi spent a lot of money to get that seat. However, we did manage to prevent our rival from securing a majority and we’ve learned our lesson for next time. You can rest assured that we’ll try again.

Why are you so adamant about putting Djibouti on the world stage? You’ve opened close to 50 embassies, which is a substantial number for a small country of 1 million residents.

Because that’s the only way for us to avoid getting swallowed up in the melting pot of globalisation!

Thirty years ago, Djibouti was only on the map for the former colonial power. Today, we’re on the cusp of becoming a global hub. It’s a matter of political will.

Six months back, a Djiboutian air force pilot named Fouad Youssouf Ali was extradited from Ethiopia. He has been detained in Djibouti ever since, and his fate has troubled some members of the public as well as human rights activists, who consider him a political prisoner. When will he be tried?

He’ll be tried, but justice takes time here, just as in France. As for the rest, this person isn’t a prisoner of conscience. He’s a former air force lieutenant and deserter who tried to fly a plane to reach Eritrea, meaning hostile territory, but ultimately fled to Ethiopia. Can you name a single other country that wouldn’t have charged such a person under the same circumstances?

His prison conditions have sparked concern in Djibouti and Ali Sabieh, the city he’s from. Could the conflict between the Issa and Afar clans, which caused so much harm to the country at the beginning of the 1990s, rear its head again?

Over the past 20 or so years, we have made every effort to strengthen our sense of national unity and to instil a spirit of citizenship. There have never been more interclan marriages between the Issas and Afars than there are today. If there’s one point we are perfectly at ease with, it’s that one.

Why does Djibouti still not have any private, independent media outlets?

Because it’s expensive, quite simply, and the market is small. A few projects are under way in the digital sphere, but the financing capabilities in this area are nowhere near those of Somalia, where tribal solidarity is fully intact.

An online media outlet close to the opposition, “La voix de Djibouti” [The Voice of Djibouti], regularly complains that its journalists are harassed by the police. Isn’t such a practice counter to the principle of freedom of expression enshrined in Djibouti’s constitution?

That media outlet isn’t close to the opposition; it’s an opposition website based in Brussels, Belgium. The correspondents you are talking about aren’t registered journalists, but instead nobodies – some of whom are barely literate – presenting themselves as such. For that matter, we haven’t jailed anyone.

You’re confronted with a determined opposition, whose leaders are divided, including when it comes to their methods of action. Do you benefit from that?

I think it’s too bad. Every democracy needs an opposition that believes in discussion, comparing policies and the country’s future. Our opposition can be summed up by the slogan “Me or chaos”. Whether it’s Daher Ahmed Farah, Abdourahman Mohamed Guelleh or Adan Mohamed Abdou, none of them abide by the rules for forming a party. A party isn’t just some group you register with a founder and 10 or so members that never holds a convention. But we prefer to look the other way.

This state of things came about because the Islamist faction of this coalition, MoDeL [Movement for Democracy and Freedom] – the local chapter of the Muslim Brotherhood – used religion as a mobilising force. We have taken the necessary measures to reduce its impact. The coalition’s main leaders have left Djibouti for Turkey and Canada, where they have nothing other than Facebook to try to indoctrinate followers.

As for sermons, their content is strictly regulated and comes under the exclusive remit of the Ministry of Muslim Affairs. Sermons are sent to each mosque by email, and imams can’t add a single word to them during Friday prayers. I think the French authorities would do well to follow in our footsteps in this regard. It’s the only way to prevent extremism from thriving.

But there isn’t just the main weekly prayer. What about the other sermons?

In Djibouti, imams and muezzins are civil servants paid by the state. If they let a person use their platform to glorify violence and jihad and utter slogans and insults, they’ll be held accountable for it and immediately punished. In this sense, you could say that we have them by the strings. But there’s less and less of a need for us to do this because our religious leaders are increasingly better trained and educated. They realise that true Islam is about knowledge and tolerance.

The presidential election is scheduled to take place in April 2021. Will you stand for a fifth term?

I can’t state my position on that matter at this time. We have to let the country and administration do what they have to do. I’ll make an announcement very shortly, inshallah.

As you must know, no one in Djibouti has any doubt about your stance on that point . . .

Really? Well, give me a bit of time to answer.

‘We call on the EU to appoint a Horn of Africa envoy’

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EU Observer | Dear Excellencies Charles Michel (president of the EU Council), Ursula von der Leyen (president of the EU Commission) and David Sassoli (president of the European Parliament),

A call to the EU to urgently engage in peace efforts for the Horn of Africa.

The European Union must immediately appoint senior high-level envoys for the Horn of Africa to engage in and provide support to international, in particular African, efforts to curb the crisis in the Horn of Africa.

The UN has called for an immediate ceasefire of all hostilities.

According to the UN, 4,000 people a day are fleeing to Sudan from Ethiopia.

The UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Filippo Grandi, has called for a humanitarian corridor to reach the 96,000 refugees and internally-displaced persons in refugee camps in Sudan and in northern Ethiopia.

The UN is already preparing to receive 200,000 refugees in Sudan. An old refugee camp, that served during the 1984 famine, is sadly brought in use again.

The UN secretary general, António Guterres, has stated the hope that “Ethiopia will be able to find the peace it needs for its development and the wellbeing of its people.”

This crisis rightly has the full attention of the African continent.

The chair of the African Union, Cyril Ramaphosa, has appointed three elderly statespersons as envoys: Joaquim Chissano, former president of the Republic of Mozambique; Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, former president of the Republic of Liberia, and Kgalema Motlanthe, former president of the Republic of South Africa – as special envoys of the African Union. Their efforts should be supported.

Unfortunately, the military interventions are not the only problem in the region.

After the lost harvest due to the destruction by locust swarms, food reserves are in severe jeopardy.

The conflict is now contributing to an already dire situation.

A new famine of most severe proportions is looming. The current crisis comes on top of the Covid-19 pandemic, leaving children out of school for six months already. It affects tens of thousands of children in precarious situations, often separated from parents and guardians.

Ethiopia is globally renowned for its world cultural heritage representing one of the oldest human civilisations of which Ethiopians and Africans are rightly proud.

The UNESCO world heritage site in Aksum, other heritage sites and religious centres are now under threat. This tragedy is compounded by a terrible loss of innocent lives, sexual violence and a destabilising refugee crisis.

This regional crisis in the Horn of Africa requires the immediate attention of the EU at the highest level. The EU should call on the experience of statespersons to contribute as high-level envoys to the efforts of the African Union and the UN.

Yours,

Professor Dr Mirjam van Reisen, professor of international relations, innovation and care, Tilburg University

Plus 51 other signatories.

U.N. Fears Ethiopia Purging Ethnic Tigrayan Officers From Its Peacekeeping Missions

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Foreign Policy | An internal United Nations document shows concern those troops could face torture or execution.

The Ethiopian government has been rounding up ethnic Tigrayan security forces deployed in United Nations and African peacekeeping missions abroad and forcing them onto flights to the Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa, where it is feared they may face torture or even execution, according to an internal U.N. account.

The moves come as Ethiopia is preparing a military offensive against the capital of the country’s Tigray region, Mekelle. Conflict erupted earlier this month between federal and Tigrayan forces in the ethnically divided nation, which for decades was under de facto rule by the minority Tigrayans. The alarm inside the U.N. suggests that Ethiopia’s Nobel Peace Prize-winning prime minister, Abiy Ahmed, may be expanding the country’s weekslong conflict beyond the country’s borders. It has alarmed human rights advocates and U.N. officials, who fear that the U.N. blue helmets may be persecuted upon their arrival back in Ethiopia.

The targeting of Tigrayan military officers in foreign peacekeeping and military operations comes amid rising fears that an Ethiopian government offensive against Tigrayan rebels inside Ethiopia could devolve into ethnic cleansing, with atrocities reported on both sides. The human rights watchdog Amnesty International recently issued a report detailing “the massacre of a very large number of civilians” in northern Ethiopia earlier this month, allegedly by groups loyal to the Tigrayan forces, in a grim harbinger of violence to come. Meanwhile, refugees fleeing the violence said they were targeted because they were Tigrayan.

In South Sudan earlier this month, Ethiopian soldiers disarmed a senior ethnic Ethiopian Tigrayan officer, escorted him to the capital of Juba, and forced him onto a Nov. 11 Ethiopian Airlines flight to Addis Ababa, according to the internal account, which was reviewed by Foreign Policy.

Ten days later, the Ethiopian contingent at the U.N. base in Juba reportedly detained three other Tigrayan officers. The officers, according to the internal account, “were coerced to take the Ethiopian Airlines flight from Juba to Addis Ababa. As of now their whereabouts are unknown.”

The U.N. Mission in South Sudan, or UNMISS, “has become aware that three soldiers were repatriated back to their country on Saturday without the Mission’s knowledge,” a senior U.N. official at the mission said. “Our Human Rights Division is working to follow up on their situation.”

“If there are any incidents where personnel are discriminated against or have their rights violated because of their ethnicity or they have concerns about their situation, this may involve a human rights violation under international law,” the official added. “As a result, the UNMISS Human Rights Division is currently liaising with the Ethiopian peacekeeping command in South Sudan and has requested access to any contingent personnel who might, for any reason, be compelled to return home and be in need of protection.”

The crackdown has spread to other African countries where Ethiopian peacekeepers and troops are deployed, including in Abyei, a disputed territory claimed by Sudan and South Sudan, and Somalia, where thousands of Ethiopian troops have been helping the government fight Islamist al-Shabab militants. As many as 40 Tigrayan officers and soldiers serving in the African Union Mission in Somalia have also been recalled to Ethiopia, according to one diplomatic source.

At Ethiopia’s U.N. mission in New York, the senior military attaché who oversaw peacekeeping issues, a Tigrayan, was fired after just months on the job, precipitating the purge of other Tigrayan officers from peacekeeping missions abroad, diplomatic sources said.

Ethiopia has seen deepening conflict between the country’s Tigray minority—which accounts for just over 6 percent of the population but played a dominant role in Ethiopia’s political life for decades, and whose status was reinforced under Meles Zenawi, an ethnic Tigrayan who served as prime minister and president of Ethiopia from 1991 until his death in August 2012—and the country’s largest ethnic groups including the Amhara and Oromo, who account for more than 60 percent of the county’s population.

During Meles’s tenure, Tigrayans were given key posts in the government and the military, and they continue to hold key leadership positions in overseas peacekeeping missions, raising questions about the ability of Ethiopian contingents to function following a purge. But the Tigrayans’ privileged position has been threatened since the election of Abiy, an ethnic Oromo, in 2018.

The latest crisis follows a recent dispute between the federal government and the Tigrayan regional government over the decision to postpone national and regional elections in the midst of the coronavirus pandemic. Tigray’s local leaders went ahead with an election, which resulted in the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) winning all the seats. The federal parliament declared the vote null, and federal troops are seeking to impose military control over the Tigray region.

The conflict in Ethiopia has killed hundreds—and perhaps thousands—of people and sparked a new refugee crisis in what is historically one of the most politically unstable regions of the world. Some 30,000 refugees have fled from Ethiopia into neighboring Sudan in recent weeks, fueling concerns that the new refugee influx could destabilize Sudan’s fragile transitional government.

Senior U.S. officials have called for an end to hostilities and independent investigations into the reports of civilian massacres.

“The ethnic dimension is one that everybody is very concerned about,” said Tibor Nagy, the top State Department diplomat on Africa, in a briefing with reporters on Nov. 19.

Nagy also condemned the TPLF’s reported missile attacks on neighboring Eritrea earlier this month, calling it an attempt to “internationalize the conflict” that “make[s] the situation more dangerous.”

The conflict has also taken on an economic lens. “This war is ultimately a battle for control of Ethiopia’s economy, its natural resources, and the billions of dollars the country receives annually from international donors and lenders,” Kassahun Melesse, an assistant professor of applied economics at Oregon State University, wrote recently in Foreign Policy. “Access to those riches is a function of who heads the federal government—which the TPLF controlled for nearly three decades before Abiy came to power in April 2018, following widespread protests against the TPLF-led government.”

“In other words, this is not a conflict over who gets to rule Tigray, a small region whose population accounts for a mere 6 percent of Ethiopia’s more than 110 million people,” Melesse wrote. “It is a fight over who gets to dominate the commanding heights of the country’s economy, a prize that Tigray’s regional leaders once held and are determined to recapture at any cost.”

That struggle is playing out in U.N. peacekeeping missions.

Ethiopia is one of the two largest contributors to U.N. peacekeeping missions, with more than 6,700 uniformed personnel, most serving in Darfur, Abyei, and South Sudan. Tigrayans have played a key role in U.N. peacekeeping operations.

Earlier this month, Ethiopia recalled more than 3,000 troops from Somalia to reinforce its military operations against the Tigrayans. The government disarmed between 200 and 300 Tigrayan soldiers who were posted in Somalia, U.S. and U.N. officials said.

“The peacekeepers are not being disarmed due to ethnicity but due to infiltration of TPLF elements in various entities which is part of an ongoing investigation,” an Ethiopian government task force told Reuters, which previously reported on the Tigrayan soldiers in Somalia being disarmed.

“All officers and soldiers from Tigray were arrested and detained upon arrival in Addis,” according to the U.N. account reviewed by Foreign Policy. “There are reports that some have been subjected to torture and extra-judicial killing.”

Privately, U.S. officials fear that the massive withdrawal of troops will leave Somalia, already one of the world’s most fragile states, in a precarious position and vulnerable to new offensives from terrorist groups such as al-Shabab.

In Abyei, the U.N.’s Tigrayan deputy force commander, Brig. Gen. Negassi Tikue Lewte, disappeared from the U.N.’s radar after traveling to Addis Ababa earlier this month. The brigadier general—who is serving under a U.N. contract—made a request for leave on Nov. 15. Shortly after, Ethiopia sent the U.N. a diplomatic note informing it to find another officer to fill the position.

“He was apparently recalled to Ethiopia and since then his whereabouts seem unknown,” according to the internal U.N. account.

The purge has raised complicated legal and political challenges for the U.N., which traditionally defers to foreign military contingents to manage troop rotations and handle disciplinary issues. The Ethiopian government has privately insisted that the repatriated Tigrayan troops and officers are simply on leave. But at least one of the officers, the deputy force commander in Abyei, is serving under a U.N. contract, imposing a greater responsibility on the U.N. to ensure his protection.

The U.N.’s peacekeeping department’s spokesperson, Nick Birnback, confirmed that the organization is “aware of the issue; we are very concerned and we are taking this matter extremely seriously.”

“At the moment, we are ascertaining all the relevant facts and we are or will be in touch with all relevant peace operations and governments in this regard,” Birnback added. “All troop-contributing countries have obligations under applicable international law, in accordance with relevant norms, standards and instruments.”

The Ethiopian missions in the United States did not respond to requests for comment. But human rights advocates have voiced concern about the reports.

“If reports of discriminatory Ethiopian repatriation of ethnic Tigrayan peacekeepers are true, they are deeply disturbing, given credible reports of profiling and arbitrary arrest of ethnic Tigrayans in Ethiopia,” said Louis Charbonneau, the U.N. director for Human Rights Watch.

“If the reports are confirmed, the U.N. should also consider suspending Ethiopian participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations,” Charbonneau added. “The U.N. needs to send a clear message to all governments that it will not ignore abuses against peacekeepers serving under the U.N. flag.”

Ethiopia in Turmoil

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The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) | Ann M. Fitz-Gerald

The northern region of Tigray is challenging Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s reform agenda. The prospects for peace are dim.

Distortions and misinformation have added further complexities to an already fraught confrontation between the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the federal government of Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. Two weeks after the clashes begun, a resolution to the current crisis is far from clear.

A FRAUGHT LEGACY

The challenge of pursuing transformative leadership and political change was always a tall order for Abiy. When he came to power in 2018, he inherited a model of federalism including nine ethnic-based regions spanning a population of approximately 110 million. His immediate focus was to open political space, pursue market-based reforms and make peace with neighbouring Eritrea.

Enhanced multi-ethnic representation across government dealt a blow to TPLF-heavy hierarchies. Abiy’s determination to depart from the socialist underpinnings of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front’s (EPRDF) ethnic federalist doctrine amounted to a sudden and unsavoury change of direction for a party which had not only liberated the country from the Derg, an oppressive military junta, but which had poured years of efforts into the development and implementation of a model of revolutionary ‘democratic developmental statebuilding’.

But Abiy’s administration persevered, reversing many of the former policies, systems and narratives. This irritated those who considered themselves national defenders and ‘guardians’ of visionary thinking. In the absence of any immediate reconciliation and reintegration scheme for TPLF leaders, a backlash from a bruised and unappreciated TPLF became inevitable.

SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

Within the security sector more specifically, Abiy deconstructed past practices which had retained senior TPLF officers beyond compulsory retirement. He also introduced a policy which prevented more than one member of any ethnic group from being present in every level of the military’s command structure. The implication was that many Tigrayans at mid-senior levels would not become eligible for career enhancing roles which, together with the limit on staying in one military rank for no more than 10 years, would support a gradual exodus of many mid- and senior-level officers and soldiers. While jobs were offered to those who could stay, and short-term support provided to those who departed in the form of additional months’ pay as well as allowing senior officers to retain military vehicles, this was no consolation for what the TPLF felt it deserved. Abiy subsequently issued arrest warrants for a number of these commanders who stood accused of corruption and human rights abuses. This caused further alienation from the Abiy administration.

The awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to Abiy only intensified the TPLF’s indignation. Abiy’s view was that the significant military build-up in the country’s eastern and northern commands – the latter in Tigray – was expensive and required dismantling now that peace with Eritrea had been achieved. The TPLF perceived the situation with Eritrea differently, and resisted the removal of this equipment. When crowds blocked returning equipment convoys in protest, federal troops were instructed by Abiy to stand down to avoid violence.

THE LOOMING CRISIS

The loose thread holding the TPLF to Abiy’s government was finally broken in 2019 when the government rebranded the ruling coalition as the ‘Prosperity Party’ – a move which sought to involve representatives from all nine regional states, five of which had not been encompassed by the previous EPRDF coalition party. The TPLF severed all ties and gradually focused more on the region.

When the country’s electoral commission took a decision to postpone the federal elections because of the pandemic, the TPLF challenged Abiy’s legitimacy. But the electoral commission exercised an independent decision, which was supported by a unanimous vote in parliament, citing challenges of the country’s weak capacity to manage the pandemic while supporting, what was anticipated to be, an election with the highest voter turnout in the country’s history. Still, Tigray forged ahead with what the federal government deemed an illegal regional election which excluded the two main regional opposition parties and produced a landslide victory for the TPLF.

Refusing to accept the decision taken by parliament and the constitutional inquiry bodies to postpone the election, the TPLF called all its government employees, ministers and parliamentarians back to their region on 5 October – the date, prior to these decisions, of the end of Abiy’s first term in office. Added to the mix was the TPLF’s demand that any dialogue with the federal government be overseen by a caretaker administration which did not include Abiy.

The move of governance capacity back to Tigray’s capital, Mekelle, meant that prospects for a negotiated arrangement were fast disappearing. Refusing to afford any legal basis to Tigray’s newly elected regional assembly, the House of Federation (the upper house of the federal parliament) unanimously passed a bill calling for regional funding disbursements to be routed to more local Tigrayan authorities, bypassing the TPLF-controlled central regional government in Mekelle. The TPLF described this as a ‘declaration of war’ by the federal government.

THE BREAKDOWN

On 4 November, following a discussion between Abiy and the Tigray regional president Debretsion Gebremichael, a government cargo plane carrying monthly army rations, and billions of new birr currency to furnish regional banks and support the salaries of personnel in the northern command, landed in Mekelle. What followed were synchronised attacks on all levels of command posts under the federal northern command. Government reports indicate that insiders loyal to the TPLF cooperated with regional militia in killing non-Tigrayan officers and soldiers and demanding that others surrender their weapons.  A senior associate of the TPLF leadership later claimed responsibility for the attack in a video which has since been withdrawn from the internet. Hours following the attack, Abiy deployed federal defence forces to ‘secure law and order in the region and to apprehend those implicated in mass corruption and gross human rights violations’.

Whereas one could ask whether or not the attack on the barracks constituted the crossing of a ‘red line’ – and whether there was scope to avoid confrontation – the federal government’s decision to deploy troops appeared to be based on what it felt had been the exhaustion of all other non-military instruments of power in efforts to appease the TPLF. Citing TPLF links to instability elsewhere in the country, conscious of the northern command’s heavy artillery and long-range weapons, and the scope for further casualties, it was clear that Abiy felt compelled to authorise the use of force. Hundreds of combatants and civilians have died, a flood of refugees has moved towards Sudan, political prisoners have been taken hostage and humanitarian corridors have become threatened.

AN INTERNATIONAL ROLE?

The TPLF’s latest rocket attacks on the Eritrean capital of Asmara appear to be an attempt to internationalise the conflict and lay the ground for an international response. Calls for a ceasefire, mediation, dialogue and negotiations have all been made. The Ethiopian government has stated that it will not sit down to negotiations with what it describes as ‘criminals’. The situation leaves only two options for an international response: calls for a swift and peaceful resolution of differences, or external intervention. While the former would be in the context of Ethiopia’s internal mechanisms of conflict resolution, the latter would involve taking sides – which, at this stage, should be avoided at all costs.

Any option moving forward, including weapons decommissioning, would need to consider the country’s important traditional and cultural dialogue processes, deep inter-federal issues, trust deficiencies and linguistic differences. Above all, the voice of the Tigrayan people is key.

Still, inaction is not without its merits as well. For if it becomes clear that the TPLF will be afforded no standing by the international community, they may agree on an internal ceasefire arrangement, and possibly an independent truth and reconciliation commission, perhaps overseen by traditional and religious leaders.

However, with both sides now facing the inevitability of further civilian casualties, and as long as the TPLF believes that there is a way of forcing the hand of both the international community and the federal government, prospects for a peaceful solution remain bleak.

The views expressed in this Commentary are the author’s, and do not represent those of RUSI or any other institution.

Are Emirati Armed Drones Supporting Ethiopia from an Eritrean Air Base?

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Source: Billing Cat | November 19, 2020

Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed declares that the war in the Tigray Region has entered its “final phase”.

The conflict broke out on November 4 when the country’s central government accused the region’s local authorities of holding “illegal” elections and seizing a military base. Thousands of civilians have fled to neigbouring Sudan as the federal army advances towards the regional capital of Mekelle.

Tigray politicians have claimed that they are under attack “on several fronts” — including neighbouring Eritrea, with which the region shares a long border. As Regional President Debretsion Gebremichael recently told Reuters, “our country is attacking us with a foreign country, Eritrea. Treason!”

Getachew Reda, a senior advisor to Gebremichael, made more detailed claims about the use of drones:

The Ethiopian Prime Minister has only stated that the Air Force conducted ‘targeted strikes’  against the militants without specifying the weapons used.

Could Emirati drones or other drones have been used in these airstrikes?

So far, there’s no evidence for that particular claim.

Satellite imagery obtained by Bellingcat suggests that the United Arab Emirates air base in Assab, Eritrea is indeed home to drones consistent with China’s Wing Loong II model of armed uncrewed aerial vehicles.

The imagery, provided by Planet Labs, shows a drone with a wingspan of just over 20 metres, matching the features of the drone model produced by China’s Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group.

The UAE acquired Wing Loong II drones in 2017. They have also used the drones to conduct operations in Yemen in the war against various militant groups, including the Houthis.

Satellite imagery from Planet Labs. Used with permission

The drones seen in these images are consistent with those operated by the UAE. Furthermore, the recently built drone hangars at the base suggest a larger presence of drones in the area, though their active deployment over Ethiopia is not yet confirmed. However, the imagery provides a strong indication of the possibility for their use. However, the Ethiopian Air Force also operates Russian-made MiG-23 and Sukhoi-27 jet fighters and attack helicopters that could also have been used in the strikes.

Footage uploaded via Facebook and shared Deutsche Welle’s Amharic-language service indicated that jet fighters have been active around Mekelle, where they are claimed to be involved in airstrikes:

The birth of a drone base

Drones aren’t new to this region. In 2015, what is likely a Chinese-produced Wing Loong I drone was spotted at the Assab airbase. This model is the predecessor of the Wing Loong II, which only entered service after 2018.

In 2016 an analysis by Stratfor detailed the construction of the base and its growth for both aerial and naval capabilities, providing the UAE with operational capability for its campaign in Yemen. Once again, satellite imagery shows a Wing Loong I drone standing outside two drone shelters at the north side of the tarmac.

A Sentinel-2 timelapse of the base comparing January 2017 with November 2020 reveals the large scale expansion of the base’s infrastructure.

Timelapse image: Sentinel Hub / Creative Commons

Two drone hangars were constructed sometime in April 2018, but in November 2019, a third hangar appeared on Sentinel-2 imagery.

The construction and lease of the base to the UAE by Eritrea has been condemned by the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea as a violation of the UN arms embargo on the two Horn of Africa states.

The current Planet Labs imagery also shows three crates next to the hangars at Assab Airbase, which could be evidence of shipping. Similar crates are used for the US-produced MQ-9 Reaper drones, as shown in an image released by the British Ministry of Defence.

According to the Twitter OSINT investigator Obretix, similar containers have also been noticed at other bases with confirmed Wing Loong II drones, such as in Egypt:

Furthermore, similar crates are visible on satellite imagery from this airbase in Iraq, which hosts US MQ-1 Grey Eagle and MQ-9  Reaper drones:

The UAE have also operated Wing Loong II drones over Libya in support of the opposition Libyan National Army (LNA) lead by the warlord Khalifa Haftar. According to the UN, at least 800 drone strikes in support of the LNA had taken place by November 2019, some of which had claimed civilian casualties. Satellite imagery confirms their presence on bases both in Libya as well as in Egypt.

The UAE also operates the US-produced General Atomic Predator XP unarmed drones. Moreover, the outgoing Trump administration has just approved the sales of MQ-9 Reaper drones to the UAE, provoking protest from human rights groups due to the Emirates’ poor human rights record and the relentless airstrikes by a Saudi and UAE led coalition in Yemen, which has caused high numbers of civilian casualties.

There are also media reports that Ethiopia has procured Chinese CH-4 armed drones, yet so far no open-source confirmation has been found which might indicate the presence of drones at known bases of the Ethiopian airforce. However, other clues could take the form of information from communications stations or satellite imagery showing the aforementioned shipping containers, as explained here by the Bard Center for the Study of the Drone.

Possible, but improbable

In sum, the claims made by the Tigray forces are not impossible, but so far they seem improbable.

Satellite imagery confirms the presence of Chinese-produced drones at the UAE’s military base in Assab, but that is all it confirms. There is currently no further evidence that these same drones have been involved in operations in support of the Ethiopian airforce, though there have been confirmed sightings of Ethiopian jet fighters in the conflict zone.

With thanks to Adam Rawnsley @arawnsley and Frank Slijper @FrankSlijper for feedback