Tag Archive for: Politics
WikipediaThe Four Constitutions of Ethiopia
The Four Constitutions of Ethiopia Full content here. Introduction: A brief history of the constitutions of Ethiopia For most part of its history, Ethiopian governance was guided by two key…
Kapuściński and the Autocrats
Source: Book and Film Globe | Neal Pollack
The late Polish journalist, like no other writer, understood societies in crisis
Everyone’s busy checking Orwell out of the library and pretending to read 1984 right now, because apparently we live in an “Orwellian” reality. But if you really want to understand, or at least try to understand, what’s going on in America, I recommend reading Ryszard Kapuściński instead. Kapuściński was a Polish journalist who had more courage on an average Tuesday than you or I have had in our entire lives. He spent decades reporting from the most dangerous war zones on Earth. He would find what’s going on in the States tragic and comic in equal measure. Kapuściński saw what really happens when societies descend into revolt.
[…] Kapuściński had many specialities as a writer, but his best literary trick was explaining autocrats, how they work, and how societies function under them. In particular, his masterpieces, Shah of Shahs, about the end of the Iranian monarchy and the rise of the caliphate, and The Emperor, about the terrifying reign of Ethopia’s monarch Halie Selassie, can help shed some understanding on what’s going on today.
[…]
The Emperor
Ethiopia doesn’t exist in the American consciousness at all, except for guilt-making commercial pleas for aid during period famines, and as the source of culinary delicacies like injera bread and zilzil tibs for urban sophisticates. In the middle of the 20th century, though, it was a larger player on the world stage, first because Mussolini’s Italy invaded it, in a precursor to World War II. Then it’s “Emperor”, Halie Selassie, became a favored pet among the Western elite, even receiving Time’s “Man of the Year” award for resisting Mussolini even though he was hiding in the English town of Bath at the time.
In reality, as Kapuściński writes in his brilliant book The Emperor, Selassie was merely a savvy bureaucrat who wheedled his way to the throne, whispering society to bend to his whims and stealing countless billions to deposit into Swiss bank accounts. Whereas Shah of Shahs is a more on-the-ground “you are there” style of book, The Emperor comes in after Selassie death in 1975, when it’s relatively safe to talk about him and his misdeeds. Kapuściński, who covered Ethiopia during Selassie’s reign as well, seeks out the surviving members of Selassie’s court, as well as some of his former servants, to provide an account of life in the insanely privileged court of a country suffering from inconceivable poverty and starvation.
The pattern is somewhat similar to Iran’s: an elaborate system of favors and rewards, hoodwinking naive Westerners into donating capital and cash, and absolute incompetence at every level of society. Monstrous violence follows. Eventually, and pathetically, Selassie falls in a military coup. The palace empties. The Emperor has no clothes.
Aftermath
Kapuściński is equally harsh on these societies after the autocrats fall. What replaces the strongman is often just as murderous as before, if not more so. The mullah-ruled Iran is a mess of repression, spying, superstition, renunciations, and meaningless, bloody street demonstrations. In post-Selassie Ethiopia, he writes of the bizarre phenomenon of “fetasha“, which authorizes every citizen to search every other citizen at all times, without explanation:
“To get things under control, to disarm the opposition, the authorities order a complete fetasha [Amharic for search], covering everyone. We are searched incessantly. On the street, in the car, in front of the house, in the house, in the street, in front of the post office, in front of an office building, going into the editor’s office, the movie theatre, the church, in front of the bank, in front of the restaurant, in the market place, in the park. Anyone can search us because we don’t know who has the right and who hasn’t, and asking only makes thing worse. It’s better to give in. Somebody’s always searching us. Guys in rags with sticks, who don’t say anything, but only stop us and hold out their arms, which is the signal for us to do the same: get ready to be searched. They take everything out of our briefcases and pockets, look at it, act surprised, screw up their faces, nod their heads, whisper advice to each other. They frisk us: back, stomach, legs, shoes. And then what? Nothing, we can go on, until the next spreading of arms, until the next fetasha. The next one might be only a few steps on, and the whole thing starts all over again. The searchers never give you an acquittal, a general clearance, absolution. Every few minutes, every few steps, we have to clear ourselves again.”
[…]
Ten Elections to Watch in 2021
Source: Council of Foreign Affairs | by James M. Lindsay
- Ethiopian Parliamentary Elections, 2021.
Ethiopians were supposed to go to the polls this past August. That vote was postponed, however, ostensibly because of COVID-19. If the vote is held in 2021, it will take place amid considerable turmoil. In late 2019, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed merged the ruling government coalition into a single political party. It includes nearly every major ethnic party except for the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). The TPLF, which dominated Ethiopian politics before Abiy took office, refused to join. In September, Tigray, which accounts for 6 percent of Ethiopia’s population, defied the federal government and held regional elections. Two months later, Abiy claimed that Tigrayans had attacked a military base. He ordered military retaliation in response and quickly claimed that federal control had been reestablished over Tigray. Fighting has continued, however, and some 50,000 Tigrayans have been displaced. Meanwhile, ethnic violence is rising elsewhere in Ethiopia. Abiy was once seen as a leader who would bring stability and prosperity to Ethiopia—he was awarded the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize. Now he looks to have turned in an autocratic direction by detaining opposition leaders and suppressing political freedoms. The Nobel Peace Prize Committee went so far as to rebuke him, saying it was “deeply concerned” by the situation in Tigray.
2. Ecuadoran General Election, February 7.
3. Dutch General Election, March 17.
4. Peruvian General Election, April 11.
5. Iraqi Parliamentary Elections, June 6.
6. Iranian Presidential Election, June 18.
7. Zambian General Election, August 12.
8. Hong Kong Legislative Council Elections, September 5.
9. German Federal Election, September 26.
10. Nicaraguan General Election, November 7.
Ethiopia in Turmoil
The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) | Ann M. Fitz-Gerald
The northern region of Tigray is challenging Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s reform agenda. The prospects for peace are dim.
Distortions and misinformation have added further complexities to an already fraught confrontation between the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the federal government of Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. Two weeks after the clashes begun, a resolution to the current crisis is far from clear.
A FRAUGHT LEGACY
The challenge of pursuing transformative leadership and political change was always a tall order for Abiy. When he came to power in 2018, he inherited a model of federalism including nine ethnic-based regions spanning a population of approximately 110 million. His immediate focus was to open political space, pursue market-based reforms and make peace with neighbouring Eritrea.
Enhanced multi-ethnic representation across government dealt a blow to TPLF-heavy hierarchies. Abiy’s determination to depart from the socialist underpinnings of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front’s (EPRDF) ethnic federalist doctrine amounted to a sudden and unsavoury change of direction for a party which had not only liberated the country from the Derg, an oppressive military junta, but which had poured years of efforts into the development and implementation of a model of revolutionary ‘democratic developmental statebuilding’.
But Abiy’s administration persevered, reversing many of the former policies, systems and narratives. This irritated those who considered themselves national defenders and ‘guardians’ of visionary thinking. In the absence of any immediate reconciliation and reintegration scheme for TPLF leaders, a backlash from a bruised and unappreciated TPLF became inevitable.
SECURITY SECTOR REFORM
Within the security sector more specifically, Abiy deconstructed past practices which had retained senior TPLF officers beyond compulsory retirement. He also introduced a policy which prevented more than one member of any ethnic group from being present in every level of the military’s command structure. The implication was that many Tigrayans at mid-senior levels would not become eligible for career enhancing roles which, together with the limit on staying in one military rank for no more than 10 years, would support a gradual exodus of many mid- and senior-level officers and soldiers. While jobs were offered to those who could stay, and short-term support provided to those who departed in the form of additional months’ pay as well as allowing senior officers to retain military vehicles, this was no consolation for what the TPLF felt it deserved. Abiy subsequently issued arrest warrants for a number of these commanders who stood accused of corruption and human rights abuses. This caused further alienation from the Abiy administration.
The awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to Abiy only intensified the TPLF’s indignation. Abiy’s view was that the significant military build-up in the country’s eastern and northern commands – the latter in Tigray – was expensive and required dismantling now that peace with Eritrea had been achieved. The TPLF perceived the situation with Eritrea differently, and resisted the removal of this equipment. When crowds blocked returning equipment convoys in protest, federal troops were instructed by Abiy to stand down to avoid violence.
THE LOOMING CRISIS
The loose thread holding the TPLF to Abiy’s government was finally broken in 2019 when the government rebranded the ruling coalition as the ‘Prosperity Party’ – a move which sought to involve representatives from all nine regional states, five of which had not been encompassed by the previous EPRDF coalition party. The TPLF severed all ties and gradually focused more on the region.
When the country’s electoral commission took a decision to postpone the federal elections because of the pandemic, the TPLF challenged Abiy’s legitimacy. But the electoral commission exercised an independent decision, which was supported by a unanimous vote in parliament, citing challenges of the country’s weak capacity to manage the pandemic while supporting, what was anticipated to be, an election with the highest voter turnout in the country’s history. Still, Tigray forged ahead with what the federal government deemed an illegal regional election which excluded the two main regional opposition parties and produced a landslide victory for the TPLF.
Refusing to accept the decision taken by parliament and the constitutional inquiry bodies to postpone the election, the TPLF called all its government employees, ministers and parliamentarians back to their region on 5 October – the date, prior to these decisions, of the end of Abiy’s first term in office. Added to the mix was the TPLF’s demand that any dialogue with the federal government be overseen by a caretaker administration which did not include Abiy.
The move of governance capacity back to Tigray’s capital, Mekelle, meant that prospects for a negotiated arrangement were fast disappearing. Refusing to afford any legal basis to Tigray’s newly elected regional assembly, the House of Federation (the upper house of the federal parliament) unanimously passed a bill calling for regional funding disbursements to be routed to more local Tigrayan authorities, bypassing the TPLF-controlled central regional government in Mekelle. The TPLF described this as a ‘declaration of war’ by the federal government.
THE BREAKDOWN
On 4 November, following a discussion between Abiy and the Tigray regional president Debretsion Gebremichael, a government cargo plane carrying monthly army rations, and billions of new birr currency to furnish regional banks and support the salaries of personnel in the northern command, landed in Mekelle. What followed were synchronised attacks on all levels of command posts under the federal northern command. Government reports indicate that insiders loyal to the TPLF cooperated with regional militia in killing non-Tigrayan officers and soldiers and demanding that others surrender their weapons. A senior associate of the TPLF leadership later claimed responsibility for the attack in a video which has since been withdrawn from the internet. Hours following the attack, Abiy deployed federal defence forces to ‘secure law and order in the region and to apprehend those implicated in mass corruption and gross human rights violations’.
Whereas one could ask whether or not the attack on the barracks constituted the crossing of a ‘red line’ – and whether there was scope to avoid confrontation – the federal government’s decision to deploy troops appeared to be based on what it felt had been the exhaustion of all other non-military instruments of power in efforts to appease the TPLF. Citing TPLF links to instability elsewhere in the country, conscious of the northern command’s heavy artillery and long-range weapons, and the scope for further casualties, it was clear that Abiy felt compelled to authorise the use of force. Hundreds of combatants and civilians have died, a flood of refugees has moved towards Sudan, political prisoners have been taken hostage and humanitarian corridors have become threatened.
AN INTERNATIONAL ROLE?
The TPLF’s latest rocket attacks on the Eritrean capital of Asmara appear to be an attempt to internationalise the conflict and lay the ground for an international response. Calls for a ceasefire, mediation, dialogue and negotiations have all been made. The Ethiopian government has stated that it will not sit down to negotiations with what it describes as ‘criminals’. The situation leaves only two options for an international response: calls for a swift and peaceful resolution of differences, or external intervention. While the former would be in the context of Ethiopia’s internal mechanisms of conflict resolution, the latter would involve taking sides – which, at this stage, should be avoided at all costs.
Any option moving forward, including weapons decommissioning, would need to consider the country’s important traditional and cultural dialogue processes, deep inter-federal issues, trust deficiencies and linguistic differences. Above all, the voice of the Tigrayan people is key.
Still, inaction is not without its merits as well. For if it becomes clear that the TPLF will be afforded no standing by the international community, they may agree on an internal ceasefire arrangement, and possibly an independent truth and reconciliation commission, perhaps overseen by traditional and religious leaders.
However, with both sides now facing the inevitability of further civilian casualties, and as long as the TPLF believes that there is a way of forcing the hand of both the international community and the federal government, prospects for a peaceful solution remain bleak.
The views expressed in this Commentary are the author’s, and do not represent those of RUSI or any other institution.
From Oslo to The Hague – The journey of Abiy Ahmed Ali
Solomon Negash
Abiy Ahmed refused dialogue, opted for war, and resisted diplomatic pressure. Make no mistake. This has been his consistent position from day one. He resolved no tension peacefully with any of his major adversaries at home, including Jawar Mohammed, Eskinder Nega, Lidetu Ayalew, Yilkal Getnet, and many more who are languishing in jail on trumped-up charges. Not even with his long-time comrade Lemma Megersa. He has never tried once to resolve his internal political difference peacefully. This says it all, Abiy Ahmed has never been a man of peace. It is not in his nature. Because, as he repeatedly proclaimed publicly and stated in his book, he dreamed of being in power for the next 10 years. Absolute power corrupts absolutely, right?
I was among the hundreds of thousands of Ethiopians who have celebrated the day he was selected as a winner of Nobel Peace Prize in 2019, even if, I believe, he did not do anything notable to deserve such a prize. But we saw it as an opportunity to encourage him to make peace at home, be committed to successful political transition, and to get the attention and support from the international community to help Ethiopia overcome the eminent danger of collapse it was and still is facing. But sadly, he used that opportunity to consolidate his political power at the expense of peace and stability of the country.
I asserted, he didn’t do anything notable to deserve such a prize. It may sound an outrageous assertion but let me clarify.
The “no peace, no war” condition that lasted for two decades was basically a reflection of the deeper conflict that existed for decades between the two dominant political parties: TPLF in Tigray and PDFJ in Eritrea. While in power, TPLF made calls for peace on several occasions, but Eritrea’s PDFJ was not willing to answer to such calls. PDFJ sees TPLF as an eternal enemy who ruined the dream of EPLF (former PDFJ) and young Issaias to become a leading power in the region. For example, the former Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn, made several calls, but President Issaias Afewerki showed no interest. He refused to negotiate with a “puppet” (his word). When Abiy came to power and signaled his interest to make peace with Eritrea (which was decided by EPRDF centrally as part of their reform agenda before Abiy Ahmed came to power), President Issaias did not show any interest and never answered for several weeks. He was not interested until he noticed Abiy entering a new chapter in his power dynamics determined to get rid of TPLF leaders from Menelik palace. Afewerki reconsidered and answered for the call when he witnessed key leaders of TPLF left Addis Ababa for Mekelle. In a way, he was the main player for the two nations to coming to the so-called “peace”, which was later praised by many.
For those who knew the history between these two rivals, there was no genuine peace to celebrate. There was and still is a tactical alliance between two groups who have a common enemy, called TPLF. As Kjetil Tronvoll, a leading expert on Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa, once accurately described it, “the ultimate goal of Isaias Afewerki is to crush TPLF and to inflict revenge upon Tigray”, i.e. not peace. Thus, what seems progress in peace was actually and paradoxically an extended conflict which draws in several new actors into play. The two actors that were in conflict are still in conflict, but this time joined and backed by several other actors (such as, Prosperity Party and the ethnic based militias from the Amhara region) which sided with PDFJ of Eritrea.
It is the alliance of these groups that declared war today not only against TPLF, but also against the people of Tigray. What started by marginalizing and discriminating ethnic Tigrians, for example, banning from national sports, cutting budgets, preventing humanitarian aid from entering Tigray, and refusing to send medical appliances related to COVID19, is now upscaled to a full-fledged war that involves aerial bombardment including in densely populated towns. (And yes, Abiy Ahmed declared and warned about this live on national television.) As such, Abiy Ahmed, the Nobel Peace Laurate, begins to commence on a new road, from Nobel Peace Center in Oslo to ICC in The Hague, in just one year.
Will Ethiopia-Eritrea Peace Last?
National Interest | Michael Rubin | History warns the relationship between these two countries could suddenly turn sour again.
When Eritrea won its independence in 1993 after a thirty-year struggle against Ethiopia, there was optimism that peace would hold. Long-time dictator Mengistu Haile Mariam resigned on May 21, 1991, and fled into exile in Zimbabwe. Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki and the new Ethiopian leader Meles Zenawi had been comrades-in-arms against Mengistu’s regime. It looked like the two would lead their respective countries into a period of both peace and prosperity. In a book review for the Financial Times, British writer John Ryle recalled a 1995 celebration in the northern Ethiopian town of Mekelle:
“The two guerrilla movements had fought together to defeat the Derg, then – unprecedentedly – agreed to an amicable secession. In western diplomatic circles, Meles and Isaias were being touted as a new breed of African statesman. That evening on the outskirts of Mekelle, I watched as Meles, Isaias and other guests, serenaded by Mahmud Ahmed, a veteran Ethiopian pop star, danced together in the moonlight.”
Such episodes would not last. Just three years later, a series of skirmishes between Eritrea and Ethiopia over relatively minor border disputes would erupt into a full-scale conflict. The land they disputed had no real resources. It seemed so irrelevant that the conflict was often described as “two bald men fighting over a comb.”
Whereas Isaias and Meles once danced at Mekelle, soon Eritrean aircraft were bombing it. Sniper fire, artillery barrages, tank fire, air raids, and land grabs slowed into a stalemate and World War I-like trench warfare replete with human wave assaults. By the time both sides agreed to a ceasefire, at least one hundred thousand Ethiopians and Eritreans had died in combat. The peace was cold, however, and at times it appeared as if hostilities might again erupt.
Both countries used the crisis as an excuse to clamp down. Whereas once diplomats and analysts hoped Eritrea might become a democracy, it quickly descended into autocracy. In 1999, Freedom House lowered its rating to “not free.” Isaias used the conflict to institute near-indefinite conscription—lasting decades and often indistinguishable from slavery. Ethiopia, meanwhile, while never quite as extreme, also slipped back into repression.
That Eritrea and Ethiopia have been a hairs’ trigger away from renewed conflict made their sudden 2018 rapprochement all the more remarkable. Many observers credit the Ethiopian parliament’s appointment of Abiy Ahmed, a young former guerilla fighter and intelligence officer who had previously led Ethiopia’s equivalent of the National Security Agency. His political work—efforts to address both youth unemployment and the plight of the displaced as well as his ability to build cross-ethnic coalitions—shot him to prominence.
Abiy called for peace upon his inauguration and wasted no time to pursue it. Even seasoned veterans in the region, however, were surprised by the speed with which Isaias reciprocated his efforts. In September 2018, the two leaders signed a peace agreement in Saudi Arabia. The rapprochement has been rapid, as Ethiopians and Eritreans reunite families and resume trade. There is widespread speculation that Abiy could win the Nobel Peace Prize.
Alas, while Abiy appears sincere, it is far from clear Ethiopia-Eritrea peace will last. Here’s the problem. The seventy-three-year-old Isaias sees himself less as an equal to the forty-two-year-old Abiy than as a father figure and guide. Even at the best of times, Isaias’ concept of diplomacy is dictating his position and then waiting for opponents to accept it without any compromise. When the adversary or partner is a generational younger, the chances that Isaias will compromise recede from miniscule to nonexistent. Bilateral issues will inevitably arise, and it is unclear whether ordinary Ethiopians—let alone a fictitious political coalition—will back repeated Abiy’s concessions. After all, from the Ethiopian perspective, they are now Africa’s second most populous country after Nigeria and, with more than 100 million, they dominate East Africa. Isaias sees Eritrea and Ethiopia as equal, but Ethiopians will never accept equality with a country whose population is just one-twentieth of their own.
So, when Isaias raises a complaint and Abiy has no room to maneuver, what Isaias do? In the past, Isaias has shown a willingness to subordinate regional security and his country’s economic health for the sake of his own twisted sense of personal honor. Just as Isaias and Meles went from comrades and friends to enemies within just a few months, so too could Isaias and Abiy. Add into the mix that Ethiopia is growing more democratic while Eritrea has become the North Korea of the African continent, and Isaias has personal reasons to put the brakes on or even reverse the peace. Isaias may temporarily welcome the economic infusion that peace brings his devastated and impoverished country, but he will not continue it at the expense of his own power.
Is peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea a good thing? Certainly. But optimism should not cloud diplomats and analysts to reality, nor do dictators like Isaias suddenly change their stripes or behaviors overnight. Realism dictates not only rightly celebrating progress, but also recognizing just how tenuous it may be and planning proactively for the chance that the rapprochement might be fleeting.
Michael Rubin is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute.