Tag Archive for: Horn of Africa

Sudan summons home envoy to Ethiopia amid border dispute

CAIRO (AP) — Sudan has summoned its envoy to Ethiopia home for consultations amid a growing border dispute that has seen military buildup along the two countries’ border in recent weeks, an official said Wednesday.

Sudan’s Foreign Ministry spokesman Mansour Boulad did not provide more information about why Ambassador Gamal al-Sheikh was called home. On Sunday, the ministry said Ethiopian troops have crossed into Sudan and warned about “grave repercussions” on the region’s security and stability.

The border dispute between Sudan and Ethiopia has escalated in recent months after Sudan deployed troops to territories it says are occupied by Ethiopian farmers and militias. Since December, over a dozen Sudanese, including troops, were killed in cross-border attacks by Ethiopian forces in Sudan’s al-Qadarif province, according to Sudanese authorities.

The dispute centers on large swaths of agricultural land Sudan says are within its borders in the al-Fashqa area that Ethiopian farmers have cultivated for years. The two nations have held rounds of talks, most recently in Khartoum in December, to settle the dispute, but have not made progress.

Khartoum has said it reclaimed most of its territories and called on Ethiopia to withdraw troops from at least two points it says are inside Sudan.

Addis Ababa, however, accused Sudan of taking advantage of the deadly conflict in Ethiopia’s northern Tigray region to enter Ethiopian territory and loot property, kill civilians and displace thousands of people. Ethiopia has called for Sudanese troops to return to their positions before the Tigray fighting erupted in November, pitting Ethiopia’s federal forces against regional fighters.

Sudan has rejected the claim and insists it deployed troops to its own territories, according an agreement that demarcated the borders between the two nations in the early 1900s.

‘Ethiopia to welcome mediation of Turkey with Sudan’

Anadolu Agency | ‘War is not an agenda. If mediation is offered by Turkey, Ethiopia will appreciate it,’ says Foreign Ministry spokesperson

ANKARA

If offered, Ethiopia would appreciate the Turkish government’s mediation on the recent border conflict with Sudan, said the Ethiopian Foreign Ministry spokesperson on Tuesday.

In an exclusive interview with Anadolu Agency, Ambassador Dina Mufti underscored that the Ethio-Sudanese border conflict could be solved through diplomatic means.

With a 1,600-km (994-mile) long shared border, Ethiopia and Sudan face issues regarding the Fashaga Triangle, a decades-long-disputed border without hard demarcation.

The spokesperson also appreciated the constructive relations within the Horn of Africa despite the recent issues with Sudan.

“Without exaggerating, We now have a great relationship with Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya, and Sudan despite the unfortunate borders situation that is created the other day,” he added.

He also urged cooperation and the creation of a grow-together spirit throughout the region. “The relationship in the north is changing for good. However, we need to cooperate in this regard,” he also noted.

Regarding the operation in Tigray, he said Ethiopia has already started rehabilitation and widened the humanitarian aid reach throughout the whole region.

“So far, 80% of the region has been covered. The rest is eventually opening, and Ethiopia mobilizes its aid to that area too,” Dina added.

Mentioning the misinformation campaign against the country, he said some forces make a “fortune” out of the “crisis” in developing countries like Ethiopia.

‘We want Ethio-Turkish relations to flourish’

Reminding the strategic bilateral ties, Dina Mufti told Anadolu Agency that Ethiopia wants the relations to flourish in various areas, including developmental, security, and economy.

During their visit to Turkey on Feb. 15-16, the ambassador said Ethiopia and Turkey’s foreign ministers had discussed further strengthening of socio-economic and security ties.

On Feb. 15, Ethiopia and Turkey have celebrated the 125th anniversary of diplomatic relations as Demeke Mekonnen, the Ethiopian deputy prime minister and foreign minister, arrived in Turkey for a brief work visit.

Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu, with his counterpart Demeke, has also inaugurated Ethiopia’s new embassy building in the capital Ankara.

Ethiopia hires lobbying help amid dual threats from Egypt, human rights critics

Foreign Lobby | Ethiopia has hired a new lobbying firm for outreach to Congress and the Joe Biden administration as the country battles a diplomatic crisis with Egypt and ethnic strife at home.

The Ethiopian Embassy in Washington signed a $35,000-per-month contract with DC-based law firm Venable on Feb. 1. The contract is for an initial three months but can be extended.

Venable will provide “government relations service which may include outreach to the United States Congress and the federal government,” according to the new filing with the US Justice Department. Registered on the account are attorney Thomas Quinn and policy adviser Loren Aho. The pair also represent the Embassy of Qatar in Washington, while Quinn also represents the Hong Kong Trade Development Council.

Venable declined to comment beyond what’s in the filing. The Ethiopian Embassy did not respond to a request for comment.

The new hire comes as Ethiopia is under increasing pressure in Washington on several fronts.

Regional rival Egypt has been flexing its new lobbying muscle to try to convince Biden to follow President Donald Trump‘s lead and side with Cairo in its dispute with Addis Ababa over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, or GERD. Ethiopia sees the 6,450 MW project as a vital development priority, but Egypt and Sudan want a say in how it is filled because of concerns it could hurt their downstream share of Nile waters.

Egypt benefited from personal ties between President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and Trump, who famously referred to his Egyptian counterpart as “my favorite dictator” and tried to broker a deal between Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan at the White House. Dissatisfied with what it called the “lack of progress” in resolving the dispute, Trump’s State Department even suspended some aid to Ethiopia in September “based on guidance from the president.”

Outflanked in Washington, the government of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed hired its first lobbying firm last summer. The contract with Barnes & Thornburg was for $130,000 but only lasted from June 30 to Sept. 30 (the firm provided no services after that date and is expected to shortly file paperwork indicating that it formally terminated its registration on Jan. 19, the day before Biden’s inauguration, Foreign Lobby Report has learned).

Lobbying filings show that Barnes & Thornburg’s lobbying focused exclusively on the dam issue. The firm contacted multiple congressional offices over the summer as well as officials at the National Security Council, the State Department and the Treasury Department, which Trump had put in charge of the negotiations.

Following Trump’s defeat, the Egyptian Embassy in Washington moved quickly to hire Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck on a year-long, $65,000-a-month contract. Former House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Ed Royce (R-Calif.), former Sen. Mark Begich (D-Alaska) and Nadeam Elshami, a former chief of staff to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.), are lobbying for the embassy.

Earlier this month, Royce touted his conservationist credentials to pitch a virtual congressional briefing by the embassy.

“As you may know, the negotiations surrounding the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam have stalled,” Royce wrote to congressional staff. “Without an enforceable agreement, the operations of the dam will have significant environmental ramifications, for both the populations of Egypt and Sudan as well as for the Nile’s regional ecosystems.”

Ethiopia is also facing pushback over long-simmering ethnic tensions, including in the northern region of Tigray that broke out into open conflict in November. At the time Biden’s pick for Jake Sullivan warned of “potential war crimes” and urged the Ethiopian government and the fugitive leaders of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) to open negotiations facilitated by the African Union.

Secretary of State Antony Blinken has also called for an end to the violence that has killed thousands of people and displaced nearly half a million others. He expressed his concerns about the situation in Tigray on a phone call with Ahmed on Feb. 4.

Ethiopia has enjoyed a helping hand from some Ethiopian-American activists in the Nile dispute. Two groups, the Ethiopian American Civic Council and the Ethiopian Advocacy Network, successfully urged the Congressional Black Caucus last year to object to Trump’s perceived siding with Egypt in the dispute.

“The Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) urges the United States and all other international actors to respect the 2015 Declaration of Principles trilateral agreement signed between Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia, and to continue to play an impartial role, only seeking the counsel of the African Union and diplomats on the ground in the region,” the group wrote in a June 23 statement. “In particular, the African Union has a pivotal role to play by expressing to all parties that a peaceful negotiated deal benefits all and not just some on the continent.”

But Abiy also has fierce critics in the diaspora.

Among them is the Oromo Legacy Leadership & Advocacy Association, a Washington-area nonprofit that advocates for human rights in Ethiopia. The group works with policy advisory firm Von Batten-Montague-York, which retained DiRoma Eck & Co., a new firm started by former Trump Treasury Department officials Andrew Eck and Michael DiRoma, in November to lobby for sanctions against “members of the Ethiopian security forces responsible for the extrajudicial killings and other human rights abuses.”

Activist Seenaa Jimjimo founded the group to fight for the rights of the Oromo, a marginalized ethnic group in Ethiopia. But as violence flared up in Tigray she told The Influencers podcast co-hosted by Foreign Lobby Report and crisis communications firm LEVICK that the group is coordinating with victims of violence across the country regardless of their ethnicity.

“We stand with the Tigrayan people and we are working closely with them trying to highlight the human rights violations,” Jimjimo said in December. “What is happening with the Tigray right now is that has happened with the Oromo for so long.”

Finding a Path to Peace in Ethiopia’s Tigray Region War has devastated Ethiopia’s northernmost region.

International Crisis Group | Pending comprehensive national dialogue, Addis Ababa should ease Tigray’s immediate predicament, engaging elements of the authorities it unseated to govern the area and ensure that aid reaches the millions in need.

What’s new? After weeks of fighting in Ethiopia’s Tigray region, federal troops removed the regional government and declared victory. Yet thousands have died, hundreds of thousands are at risk of starvation and the conflict continues. Addis Ababa has established an interim administration, but ousted Tigrayan politicians say they will fight back.

Why did it happen? Relations between Addis Ababa and Mekelle tanked after Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed took office in 2018 and Tigray’s leaders lost federal power. Tensions spiked when Tigray defied central authority by holding regional elections in September, culminating when Tigrayan forces captured the national military command in the region, triggering federal intervention.

Why does it matter? The conflict has poisoned relations between Tigrayan and other Ethiopian elites and inflamed public opinion in Tigray against the federal authorities, who may well struggle to administer a restive region. If Addis Ababa’s energies are drained by enforcing its rule on Tigray, other Ethiopian ethno-nationalist forces may be emboldened.

What should be done? To get Tigray’s public on side, Ababa Ababa should ensure that Eritrean and Amhara regional forces that participated in the intervention withdraw. It also should urgently allow aid to reach all Tigrayans who need it. Ultimately, inclusive dialogue is needed to address federal-Tigray disagreements and wider disputes over regional autonomy. Read more

Why is the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam contentious?

The Economist | The project has been a source of disputes in north-east Africa for a decade

DAMS HAVE several uses. They generate electricity, store water for crop irrigation and help to prevent floods. They can also cause dispute and heartache—for example, over damage to the environment or the displacement of people whose homes are lost beneath dammed waters. The construction of one on the Nile has sparked a quarrel between Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), costing $5bn, will be Africa’s largest hydroelectric-power project once fully operational later this decade. Located on the Blue Nile in northern Ethiopia, upstream from Egypt and Sudan, it will produce 6,000 megawatts of electricity, twice as much as Ethiopia’s entire current output. Even though the dam could give the region a big economic boost, officials from the three countries have failed to strike a deal on how it will be operated. And the Egyptian government has even considered bombing it. In January yet another round of virtual talks failed. So why is the GERD so controversial?

Egypt frets that the dam will choke off the life-giving waters of the Nile. It has good reason to worry. Some 95% of the water consumed by the country’s 115m people is drawn from the river. Previous dams on the Nile have altered the floods and flow of sediments that the country relies on to grow food. The Nile Waters Agreements of 1929 and 1959 granted Egypt and Sudan the right to use all of the water between them, and gave Egypt the right of veto over upstream construction projects. Ethiopia, which was left out of the agreements, does not recognise them, prompting the disagreement over the impact of the GERD.

It is difficult to assess the exact impact of the new dam on downstream countries. Some studies suggest that Egypt could lose nearly half of its share of the water if Ethiopia filled the reservoir over a three-year period. Ethiopia has said it plans to raise the water level more slowly than that. Even so, the dam will undoubtedly give Ethiopia greater control over the river’s waters.

Egypt wants a legally binding agreement over river flows and demands that Ethiopia release certain amounts of water to top up the Nile, especially in the event of a drought, once the dam is operational. Ethiopia says it would prefer to agree on guidelines which carry no such legal compulsion. Until recently, Sudan had sided with its southern neighbour. But its attitude has shifted of late. In late November Sudanese officials noted an “abrupt” change in the amount of sediment in the water reaching their own Roseires dam, which sits downstream from the GERD. An exchange of letters between the two countries confirmed that Ethiopia had released some water from the GERD without prior warning. Sudanese officials fear that large releases of water could overwhelm their dam, which has a storage capacity less than a tenth of that of Ethiopia’s megaproject.

With or without Sudan, Egypt is not ready to concede defeat. Moreover, Abiy Ahmed, Ethiopia’s prime minister, may well be too distracted with problems at home to solve the dispute with his neighbours. In November the country fell back into civil war between the federal government and the region of Tigray. In recent weeks tensions have erupted between Sudanese forces and militias from Amhara, a region of Ethiopia, over contested farmland. The military clashes will surely delay talks about the dam even further. The African Union has already tried to mediate over the GERD. In September America suspended some aid to Ethiopia in an attempt to nudge it towards an agreement. International pressure could be the key to restarting the talks. But do not expect an agreement soon.

Security agents killed in central Somalia roadside bomb attack

Al Jazeera | Police say Abdirashid Abdunur, intelligence chief for Dhusamareeb town, was killed in the blast claimed by al-Shabab.

A roadside bomb went off just outside the central Somalia town of Dhusamareeb on Sunday, killing 12 agents working for the National Intelligence and Security Agency, police said.

Those killed included Abdirashid Abdunur, the head of the intelligence agency in Dhusamareeb, police officer Mohamed Ahmed said.

The al-Qaeda-linked armed group, al-Shabab, claimed responsibility for the attack.

Political leaders have been meeting in Dhusamareeb, a town about 510 kilometres (317 miles) north of the capital Mogadishu, to try to resolve a dispute over how to hold an election due on Monday.

A deal on how to choose a new president on Monday has been elusive so far, threatening to unleash more political turmoil.

Somalia had initially aimed to hold its first direct election in more than 30 years but delays in preparations, and the government’s inability to rein in daily attacks by al-Shabab, meant switching to an indirect vote, with elders picking legislators who would choose a president.

However, regional authorities in at least two of Somalia’s five federal states, Puntland and Jubbaland, oppose holding the election for now.

Somalia’s opposition cease recognising president as election row escalates

MOGADISHU (Reuters) – An alliance of Somali opposition parties proposed the creation of a national council of lawmakers, opposition leaders and civil society to govern the Horn of Africa nation after the president’s term expired on Monday with no clear succession plan.

The power vacuum and divisions between political leaders was a boost to the al Qaeda-linked al Shabaab insurgency, a Somali security analyst warned, citing a spate of recent attacks in a relatively peaceful part of the country.

The opposition alliance said they would reject any attempt to extend the term of President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed and suggested the council could elect a transitional leader to govern until a new president can be chosen by lawmakers.

“We are against time extension, suppression, violence and further delay to the election,” the alliance said in a statement. “An election schedule should immediately without delay be displayed with agreed upon specified time.”

There was no immediate comment from the presidency. Aides had previously privately floated the idea of extending his term.

In a statement issued by its embassy in Mogadishu, the United States urged Mohamed to “act now to resolve the political impasse…and find agreement with Federal Member State leaders to allow the conduct of parliamentary and presidential elections immediately.”

“The political gridlock…has resulted in a disappointing lack of progress in fighting al-Shabaab.”

Somalia was initially planning to hold its first direct election since civil war erupted in 1991, but delays in preparations and continuous attacks by al Shabaab forced Somalia to plan another indirect vote.

Clan elders should have chosen lawmakers in December and the lawmakers were due to choose a president on Monday.

But selection of lawmakers was delayed after the opposition accused President Mohamed – who was seeking a second term – of packing regional and national electoral boards with his allies.

Leaders in two of Somalia’s five federal states, Puntland and Jubbaland, have said they will no longer recognise President Mohamed.

On Sunday night at midnight, the capital Mogadishu lit up with gunfire and drums as residents said they were celebrating the end of the president’s term.

“We are firing into the sky to say goodbye to the dictator Farmajo, he has burnt Somalia these four years,” said a soldier Aden Ali, using President Mohamed’s common nickname.

Hussein Sheikh Ali, Somalia’s former national security advisor and founder of the Mogadishu-based Hiraal think-tank, said al Shabaab had already taken advantage of the security vacuum to launch attacks in portions of central Somalia that had been relatively peaceful for around a decade.

“They (al Shabaab) are laughing out loud,” he said. “This is a failure by the president, Somalia’s political elite and the international community. They didn’t have a plan B to move forward.”

On Sunday, 12 security agents were killed by a roadside bomb outside the town of Dhusamareb in central Somalia where political leaders were meeting to try to resolve disagreements over the presidential selection process. Al Shabaab also launched repeated mortar attacks on the town.

The attack happened a week after four al Shabaab suicide attackers killed five people at a hotel in Mogadishu.

From Ethiopia’s Tigray region to Yemen, the dilemma of declaring a famine

BBC | Every day, more and more reports of starvation trickle out of the Tigray region of Ethiopia that has been hit by conflict.

On Wednesday, Mark Lowcock, chief of humanitarian affairs at the United Nations, warned of a deteriorating humanitarian crisis in which aid still wasn’t reaching many affected people.

Earlier in the week, his predecessor Jan Egeland, now head of the Norwegian Refugee Council, was more blunt: “In all my years as an aid worker, I have rarely seen a humanitarian response so impeded and unable to deliver in response for so long, to so many with such pressing needs.”

Mr Egeland went on to say: “The entire aid sector . . . must also recognise our failure to define the scale of the crisis.”

In other words, will the United Nations call out “famine” and if so when?

Farming in Tigray’s rocky soils has long been a precarious endeavour, made worse over the last year by a plague of locusts. At the close of the growing season in September last year, international food security assessments were that 1.6 million of Tigray’s seven million people were relying on food aid to survive.

Conflict broke out on 4 November between forces from the region’s now-ousted ruling party, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), and federal troops following sharp differences over the political make-up of the federal government.

The TPLF opposed the 2019 decision of Prime Minister Aibiy Ahmed to dissolve the ruling coalition, of which it was a part, leading to tensions that spiralled out of control.

The UN is now quietly admitting what others – including the United States – have been saying for weeks, which is that Eritrean troops control much of Tigray. The Ethiopian and Eritrean governments continue to deny this.

Most of Tigray has been sealed off from the world since then. Aid agencies are beginning to send their staff back in, and what they describe is disturbing: hospitals ransacked, people living in fear unable to obtain food or money, deaths from hunger and treatable illnesses.

Some Tigrayans who are able to make phone calls tell of massive looting, burning of crops, and literally millions of people beyond the reach of humanitarian aid.

In a leaked internal memo from 8 January, humanitarian staff from the UN, aid agencies and local government warned that hundreds of thousands were at risk of starving to death. They reported that they could not reach 99% of those in need – a number that aid agencies estimate is 4.5 million – more than 60% of Tigray’s population.

The Ethiopian government insists that these reports are exaggerated at best, and that it has the humanitarian crisis under control. It says that only 2.5 million people are in need and says it can reach almost all of them.

Ethiopia’s history of famine denial

It asks the European Union – its biggest donor – not to be distracted by the “transient challenge” of emergency aid to Tigray, and to continue its generous development aid to the country.

However, there is a history of Ethiopian governments hiding their famines.

In 1973, Jonathan Dimbleby’s film The Unknown Famine exposed mass starvation, hidden from the world by Emperor Haile Selassie. About 200,000 people died in the famine.

The emperor’s callous indifference brought Ethiopians on to the streets to protest and he was overthrown the next year.

In 1984, Tigray and the next-door province of Wollo were the epicentre of another famine, this time caused by a combination of drought and war, that led to between 600,000 and one million deaths.

The Ethiopian government at the time denied the existence of that famine until it was exposed by a BBC film crew, led by Michael Buerk and Mohamed Amin. That news report moved pop star Bob Geldof to record Do They Know Its Christmas? and provoke a global outpouring of charity.

That famine discredited the military government of Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam at home and abroad. Ethiopians hated being seen as beggars by the rest of the world.

In 2001, Ethiopia, then led by the TPLF, disputed the existence of famine conditions in the south-east of the country, where it was fighting an insurgency. An estimated 20,000-25,000 died in what was officially designated a “humanitarian emergency”.

Over the decades, the international humanitarian system has become far larger and more professional. There are sophisticated systems for monitoring child nutrition and food availability in African countries to give timely warning of food crises, to prevent famine.

Five years ago, the Ethiopian government and foreign donors responded to nationwide drought, setting up a relief programme that helped 10.2 million people.

Instead of old-fashioned food handouts, aid was designed to reach villagers before they were forced to sell their cattle and sheep, and to help them stay on their farms to plant for the next year.

But there are two big differences between the 2015-2016 emergency programme and the situation today: information and politics.

There simply isn’t enough information for the UN to declare a famine.

About 15 years ago, humanitarian professionals in the UN developed a standardized metric for measuring food insecurity. They came up with the “integrated food security phase classification” system, known as the IPC.

It has five levels, from “minimal food insecurity” through increasing degrees of severity to the worst level, “famine”. The IPC uses a standard set of indicators including food consumption, numbers of malnourished children, and death rates.

‘No data, no famine’

This official definition of famine is much more precise than its everyday use as “large numbers of people suffering life-threatening hunger”.

But in solving one problem, the IPC system set up another. Now the UN can only cry “famine” when it has certain very specific information.

And, determined to avoid getting a “famine” designation, governments often conceal or manipulate data to achieve their goal – and downplay the severity of hunger. Meanwhile, in the next levels down, “emergency” and “crisis”, people are still dying – just at a slightly lower rate.

The UN has encountered this problem recently in other humanitarian disasters. In Yemen, the Saudi-led coalition, its client government and the Houthi authorities have denied humanitarian agencies access to hungry areas, meaning they can’t conduct surveys.

Without data on malnutrition, child deaths and food consumption, the members of the IPC committee arrive at the cautious conclusion that it’s an emergency, but they can’t say “famine” because they don’t have the information to prove it.

In South Sudan, the government couldn’t stop the data gathering. But it intervened in the IPC food assessment in December to downgrade the “famine likely” finding.

We shouldn’t be quibbling over definitions. According to a study by the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, over 380,000 people died of hunger and violence over the five years of South Sudan’s civil war – but only around 1% of these died in places that met the official threshold of “famine” in Unity State in 2017.

‘Dilemma for aid agencies’

The other big problem is politics. When the cause of mass starvation is military policy, humanitarian agencies face a terrible dilemma. Will they denounce the abuses and risk getting thrown out of the country? Or will they stay silent and become complicit in starvation crimes?

The Ethiopian government admits only to “sporadic fighting”. However, reports from the affected area show that vast swathes of rural Tigray are either battlefields or are controlled by the insurgent TPLF.

Under the definition of international humanitarian law, this is an armed conflict, and the Tigray rebels constitute a belligerent party. Getting aid to the hungry needs negotiations for a ceasefire with the TPLF – it simply can’t be done with the co-operation of one side only.

Up to now, the TPLF hasn’t offered a ceasefire or access to aid agencies. And there’s always a risk that the rebels will misuse the aid to feed their own troops. That’s why international monitoring is essential.

The starvation in Tigray poses the humanitarians’ dilemma in its sharpest form. How can they challenge the official story about the crisis without endangering their limited but essential operations?

There’s an old truism among aid workers: humanitarian crises don’t have humanitarian solutions. What’s needed is high-level political action.

Recognizing this as a problem that recurs in crises as diverse as Syria and Congo, three years ago the UN Security Council passed resolution 2417 on armed conflict and hunger.

As well as reiterating that the use of hunger as a weapon may constitute a war crime, the resolution, which has not been activated up to now, requires the UN Secretary General to alert the Security Council quickly whenever there is a possibility that armed conflict will lead to widespread food insecurity or famine.

The resolution could almost have been designed with the Tigray crisis in mind.

But humanitarian agencies are nervous about invoking it, because they don’t want to offend the Ethiopian government.

We can’t put reliable numbers on the hunger, sickness and death in Tigray, but we know enough to be sure that an immense tragedy is unfolding.


Alex de Waal is the executive director of the World Peace Foundation at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University in the US.

As Ethiopia fills its Nile dam, regional rivalries overflow

The Christian Monitor | When African Union-mediated talks between Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan over a Nile River dam broke down yet again last month, it didn’t mark a new disagreement over sharing vital water resources.

Rather, it was a case of regional rivalries trumping understandings about science and cooperation that have been laid out by African and Western mediators in multiple draft agreements.

Since then, Egypt’s media have sounded war drums, and a border territory dispute between Sudan and Ethiopia has erupted into violence.

At the center of the dispute is the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), built by successive governments in Addis Ababa with the goal of pulling millions out of poverty.

The turbines of the dam, located near the source of the Blue Nile in northwest Ethiopia, are to generate 6,000 megawatts of hydropower – critical in a country where more than half of the population, some 50 million people, are without access to electricity, and demand for power is increasing by 30% annually.

The solution to Egypt and Sudan’s resulting water-security concerns, observers say, is simple: coordination and data-sharing.

Yet even amid indications that the revival of traditional American diplomacy could help resolve the dam dispute, observers say mediators must also confront currents stronger than the Nile itself: nationalism, territorial disputes, and a struggle over supremacy in the Horn of Africa.

Regional supremacy

For Ethiopia, the dam project promises to fuel the country’s ascendance as a geopolitical player. Even amid the struggle over the future of the country that last November erupted into war in Ethiopia’s northern Tigray region, the dam remains a cause that unites the diverse nation.

“There has been among the government and broadly the Ethiopian people a sense of unfairness, that as a poor country we have not been able to utilize a natural resource that springs out of Ethiopia,” says Awol Allo, an Ethiopian analyst and lecturer at Britain’s Keele University.

“This dam project signals the revival of the Ethiopian state after the decades of shame, poverty, and famine it has been identified with.”

A sense of personal investment and national unity around the dam solidified after the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and other lenders refused to fund the GERD. Ethiopia in 2010 decided to go it alone, paying for it with government funds and bonds purchased by private citizens, and broke ground on the project in 2011.

“Every Ethiopian sees themselves as a stakeholder in a project that is not just about energy needs, but a statement that Ethiopia is a significant, powerful country that can go at it alone and assert itself on the regional stage,” Mr. Allo says.

Downstream drama

The draft agreements notwithstanding, the water-sharing disputes between Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia have only deepened since construction completed on the GERD in 2020 and Addis Ababa began filling the reservoirs in July.

Downstream countries long used to the unrestricted flow of the Nile for their farming and fresh water are alarmed by the dam’s potential impact on their water and food security.

Egypt, 1,000 miles downstream from the dam, has laid a historic claim on a lion’s share of water from the Nile and views GERD as a national security threat. Egypt currently depends on the Nile for 90% of its fresh water and the vast majority of irrigation water for crops to feed its 105 million citizens. It is also concerned with potential flooding and drought.

Egypt and Sudan decry the lack of technical studies and assessments of the dam’s environmental and social impact downstream.

Tensions are now high as Addis Ababa is set to fill the dam’s reservoir with an additional 11 billion cubic meters this year after the initial 4.9 BCM it filled in July 2020. The dam has a total capacity of 74 BCM. “The biggest problem is not knowing how Ethiopia intends to use and operate the dam, what times of year, what quantities, and what will be the impact,” says Amal Kandeel, an environmental and policy consultant and former director of the Climate Change, Environment and Security Program at the Middle East Institute. “Downstream countries can’t plan without knowing; they need clarity.

“Egypt will not benefit from the dam,” she says. “But if there is coordination, facts, evidence, and data shared transparently at the minimum, any potential harm will be reduced.”

For Egypt, a “humiliation”

Egypt’s inability to stop or influence the project has become a symbol of the government’s inward-looking focus the past decade and its withdrawal from the Arab and African stage, which domestic critics say has dramatically reduced Egypt’s geopolitical significance.

Egyptian insiders privately say the prospect of Ethiopian control over the most populous Arab country’s water and food security is viewed as “a humiliation,” driving Cairo’s hard line.

“For 50 or 60 years, Egypt was the biggest geopolitical actor, not only in the Middle East, but the northeast Horn of Africa as well,” says Horn of Africa analyst Rashid Abdi.

“Times have changed, you have new governments that are becoming more assertive on the regional and world stage and acting independently,” he says. “It is a natural progression that Egypt is finding uncomfortable.”

Egypt has pushed for intervention by the United States, its Arab allies, and the U.N. Security Council. In June, Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry warned of conflict should the United Nations fail to intervene.

After the talks’ breakdown last month, Egyptian state-influenced media clamored for the use of “force” against Ethiopia, advocating surgical strikes on the GERD’s electricity infrastructure.

For Sudan, it’s good, but ….

Meanwhile, regional alliances and a century-old border dispute have transformed Ethiopia’s northwest neighbor from a quiet supporter of the dam to a spoiler.

Observers and experts agree: The GERD’s benefits for Sudan are many.

The dam, 20 miles from the Sudan-Ethiopia border, will reduce flooding that has devastated Sudan in the past. Blue Nile flooding destroyed one-third of cultivated farming land in the country last year, destroying 100,000 homes and killing 100 people, deepening Sudan’s economic crisis.

The reduction in flooding and sharing of irrigation water would help Sudan cultivate more than 50 million hectares of arable land abandoned due to flooding and mismanagement, a critical boost to an agricultural sector that is Sudan’s largest employer and accounts for 30% of the country’s gross domestic product.

Ethiopia has also vowed to export cheap electricity to Sudan.

“Honest people in Khartoum will tell you that the dam is a net positive from all logical, logistical, and economic perspectives. Objectively, Sudan would benefit from the dam,” says Jonas Horner, Sudan analyst and deputy director for the Horn of Africa at the International Crisis Group.

“But it is not quite as simple as that,” he says, pointing to Sudan’s need to balance regional alliances.

Khartoum – militarily close to Egypt, diplomatically indebted to Ethiopia, and financially and politically dependent on Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, who are allied with Egypt – is reluctant both to appear to support the dam, on the one hand, or come down hard on Addis Ababa, on the other.

This complicated balancing act was disrupted in December by the violent reignition of a century-old Sudan-Ethiopia border dispute.

Sudanese patrols have come under shelling allegedly at the hands of Ethiopian militias, and the Sudanese army and Ethiopian federal forces have clashed multiple times this month.

Ethiopian officials blame Cairo for stoking the tensions, alleging an Egyptian plot to prolong conflict and derail the GERD’s completion.

Traditional American diplomacy

Observers agree the dispute provides an opportunity for the Biden administration to demonstrate its vowed return to traditional American diplomacy.

The Trump administration’s few forays into the GERD dispute favored Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, a Trump ally. Last July the Trump administration partially suspended American assistance to Ethiopia after Addis Ababa rejected a draft agreement compiled by Washington that it saw as heavily favoring Cairo. President Donald Trump publicly warned that Cairo would “blow up that dam” should talks fail.

In contrast, President Joe Biden’s secretary of state, Antony Blinken, vowed in his confirmation hearing last month to conduct “active engagement” to address a rise in tensions that “has the potential to be destabilizing throughout the Horn of Africa,” indicating that he is considering appointing a special U.S. envoy for the Horn of Africa.

But observers caution that the Biden administration must untangle the web of regional politics, nationalist fervor, and power plays in order to get the three states back to the basics: water.

“The war in Tigray has created instability in the Ethiopian state, and now you have the border issue with Sudan that is clearly linked to the GERD issue. You have domestic actors in each of these countries lobbying external actors to advance their interests,” says Mr. Allo.

“It will be difficult for any U.S. administration with all the goodwill in the world to mend things.”

Rising tension as Ethiopia and Sudan deadlocked on border dispute

Al Jazeera | Bickering over contested farmland along the border has in recent weeks deteriorated into armed clashes.

Age-old territorial claims are threatening to embroil Ethiopia and Sudan into armed conflict, as bickering over disputed strips of farmland in recent weeks has boiled over into the most serious escalation of border tensions in years.

The uptick in skirmishes initially involving militias from the two countries saw the neighbours’ national armies intervene – and by mid-December, both countries had massed soldiers along the frontier in the al-Fashaga region.

Last month, Sudan closed its airspace over the region alleging that an Ethiopian fighter jet had infiltrated Sudanese airspace.

Al-Fashaga, where the contested farmlands at the heart of the dispute lie, runs about 100 square miles (259 square kilometres) along the joint border of Ethiopia’s northwestern frontier and eastern Sudan.

For decades, farmers from both countries have harvested crops with little care for border markings in the area amid sporadic flare-ups.

Attempts to properly demarcate the border date back to a treaty signed in 1902 between then British-ruled Sudan and Ethiopia. But the ambiguity along certain border points left the issue unresolved and demarcation has remained a sticking point between the two countries, particularly since Sudan gained independence in 1955.

The flashpoint of the recent bickering was a December 15 ambush, reportedly carried out in the area by Ethiopian militia backed by Ethiopian soldiers.

The attack is said to have killed several Sudanese military officers, and it provoked a rare condemnation from Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, who said on Twitter Sudan’s forces would be prepared to “repel” military aggression.

With his country already engulfed in a brutal war in its northern Tigray region, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed responded with a reconciliatory call for calm. “Such incidents will not break the bond b/n our two countries as we always use dialogue to resolve issues,” he said in a tweet.

But Sudan struck back, mobilising soldiers towards contested areas and announcing that it had retaken them by New Year’s day.

“Our military is engaged elsewhere, they took advantage of that,” Ethiopian military chief General Birhanu Jula said of Sudan’s recent military manoeuvres.

“This should have been solved amicably. Sudan needs to choose dialogue, as there are third party actors who want to see our countries divided,” he added, strongly hinting at Egypt, with whom Ethiopia is engaged in a diplomatic spat over the construction of a massive hydroelectric power dam on the Blue Nile River.

Egypt says the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) project threatens the water supply and livelihood of its farmers downstream. Thinly veiled accusations that Egypt coerced Sudan into its heavy-handed military approach were largely fuelled by Egypt’s issuing a statement last month backing Sudan in the affair.

Despite Sudan finding itself at odds with Ethiopia over GERD amid seemingly stonewalled tripartite efforts on reaching an agreement on the dam’s construction, Khartoum and Addis Ababa have generally enjoyed warm ties. In 2019, Abiy acted as a mediator between Sudan’s military and pro-democracy leaders in an attempt to ease the political crisis that gripped the country in the wake of the removal of longtime ruler Omar al-Bashir.

Since early November, Sudan has allowed more than 50,000 Ethiopians fleeing the country’s war in Tigray to shelter at refugee camps in its territory.

But both countries have made notable shifts in policy regarding the border dispute.

Previous Ethiopian administrations were far more accommodating of Sudan’s territorial claims. In 2009, Ethiopia’s former Prime Minister Meles Zenawi relinquished control of strips of land on the border to Sudan, as part of agreements that caused an uproar in Ethiopia when made public.

Despite Ethiopia’s concessions, Sudan’s al-Bashir made no concrete effort to militarise its border and prevent the odd raid into its territory by Ethiopian militia.

But under Abiy, Ethiopia appears to have backtracked on past agreements and could yet stake a claim for some of the coveted farmland. Sudan’s tolerance, meanwhile, has thinned considerably amid the rising tensions, which have sparked calls for de-escalation.

Saudi Arabia has reportedly offered to help reconcile the feuding parties, while UK Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab recently met officials from both sides and urged them to sort out their differences.

“The UK is a friend to both countries,” Raab’s office said in a statement sent to Al Jazeera. “We want to see the tensions settled not just for Ethiopia and Sudan, but also for the region as a whole.”

While the diplomatic community’s efforts are yet to be exhausted, Raab’s call for roundtable talks has received a lukewarm response.

“We are thankful for the mediation offers, but Sudanese forces needs to vacate our land and return to their territory,” Ethiopia’s Foreign Ministry Spokesman Dina Mufti told assembled press in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa, last week. “When this occurs, we will gladly attend roundtable talks.”

Sudan denies it is occupying Ethiopian territory.

Gridlocked, the two states remain perilously close to a breakout of fresh hostilities. Experts believe that domestic political wrangling in both countries might be behind their somewhat uncompromising stances. Meanwhile, the possibility of domestic political foes interpreting any concessions on al-Fashaga as weakness and the odds of provoking the ire of each country’s nationalist camp could further fuel the standoff.

“Ethiopia is reticent about the al-Fashaga crisis because it touches on Prime Minister Abiy’s grip on power and the interests of the Amhara [Ethiopian region bordering al-Fashaga], his only ethnic support base,” said Rashid Abdi, a researcher and Horn of Africa analyst.

“Whereas in Sudan, a new conflict could complicate the political transition and sow divisions. The army can use war as excuse to reconsolidate power and edge out the civilians,” he added.