ERITREA

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Tigray crisis: Biden administration calls for Eritrea troops to withdraw

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BBC | The US has called for the immediate withdrawal of Eritrean troops in Ethiopia’s Tigray region.

“Credible reports” had emerged of their involvement in human rights abuses, including sexual violence and looting, the state department said.

This is its first statement on the conflict since the Joe Biden administration took office last week.

Both the Eritrean and Ethiopian governments deny that Eritrean forces are in Tigray, which borders Eritrea.

Eritrea is a highly militarised one-party state ruled by President Isaias Afwerki since 1993.

Thousands of people have been killed and about two million people, or one-third of Tigray’s population, have fled their homes since conflict broke out in early November.

Dialogue between the Ethiopian government and Tigrayans was “essential”, and humanitarian aid needed to be “mobilised” immediately because of “credible reports” that hundreds of thousands of people may starve to death, the US state department said.

Eritrea appeared to have launched artillery attacks from its side of the border, and had troops in Tigray, though the exact number was unclear, it said.

“The United States has made clear its position that all Eritrean troops need to leave Tigray immediately, given credible reports of looting, sexual violence, assaults in refugee camps and other human rights abuses.

“There is also evidence of Eritrean soldiers forcibly returning Eritrean refugees from Tigray to Eritrea,” it added in a statement.

Nearly 100,000 Eritreans had lived in four camps in Tigray after fleeing political persecution and military conscription over the last decade.

Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2019 for restoring relations with Mr Isaias’ government, almost two decades after the two nations fought a border in Tigray that left up to 100,000 people dead.

Last month, Mr Abiy admitted that Eritrea had hosted armed Ethiopian troops who had retreated to its territory after the TPLF captured their bases in Tigray in early November.

However, he did not acknowledge that Eritrean troops had entered Tigray to bolster the fight against the TPLF.

‘Residual fighting continues’

The TPLF had been the ruling party in Tigray for almost three decades. It said it had seized the military bases in a “pre-emptive strike” following a breakdown in relations with Mr Abiy’s government.

Mr Abiy responded by ordering air strikes and a ground offensive to oust the TPLF from power. He declared the operation over after the capture of the regional capital, Mekelle, at the end of November.

He rejected calls for mediation to end the conflict, saying Ethiopia would not accept foreign interference in its affairs.

The US said “residual fighting” was still taking place, and there was the risk of “a long-running insurgency in Tigray that will destabilise northern Ethiopia and worsen ethnic tensions throughout the country”.

“That could not only put at risk US-endorsed democratic and other reforms by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed,” the statement said.

“It could also exacerbate instability in neighbouring Somalia, from where Ethiopia has already withdrawn some of its peacekeeping forces, and even in Sudan, where the transitional government is already grappling with serious problems.”

Analysts had estimated before the conflict that the TPLF had up to 250,000 fighters. It is unclear how many it had lost in the conflict.

TPLF veterans killed include former Ethiopian Foreign Minister Seyoum Mesfin, while Abay Weldu, the Tigray regional government’s former president, has been captured.

Tigrayans make up around 6% of Ethiopia’s more than 110 million population.

Eritrean Soldiers in Ethiopia’s Tigray Region Accused of Murder, Looting and Sexual Assault

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Democracy Now 

In Ethiopia, jarring witness accounts are emerging of the involvement of Eritrean soldiers in the deadly conflict in the northern Tigray region. Survivors told the Associated Press that Eritrean soldiers looted homes and broke into houses searching for and killing Tigrayan men and boys. They’re also accused of targeting thousands of refugees and sexually assaulting people. Thousands of Eritrean soldiers have fought on the side of Ethiopian armed forces in the bloody conflict that started in November.

Humanitarian aid workers warned earlier this month that hundreds of thousands of people in the Tigray region could “starve to death,” as shops were depleted of food weeks ago and nearly all of the region’s population — some 4.5 million people — need emergency food aid.

US says Eritrean forces should leave Tigray immediately

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NAIROBI, Kenya (AP) — The United States says all soldiers from Eritrea should leave Ethiopia’s embattled Tigray region “immediately.”

A State Department spokesperson in an email to The Associated Press late Tuesday cited “credible reports of looting, sexual violence, assaults in refugee camps and other human rights abuses.”

“There is also evidence of Eritrean soldiers forcibly returning Eritrean refugees from Tigray to Eritrea,” the spokesperson said.

The statement reflects new pressure by the Biden administration on the government of Ethiopia, Africa’s second-most populous country with 114 million people and the anchor of the Horn of Africa, and other combatants as the deadly fighting in Tigray nears the three-month mark.

The AP this week cited witnesses who fled the Tigray region as saying Eritrean soldiers were looting, going house-to-house killing young men and even acting as local authorities. The Eritreans have been fighting on the side of Ethiopian forces as they pursue the fugitive leaders of the Tigray region, though Ethiopia’s government has denied their presence.

The U.S. stance has shifted dramatically from the early days of the conflict when the Trump administration praised Eritrea for its “restraint.”

The new U.S. statement calls for an independent and transparent investigation into alleged abuses. “It remains unclear how many Eritrean soldiers are in Tigray, or precisely where,” it says.

It was not immediately clear whether the U.S. has addressed its demand directly to Eritrean officials. And the office of Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed did not immediately respond to questions.

Witnesses have estimated that the Eritrean soldiers number in the thousands. Eritrean officials have not responded to questions. The information minister for Eritrea, one of the world’s most secretive countries, this week tweeted that “the rabid defamation campaign against Eritrea is on the rise again.“

The U.S. also seeks an immediate stop to the fighting in Tigray and “full, safe and unhindered humanitarian access” to the region, which remains largely cut off from the outside world, with Ethiopian forces often accompanying aid.

“We are gravely concerned by credible reports that hundreds of thousands of people may starve to death if urgent humanitarian assistance is not mobilized immediately,” the statement says.

The United Nations in its latest humanitarian update said it is receiving reports of “rising hunger” in Tigray and cited a “dire lack of access to food” since many farmers in the largely agricultural region missed the harvest because of the fighting, and as “critical staff” to scale up the humanitarian response can’t access the region. Transport, electricity, banking and other links “have yet to be restored in much of the region,” the U.N. said, and 78% of hospitals remain nonfunctional.

“Our concern is that what we don’t know could be even more disturbing,” U.N. children’s agency chief Henrietta Fore said in a statement Wednesday. “For 12 weeks, the international humanitarian community has had very limited access to conflict-affected populations across most of Tigray.”

Vaccinations have stopped across the region, Fore added.

The U.S. statement added that “dialogue is essential between the government and Tigrayans.” Ethiopia’s government has rejected dialogue with the former Tigray leaders, seeing them as illegitimate, and has appointed an interim administration.

The former Tigray leaders, in turn, objected to Ethiopia delaying a national election last year because of the COVID-19 pandemic and considered Abiy’s mandate over.

The Three-Country Alliance Against Tigray Might Jeopardize Ethiopia’s Future – Analysis

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Eurasia Review | Martin Plaut

The Tigray war has turned into an all-out conflict, pitting Tigrayan forces loyal to the Tigray People’s Liberation front (TPLF) against Ethiopian federal troops, the Eritrean army, Amhara militia and – as revealed last week – Somali soldiers.

Despite what would seem to be overwhelming odds against them, the Tigrayans appear to be holding their own in large areas of the region.

Both Eritrea and Somalia routinely deny any involvement in the war, but the evidence of their presence is strong.

On December 8, Reuters reported that “a U.S. government source and five regional diplomats” told them the US believes Eritrean soldiers have crossed into Ethiopia. The EU and UK support this assessment.

A senior Ethiopian general confirmed that Eritrean troops were in Tigray. Major General Belay Seyoum, head of the Northern Command, described the presence of foreign forces on Ethiopian soil as “painful”.

The Eritrea-Ethiopia-Somali alliance

The alliance has its origins in the ending of hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Much of the groundwork for this rapprochement was done by the United States, with Donald Yamamoto playing a critical role behind the scenes, although Washington could hardly have envisaged where this would lead.

On July 8-9, 2018 Prime Minister Abiy visited Asmara to seal the peace between Eritrea and Ethiopia. In the same month, the ice between Eritrea and Somalia was broken, with a three-day visit by Somali President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed to Asmara. It was the first visit by a Somali president to Eritrea since it gained independence from Ethiopia in 1993. The two nations have not had diplomatic ties in nearly 15 years.

Abdinur Mohamed, a spokesman for the Somali president, said on Twitter that the country “is ready to write a new chapter of its relations with Eritrea.” Economic and security concerns are at the top of the agenda, as well as “regional issues of interest to both countries,” Eritrea’s information ministry said.

There were further bilateral visits in August 2018 and April 2019. This culminated in a summit between the leaders of Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia on January 27, 2020, held in Asmara.

The communique committed the three leaders to consolidate “peace, stability, and security as well as promoting economic and social development. They also agreed to bolster their joint efforts to foster effective regional cooperation.”

There was no press conference at which the details of the agreement might be explained. The public was left in the dark about what the leaders were planning.

Further meetings took place in the run-up to the outbreak of war in Tigray:

  • Prime Minister Abiy made a rare visit to the Eritrea main training base at Sawa in July 2020.
  • Somali President Farmajo arrived in Asmara on 4 October.
  • President Isaias went to Ethiopia on October 14-15. This trip included seeing the Ethiopian air-force base at Bishofu.

Within three weeks, on November 4, 2020, the Tigray war erupted. Is it credible that the war was not discussed, and a strategy agreed between the three leaders at these meetings?

War aims

The first priority of the alliance is to remove the Tigrayan administration from Tigray. President Isaias has long loathed the TPLF. This goes back to the 1970’s and 80’s when the Eritreans and Tigrayans fell out over ideology, tactics and strategy.

Prime Minister Abiy also wants to rid himself of the vestiges of power of the previous Ethiopian government, which the TPLF controlled. He is attempting to reverse their policy of “ethnic federalism.”

Beyond this, outlines of a plan were revealed when information was leaked about a meeting held by President Isaias just prior to the outbreak of the war.

According to reports citing well-placed sources, President Isaias brought together his closest confidantes on the eve of the Tigray war. He said that Eritrea had to accept that it had a small economy and a lengthy Red Sea coast that it cannot patrol on its own. He suggested forming some sort of “union” with Ethiopia, at least in terms of economic co-operation and maritime security.

If accurate, President Isaias appeared to have echoed Abiy’s grandiose dream of re-establishing the old empire-state of Ethiopia. This includes suggestions that the Ethiopian navy could be reconstructed – a proposal supported by France. This would require the use of Eritrean ports which were once home to the Imperial Ethiopian Navy.

The idea of some form of union may not be as far-fetched as it would appear, despite the fact Isaias previously led Eritrea’s decades-long war to gain independence from Ethiopia.

It should not be forgotten that when President Isaias made his first visit to Addis Ababa in July 2018 he made what many Eritreans regarded as an extraordinary offer: for a joint administration of both countries.

“This is a historic day for all of us,” President Isaias Afwerki said. “Anyone who thinks the people of Eritrea and Ethiopia are separated is considered as naïve from now on.”  In a speech, Abiy said the countries had agreed to develop together and that Isaias had offered to help “lead this great nation.” He added that “we have finally found our sister nation after many years of hiding.”

This vision – of co-suzerainty – or a revised form of federation, appears to be behind the current conflict.

Regional blocs

In September 2020 Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia held their third trilateral meeting. They proposed to form a new regional bloc, which has been referred to as the “Horn of Africa Cooperation”.

The flaw in this proposal was commented on at the time. “Creating an economic and political bloc may seem a solution to bring peace and boost trade. But it risks sparking distrust from other East African countries, and with the other regional body, IGAD,” the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, which Eritrea has long distrusted.

The Horn of Africa Cooperation could be linked to the wider ambition of the Saudis to extend their influence in the Horn of Africa. The “Council of the Arab and African States bordering the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden” was launched in January 2020. This new Arab-African alliance has eight members: Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Jordan and Yemen.

Conclusion

These plans depend on succeeding to crush the Tigrayans. At the moment this appears a distant prospect, despite Prime Minister Abiy’s assertion in November that it was little more than a “law enforcement”  operation that would soon be over.

If the war goes badly, and Eritrea, Somalia and the rest of Ethiopia becomes sucked into the conflict, the conflict could threaten the future of Ethiopia itself.  This was the warning from senior African experts at the US Institute of Peace.

“As members of the bipartisan senior study group on peace and security in the Red Sea arena, we are watching with grave concern the situation in Ethiopia. While many of the facts remain unclear, the risks of escalation are certain: Intrastate or interstate conflict would be catastrophic for Ethiopia’s people and for the region and would pose a direct threat to international peace and security.

The acceleration of polarization amid violent conflict would also mark the death knell for the country’s nascent reform effort that began two years ago and the promise of a democratic transition that it heralded.

As we cautioned in the study group’s Final Report and Recommendations released on October 29, the fragmentation of Ethiopia would be the largest state collapse in modern history. Ethiopia is five times the size of pre-war Syria by population, and its breakdown would lead to mass interethnic and interreligious conflict; a dangerous vulnerability to exploitation by extremists; an acceleration of illicit trafficking, including of arms; and a humanitarian and security crisis at the crossroads of Africa and the Middle East on a scale that would overshadow any existing conflict in the region, including Yemen.

As Ethiopia is currently the leading Troop Contributing Country to the United Nations and the African Union peacekeeping missions in Sudan, South Sudan and Somalia, its collapse would also significantly impact the efforts by both to mitigate and resolve others conflicts in the Horn of Africa.”

Witnesses: Eritrean soldiers loot, kill in Ethiopia’s Tigray

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Zenebu, who arrived home in Colorado after weeks trapped in Tigray, Ethiopia, where she had gone to visit her mother, poses for a photo Friday, Jan. 22, 2021. Huge unknowns persist in Ethiopia’s deadly conflict, but details of the involvement of neighboring Eritrea, one of the world’s most secretive countries, are emerging with witness accounts by survivors and others such as Zenebu. While fighting in support of Ethiopian forces, Eritrean soldiers have been accused of killing civilians, targeting refugees and even acting as local authorities. (AP Photo/David Zalubowski)

NAIROBI, Kenya (AP) — The Eritrean soldiers’ pockets clinked with stolen jewelry. Warily, Zenebu watched them try on dresses and other clothing looted from homes in a town in Ethiopia’s embattled Tigray region.

“They were focused on trying to take everything of value,” even diapers, said Zenebu, who arrived home in Colorado this month after weeks trapped in Tigray, where she had gone to visit her mother. On the road, she said, trucks were full of boxes addressed to places in Eritrea for the looted goods to be delivered.

Heartbreakingly worse, she said, Eritrean soldiers went house-to-house seeking out and killing Tigrayan men and boys, some as young as 7, then didn’t allow their burials. “They would kill you for trying, or even crying,” Zenebu told The Associated Press, using only her first name because relatives remain in Tigray.

Huge unknowns persist in the deadly conflict, but details of the involvement of neighboring Eritrea, one of the world’s most secretive countries, are emerging with witness accounts by survivors and others. Estimated in the thousands, the Eritrean soldiers have fought on the side of Ethiopian forces. They are accused of targeting thousands of vulnerable refugees from their own country, raping and intimidating locals — and now, some worry, refusing to go home.

Eritrea and Ethiopia recently made peace under Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2019 for his efforts. But Eritrea remains an enemy of the Tigray leaders who dominated Ethiopia’s government for nearly 30 years and are now fugitives since fighting began between Ethiopian and Tigray forces in November, the result of growing tensions over power.

Ethiopia’s government denies the Eritreans are in Tigray, a stance contradicted by an Ethiopian military commander who confirmed their presence last month. The U.S. has called Eritrea’s involvement a “grave development,” citing credible reports. Eritrean officials don’t respond to questions.

Despite the denials, the Eritrean soldiers aren’t hiding. They have even attended meetings in which humanitarian workers negotiated access with Ethiopian authorities.

Now millions of Tigray residents, still largely cut off from the world, live in fear of the soldiers, who inspire memories of the countries’ two-decade border war. The recent peace revived cultural and family ties with Tigray, but Eritrea soon closed border crossings.

“If Eritrea refuses to leave, the U.N. should give us protection before we perish as a people,” a former Ethiopian defense minister, Seye Abraha, said in comments posted Sunday by a Tigray media outlet.

A spokeswoman for Ethiopia’s prime minister, Billene Seyoum, did not respond to a request to discuss the Eritrean forces.

With almost all journalists blocked from Tigray and humanitarian access and communications links limited, witness accounts give the clearest picture yet of the Eritreans’ presence.

They were first reported in northwestern Tigray, which saw some of the earliest fighting. The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission cites residents of the border town of Humera as saying the Eritreans participated in widespread looting that “emptied food and grain storages.” That has contributed to growing hunger among survivors.

The account by Zenebu, a 48-year-old health care worker, is one of the most detailed to emerge — and it came from central Tigray, an area little heard from so far.

She first saw the Eritrean soldiers in mid-December. She had fled with others into the mountains as fighting approached, leaving her mother, too frail for the journey, behind. Twelve days later she returned to the town of Hawzen, needing to know whether her mother had survived.

In the darkness, she said, she stumbled over bodies, including around 70 she later realized she knew as they were identified. The ground was strewn with beer bottles, cigarettes and other trash, and “I couldn’t tell the difference between human and animal bodies.” The stench of death was strong.

A neighborhood boy, just 12, had been recruited by soldiers to do errands and then killed.

“I saw his body,” Zenebu said. “They just, like, threw him away.”

Her mother had survived, her home stripped of possessions.

People had been killed for having photos of Tigray leaders, even long-ago ones, Zenebu said, and the photos were set on fire. While she said some atrocities were carried out by Ethiopian forces and allied fighters from the neighboring Amhara region, she recognized the Eritreans by markings on their cheeks and their dialect of the Tigrinya language.

“I was more heartbroken and surprised to see the Eritreans doing that because I felt a connection, speaking the same language,” Zenebu said. “I felt we shared more of the same struggle,” while others “don’t know us like the Eritreans do.”

Residents tried to survive as food supplies dwindled. Electricity for grinding grains was gone, and medical supplies ran out. “People are starving to death,” Zenebu said.

It was worse, she said, than in the 1980s, when famine and conflict swept through Tigray and images of starving people in Ethiopia brought global alarm and she fled to Sudan.

Then, “there wasn’t house-to-house looting of civilians, weaponizing hunger, the merciless killing,” she said. “It’s worse than before.”

Zenubu eventually managed to leave Hawzen and reach the Tigray capital, Mekele, after pretending she was a resident and blending in with others traveling there. She called her family in the U.S., crying hysterically.

“I just wanted to say I was alive,” she said. Now she is unable to reach her mother.

Her account, like many, cannot be verified until communication links with Tigray are fully restored — and even then, people in Ethiopia worry that phone calls are monitored.

But another person who escaped Hawzen and arrived in the U.S. this month told the AP that Eritrean soldiers were “everywhere” and confirmed their killing and looting. He also identified them by their dialect.

“Same blood, same language,” he said, noting the close ties with Tigrayans. “I don’t know why they killed.” He spoke on condition of anonymity out of fear for his relatives.

“We are investigating credible reports of a whole range of abuses by the Eritrean forces in central Tigray, including extrajudicial executions of civilians, widespread looting and damage of public and private property, including hospitals,” Human Rights Watch researcher Laetitia Bader said, urging “immediate international scrutiny” and a U.N.-led investigation.

Other accounts come from the nearly 60,000 refugees who fled to Sudan.

“My five brothers and mother are in Axum” near the Eritrean border, a doctor among the refugees, Tewodros Tefera, told the AP. “People from Axum said Eritrean forces killed many young men.”

“I don’t know if my brothers are alive,” he said of his brothers, who are 25 to 35. His phone calls don’t go through.

A woman now in the U.S. after managing to leave Axum, who gave only her first name, Woinshet, wept as she told the AP she believes she survived because she showed Eritrean soldiers her U.S. passport instead of a local ID.

“There’s no (military) camp in Axum, just monasteries,” she said, recalling bodies left in the streets. “Why are they there?”

Other survivors have fled the Eritrean soldiers to remote areas in Tigray and called to say they have been living for weeks on leaves and dried fruit.

“I don’t know how people are staying alive,” Tewodros said.

Pterosaur Rainbow drones (UAV) are put into battle, attacking Ethiopian rebels at night, killing 500 people on the spot

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UAV Network 2020-11-30 | The Asian-African conflict that was just quelled a while ago finally ended with Azerbaijan’s victory. In this war, drones as a new type of military weapons showed up on the battlefield, and soon won the world’s Concerned, some experts even predict that in future wars, drones will replace armed helicopters and become the new darling on the battlefield. This is true when used in the recent conflict between Ethiopia and the “rebels”.

Satellite data provided by a US space company recently showed that buildings in areas where Ethiopia was engaged in combat with rebels were suspected of being subjected to a wide range of precision-guided strikes, and the rebels who used buildings as shelters suffered a devastating blow. In this attack, at least 500 rebels were wiped out on the spot. The Ethiopian government forces had absolute initiative at the beginning of the battle. Such a precise air strike was definitely not done by the Su-27 of the Ethiopian Air Force. It was the Ethiopian Air Force that used the killer weapon. Judging from the current situation in Ethiopia, Ethiopia and the UAE Air Force stationed in Eritrea both use this killer weapon: it is possible to armed drones. The Ethiopian side uses the Rainbow 4 weapon. The man-machine, and the UAE Air Force, is likely to use the Pterosaur 2 armed drone.

Read More China Has Been Spying On The African Union Headquarters

Both of these drones are excellent products manufactured in China, and have been exported to many countries and regions in the world. The Pterosaur 2 was developed by my country’s Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group. The aerodynamic layout of the Pterosaur 2 and the previous Pterosaur domestic UAV is generally similar, but the size of the Pterosaur 2 is almost a circle larger than the Pterosaur, so Compared with the pterosaur, the descendant pterosaur 2 has a significant improvement over the pterosaur in terms of bomb load and maximum range. In the seven years since it was put on the market, the Pterosaur 2 has been successfully equipped in many countries, and it has achieved normalized applications. It has also performed well in actual combat. The Rainbow 4 UAV is my country’s “Rainbow” series UAV Representative products in China are also exported to the Middle East and Europe.

Read More The UAE supports Ethiopia and dispatched drones to fight the rebels

And it shines in the struggle against the armed elements. Both types of drones represent the advanced level of Chinese drones. Compared with UAVs produced in the United States, U.S.-made UAVs have always been popular in the international arms market before China’s UAV momentum has risen, but since Chinese UAVs entered the international market many countries were immediately attracted by the ultra-high cost performance of our drones. At the same time, our drones are more durable than American drones, easy to maintain, which has successfully shaken the US drones in the international market. Dominance.

In this conflict, Ethiopia once again used Chinese domestic drones. Obviously, after the conflict in the Tigray region, the use of drones in modern warfare has also been attracted by countries all over the world and started imitation.

Geopolitical dynamics in the Horn of Africa

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An Emboldened Horn of Africa Axis and an Unfolding Humanitarian Crisis Await the Biden Administration

By Guled Ahmed | Middle East Institute

Summary

The Biden Administration is set to face a series of challenges in the Horn of Africa. Given growing Russian and Chinese involvement in this strategically important region, U.S. policymakers should be attuned to the historical background and current dynamics in the relevant countries. In the Horn of Africa, the U.S. can ameliorate the COVID-19 pandemic, stem ongoing civil strife, and ease intraregional tensions. To achieve these objectives, the U.S. will need to adopt bold strategies based on lessons from the past. This article provides essential context about the region and proposes policy measures for the incoming administration.

Introduction

As Joe Biden prepares to take office on Jan. 20, 2021, the U.S. and the world are facing multiple crises. Now is one of the worst times in American history as the country struggles through a major economic recession and a pandemic that has taken more than 300,000 American lives. Biden is no stranger to economic crises, having served as vice president under the Obama administration during the Great Recession in 2009. Undoubtedly, Biden’s experience as a senator and VP makes him ready to tackle America’s domestic challenges and to reset relations with its allies.

In the Horn of Africa, his upcoming administration will grapple with longstanding challenges. However, this time, he will have to deal with the emboldened and unchecked leaders of the Horn of Africa — Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed of Ethiopia, President Mohamed Abdullahi (Farmaajo) of Somalia, and President Isaias Afwerki of Eritrea. Recently, the three leaders have formed an axis through the Horn of Africa Cooperation (HoAC) deal to consolidate security, stability, and economic integration.1

The main driver of the HoAC is PM Abiy, who wants to access Somali ports for trade and promote military and economic integration in order to influence Somali politics and economy. More multilateral agreements and initiatives may come on the heels of the HoAC. In the long term, integration may become possible once the three countries stabilize and resolve their border issues.

In terms of foreign involvement in the region, the Horn of Africa could become a theater for the escalating Cold-War-like dynamic between the U.S and Russia. With its increasing power and influence, Russia could repeat strategies from Syria in the Horn of Africa and help prop up leaders of the Horn of Africa Axis who are desperate to stay in power, regardless of the results of democratic elections. Because the incoming Biden Administration will advance human rights and democratic elections, Horn of Africa leaders may turn to Russia for protection instead.

The Unfolding “Triple Threat” Humanitarian Crisis

The Horn of Africa has suffered multiple disasters since the start of 2020, including the COVID-19 pandemic, recurring deadly floods, and devastating locust attacks. Several donors and humanitarian agencies have increased calls for support to tackle the “triple threat” in the region. Even before the current crises, Somalia, one of the world’s most fragile states, suffered droughts in 2017 that impacted more than 6 million inhabitants. In 2018 and 2019, the Shabelle and the Juba river riparians had already experienced recurring cycles of drought and floods. And now for the first time in recorded history, the Shabelle River, which is Somalia’s breadbasket, is under a locust attack. A swarm of locusts can occupy 460 square miles and consume up to 6,000 metric tons of food daily. The current swarms can inflict the equivalent of more than 120,000 hectares of crop damage within the Shabelle River Basin. Combined with flood damages this year and previous instability, Somalia could experience catastrophic food insecurity and mass starvation similar to the horrific 1974 drought.

In Ethiopia, another full-scale humanitarian crisis is unfolding due to the ongoing civil war between the government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) in the Tigray region. Locust attacks have also compounded the impact on citizens. The current invasion of desert locusts is the worst that Ethiopia has experienced in 25 years. Furthermore, the COVID-19 pandemic has hurt economic conditions by restricting the agricultural supply chain, productivity, and cross-border trade. On top of these external factors, agriculture export revenue is already negatively impacted by Ethiopia’s currency devaluation. These conditions could push Ethiopia into starvation, mass migration, and multilateral ethnic conflict, and thus threaten overall regional stability.

Country Profiles from the Horn of Africa

The Post-Cold War Horn of Africa is fragile and susceptible to cyclical crises as a result of conflicts and increased climate change. This region also suffers from the legacy of ruthless dictators, such as Mengistu Mariam of Ethiopia and Siad Barre of Somalia. After both dictators were overthrown, new governments adopted systems of fragile ethnic federalism and decentralization that are now destabilizing the region.

Ethiopia

Ever since Abiy was selected as prime minister in April 2018, violence driven by ethnic tensions has gripped Ethiopia and displaced 1.8 million people. Abiy’s vision of a centralized power controlling the political process and economic development appears to be irreconcilable with the ethnic federalism enshrined under Article 39 of the Ethiopian Constitution. While nationalism has kept Ethiopia together for the past 30 years, it has also created division and hostility between Abiy’s reformist government and the TPLF and Oromo opposition leaders who have returned from exile.

With his political reforms intended to promote Ethiopian nationalism failing, he has also hastened economic liberalization through privatization and currency devaluation. The U.S. dollar has appreciated against the Ethiopian birr by more than 35% as the country simultaneously faces a severe export decline, yearly debt payments surpassing $1 billion, and declining domestic borrowing. Overall, this trend has forced Ethiopia to print money at an unsustainable rate. “Abiynomics” will burden Ethiopia with unpayable IMF loans and Chinese loans to finance dam projects. Furthermore, borrowing has increased the debt-to-GDP ratio to over 50%, a rate that is unsustainable, especially for a country that experiences annual major droughts. This rate of borrowing ultimately forced Ethiopia to reschedule 60% of its loan repayment.

To divert public attention from the impending economic crisis and unrest that have tarnished Abiy’s image, he has turned the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam dispute with Egypt and Sudan into a nationalist rallying cry and canceled an agreed-upon deal. Similarly, opposition groups have accused him of taking advantage of the COVID-19 pandemic to unconstitutionally delay the national election, extending his term for almost another year. These actions have incited major opposition, especially from militias in Oromo and Tigray, which threatened to form a caretaker government following Article 60, Section 5 of the Ethiopian Constitution. Abiy took this threat seriously and decided to jail the outspoken Oromo opposition leader Mohamed Jawar. Furthermore, the federal government declared the regional Tigray elections illegal and imposed an economic embargo, which contributed to the civil war. Despite Abiy claiming victory at the end of November, 2020, the war rages on, with thousands displaced and effects that could destabilize the entire region.

Somalia

In Somalia, Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo became president in February 2017 through indirect elections by tribal chiefs. His election was marred by corruption even though he ran on an anti-corruption platform.5 Despite his promises, Somalia has been named the world’s most corrupt country three times in a row by the Corruption Perceptions Index. Furthermore, despite his anti-Ethiopian platform, Farmaajo became President Abiy’s reliable ally during his tenure.6 Abiy even seem to have convinced Farmaajo of the idea of “Greater Horn of Africa Economic Integration.” The two leaders also have similar political preferences. Both are against federalism and for centralized government, despite the weak Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) that only controls parts of the capital with the help of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the Somalia donors fund. Instead of cooperating with federal member states (FMS), he started dismantling the federal system through electioneering that installed his allies as state leaders. Starting with Southwest State, his forces arrested the likely winner, clearing the path to victory for his hand-picked candidate. This move caused a backlash that was particularly intense in Baidoa, where the Somali National Army along with Ethiopia violently cracked down on protests in December 2018.

In response, UN Somalia Special Representative Nicholas Haysom requested an investigation. Haysom was allegedly expelled so that the Ethiopian Army and Somalia National Army could conceal their crimes and avoid potential prosecution.7 The FGS succeeded in further electioneering by installing their preferred candidate in Galmudug and Hirshabelle states. The FGS was unable to pull off the same feat in Puntland.8 In Jubbaland state, Kenyan AMISOM troops almost clashed with Ethiopian AMISOM troops who are pro-Farmaajo.

Mogadishu, which is in the Benadir region, has become the city with the most internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Africa due to local conflicts. The FGS has paralyzed the city’s economy and mobility, essentially turning it into an open-air prison where IDPs are more than 25% of the population. Not only do the residents of Mogadishu live under difficult circumstances, they also provide taxes to the federal government without enjoying political representation in the Senate. This is because Mogadishu is not recognized as a federal state, which entails less autonomy.

The general condition of Somalia has declined under Farmaajo, The security improvements created by his predecessor, Hassan Sheikh, have vanished. The robust GDP growth of 4% has dropped below 2% and export revenue dropped by 70%, a figure unseen since the 1980s. Foreign direct investment decreased and domestic revenue was below 2016 levels. While not attributable to Farmaajo’s policies, Somalia has also seen a decline in remittances. In an apparent reflection of its corruption, the federal government has camouflaged aid from donors like Qatar as domestic revenue in order to meet debt relief obligations and improve its image abroad.9 Despite Somalia’s lack of financial accountability and illegitimate tax revenue increases, the IMF and World Bank determined that the country has reached the “decision point,” at which heavily indebted poor countries are considered to have met the obligations for interim debt relief. The U.S. has further enabled Farmaajo by supporting debt relief and turning a blind eye on FGS human rights abuses, their war against FMSs, media repression, and deteriorating security. However, the U.S has suspended military aid over corruption concerns.10

As a primary foreign donor to the FGS, Qatar is another important player in the region. Beyond propping up FGS, Qatar has allegedly encouraged violent extremism and instability. A cellphone call obtained by the New York Times captured the Qatari ambassador to Somalia stating that a terrorist bombing in Bosaso was carried out to further Qatari interests.11 Similarly, Somali intelligence chief Fahad Yassin Hajji Dahir, who is alleged to have ties with al-Qaeda, is currently said to be engineering the re-election of Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo.12 This major foreign interference could have serious consequences, such as igniting public unrest and possibly even a civil war similar to that in 1991, which overthrew Siad Barre, Farmaajo’s uncle.13

Eritrea

While there are no major violent conflicts in Eritrea, the government shows many of the same pathologies as Ethiopia and Somalia. Although Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki has rehabilitated his image through the historic peace deal with PM Abiy, he remains a ruthless authoritarian who has been starving his people for the past 20 years. With the peace deal, Isaias Afwerki merely showed the EU a false soft side in order to gain aid and assistance. Thus, the EU diplomats are in essence ignoring the regime’s record of human rights violations and forced labor in order to fund projects that will further Europe’s interest in keeping migrants in Eritrea. The EU has funded infrastructure projects serviced by forced conscript labor, perpetuating a system that the U.N. has defined as “tantamount to slavery.”14 Thus, it seems that the EU has chosen to “hire” a dictator at a low price rather than solve the core issues that cause migration in the first place. This is why the EU Horn of Africa policy is failing: it emboldens dictators to oppress their citizens at the expense of EU taxpayers.

Afwerki is widely unpopular, so he is vulnerable to a potential coup. While Afwerki is a brutal dictator, a coup would certainly be destabilizing. In the past, he narrowly escaped previous coup attempts from dissatisfied armed forces, such as in 2013. It is highly likely that he will face another coup because of his alliance with Abiy, who is particularly disliked among the ethnic Tigray in Eritrea.15

“In the 21st century, the EU and the U.S. have pushed for Horn of Africa integration in three key areas: politics, economics, and security. This encouragement is an important reason why Horn of Africa Axis leaders pursued forming a new regional organization bloc. However, these initiatives have been dead on arrival for various reasons.”

The Return of Russia to the Horn of Africa

Russia has been steadily making inroads with the region’s leaders. While hosting the Sochi Olympics in 2017, Russia seized the opportunity to strengthen its relationship with Africa by organizing the 2019 Russia-Africa summit that saw trade, aid, and military deals offered with no political preconditions. Russia’s goal is to project its power and influence in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea by providing arms and nuclear technology for energy development in exchange for mining natural resources like uranium and gold. Russia is also interested in securing the rights to rare earth elements (REE), which are key ingredients in batteries for electric cars, cell phones, high-tech weapons, and wind turbines. Russia has been steadily accumulating REE to the point where it now has the 4th largest reserves in the world, significantly ahead of the U.S.16

Just outside the Horn of Africa, former Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir signed bilateral agreements with Russian President Vladimir Putin during his November 2017 visit to Russia that included the establishment of a military base in the Red Sea, a nuclear agreement, and modernization of the Sudanese army.17 Similarly, Bashir asked Putin for protection from the U.S.and hired Russian mercenaries to quell citizen uprisings before his overthrow in a military coup.18 It is noteworthy that Bashir’s visit to Russia came after the Trump administration lifted the trade embargo on Sudan and removed it from the travel ban list. This suggests that both the U.S. and Russia are competing for Sudan’s favor.

In the Horn of Africa, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov announced the opening of a logistics center in Eritrea in 2018, but gave few details about its purpose.19 The lack of information likely indicates a larger strategic aim. A Russian logistics center in Eritrea, however, now looks improbable due to the Eritrean government’s realignment toward the UAE and Saudi Arabia, two countries that are loathe to see Russian encroachment in the Red Sea. Opposition from these two Gulf countries will be an obstacle to Russia’s quest to gain influence in the Horn of Africa.

The extent of Russia’s influence on Somalia will largely depend on the results of upcoming elections. One of the candidates for the Somali presidency is former Prime Minister Hassan Ali Khaire, who cofounded Som Oil & Gas. For various reasons, Russia is hoping for his victory. The majority stakeholder in Som Oil & Gas is the Russian national Georgy Djapridze, who is also a close ally of Putin. In November of 2020, Khaire met with Foreign Minister Lavrov to discuss the upcoming elections and the prospects for strengthening Russian-Somali cooperation, particularly trade and economic ties. Such a meeting seems to validate suspicions that Khaire is seeking to obtain Russian assistance in the elections. Given Somalia’s instability, if Khaire wins the presidency he may invite Russian mercenaries to restore order.

In November of 2020, Russia and China indicated their support for the Somali government by abstaining on a vote to renew the UN panel of experts on Somalia, which includes an arms embargo.20 Russia justified its abstention by comparing the vote to lifting the Eritrea embargo in 2018, and China reasoned that the embargo hindered the Somali government’s ability to combat al-Shabab. The true intention behind Russia’s abstention was to protect its interest in selling arms to Somalia, however. China, for its part, wanted to maintain a strong relationship with Somalia, especially as it has received an unmonitored and controversial fishing license from the Somali government. China also supports Somalia on the question of Somaliland.21 China sees Somaliland, a de facto independent state, as analogous to Taiwan. Recognition of Somaliland would thus set a precedent that would undermine the “One China” policy.

The U.S. has left an opening for these powers. The inaction and disengagement of the Trump administration allowed Russia to preemptively protect the region’s new authoritarians. In contrast, the upcoming Biden-Harris administration will likely hold the Horn of Africa Axis accountable for human rights violations and their destabilizing anti-democratic ways. Russia may be a latecomer to the 21st century version of the “Scramble for the Horn of Africa” but won’t mind claiming its spot as a competitor against China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the EU’s initiatives in the Horn of Africa.

Failing Horn of Africa Integration

The idea of integrating the various territories of the Horn of Africa has a long history. Current Horn of Africa integration initiatives echo the idea of “Greater Somalia.” This concept was championed by Benito Mussolini, who hoped to capture British-Somaliland, part of Ethiopia, and Italian Somalia to achieve the grandiose idea of an Italian East Africa empire. Mussolini imagined Italians settling in the territory. He also wanted to connect Assab (a port city in Eritrea) to Mogadishu in order to reduce the export cost of cotton, bananas, and other valuable commodities. In post-colonial times, this vision of integration has been revived and modified. Fidel Castro, for example, proposed a communist federation between Ethiopia and Somalia before the two countries went to war in 1977.

In the 21st century, the EU and the U.S. have pushed for Horn of Africa integration in three key areas: politics, economics, and security. This encouragement is an important reason why Horn of Africa Axis leaders pursued forming a new regional organization bloc. However, these initiatives have been dead on arrival for various reasons.

Events show that the region is disintegrated from a military and political point of view. To give a stark example of regional strife, the Ethiopian army committed war crimes in Somalia in 2006. Ethiopian forces have also not produced tangible results in the war against al-Shabab as a part of the AMISOM force. For its part, the Eritrean government is a former funder of the terrorist group al-Shabab, which has wreaked havoc in Somalia.

Destabilizing actions by Ethiopia and Eritrea in Somalia have precluded political integration. As a former Somali president said, “Simply put, neither Ethiopia nor Somalia is ready for deeper integration. Ethiopia is sliding toward instability and preoccupied with both internal ethnic conflicts and border disputes with Somalia and Eritrea.”22

From an economic point of view, the countries of the Horn of Africa have negligible engagement. This is the case for Eritrea and Somalia. As for Somalia and Ethiopia, several economic barriers currently stand between them. Ethiopia is foreclosing on Somalia’s future water rights by building more dams without consultation, which negatively impacts the Juba and Shabelle rivers. The two countries also do not have a transboundary water agreement, and Ethiopia is notorious for not sharing its river flow data. Already, these actions have contributed to recent floods and droughts according to regional water experts. While cross-border electrification initiatives are pushed by the World Bank and foreign donors to Somalia, they come with high risks such a lack of institutional oversight, infrastructural unpreparedness, and energy security politicization. Furthermore, the two countries have economies that are largely informal and affected by multiple problems such as high inflation, lack of security, indebtedness, high unemployment, and poor infrastructure with limited interconnectedness.

“Without decisive and sustainable policy moves, geopolitical dynamics in the Horn of Africa could sow the seeds for further turmoil within the next 20 years.”

Where the U.S. and EU Are Getting It Wrong

The U.S. has promoted misguided policy in the Horn of Africa region. For example, it supported an Ethiopian incursion into Somalia that resulted in war crimes against residents of Mogadishu in 2006.23 To date, victims have not been awarded any compensation and justice has not been served. In 2010, while speaking at the Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs, current U.S. ambassador to Somalia and former ambassador to Ethiopia(2006-2009), Donald Yamamoto said, “We’ve made a lot of mistakes and Ethiopia’s entry in 2006 was not a really good idea.”

Ambassador Yamamoto would do well to recognize that China poses a threat to U.S. interests in Somalia and to the region as a whole. One way that the U.S. could counter Chinese designs on Somalia is by encouraging the ties between Taiwan and Somaliland. So far, Yamamoto has remained silent about this bilateral relationship even though the U.S National Security Council sent out a congratulatory tweet about this emerging bond between Taiwan and Somaliland. U.S. inaction has emboldened President Farmaajo to align with Beijing.

EU policy toward the Horn of Africa has also yielded mixed results. It is wholly fixated on keeping migrants away from EU shores, making the region a hub for IDPs. The significant presence of IDPs tends to spur conflict. Africa watchers have argued that EU funding without proper checks and balances merely finances kleptocratic authoritarians. This model has already been tested with Turkey in order to keep Syrian refugees outside Europe. A negative consequence of this policy was to give Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan leverage over the EU. While EU leaders claim to want stability for the Horn of Africa, they continue sell arms to the region. In Germany, Chancellor Angela Merkel is pushing arms sales to the region and the continent to counter Russia and China.24 Similarly, French President Emmanuel Macron is helping Abiy develop a navy, despite Ethiopia being landlocked.25

The EU approach to migration, cyclical conflicts, and the impacts of climate change in the Horn of Africa is not working. Rather than throw money at problems, the EU must seek to cultivate good governance and institutions. Perhaps it is time to support an approach to sustainable development that takes power away from dictators and puts it in the hands of local actors. Current strategies have only resulted in mass migration and vulnerable youth who can easily be recruited by extremists. It is not surprising to see recurrent cycles of destruction and humanitarian crises in the region.

Opportunities for Biden

How can the Horn of Africa become peaceful and secure despite high levels of instability, mistrust, and unresolved border issues inherited from colonial times? With the rise of authoritarianism, repressive rule, terrorism, ethnic cleansing, nationalism, economic stagnation, and mass migration, this goal seems to be moving further away. Without decisive and sustainable policy moves, geopolitical dynamics in the Horn of Africa could sow the seeds for further turmoil within the next 20 years. What should the Biden administration do?

China Vaccine Politics

The Pfizer COVID-19 vaccine must be stored at -70 degrees Celsius, which will require costly refrigeration for safe distribution. Unfortunately, almost 40% of the healthcare facilities in Africa don’t have access to electricity, and only 28% of them have reliable electricity. China is speeding up distribution to Africa of its own vaccine, which requires storage at 2 to 8 degrees Celsius. Africa, due to its climate and level of development, may not be able to meet the refrigeration demands for either vaccine. This opens an opportunity for Biden to accelerate vaccine delivery and distribution through humanitarian channels, i.e. USAID and Direct Relief, and through investment channels or public-private partnerships, i.e. the International Development Finance Corporation.

AMISOM in Somalia

Recently the Ethiopian government redeployed 3,000 of its troops from Somalia to the civil war with TPFL.26 The Ethiopian troops in Somalia were ineffective in fighting al-Shabab terrorists, and most of its troops were supporting the government of Somalia to wage war against FMS. The recent U.S. troop pullout under Trump is also likely to embolden al-Shabab to capture more territories. Troops should remain in Somalia, but they should be UN peacekeepers with a five-year mandate rather than ineffective AMISOM troops. Due to their vested interests, countries like Kenya and Ethiopia should be excluded from any peacekeeping mission in Somalia

U.S. Horn of Africa Special Representative

Biden should consider appointing a special representative to oversee security and development in this increasingly important region. The representative’s mandate should also include the Red Sea. This position will help the State Department to better engage regional leaders and allies. Such engagement will help the U.S. to counter the aggressive expansion of Russian and Chinese interest in the region.

Reform Trade

The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) has significantly reduced the continent’s trade deficit with the U.S. to less than $5 billion.27 However, U.S. imports from Sub-Saharan African countries are concentrated in apparel and oil products.28 The Biden administration could increase non-oil exports from the region to the U.S. by prioritizing agro-manufacturing and fish processing industries, setting up more export zones, repealing all Trump tariffs against products that are produced in Africa, and adding new countries to the AGOA, such as Somalia and Eritrea.

War Against al-Shabab

The current government of Somalia has focused on waging war against FMS and instigating clan wars rather than fighting against al-Shabab. The Biden administration should hold Somalia accountable for its failures on human right and counterinsurgency. The administration must adopt diplomatic and economic strategies rather than drones. Furthermore, Biden could consider investing in and providing U.S. army training to local militia and Danab forces. They are more effective than the national army, which is hampered by weak federal institutions.29 Similarly, the Biden administration should invest in a strong finance tracking system and biometric registration, not only to track illegal activities, but also to build a voter registration system and promote democratic elections.
America can no longer sit on the sidelines and allow Russia and China to influence regional leaders, who have become addicted to Chinese predatory loans and Russian AK-47 diplomacy. Biden should implement a strategy that is designed by regional planners and economists, one that is based on strong, democratic institutions with the principle of “one person, one vote” and focuses on capacity building and tangible economic development.

Biden has a difficult task ahead if he is going to de-escalate tensions in the Horn of Africa. His administration has a chance to rectify the mistakes of American presidents over the past half century, who too often turned a blind eye to the destabilizing actions of dictators in the region. It is now or never, and as John F. Kennedy said, “Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make violent revolution inevitable.”

Endnotes

[1] Henneberg, Ingo and Stapel, Sören. “Cooperation and Conflict at the Horn of Africa: A New Regional Bloc Between Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia and Its Consequences for Eastern Africa,” Africa Spectrum, (August 2020). https://doi.org/10.1177/0002039720936689.

[2] Nyabiage, Jevans. “China’s Allies at Loggerheads Over Ethiopia Dam — Will Beijing Intervene?” South China Morning Post, July 26, 2020, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3094650/chinas-allies-loggerheads-over-ethiopia-dam-will-beijing.

[3] Atoma, Bekele. “Jawar Mohammed: The Ethiopian Media Mogul Taking on Abiy Ahmed,” BBC News, July 9, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-53306091.

[4] Elbagir, Nima, Arvanitidis, Barbara, and McSweeney, Eoin. “Forces From Ethiopia’s Tigray Region say Eritrean Troops are Part of the Conflict and the War is Far From Over,” CNN, December 4, 2020, https://www.cnn.com/2020/12/04/africa/ethiopia-war-tplf-exclusive-intl/index.html.

[5] Gettleman, Jeffrey, “Fueled by Bribes, Somalia’s Election Seen as Milestone of Corruption,” The New York Times, February 7, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/07/world/africa/somalia-election-corruption.html.

[6] “Corruption Perceptions Index,” Transparency International, https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2019.

[7] “UN Special Representative to Somalia and Head of UNSOM is “Persona Non Grata” – Somalia’s Foreign Ministry,” Somaliland Chronicle, January 1, 2019, https://somalilandchronicle.com/2019/01/01/un-special-representative-to-somalia-and-head-of-unsom-is-persona-non-grata-somalias-foreign-ministry/.

[8] Hassan, Abdiqani. “Leader of Somalia’s Jubbaland, at Odds With Mogadishu, Wins New Term,” Reuters, August 22, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-politics/president-of-somali-state-of-jubbaland-re-elected-in-divisive-vote-idUSKCN1VC15B?il=0.

[9] Gundel, Joakim. Debt Relief and the Political Marketplace in Somalia. London: London School of Economics Conflict Research Programme, November 2, 2020, http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/107125/1/CRP_debt_relief_and_political_marketplace_somalia.pdf.

[10] Rubin, Michael. “U.S. Ambassador Wasted $1B in Somalia and is Now Funding a Coup,” The Washington Examiner, February 7, 2020, https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/us-ambassador-wasted-1b-in-somalia-and-is-now-funding-a-coup; “Somalia: Journalists Under Attack,” Human Rights Watch, May 3, 2016, https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/05/03/somalia-journalists-under-attack#; Houreld, Katharine. “Exclusive: U.S. Suspends Aid to Somalia’s Battered Military Over Graft,” Reuters, December 14, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-military-exclusive/exclusive-u-s-suspends-aid-to-somalias-battered-military-over-graft-idUSKBN1E81XF.

[11] Bergman, Ronen and Kirkpatrick, David D. “With Guns, Cash, and Terrorism, Gulf States Vie for Power in Somalia,” The New York Times, July 22, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/22/world/africa/somalia-qatar-uae.html.

[12] Rubin, Michael. “Somalia’s Intelligence Chief Worked With an al Qaeda Affiliate, so Why Do We Fund Him?” American Enterprise Institute, November 16, 2020, https://www.aei.org/op-eds/somalias-intelligence-chief-worked-with-an-al-qaeda-affiliate-so-why-do-we-fund-him/; Ali, Abdullahi Mohamed. “Somalia Must Save Itself From Qatar,” The National Interest, June 22, 2020, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/somalia-must-save-itself-qatar-163233.

[13] Henry, Neil. “Rebels Force Somali Leader Out of Capital,” The Washington Post, January 1, 1991, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1991/01/01/rebels-force-somali-leader-out-of-capital/7e7267ef-139c-4108-bf67-73687a26a243/.

[14] Stevis-Gridneff, Matina. “How Forced Labor in Eritrea is Linked to EU-Funded Projects,” The New York Times, January 8, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/08/world/europe/conscription-eritrea-eu.html.

[15] Gettleman, Jeffrey. “Coup Attempt by Rebel Soldiers is Said to Fail in Eritrea,” The New York Times, January 21, 2013, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/22/world/africa/coup-attempt-fails-in-eritrea.html.

[16] “How is Russia Developing Rare Earth Metals?” Mining World Russia, March 3, 2020, https://miningworld.ru/Articles/how-is-russia-developing-rare-earth-metals#:~:text=As%20of%20June%202019%2C%20Russia,and%201.4m%20tons%20respectively.

[17] “Russia to Establish Military Base in Sudan,” Middle East Monitor, November 13, 2020, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20201113-russia-to-establish-military-base-in-sudan/.

[18] “Sudan’s President Bashir Asks Putin for ‘Protection’ From ‘Aggressive U.S.’” France 24, November 23, 2017, https://www.france24.com/en/20171123-sudan-president-bashir-asks-putin-protection-aggressive-us.

[19] Solomon, Salem. “Russia-Eritrea Relations Grow With Planned Logistics Center,” Voice of America, September 2, 2018, https://www.voanews.com/africa/russia-eritrea-relations-grow-planned-logistics-center.

[20] “Adopting Resolution 2551 (2020) by 13 Votes in Favour, 2 Abstentions, Security Council Extends Mandate for Expert Panel on Somalia, Renews Partial Lifting of Arms Embargo,” United Nations Security Council, November 12, 2020, https://www.un.org/press/en/2020/sc14355.doc.htm.

[21] “Report: Somali Fishermen Object to ‘Shocking’ Deal Allowing China in Their Waters,” Stop Illegal Fishing, February 8, 2019, https://stopillegalfishing.com/press-links/report-somali-fishermen-object-to-shocking-deal-allowing-china-in-their-waters/.

[22] Mohamud, Hassan Sheikh. “Somalia Must Learn to Stand Alone,” Foreign Affairs, November 25, 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/africa/2020-11-25/somalia-must-learn-stand-alone.

[23] “Somalia: War Crimes in Mogadishu,” Human Rights Watch, August 13, 2007, https://www.hrw.org/news/2007/08/13/somalia-war-crimes-mogadishu

[24] “Ethiopian Invasion of Somalia, a Debacle U.S. Official Says,” ECADF Ethiopian News, March 13, 2010, https://ecadforum.com/blog1/ethiopian-invasion-of-somalia-a-debacle-u-s-official-says/.

[25] Shelton, Jon. “Angela Merkel Calls for Weapons Exports to Africa,” DW, November 27, 2019, https://www.dw.com/en/angela-merkel-calls-for-weapons-exports-to-africa/a-51441421.

[26] Irish, John. “Ethiopia, France Sign Military, Navy Deal, Turn ‘New Page’ in Ties,” Reuters, March 12, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-france/ethiopia-france-sign-military-navy-deal-turn-new-page-in-ties-idUSKBN1QT2W3.

[27] Marks, Simon. “Ethiopia Withdraws Thousands of Troops From Neighboring Somalia,” Bloomberg, November 13, 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-11-13/ethiopia-withdraws-thousands-of-troops-from-neighboring-somalia.

[28] Grane, Allen. “What is the African Growth and Opportunity Act?” Council on Foreign Relations Africa in Transition, February 17, 2017, https://www.cfr.org/blog/what-african-growth-and-opportunity-act.

[29] U.S. Trade and Investment with Sub-Saharan Africa: Recent Trends and New Developments. Washington D.C.: U.S. International Trade Commission, March 2020, https://agoa.info/images/documents/15766/pub5043-usitc-report.pdf.

[30] Robinson, Colin D. and Matisek, Jahara. “Assistance to Locally Appropriate Military Forces in Southern Somalia,” The RUSI Journal 165, no. 4 (December 8, 2020), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03071847.2020.1830711?journalCode=rusi20&.

Who Will Call Out Eritrea’s War Crimes in Tigray?

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By Alex de Waal | World Peace Foundation 

Eritrea has deployed most of its army in Tigray region of Ethiopia. This is no secret. At minimum, 12 divisions have been fighting inside Tigray.

At first, the United States gave Eritrea a free pass, expressing “thanks to Eritrea for not being provoked” into retaliating after a TPLF rocket attack on Asmara. Later it admitted that Eritrea was a belligerent. The United Nations Secretary General repeated Ethiopian PM Abiy Ahmed’s assertion that Eritrean troops had not crossed the border. The Chairperson of the African Union has carefully said nothing on the issue.

It is lawful for a state to request the military assistance of another state. The involvement of Eritrea in Ethiopia isn’t illegal per se.

But there is mounting evidence that activities of Eritrean troops include perpetrating war crimes on a vast scale. Every report from the northern parts of Tigray speaks about Eritrean soldiers looting. They ransacked the town of Shire. They shelled Humera close to the Sudanese border. They systematically dismantled the university and pharmaceutical factory in Adigrat. They stole cars, generators, and high value goods. Now we hear that they are combing ordinary houses in towns and villages, taking such basic items as furniture, doors, and jerrycans. Eritreans are said to have emptied food stores and looted cattle, sheep and goats.

Catholic priests in Eritrea were horrified by the looted items coming into Eritrea from Tigray and admonished anyone buying them. Despite the information blackout, journalists have pieced together enough information on these actions.

International criminal law prohibits a belligerent from removing, destroying or rendering useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population. The fast-approaching humanitarian crisis with at least 2 million displaced is due not only to fighting but to starvation crimes such as these.

Eritrean troops overran and emptied four refugee camps where Eritreans who had escaped their country had been living, until last month under the protection of the Ethiopian government. That’s another violation of international law.

As the weeks pass, it is becoming ever clearer that President Isseyas Afewerki has long planned this war with the intention of annihilating the TPLF and reducing Tigray to a condition of complete incapacity. His strategy is to say nothing and make a fait accompli on the assumption that the world will, in due course, come to live with it.

If anyone should doubt Isseyas’s intent, they should reflect on the way in which he has dealt with domestic opposition. In September 2001, while international attention was consumed by the al-Qaeda attacks on New York and Washington DC, he arrested eleven high-ranking colleagues, heroes of the liberation war, who had called for democratization, and ten journalists. They have never been seen since. After PM Abiy Ahmed visited Asmara in 2018 to end the long-dormant peace process between the two countries, Eritrea did not liberalize or demobilize its army. Nothing was said about political prisoners. Eritreans complained that nothing changed for them. For Pres. Isseyas, it wasn’t peace—it was a new opportunity to consolidate despotism.

Who will call out Eritrea’s role in the destruction of Tigray?

Will Ethiopia-Eritrea Peace Last?

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National Interest | Michael Rubin | History warns the relationship between these two countries could suddenly turn sour again.

When Eritrea won its independence in 1993 after a thirty-year struggle against Ethiopia, there was optimism that peace would hold. Long-time dictator Mengistu Haile Mariam resigned on May 21, 1991, and fled into exile in Zimbabwe. Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki and the new Ethiopian leader Meles Zenawi had been comrades-in-arms against Mengistu’s regime. It looked like the two would lead their respective countries into a period of both peace and prosperity. In a book review for the Financial Times, British writer John Ryle recalled a 1995 celebration in the northern Ethiopian town of Mekelle:

“The two guerrilla movements had fought together to defeat the Derg, then – unprecedentedly – agreed to an amicable secession. In western diplomatic circles, Meles and Isaias were being touted as a new breed of African statesman. That evening on the outskirts of Mekelle, I watched as Meles, Isaias and other guests, serenaded by Mahmud Ahmed, a veteran Ethiopian pop star, danced together in the moonlight.”

Such episodes would not last. Just three years later, a series of skirmishes between Eritrea and Ethiopia over relatively minor border disputes would erupt into a full-scale conflict. The land they disputed had no real resources. It seemed so irrelevant that the conflict was often described as “two bald men fighting over a comb.”

Whereas Isaias and Meles once danced at Mekelle, soon Eritrean aircraft were bombing it. Sniper fire, artillery barrages, tank fire, air raids, and land grabs slowed into a stalemate and World War I-like trench warfare replete with human wave assaults. By the time both sides agreed to a ceasefire, at least one hundred thousand Ethiopians and Eritreans had died in combat. The peace was cold, however, and at times it appeared as if hostilities might again erupt.

Both countries used the crisis as an excuse to clamp down. Whereas once diplomats and analysts hoped Eritrea might become a democracy, it quickly descended into autocracy. In 1999, Freedom House lowered its rating to “not free.” Isaias used the conflict to institute near-indefinite conscription—lasting decades and often indistinguishable from slavery. Ethiopia, meanwhile, while never quite as extreme, also slipped back into repression.

That Eritrea and Ethiopia have been a hairs’ trigger away from renewed conflict made their sudden 2018 rapprochement all the more remarkable. Many observers credit the Ethiopian parliament’s appointment of Abiy Ahmed, a young former guerilla fighter and intelligence officer who had previously led Ethiopia’s equivalent of the National Security Agency. His political work—efforts to address both youth unemployment and the plight of the displaced as well as his ability to build cross-ethnic coalitions—shot him to prominence.

Abiy called for peace upon his inauguration and wasted no time to pursue it. Even seasoned veterans in the region, however, were surprised by the speed with which Isaias reciprocated his efforts. In September 2018, the two leaders signed a peace agreement in Saudi Arabia. The rapprochement has been rapid, as Ethiopians and Eritreans reunite families and resume trade. There is widespread speculation that Abiy could win the Nobel Peace Prize.

Alas, while Abiy appears sincere, it is far from clear Ethiopia-Eritrea peace will last. Here’s the problem. The seventy-three-year-old Isaias sees himself less as an equal to the forty-two-year-old Abiy than as a father figure and guide. Even at the best of times, Isaias’ concept of diplomacy is dictating his position and then waiting for opponents to accept it without any compromise. When the adversary or partner is a generational younger, the chances that Isaias will compromise recede from miniscule to nonexistent. Bilateral issues will inevitably arise, and it is unclear whether ordinary Ethiopians—let alone a fictitious political coalition—will back repeated Abiy’s concessions. After all, from the Ethiopian perspective, they are now Africa’s second most populous country after Nigeria and, with more than 100 million, they dominate East Africa. Isaias sees Eritrea and Ethiopia as equal, but Ethiopians will never accept equality with a country whose population is just one-twentieth of their own.

So, when Isaias raises a complaint and Abiy has no room to maneuver, what Isaias do? In the past, Isaias has shown a willingness to subordinate regional security and his country’s economic health for the sake of his own twisted sense of personal honor. Just as Isaias and Meles went from comrades and friends to enemies within just a few months, so too could Isaias and Abiy. Add into the mix that Ethiopia is growing more democratic while Eritrea has become the North Korea of the African continent, and Isaias has personal reasons to put the brakes on or even reverse the peace. Isaias may temporarily welcome the economic infusion that peace brings his devastated and impoverished country, but he will not continue it at the expense of his own power.

Is peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea a good thing? Certainly. But optimism should not cloud diplomats and analysts to reality, nor do dictators like Isaias suddenly change their stripes or behaviors overnight. Realism dictates not only rightly celebrating progress, but also recognizing just how tenuous it may be and planning proactively for the chance that the rapprochement might be fleeting.

Michael Rubin is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute.