Egypt Deploys its Most Advanced Fighters to Sudan For Joint Exercises Amid Political Uncertainty

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Source: Military Watch Magazine

The Egyptian Air Force has deployed a contingent of its most capable fighter aircraft, the MiG-29M, to neighbouring Sudan for the Protectors of the Nile 2020 military exercises. This follows a Western-backed coup in Khartoum in 2019 which saw the administration of longstanding Western adversary Omar Al Bashir toppled, with Sudan’s political future still uncertain as nationalist, pro-Western, Islamist and other factions continue to vie for influence. The MiG-29M deployments has been met with a number of different interpretations, including a sign of support for the Sudanese Military amid growing instability internally. The Sudanese Air Force itself operates the MiG-29 as its primary frontline fighter, albeit the older but still relatively modern MiG-29SE variant, which until 2015 had a significant qualitative edge over anything in the Egyptian fleet due largely to its use of active radar guided R-77 missiles. Egypt itself was able to acquire the R-77 from 2015 alongside its MiG-29M jets – providing the most advanced air to air missile in both fleets and Egypt’s only active radar guided missile with a range exceeding 100km.

Sudanese Air Force MiG-29 Fighters Escort Su-24M Strike Fighter | Military Watch Magazine

 

Interoperability between Egyptian and Sudanese air units is expected to be high, and could improve considerably as the two carry out more joint exercises. With Cairo aligning itself closely with Russian since the overthrow of its Western backed Islamist government in 2013, and opposing Western designs in both Syria and Libya, greater Egyptian involvement in Sudan has the potential to tip the balance against of Western interests in the country, reversing many of the gains made since the coup against the Bashir government. While relations between the two East African states have historically been far from positive, with territorial disputes surrounding the Egyptian-held Hala’ib triangle area ongoing, the emergence of common perceived threats to both countries could well lead to the forging of a robust partnership.

What’s Happening in Ethiopia Is a Tragedy

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By Tsedale Lemma for ©The New York Times

Much of the blame must be laid at the door of the prime minister.

The announcement last week that the government was about to launch a military operation into one of the country’s regions came, to put it lightly, as a shock.

Not only was it very far from the emollient statecraft that won Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed the Nobel Peace Prize last year, it also seemed to shatter the purpose of his premiership. When he rose to power in 2018, Mr. Abiy promised to guide Ethiopia into a new era of peace, prosperity and national reconciliation.

But on Nov. 4, he dispatched the Army to Tigray, one of the country’s 10 semiautonomous regions and home to roughly 6 percent of the population, accusing its leaders — with whom he has increasingly sparred — of attacking a government defense post and attempting to steal military equipment.

And in the days since, Mr. Abiy imposed a six-month state of emergency on the Tigray region, declared its legislature void and approved a provisional replacement. As fighting raged, the internet and telephone networks have been shut down. Hundreds are reported to be dead.

This is a tragedy. Ethiopia stands on the cusp of civil war, bringing devastation to both the country and the wider region. While the situation is volatile and uncertain, this much is clear: Mr. Abiy’s political project, to bring together the nation in a process of democratization, is over. And much of the blame must be laid at his door.

After years of persistent anti-government protests, economic troubles and widespread unrest, Mr. Abiy took over a country on the brink of collapse. At least one million people were internally displaced in 2017, according to the United Nations, as the country was shaken by protests from Oromo and Amhara ethnic groups, who together make up nearly two-thirds of the population. Presenting himself as a reformer, the avalanche of changes promised by Mr. Abiy, who took over in April 2018, seemed to avert the worst of the country’s problems.

But Mr. Abiy overreached. His first cardinal mistake was to sideline the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, for decades the most powerful political force in the country, in the peace he brokered between Ethiopia and Eritrea. By pushing the Tigrayan leadership aside as he sealed his signature achievement, Mr. Abiy made clear the limits to his talk of unity.

That was a taste of what was to come. Last year, Mr. Abiy moved to dismantle the old political order. Going beyond his original remit, he proposed reconfiguring the coalition that had ruled the country for 27 years — the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Front, or E.P.R.D.F., which itself comprised a gamut of regional parties — into a new, single party.

The T.P.L.F., which founded and dominated the coalition, was not keen on the change — but Mr. Abiy went ahead with it regardless, creating a rift with the Tigrayans and undermining the country’s delicate political settlement. Far from minimizing the fallout, Mr. Abiy exacerbated it, removing all ministers from the T.P.L.F. from his cabinet.

By the time the new party was announced, in November 2019, the damage was done. The T.P.L.F., angered by the whittling away of its power and concerned that the country’s federal system was under threat, had not joined. They weren’t alone in their disquiet. In Mr. Abiy’s own region, Oromia, many were skeptical of the new order, while southern Ethiopia splintered into disorder, as multiple administrative zones demanded self-rule. After coming to power on the promise of unity, Mr. Abiy had alienated and frustrated key components of his coalition. Suddenly, he looked vulnerable.

The coronavirus changed the calculus. The all-important national election, scheduled for August, was postponed; the focus became how to mitigate the damage wrought by the pandemic. But the political problems didn’t go away.

In the summer, the killing of a popular Oromo musician — whose perpetrators the government claims were acting under the orders of an armed opposition group, the Oromo Liberation Army, and the T.P.L.F. — set off widespread violence against minorities in Oromia and police killings of protesters, in which at least 166 people died. It also led to a major crackdown against opposition political leaders, including Mr. Abiy’s former ally and now fierce critic, Jawar Mohammed.

Then in September, the Tigray region went ahead with its elections, in defiance of the government’s orders. Since that act of subversion, tensions between the government and the leaders in Tigray, simmering for two years, have been high. Last week, they spilled out into open conflict.

Whether or not it escalates into a civil war, it will leave an indelible mark on Ethiopian politics. What was already a deeply polarized country will become more divided still. But most importantly, it could crush the hopes of a democratic transition. Free speech, civil liberties and due process may fall afoul of the turn to militarism and repression.

In Tigray, the possibility of civilian casualties, indiscriminate attacks and protracted conflict could further deepen grievances; in a region with a long history of resistance to the central state, that might lead to an insurgency. The consequences for the wider region, if the conflict were to spill out to Eritrea, Sudan and Djibouti, could be severe.

Judging by Mr. Abiy’s moves over the past week, not least the replacement of the foreign minister and the leaders of the entire security sector with trusted loyalists, he is not inclined to de-escalate. The leader who once committed “to toil for peace every single day and in all seasons” has been acting more like a commander in chief than a prime minister.

Mr. Abiy has come a long way. War, he memorably said as he accepted the Nobel Peace Prize, was “the epitome of hell.” Now he looks ready to meet it.

Tsedale Lemma (@TsedaleLemma) is the editor in chief of the Addis Standard.

Ethiopia is about to cross the point of no return

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©Mail&Guardian – Rashid Abdi  & Tobias Hagmann

With the world’s attention fixated on the United States elections, Ethiopia embarked on a civil war last week. In a time span of five days Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, who won the 2019 Nobel peace prize after making peace with Eritrea, ended the democratic transition that he had initiated two years before.

In the early hours of Wednesday last week, Abiy ordered federal troops to launch an offensive against the northern region of Tigray, which borders Eritrea and is home to about 6% of the population. Government airstrikes on military positions in Tigray and a telecommunication shutdown began the same day.

Since then, Abiy’s government has purged Tigrayan officials from government positions, mobilised ethnic militias to join the war and rejected international calls for dialogue with leaders of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF).

On Saturday, Ethiopia’s parliament replaced Tigray’s elected leadership with a caretaker administration. On Sunday, the prime minister appointed some of his close allies as the new heads of national defence, intelligence and the federal police. Until recently, Abiy preached national unity and forgiveness. So why did he start a civil war?

Abiy’s casus belli is an alleged raid on the headquarters of the Northern Command in Mekelle during which, it is claimed, arms were looted and scores killed. The truth is more complicated. First, the war preparations had been underway for weeks. Federal forces and allied troops from other federal states were in fact massed on the border between Tigray and Amhara as early as late October.

Second, the officer corps of the Northern Command is predominantly Tigrayan and Oromo. The command has been in Mekelle for more than a decade. It had put down deep social roots and developed close ties with the TPLF. When Abiy issued the order for an offensive, the command rejected it and reaffirmed its loyalty to the elected leadership in Tigray. A brief firefight between loyalist and dissident troops ensued, which was quickly suppressed.

The Oromo members of the command are believed to be predominantly supportive of the TPLF. Most are disenchanted with the prime minister’s arrest of Oromo leaders and the heavy-handed crackdown in Oromia.

Third, Tigray is estimated to hold the bulk of Ethiopia’s military hardware. The region has enough helicopter gunships, heavy field guns, tanks and armoured personnel carriers to mount a conventional war. The idea they would raid the command armoury and depots for weapons and ammunition is spurious, fantastical, even.

The role of distrust

Abiy distrusts the professional national army. His relations with the rank and file are brittle. His stint in the army as a radioman in the signals corps and cyber-security department was brief and had not given him the depth and network needed to effectively influence it.

This partly explains why he is increasingly reliant on ethnic forces drawn from other regional states to prosecute the campaign in Tigray. So far, the bulk of the federal fighting force is drawn from a plethora of ethnic armies from the regional states. They include Amhara State special forces and liyu paramilitary police from Oromia.

By outsourcing the war to ethnic units — some with axes to grind against Tigrayans — Abiy is playing a dangerous game almost certain to aggravate the conflict and transforming, potentially, what is a centre-periphery contest into a wider ethnic conflagration.

Both the Tigray leadership and the federal government deserve blame for the current crisis, but it is important to understand the wider context.

The speed at which Abiy evolved from political reformer to war prime minister has astonished his friends and foes alike. When he came to power amid popular unrest in March 2018, Abiy gained overwhelming acclaim as a reformer. He released prisoners, welcomed back the opposition and promised to open up the economy. Yet political liberalisation backfired as pent-up ethnic tensions spiralled out of control, destabilising a nation that has long been considered an anchor of stability in the Horn of Africa region.

Opposition arrests

“Abiymania” dissipated rapidly when it became clear that the new federal leadership was unable to manage these conflicts. Abiy faced serious political opposition from the outgoing TPLF guard, which had dominated the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front for decades. After he broke with his former colleagues of the Oromo Democratic Party, Abiy faced increasing criticism from Oromo nationalists. They accused him of selling out the Oromo cause; he had many of them arrested in return. Repositioning himself as an Ethiopian nationalist who transcends ethnic cleavages, Abiy created the multi-ethnic, but unitary Prosperity Party that controls all levers of power.

Ethiopia has taken a fatal step towards a full-blown civil war. Armed clashes are now raging on multiple battle fronts. Hundreds of soldiers have died on both sides in less than a week.

Expectations of a swift and clean victory are misplaced. The most likely outcome is a messy and grinding stalemate; and, worse, a protracted insurgency for which TPLF is well-suited. A prolonged conflict is bound to have dire implications. It elevates the prospect of a regionalised and multi-ethnic conflict, risks reversing the economic and development gains made in the past 20 years, and is almost certain to trigger large-scale displacement. Most crucially, it diminishes prospects for furthering democratisation and reduces the chances for credible elections in 2021.

The window for international intervention and mediation is closing very fast. Without a quick, robust and concerted international response to stop the fighting, Ethiopia runs the real risk of crossing the point of no return.

 

Rashid Abdi is a Horn of Africa analyst based in Nairobi, Kenya. Tobias Hagmann is an associate professor in international development at Roskilde University in Denmark. 

ጎራችሁን ለዩ፥ ከህዝብ ወገን ወይስ ከወንጀለኞች ጎን

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ሰለሞን ነጋሽ

ጦርነቱ ትክክል ነው፣ ከህወሓት ጋር ነው። ወንጀለኞችን ለህግ ለማቅረብ የሚደረግ ህግ የማስከበር ስራ ነው። ብላችሁ ለምታምኑ ህሊናችሁን እንድትፈትኑት የሚጋብዝ ጽሁፍ ነው። 95 ሚልዮን ለ5 ሚልዮን፣ ይጥፉ ወይስ እንጥፋ፣ ወዘተ በሚል የታወረ እይታ የምታራምዱ ከሆነ፣ ይህን ማንበብ አይመከረም እዚሁ አቁሙ። አላማው ምን ያህሉ በተሳሳተ መረጃ፣ የተሳሳተ አቋም እንደያዘ ለማወቅ ነው። ሁላችንም አቋማችንን እያጠራን እንድንሔድ ይረዳናል።

  1. ህወሓት አታልሎም ይሁን አሳምኖ የትግራይን ህዝብ ከጎኑ አሰልፏል። የትግራይ ህዝብ በፌደራል የተላለፈውን ህግ እያወቀ የክልሉ መንግስት ባዘጋጀው ምርጫ ተሳትፏል። ህወሓትንም መርጧል። የህዝብ ውሳኔ ምን ማድረግ ይቻላል?
  2. አብይ አሕመድ በሁሉም ቦታ ተቀባይነቱን የሚሸረሽር ስራ ሲሰራ ላለፉት ሁለት አመታት ቆይቷል። ኦሮሞው አልተቀበለውም። አማራው እንደ ፔንዱለም ቢወዛወዝም የተቃወመውና ያማረረበት ጊዜ ይበጣል፣ አዲስ አበቤው አልተቀበለውም፣ ወላይታ ሲዳማ ጉራጌ ወዘተ ሁሉም ከአብይ መንግስት ጋር አልተስማሙም። የትግራይ ለብቻው አይደለም። ይህ እውነታ ሰፊ ቅስቀሳና ፕሮፓጋንዳ ሳያስፈልገው የትግራይ ህዝብ በራሱ ጊዜ ከህወሓት ጎን እንዲሰለፍ ዋነኛ ምክንያት ሆኗል። ወዶና ፈቅዶ ከጎኑ ከተሰለፈ ደግሞ እኔ አውቅልሀለሁ አይባልም። ፋሽሽታዊ ባህሪ ነው።
  3. በህገወጥ መንገድ ያለበቂ ምክንያት አብይ አሕመድ ስልጣኑን በራሱ መንገድ አራዝሟል። በዚህ ምክንያት ከህወሓት ጋር ብቻ ሳይሆን፣ ከሌሎች የተቃዋሚ ፓርቲ አመራሮች ጋር መግባባት አልቻለም። በሀሰት ክስ ሁሉንም አስሯቸውም ይገኛል። በተለይ ልደቱ አያሌውን ፍርድ ቤቱ በተደጋጋሚ ነጻ ቢለውም፣ ፈጽሞ ሊፈታው አልፈለገም። ከመስከረም 30 ብኋላ ሰላም እንደማይኖር በመናገሩ ብቻ ቂም ቋጥሮበታል። ልደቱ እንዳለው ታድያ የመጨረሻው ደረጃ ላይ ደረሰን አየን እንጂ፣ ግምቱ የተሳሳተ አልነበረም። (“አደባባይ ውጡ አልል፣ ተኩሱ አልል፣ ምንም አልልም። ዝም ብዬ ነው የማየው” እንዳለው፣ ይኸው እርሱ ምንም ሳይል እኛ ጥቅምት ሳይገባደድ እዚህ ደረጃ ላይ ደርሰናል ።)
  4. በሁሉም የአገሪቱ ክፍሎች ግጭቶች ተስፋፍተዋል። ህወሓት ላይ ማሳበብ እንደማይቻል ባለፉት ጥቂት ቀናት ብቻ ያየናቸው ተደጋጋሚ ግጭቶች በቂ ማስረጃዎች ናቸው። ትግራይ ከተከበበች፣ ኔትዎርክ ከተዘጋና ጦርነቱ ከተጀመረ ወዲህ በሌላ የአገሪቱ ክፍል የሲቪልያን ህይወትን የቀጠፉ ቢያንስ አምስት ግጭቶችን አይተናል። በህወሓት ማሳበብ አይቻልም።
  5. ኢሳያስን እየጋበዘ የጦር መሳሪያ ሲያስጎበኝ፣ አየር ሀይሉን ሲያሳይ፣ ለራሱም ኤርትራ ሄዶ አንዳንድ ሁኔታዎችን ሲያጠና፣ ወሎና ጎንደር ሄዶ ቅድመ ዝግጅት ሲያደርግ እንደከረመ ሁላችንም እናውቃለን። ከህዝብ የተደበቀ እውነታ አይደለም። በራሱ ሚድያ የዜና እወጃ ሆኖ ሰምተነዋል/አይተነዋል። የገንዘብ ቅየራው፣ ወታደሩን ማጓጓዝ፣ ወታደራዊ አመራሩን መቀየር ወዘተ የጦርነት ቅድመ ዝግጅቱ አንድ አካል ነበሩ።
  6. ጦሩን አጓጉዞ፣ ከነ ኢሳያስ ጋር መክሮ፣ ተዘጋጅቶበት ሲያበቃ፣ ኋላ እንደተረጋገጠው በኦሮሞ ነጻ አውጪ ታጣቂዎች የተወሰደውን እርምጃ ህወሓት ላይ ለድፎና ያንን ሰበብ አድርጎ “ምክር ቤቱ”ን በማላቀስ ሲያስወስን የዋለ እለት፣ ጦርነቱን የሚጀምርበት ሁኔታን እያመቻቸው እንደነበር እንገነዘባለን። (ህወሓት የሰሜን እዝ ላይ እርምጃ ወሰደ ስልሚባለው ወሬ ሰለማያግባባን እንተወው። ኦፕሬሽኑን ቀድሞ የጀመረው አማራና ሶማሌ ክልል ላይ እንዳደረገው በአውሮፕላን ኮማንዶ ጭኖ በመላክ የሞከረ ሲሆን ያ ሀይል ላይ ነው እርምጃ የተወሰደው፣ የሰሜን እዙ ከጎናችን ተሰልፏል ባይ ነው ህወሓት። እርሱ ደግሞ እዛ ሲጠብቁ የነበሩትን በተኙበት ወጓቸው ነው የሚለው። ተጣርቶ ማስረጃው እስኪወጣ ድረስ ማንም ሰው እርግጠኛ ሊሆን አይችልም። ለፎቶ ካለው ፍቅር አንጻር ማስረጃ ቢኖረው ኖሮ ይፋ ያደርገው እንደነበር ግን ማስታወስ ያስፈልጋል። )
  7. ጦርነቱ በይፋ ከመጀመሩ በፊት ህዝቡ ላይ የተፈጸሙ ግፎችን በቅድሚያ እንመልከት፥ በጀት መከልከል። የዓለም ባንክና የመሳሰሉ አለም አቀፋ ተቋማት የሚሰጡትን እርዳታ መከልከል። ከስፖርት ውድድር ተጋሩን ማግለል። የኮቪድ ቁሳቁስ ወደ ትግራይ አለመላክ። ከውጪ የተገዙ የተለያዩ ቁሳቁሶች ወደ ክልሉ እንዳይገቡ ማገድ። መንገድ መዝጋት። ነዳጅ እንዳይገባ ማድረግ። በሁሉም ዙሪያ ክልሉን መክበብ። ጦርነት ከከፈተ ብኋላ ደግሞ ተደጋጋሚ የአየር ድብደባ በከተሞች ጭምር ማካሔድ። ከቤታችሁ እንዳትወጡ እደበድባለሁ ብሎ በአደባባይ ማወጅና ህዝብን ማሸበር። ከትግራይ ውጭ ያሉ ተጋሩን ማዋከብ፣ ኢትኒክ ፕሮፋይሊንግና ድንገተኛ ፍተሻ ተጋሩ ላይ ማካሔድ። በጸጥታ መዋቅር ውስጥ የነበሩ የትግራይ ተወላጆች በሙሉ ከስራ ማገድ፣ ትጥቃቸውን ማራገፍ፣ ብሎም ማሰር። ተማሪና የውጭ ዜግነት ያላቸው ተጋሩ ጭምር ወደ ውጭ እንዳይወጡ ማገድ። ከትምህርት፣ ከስራ፣ ከቢዝነሳቸው ማስተጓጎል። ወዘተ
  8. በብሔር የተደራጀ ልዩ ሀይልና ምልሻ እዚህ ጦርነት ውስጥ እንዲገባ አድርጓል። ወደ ብሔር ግጭት ሊያመራ ይችላል የሚል ስጋት በስፋት አለ።
  9. የውጭ ሀይል ማለትም የኤርትራና (ዛሬ ደግሞ የሱዳንም ተጨምሮበታል እየተባለ ነው) ጦርነቱ ውስጥ ጎትቶ ማስገባት።
  10. ለአለም አቀፍ የተኩስ አቁሙ ጥሪ ጆሮ አለመስጠት።

ይህ ሁሉ የተደረገውና እየተደረገ ያለው ጥቂት በህግ የሚፈለጉ ሰዎችን ለመያዝ ወይስ ትግራዋይን ለመስበር? የፈለገውን ያህል ኪሳራ ያስከትል (ትግራዋይ ተሰብሮም ይሁን) ደንታ የለንም ከሆነ መልሳችሁ አንድ ነገር ነው። ጥቂቶችን ለህግ ለማቅረብ ይህን ያህል ርቀት መጓዝ ትክክልና ተገቢ ነው ብላችሁ ከሆነ የምታምኑትና እርምጃውን የምትደግፉት ዝምታችሁ መልስ ይሆናል። እንደነ አቶ ገዱ አንዳርጋቸው “የለም ይህ ትክክል አይደለም፣ እብደት ነው” የምትሉ ከሆነ ደግሞ አቋማችሁን አጥርታችሁ ይህን ጦርነት ለማስቆም ጫና መፍጠር ይጠበቅባችኋል።

በበኩሌ አብይ ህግ አስከባሪ ሆኖ በህግ ሊፈልጋቸው የሚችሉ ወንጀለኞች ይኖራሉ ብዬ አላምንም። ምናልባት የኢትዮጵያ ህዝብ እርሱንና ጋሻ ጃግሬዎቹን ወደ ህግ ማቅረብ የሚፈልገውን ያህል ከህወሓት ባለስልጣና ሌሎችም በህግ ሊጠይቃቸው የሚፈልጋቸው ሊኖሩ ይችላሉ። አሉም። ነገር ግን አብይ ከነሱ ተሽሎ ህግ አስከባሪ ነኝ የሚልበት ምንም የሞራል መሰረት የለውም ብዬ አምናለሁ። በደም የተጨማለቀ በብዙ ወንጀል የሚፈለግ፣ በገለልተኛ አካል ብዙ መጣራት ያለባቸው የህዝብ ጥያቄዎች አሉ። የአማራ መሪዎች ሞት፣ የኢንጅነር ስመኘው ግድያ፣ የነጄነራል ሰዓረ ሞት፣ የአርቲስት ሀጫሉ ግድያ፣ የዜጎች በየቦታው መፈናቀል በየተለይ አዲስ አበባ ዙሪያና ኦሮሚያ፣ የንጹሀን ዜጎች በየቦታው መሞትና ሌሎችም ሁሉም በገለልተኛ አጣሪ ኮሚሽን ተጣርተው ወንጀል ፈጻሚዎች ለፍርድ መቅረብ አለባቸው። አገሪቱ አሁን የገባችበትን ጦርነት ጀስቲፋይ የሚያደርግ በቂ ምክንያት ስለሌለ፣ ወደ ጦርነት የከተቱን  ተጠያቂ ሰዎች ተጣርቶ ለፍርድ ሊቀርቡ ይገባል። እስከዛው ያለ በቂ ምክንያት የተገባው ጦርነት አንድን ሉአላዊ ህዝብ ለማንበርከክ የተቃጣ ወረራና ጥቃት ነው ብዬ ነው የማምነው። ለዚህም ነው ከትግራዋይ ወገኔ ጎን የቆምኩት። ተሳሳትኩ?

From Oslo to The Hague – The journey of Abiy Ahmed Ali

/17 Comments/in , /by

Solomon Negash

Abiy Ahmed refused dialogue, opted for war, and resisted diplomatic pressure. Make no mistake. This has been his consistent position from day one. He resolved no tension peacefully with any of his major adversaries at home, including Jawar Mohammed, Eskinder Nega, Lidetu Ayalew, Yilkal Getnet, and many more who are languishing in jail on trumped-up charges. Not even with his long-time comrade Lemma Megersa. He has never tried once to resolve his internal political difference peacefully. This says it all, Abiy Ahmed has never been a man of peace. It is not in his nature. Because, as he repeatedly proclaimed publicly and stated in his book, he dreamed of being in power for the next 10 years. Absolute power corrupts absolutely, right?

I was among the hundreds of thousands of Ethiopians who have celebrated the day he was selected as a winner of Nobel Peace Prize in 2019, even if, I believe, he did not do anything notable to deserve such a prize. But we saw it as an opportunity to encourage him to make peace at home, be committed to successful political transition, and to get the attention and support from the international community to help Ethiopia overcome the eminent danger of collapse it was and still is facing. But sadly, he used that opportunity to consolidate his political power at the expense of peace and stability of the country.

I asserted, he didn’t do anything notable to deserve such a prize. It may sound an outrageous assertion but let me clarify.

The “no peace, no war” condition that lasted for two decades was basically a reflection of the deeper conflict that existed for decades between the two dominant political parties: TPLF in Tigray and PDFJ in Eritrea. While in power, TPLF made calls for peace on several occasions, but Eritrea’s PDFJ was not willing to answer to such calls. PDFJ sees TPLF as an eternal enemy who ruined the dream of EPLF (former PDFJ) and young Issaias to become a leading power in the region. For example, the former Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn, made several calls, but President Issaias Afewerki showed no interest. He refused to negotiate with a “puppet” (his word). When Abiy came to power and signaled his interest to make peace with Eritrea (which was decided by EPRDF centrally as part of their reform agenda before Abiy Ahmed came to power), President Issaias did not show any interest and never answered for several weeks. He was not interested until he noticed Abiy entering a new chapter in his power dynamics determined to get rid of TPLF leaders from Menelik palace. Afewerki reconsidered and answered for the call when he witnessed key leaders of TPLF left Addis Ababa for Mekelle. In a way, he was the main player for the two nations to coming to the so-called “peace”, which was later praised by many.

For those who knew the history between these two rivals, there was no genuine peace to celebrate. There was and still is a tactical alliance between two groups who have a common enemy, called TPLF. As Kjetil Tronvoll, a leading expert on Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa, once accurately described it, “the ultimate goal of Isaias Afewerki is to crush TPLF and to inflict revenge upon Tigray”, i.e. not peace. Thus, what seems progress in peace was actually and paradoxically an extended conflict which draws in several new actors into play. The two actors that were in conflict are still in conflict, but this time joined and backed by several other actors (such as, Prosperity Party and the ethnic based militias from the Amhara region) which sided with PDFJ of Eritrea.

It is the alliance of these groups that declared war today not only against TPLF, but also against the people of Tigray. What started by marginalizing and discriminating ethnic Tigrians, for example, banning from national sports, cutting budgets, preventing humanitarian aid from entering Tigray, and refusing to send medical appliances related to COVID19, is now upscaled to a full-fledged war that involves aerial bombardment including in densely populated towns. (And yes, Abiy Ahmed declared and warned about this live on national television.) As such, Abiy Ahmed, the Nobel Peace Laurate, begins to commence on a new road, from Nobel Peace Center in Oslo to ICC in The Hague, in just one year.

ከአርቲስት ሀጫሉ ግድያ በስተጀርባ ….

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… በሆነው ነገር ከማዘን በላይ ተበሳጭቼ፣ ምንም ላለማለት ወስኜ ነበር። ነገር ግን ዝምታዬም ያስወቅሰኝ ጀምሯል። ታድያ … የሚሰማኝን ልጻፍና …

በቅድሚያ አንድ ነገር ልበል። በዚህ እድሜው በሰው እጅ ቀርቶ በበሽታም መሞት የማይገባው ወጣት ነበር አርቲስት ሀጫሉ። በፖለቲካ አመለካከቱ ባንግባባም፣ የሚያወራው ባይጥመኝም፣ ምናምን የሚል ቅራቅንቦ አልደርትም። ምንም ይሁን ምን ግድያውን ፍጹም አወግዛለሁ!! ገዳዮቹና አስገዳዮቹ (ህግ አስከባሪ የለም እንጂ) ለህግ ቀርበው የእጃቸውን ማግኘት እንዳለባቸውም አምናለሁ። በዚህ አጋጣሚ በአርቲስት ሀጫሉ ሞት፣ በሀዘን ልባቸው ለተሰበረ በሙሉ (አስመሳዮች የአዞ እንባ የሚያነቡትን ሳይጨምር) መጽናናትን ከልብ እመኛለሁ። እንዲህውም ከግድያው ብኋላ በተፈጠረ ቀውስ ህይወታቸውን ላጡ ወገኖች ሀዘኔ ጥልቅ ነው። ለቤተሰቦቻቸውና ወዳጅ ዘመዶቻቸው መጽናናትን እመኛለሁ።

እንግዲህ ከሀጫሉ ግድያ በስተጀርባ ማን ሊሆን እንደሚችል ብዙ መላምቶችን ከተለያዩ አቅጣጫዎች እየሰማን ነው። ሞቱን ተከትሎም ሁሉም በየአቅጣጫው ለፖለቲካ ፍጆታው እየተጠቀመበት ነው። ለፖለቲካ ፍጆታ እንደሚውልና አመጽ እንደሚያቀጣጥል የሚጠበቅ ነበር። ለጊዜው መንግስት ነኝ የሚለው የአብይ ቡድን፣ ገዳዮቹ እነማን እንሆኑ እያጣራን ነው ባለበት ቅጽበት፣ ህወሓት ነው፣ ግብጽ ነው፣ የግብጽ ተላላኪዎች ናቸው፣ የሚሉ የተለያዩ ግራ የገባቸው ውንጀላዎችን ሰንዝሯል። ህግ ይዞታል ከተባለ፣ ተጣርቶ ሳያልቅ እንዲህ አይነት ውንጀላ፣ መነሻውና ጥቅሙ ምንድን ነው? የዛሬ ሁለት አመት፣ የምርመራ ውጤቱ ከመታወቁ በፊት ህወሓት ነው ከዚህ በስተጀርባ ያለው ብሎ የከሰሰው መሪ፣ ውጤቱ ሲታወቅ እስከዚች ደቂቃ ድረስ ይፋ እንዳላደረገ ይታወቃል። የዛሬ አመት ለተፈጠረው ግድያ በተመሳሳይ መልኩ ከምርመራው በፊት ጣቱን ሌሎች ላይ ቢቀስርም፣ የሆነው ግን ሌላ ሆኖ የተገኘው። ውጤቱም እስከአሁኗ ደቂቃ ድረስ ለህዝብ አልተነገረም። በመካከላቸው ለተፈጠረው አለመግባባት ተጨማሪ ቤንዚን ሆነ አገለገለ ይበልጥ መካረር ውስጥ ከተታቸው እንጂ የፈየደው ነገር አልነበረም። ዛሬም ምርመራ ከመካሔዱ በፊት ውንጀላው አንድ ቡድን ላይ (ህወሓት ላይ) አድርጎ እያደነ የሚያስረው ደግሞ ሌላ ቡድንን (የእነ ጀዋር) ነው። ህወሓት/ግብጽ ከሆነ ሀጫሉን የገደለው ኦሮሚያ ላይ የብልጽግና ውጋት የሆኑ የፖለቲካ ድርጅቶችን የሚመሩ የፖለቲካ መሪዎችና ጋዜጠኞች ለምን እየታድኑ ታሰሩ?

ተጣርቶ እስኪታወቅ ድረስ መላምት መደረት የሚቻል ከሆነ፣ ከአጫሉ ግድያ በስተጀርባ ህወሓት፣ የኦሮሞ ብሔርተኞቹ፣ የግብጽ ተላላኪዎች ሊኖሩ ከቻሉ፣ አብይ ራሱ ሊኖር የማይችልበት ምክንያት ምንድን ነው? እስኪ በዝርዝር እንመልከተው። በአባይ ግድብ ዙሪያ በተደጋጋሚ እንዳየነው እርሱ የተካፈለበት ድርድር፣ የአገርን ሉአላዊነት አሳልፎ የሚሰጥ ነበር። በመጀመሪያ አሜሪካና የዓለም ባንክ አደራዳሪ እንዲሆኑ የተስማማው አብይ ነው። ሲቀጥል በሁለት ሳምንት ውስጥ ስምምነት ላይ መደረስ አለበት፣ ስምምነት ላይ ከመድረሳችን በፊት ግድቡን መሙላት አንጀምር ብሎ ግብጽን ያስፈነጠዘ ስምምነት የፈጸመው አብይ ነው። አጫሉ በተገደለበት እለት ደግሞ፣ ግድቡን የመሙላት ሂደት የመብት ጉዳይ ሳይሆን፣ የጦርነት ጉዳይ ይመስል፣ የጸጥታው ምክር ቤት አጀንዳ እንዲሆን ያደረገው አብይ ነው። እዛ ደግሞ ምን አይነት ስምምነት አድርጎ እንደመጣ አናውቅም። ምናልባትም ከዛ አጀንዳ ለማስቅየስ የተደረገ፣ ብሎም አገርን በማበጣበጥ፣ ግድቡን የመሙላት ሂደት ለማዘግየት የተቀነባበረ ሴራም ሊሆን ይችላል። በነገራችን ላይ በነዚህ ጉዳዮች ጀዋር ሲያራምድ የነበረው አቋም፣ እንደ አንድ ፖለቲከኛ ሳይሆን እንደ አንድ አገር መሪ ነበር። እንዲያውም መጨረሻ ላይ፣ በዲፕሎማሲው ረገድ ደህና ድል እያገኘን የነበረውን ሁኔታ የቀለበሰው፣ የውጭ ጉዳይ ሚንስቴር ስራውን እንዳይሰራ ስለተደረገ ነው፣ የሚል ስሞታ አሰምቷል። አብይን በአገር ጉዳይ የማያምነው መሆኑ፣ ልክ ብዙዎቻችን የታዘብነውን አይነት ክህደቶችን የታዘበ መሆኑን የሚያሳይ ፍንጭ ጽፎ ነበር። በእርግጥ ግብጽን አልጎዳም ብሎ በማያውቀው ቋንቋ ደጋግሞ የማለውና የተገዘተው ማን እንደሆነ ሁሉም ያውቃል።

ይህን ግድያ አብይ ከግብጽ ጋር ያለውን ጉዳይ ለማለዘብ ብቻ ሳይሆን፣ ተቀናቃኞቹን ለመስበርም እየተጠቀመበት ያለ ይመስለኛል። ከላይ እንዳልኩት ኦሮሚያ ላይ፣ ሰማይ ምድሩ ቢገለበጥ፣ በነጻ ምርጫ ሊያሸንፋቸው የማይችሉ ተቀናቃኞቹ ለማሰር ተጠቀሞበታል። የኦሮሞ ተቀናቃኞቹን ከሰበረ ብኋላ በሙሉ ጉልበት ፊቱን ወደ ህወሓት ማዞር ነው ስሌቱ። ያው የጅል ስሌት ነው። ፊቱን ወደ ሰሜን ከማዞሩ በፊት፣ ኦሮሚያ ላይ በማሰው ጉድጓድ ራሱን ያገኘዋል። የት ድረስ እንደሚያዛልቀው እንኳን በደንብ ያሰላው አይመስልም። ለእርሱ ታማኝ የሆኑ አንድ ሁለት ቀበሌ ማተራመስ የሚችሉ ልዩ ሃይሎች ቢኖሩትም፣ የሚያስመካና ልትተማመንበት የምትችል ጉልበት ያላቸው አይደሉም። ሁሉም የተነሳባቸው እለት ድራሻቸው አይገኝም።
ከዚህ ሁሉ ግን፣ ከተቀናቃኞቹ ጋር ያለውን ችግር በድርድርና በውይይት ቀድሞ ፈትቶ ወይም ለመፍታት ሞክሮ ቢሆን ኖሮ ይህ ሁኔታ ሊፈጠር ይችል ነበር? አይመስለኝም። ምክንያቱም እርሱም ሆኑ ሌሎቹ ችግራቸውን በጠረጴዛ ዙሪያ፣ በሰለጠነ መንገድ ከፈቱ የዚህ አይነት ሴራ ውስጥ መግባት አያስፈልጋቸውም ነበር። ለዚህ እነ ጀዋርም፣ ህወሓትም ሌሎችም ዝግጁ መሆናቸውን በተደጋጋሚ በግልጽ ሲናገሩ ሰምተናል። ለጥሪው ጆሯቸውን የቆለፉበት አብይና የአብይ ድርጅት ብቻ ናቸው። ይህን ባለማድረጉ ለፖለቲካ ፍጆታ ሲባል በሴራ ፖለቲካ ያለ እድሜው መሞት የማይገባው ወጣት እንዲሞት ሆነ። በዛ የተነሳም ሌሎች በርካታ ንጹሃን ዜጎች እንዲሞቱ፣ እንዲቆስሉ፣ አገሪቱ ሌላ ቀውስ እንድታስተናግድ (እግዜር ይሁናትና!) ምክንያት ሆነ። ታድያ ማነው ለዚህ ተጠያቂው? ማን ነበር ይህን ማስቀረት ይችል የነበረው? በማን ውሳኔና እጅ ነበር?

አብይ፣ ሰልፊሽና የስልጣን ጥመኛ በመሆኑ ብቻ፣ አገሪቱን ከማቀራረብ ይልቅ፣ የባሰ ጽንፍ ነው ያስያዛት። ህወሓትን ሲታገሉ መቀራረብ ጀመረው የነበሩትን፣ ያራራቃቸውና ጽንፍ ያስያዛቸው የአብይ መንግስት ነው። ይህንን ቀዳዳ ተጠቅመው የውጭ ሃይሎች አገራችን ውስጥ ሴራ ቢሞክሩ እንኳን አይፈረድባቸውም። የሚያራርቅ እንጂ የሚያቀራርብ መሪና አሰራር እንደሌለን ይታወቃል። በድጋሚ ላንሳውና በድርድር ልዩነቱን ቀርፎ ቢሆን ኖሮ፣ የውጭ ሃይል አገራችንን የማተራመስ እድል ይኖረዋል? ግብጽ ብትሞክር እንኳን፣ መግባባት ካለ፣ በጋራ ያከሽፉት ነበር። ታዋቂ ሰው/ፖለቲከኛ ገድለው አመጽ ለመቀስቀስ ቢሞክሩ፣ ታዋቂ ሰዎች (ተፎካካሪዎች) በጋራ ቆመው፣ ተሰሚነታቸውን ተጠቅመው፣ ህዝባቸውን ያረጋጉ ነበር። አሁን ባለበት ሁኔታ ግን ይህ የሚቻል አልሆነም። ምክንያቱም ሁሉንም ነገር በራሱ መንገድ ብቻ ከማስተናገድ ውጭ ሌላ ነገር ስለማያውቅ።

ሲጠቃለል ከሀጫሉ ግድያ በስተጀርባ ያለው ሀይል ማንም ይሁን ማን፣ የመንግስት ተጠያቂነት ጎልቶ ይታየኛል። ገዳዮ ምንም ፖለቲካል ሞቲቭ የሌለው አንድ ተራ ሰው (ለምሳሌ የምኒሊክ አምላኪ) ሆኖ ቢገኝ እንኳን፣ አገሪቱን እዚህ ቀውስ ውስጥ የከተተው (ምናልባትም የከፋ ቀውስ ውስጥም ሊከታት የሚችለው) ማን በፈጠረው ችግር ምክንያት እንደሆነ ለሁላችንም ግልጽ ነው። ደጋግመን ድርድር፣ ውይይት፣ ድርድር፣ ስንል የነበረው ለዚህ ነው። አሁንም አገሪቱ ከዚህ ውጭ ሌላ መውጫ ቀዳዳ የላትም።

በመጨረሻ አንድ አቋሜን ግልጽ ላድርግ፣ ከሀጫሉ ግድያ በስተጀርባ የነጀዋር እጅ አለበት ብዬ የማላምነውን ያህል፣ የተደራጀ የአማራ ፖለቲከኞች ቡድንም ይኖራል ብዬ አላምንም። እነ ጀዋር አመጽ መቀስቀስ ከፈለጉ፣ ሀጫሉን መግደል አያስፈልጋቸውም። የአመንስቲ ሪፖርት የፈጠረውን አጋጣሚ ተጠቅመው ማቀጣጠል ይችሉ ነበር። ሀጫሉ ካስፈለጋቸውም አብሯቸው እንዲያቀጣጥል ማድረግ ይችሉ ነበር። እንዲህውም ነፍጠኛ የምትሏቸው የተደራጁ የአማራ ብሔርተኞችም ከዚህ ጀርባ አይኖሩም፣ ምክንያቱም የምኒሊክ ስም ከመጥፋት በላይ (ያውም ያልተለመደ አይደለም) የሚያሳስብ ዘርፈ ብዙ ችግር አለ። ለማይረባ ነገር ያን የመሰለ አርቲስት ገድሎ፣ የባሰ ጥፋትና ኪሳራ እንጂ ጥቅም እንደማይገኝ አያውቁም ለማለት አልደፍርም።

 

ሰ.ነ.

ወደ አምባገነናዊ ስርዓት መመለስ አገር ያሳጣል

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ለዚህ  ጽሁፌ መነሻ ምክንያት ወደ ሆነኝ ነጥብ ልምጣና የኢህአዴግ አልጋ ወራሽ የሆነው ብልጽግና ልክ እንደትላንቱ ዛሬም በተመሳሳይ ጎዳና እየገሰገሰ ይገኛል። ኩንትራቱን ሊጨርስ እየተቃረበ ያለው ጠ/ሚ/ር አብይ አሕመድ፣ በኢህአዴግ ውስጥ የተፈጠረውን ክፍፍል በአሸናፊነት ተወጥቶ ስልጣኑን ለማደላደል ሲል ብልጽግናን የመሰረተበት ሒደት፣ ድርጅቱን ለማጠናከርና አባላትን ለማፍራት እየተጓዘበትና ያለው መንገድ ከቀድሞ የኢህአዴግ ባህል ምንም የተለየ አይደለም። ኢህአዴግ የቀድሞ ስሙን ብቻ ቀይሮ በህይወት አለ። ልዩነቱ የቀድሞ ታጋዮች ኮትኩተው ባሳደጓቸው ካድሬዎች በፖለቲካ ጌም መሸነፋቸው ብቻ ነው። ሰዎቹ ተሸነፉ እንጂ የዘረጉት ባህል አልተሸነፈም። ካድሬዎቹ ከህወሓት ካድሬዎች ውጪ ቀሪዎቹ የነበሩት ናቸው። የሚተዳደሩት በለመዱትና በኖሩበት የድርጅት ባህል ብቻ ነው። ለዚህም ነው ብልጽግና ከኢህአዴግ የተለየ ባህል ሊኖረው የማይችለው።

ጠ/ሚ/ሩ በህዝብ ይሁንታ፣ በተሰጠው የሁለት አመት የስልጣን ገደብ ቀድሞ የገባውን ቃል አጥፎ፣ የዴሞክራሲ ተቋማትን ሳይገነባ፣ ነጻና ገለልተኛ ምርጫ ሳያካሒድ፣ ስልጣን በሰላማዊ መንገድ በህዝብ ለተመረጠ አሸናፊ ፓርቲ ማስተላለፍ የሚችልበትን እድል ሳይፈጥር፣ በማንኛውም መንገድ ስልጣን ላይ ለመቆየት የሚያስችሉትን አማራጮች እየዘረጋ ቆይቷል። አንዱ መንገድ የቀድሞ አጋሮቹን ገፍትሮ በአዲስና ታማኝ ካድሬዎች መተካት ነው። እኔ አሻግራችኋለው ከማለት ስልጣን ላይ ካልቆየሁ መታሰራችን ነው ወደ ማለት ተሸጋግሯል። ይህ አፍሪካ ነው፣ ምርጫ ማጭበርበር ብርቅ አይደለም ማለቱም ተሰምቷል። አንድ ሰሞን መተካከት የሚባል የፖለቲካ ዲስኩር ተፈጥሮ ነበረ። አቶ መለስ የቀድሞ ጓዶቹን በመተካካት አሰናብቶ፣ በአዲስ ሀይል ተካቸው። እኔም በቅቶኛል ስልጣን ለአዲሱ ትውልድ አስተላልፋለሁ ሲል ቆይቶ፣ ባለቀ ሰዓት ድርጅቴ መርጦ አዲስ አደራ ስለጣለብኝ፣ ግዴታዬን መወጣት አለብኝ አለ። በ99.96% አሸነፍኩ ብሎ የለየለት አምባገነን ሆኖ ብቅ አለ።

ዛሬም ዶ/ር አብይ እየተጓዘበት ያለው መንገድም ተመሳሳይ ነው። አሻግራለሁ ሲል ቆይቶ፣ ሌላ መሪ ማን አለ እስከማስባልና ዛሬ ስልጣን ላይ ካልቆየን መታሰራችን ነው የሚል አቋም እስከማራመድ ድረስ ዘልቋል።

ምርጫውን መራዘም አለበት የሚል ዘመቻ የተከፈተው አምና ነበር። ከተራዘመ የቅቡልነት ጥያቄ ሊነሳ እንደሚችል ሲገለጽ፣ ነሓሴ እንደሚካሔድ ተገለጸ። ውሳኔው ምርጫው በግፊት የሚራዘምበትን ሰበብ ለመፍጠር ያለመ ይመስል ነበር። የኮቪድ ወረርሽኝ ሲከሰት፣ ጥሩ አጋጣሚ ሆነለትና ምርጫው እንዲራዘም ተደረገ። ምርጫው መራዘሙ ብቻ ሳይሆን፣ ያልተገደበ ስልጣን የሚሰጠው የአስቸኳይ ጊዜ አዋጅ አሳወጀ። አዲስ የአፈና መርበብ ተዘረጋ። ስልጣን ላይ በጉልበት ለመቆየት ርብርቡ ቀጥሏል።

ይህ በዙርያው ላሰባሰባቸው ኪራይ ሰብሳቢዎች ትልቅ ሲሳይ ነው። ከህዝብ ተነጥሎ በካድሬና በድርጅቱ ሰዎት መተማመን ከጀመረ፣ መዝረፍ የፈለገ አሁን እንደልቡ ይዘርፋል። እንደድሮ በግፍ ራሱን ማዝናናት የሚያስፈልግ ካለም አሁን ያን ማድረግ ይችላል። ምክንያቱም ሰውዬው ከህዝብ ተነጥሏል። የሚፈራው ነገር እንዳይደርስበት ካድሬዎቹን ሸክፎ መያዝ አለበት። ሲሰርቁና ግፍ ሲፈጽሙ እየቀጣ ካድሬን ሸክፎ ማቆየት ደግሞ አይቻለውም። ስለሆነም ነጻ ይለቃቸው፣ ከቁጥጥሩ ውጭ ናቸው።

ትላንት በኮረና ስም፣ ትንሽ ሰብሰብ ያሉ ሰዎችን ለመበተን ሲባል፣ ወጣቶችን ገደሉ። እንደገና ቤት አፍርሰው ደግሞ በርካቶችን ለበሽታው ማጋለጣቸው አልቀረም። ከእንግዲህ እንዲህ አይነት ዝብርቅርቁ የወጣን ነገር ማስታረቅም፣ ማረምም አይቻለውም ጋሽ አጃግሬ። ያለው አማራጭ በስልጣኑ እስካልመጡበት ድረስ ጆሮ ዳባ ልበስ ብሎ ማለፍ ነው።

አብይ ብዙ ጊዜ ስቷል። አንኳር ስ ህተቶቹ ግ ን ሁለት ናቸው። አንደኛ ተቋማትን መገንባትና ራሳቸውን ችለው እንዲንቀሳቀሱ ማድረግ ሲገባው፣ እርሱን የሚያወድሱና በስልጣን ላይ ሊያቆዩት የሚሹ አጨብጫቢዎችን አፈራ። ሁለተኛ ስልጣን እየጣፈጠችው ስትሔድ ከህዝብ እየራቀ ሔደ፣ አምባገነናዊ ባህሪ እየተላበሰ ሔደ። አሁን መፍራት ጀመረ። ፍራቻው አገርን እንዳያሳጣን እፈራለሁ።

Amid Red Sea Rivalries, Eritrea Plays for Independence

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Source: Small Wars | Harry Verhoeven

President Isaias proposes a regional bloc to balance the rising influence of Gulf states.

When Eritrea’s president last month hosted the leaders of Ethiopia and Somalia to discuss “regional cooperation,” that initiative drew few global headlines. Still, Eritrea’s move should be noted by policymakers and others working for stability in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea region. For years, President Isaias Afwerki’s disdain for multilateral forums such as the African Union, and his strained relations with many governments in the region, have contributed to caricatures of Eritrea as the “North Korea of Africa.” But his invitation for two neighbors to discuss a new regional bloc reflects an important factor in Eritrea’s foreign policy: its efforts to preserve its independence in a fast-evolving geopolitical environment.

Effectively, Isaias’ proposal is a fine-tuning of Eritrea’s alignments amid the growing influence of Arab Gulf states in Africa and consistent with long-standing efforts to preserve its independence, notes Professor Harry Verhoeven, convenor of the Oxford University China-Africa Network.

Eritrea evolved a reputation as perhaps Africa’s most isolated state.  Hasn’t it historically been hostile to regional integration?

Yes and no. Eritrea’s relationship with the idea of regional cooperation has been complex ever since the country gained its independence from Ethiopia in 1993 following a 30-year war. That same year, Eritrean President Isaias Afewerki stunned his African peers when, at a summit of the Organization of African Unity (now the African Union), he publicly repeated criticisms he had formulated as one of Africa’s most formidable guerrilla commanders: the OAU had utterly failed by closing its eyes to the terror inflicted by Ethiopia’s Soviet-backed military dictatorship (the Derg) and he accused his peers of clinging to power while failing to take any meaningful action to address poverty in Africa. From that starting point, Eritrea never invested significant resources in continent-wide diplomacy. When the African Union (AU) imposed sanctions on Eritrea in 2009 for supporting al-Shabab extremists in Somalia and seeking to overthrow the Somali government, Eritrea suspended its participation in the organization and denounced the AU as a lapdog of U.S. imperialism and a mechanism for the hegemonic aspirations of Ethiopia, its main rival.  In addition, Eritrea has twice withdrawn from the East African regional bloc—the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

Still, Eritrea is not by definition opposed to regional cooperation. In the 1990s, Isaias and his fighters formed the vanguard of the wave of leftist African liberation movements that captured power from the Red Sea to the Cape between 1991 and 1997. Together with “comrade-leaders” in Congo, Ethiopia, Rwanda and Uganda, Isaias dreamed of a “Greater Horn of Africa” of like-minded regimes who could offer an alternative to the much-criticized OAU and jointly develop regional investment opportunities to cement ideological solidarity. The government in Asmara sent Eritrean troops, spies and diplomats to support wars against the military-Islamist regime in Sudan and the dictatorship of Mobutu Seso Seko in the Democratic Republic of Congo (then Zaire). These were concrete sacrifices in blood and treasure made by a fragile, small and newly independent Eritrea to further its preferred form of regional integration.

What might Isaias hope to achieve with this new initiative?

Isaias’ proposal to deepen integration between Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia (the so-called “Cushitic Alliance”) is a continuation of efforts he championed in the 1990s to institutionally anchor alliances between governments with a similar political outlook. Just like in the era of the “Greater Horn,” Asmara appears to be proposing new regional norms and understandings of peace and security as well as infrastructure ties to forge a web of partnerships among the participating states.

This said, the disappointments of the past have not been forgotten—most particularly not since the 1998-2000 “war of brothers” with Ethiopia, which ended the dream of the “Greater Horn.” Eritrean diplomacy, especially since that conflict, has been focused on creating space to maneuver and chart a foreign policy independent of Ethiopian hegemony. For almost 20 years, Isaias sought to undermine the Ethiopian government by supporting its domestic opposition as well as its adversaries in Somalia—policies that contributed to the imposition of international sanctions. Eritrea also aligned itself with Ethiopia’s rival, Egypt, and by establishing partnerships with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in which Isaias offered security cooperation—notably the use of Eritrea’s Red Sea port of Assab for operations in the Yemen war—in exchange for economic support against Ethiopian pressures. While this diplomatic choreography failed to stop Ethiopia’s regional ascendancy, it achieved the chief objective of keeping Isaias’ government in power.

Last month’s summit signals a change in the pattern of Isaias’ maneuvering, caused by recent geopolitical shifts. The Gulf states’ projection of power in the Horn of Africa and the European refugee crisis have provided Isaias with diplomatic and financial leverage to move from isolation to regional influence. In addition, the ascension of Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed side-lined Isaias’ Ethiopian nemesis, the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front. That made it possible for Isaias to cooperate with Abiy in quickly negotiating an end to their countries’ “frozen” war. While that peace accord was a domestic popular triumph for both leaders, the rapprochement has stalled and the hoped-for “peace dividends”—economic and democratic—have been disappointing. The rise of the younger Abiy in Addis Ababa has allowed Isaias to pose as the region’s elder statesman and—in last month’s summit conference—to proffer his own idea for cooperation in the Horn of Africa; Isaias’ proposal will in fact undercut Ethiopia’s historic ambitions to once again dominate efforts toward greater regional integration.

Other players are moving to establish regional organizations in the Red Sea area, as Saudi Arabia just did in January. What are the implications of the Eritrean initiative in light of those efforts?

Recent efforts to establish new regional bodies, such as the Council of the Arab and African States of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, or to reinvigorate IGAD or the AU in the Horn of Africa, are ambivalent developments from Eritrea’s perspective. Its priority remains the preservation of its flexibility to shift policies and alignments as necessary to defend its independence, squeezed as it is among larger neighbors. Sudan, Ethiopia and Saudi Arabia have all had their own designs for the region, which have rarely accounted for Eritrean interests. As seen from Asmara, multilateral organizations under the control of actors with hegemonic ambitions are therefore potentially dangerous and better subverted or, if need be, boycotted altogether.

Eritrea joined the Red Sea Council at Riyadh’s unrelenting insistence but likely has no intention of letting the body circumscribe its sovereignty. Membership served the useful purpose of confirming the Saudi-Eritrea relationship and of reminding Ethiopia (which, at the insistence of Egypt, was not invited to join the council) that, despite the outward expressions of fraternity between Abiy and Isaias, Eritrea has strategic options that do not require Ethiopia’s consent.

Similarly, Isaias’ move toward a new grouping with Ethiopia and Somalia is useful to remind old foes in the Horn of Africa (Djibouti and Sudan) and the Gulf states that Eritrea has alternative friends and will not accept a role as regional proxy for Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates. The growing projection of the Gulf states’ power in the Horn helped Isaias to break out of his isolation. But from the Eritrean perspective, that projection is a trend that requires careful management, rather than further encouragement, and that needs to be assessed in terms of its implications for Eritrea’s autonomy going forward.

The X Factor in China-UAE Relations: The Horn of Africa

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The Diplomat | From port competition to the Somaliland issue, China and the UAE’s conflicting interests in the region are not easy to reconcile.

May 03, 2019

On April 26, Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid al-Makhtoum, the ruler of Dubai, signed $3.4 billion in investment deals between the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and China. These contracts were hailed in Dubai-based news outlet, Khaleej Times, as a catalyst for a UAE role in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Overall, annual trade between China and the UAE is expected to increase to $106 billion by 2022.

While this major boost to the China-UAE economic partnership follows years of strengthening trade links, the foreign policies of both countries are not aligned in numerous respects. The most commonly cited obstacles to a durable China-UAE partnership stem from Beijing’s deepening economic links with Iran and Qatar, but conflicting interests on the Horn of Africa could also emerge as a cleavage between the two countries. The primary areas of contention between China and the UAE in the Horn of Africa relate to trade policy and the status of Somaliland, an autonomous region of Somalia that has independence aspirations.

Latent China-UAE tensions over trade policy have persisted since Djibouti rankled Dubai-based port company DP World by selling a 23.5 percent stake in Doraleh Container Terminal to China Merchants Port Holding Company (CMP) in 2013. Relations between DP World and CMP have since deteriorated considerably. In November 2018, DP World filed a lawsuit against CMP and accused the Chinese port company of breaching its contractual obligations. Frustration with CMP’s conduct caused the DP World chairman, Sultan Ahmed bin Sulayem, to condemn China’s “predatory” trade practices and accuse China of engaging in debt trap diplomacy at the January 2019 Davos World Economic Forum.

While UAE officials have cautiously framed the DP World-CMP incident as an isolated case and insisted that Abu Dhabi will not take sides in the U.S.-China trade dispute, the ambitious trade policies of both countries suggest that China-UAE trade conflicts in the Horn of Africa could become more frequent. As China’s economic interests on the Red Sea continue to grow, the UAE could see the leverage accrued by its investments in critical ports, like Saudi Arabia’s Jeddah and Somaliland’s Berbera, be eroded by Chinese competition, resulting in new sources of tension.

In addition to trade disputes, differing views between China and the UAE on the status of Somaliland could emerge as a future source of friction between the two countries. As UAE-Somalia relations have deteriorated markedly since Mogadishu refused to join the blockade against Qatar in June 2017, Abu Dhabi has deepened its relationship with Somaliland. The UAE plans to have an operational military base in Berbera by June 2019 and has trained Somaliland’s military personnel as part of this basing agreement.

Ali Bakeer, an expert on the Gulf region at Ankara’s ORSAM think tank, told The Diplomat, that the UAE’s investments in Somaliland aim to separate the autonomous region from Somalia and resemble Abu Dhabi’s support for separatist enclaves in other regions, like southern Yemen and northern Syria. This policy is squarely at odds with China’s efforts to promote power centralization in Somalia, and frequently stated opposition to external interference regarding Somaliland’s status. As China strengthens its pivot toward Somalia, due to Somaliland’s objection to Mogadishu’s decision to grant Chinese ships fishing rights in Somaliland ports, this policy divergence could sharpen in the months to come.

In spite of these disagreements, the China-UAE relationship in the Horn of Africa has yet to devolve into a state of strategic competition. The UAE remains focused on restricting Turkey’s influence on the Red Sea, as Ankara’s close ties with Somalia and burgeoning relationship with Sudan threaten to undercut Abu Dhabi’s geopolitical aspirations. China is the UAE’s leading supplier of manufactured goods and industrial materials, and Abu Dhabi’s BRI integration goals also restrict its ability to directly confront China in the Horn of Africa.

The most significant geostrategic risk that could convert latent China-UAE tensions on the Horn of Africa into a more hostile relationship is Abu Dhabi’s continued militarization of the region. The UAE’s takeover of the Yemeni island of Socotra in May 2018 highlighted its willingness to unilaterally use military force to bolster its regional influence. Although the UAE ultimately withdrew from Socotra as a result of Saudi Arabia’s mediation efforts, concerns are growing that the UAE’s aggressive pursuit of new bases in the Horn of Africa will exacerbate regional power rivalries and trigger an accidental interstate conflict.

Although Chinese officials have remained silent about the UAE’s activities in the Horn of Africa, Beijing’s numerous investments in Somalia, Djibouti, and Ethiopia ensure that it does not want the region to become subjected to an interstate conflict. In order to highlight its desire to avoid an interstate war, China has emphasized the stabilizing nature of its base in Djibouti and has offered to mediate border disputes between Eritrea and Djibouti.

To the UAE’s credit, Abu Dhabi played a crucial role in successful resolution of the Ethiopia-Eritrea protracted conflict in June 2018, and these diplomatic actions reflect its interest in preserving collective security on the Horn of Africa. Nevertheless, the UAE’s continued hostility toward Somalia suggests that it is not universally committed to this goal. If Abu Dhabi’s tensions with Mogadishu persist as Ethiopia seeks to mediate a truce between Somalia and Somaliland, the credibility of the UAE’s efforts to frame itself as a stabilizing force in the Horn of Africa could be tarnished and tensions with China might commensurately rise.

Although the China-UAE bilateral relationship is rapidly strengthening, especially in the economic sphere, both countries possess conflicting interests in the Horn of Africa that are not easily reconcilable. While these disagreements are unlikely to threaten the UAE’s aspirations of BRI inclusion or its trade deals with China, they add a layer of tension to the Beijing-Abu Dhabi relationship that could surface in a more significant way in the event of renewed conflict on the Horn of Africa.