Situation Report EEPA HORN No. 44 – 3 January 2021

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Europe External Programme with Africa is a Belgium-based Centre of Expertise with in-depth knowledge, publications, and networks, specialised in issues of peace building, refugee protection and resilience in the Horn of Africa. EEPA has published extensively on issues related to movement and/or human trafficking of refugees in the Horn of Africa and on the Central Mediterranean Route. It cooperates with a wide network of Universities, research organisations, civil society and experts from Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Djibouti, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Uganda and across Africa. Key in-depth publications can be accessed on the website.

Military situation (as confirmed per 2 January 2021)

● The TPLF is keeping control of mountainous areas in Tigray. As many analysts predicted when Mekelle was taken, the ENDF has had difficulties driving the TPLF out of well entrenched mountain positions.

● The ENDF has launched an offensive towards Samre, East of Mekelle.

● Reported cruelties against civilians include forcing relatives to commit incest on women and girls under the threath of arbitrary execution.

● Report that 150 civilians were hiding in a church in Edagahamus, Tigray. They were, reportedly, brutally killed. It is estimated that 300 civilians were killed in Edagahamus and surrounding.

● Many towns in Tigray have been attacked by ENDF and Eritrean troops by heavy artillery. The towns include: Humera, Shire, Aksum, Adwa, Adigrat, Wukro, Mekelle, Hewane, Workamba, Abi Adi, and Hagerselam. In these operations innocent civilians were attacked.

● In Mekelle, Tigray, there were air strikes and bombings on Saint George church, two Mekelle university campuses and ‘adishimdehun’, kebeles 03, 05, 11, 14 & 15, ‘Enda Gebriel’, ‘70 kare’, and ‘Latchi’.

● Abi Adi, Tigray, and its outskirts, has been hit by airstrikes on civilian neighbourhoods for one week.

● It is reported that 1000 civilians were killed in attacks on Aksum town and 500 civilians in Wukro.

● It is reported that hundreds of civilians were killed in smaller towns of Hazwzen, Digum and Nebelet.

● Pictures are emerging of the heavily damaged Al Negash Mosque in Tigray. There are clear signs of shelling. It was first reported that the mosque had been destroyed on 18 december. Reportedly, the mosque was first bombed and later looted by Ethiopian and Eritrean troops.

● The Al Negash Mosque is thought to be the oldest mosque in Africa, dating back to the 7th century. It is a UNESCO world Heritage site and was recently restored. People died trying to protect the mosque.

● Foreign Minister Demeke, Ethiopia, rejects the TPLF-claim to have carried out a pre-emptive strike.

● TPLF stated it was provoked on 3 Nov when the Ethiopian government sent commandos in an Antonov and/or cargo plane, under pretext of delivering new banknotes, allegedly with the intention to capture the Tigray regional government, which was assembled in a meeting in Planet hotel in Mekelle.

Regional situation (as confirmed per 2 January 2021)

● The US carried out drone strikes on an Al Shabaab operated radio station. No casualties were reported.

● Sudan has announced that it is redeploying more troops to the Sudan-Ethiopian border.

● The UN peacekeeping mission to Darfur in Sudan, ongoing since 2003, has ended. 800 Ethiopian soldiers helping with policing the area are returning home. Sudanese security forces will be taking over. Protests have been taking place urging for the continuation of the mission.

● The Ethiopian Border Affairs Commission (EBAC) has released a statement that all Sudanese forces should leave Ethiopian soil immediately. They condemn the Sudanese aggression and the destruction of property, looting and killings of Sudanese forces in the disputed region.

● EBAC warns that unlike in previous clashes, this time regular Sudanese military played an important role in operations. This creates a “destabilizing” regional environment.

● The EBAC called for the withdrawal of Sudanese troops and the Ethiopian government to deploy troops to protect the farmers.

Situation in Ethiopia (as confirmed per 2 January 2021)

● The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission reported that individuals wanting to leave the country now need to show their ID, which shows an ethnic classification of each citizen.

● Tigrayans at airports are being asked whether they participated in the election on 9 September. Fana, the Ethiopian state broadcaster reported that an Ethiopian airlines employee of Tigrayan origin had been charged with assisting in the organising of the election. Another Tigrayan, a manager at the state company Ethiotelecom has also been accused of participating in the election as a voter.

● The ENDF has released a list of TPLF groups and cells that have been destroyed. They include many high ranking officers as well as a former minister. A law professor at the university of Mekelle has also been arrested for allegedly creating agitation and unrest.

● Ethnic harassment continues to take place. The New York Times (NYT) reported earlier that Tigrayans had their houses sacked by police. These have not been isolated events.

● Tigrayan businesses have been targeted by ethnic profiling. Companies are having their finances investigated, others closed. The CEO of Ethiopian Airlines, among executives and employees, has been put under house arrest for communicating with the TPLF.

● The NYT reported earlier three foreign diplomats from different embassies have said that they had to search for new security contractors after a Tigrayan security company had been suspended.

● State companies are conducting purges of employed Tigrayans. Employees are detained by police.

● The NYT also reported earlier that the purge is taking place within the armed forces. Tigrayans in the ENDF have had their phones confiscated and were then put under arrest.

● The Ethiopian Attorney General (AG) Gedion has said that there have been a few “isolated incidents”. The government is taking the issue seriously. A hotline will be set up to report complaints.

● 27 people were killed by gunmen in Oromia. It is unclear who committed these shootings, although there have been some accusations that government forces were involved.

International Situation (as confirmed per 2 January 2021)

● The Ethiopian Diaspora group ED-REAP released a press statement including 5 demands: immediate withdrawal of foreign forces, a UN mandated investigation into war crimes, full access for independent media, full and unfettered access for humanitarian aid groups, and access to organisations helping with rehabilitation of TIgray.

Disclaimer:

All information in this situation report is presented as a fluid update report, as to the best knowledge and understanding of the authors at the moment of publication. EEPA does not claim that the information is correct but verifies to the best of ability within the circumstances. Publication is weighed on the basis of interest to understand potential impacts of events (or perceptions of these) on the situation. Check all information against updates and other media. EEPA does not take responsibility for the use of the information or impact thereof. All information reported originates from third parties and the content of all reported and linked information remains the sole responsibility of these third parties. Report to info@eepa.be any additional information and corrections.

Links of interest

https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/12/world/africa/Ethiopia-Tigray-ethnic.html
https://www.fanabc.com/english/ministry-of-defence-announces-list-of-destroyed-tplf-group-members/
https://am.al-ain.com/article/ethiopian-national-defence-force-announced-the-names-of-tplf-s-killed-officials
http://www.branapress.com/2020/12/31/ethiopian-border-affairs-committee-issues-a-statement-sudan-should-unconditionally-withdraw-its-forces-from-ethiopian-territories/
https://t.co/FRCkis06CO?amp=1
http://www.tigraionline.com/articles/ed-reap-press-release.html

5 killed, 14 injured in suicide bombing in Somalia: officials

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Global News – AP |  A suicide bombing near the   Somalia capital, Mogadishu, on Saturday killed five people including two Turks, Turkish and Somali officials said.

The al-Qaida-linked al-Shabab extremist group claimed responsibility for the attack in a post by its Shahada News Agency. The Somalia-based group often targets Mogadishu with suicide bombings and other attacks, and it has exploded bombs against the Turkish military and other targets there in the past.

Turkish Health Minister Fahrettin Koca tweeted that 14 people, including three Turks, were wounded and are being treated in a Mogadishu hospital named after Turkey’s president.

“We strongly condemn this heinous attack targeting the employees of a Turkish company that undertook the Mogadishu-Afgoye road construction and contributes to the development and prosperity of Somalia,” a foreign ministry statement said.

The three others killed were Somali policemen, police Capt. Ahmed Mohamed said.

Turkish security sources said the suicide attacker used a motorcycle. They said the attack took place 15 kilometres (8 miles) from a Turkish military base, which was not affected. The base is Turkey’s largest military installation abroad.

This is the second time the road project has been attacked by al-Shabab. In January last year, a vehicle filled with explosives exploded at the entrance, killing and wounding dozens of people, including several Turkish citizens.

The attack led to a pause in the project, which recommenced a few months ago after security was improved.

Separately on Saturday, the U.S. military said it had carried out two airstrikes against al-Shabab compounds near Qunya Barrow on Friday, the first such strikes of the year after more than 50 last year. A U.S. statement said both compounds were destroyed.

Why Ethiopia and Sudan have fallen out over al-Fashaga

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Source: BBC | Alex de Waal, African Analyst

 

The armed clashes along the border between Sudan and Ethiopia are the latest twist in a decades-old history of rivalry between the two countries, though it is rare for the two armies to fight one another directly over territory.

The immediate issue is a disputed area known as al-Fashaga, where the north-west of Ethiopia’s Amhara region meets Sudan’s breadbasket Gedaref state.

Although the approximate border between the two countries is well-known – travellers like to say that Ethiopia starts when the Sudanese plains give way to the first mountains – the exact boundary is rarely demarcated on the ground.

Colonial-era treaties

Borders in the Horn of Africa are fiercely disputed. Ethiopia fought a war with Somalia in 1977 over the disputed region of the Ogaden.

In 1998 it fought Eritrea over a small piece of contested land called Badme.

About 80,000 soldiers died in that war which led to deep bitterness between the countries, especially as Ethiopia refused to withdraw from Badme town even though the International Court of Justice awarded most of the territory to Eritrea.

It was reoccupied by Eritrean troops during the fighting in Tigray in November 2020.

After the 1998 war, Ethiopia and Sudan revived long-dormant talks to settle the exact location of their 744km-long (462 miles) boundary.

The most difficult area to resolve was Fashaga. According to the colonial-era treaties of 1902 and 1907, the international boundary runs to the east.

This means that the land belongs to Sudan – but Ethiopians had settled in the area and were cultivating there and paying their taxes to Ethiopian authorities.

‘Deal condemned as secret bargain’

Negotiations between the two governments reached a compromise in 2008. Ethiopia acknowledged the legal boundary but Sudan permitted the Ethiopians to continue living there undisturbed.

It was a classic case of a ‘soft border’ managed in a way that did not let the location of a ‘hard border’ disrupt the livelihoods of people in the border zone; there was coexistence for decades until just now, when a definitive sovereign line was demanded by Ethiopia.

The Ethiopian delegation to the talks that led to the 2008 compromise was headed by a senior official of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), Abay Tsehaye.

After the TPLF was removed from power in Ethiopia in 2018, ethnic Amhara leaders condemned the deal as a secret bargain and said they had not been properly consulted.

Each side has its own story of what sparked the clash in Fashaga. What happened next is not in dispute: the Sudanese army drove back the Ethiopians and forced the villagers to evacuate.

At a regional summit in Djibouti on 20 December, Sudan’s Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok raised the matter with his Ethiopian counterpart Abiy Ahmed.

They agreed to negotiate, but each has different preconditions. Ethiopia wants the Sudanese to compensate the burned-out communities; Sudan wants a return to the status quo ante.

While the delegates were talking, there was a second clash, which the Sudanese have blamed on Ethiopian troops.

As with most border disputes, each side has a different analysis of history, law, and how to interpret century-old treaties. But it is also a symptom of two bigger issues – each of them unlocked by Mr Abiy’s policy changes.

Territorial claims in Tigray

The Ethiopians who inhabit Fashaga are ethnic Amhara – a constituency that Mr Abiy increasingly hitched his political wagon to after losing significant support in his Oromo ethnic group, the largest in Ethiopia. Amharas are the second largest group in Ethiopia and its historic rulers.

Emboldened by the federal army’s victories in the conflict against the TPLF over the last two months, the Amhara are making territorial claims in Tigray.

After the TPLF retreated, pursued by Amhara regional militia, they hoisted their flags and put up road signs that said “welcome to Amhara”. This was in lands claimed by Amhara state but allocated to Tigray in the 1990s when the TPLF was in power in Ethiopia.

The Fashaga conflict follows the same pattern of claiming sovereignty – except that it is not about Ethiopia’s internal boundaries, but the border with a neighbouring state.

The failure to resolve it peacefully is the indirect result of another of Mr Abiy’s policy reversals: Ethiopia’s foreign relations. For 60 years, Ethiopia’s strategic aim was to contain Egypt, but a year ago Mr Abiy reached out a hand of friendship.

The two countries each regard the River Nile as an existential question.

Egypt sees upstream dams as a threat to its share of the Nile waters, established in colonial era treaties. Ethiopia sees the river as an essential source of hydroelectric power, needed for its economic development.

The dispute came to a head over the construction of the huge Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (Gerd).

The bedrock of the Ethiopian foreign ministry’s hydro-diplomacy used to be a web of alliances among the other upstream African countries.

The aim was to achieve a multi-country comprehensive agreement on sharing the Nile waters. In this forum, Egypt was outnumbered.

Sudan was in the African camp. It was set to gain from the Gerd, which would control flooding, increase irrigation, and provide cheaper electricity.

Egypt wanted straightforward bilateral talks with the aim of preserving its colonial-era entitlement to the majority of the Nile waters.

In October 2019, Mr Abiy flew to the Russia-Africa summit at Sochi. On the side-lines he met Egyptian President Abdul Fattah al-Sisi.

In a single meeting, with no foreign ministry officials present, Mr Abiy upended Ethiopia’s Nile waters strategy.

He agreed to Mr Sisi’s proposal that the US treasury should mediate the dispute on the Gerd. The US leaned towards Egypt.

If the young Ethiopian leader, who had just won the Nobel Peace Prize for ending tensions with Eritrea, thought he could also secure a deal with Egypt, he was wrong. The opposite happened: the 44-year-old cornered himself.

Sudan was the third country invited to negotiate in Washington DC. Vulnerable to US pressure because it desperately needed America to lift financial sanctions imposed when it was designated a “state sponsor of terrorism” in 1993, Sudan fell in with the Egyptian position.

Ethiopian public opinion turned against the American proposals and Mr Abiy was forced to reject them, after which the US suspended some aid to Ethiopia. US President Donald Trump warned that Egypt might “blow up” the dam, and Ethiopia declared a no-fly zone over the region where the dam is located.

‘Pattern of mutual destabilisation’

The Nobel laureate can ill-afford further disputes with Egypt, amidst the conflict in Tigray and the clashes in Fashaga. The latter raise the ghosts of a long history of rivalry between Ethiopia and Sudan.

In the 1980s, Communist Ethiopia armed Sudanese rebels while Sudan aided ethno-nationalist armed groups, including the TPLF. In the 1990s, Sudan supported militant Islamist groups while Ethiopia backed the Sudanese opposition.

With armed clashes and unrest in many parts of Ethiopia, and Sudan’s recent peace deal with rebels in Darfur and the Nuba Mountains still incomplete, each country could readily return to this age-old pattern of mutual destabilisation.

Relations between Sudan and Ethiopia reached their warmest when Mr Abiy flew to Khartoum in June 2019 to encourage pro-democracy protesters and the Sudanese generals to come to agreement on a civilian government following the overthrow of long-term ruler Omar al-Bashir.

It was a characteristic Abiy initiative – high profile and wholly individual – and it needed formalization through the regional body Igad and the diplomatic heavy lifting of others, including the African Union, Arab countries, the US and UK to achieve results.

Sudan Prime Minister Hamdok has tried to return the favour by offering assistance in resolving Ethiopia’s conflict in Tigray. He was rebuffed, most recently at the 20 December summit, at which Mr Abiy insisted that the Ethiopian government would deal with its internal affairs on its own.

As refugees from Tigray continue to flood into Sudan, bringing with them stories of atrocities and hunger, the Ethiopian prime minister may find it more difficult to reject mediation.

He also risks igniting a new round of cross-border antagonism between Ethiopia and Sudan, deepening the crisis in the region.

Ten Elections to Watch in 2021

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Source: Council of Foreign Affairs | by James M. Lindsay

  1. Ethiopian Parliamentary Elections, 2021.

Ethiopians were supposed to go to the polls this past August. That vote was postponed, however, ostensibly because of COVID-19. If the vote is held in 2021, it will take place amid considerable turmoil. In late 2019, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed merged the ruling government coalition into a single political party. It includes nearly every major ethnic party except for the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). The TPLF, which dominated Ethiopian politics before Abiy took office, refused to join. In September, Tigray, which accounts for 6 percent of Ethiopia’s population, defied the federal government and held regional elections. Two months later, Abiy claimed that Tigrayans had attacked a military base. He ordered military retaliation in response and quickly claimed that federal control had been reestablished over Tigray. Fighting has continued, however, and some 50,000 Tigrayans have been displaced. Meanwhile, ethnic violence is rising elsewhere in Ethiopia. Abiy was once seen as a leader who would bring stability and prosperity to Ethiopia—he was awarded the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize. Now he looks to have turned in an autocratic direction by detaining opposition leaders and suppressing political freedoms. The Nobel Peace Prize Committee went so far as to rebuke him, saying it was “deeply concerned” by the situation in Tigray.

2. Ecuadoran General Election, February 7.

3. Dutch General Election, March 17.

4. Peruvian General Election, April 11.

5. Iraqi Parliamentary Elections, June 6.

6. Iranian Presidential Election, June 18.

7. Zambian General Election, August 12. 

8. Hong Kong Legislative Council Elections, September 5.

9. German Federal Election, September 26.

10. Nicaraguan General Election, November 7.

Situation Report EEPA HORN No. 42 – 2 January 2021

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Europe External Programme with Africa is a Belgium-based Centre of Expertise with in-depth knowledge, publications, and networks, specialised in issues of peace building, refugee protection and resilience in the Horn of Africa. EEPA has published extensively on issues related to movement and/or human trafficking of refugees in the Horn of Africa and on the Central Mediterranean Route. It cooperates with a wide network of Universities, research organisations, civil society and experts from Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Djibouti, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Uganda and across Africa. Key in-depth publications can be accessed on the website.

Military situation (as confirmed per 2 January 2021)

● Multiple sources state that Eritrean soldiers are blocked in attempts to leave Tigray. Heavy fighting between Ethiopia National Defense Forces (ENDF) and Tigray Defense Forces (TDF) is taking place near the major roads out to Eritrea. This has stopped the Eritrean transfer of looted goods out of the region.

● A source says that the ENDF is handing Shire, Tigray, to Eritrean troops. Eritrean telecom is servicing the area. Some people received calls. The Shire area hosts 100.000 Eritrean refugees.

● A source states that the Tigray Egela Woreda (including Gerhu-Sirnay, Semhal, May-Hamato, Leyto, Endaba-Estifanos, and Gere’a), on the border with Eritrea, is occupied by Eritrean soldiers and Eritrean telecom is providing full coverage. Citizens made calls, using phones of Eritrean troops.

● The TPLF says that it has shot down an ENDF airforce gunship on 30/12 8:30.

● Belgian TV shows footage of dozens of “shot-up army vehicles”.

● Reports of rape of Tigray women as part of the violence carried out on civilians in Tigray.

● Sudan has declared that it achieved control of its territory occupied by Ethiopian farmers after several weeks of fighting in the area. Ethiopian Minister of Foreign Affairs accused Sudan of sending troops into Ethiopia, which is denied by Sudan. Negotiations between the countries broke down last week.

Regional situation (as confirmed per 2 January 2021)

● Egypt reported that the statement of the spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, Dina Mufti, was “totally unacceptable”. The statement held that Egypt “has turned Ethiopia into a threat”, a statement that was related to the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.

● Egypt will hire an international law firm to protect investments, states Alaa Al-Saqati, head of the Egyptian Industrial Zone in Ethiopia, to initiate a case before international courts against Ethiopia.

● Al Shabaab and the Somalia ISIS branch have been emboldened after Ethiopia and the US withdrew a significant numbers of troops. The terrorist organisations state that they will disrupt elections planned for early 2021. There are fears of suppression and low turnout.

● The government and opposition in Somalia are in disagreement on the election preparations. The President has been accused by the opposition of “stacking” election committees with loyalists.

● There are concerns about the severe coronavirus restrictions in Eritrea. Sources say people have described the restrictions as a death sentence as they have no food. The rules do not apply to soldiers.

● Representatives of Ethiopia forced 179 truck drivers from the Tigrayan company EFFORT to hand the trucks over to the Ethiopian government. Amharic and Tigray drivers were separated. The drivers refused, but were brought to camps and forced to hand over the keys of the trucks.

Situation in Tigray (as confirmed per 2 January 2021)

● UN risk assessment team has reportedly not been able to travel outside Mekelle. According to a report they feared the Ethiopian security forces were surveilling their work.

● Aid agencies say that they are still largely unable to access the rest of Tigray. No communications, damaged infrastructure and government restrictions have stopped them from reaching most areas in Tigray. The Ethiopian government is still refusing full access.

● Students from the University of Adigrat have been transferred to Mekelle University. The other institutions in Tigray, have all been looted. Mekelle remains the only functional university in Tigray.

● Many houses have been completely looted. Utensils, valuables, and furniture have been taken. VOA Tigrigna has also reported that investments worth billions of Birr have been destroyed and looted in the southern areas of Tigray.

● ENDF soldiers have rounded up youth in Mekelle and these were taken to an unknown location.

● Report that the transitional Tigray government (Prosperity Party) is intimidating scholars of Mekelle University to join the Prosperity Party and to take a position in the transitional government appointed by the Federal Ethiopian government.

● The elected government of Tigray (TPLF) states on its station DW that it will act against Tigrinyans working with the transitional government appointed by the Federal Ethiopian government.

● Trucks owned by the Tigray EFFORT company were taken to Addis Ababa by the Ethiopian government.

Situation in Ethiopia (as confirmed per 2 January 2021)

● No evidence has been presented against the Reuters cameraman arrested on thursday 24 december. He will be held until January 8th, pending investigation.

● More reports of ethnic profiling and harassment against Tigrayans, including at Bole airport.

● 310 people were arrested in Ethiopia for causing disputes between the Ale and Konso communities in South Ethiopia. The conflict between the communities was quelled after traditional reconciliation. The communities are now helping each other rebuild their homes. Traditional law can help settle disputes.

● The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC) released a report on the killings that took place in june following the assassination of the Oromo musician Hachalu Hundessa’s June 29th. 123 people were killed in the violence, 75 were killed by Ethiopian security forces. Many more were wounded and displaced as a result. The EHCR report finds that Crimes against Humanity took place by groups perpetrating the massacre.

● Witnesses interviewed by the EHCR stated that sometimes police watched and did not intervene while attacks were taking place.

● The EHCR said that they “did not find any indication of ongoing efforts to investigate the use of force by security officers during the unrest and to hold to account those who caused unnecessary human suffering”.

● The report noted that “crimes against humanity of this nature combined with the current national context are signs that the risk of atrocity crimes, including genocide, is increasing”. They call for
investigation and “a lasting institutional solution.”

Disclaimer:

All information in this situation report is presented as a fluid update report, as to the best knowledge and understanding of the authors at the moment of publication. EEPA does not claim that the information is correct but verifies to the best of ability within the circumstances. Publication is weighed on the basis of interest to understand potential impacts of events (or perceptions of these) on the situation. Check all information against updates and other media. EEPA does not take responsibility for the use of the information or impact thereof. All information reported originates from third parties and the content of all reported and linked information remains the sole responsibility of these third parties. Report to info@eepa.be any additional information and corrections.

Links of interest

http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/397910/Egypt/Politics-/BREAKING-Egypt-slams-Ethiopian-statements-on-its-i.aspx
https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somalia/b165-blunting-al-shabaabs-impact-somalias-elections
https://www.trtworld.com/africa/scores-reportedly-killed-beheaded-tortured-in-ethiopia-s-june-july-unrest-42873

Events in Tigray Overview 2020 – Briefing EEPA HORN No.2 – 31 Dec 2020

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Europe External Programme with Africa is a Belgium-based Centre of Expertise with in-depth knowledge, publications, and networks, specialised in issues of peace building, refugee protection and resilience in the Horn of Africa. EEPA has published extensively on issues related to movement and/or human trafficking of refugees in the Horn of Africa and on the Central Mediterranean Route. It cooperates with a wide network of Universities, research organisations, civil society and experts from Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Djibouti, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Uganda and across Africa. Key in-depth publications can be accessed on the website.

Key points

● More than two million children in Tigray do not have access to food, water and safety and may have been displaced, while there is a severe humanitarian situation regarding
100.000 Eritrean refugees in Tigray; full humanitarian access has not been given.
● Serious concern that war crimes are being committed against civilians in Tigray.
● Military situation likely to evolve into a protracted guerilla war situation.
● Destabilisation of peace in the region.
● Destabilisation in Ethiopia with increased ethnic fighting in the preparation of the elections.
● Facts on the ground in Tigray remain unclear due to a two-month communication lock-down.

Short overview

● Ethiopia PM Abiy claims that the regional government of Tigray state is undermining the central authority of Addis Ababa, by carrying out elections in September 2020, which were
not recognised by Addis Ababa. National elections had been postponed due to the COVID-situation.

● Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) won a new mandate, it claims, through the elections it held. It claims that PM Abiy was in cohoot with Eritrean Pres Isayas to
undermine Tigray.

● PM Abiy ordered a reorganisation of the Northern command of the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF). This constitutes an important part of the ENDF, stationed in Tigray
region due to the earlier conflict with Eritrea. This conflict ended with an agreement between Abiy and Afwerki in July 2018. Abiy ordered the split of the Northern command.

● After PM Abiy sent a general to carry out the division of the Northern command, the TPLF sent him back to Addis Ababa. In a next move, PM Abiy sent troops in a cargo plane on 3
November to the Tigray capital Mekelle. The TPLF ordered the arrest of the troops. Details on what happened with them are missing and contradictory.

● Shooting from the main camp of the Northern Command in Qwiha/Mekelle was reported starting from ca. 10 pm. Different sources claim that some members of the ENDF had sided
with Tigray Defense Forces (TDF) and other parts of the ENDF resisted, which led to bloodshed. Similar events are reported from other military posts in Tigray around the same
time. Sources from inside the TPLF, claimed that it was a pre-emptive strike due to preparations for an immediate attack by the federal government. PM Abiy called a law and order operation with the aim to restore his authority over the region.

● PM Abiy instated a temporary provisional government in Tigray to replace the elected TPLF regional government. He declared a six-month state of emergency in Tigray.

● Operations to get control over the Tigray capital Mekelle started 28th of November. The TPLF withdrew from the capital and the ENDF took control of the capital.

● Eritrea participates in the war, by providing support to Ethiopian troops within Eritrea and by sending troops into Tigray. The latter is denied by both PM Abiy and Eritrea President
Afewerki. However, the evidence from Tigray and Ethiopia is overwhelming. The US State Department declared Eritrea was engaged in the war after studying evidence.

● Tigray has been in shut down since the start of the military hostilities, with no phone, internet and bank access. In Mekelle phone contact was restored in December. More than
two million people do not have access to food, water and safety and are displaced.

Current Military Situation

● ENDF have stated that they control the situation in Tigray regional state.

● This is contradicted by the TPLF and TDF who state they are involved in large parts of Tigray and have claimed victory in several battles in which they would have been able to capture
soldiers, weapons, ammunition and vehicles.

● TPLF had 250.000 troops at the start of the war and claimed it had gained control over parts of the Northern command of the ENDF. This has weakened ENDF, and increased its
dependency on Eritrea. Amharic militia, including the youth militia Fano, are fighting alongside ENDF forces.

● Eritrean troops have been fighting alongside ENDF forces; although it is difficult to give exact numbers, there is reason to believe that an extensive number of divisions and
mechanised divisions of Eritrea are involved.

● The UAE has been alleged of engaging in the war initially by giving air-support with drones flown in from the Eritrea port of Assab, where the UAE has a military base.

Regional Stability in the Horn

Sudan: A border conflict broke out between Sudan and Ethiopia concerning fertile land originally from Sudan but in use by Ethiopian farmers. Both sides mobilised troops and
clashed after Sudanese troops claimed to have been ambushed and soldiers were killed. The army Chief of Staff al-Barun of Sudan personally oversaw the operation.

South Sudan: Ethiopia is the major contributor of UNMISS and UNISFA-Abyei. Ethiopia is the head of the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangement Monitoring and
Verification Mechanism (CTSAMM) and contributes forces to CTSAMM. The crisis in Ethiopia is affecting its ability to engage with South Sudan.

Somalia: Ethnic Tigray troops were removed from AMISOM and replaced by Eritrean troops. AMISOM’s mandate includes overseeing the threats posed by Al Shabaab and other
terrorist groups. In the past Al Shabaab was supported and trained by Eritrea as reported by the UN Monitoring Group.

Refugee situation

Shire, Tigray: four large camps hosting 100.000 refugees from Eritrea under international protection were among the places targeted in the military operations. It is estimated that
thousands of refugees were abducted by Eritrean troops and forcefully returned to Eritrea. Refugees were forced to engage in the fighting against the local population. Refugees were
killed and many fled from the camps. Two camps, Adi Harush and May Aini received the first food aid from World Food Programme on 27 December. The other camps, Shemelba and Hitsats have not received any food for three months. Five humanitarian workers in the camps have been killed.

Eastern Sudan: Over 60.000 refugees from Tigray have arrived in Eastern Sudan. They report massacres and cruel killings and many dead. Many lost their relatives. Ethiopian
troops and militia from Amhara regional state have been reported to block refugees from reaching Sudan.

Addis Ababa: Eritrean refugees who fled from Shire, Tigray to Addis Ababa have been arrested and forcefully transported back to the refugee camps in Tigray, despite the lack of
safety, food and water in those camps and the threat of forced refoulement to Eritrea.

Ethnic profiling, civilian targeting, looting

● Reports of massacres across Tigray, especially in Humera and Adigrat, cruelties and mass executions.

● Widespread profiling of ethnic Tigrayans has been reported in Tigray. In Ethiopia ethnic profiling has affected ethnic Tigrayans, who have been suspended from work, travel and
have been subject to harsh security measures.

● Heavy looting of properties, allegedly by Amhara militia and Eritrean troops, involving universities and laboratories, industries, commercial places, churches, religious sites and
citizens. It is reported that truckloads were transported to Eritrea (military base Asholgol).

Situation in Ethiopia

● In Ethiopia further conflict broke out in the Benishangul-Gumuz region and some officials of the region have been arrested.

● Leaders of the Oromo Liberation Front have been arrested.

● Journalists have been harassed, surveilled, arrested, raising concern of freedom of press.

● National elections have been called by the Ethiopian National Election Board for June 5th.

International response

● AU has appointed 3 special envoys: Mr Joaquim Chissano, former president of Mozambique; Madame Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, former President of Liberia, and Mr Kgalema
Motlanthe, former President of South Africa. The envoys have met with PM Abiy.

● US has repeatedly expressed concern over the developing situation. The US has sent the USS Makin Island ship to the Red Sea to relocate US “forces in Somalia to other East Africa
operating locations while maintaining pressure on violent extremists and supporting partner forces”. US has expressed concern over the situation.

● EU has suspended budget support to Ethiopia due to violation of Human Rights. The EU has called for a ceasefire and full humanitarian access to the Tigray region.

● UN has asked for full humanitarian access to all parts of Tigray and investigations into the allegations related to what may constitute war crimes.

● IGAD has met on 20th December 2020 in Djibouti to discuss the regional situation.

● Sudan and Egypt increased cooperation on military exercises.3rd Jan negotiations are planned on the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam which may further increase tension.

Disclaimer:

All information in this situation report is presented as a fluid update report, as to the best knowledge and understanding of the authors at the moment of publication. EEPA does not claim that the information is correct but verifies to the best of ability within the circumstances. Publication is weighed on the basis of interest to understand potential impacts of events (or perceptions of these) on the situation. Check all information against updates and other media. EEPA does not take responsibility for the use of the information or impact thereof. All information reported originates from third parties and the content of all reported and linked information remains the sole responsibility of these third parties. Report to info@eepa.be any additional information and corrections.

Links of interest

https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/28/world/africa/Ethiopia-Eritrea-Tigray.html
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-arrest/ethiopian-police-arrest-reuters-cameraman-idUSKBN2920AD
https://addisstandard.com/news-local-official-in-amhara-region-accused-sudan-of-invading-large-swaths-of-land-stealing-destroying-more-than-25-m-worth-property/
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/africa/2020-12-30/abiy-ahmeds-crisis-legitimacy
https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2020/12/30/evidence-mounts-that-eritrean-forces-are-in-ethiopia
https://www.google.com/maps/d/u/0/viewer?mid=1ukq3h-fUshA0a0ZDcSI22WHbfC6PnKtX&shorturl=1&ll=26.16920359729128%2C-14.51459589999999&z=2
https://www.ethiopia-insight.com/2020/12/29/the-murky-politics-behind-the-metekel-massacres/
https://www.cfr.org/blog/amid-misinformation-and-suppressed-free-speech-ethiopian-conflict-erodes-abiys-credibility

Ten Conflicts to Watch in 2021

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According to a report by Robert Malley, President and CEO of International Crisis Group, published on Foreign Policy, the War on Tigray is one of the 10 conflicts the world should watch in 2021:

  1. Afghanistan
  2. Ethiopia
  3. The Sahel
  4. Yemen
  5. Venezuela
  6. Somalia
  7. Libya
  8. Iran – United States
  9. Russia – Turkey
  10. Climate Change

Read more

US businessmen are close to exploiting Ethiopia’s oil plans in a multibillion-dollar scheme

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Source: Quartz Africa | By Zecharias Zelalm

An Ethiopian-American investor and his partners are on the brink of pulling off an elaborate scheme that may unfairly take advantage of Ethiopia’s long-held ambitions to build its own oil & gas industry and become energy independent.

Nebiyu Getachew, 48, chief executive of GreenComm Technologies, a Virginia-based energy firm, signed a $3.6 billion deal with Ethiopia’s ministry of Mines and Petroleum on April 28 to construct an oil refinery in Ethiopia’s oil-rich Somali region.

But checks reveal little evidence GreenComm Technologies and its key executives have the expertise or experience to take on this major project. The company has no known industry credentials and has been delisted from the Virginia corporate database on two occasions, likely for failure to pay company registration fees on time. Read more

Situation Report EEPA HORN No. 42 – 31 December 2020

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Europe External Programme with Africa is a Belgium-based Centre of Expertise with in-depth knowledge, publications, and networks, specialised in issues of peace building, refugee protection and resilience in the Horn of Africa. EEPA has published extensively on issues related to movement and/or human trafficking of refugees in the Horn of Africa and on the Central Mediterranean Route. It cooperates with a wide network of Universities, research organisations, civil society and experts from Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Djibouti, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Uganda and across Africa. Key in-depth publications can be accessed on the website.

Military situation

– The TPFL broadcaster Dimtsi Woyanen (DW) reports victories by the TPLF including over the ENDF 4th brigade moving from Adwa through Edaga Arbi. The TPLF claims it ambushed them in Zongi, and 124 soldiers were killed, and 114 captured, as well as weapons, ammunition, vehicles and a 507 rocket.

– The TPLF also claims that it has captured ENDF colonel Alemu Semie, commander of the 4th brigade.

– Eritrean troops were blocked on the way from Ahsea around Ziban Guila, carrying large amounts of looted property. They took many casualties and were forced to turn back.

– According to DW the ENDF aligned forces are committing atrocities on civilians in Gijet, southern Tigray through heavy bombardment and killed 21 youth, including a 7 year old child.

– The economist has published an article which argues that there is mounting evidence of an Eritrean presence in Ethiopia. This “makes it harder to bring peace to Tigray”.

– Eight hundred ENDF and Eritrean troops have gathered at the Trans Ethiopia PLC camp in Mekelle. They reportedly retreated from Agula and May Mekden. Their commander is severely wounded.

– Eritrean soldiers in Tigray have reportedly only passed through, and have not occupied any positions.

– Pictures show that medical equipment and pharmacies of health centers in Wukro, Negash, Idagahamus and Adigrat towns were completely destroyed and looted – allegedly by Eritrean troops.

– Tsedale Lemma (Addis Standard) states that: “No armed conflict in the world, much less politically complex as the one in Tigray, has ever been resolved without a roundtable negotiated settlement.”

Reported Regional situation

– The Ethiopia crisis has a direct impact on South Sudan since Ethiopia is the major contributor of UNMISS and UNISFA-Abyei. Ethiopia is the head of the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangement Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (CTSAMM) and has a reasonable contribution of forces under CTSAMM. The crisis in Ethiopia is affecting its ability to engage with South Sudan.

– Refugees report they were hunted down by militia trying to escape to Sudan fleeing without anything.

Reported International dimension

– A Dutch humanitarian organization ZOA staff member is killed in Tigray, Ethiopia. The 52 year old staff member was murdered during the recent conflict while on duty in Hitsats refugee camp.

– United Nations Human Rights Chief, Bachelet, demands access to the whole of Tigray.

– Egypt’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs summons the Ethiopian chargé d’affaires to Cairo to clarify statements by the Ethiopian Foreign Ministry’s spokesperson on Egypt’s internal affairs.

– An AU initiated negotiation on the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam is scheduled for Sunday. Agreement was almost reached in 2020, but fell through. The outcome of the negotiations will be influenced by the dispute on land-ownership at the Ethiopia-Sudan border, fueling conflict.

– The UN has reiterated its Human Rights chief’s demands for access to the whole of Tigray.

– Article in Foreign Affairs points out that PM Abiy is facing a legitimacy issue with ethnic tensions rising all over Ethiopia, causing a precarious situation. The article finds the conflict in Tigray is not over.

– US Council on Foreign Relations writes that misinformation and suppression of free speech erodes the credibility of PM Abiy.

Situation in Tigray

– Sources state that the church in Yeha, an archeological site, was looted, allegedly by Eritrean troops.

– Sources state that the school in Yeha, where many were taking shelter, was bombed. No information on casualties. Eritrean troops reportedly moved from Adwa through Yeha without occupying it.

– Sources state that there were killings in the village of Tashi (27-29/12). Federal soldiers started killing young men in the settlement area after they did not receive information about the whereabouts of TPLF leadership and militias. Tashi is located near Samre, where fighting has been taking place.

– Money transfers via Western Union and Moneygram are possible in Mekelle since 29/12. It is not clear whether people can access their regular accounts.

– Internet and mobile services remain cut in most of Tigray. While services have been partially returned to Mekelle, large areas of Tigray remain cut off.

– VICE reported on interviews with refugees in Sudan stating that civilians were not warned, prepared and protected. Civilian houses and people in their homes were shelled during the bombardment.
– In another interview, a refugee from Tigray in Sudan reported seeing people killed and “slaughtered”, he saw many dead bodies on the way and stated that many died on the way.

– VICE also reported that militias are blocking refugees from Tigray to reach Sudan. Refugees are now crossing Sudan through the Eritrean border with Sudan and also through Ethiopian farmlands.

Situation in Ethiopia

– Over 20 Eritrean refugees fleeing from tigray, were arrested by federal police in Addis Ababa (30/12).

– The Ethiopian Red Cross reported that 207 people were killed in the attack at around 04:00 local time (23/12) in the village of Bekoji in Bulen county in the Metekel zone (Benishangul-Gumuz region).

– ENDF chief now in charge of Benishangul-Gumuz, says 50 perpetrators of the massacre are captured.

– 97.000 people have been displaced as a result of ethnic violence in Benishangul-Gumuz.

Disclaimer:

All information in this situation report is presented as a fluid update report, as to the best knowledge and understanding of the authors at the moment of publication. EEPA does not claim that the information is correct but verifies to the best of ability within the circumstances. Publication is weighed on the basis of interest to understand potential impacts of events (or perceptions of these) on the situation. Check all information against updates and other media. EEPA does not take responsibility for the use of the information or impact thereof. All information reported originates from third parties and the content of all reported and linked information remains the sole responsibility of these third parties. Report to info@eepa.be any additional information and corrections.

Links of interest

https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2020/12/30/evidence-mounts-that-eritrean-forces-are-in-ethiopia
https://www.google.com/maps/d/u/0/viewer?mid=1ukq3h-fUshA0a0ZDcSI22WHbfC6PnKtX&shorturl=1&ll=26.16920359729128%2C-14.51459589999999&z=2
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J_wWwfTso7I&feature=youtu.be
https://www.ethiopia-insight.com/2020/12/29/the-murky-politics-behind-the-metekel-massacres/
https://twitter.com/UNGeneva/status/1344323612694568961?s=08
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/africa/2020-12-30/abiy-ahmeds-crisis-legitimacy
https://www.cfr.org/blog/amid-misinformation-and-suppressed-free-speech-ethiopian-conflict-erodes-abiys-credibility
https://youtu.be/9bAOhqV8bWU

Abiy Ahmed’s Crisis of Legitimacy

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War and Ethnic Discrimination Could Be the Ethiopian Prime Minister’s Undoing.

Source | Foreign Affairs | By Nic Cheeseman and Yohannes Woldemariam

In early November, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed began a military offensive against the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front, an estranged regional government that once dominated Ethiopia’s ruling coalition. Abiy’s forces swiftly captured major cities in Tigray, inflicting heavy causalities on the TPLF and sparking fears of a wider conflict that could extend well beyond the country’s borders.

Now, Abiy insists that the war in Tigray is over. He claims that his forces won a decisive victory over the TPLF and that reports of a continuing insurgency are false. The prime minister has even resumed his normal calendar of official events, traveling to northern Kenya earlier this month to open a new border post with Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta—and no doubt to reinforce the impression that Ethiopia has returned to business as usual.

The reality in Tigray is very different. Ethiopian forces now hold much of the region, but they do not enjoy total control, and many TPLF leaders and fighters remain at large. One of the reasons that Ethiopian forces were able to capture the regional capital of Mekelle so quickly was that the TPLF had already pulled many of its fighters back and dispersed them across the region’s rural areas and mountainous hinterlands. The TPLF came to power in 1991 by using guerilla tactics against the Derg regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam. Now, it has reverted to those practices and appears to have launched a series of small-scale attacks against Ethiopian forces, although it is impossible to know how frequent or effective these attacks have been because Addis Ababa has imposed a news blackout on the region.

Another sustained and bloody insurgency is impossible to rule out. A Tigrayan uprising could also prove contagious, invigorating or even fusing with rebellions in other parts of the country. And even if Ethiopian forces eventually succeed in eliminating the TPLF, deep popular resentment at the prime minister’s perceived aggression will continue to fester, giving rise to a new generation of anti-Abiy leaders who will do everything in their power to resist Addis Ababa.

Beyond Tigray, the war has accelerated what was already a creeping crisis of legitimacy for Abiy. Less than three years after embarking on democratic reforms and one year after accepting the Nobel Peace Prize, the Ethiopian prime minister finds himself on a war footing and governing more through coercion than through compromise. With no unifying narrative to legitimize his authority and with international support wavering, Abiy may find the fallout from the Tigrayan war much harder to manage than the war itself.

AN UPHILL BATTLE

Abiy was quick to claim that the people of Tigray celebrated their “liberation” by Ethiopian troops. In fact, the military offensive humiliated the TPLF and in doing so, stoked Tigrayan nationalism. For 28 years before Abiy came to power, the TPLF had dominated Ethiopia’s ruling coalition, known as the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), while fiercely defending Tigrayan autonomy. Abiy’s selection as prime minister in 2018 broke the TPLF’s hold on power and stripped away many of its privileges. As a result, Abiy’s attempts to subdue Tigray militarily and to bring its government under his control have engendered deep antipathy toward the central government.

Abiy’s regime made matters worse with a campaign of systematic discrimination. While its forces were storming Tigray, Addis Ababa set about removing Tigrayan officials from embassies, from the African Union peacekeeping mission in Somalia, and even from the national airline. According to Human Rights Watch, Tigrayans living outside of Tigray are increasingly being harassed, including through arbitrary raids on their homes by the security forces. Even Ethiopia’s own Human Rights Commission has said that it is “gravely concerned” about the ethnic profiling of Tigrayans, “manifested in forced leave from work and in stopping people from traveling overseas including on work missions, for medical treatment or studies.”

Beyond Tigray, the war has accelerated what was already a creeping crisis of legitimacy for Abiy.

The perception that Addis Ababa is punishing Tigrayans around the country will no doubt fuel the insurgency. But the TPLF faces an uphill battle against the Ethiopian state. TPLF fighters became experts at guerilla warfare during the conflict that toppled the Derg, but Abiy’s government is a much stronger opponent—and the international environment is much less favorable to Tigray than it was in the 1980s. Back then, the TPLF had the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front as an ally. Now, Eritrea is an independent country that sees the TPLF as an enemy. Tigrayan leaders also find themselves sandwiched between Eritrea and Sudan, with no easy access to an international border through which to secure access to weapons and supplies.

These constraints do not mean the TPLF’s efforts are doomed, but they do mean that an insurrection is likely to be low grade and prolonged—and that its effectiveness will partly depend on the TPLF’s ability to form alliances with other insurgent groups in order to stretch thin the Ethiopian army. And Tigrayan resistance is likely to extend beyond the battlefield. Regardless of whether the TPLF can sustain a potent insurgency, Abiy’s military campaign and his regime’s discrimination against Tigrayans will solidify political resistance to federal government control in Tigray for at least a generation. In the absence of consent, Addis Ababa will have to rule through repression.

REPRESSION OR REFORM

The Ethiopian government’s discrimination against Tigrayans and its efforts to centralize power threaten Abiy’s legitimacy throughout the country. The EPRDF professed to respect the autonomy of each of Ethiopia’s major ethnic groups, going so far as to enshrine the groups’ rights to self-determination in the constitution. The EPRDF often failed to live up to that promise, as protests in Oromia and elsewhere demonstrated in recent years. But along with impressive state-led development, the principle of ethnic federalism gave the government a powerful narrative to sell both at home and abroad.

Abiy disbanded the EPRDF in favor of a new political vehicle, the Prosperity Party, whose first act was to suppress a region demanding greater autonomy. The prime minister sought to bolster support for that offensive by holding mass rallies that played on popular anger at the TPLF’s years of ascendancy in the EPRDF. At times, the TPLF has inadvertently aided Abiy’s campaign of vilification, most notably when it fired rockets into the nearby Amhara region. But Abiy’s government also worked assiduously to stoke anti-Tigrayan sentiment in order to justify its military incursion into the northern region.

Those tactics will complicate any effort the prime minister makes to resurrect the legitimizing principle of ethnic self-determination. Abiy could still attempt to revive his reform agenda and hold democratic elections that have been much delayed due to the pandemic—and perhaps due to Abiy’s concern that they might return unfavorable results. Western donors and some of Ethiopia’s ethnic groups would welcome such a move. But Abiy will have a hard time credibly reclaiming a narrative of democratic reform given that his military assault on the TPLF came just months after his security forces were accused of committing widespread human rights abuses during security operations in the Amhara and Oromia regions. Moreover, continued reform—and the reduction in central government control that would entail—would leave Abiy vulnerable to additional challenges from rebel groups and opposition parties.

Abiy could therefore choose instead to reassert the dominance of the central state and expand the security forces to stamp out resistance. He would be able to draw on his anti-TPLF narrative to legitimize such an approach—this time arguing that no group should ever be allowed to act as if it is more important than the collective and labeling those that do so terrorists. Many of Abiy’s critics believe that deep down, he wishes to centralize power but knows that doing so would explode the bargain that has held the country together for the last three decades, triggering new insurrections and exacerbating existing conflicts.

Even outside Tigray, it is already clear that Abiy has failed to establish effective control over Ethiopia’s vast territory. Despite hailing from the Oromia region, the prime minister has failed to quell the unrest there or in the regions of Western Wolega and Benishangul-Gumuz. Along with the continued fighting in Tigray, long-running rebellions and regular clashes between rival ethnic groups in these regions offer an important reminder of the difficulty of maintaining political stability in Ethiopia—and of the fact that every government that has sought to maintain power through force alone has eventually been overthrown.

ROCK AND A HARD PLACE

Whatever Abiy chooses to do, he will come under additional pressure from beyond Ethiopia’s borders. Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki provided military support for Abiy’s offensive in Tigray and expects to be rewarded. Afwerki harbors deep personal hostility toward TPLF leaders and will likely seek to dissuade Abiy from pursuing a negotiated settlement with them.

But if Abiy decides to keep Afwerki happy by continuing to keep his foot on the throat of the Tigray region, hounding the TPLF militarily and preventing aid from reaching those in need, the exodus of refugees into neighboring Sudan will exacerbate tensions with that country. Already, Sudanese Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok has attempted to mediate a cease-fire between the TPLF and the Ethiopian government. And in what appears to be a bid to gain additional leverage, Sudanese troops have reportedly moved into the Al Fashaga Triangle, a disputed territory between Sudan and Ethiopia.

Whatever Abiy chooses to do, he will come under additional pressure from beyond Ethiopia’s borders.

Continued Ethiopian military action in Tigray (and tolerance for Eritrean interference there) would also complicate relations with Western donors who have invested around $5 billion in Ethiopia since 2018. Although the United States and European countries have historically overlooked Ethiopia’s human rights violations because of its developmental success and its support for U.S. counterterrorism efforts in the region, the high-profile nature of the Tigray conflict has given some donors pause. The European Union recently decided to delay releasing budgetary aid to Addis Ababa—in part because of mounting frustration over Abiy’s refusal to allow aid agencies to respond effectively to the growing humanitarian crisis in Tigray. The current U.S. administration remains staunchly behind Abiy, but the next one may be more circumspect, since President-elect Joe Biden has pledged to place greater emphasis on human rights and could be more concerned with Eritrea’s role in the conflict.

Ethiopia is too strategically important for Western nations to consider completely cutting off aid. But even a modest reduction in international assistance would be a significant blow in the context of the pandemic and the attendant economic downturn. For all the country’s vaunted progress over the last two decades, Ethiopia remains heavily dependent on aid, with overseas development assistance covering more than half the central government’s expenditures.

To date, the government news blackout has prevented a full picture of the events in Tigray from reaching the outside world. Those reports that have trickled out, from journalists who have interviewed refugees and corroborated their stories, indicate that both sides have committed widespread human rights violations. When the dust begins to settle, the trickle of bad news is likely to become a flood, increasing pressure on the international community to rethink its support for Abiy and to open an independent investigation into whether his forces have committed crimes against humanity. Should such an investigation lead to significant reductions in foreign aid, private investors could begin to scale back their involvement in Ethiopia as well. That loss, in turn, would deepen Abiy’s crisis of legitimacy, potentially threatening his grip on power regardless of whether he responds with repression or reform.