Ethiopia’s Oromia conflict: Why a teacher was killed ‘execution-style’

/0 Comments/in , , /by

Source: BBC

The shooting dead of Kitilaa Guddata has left his family in shock.

The 32-year-old high school teacher was among the latest casualties in the conflict between government forces and rebels in Ethiopia’s Oromia region.

The violence centres around demands by an insurgent group for the “liberation” of Oromia – a vast swathe of land that is home to Ethiopia’s largest ethnic group, the Oromo – and the subsequent security crackdown.

It has led to civilians being caught in the crossfire – including Mr Kitilaa. His family allege that he was killed after about 10 police officers took him from his home in Sekela town on the night of 19 November.

Frantic search

“His wife – the mother of his two children – begged them to take her instead, but they told her he would be back after some questioning,” said a relative, who spoke to BBC Afaan Oromoo on condition of anonymity for fear of reprisals.

The teacher never returned. His family said that after a frantic search they found his body, along with those of two other people, a couple of days later.

“There was a river and they killed him on a rock next to it. He was shot from behind; his hands were tied at the back. It looks like they used him as a target for shooting practice,” the relative alleged.

Attempts to obtain comment from the Oromia Special Police Force were unsuccessful, but Oromia regional government spokesman Getachew Balcha said he was unaware of the security forces falsely accusing people of being allied with the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA).

“Measures are taken only against those whose crimes are known and exposed by the people,” he told BBC Afaan Oromoo.

“But anyone found to have committed a crime, including police members and government officials, would be held accountable,” he added.

The Oromia Special Police Force has increasingly become involved in operations aimed at quelling the insurgency in the southern and western parts of Oromia after an unspecified number of soldiers were hastily redeployed to the Tigray region following the outbreak of conflict there in early November.

It highlights the mounting security challenges in Ethiopia, ending the euphoria that had gripped the nation when Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed rose to power in April 2018 and won the Nobel Peace Prize the following year.

He introduced sweeping reforms to end decades of authoritarian rule, including unbanning political parties and rebel groups, releasing thousands of detainees, and allowing exiles to return.

As Ethiopia’s first Oromo prime minister, Mr Abiy’s premiership was particularly welcomed in Oromia, with the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), the biggest rebel group, turning into an opposition party.

But one of its top military commanders, Kumsa Diriba, who is also known as “Jaal Maro”, failed to reach a deal with the government over the disarmament of fighters.

After also falling out with the OLF, he continued the insurgency for what he calls the “liberation” of Oromia under the banner of the OLA from his forest hide-out in the west.

At the time in 2018, the security forces promised to crush his group within two weeks, but more than two years later they are still battling the insurgents.

‘Buried without family knowing’

Meanwhile, reports of civilian casualties mount. Another case is that of Galana Imana, a father of two.

In a BBC Afaan Oromoo interview, his younger sister Chaltu Imana said he was arrested by nearly 20 armed officers at his home in Ambo town, about 100km (60 miles) west of Addis Ababa, in November.

Ms Chaltu said she desperately searched for him for four days until she received news that police had found a body by a river. She then went to a local police station, where officers confirmed they had found a body and buried it.

“After some deliberations they asked us to bring his photo and describe how he was dressed the night he was arrested. Later they confirmed to us that the man they buried matched the photo and the description we gave them.

“They told us to go home and mourn him in the absence of his body. We had no option,” she said, adding that the officers confirmed that her brother had died of a gunshot wound.

“We only know about his arrest. We don’t know what his crime was, we don’t know why they preferred to kill him rather than take him to court,” Ms Chaltu said.

Her brother had only been politically active in the OLF, having served on a committee to welcome leaders who had returned from exile in 2018, she said.

Ethnic Amharas killed

The exact number of casualties from the conflict is unclear, but the state-linked Ethiopian Human Rights Commission said it had recorded the alleged killing of 12 civilians by the security forces in Oromia in November alone.

“Political disagreements are costing civilians dearly,” commission adviser Imad Abdulfetah told BBC Afaan Oromoo.

He emphasised that OLA fighters have also been accused of targeting civilians.

Their victims include Amharas, the second largest ethnic group in Ethiopia and its historic rulers. More than 50 of them have been killed in western Oromia’s Horro Guduru zone since November, in an apparent attempt to drive them out of the region.

The zone had been largely peaceful. The attacks suggest that the OLA has now moved in, and the killings have shocked people and raised fears of causing ethnic tensions.

According to government accounts, 13 Amharas were reportedly killed in the zone’s Amuru district in November. In a deadlier attack in the same month, at least 34 Amharas were gunned down after OLA fighters called them to a meeting in a school compound in Guliso district.

The BBC also spoke to two residents of Abbay Choman district, who witnessed the killing of seven Amharas in December.

Competing political visions

Residents said the gunmen, whose identities they were unsure of, used a loudhailer to summon both Oromos and Amharas to a meeting on the evening of 8 December.

“There were eight armed men, they had long hair, their faces were covered, they asked for residents who were Amharas to identify themselves. They told the rest of us to go home and took away about 10 of those who stood up,” an Oromo resident said.

“We were waiting for their release the whole night, they didn’t come. We found seven bodies the next morning,” he added.

While it is unclear what exactly the OLA means by the “liberation” of Oromia, the main opposition parties in Oromia are demanding greater regional autonomy, believing it to be the best way to guarantee the political, cultural and language rights of different ethnic groups.

But their critics, especially urban elites with a more cosmopolitan outlook, fear this could result in ethnic identities becoming more entrenched, and Ethiopia disintegrating into ethnic fiefdoms.

Many Oromos feel Mr Abiy is leaning towards the latter view and wants to centralise power. This perception grew especially after he dissolved the ethnically based ruling coalition in 2019 and gave his newly formed Prosperity Party (PP) power at both the centre and in Ethiopia’s 10 regions.

The same argument is part of the conflict in Tigray.

‘Enemy of the people’

In Oromia, the security forces have also arrested almost the entire leadership of the two main opposition parties, the OLF and Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC), accusing them of fuelling violence to advance their cause for greater autonomy. They deny instigating violence.

Their detention has led to many opposition supporters concluding that the political space Mr Abiy opened in 2018 had now closed. This has resulted in sympathy, if not support, for the OLA growing, especially among youths impatient for change.

The OLA has mainly attacked government officials and police officers – including commanders – in small towns and villages as part of a strategy to make them ungovernable for Mr Abiy.

However, it has also created a culture of fear among Oromos. Armed men raided two banks in Hagamsaa village in December and set ablaze an ambulance, which was taking a pregnant woman to a medical facility to deliver her baby, and a private vehicle in nearby Shambu town. Locals suspect that the rebels were trying to obtain money and vehicles for their insurgency.

The OLA is strongest in southern Oromia, which borders Kenya. The group suffered a major blow there in December when a powerful traditional leader in the region, Kura Jarso, denounced it as an “enemy of the people” after accusing its fighters of killing civilians, raping women and stealing cattle.

The conflict has also spilled into Kenya, where tens of thousands of Oromos live and are loyal to Mr Kura. In November, residents in the Kenyan town of Moyale said Ethiopian troops had crossed the border ransacking neighbourhoods and taking away 10 people they accused of sheltering members of the OLA, also referred to as OLF-Shane.

Mr Abiy visited the Kenyan side of the border with Kenya’s President Uhuru Kenyatta in December.

In his speech, he lumped the Oromo rebels with Somalia-based militant Islamist group al-Shabab, which is the main security threat in Kenya. He said both should be “eliminated”, although there is no evidence linking the ethnic nationalists to the Somali militants.

It was a further sign that Mr Abiy intends to continue taking a hard-line approach to tackling conflicts in Ethiopia.

Menneskene som flykter fra Tigray i Etiopia

/0 Comments/in , /by

Flyktninghjelpen | De er mødre, fedre og barn – studenter, lærere, jordbrukere og skreddere. Alle flykter de for å redde livet.

Tigray ligger i det nordlige Etiopia. I november 2020 brøt det ut kamper her, og volden vedvarer. Minst 55.000 mennesker, mange av dem familier, har blitt nødt til å flykte fra konflikten. De har kommet over grensen til nabolandet Sudan.

Over 20.000 flyktninger bor nå i Um Rakuba-leiren. Flyktninghjelpen er til stede og bidrar med nødhjelp.

Vi har snakket med noen av dem som har kommet seg i trygghet.

Les mer >>

Canada Should Support Ethiopia

/0 Comments/in , , , /by

The conflict between Tigray and Ethiopia could cause rifts with other African regions. Canada’s truth and reconciliation experience could help.

Source: Policy Options Politiques | Ann Fitz-Gerald, Hugh Segal

The conflict between the Ethiopian federal government and a group from within its northern state of Tigray has ended according to the Ethiopian government. The view of some analysts is that in this post-conflict phase, there remain risks of insurgency from peripheral regions of Tigray. Rather than any organized armed conflict, or armed regrouping by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the more likely outcome is ongoing sporadic violence leading up to delayed federal elections in Ethiopia, now scheduled for June 2021.

Ethiopia is a significant player in Africa’s future. Canada should support its efforts to limit further violence by considering its experience in other similar international challenges. In the wake of its newly brokered partnership with Ethiopia following Prime Minister’s Justin Trudeau’s visit to Addis Ababa in 2020, it’s time for Canada to use its experience in support of peace and progress in Ethiopia, and across the African continent more generally.

Border tensions could bring other countries into the fray

Of increasing concern for the resolution of conflict in Tigray are recent border tensions between Ethiopia and neighbouring Sudan regarding land that has long been inhabited by Ethiopian farmers in the agricultural region of al-Fashqua. Although precise borders in this area have been contested peacefully since the 1896-1902 Ethiopian-British negotiations, otherwise cordial relations between the two allied countries now appear threatened.

Any new Sudanese hostility towards Ethiopia’s border region could compel Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed to act militarily. This in turn could spur Egypt to become involved to protect its interests vis-à-vis the Ethiopian Grand Renaissance Dam. The dam draws from the Abay River or Blue Nile, which is the main tributary of the Nile River, on which Egypt depends. Heightened Ethiopia-Sudan tensions, and the prospect of Egypt backing Sudan’s position, risks magnifying regional instability. Having these tensions become an international issue will further complicate matters for Prime Minister Ahmed, and potentially undermine and distract from the urgent internal healing and rebuilding processes in Tigray.

Internationalization of Sudan-Ethiopia tensions could realign interests of some groups and create wider internal cracks in an already challenging federalist arrangement in Ethiopia. This is why the international community must keep front and centre the peacebuilding process in Tigray – which requires the confidence and commitment of the Tigrayan people.

Ethiopia’s close partners have concerns about the conflict, which is constraining any unconditional offers of help. Disabled network communications and a lack of access to the conflict area have restricted reliable and verified situational analyses. This suggests that a wide range of perceptions could be influencing the international position on the conflict. International concerns include the role of Eritrea, which neighbours Tigray to its north, and the Amhara Regional State of Ethiopia, neighbouring to the south, in the conflict; media arrests and detentions; and issues concerning humanitarian access and alleged civilian casualties. That some Ethiopia-based advocacy organizations and international actors are not viewed as free from bias is further obscuring clarity around the situation.

Post-conflict dialogue and regional security structures

To heal from the past, there needs to be a post-conflict dialogue, which considers lessons learned from past Truth and Reconciliation Commissions held in other countries. A wider national dialogue has always been planned in Ethiopia, but because there has been so much dispute over the facts of the conflict, this dialogue process may become challenged. To an extent, this is understandable in a diverse and internally competitive, ethnic federalist system which leaves little, if any, room for perceived impartiality and independence, particularly with nine regional ethnic states and two federally administered city-states. It will, however, be essential to establish the truth regarding the facts of the conflict in order to navigate through the national dialogue process that the government seeks to facilitate.

But even if the details surrounding the conflict are established and agreed upon, the challenge then becomes the reform of the regional security structures. If this is not addressed in parallel to dialogue processes, governance and national stability will continue to be undermined.

While the constitution permits the formation of regional security forces to protect the interests of regional states, the relative strength of these security forces has amplified over the years to levels and conduct beyond the scope of the constitution. These regional militia forces have included a “Liyu Hail” (special force) capability which, like the broader regional force, is accountable directly to the regional president.

Precedent for this “Liyu” paramilitary wing was set in Ethiopia’s eastern Somali regional state. Set up originally to defend the region against the threat of an Ogaden National Liberation Front-led insurgency, the loosely structured force subsequently committed grave atrocities and human rights abuses. This Liyu concept of policing was copied in the regional states of Oromia and Amhara, and continued to grow in capacity after Prime Minister Abiy came to power.

Tigray’s regional security architecture is no exception to this setup. It was already quite expansive due to the northern region’s lead role in supporting the armed insurgency which, in 1991, overthrew the Derg military dictatorship. Tigray further increased its militia capacity following both forced and voluntary 2018 retirements of senior Tigrayan officers of the national defence forces, which brought an influx of experienced and knowledgeable operational leaders back to the region.

Truth and clarity are also required on issues concerning regional security structures, not only in Tigray but also in other regions with large militia build up. A recently reformed legal proclamation restricting the development of civil society groups with an interest in security studies has, since 1991, limited useful national data on this issue.

There is ambiguity surrounding the number of sworn members of regional and special forces, the types of weapons they can use, and the circumstances in which force can be deployed. The prospect for future regional-federal tensions will only increase if regional militia and special forces, with different lines of authority than federal forces, are maintained.  Clarity around these issues is particularly important for a pluralist democratic federalist system, which could benefit from different political party affiliations co-existing between regional and federal jurisdictions in the future.

The Ethiopian government should consider inviting a respected, independent and impartial adjudicator to assist with post-conflict dialogue and strategic communications. This would add legitimacy to the country’s reporting on key issues – clarity which is vital to the relationship between the Tigrayan population and the federal government. Too much of the federal government’s focus is on fire-fighting less-than-substantiated allegations, which only legitimizes the allegations and dilutes the progress required on the key priorities of healing and reconciliation.

Based on its view that outside mediation was neither desired nor appropriate, the Ethiopian government declined the African Union’s arbitrary appointment of three former presidents as mediators. The government has initiated a broader national dialogue involving a Reconciliation Commission and an independent committee of facilitators. Independent adjudication to verify alleged facts on the ground from the Tigray conflict is necessary to give traction to this homegrown dialogue process.

Drawing from international lessons learned

There is a long history of truth and reconciliation commissioners in South Africa, Australia and Canada. In South Africa, the process involved creating a forum where victims and perpetrators could testify without fear of prosecution on the cruelty of Apartheid. In Canada, the process was initiated by Prime Minister Stephen Harper following his apology to Indigenous Peoples for the cruelty and trauma of Residential schools. The process helped establish the truth and form a basis for reparations for survivors. The lack of commonly shared “truth” in Ethiopia between some groups creates a need for a commission. The commission would investigate the legitimate concerns that moderate and non-violent Tigrayans might have, allowing Abiy’s government to make progress towards strengthening the Ethiopian federation.

A commission could specify the nature of its mission and the questions it would consider before preparing its recommendations. Two co-chairs, perhaps a prominent and respected Ethiopian academic or judicial figure well-versed in the unique structures of Ethiopian federalism, and an external eminent person, could – together with regional religious and traditional leaders — oversee the data collection, data processing and subsequent dialogue concerning conflict-related issues.

Canada’s contribution to the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning of paramilitary weapons, as part of the Northern Ireland peace process, has relevance to this proposal. Former Chief of Defence Staff, John de Chastelain, supported by reputable Finnish and American representatives, was chosen to chair the commission. The appointment of a Catholic bishop to work with General Chastelain as co-chair for the commission resonates with the integral role of traditional and religious leaders in supporting Ethiopia’s conflict resolution tradition.

An active or retired military leader may be a good choice for co-chairing the Ethiopian commission, because of the non-partisan nature of the military. Such a leader would bring knowledge and insight when developing a workable solution for Ethiopia’s regional security structures.

Knowledge of the country, its federal dynamics, as well as experience with the Tigrayan people, matters. A reputable individual who served with the UN Mission in Eritrea and Ethiopia (UNMEE) following the 1998-2000 Ethiopian-Eritrea conflict could be of value. Canada played a very positive role in that UN mission.

For Canada, beyond the implicit value of supporting democratic federalism in Ethiopia, and contributing to peace, stability and opportunity across the African continent, there is an opportunity to make real the professed global engagement implicit in the “Canada is back” slogan. Foreign policy is about principles, values and interests, and how competently a government advances them in complex global contexts. With recent events in the United States impacting on the perception of its own soft power equity, Canada should not reduce its own soft power projection – one supported by a strong commitment to democratic norms.

Canada’s impact in the past – in Cyprus, in the Middle East and Suez, in Sri Lanka, in Bosnia, on the ending of Apartheid in South Africa – has been real because Canadian leaders and diplomats engaged in situations where Canada could play a constructive role.

Ethiopia plays a major role in the future of Africa. Its legitimate effort at addressing, what appears to have been, an attempted armed attack from some TPLF elements, could benefit from Canadian support and involvement. Canada has genuine experience in similar contexts in other international challenges. It is time to offer that experience in support of peaceful resolution, conciliation and progress in Ethiopia.

Situation Report EEPA HORN No. 57 – 16 January 2021

/0 Comments/in , , /by

Europe External Programme with Africa is a Belgium-based Centre of Expertise with in-depth knowledge, publications, and networks, specialised in issues of peace building, refugee protection and resilience in the Horn of Africa. EEPA has published extensively on issues related to movement and/or human trafficking of refugees in the Horn of Africa and on the Central Mediterranean Route. It cooperates with a wide network of Universities, research organisations, civil society and experts from Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Djibouti, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Uganda and across Africa. Key in-depth publications can be accessed on the website.

Reported war situation (as confirmed per 15 January)

● During the last three days, there has been heavy fighting in Daero Hafash (East of Axum) where four battalions of Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) and Eritrean Defense Forces (ErDF) were “totally destroyed” by Tigray forces. It is reported that Tigray forces captured “lots of weapons”.

● It is reported that in a place called Dairo Hafash, Tigray forces overtook 4.000 troops of the ENDF/EriDF.

● Fighting is going on in Tsigereda around Wukro between ENDF/ErDF and Tigray forces.

● Reported that one battalion of ENDF/ErDF was “eliminated” by Tigray forces in Ruwa Gered on the way from Adwa to Edaga Arbi two days ago.

● Reported fighting is ongoing in “various locations”.

● Video circulating with shooting and people running in Addis Ababa. No further information.

● In a meeting at Mekelle University staff with the appointed chief of the Tigray provisional government, Mulu Nega, a number of ‘difficult questions’ were raised during a hot debate. Mulu Nega told participants that he had called on the federal government to pull Eritrean troops out of Tigray. However, the country lacked the military power to force the troops to leave Tigray.

● In a nervous response to a question of what would happen to those dissenting, Mulu Nega answered: “if you don’t listen to what we’re telling you? You’d better go into the deserts and join the fight.”

● A UN team reports that it has encountered uniformed troops from neighbouring Eritrea.

● Message circulated of the relatives of a female Eritrean refugee, Eyasu Hagos, who was kidnapped from the Hitsats refugee camp in Tigray and has disappeared. When she was abducted her children Adyam Kesete, 12, and Merhawi Mebrahtom, 8 were left behind on their own.

● Reported that Hitsats camp was under Eritrean military control from end November/December. Eritrean soldiers killed people, including 2 priests that protested when soldiers tried to enter into the church. Tigray troops started shooting on 17 November in a fight with the Eritrean troops, and 9 Eritrean refugees were killed in the crossfire. Shimelba and Hitsats have not been accessible since.

● Wife and two children of Tsadkan Gebretinsae, former chief of staff of the army, have been detained.

● The Tigray regional government issued a statement today: “The government of Tigray has confirmed that Tegadalay Syoum Mesfin, Abay Tsehaye and Asmelash Weldeselassie were not in the war front due to their ages and health issues. Therefore, they are assassinated by Abiy Ahmed and Eritrean forces, very likely at the order of Isayas.”

Reported situation in Ethiopia (as confirmed per 15 January)

● In a video circulating on social media of PM Abiy addressing a church group, the Ethiopian PM states that his mother predicted that he would be the 7th king of Ethiopia and that he had achieved this.

● Brigadier-General Tesfaye Ayalew, Head of the ENDF Deployment Department, states: “Even if there may be good people amongst them (Tigrayans) we can’t differentiate the good from the bad. To save the country we made it so that they (Tigrayans) were excluded from doing the work.”

● Reported that the chairman of Asimba Democratic Party (ADP) Dori Asegdom is arrested. Earlier, Dori had rejected an invitation from the Prosperity Party to be part of Tigray provisional Administration.

Reported regional situation (as confirmed per 15 January)

● The ambassador of Ethiopia in Khartoum has stated that Sudan took over disputed land as it was taking advantage of the war in the Tigray. Ethiopian military warplane crossed over the disputed border area.

● Sudan has accused Ethiopia of a “dangerous and unjustified escalation”.

● The Sudanese Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) imposed restrictions on air traffic over El-Gadarif province and the greater and lower areas of Al-Fashaga in the east of the country.

● Ambassador of Ethiopia to The UAE, Suleiman Dedefo, points out that the GERD dam is located in the areas of Matema and Benishangul and that Sudan, by implication of its claim to these areas, is claiming the GERD dam. The ambassador states Ethiopia is able to protect its sovereign claim to the area.

● Sudan’s head of the Sudanese military, Lieutenant General Abdel-Fattah al-Burhan, visited the disputed area, meeting Sudanese troops guarding the borders and stated that Ethiopia had started the war when militia killed civilians in the al-Fashaga area.

Reported International situation (as confirmed per 15 January)

● EU suspends 88 million€ in budget support to Ethiopia until it opens access to Tigray for humanitarian aid organisations.

● EU Diplomat Josep Borrell states: “We are ready to help, but unless there is access for humanitarian aid operators, the EU cannot disburse the planned budget support to the Ethiopian government.”

● Borrell says it is no longer credible to describe the Tigray conflict as an internal “law and order” operation and that the conflict threatens stability of the whole region. He stated: “We receive consistent reports of ethnic-targeted violence, killings, massive looting, rapes, forceful returns of refugees and possible war crimes.”

● Borrell also pointed to the impact of the Eritrean participation in the war: “there are regional spill-over effects of the conflict, with for instance Eritrean troops being involved in the military operations in Tigray and with Ethiopian troops being withdrawn from Somalia”.

● Referring to the refugee camps in Tigray for Eritrean refugees, Un High Commissioner for Refugees, Fillipo Grandi states: “These are concrete indications of major violations of international law.”

● Reported that Beijing is “extremely angry” at PM Abiy for the killing of Seyoum Mesfin, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia. Seyoum “was respected in policy circles. He was the architect of Ethiopia’s strategic partnership with China that spawned a vast infrastructure renewal in Ethiopia.”

Disclaimer:

All information in this situation report is presented as a fluid update report, as to the best knowledge and understanding of the authors at the moment of publication. EEPA does not claim that the information is correct but verifies to the best of ability within the circumstances. Publication is weighed on the basis of interest to understand potential impacts of events (or perceptions of these) on the situation. Check all information against updates and other media. EEPA does not take responsibility for the use of the information or impact thereof. All information reported originates from third parties and the content of all reported and linked information remains the sole responsibility of these third parties. Report to info@eepa.be any additional information and corrections.

Links of interest

EU – We need humanitarian access to Tigray as urgent first step towards peace in Ethiopia

/0 Comments/in , , /by

Statement: EU | Josep Borrell, EU foreign affairs chief

“For more than two months, conflict has been raging in the Ethiopian Tigray region. The authorities must allow humanitarian access as first step towards peace.” 

For more than two months, conflict has been raging in the Tigray region in Ethiopia. The situation is desperate for the local population and the conflict is unsettling dynamics both within Ethiopia and the whole region. I have passed a clear message to the Ethiopian leadership: we are ready to help, but unless there is access for humanitarian aid operators, the EU cannot disburse the planned budget support to the Ethiopian government.

Without deliberate efforts of de-escalation, conflicts tend to worsen, as Ethiopia’s bloody conflict in the northern Tigray region is reminding us. What started two months ago as an internal matter between an autonomous region and the federal government has become a fight affecting the whole region.

“The situation on the ground goes well beyond a purely internal ‘law and order’ operation”

The situation on the ground goes well beyond a purely internal ‘law and order’ operation. We receive consistent reports of ethnic-targeted violence, killings, massive looting, rapes, forceful returns of refugees and possible war crimes. More than 2 million people have been internally displaced. And while people are in dire need of aid, access to the affected region remains  limited, which makes it very difficult to deliver humanitarian assistance.

Moreover, there are regional spill-over effects of the conflict, with for instance Eritrean troops being involved in the military operations in Tigray and with Ethiopian troops being withdrawn from Somalia.55.000 refugees have fled to Sudan and tensions grow dangerously at the border between Sudan and Ethiopia. By affecting or involving other countries, the conflict is also a direct threat to the stability of the whole region.

Just over a year ago, in October 2019, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. It was a recognition for his firm efforts to achieve peace, in particular with neighbouring Eritrea, and for promoting peace and reconciliation in the country and in the East and Northeast African regions. Today the world needs Ethiopia’s Prime Minister and his government to live up to this prestigious recognition – by doing all it takes to end the conflict. As an immediate first step, the Ethiopian authorities must comply fully with international humanitarian law and ensure that people in need get access to life-saving aid. This applies to all states in conflict.

When I spoke to the Ethiopian Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Demeke Mekonnen last week, I underlined that the European Union has been and will remain a reliable partner of Ethiopia. We strongly support the democratic and economic reform agenda of the authorities. Just in terms of bilateral development cooperation, we have provided € 815 million over the last 7 years (2014-2020). On top of this, Ethiopia is benefitting from € 409 million worth of projects under the EU Trust Fund for Africa, focused mainly on support to refugees and host populations.

“I stressed that in the absence of full humanitarian access to all areas of the conflict, we have no alternative but to postpone the planned disbursement of €88 million in budget support.”

To help Ethiopia face the COVID-19 pandemic, the EU mobilised € 487 million to support the government’s Health Preparedness and Response Plan. And several budget support operations were fast-tracked to enable the country to face the economic strains of the pandemic. However, I also stressed that, under the current circumstances, in particular in the absence of full humanitarian access to all areas of the conflict, we have no alternative but to postpone the planned disbursement of €88 million in budget support.

It is in the best interest of Ethiopia and the wider region to allow humanitarian access and to resume the path towards an inclusive and sustainable peace. Regional experiences are relevant here: Sudan stared into the abyss of civil war two years ago, before the parties to its political dispute stepped back and chose a peaceful transition instead. Ethiopia was the midwife to that transition, together with the African Union and the United Nations. Maybe Khartoum can now return the important effort. But this requires that there first be a de-escalation of tensions between the two countries.

I hope we will be able to work out swiftly a favourable outcome with the authorities and we are ready to meet government representatives in Addis Ababa very soon. As EU, we will continue to do our part, in cooperation with the African Union. As we often say, we support ‘African solutions to African problems’. It is urgent, now, to find these solutions.

Etiopia: Pressefrihet førte til mer etniske motsetninger

/0 Comments/in , /by

Bistandsaktuelt | Hatefulle ytringer og etniske motsetninger blusset opp da president Abiy Ahmed liberaliserte media. Den væpnede konflikten i Tigray-provinsen har forverret «dem» og «oss»-polariseringen i Etiopia. Men forsker Terje Skjerdal er likevel ikke pessimist.

– Det har skjedd en etnisk fragmentering i etiopisk politikk og etiopisk media. Det kan eksemplifiseres med Tigray-konflikten som blusset opp i november, sier forsker Terje Skjerdal.

Han har skrevet rapporten «The ethnification of the Ethiopian media» sammen med etiopiske Alemayehu Moges.

 

Les mer >>

Will Somalia Be Collateral Damage of Ethiopia’s Tigray Conflict?

/0 Comments/in , , /by

Source: World Politics Review | Peter Kirechu

In November, as the Ethiopian government escalated its military campaign against the northern Tigray region, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed quietly ordered a drawdown of Ethiopian peacekeepers from neighboring Somalia. The scale of the move is still unconfirmed, but as many as 3,000 Ethiopian troops were reportedly redeployed to fight against the regional ruling party in Tigray, the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front, or TPLF. Around 200 to 300 ethnic Tigrayan soldiers in Somalia were also disarmed, and some may have even been purged from the ranks.

The Ethiopian troops’ departure injects additional uncertainty into Somalia’s already precarious security situation, as it struggles to hold federal elections that were scheduled for this month, while containing a long-running insurgency by the violent extremist group al-Shabab. The situation is further complicated by escalating tensions between the federal government, based in Mogadishu, and Somalia’s semiautonomous regional states—a standoff that bears similarities to Ethiopia’s conflict between the federal government and Tigray. Both Abiy and his Somali counterpart, Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed—who is more commonly known by his nickname, Farmajo—have sought to centralize executive authority within their respective federal governments despite sustained and increasingly violent opposition by powerful rivals.

Although Tigrayans make up only around 7 percent of Ethiopia’s population, the TPLF has played an outsized role in Ethiopian politics for decades, largely due to its leadership of the military campaign to overthrow the old communist dictatorship, the Derg, in the 1980s and early 1990s. In 2006, the TPLF-led government sent troops to Somalia to help secure the country’s nascent transition to a federal government after decades of civil war. Ethiopia later joined the African Union mission against al-Shabab as a troop-contributing country in 2014. These deployments helped foster ties between the TPLF and regional state leaders in Somalia, particularly in the south, where al-Shabab is most active.

When Abiy took office in 2018, however, he promptly began sidelining the TPLF, including by dissolving the old ethnic federalist coalition, known as Ethiopian People’s Democratic Front, and replacing it with a single, pan-Ethiopian political party that the TPLF refused to join. Abiy’s campaign to create a strong central government resonated with Farmajo, who has similarly sought to curb the authority of Somalia’s semiautonomous states. Abiy’s efforts to defang the TPLF and remove ethnic Tigrayans from the ranks of peacekeepers in Somalia can thus be seen as part of a burgeoning partnership between the Somali and Ethiopian leaders, united by their mutual desire to centralize federal power and weaken the political influence of domestic rivals in both countries.

Abiy and Farmajo share a mutual suspicion of the TPLF’s enduring influence within the Ethiopian military and security services. This deep-seated mistrust likely informed the disarming of Tigrayan peacekeepers in Somalia in November, which Abiy’s government defended as an effort to root out the “infiltration of TPLF elements in various entities.” Prior to the recent drawdown, Ethiopia had nearly 4,000 troops assigned to the United Nations Mission in Somalia, or AMISOM, targeting al-Shabab, and an additional 4,000 troops supporting a separate bilateral security agreement between the Somali and Ethiopian governments.

Farmajo is running for a second term in a presidential election that is scheduled for next month, but is likely to be delayed. If his reelection bid is successful—not a certain prospect—his political survival would be influenced by the outcome of the Ethiopian offensive in Tigray. Sporadic fighting is continuing despite Abiy’s declaration of victory in late November, after federal troops captured the regional capital, Mekelle. A decisive defeat of the heavily armed and well-trained TPLF troops would strengthen Abiy’s grip on the military, and may also weaken the TPLF’s historical ties to allies in Somalia, especially those in its southern and central federal member states.

An enduring guerrilla insurgency in Tigray will likely stress Ethiopia’s military resources and raise the prospect of additional drawdowns from the Somalia mission.

Here, Farmajo’s efforts to marginalize his political opponents have been bolstered by Ethiopia’s military presence. It is also in these Somali heartland regions, the epicenter of the al-Shabab insurgency, where Farmajo’s efforts to expand federal authority have faced the most resistance. In 2018, he intervened in a local election in Somalia’s South West state to prevent a former al-Shabab leader and defector, Mukhtar Robow, from competing in the state’s presidential election. Farmajo’s federal government reportedly orchestrated Robow’s arbitrary arrest and detention by Ethiopian security forces, leading to his withdrawal from the race, and the subsequent election of a Farmajo ally.

And last March, Farmajo unsuccessfully tried to intervene to prevent the reelection of Ahmed Madobe, a key political opponent who serves as president of Somalia’s southernmost regional state, Jubaland. Here, again, Farmajo leveraged Ethiopia’s military presence and political support in a bid to unseat an incumbent and expand the federal government’s writ of authority. This effort sparked violent clashes between federal troops and Jubaland’s forces, and drew in both Kenya and Ethiopia—two troop-contributing countries in the AMISOM mission that stand on opposite sides of the fractious dispute in Jubaland.

Kenya has long supported the Jubaland administration of Madobe, a former ally of al-Shabab who now opposes the group. Madobe led the 2012 military campaign that ousted al-Shabab from Kismayo, the regional capital, and has since enjoyed Kenya’s military and political backing. Madobe also has historical ties to the former TPLF-led government in Addis Ababa, dating back to Ethiopia’s military campaign against Islamist extremists in southern Somalia during the 2000s.

Today, al-Shabab has been beaten back from Jubaland’s cities, but it still maintains a presence in rural parts of the state. Kenya, which has suffered from deadly al-Shabab attacks in the past, views Jubaland—and therefore Madobe—as an essential security buffer on its northeastern border with Somalia. Abiy, on the other hand, is suspicious of Madobe’s historical links with the TPLF, as well as other Ethiopian groups that are opposed to Abiy’s agenda.

These tensions imperil AMISOM’s already beleaguered campaign against Al-Shabab, which took a hit from the sudden withdrawal of U.S. troops that President Donald Trump ordered last month. National interests have long driven countries’ decisions on participation in the AMISOM mission, but the rift between Kenya and Ethiopia—and each country’s divergent support for rival domestic factions inside Somalia—fundamentally weakens the AMISOM mission. These tensions may not spill into direct confrontation, but they create an additional wedge that the resurgent al-Shabab can exploit to advance its military and political objectives.

The conflict in Tigray only exacerbates these exigent rifts. An enduring guerrilla insurgency in Tigray will likely stress Ethiopia’s military resources and raise the prospect of additional drawdowns from the Somalia mission. A conclusive TPLF defeat, on the other hand, would embolden Abiy’s centralization campaign—an outcome that would resonate in Somalia and strengthen Farmajo’s like-minded agenda.

While prospects for a negotiated settlement in Tigray are still uncertain, it presents the best opportunity to mediate the Ethiopian federal government’s rivalries with the TPLF and other regional state rivals. Such an outcome could also provide a viable blueprint for the negotiation to ease federal-regional tensions in Somalia, where the effects of the Tigray conflict will likely reverberate for many months to come.

Peter Kirechu is the former director of the Conflict Finance and Irregular Threats Program at the Center for Advanced Defense Studies (C4ADS). He is a specialist on illicit transnational networks in the Middle East and Africa.

Massacre ‘of 750’ reported in Aksum church complex, Tigray, Ethiopia

/0 Comments/in , , /by

Source: Church Times | Rebecca Paveley

Reports of a massacre of 750 people in the cathedral complex that reputedly houses the Ark of the Covenant have emerged from the Tigray region of Ethiopia.

Accounts have come from those who fled the town of Aksum and walked more than 200km to the regional capital, Mekelle.

The massacre was first reported in dispatches from the Belgium-based NGO European External Programme with Africa (EEPA). The area is sealed off to journalists, but many reports of massacres have nevertheless emerged, some of which have been documented by Amnesty International.

The former BBC World Service Africa editor and Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, Martin Plaut, said that those who escaped the Aksum massacre had reported that the attack began after Ethiopian federal troops and Amhara militia approached the Church of St Mary of Zion.

Up to 1000 people were believed to be sheltering in the church complex. One of the chapels, the Chapel of the Tablet, is believed by Ethiopian Christians to contain the Ark of the Covenant, which is hidden from the view of everyone, apart from a single priest who never leaves the compound.

Mr Plaut said: “People were worried about the safety of the Ark, and when they heard troops were approaching feared they had come to steal it. All those inside the cathedral were forced out into the square.”

EEPA’s latest dispatch on the situation in Tigray, on Tuesday, reports that 750 people were shot in Aksum, although this has not been verified. It says that the massacre was carried out by Ethiopian federal troops and Amhara militia.

The Church is not thought to have been damaged, and Mr Plaut said that the Ark is likely to have been hidden before troops arrived, although it has not been possible to confirm this.

The Ark is believed by Ethiopian Orthodox Christians to have been hidden in Aksum by Menelik I, the son of King Solomon of Israel. The kingdom of Aksum was one of the four great powers of the ancient world, and the town of Aksum is a UNESCO World Heritage Site.

Fighting broke out in Tigray in November, after the Ethiopian Prime Minister, Abiy Ahmed, sent federal troops, supported by militia and troops from Eritrea, to fight the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), which he accused of holding illegitimate elections (News, 20 November 2020). The TPLF was part of the governing coalition of Ethiopia until 2019.

The government declared that the conflict was over after it captured Mekelle, in late November, but the TPLF continues to fight a guerrilla war.

The Ethiopian government has admitted shelling an ancient mosque in Tigray, and has promised to repair it. The al-Nejashi mosque in northern Tigray was hit by shells, and its dome, minaret, and ancient tombs, reputedly of 15 disciples of the Prophet Muhammad, were damaged. A church near by was also damaged in the attack, and the government has pledged that it will also repair it.

EEPA reported that, after the shelling, the mosque had been looted by Ethiopian and Eritrean troops, and that some civilians had died trying to protect it.

Humanitarian aid has been unable to get to the region, despite pleas from the United Nations, which estimates that 2.3 million children have been cut off from food and aid (News 1 January). More than one million people have been displaced by the fighting, and more than 50,000 have fled into Sudan. There are also concerns for the safety of many Eritrean refugees in camps in Tigray.

EU suspends Ethiopian budget support over Tigray crisis

/0 Comments/in , , /by

Source: Reuters

The European Union has suspended budget support for Ethiopia worth 88 million euros ($107 million) until humanitarian agencies are granted access to people in need of aid in the northern Tigray region.

In a blog post published on Friday, the EU’s top diplomat Josep Borrell said Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed now needed to live up to the Nobel Peace Prize he was awarded in 2019 by doing all it takes to end the conflict in Tigray.

“We are ready to help, but unless there is access for humanitarian aid operators, the EU cannot disburse the planned budget support to the Ethiopian government,” Borrell said.

Abiy’s office did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

In December, the government’s task force for Tigray said it had reached a deal with the United Nations in which Addis Ababa would call the shots on access for aid agencies.

Conflict erupted in Tigray on Nov. 4 between Ethiopian federal forces and the party ruling the northern region. Thousands have been killed, millions displaced and more than 50,000 refugees have fled to Sudan.

Abiy’s government declared victory over the rebellious leaders in at the end of November but they vowed to fight on. The United Nations has said there are reports fighting is still going on in various parts of Tigray.

Reuters reported in December that the EU was delaying budget support to Ethiopia over the Tigray crisis, according to internal documents.

Borrell said the Tigray conflict had become far more than an internal “law and order” operation and was now a direct threat to the stability of the whole region.

“We receive consistent reports of ethnic-targeted violence, killings, massive looting, rapes, forceful returns of refugees and possible war crimes,” he said.

Reuters was unable to independently verify events in Tigray as the government is restricting journalists’ access.

“Moreover, there are regional spill-over effects of the conflict, with for instance Eritrean troops being involved in the military operations in Tigray and with Ethiopian troops being withdrawn from Somalia,” Borrell said.

‘SMEAR CAMPAIGNS’

The EU has provided 815 million euros of development aid to Ethiopia over the past seven years, on top of 409 million euros of projects focused mainly on supporting refugees and host communities in the country.

The United Nations said on Thursday there had been major violations of international law in Tigray at two refugee camps, home to people who fled repression in neighbouring Eritrea long before the latest conflict.

It said satellite imagery showed fires burning and fresh signs of destruction at the Shimelba and Hitsats camps.

The U.N. refugee agency, which decried the lack of humanitarian access to the camps, did not say who was responsible, but said there had been additional military incursions over the past 10 days.

“UNHCR seems to indulge, yet again, in another bout of gratuitous & irresponsible smear campaigns against Eritrea,” Eritrea’s Information Minister, Yemane Meskel, tweeted on Friday.

After repeated denials of the presence of Eritrean troops in Tigray by both countries, a senior Ethiopian general has since said they had crossed into the northern region uninvited.

Borrell also said there needed to be a de-escalation of tension between Ethiopia and Sudan.

Ethiopia has said it is running out of patience with Sudan’s continued military build-up in an area populated by Ethiopian farmers on the Sudanese side of their disputed border.

Sudan’s foreign ministry said this week that an Ethiopian military aircraft had crossed the border in a “dangerous and unjustified escalation”.

($1 = 0.8252 euros)

 

UN OCHA – Ethiopia – Daily Noon Briefing Highlights – January 2021

/0 Comments/in , , /by

15 January 2021

OCHA reports that hundreds of thousands of people in Tigray, Ethiopia, are facing food and water shortages and lacking health services. There has also been a reported rise in malnutrition and water-borne diseases.

Meanwhile, humanitarian relief operations continue to be constrained by the lack of full, safe and unhindered access to Tigray caused by both insecurity and bureaucratic obstacles imposed by federal and regional authorities.

There has, however, been some progress. The road between Gondar and Shire has been accessible in the past days and humanitarian partners have provided assistance to the people in Shire for the first time since the conflict began two and half months ago.

But delays in clearance processes and the need to engage with multiple actors for approval to access certain areas are hampering operations.

The UN renews its call on all parties to allow the immediate and safe passage of humanitarian personnel and supplies to the Tigray Region to make sure we are able to reach all people who need assistance.