Hva kan man kreve av en fredsprisvinner?

Bistandsaktuelt | Etiopias statsminister beskrev krigens vanvidd i sin nobeltale i Oslo Rådhus. «Krigen skaper barbariske menn», sa han. Beskrev Abiy Ahmed seg selv? spør Tomm Kristiansen.

Det var ingen krig, sa statsministeren. Det var en «rettshåndhevelse i eget land».

Men det settes ekstra krav til en mann med fredsprisen rundt halsen. Det er lettere å starte en krig enn å avslutte den. Tigray har egne styrker, og Eritrea har gått over grensen for å bistå Abyi, sivile er blitt drept, massakrer er gjennomført, og folk har flyktet over grensa til Sudan.

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Sudanese troops have been deployed on the border in agreement with Ethiopia’s PM: al-Burhan

Source: Sudan Tribune

The head of the Sudanese Sovereign Council, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, disclosed Saturday that he had agreed with the Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed to deploy the Sudanese troops to secure the borders between countries.

On the first of November 2020, days before the attack of the Ethiopian federal army on the TPLF forces in Tigray region, al-Burhan travelled to Ethiopia together with Omer Gamar Eldin the Foreign Minister, Jamal Abdel Majeed the head of the General Intelligence Service, and Yasir Mohamed Osman the head of the Military Intelligence.

Al-Burhan told a gathering of businessmen and entrepreneurs to support the Sudanese army that his army has no intention to wage war against Ethiopia. He added that the army has been deployed within the Sudanese borders.

“I visited Ethiopia shortly before the events, and we agreed with the Prime Minister of Ethiopia that the Sudanese armed forces would close the Sudanese borders to prevent border infiltration to and from Sudan by an armed party,” he said.

“Actually, this is what the (Sudanese) armed forces have done to secure the international borders and have stopped there,” he further added.

His statements suggest that Abiy Ahmed spoke with him about these plans before to launch the military operation on the TPLF positions in Tigray few days after

He further described as “inaccurate” statements by Ethiopian officials saying that Sudanese military are implementing the agenda of a third party.

Ethiopian officials kept repeating that some people in the Sudanese government are implementing plans by a third party to harm their country without naming it.

Al-Burhan who worked in the border army during long years said he had participated four years ago in joint committees to discuss placing border markers on the ground and forming joint forces, adding nobody raised doubts on Sudan’s ownership of any border area.

“Four years ago, I was based with a military force in the Qalaa Alluban area, in which were killed six Sudanese women a few days ago. During that time, the Ethiopians argued that they had internal problems and that the situation did not allow marking the borders,” he said.

“The political leadership at the time assessed the situation and gave us instructions to withdraw, ” he added referring to the former president Omer al-Bashir who is accused of facilitating the occupation of Sudanese borderland for over 20 years.

He further said that the statements by Ethiopian officials claiming several border areas are a new development that requires to defend the integrity of the Sudanese territory.

(ST)

የኢትዮጵያ ፍጻሜ: ጉዞ ወደ ዩጎዝላቪያ?

ኦህዴድ-ብልጽግና፣ መሬት አስመላሹ ብአዴንና ህግደፍ-ሻዕቢያ፣ ህወሓትን ለየብቻ መግጠም ስለማይችሉ፣ ተቧድነው ገጠሙት። ሁሉም የጋራ ጠላት እንጂ የሚያስተሳስራቸው የጋራ ሌላ አጀንዳ የላቸውም። ያሸነፉ በመሰላቸው ማግስት፣ እርስ በእርስ መባላት እንደሚጀምሩ ሳይታለም የተፈታ ነበር። ብዙ ዝርዝር ጽፌያለሁ ስለዚህ ጉዳይ፣ ወደዛ አልመልሳችሁም። ፈትቶ የለቀቀው የአማራ ምልሻ / ልዩ ሀይል የአብይ አሕመድ ዋነኛ ራስ ምታቱ ነው። ይህ ሀይል ለ30 ዓመታት ሲፎክርና ሲሸልል ኖረ እንጂ ተኩሶ አያውቅም። አሁን ተደራጅቶ በቆመህ ጠብቀኝ የመተኮስ እድሉን አገኝቷል። ወልቃይትና ራያን እንዲይዝ ተፈቀደሎታል። ይህ የልብ ልብ ይሰጠውና ፊቱን ወደ ሌላ መሬት የማስመለስ ዘመቻ ያዞራል አልነ። እንሆ፣ በቤንሻንጉል ጉምዝ ልዩ ሀይልና ምልሻውን አሰማርቶ፣ ሲቪሎቹን ለፖለቲካ ትርፍ እየማገደ፣ በሰው ክልል ጦርነት ከፈተ። ኦህዴድና ኦነግም ከጉምዝ ጎን ቆመው እየከተከቱት ይገኛሉ። በጅምላ ተጨፍጭፈው፣ በጭነት መኪና ሬሳቸው እየተነዳ፣ በጅምላ እየተቀበሩ ነው። ሰው ያልዘራውን አያጭድም።

አብይ አሕመድ ያለ የሌለ ጉልበቱን ትግራይ ላይ ጨርሷል። በሌላ ክልል ጸጥታ ሊያስከብር ቀርቶ፣ በትግራይ የጀመረውን መቋጨት አይችልም። ሻዕቢያም ከቁጥጥሩ ውጭ ሆኖ፣ መከላከያ ፈለገ አልፈለገ፤ የትግራይ ጊዜያዊ አስተዳደረ ፈቀደ አልፈቀደ፣ ግድ ሳይሰጠው፣ ያሻውን እያደረገ ነው። ይህ ብልጽግናን ከፈሎታል። መከላከያን ከፈሎታል። በመከላከያና በብልጽግና ቅራኔ ፈጠሯል። አሁን ትግራይ መቀበሪያቸው ብቻ ሳትሆን፣ እርስ በእርስ የሚጫረሱባት የጦርነት አውድም እየሆነች ነው።

የአገር ውስጥ ራስ ምታቱ በቤንሻንጉል ጉምዝና በትግራይ ብቻ አይደለም እየታየ ያለው። በኦሮሚያ ኦነግ ግማሹን ቦታ ተቆጣጥሮታል። የኦህዴድ ተከታዮች ሳይቀሩ፣ ወደ ኦነግ ማዘንበል መርጠዋል። ጃል መሮን የሚከተል ሰራዊት፣ በ10ሺዎች የሚቆጠሩ ሆነዋል። በሺዎች የሚቆጠሩ የኦሮሚያ ክልል ያሰለጠናቸው ምልሻዎች፣ ጃል መሮን እየተቀላቀሉ ነው። ድፍን ኦሮሞ “እስከዛሬ ለኢዮጵያ የሞትነው ይበቃል፣ ለአገሪቱ እየሞትን በአገሪቱ እየተከዳንና እየተገደልን መኖር የለብንም፣ ከእንግዲህ ትግላችን ለነጻነታችን መሆን አለበት” ብሏል። አብይ አሕመድ ለስልጣኑ ሲል፣ ኦሮሞን ክዶ፣ ከሁሉም ተነጥሎ ብቻዉን ቀርቶ፣ የነፍጠኛ ስርዓት ለመመለስና ለማንገስ እያሸረገደ ነው ብሎ የሚከሰው ድፍን ኦሮሞ ነው። ብንፈልግ እንኳን ኢዮጵያ ከእንግዲህ የመትረፍ እድል የላትም በማለት ኦሮሞ የራሱን ህልውና ወደሚያስከብርበት፣ ጥቅሙን ወደሚያስጠብቅበት ትግል አቅንቷል።

በሌላ በኩል ደግሞ ቅርቃር ውስጥ እንደገባ የተረዳው አብይ አሕመድ፣ የአማራ ልዩ ሀይልና ምልሻን በማስቀጥቀጥ፣ ነፍጠኛን ለመስበር በማሴር፣ ሱዳን ጦሯን ድንበር ላይ እንድታሰፍር ከሱዳን ጋር መስማማቱን በየሚዳው እየተነገረ ነው። ይህን ሊያደርግ እንደሚችል ከዴይ ዋን ጀምሮ ገምተን ነበር። የልብ ልብ የሰጠው ነፍጠኛ ከሱዳን ጋርም ይተናኮሳል፣ ቢተናኮስም በአብይ ትዕዛዝ ከመከላከያ ድጋፍ አያገኝም የሚል መላምት አስቀምጠን ነበር። እንደተገመተው ብቻ ሳይሆን ከገመትነው ባላይ ነው እየሆነ ያለው። ራሱ አብይ፣ ጦርነቱን የጀመሩትን የአማራ ምልሻና ልዩ ሀይል በይፋ በማህበራዊ ሚድያ ገጾቹ ኮንኗል። የኛን ሰላም የማይሹና የሁለቱ አገራት ወዳጅነት የማይረዱ ናቸው፣ ሲል በሱዳን ወታደር ክፉኛ መቀጥቀጣቸው ሳያንስ ድርጊታቸውን ኮንኗል። ከዛ ብኋላ ነው መከላከያ ለሁለት የተከፈለው። ከአብይ ትዕዛዝ ውጭና ከብርሃኑ ጁላ እውቀት ውጪ፣ በነፍጠኛው የሚመራ የመከላከያ ብራንች ከሱዳን ጋር መጠነኛ ጦርነት ከፍቶ ቆይቷል። አሁንም እንደተፋጠጠ ነው። ምልሻው ብቻዉን ስላልቻለ፣ ጦርነቱን በሁለት ሉአላዊ አገራት መካከል ለማድረግና ከሌላው ህዝብ የድረሱልኝ ጥሪ ለማሰማት ነው ትንኮሳው። በዚህ የብልጽግና መሪዎች አልተስማሙም። ለበርካታ ቀናት አብይ አሕመድ የገባበት አይታወቅም። አንዴ ተመርዟል፣ ሌላ ጊዜ ታሟል፣ ሌላ ጊዜ ታፍኗል የሚል ወሬ እንደሰማን አለን። ምንም ይሁን ምን፣ አገሪቱን አክቲቭሊ እየመራ እንዳልሆነና ለበርካታ ቀናት ከህዝብ እየታ ርቆ እንዳለ ግልጽ ነው።

ይህ ሁሉ ሔዶ ሔዶ የሚጠናቀቀው በአንድ አስቀያሚ እልቂት ነው። በተለይ በኦሮሚያና በአማራ ክልል የሰለጠኑ ልዩ ሀይሎች፣ እርስ በእርስ የሚጫረሱበት ግዜ እየመጣ ነው። ፊንፊኔ/አዲስ አበባ እየተሰማ ያለው ተኩስና ፍንዳታ፣ እየታየ ያለው የእሳት ቃጠሎ፣ የፍጻሜው መነሻ ምልክቶች ናቸው። ኢዮጵያ ከሞተችና ከተበተነች ሰነባብታለች። ክፋቱ በሰላም መለያየት ሲቻል፣ በደም አፋሳሽ መንገድ እንዲሆን፣ መንጋው መምረጡ ነው ጉዞዋን ወደ ዩጎዝላቪያ እየቃኘ ያለው።

የህወሓት መሪዎችን በማሰርና በመግደል የተወሳሰበና ለክፍለዘመናት የኖረ ችግራቸውን የሚፈቱ መስሏቸው የነበሩ ሰዎች ዛሬ፣ ትግራይ ላይ ቃታቸውን የሳቡባትን ቀን መርገም ጀምረዋል። ገና ነው፣ ጸጸቱ የምትችሉት አይሆንም።

Akutt fare for sultkatastrofe i Tigray

iTromsø.no | Krigen i Tigray-regionen nord i Etiopia har ført til at befolkningen står i akutt fare for å sulte i hjel, advarer hjelpearbeidere og myndighetene i området.

De første hjelpearbeiderne har nå ankommet den krigsherjede regionen etter at de gjentatte ganger har bedt Etiopias regjering om å slippe inn.

De beskriver hvordan avmagrede barn dør av diaré etter å ha drukket vann fra elvene.

Nyhetsbyrået AP har fått tak i et referat fra et krisemøte 1. januar. Der står det at «hundretusener av mennesker kan komme til å sulte i hjel», og at noen allerede har gjort det.

På krisemøtet deltok hjelpearbeidere, regjeringen og lokale myndigheter. En lokal tjenestemann uttalte at mennesker ber om å få en enkelt kjeks for å stagge sulten.

Over 4,5 millioner mennesker, nesten hele Tigrays befolkning, trenger akutt mat, ifølge deltakerne.

– Det er et ekstremt akutt behov – jeg vet ikke hvilke ord jeg skal bruke – for en rask opptrapping av hjelpearbeidet fordi folk dør hver eneste dag mens vi snakker, sier Mari Carmen Vinoles, leder for kriseenheten i Leger Uten Grenser.

Under regjeringsoffensiven på slutten av fjoråret ble butikker plyndret eller tømt for varer, og avlinger ble svidd av. Offensiven var rettet mot de regionale lederne.

(©NTB)

Situation Report EEPA HORN No. 58 – 17 January 2021

Europe External Programme with Africa is a Belgium-based Centre of Expertise with in-depth knowledge, publications, and networks, specialised in issues of peace building, refugee protection and resilience in the Horn of Africa. EEPA has published extensively on issues related to movement and/or human trafficking of refugees in the Horn of Africa and on the Central Mediterranean Route. It cooperates with a wide network of Universities, research organisations, civil society and experts from Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Djibouti, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Uganda and across Africa. Key in-depth publications can be accessed on the website.

Reported war situation (as confirmed per 16 January)

● Fires have been detected on the outskirts of Humera. The fires are within an active combat zone.

● Minutes have leaked of the Tigray Emergency Coordination Centre (TECC) meeting of 8 January 2021. The minutes identify that 4.5 million are in need of food.

● The TECC includes the UN and Humanitarian organisations present in Tigray (MSF, Red Cross, CRS, Norwegian Church Aid) and several administrators of the transitional governments participated in the meeting.

● The minutes identify that five assessment teams have been re-established but only two of them “managed to go to the field”, while three teams have no access and no vehicles to go to West, North-west and Central zones of Tigray.

● Impediments to humanitarian assistance is the lack of vehicles and salary issues as people outside have not received salaries pending payment issues.

● Delivery of water has been difficult as water trucks and missionaries are looted.

● A flow of IDPs is observed “coming into Mekelle and other major towns” showing “how much desperate” people are to get “humanitarian access”. Their produce and household materials are vandalised or burned.

● The humanitarian administrators can not go back to regional offices without food as “people are starving” and they will be in trouble “if they go with empty hands”.

● The Central Zone interim administrator states that “the situation on the ground is dire”. It is explained that “food and non-food items or other livelihoods are either looted or destroyed.”

● The Central Zone administrator warns that “hundreds of thousands” may “starve to death”, if urgent emergency assistance is not dispatched.

● The humanitarian organisations do not have an adequate number of trucks for transportation. During the war all trucks from the region were allegedly looted and driven to Addis Ababa. To transport the required food ratios to 4.5 million people more than 2000 trucks are now urgently required.

● Pictures have emerged on the internet of the bodies of the former Minister of Foreign affairs Seyoum Mesfin, the former minister of Federal affairs Abay Tsehaye, and former chief Whip of the government Asmelash Weldeselassie.

● The pictures of the bodies would indicate that the three have been executed together. The picture of Seyoum Mesfin shows that he was shot in the forehead. Asmelash is wearing socks. There is no indication of any fighting.

● The ENDF had said previously that the retired politicians had been killed in a firefight after they had resisted arrest. Asmelash Weldeselassie was blind.

● The pictures of the retired leaders were posted on facebook by the head of the transitional government in Tigray, Mulu Nega.

● The statement by the provisional administrator of Tigray, Mulu Nega, that Ethiopia did not have the power to get Eritrean troops out of Tigray has led to fierce comments.

● Tsedale Lemma of the Addis Standard states in response to the admission of Mulu Nega: “Any reflection on the status of Ethiopia as a state at this moment should begin by recognizing the somber fact that it’s no longer a sovereign state. For a country that fiercely defended its sovereignty for generations, 76 days to lose it is like being hit with a brute force!”

● Increased presence of Eritrean military and intelligence reported in Addis Ababa.

Reported situation in Tigray (as confirmed per 16 January)

● 20.000 health workers and other government civil servants are not receiving their salary for over two months with some exceptions.

● International partners are requested to fill in the gaps as government structures are not functioning.

● Many businesses in Mekelle remain unable to operate due to a shortage of Ethiopian Birr. A withdrawal limit is still in place, hindering economic transactions.

● The interim administration has said that the majority of businesses are still unable to conduct normal activities.

● The Interim government has also said that government offices have been looted, making public services hard to distribute.

● 24 Former TPLF officials appeared in court, including Sebhat Nega. Federal police have asked for 14 days to investigate the case. The court accepted the extension and adjourned the case until the 29th of January.

Reported regional situation (as confirmed per 16 January)

● Sudan has said that it would not allow Ethiopia to accomplish a fait accompli regarding the filling of the GERD dam. Ethiopia has said that it would proceed with the second filling of the dam in July, something which both Sudan and Egypt oppose.

● Ethiopia has denied that it violated Ethiopian airspace. The chief of the Ethiopian army staff said that Sudan was trying to mislead the Sudanese and Ethiopian people into an “unwanted situation”.

● Sudanese Prime minister Hamdok has welcomed the initiative by President Kiir to mediate the Ethiopian-Sudanese dispute.

● Kenya is in talks with China to rearrange its debt. This is important because the harbour of Mombassa serves as a collateral to these debts. This has been an additional factor in heightened tensions in the region.

Reported International situation (as confirmed per 16 January)

● France will host the next Sudanese investment conference. Due to take palace in Paris in May, the conference aims to encourage investment in the country.

Disclaimer:

All information in this situation report is presented as a fluid update report, as to the best knowledge and understanding of the authors at the moment of publication. EEPA does not claim that the information is correct but verifies to the best of ability within the circumstances. Publication is weighed on the basis of interest to understand potential impacts of events (or perceptions of these) on the situation. Check all information against updates and other media. EEPA does not take responsibility for the use of the information or impact thereof. All information reported originates from third parties and the content of all reported and linked information remains the sole responsibility of these third parties. Report to info@eepa.be any additional information and corrections.

Links of interest

Uro i Etiopia – NRK

NRK | OPPSUMMERT

I 2020 er det kamper i Tigray-regionen nord i Etiopia, der regjeringen hevder regionale myndigheter har gjort opprør. Statsminister Abiy Ahmed fikk Nobels fredspris for avtalen med Eritrea i 2019. Det er også sluttet fred mellom opposisjonsgrupper.

Mer om Uro i Etiopia 

Brookings: Internal and external conflicts compound in Ethiopia

Source: Brookings | Chris Heitzig

In recent weeks, tensions between Ethiopia and Sudan over the disputed Al-Fashqa region have flared up, including an attack on Tuesday that left 80 civilians dead, according to Sudan’s Foreign Ministry. The latest violence comes in the wake of fatal attacks in the region last month that killed more than 220 people. The situation is complicated by a multitude of actors, including gangs, which Sudanese officials have claimed are responsible for some of the violence. On Tuesday, Ethiopia indicated that it was losing patience for Sudan’s militarization on the border of the disputed territory. Sudan has blamed Ethiopian military forces for escalating conflict in the region and reported on Wednesday that an Ethiopian military aircraft had recently entered into Sudanese territory.

A new round of negotiations to resolve the dispute over the filling of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam was short-lived, as the three countries concluded on January 10 without a resolution. In separate statements, Ethiopia and Egypt faulted Sudan for the latest impasse. The statement released by Egypt’s foreign ministry read, “Sudan insisted on the assigning of African Union experts to offer solutions to contentious issues … a proposal which Egypt and Ethiopia have reservations about.” Sudan, however, claims the stalemate stems from Ethiopia’s determination to fill the reservoir with 13.5 million cubic meters of water this year in the face of objections from other countries in the region. “We cannot continue this vicious cycle of circular talks indefinitely,” said Sudanese Irrigation Minister Yasir Abbas.

These tensions continue to mount despite the fragile situation within Ethiopia itself. Last week, a senior Ethiopian military official confirmed that Eritrean troops were indeed present in the country’s Tigray region, which has been the source of infighting for several months. Humanitarians fear that fighting in that region has rendered the local population vulnerable to displacement and food insecurity. Last week, the United Nations expressed in a report the fear that Tigray could also be a source of “massive community transmission” of COVID-19 due to the suspension of health services caused by the conflict.

Ethiopia’s Oromia conflict: Why a teacher was killed ‘execution-style’

Source: BBC

The shooting dead of Kitilaa Guddata has left his family in shock.

The 32-year-old high school teacher was among the latest casualties in the conflict between government forces and rebels in Ethiopia’s Oromia region.

The violence centres around demands by an insurgent group for the “liberation” of Oromia – a vast swathe of land that is home to Ethiopia’s largest ethnic group, the Oromo – and the subsequent security crackdown.

It has led to civilians being caught in the crossfire – including Mr Kitilaa. His family allege that he was killed after about 10 police officers took him from his home in Sekela town on the night of 19 November.

Frantic search

“His wife – the mother of his two children – begged them to take her instead, but they told her he would be back after some questioning,” said a relative, who spoke to BBC Afaan Oromoo on condition of anonymity for fear of reprisals.

The teacher never returned. His family said that after a frantic search they found his body, along with those of two other people, a couple of days later.

“There was a river and they killed him on a rock next to it. He was shot from behind; his hands were tied at the back. It looks like they used him as a target for shooting practice,” the relative alleged.

Attempts to obtain comment from the Oromia Special Police Force were unsuccessful, but Oromia regional government spokesman Getachew Balcha said he was unaware of the security forces falsely accusing people of being allied with the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA).

“Measures are taken only against those whose crimes are known and exposed by the people,” he told BBC Afaan Oromoo.

“But anyone found to have committed a crime, including police members and government officials, would be held accountable,” he added.

The Oromia Special Police Force has increasingly become involved in operations aimed at quelling the insurgency in the southern and western parts of Oromia after an unspecified number of soldiers were hastily redeployed to the Tigray region following the outbreak of conflict there in early November.

It highlights the mounting security challenges in Ethiopia, ending the euphoria that had gripped the nation when Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed rose to power in April 2018 and won the Nobel Peace Prize the following year.

He introduced sweeping reforms to end decades of authoritarian rule, including unbanning political parties and rebel groups, releasing thousands of detainees, and allowing exiles to return.

As Ethiopia’s first Oromo prime minister, Mr Abiy’s premiership was particularly welcomed in Oromia, with the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), the biggest rebel group, turning into an opposition party.

But one of its top military commanders, Kumsa Diriba, who is also known as “Jaal Maro”, failed to reach a deal with the government over the disarmament of fighters.

After also falling out with the OLF, he continued the insurgency for what he calls the “liberation” of Oromia under the banner of the OLA from his forest hide-out in the west.

At the time in 2018, the security forces promised to crush his group within two weeks, but more than two years later they are still battling the insurgents.

‘Buried without family knowing’

Meanwhile, reports of civilian casualties mount. Another case is that of Galana Imana, a father of two.

In a BBC Afaan Oromoo interview, his younger sister Chaltu Imana said he was arrested by nearly 20 armed officers at his home in Ambo town, about 100km (60 miles) west of Addis Ababa, in November.

Ms Chaltu said she desperately searched for him for four days until she received news that police had found a body by a river. She then went to a local police station, where officers confirmed they had found a body and buried it.

“After some deliberations they asked us to bring his photo and describe how he was dressed the night he was arrested. Later they confirmed to us that the man they buried matched the photo and the description we gave them.

“They told us to go home and mourn him in the absence of his body. We had no option,” she said, adding that the officers confirmed that her brother had died of a gunshot wound.

“We only know about his arrest. We don’t know what his crime was, we don’t know why they preferred to kill him rather than take him to court,” Ms Chaltu said.

Her brother had only been politically active in the OLF, having served on a committee to welcome leaders who had returned from exile in 2018, she said.

Ethnic Amharas killed

The exact number of casualties from the conflict is unclear, but the state-linked Ethiopian Human Rights Commission said it had recorded the alleged killing of 12 civilians by the security forces in Oromia in November alone.

“Political disagreements are costing civilians dearly,” commission adviser Imad Abdulfetah told BBC Afaan Oromoo.

He emphasised that OLA fighters have also been accused of targeting civilians.

Their victims include Amharas, the second largest ethnic group in Ethiopia and its historic rulers. More than 50 of them have been killed in western Oromia’s Horro Guduru zone since November, in an apparent attempt to drive them out of the region.

The zone had been largely peaceful. The attacks suggest that the OLA has now moved in, and the killings have shocked people and raised fears of causing ethnic tensions.

According to government accounts, 13 Amharas were reportedly killed in the zone’s Amuru district in November. In a deadlier attack in the same month, at least 34 Amharas were gunned down after OLA fighters called them to a meeting in a school compound in Guliso district.

The BBC also spoke to two residents of Abbay Choman district, who witnessed the killing of seven Amharas in December.

Competing political visions

Residents said the gunmen, whose identities they were unsure of, used a loudhailer to summon both Oromos and Amharas to a meeting on the evening of 8 December.

“There were eight armed men, they had long hair, their faces were covered, they asked for residents who were Amharas to identify themselves. They told the rest of us to go home and took away about 10 of those who stood up,” an Oromo resident said.

“We were waiting for their release the whole night, they didn’t come. We found seven bodies the next morning,” he added.

While it is unclear what exactly the OLA means by the “liberation” of Oromia, the main opposition parties in Oromia are demanding greater regional autonomy, believing it to be the best way to guarantee the political, cultural and language rights of different ethnic groups.

But their critics, especially urban elites with a more cosmopolitan outlook, fear this could result in ethnic identities becoming more entrenched, and Ethiopia disintegrating into ethnic fiefdoms.

Many Oromos feel Mr Abiy is leaning towards the latter view and wants to centralise power. This perception grew especially after he dissolved the ethnically based ruling coalition in 2019 and gave his newly formed Prosperity Party (PP) power at both the centre and in Ethiopia’s 10 regions.

The same argument is part of the conflict in Tigray.

‘Enemy of the people’

In Oromia, the security forces have also arrested almost the entire leadership of the two main opposition parties, the OLF and Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC), accusing them of fuelling violence to advance their cause for greater autonomy. They deny instigating violence.

Their detention has led to many opposition supporters concluding that the political space Mr Abiy opened in 2018 had now closed. This has resulted in sympathy, if not support, for the OLA growing, especially among youths impatient for change.

The OLA has mainly attacked government officials and police officers – including commanders – in small towns and villages as part of a strategy to make them ungovernable for Mr Abiy.

However, it has also created a culture of fear among Oromos. Armed men raided two banks in Hagamsaa village in December and set ablaze an ambulance, which was taking a pregnant woman to a medical facility to deliver her baby, and a private vehicle in nearby Shambu town. Locals suspect that the rebels were trying to obtain money and vehicles for their insurgency.

The OLA is strongest in southern Oromia, which borders Kenya. The group suffered a major blow there in December when a powerful traditional leader in the region, Kura Jarso, denounced it as an “enemy of the people” after accusing its fighters of killing civilians, raping women and stealing cattle.

The conflict has also spilled into Kenya, where tens of thousands of Oromos live and are loyal to Mr Kura. In November, residents in the Kenyan town of Moyale said Ethiopian troops had crossed the border ransacking neighbourhoods and taking away 10 people they accused of sheltering members of the OLA, also referred to as OLF-Shane.

Mr Abiy visited the Kenyan side of the border with Kenya’s President Uhuru Kenyatta in December.

In his speech, he lumped the Oromo rebels with Somalia-based militant Islamist group al-Shabab, which is the main security threat in Kenya. He said both should be “eliminated”, although there is no evidence linking the ethnic nationalists to the Somali militants.

It was a further sign that Mr Abiy intends to continue taking a hard-line approach to tackling conflicts in Ethiopia.

Menneskene som flykter fra Tigray i Etiopia

Flyktninghjelpen | De er mødre, fedre og barn – studenter, lærere, jordbrukere og skreddere. Alle flykter de for å redde livet.

Tigray ligger i det nordlige Etiopia. I november 2020 brøt det ut kamper her, og volden vedvarer. Minst 55.000 mennesker, mange av dem familier, har blitt nødt til å flykte fra konflikten. De har kommet over grensen til nabolandet Sudan.

Over 20.000 flyktninger bor nå i Um Rakuba-leiren. Flyktninghjelpen er til stede og bidrar med nødhjelp.

Vi har snakket med noen av dem som har kommet seg i trygghet.

Les mer >>

Canada Should Support Ethiopia

The conflict between Tigray and Ethiopia could cause rifts with other African regions. Canada’s truth and reconciliation experience could help.

Source: Policy Options Politiques | Ann Fitz-Gerald, Hugh Segal

The conflict between the Ethiopian federal government and a group from within its northern state of Tigray has ended according to the Ethiopian government. The view of some analysts is that in this post-conflict phase, there remain risks of insurgency from peripheral regions of Tigray. Rather than any organized armed conflict, or armed regrouping by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the more likely outcome is ongoing sporadic violence leading up to delayed federal elections in Ethiopia, now scheduled for June 2021.

Ethiopia is a significant player in Africa’s future. Canada should support its efforts to limit further violence by considering its experience in other similar international challenges. In the wake of its newly brokered partnership with Ethiopia following Prime Minister’s Justin Trudeau’s visit to Addis Ababa in 2020, it’s time for Canada to use its experience in support of peace and progress in Ethiopia, and across the African continent more generally.

Border tensions could bring other countries into the fray

Of increasing concern for the resolution of conflict in Tigray are recent border tensions between Ethiopia and neighbouring Sudan regarding land that has long been inhabited by Ethiopian farmers in the agricultural region of al-Fashqua. Although precise borders in this area have been contested peacefully since the 1896-1902 Ethiopian-British negotiations, otherwise cordial relations between the two allied countries now appear threatened.

Any new Sudanese hostility towards Ethiopia’s border region could compel Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed to act militarily. This in turn could spur Egypt to become involved to protect its interests vis-à-vis the Ethiopian Grand Renaissance Dam. The dam draws from the Abay River or Blue Nile, which is the main tributary of the Nile River, on which Egypt depends. Heightened Ethiopia-Sudan tensions, and the prospect of Egypt backing Sudan’s position, risks magnifying regional instability. Having these tensions become an international issue will further complicate matters for Prime Minister Ahmed, and potentially undermine and distract from the urgent internal healing and rebuilding processes in Tigray.

Internationalization of Sudan-Ethiopia tensions could realign interests of some groups and create wider internal cracks in an already challenging federalist arrangement in Ethiopia. This is why the international community must keep front and centre the peacebuilding process in Tigray – which requires the confidence and commitment of the Tigrayan people.

Ethiopia’s close partners have concerns about the conflict, which is constraining any unconditional offers of help. Disabled network communications and a lack of access to the conflict area have restricted reliable and verified situational analyses. This suggests that a wide range of perceptions could be influencing the international position on the conflict. International concerns include the role of Eritrea, which neighbours Tigray to its north, and the Amhara Regional State of Ethiopia, neighbouring to the south, in the conflict; media arrests and detentions; and issues concerning humanitarian access and alleged civilian casualties. That some Ethiopia-based advocacy organizations and international actors are not viewed as free from bias is further obscuring clarity around the situation.

Post-conflict dialogue and regional security structures

To heal from the past, there needs to be a post-conflict dialogue, which considers lessons learned from past Truth and Reconciliation Commissions held in other countries. A wider national dialogue has always been planned in Ethiopia, but because there has been so much dispute over the facts of the conflict, this dialogue process may become challenged. To an extent, this is understandable in a diverse and internally competitive, ethnic federalist system which leaves little, if any, room for perceived impartiality and independence, particularly with nine regional ethnic states and two federally administered city-states. It will, however, be essential to establish the truth regarding the facts of the conflict in order to navigate through the national dialogue process that the government seeks to facilitate.

But even if the details surrounding the conflict are established and agreed upon, the challenge then becomes the reform of the regional security structures. If this is not addressed in parallel to dialogue processes, governance and national stability will continue to be undermined.

While the constitution permits the formation of regional security forces to protect the interests of regional states, the relative strength of these security forces has amplified over the years to levels and conduct beyond the scope of the constitution. These regional militia forces have included a “Liyu Hail” (special force) capability which, like the broader regional force, is accountable directly to the regional president.

Precedent for this “Liyu” paramilitary wing was set in Ethiopia’s eastern Somali regional state. Set up originally to defend the region against the threat of an Ogaden National Liberation Front-led insurgency, the loosely structured force subsequently committed grave atrocities and human rights abuses. This Liyu concept of policing was copied in the regional states of Oromia and Amhara, and continued to grow in capacity after Prime Minister Abiy came to power.

Tigray’s regional security architecture is no exception to this setup. It was already quite expansive due to the northern region’s lead role in supporting the armed insurgency which, in 1991, overthrew the Derg military dictatorship. Tigray further increased its militia capacity following both forced and voluntary 2018 retirements of senior Tigrayan officers of the national defence forces, which brought an influx of experienced and knowledgeable operational leaders back to the region.

Truth and clarity are also required on issues concerning regional security structures, not only in Tigray but also in other regions with large militia build up. A recently reformed legal proclamation restricting the development of civil society groups with an interest in security studies has, since 1991, limited useful national data on this issue.

There is ambiguity surrounding the number of sworn members of regional and special forces, the types of weapons they can use, and the circumstances in which force can be deployed. The prospect for future regional-federal tensions will only increase if regional militia and special forces, with different lines of authority than federal forces, are maintained.  Clarity around these issues is particularly important for a pluralist democratic federalist system, which could benefit from different political party affiliations co-existing between regional and federal jurisdictions in the future.

The Ethiopian government should consider inviting a respected, independent and impartial adjudicator to assist with post-conflict dialogue and strategic communications. This would add legitimacy to the country’s reporting on key issues – clarity which is vital to the relationship between the Tigrayan population and the federal government. Too much of the federal government’s focus is on fire-fighting less-than-substantiated allegations, which only legitimizes the allegations and dilutes the progress required on the key priorities of healing and reconciliation.

Based on its view that outside mediation was neither desired nor appropriate, the Ethiopian government declined the African Union’s arbitrary appointment of three former presidents as mediators. The government has initiated a broader national dialogue involving a Reconciliation Commission and an independent committee of facilitators. Independent adjudication to verify alleged facts on the ground from the Tigray conflict is necessary to give traction to this homegrown dialogue process.

Drawing from international lessons learned

There is a long history of truth and reconciliation commissioners in South Africa, Australia and Canada. In South Africa, the process involved creating a forum where victims and perpetrators could testify without fear of prosecution on the cruelty of Apartheid. In Canada, the process was initiated by Prime Minister Stephen Harper following his apology to Indigenous Peoples for the cruelty and trauma of Residential schools. The process helped establish the truth and form a basis for reparations for survivors. The lack of commonly shared “truth” in Ethiopia between some groups creates a need for a commission. The commission would investigate the legitimate concerns that moderate and non-violent Tigrayans might have, allowing Abiy’s government to make progress towards strengthening the Ethiopian federation.

A commission could specify the nature of its mission and the questions it would consider before preparing its recommendations. Two co-chairs, perhaps a prominent and respected Ethiopian academic or judicial figure well-versed in the unique structures of Ethiopian federalism, and an external eminent person, could – together with regional religious and traditional leaders — oversee the data collection, data processing and subsequent dialogue concerning conflict-related issues.

Canada’s contribution to the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning of paramilitary weapons, as part of the Northern Ireland peace process, has relevance to this proposal. Former Chief of Defence Staff, John de Chastelain, supported by reputable Finnish and American representatives, was chosen to chair the commission. The appointment of a Catholic bishop to work with General Chastelain as co-chair for the commission resonates with the integral role of traditional and religious leaders in supporting Ethiopia’s conflict resolution tradition.

An active or retired military leader may be a good choice for co-chairing the Ethiopian commission, because of the non-partisan nature of the military. Such a leader would bring knowledge and insight when developing a workable solution for Ethiopia’s regional security structures.

Knowledge of the country, its federal dynamics, as well as experience with the Tigrayan people, matters. A reputable individual who served with the UN Mission in Eritrea and Ethiopia (UNMEE) following the 1998-2000 Ethiopian-Eritrea conflict could be of value. Canada played a very positive role in that UN mission.

For Canada, beyond the implicit value of supporting democratic federalism in Ethiopia, and contributing to peace, stability and opportunity across the African continent, there is an opportunity to make real the professed global engagement implicit in the “Canada is back slogan. Foreign policy is about principles, values and interests, and how competently a government advances them in complex global contexts. With recent events in the United States impacting on the perception of its own soft power equity, Canada should not reduce its own soft power projection – one supported by a strong commitment to democratic norms.

Canada’s impact in the past – in Cyprus, in the Middle East and Suez, in Sri Lanka, in Bosnia, on the ending of Apartheid in South Africa – has been real because Canadian leaders and diplomats engaged in situations where Canada could play a constructive role.

Ethiopia plays a major role in the future of Africa. Its legitimate effort at addressing, what appears to have been, an attempted armed attack from some TPLF elements, could benefit from Canadian support and involvement. Canada has genuine experience in similar contexts in other international challenges. It is time to offer that experience in support of peaceful resolution, conciliation and progress in Ethiopia.