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Ethiopia: Contemplating Elections and the Prospects for Peaceful Reform

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Source: USIP  April 29, 2021 |  Amid ongoing violence across the country, the vote may offer opportunities to support political dialogue and decrease polarization.

Ethiopia is approaching parliamentary elections on June 5. This will be the first vote since the process of reform launched in 2018 by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, and the stakes are extremely high. Elections to the next national parliament, the House of People’s Representatives, may determine future decisions about the structure of the country and consolidate the ruling party’s power. While the short-term outlook for the vote is unlikely to change, the election may offer opportunities to support political dialogue which could sustain important reforms and decrease polarization. Still, amid ongoing violence across Ethiopia, including in Tigray, voting in some areas will either not take place or will only be possible to hold under troubling security conditions, which may limit participation.

Researchers Lidet Tadesse Shiferaw and Terrence Lyons and USIP’s Aly Verjee discuss what is at stake in these elections, how ongoing violence could impact the electoral process and how the United States can help advance political reform in Ethiopia.

What is at stake in the June 2021 elections in Ethiopia?

Lidet: The election may shape both short-term political reforms and Ethiopia’s long-term trajectory. Ultimately, the election may shift the balance of power between ethno-nationalists and nationalists. Ethno-nationalists emphasize the primacy of ethnic identity as a political organizing principle. They advocate for the implementation of the self-determination of nations, nationalities and peoples in Ethiopia through self-governing, ethnically constituted regions. This is the system established by Ethiopia’s current constitution. Nationalists instead contend that citizenship, rather than ethnic or group identity, be the primary political organizing principle. They propose that ethno-linguistic demographic distribution alone is insufficient to determine how the federation is structured. Today’s political parties span the spectrum of these two political visions. The parties that secure significant shares in the next parliament and which go on to form the government will thus seek to advance their preferred vision of how Ethiopia’s state is organized.

Lyons: The elections are central to Abiy’s claims of legitimacy. The current parliament is composed of members elected in 2015 when the previous ruling party and its affiliates won 100 percent of the seats. Abiy came to office with promises of democratization and prosperity that earned him extraordinary goodwill but today Ethiopia faces its greatest crisis in decades: a brutal civil war and massive humanitarian emergency that involves neighboring Eritrea, allegations of ethnic cleansing and ghastly reports of rape in the northern Tigray region. At the same time, political violence has erupted across Ethiopia, notably in the highly populous Oromo and Amhara regions. The election will not be held in Tigray and will be held under troubling security conditions and federal military supervision in several other areas. Prospects for political reform that seemed so promising in 2018 are in question.

Verjee: In addition to the parliamentary election, residents of five zones (the zone is the administrative structure below a regional state) and one district in southern Ethiopia are due to vote in a referendum to create a new regional state. The South West Regional State is almost certain to be approved and augur another change to internal boundaries which continues the slow unravelling of Ethiopia’s most ethnically diverse region, following the similar Sidama referendum in 2019.

How do these elections compare to prior elections?

Lyons: From 1995 to 2015, polls were held every five years but, with the exception of very contentious elections in 2005 that ended in a crackdown and the arrest of leading opposition leaders, have not offered voters a meaningful choice. While elections were generally peaceful and voter turnout high, they were largely non-competitive. Government harassment led major opposition parties to boycott most votes. Instead of offering citizens a meaningful opportunity to choose their leaders, elections in Ethiopia have served to consolidate the ruling party’s power. The 2021 process differs from the past in several ways, notably with regard to the independent National Election Board (NEBE) and the involvement of several new opposition parties, but it seems likely that the upcoming vote will resemble the past with regards to the limits on participation.

Lidet: Compared to previous elections, today’s political field is formally wider now that exiled opposition parties have returned following the reforms of 2018. However, several opposition figures complain of political harassment, some prominent and controversial opposition leaders are in prison, and at least two political parties have decided to pull out of the race. Whether a decision to boycott is appropriate is debated: Critics point out that one of these parties participated in previous elections despite harassment and other process deficiencies. But their absence, as well as that of some other key political figures, diminishes the competitiveness of the election.

Another important change is social media. In previous elections, the use of social media was negligible. Traditional media, especially print, played a tremendous role in the flow of information and voter education in the 2005 electoral process. Independent media was very restricted in Ethiopia following the 2005 election. Today, social media is increasingly accessible and popular in Ethiopia and has become a preferred platform for information dissemination and consequently both political mobilization and exclusion. In a context of inadequate digital literacy and socio-political polarization, social media platforms are fraught with disinformation and misinformation, used to disseminate hate speech, and even incite violence. This challenge is not unique to Ethiopia, but it is the first time Ethiopians must reckon with the impacts of social media in an electoral process.

Does violence in several parts of Ethiopia affect the electoral process?

Verjee: NEBE has recently reported relatively low levels of voter registration, and as registration was about to conclude last week, decided to extend the registration period. Insecurity has likely contributed to the low registration uptake, and so many may be excluded from the election from the start. Organizing an election in areas with security challenges is obviously difficult for election administrators. Similarly, campaigning in such areas will be difficult, especially for smaller and less well-resourced parties. Potential voters will also understandably find it hard to focus on an election if they are worried that violence will recur in their communities. When political violence is widespread outside of the electoral process, the security of the vote may not be a foremost consideration for many ordinary people.

Lidet: Maintaining a secure electoral process throughout the country will test the capacity of the security forces. How security agencies discharge their responsibilities now, on election day, and in the post-election period, will test whether recent reforms have improved the institutional independence of the security and justice sector from the governing party, particularly if electoral disputes emerge.

For voters, risks to personal security are linked to the number of actors with the capacity for violence. In some parts of the country, the state does not have a monopoly over the means of violence. To safeguard both voters and the electoral process as a whole, the engagement of Ethiopian civil society, including its religious and traditional institutions is needed, even as Ethiopian civil society still recovers from years of suppression.

With only weeks left until the vote, sticking points persist. NEBE has not managed to establish polling stations in internally displaced person (IDP) camps hosting more than 2 million people across the country, before IDPs in Tigray are even considered. NEBE has also been forced to suspend voter registration in several areas of conflict, and not conduct any registration activities in the Tigray region. These issues risk undermining the voting rights of millions, if not effectively addressed, and could also affect the pluralism of the election in some constituencies.

Given these challenges, what can the United States do to advance political reform in Ethiopia?

Lyons: It is not surprising that the June elections are the focus of considerable external attention but by itself the vote will not determine the potential for future reforms or provide meaningful legitimacy to the incumbent. Washington should recognize that political actors and dynamics within Ethiopia will determine the outcome of this moment of crisis. There are opportunities, however, for the United States and others interested in advancing peace and reform to support longer term processes and political dialogue to develop a new road map to sustain the political opening, decrease polarization and end political violence.

Lidet: This election takes place at a time when Ethiopia confronts surmountable national and regional security and political challenges. The election is but one element of Ethiopia’s political evolution and should not be treated as an end in itself. The United States should therefore take a long-term perspective and support broad-based processes of reconciliation and inclusive and accountable local governance, which could contribute both to the wellbeing of citizens and the future stability of Ethiopia.

Verjee: There is not much time to change the likely course of the election. However, the election is a moment to push for necessary reforms, such as addressing the detention of political party leaders, limitations on the freedom of the press and the ability to freely organize and assemble. With forceful action to change some state boundaries already underway, signalling that all should adhere to Ethiopia’s existing constitutional arrangements on the management of state boundaries — as is happening in southern Ethiopia — is also important.

Lidet Tadesse is ‎a policy officer at the European Centre for Development Policy Management. Terrence Lyons is associate professor at the Carter School for Peace and Conflict Resolution, George Mason University, and author of the 2019 book, The Puzzle of Ethiopian Politics.

Could a National Dialogue Solve Ethiopia’s Political Crisis?

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USIP | It is time to talk about the common challenges that every Ethiopian faces.

While the recent conflict in Tigray renewed international focus on Ethiopia, more challenges lie ahead, including elections now scheduled for June 5. The state of Ethiopia’s political transition is contested, and the country remains polarized. However, as Ethiopian scholars Emebet Getachew, Mehari Taddele Maru, and Yohannes Gedamu discuss, a national dialogue process may have the potential to address the country’s dilemmas.

What is the current state of Ethiopia’s political transition?

Emebet: The political transition underway since Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed came to power is not Ethiopia’s first. Transition should be considered a recurrent Ethiopian phenomenon which, unfortunately, has rarely occurred peacefully. As with the 1974 revolution toppling Emperor Haile Selassie and the 1991 overthrow of the Derg military government, the consequences of the 2018 transition claimed many lives, even if the transfer of power itself was generally peaceful.

This transition means different things to different people. The initial euphoria that greeted the transition was short-lived. There was limited consensus to propel change. Critics were left out of the transition process leading to avoidable conflicts. The transition thus faces an uphill battle to stabilize and effectively govern the country, especially since reconciliation has not been high on the agenda.

Mehari: Ethiopia faces a “war of visions” as to its future. One vision is of centralization, the basis of which is to reclaim quasi-unitarist powers that have been—at least de jure—dismantled over decades. This vision recalls Ethiopia’s contested history of forcible assimilation. The same unitarist governance style, albeit with some aspects of decentralization, is now in the making. Proponents of this vision employ both constitutional norms, and when they deem necessary, unconstitutional, oppressive means including war on those who resist. This vision of centralization is undemocratic and antagonistic to multiculturalism.

On the other side is a vision of federalism, greater devolution of power, more autonomy, confederal arrangements, self-determination and even, potentially, secession. There are also middle positions between the two extremes with overlapping visions, based on maintaining the current constitution, with some tweaks. Ethiopia’s current system of multinational federalism still partially addresses the country’s historical problems, although it is also responsible for spawning new local conflicts.

By appointing new regional state presidents and councils, the prime minister’s office is replacing federalism with centralization. Supporters of Abiy back these actions as part of the transition to democracy and the preservation of the state, seemingly even at the cost of political instability, military confrontation, and the death of civilians. Choreographed narratives of national unity undermine the need for the constitutionally guaranteed governance of diversity. Political leaders of the most critical opposition to Abiy are in jail. Ethiopia has shut down independent and critical local media outlets, increased censorship and state propaganda, and reduced academic freedom. As a consequence, the Ethiopian state is in a precarious situation. The recent announcement of the election calendar only makes the state more fragile.

Yohannes: Reforms by Abiy’s administration were initially fast paced, although this has since slowed. But many key promises were fulfilled. In the first year of reforms, prisoners were released, the media revived, and exiled opposition returned to the country. A reformed ruling party has been established, which created inclusive politics by better involving regional political parties than previously. True, there have been serious peace and security challenges: repeated violence in Benishangul-Gumuz, Guji, and Wollega. Sadly, internal displacement and massacres on the basis of identity are now common. The government lost patience and even arrested some opposition leaders. However, the government continued to enact security sector reforms, long-term economic plans and other meaningful development programs, including environmental initiatives such as the Green Legacy Initiative.

Ethno-nationalist political narratives have increased ethnic polarization, inter-communal intolerance and violence, and are antagonistic to Abiy’s hope for unity. Such narratives that pit one group against another were exploited by some of Abiy’s opposition. Now that a date for a vote has been set, the 2021 elections will be another major test for Ethiopia’s future.

Given Ethiopia’s many challenges, is there a place for a national dialogue process?

Mehari: There is no military solution to a war of visions. Any government that fails to recognize the precedence of politics over military action risks facing protracted armed resistance and insurrection.

The Ethiopian government rejected calls for dialogue during the constitutional crisis in Ethiopia, when it became clear that elections would not be held on schedule and that the constitutional term of office of the government would soon expire. The government rejected dialogue to resolve the conflict with the Tigray region. Now, the solution lies in building bridges between communities and narrowing the gulf between the different political visions. Since existing institutions like the reconciliation commission are distrusted, a new process is required. A national dialogue is the best option of all, although it will not necessarily resolve all the problems Ethiopia faces.

Yohannes: Yes, there is always a place for national dialogue, as long as there is genuine commitment. Past Ethiopian regimes, including the one led by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) before 2018, downplayed the need for such dialogue by saying that the timing was not right, and that Ethiopia faced too many challenges at that moment. The Abiy government is the first in Ethiopian history to have established a reconciliation commission to study and recommend solutions. As with his other initiatives, however, some of Abiy’s opponents undermined the idea of this commission. However, I have hope that this is a good place from which dialogue can start, if people agree that reconciliation is also about looking forward rather than just arguing about the past. It is time to talk about the common challenges that every Ethiopian faces, not only concentrate on particular, group-based grievances.

Emebet: Initiatives that foster national dialogue are needed more than ever in Ethiopia. Existing civil society initiatives should not be overlooked. One such initiative is the Multi-stakeholder Initiative for National Dialogue (MIND), a coalition of Yehasab Me’ad (Plate of Ideas), Destiny Ethiopia and the Political Parties’ Joint Council, endorsed and supported by the Ministry of Peace. MIND intends to bring “contentious issues to the table and discuss them one by one to create a common understanding step by step.” Led by civil society, MIND aims to build confidence in the concept of dialogue among participants. An inclusive national dialogue could help MIND strengthen its attempts to resolve challenges to peace and security.

How could a successful national dialogue process for Ethiopia be designed?

Yohannes: Work could start with the reconciliation commission, which could educate the public about the dimensions of reconciliation and what the commission aims to achieve. Some critical differences among groups and parties must be examined, and a task force that involves all stakeholders organized to debate and reach at least partial consensus. The goal should be to arrive at a common national agenda.

Emebet: For a national dialogue to succeed, five aspects must be considered:

  • Credibility of the conveners: Public trust in who convenes a national dialogue is especially critical in a deeply polarized society like Ethiopia. The whole process depends on the integrity, impartiality, and public perception of the convener(s).
  • Inclusivity: If critical participants are excluded from the process, the credibility and legitimacy of the process will be reduced. Inclusion is an ongoing process, and broad-based consultations are necessary if people are to feel they are represented in both the process and the outcomes of the dialogue. A commitment to inclusivity requires both formal (track 1) and informal (track 2) efforts. It also requires being gender and conflict sensitive.
  • Institutional linkages: Dialogue does not occur in a vacuum. Thinking how the process involves, for example, regional governments and processes, such as the elections and the reconciliation commission, will strengthen the coherence of the effort. Critically, it is unlikely that dialogue can be sustained if past grievances and serious human rights violations are ignored, so links to the institutions responsible for these processes is also needed.
  • How dialogue outcomes will be implemented: A dialogue process will not in itself solve the problems of the country. Effective implementation of the dialogue’s outcomes is needed, including of any recommendations to amend policy and legislation as well as on accountability and reconciliation. The high expectations of the process must be managed.
  • Mobilizing resources: Significant technical and financial resources are needed to involve large number of participants and multiple consultations.

Mehari: Dialogue design must be a guided by the goals of the process. Further, the process must account for realities on the ground, in particular, the war in Tigray and conflicts elsewhere in Ethiopia, the detentions and stifling of critical voices in the political opposition, political prisoners, and recent atrocities, assassinations, and displacement.

There should be a pre-dialogue to consult stakeholders and to solicit views on the central issues to be addressed. These consultations should also inform the dialogue’s design. The design of the dialogue needs to consider structure and rules; the core agenda; criteria for determining the participants, who may include, but not be limited to, political parties and armed groups; seating arrangements; and a realistic timeline, all outlined in an implementation roadmap. A sound communications strategy is vital to build and maintain trust, publicize progress, address dis- and misinformation and where necessary, change behavior.

Ultimately, Ethiopian ownership of the process, participants’ political will, and determination to ensure implementation will be intrinsic to the success of any dialogue process.

 

Emebet Getachew is country program manager at the Life & Peace Institute in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Mehari Taddele Maru is a professor at the European University Institute in Florence, Italy. Yohannes Gedamu is a lecturer in political science at Georgia Gwinnett College in Lawrenceville, Georgia.

The views expressed by the authors are their own.

Ethiopia’s worsening crisis threatens regional, Mideast security

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Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed (C-L) meets with members of Sudan’s ruling military council after his arrival at Khartoum International Airport, Sudan, June 7, 2019. Photo by Ashraf Shazly/AFP via Getty Images.

Source: Al-Monitor | Payton Knopf and Jeffrey Feltman

With the Horn of Africa increasingly becoming an integral part of the Middle East’s security landscape, the fallout from Ethiopia’s current crisis will have a significant impact on states of the region.

The Gulf Arabs recognize a strategic reality that has eluded the stove-piped US foreign and security policy bureaucracy for too long: The Horn of Africa is an integral part of the Middle East’s security landscape, and increasingly so. No country demonstrates this more clearly than Ethiopia. That country’s escalating internal crises pose an increasingly grave threat not only to the country’s citizens but to international peace and security and to the interests of the United States and its partners in the Middle East, principally Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

As a recent bipartisan study group convened by the US Institute of Peace (USIP) concluded, developments in the Horn of Africa are not only shaped by the states of the Middle East “but also have a direct impact on [these states’] political, economic, and security environments.” Ethiopia’s internal and external borders are being changed violently, and the centrifugal forces of nationalism that now dominate Ethiopian politics are indicative of the weakness of the central state, not the strength of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed or the federal government. These intrastate fissures are undermining the country’s territorial integrity and morphing into interstate conflicts involving, to date, Eritrea and Sudan.

The armed confrontation that erupted Nov. 3 between the federal government and the regional government in Tigray state precipitated what Abiy characterized as a “domestic law enforcement operation.” The involvement of Eritrean combat forces, however, as well as the federal government’s use of airstrikes, mechanized ground units and ethnic militias undermines the credibility of that characterization. Similarly, assertions that the operation has succeeded in stabilizing Tigray is belied by the persistent violence in the region; a worsening humanitarian emergency; the government’s unwillingness to allow adequate access for a humanitarian response; and reports of severe human rights abuses, including of Eritrean refugees in Tigray being killed or forcibly returned to Eritrea.

The war in Tigray is symptomatic of a national political crisis in Ethiopia, which preceded Nov. 3 but has been exacerbated by the nationalist rivalries that have been unleashed since then. Much of western Tigray may now be occupied by Amhara regional state forces, and a border war has erupted between Amhara militias and the Sudanese military. Ethnically motivated killings of Amhara, Oromo and others in Benishangul-Gumuz regional state have precipitated the intervention of Amhara security forces, an unprecedented military deployment by one of Ethiopia’s states into another. In addition, the federal government has been engaged in an intensifying campaign against insurgents in Oromia regional state for months. While each of these conflicts involve historic and complex claims over territory, resources, identity and political representation, the pursuit of those claims by force of arms has set the country on a trajectory toward fragmentation.

The fallout for the states of the Middle East is significant

First, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have both made considerable political and economic investments in the leadership in Addis Ababa, Cairo and Khartoum, investments that will be undermined by bourgeoning conflict among the three. Egyptian-Ethiopian relations have long been strained by the dispute over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), and Ethiopian-Sudanese relations have become increasingly toxic due not only to the GERD but to the border conflict. The recent spike in violence in Benishangul-Gumuz, where the dam is located, could also pose a threat to the control and function of the dam itself. The Nile is an emotive and sensitive issue in Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan, and the crisis facing Abiy’s government makes any realistic compromise even more difficult.

Second, Ethiopia’s fragmentation could portend displacement on a scale not seen in modern times. In 2018-19, approximately 300,000 people — the vast majority of whom were Ethiopian and Eritrean — fled the Horn of Africa for Yemen, in spite of that country’s civil war. As the USIP senior study group report warned, the breakdown of Ethiopia — a country of over 110 million people — would “result in a refugee crisis that could easily dwarf that figure.” Over 56,000 refugees have already fled from Tigray into Sudan since November. Large-scale refugee outflows could destabilize Sudan’s delicate transition, and the consequences of state collapse in Ethiopia would also certainly extend across the Red Sea.

Third, calls for the secession of one or more of Ethiopia’s states are gaining steam, which would put additional strain on the already fraying state system in the Middle East, wracked as it is by the ongoing wars in Libya, Syria and Yemen. Somewhat unique among world regions, the Horn of Africa has several recent experiences with secession — Eritrea from Ethiopia in 1993, South Sudan from Sudan in 2011 and the self-declared independence of Somaliland from Somalia in 2001. The prospects and ramifications of further changes to the regional order should not be underestimated.

Fourth, the risk of radicalization is real should extremist groups exploit the political and security crises inside Ethiopia, particularly if Abiy and his supporters continue to reject dialogue as a means of channeling political grievance. For example, al-Shabab, the Islamic State or al-Qaeda could play for advantage inside Ethiopia’s Somali region or among disaffected and disenfranchised Muslim communities in Oromia and elsewhere.

Brute force is no more likely to be successful in Ethiopia than it has been in Syria in preserving the integrity of the state or in mitigating threats to its neighbors or to the states of the Middle East. Nor can elections that Abiy has announced for June be credible, free or fair in the current political and security climate and therefore able to reconcile the competing visions for the country’s future. The political transitions that have unfolded in Ethiopia and Sudan in the last two years in fact illustrate that the restive and youthful body politics of the Horn of Africa are too diverse, pluralistic and eager for political change for authoritarian repression to result in stability.

Ethiopia’s recent history provides a sobering precedent.  In 2015-16, large-scale protests against Ethiopia’s federal government, which was then dominated by Tigray’s ruling party, was met by a military crackdown that both failed to quell the unrest and led to expanding violence. The widening political and security catastrophe only abated with the resignation of former Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn, the promise of a new political dispensation heralded by Abiy’s accession to the premiership and his articulation of a reform agenda that included a loosening of restrictions on civic space and the prospect of a more inclusive political discourse.

Similarly, when a junta deposed Omar al-Bashir following months of nationwide protests in Sudan, there were those within the security services and among their supporters abroad who argued that stability could be achieved through military rule. This proved elusive, however, amid the massacre of protesters at a sit-in in Khartoum and continued mass demonstrations demanding civilian rule. Following talks between the junta and the umbrella group representing the protesters, an agreement was reached to form a transitional government based on a cohabitation arrangement between a civilian-led Cabinet and a council chaired by the military until elections in 2022 — an agreement due, in part, to diplomatic coordination between the United States and the Gulf. While fragile, this negotiated arrangement has so far averted fears of a slide into civil war akin to that of Libya, and Sudan is now a more responsible member of the international community than it has been at any time in the last three decades.

The Gulf states’ policies toward the Horn of Africa are undoubtedly rooted in their own strategic and political calculations. They understand that the two sides of the Red Sea comprise an integrated region that transcends the geographic distinctions between Africa and the Middle East. The close bilateral relationships that Saudi Arabia and the UAE have cultivated with Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia, alongside Abu Dhabi’s historic ties with Asmara, can be strong assets in stabilizing the Horn of Africa in the long term. The long-awaited reconciliation among the Gulf Cooperation Council countries could also alleviate competitive pressures in Somalia, where Qatar has supported the federal government and the UAE has backed the federal member states.

US-Gulf coordination is needed most urgently, however, in the case of Ethiopia. The Gulf states’ explicit or implicit support for Abiy’s shortsighted approach or for Eritrean military intervention not only risks implicating the Gulf in the humanitarian emergency in Tigray but damaging their own strategic interests as the Ethiopian state deteriorates. While Abiy and the federal government continue to prejudice military action over dialogue — not just with Tigrayan leaders but across the political spectrum — there is an urgent need for a process that provides an opportunity to build a new national consensus in Ethiopia, including an understanding of the electoral calendar. The United States and its Gulf partners must cooperate in promoting and supporting such an effort.

The Unfolding Conflict in Ethiopia

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Testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights and International OrganizationsCongressional Testimony | BY: Susan Stigant | Thursday, December 3, 2020

Susan Stigant, director of Africa Programs at the U.S. Institute of Peace, testified on December 3, 2020 at the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights and International Organization’s hearing on “The Unfolding Conflict in Ethiopia.” Her expert testimony as prepared is presented below.

Chairwoman Bass, Ranking Member Smith and members of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights and International Organizations, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the unfolding situation in Ethiopia. The timing for this hearing is critically important given the serious deterioration in the country’s internal peace and stability, the risks that recent developments pose to regional and international peace and security, and the potential dangers of both to U.S. interests. If Ethiopia spirals down into further violence and fragmentation, the entire region will be severely impacted.

I am the director of Africa Programs at the United States Institute of Peace, although the views expressed here are my own. The U.S. Institute of Peace was established by Congress over 35 years ago as an independent, nonpartisan national institute to prevent and resolve violent conflicts abroad, in accordance with U.S. national interests and values. The Institute’s Africa Center leads the engagement in sub-Saharan Africa and deepens, elevates, and expands the Institute’s commitment to stem violent conflict in a region vital to American interests and that have global impacts.

Overview

A military confrontation between the federal government of Ethiopia and the regional state of Tigray, in the country’s north, began November 4 and quickly escalated. The ruling party of Tigray, the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), which once led the ruling party coalition that preceded the Abiy government, claims that it launched a pre-emptive attack on the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) Northern Command. The federal government responded with an operation to regain control of the regional state and apprehend the TPLF leadership, which now stands accused of acts of treason. More than 40,000 refugees have fled into eastern Sudan. There is little information about the death toll or internal displacement, but initial reports suggest heavy casualties and human suffering.

The conflict between the TPLF and the federal government was not unexpected, nor did it occur in a vacuum. Political transitions rarely move forward with consistent, one-directional progress. It is normal that there will be resistance to reforms, both from those who previously held power and those who see a path towards power under a new dispensation. It is normal that there will be fundamental debates about the nature and shape of the state. It is normal that the legacy of a system based on exclusion and repression over decades requires sustained, generational efforts to forge justice, genuine inclusion, and agreement on how communities can share a common future.

Amidst escalating tensions and failed efforts of dialogue, it is also unsurprising that both parties would view the exercise of force as the logical, effective, and even a necessary decision in the short-term. However, all of our best thinking, practice and knowledge underlines that violence does not work in the medium to long-term. This knowledge has forged consensus about the imperative of prevention in U.S. policies and assistance, and this approach needs to be at the center of U.S. policy and partnerships with Ethiopia. We know that violence is costly – in unquantifiable human consequences, economic losses, investments in humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping interventions, risks of radicalization, and opportunities lost. For Ethiopia, this is not an abstract, theoretical practice. It is grounded in the country’s own history and the people’s lived experience. These reverberations resulting from the violence have provoked core questions about the trajectory of the transition and should provoke a fundamental re-assessment of U.S. policy.

Complex Roots of the Crisis

Disagreement over the postponement of the anticipated August 2020 elections set the stage for the crisis. The National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) determined in March 2020 that voter registration and other critical steps could not be completed due to the COVID-19 pandemic. That decision had broad support from political forces in Ethiopia. The decision by the House of Federation to extend the mandate of the prime minister and the parliament did not enjoy political consensus. When the Tigray region decided to proceed with organizing the state-level elections in defiance of the federal government and without the engagement of the NEBE, another step was taken towards November’s violence.

The story is, of course, more complicated than postponed elections or COVID-19. The tensions between the federal government and the TPLF reflect broader, unresolved debates about Ethiopia’s transition and federal arrangements. Past mechanisms for political dialogue were no longer fit for this purpose amidst rapid political reforms, and parties with diverging views or resistant to the reforms either opted out of or were not included in new forums. The federal government has detailed more than a dozen efforts to engage the TPLF through dialogue; however, none of these overcame fundamental obstacles. The tensions are also anchored in unaddressed reports, documentation and legacy of corruption, human rights abuses and state repression under the TPLF’s leadership in the previous regime, along with allegations that the TPLF has been fomenting some of the disorder, violence and chaos during the transition period.

Solely focusing on what is going on today in Tigray risks obscuring broader concerns about violence, democratic backsliding, and repression elsewhere in the country. Even before the Tigray crisis, the International Organization on Migration recorded that more than 1.8 million people had been displaced in 2020. By July, Amnesty International had reported that at least 15,000 people had been arbitrarily arrested and detained as part of the government’s crackdown on armed attacks, violence and following protests in Oromia. In the weeks leading up to the crisis, the federal government reorganized security institutions, including the ENDF, and several prominent political figures and journalists were jailed.

As a horrific example of the type of violence in Ethiopia that has become all too common, on November 1, ethnically targeted killings left at least 54 people dead in a schoolyard in the Wollega zone of Oromia state. Throughout western Ethiopia, communal violence has only increased since 2018. An attack on a bus in Benishangul-Gumuz in western Ethiopia left at least 34 people dead on November 14 and marked the latest in an unrelenting pace of violence. In southern Ethiopia, tensions remain high, as the consequences of the model of ethnic federalism continue to unfold.

The Ethiopian transition is taking place against the backdrop of a fundamental geopolitical shift in the Horn of Africa and stretching across the Red Sea, as outlined in a recent report by the Senior Study Group on Peace and Security in the Red Sea Arena convened by the U.S. Institute of Peace. In the last five years, the geopolitical landscape of the Red Sea arena has been fundamentally reshaped. The Horn of Africa is now an integral part of and in fact the link among the security systems of the Middle East, the Indo-Pacific, and the Mediterranean. Middle Eastern states are asserting themselves in the Horn of Africa in ways unprecedented in at least a century, and the Red Sea arena is becoming increasingly militarized. The export of Middle Eastern rivalries into the Horn of Africa—with the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, and Egypt contesting Turkey and Qatar for dominance—risks fueling instability and insecurity in an already fragile, volatile, and conflict-prone region.

Cost of Violence

The federal government announced on November 28 that it had completed military operations and would turn its attention to “rebuilding what has been destroyed, repairing what has been damaged and returning those who have fled.” For its part, the TPLF withdrew from Mekelle and vowed to “fight…to the last” asserting that “this is about defending our right to self-determination.” Given the TPLF’s experience in waging an insurgency from the mountains of Tigray, it is too easy to breathe a sigh of relief and move onto a “post-conflict” phase. Indeed, silencing the guns – on all sides — needs to remain the priority in the short term to avoid the intolerable costs of war.

Amidst a communications blackout and lack of independent reporting, it is difficult to ascertain the full human and humanitarian impact of this conflict. More than 40,000 refugees fled Ethiopia into eastern Sudan. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees has requested $147 million to support the initial response. Access to nearly one million Eritrean refugees living in Tigray has been blocked over the course of the conflict, and it appears that large numbers of Ethiopians have been displaced internally and will require additional humanitarian support. This comes at a critical point in the harvest season and could have a ripple effect on food security for the months ahead, already exacerbated by the locust plague. In late November, the International Committee for the Red Cross reported that local hospitals and health facilities in Mekelle were running “dangerously low on medical supplies to care for the wounded as well as other mounting medical needs and conditions.”

The targeting of individuals or groups on the basis of ethnicity comes at a great cost. Amnesty International and the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission have investigated and documented horrific violence in Mai Kadra in Tigray. Independent investigations are needed to document the experience of those who fled the country and violence. Early indications suggest that the patterns of violence are widespread and complex. Reports of targeting of ethnic Tigrayans through restrictions on travel and removal from civil service and military posts have raised alarm bells with the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission. An escalating narrative of dangerous speech and division risks continued cycles of violence and deep damage to the fabric of Ethiopian society.

Even prior to the fighting, the International Monetary Fund forecast a growth rate of 0% for 2021, down from 9% GDP growth in 2019. Under immense pressure from the COVID-19 pandemic, the economy will depend on expanding foreign direct investment and advancing discussions about debt relief. Ongoing violence will almost certainly distract from the economic imperatives that underpin the political transition. The violence also risks curtailing private sector investment and may lead international partners to call into question large-scale partnerships with the World Bank or other institutions.

Ethiopia has and continues to play a central regional leadership role: a founding member of the United Nations and African Union, a leading contributor to peacekeeping, and the seat of the continental body for peace and security. Narratives – some false – about the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces from Somalia are already fueling uncertainty in the lead up to Somalia’s elections and at a moment when the U.S. Administration has indicated that it will draw down its military engagement there. The flow of refugees into eastern Sudan adds stress to a fragile transition and region. The resort to violence by all parties without activation of the African Union’s own architecture missed an opportunity to exercise and underline the hard-won norms of peace and security. This may very well ripple into future conflicts. Attacks on the Eritrean capital by the TPLF and the allegations of reorganization of Ethiopian troops in Eritrea and even Eritrean troop involvement point to a regionalization of the conflict.

U.S. Policy Priorities to Advance Prevention in a Complex Transition and Interconnected Red Sea Arena

Ethiopia stands at an inflection point, and U.S. policy needs to be recalibrated to reflect that reality. The resistance to or disagreement with reforms by the TPLF and other parts of the political, social, and economic establishment is to be expected. Indeed, resistance and debate are fundamental features of democratic transitions. The challenge before the Ethiopian leadership is to develop a strategic approach to address that resistance without falling into the trap of continued cycles of violence. For the United States government, centering policy around the tenets of prevention, political inclusion and legitimacy enshrined in the Global Fragility Act as well as anchoring Ethiopia in the broader Horn of Africa and Red Sea Arena provide the best foundation to support the aspirations of the Ethiopian people for their transition.

Despite the escalation, I believe that there is a shared desire – by the federal government, the TPLF, the political opposition, the African Union and U.S. partners in the EU and beyond – to avoid the horrible costs of violence and support the possibility that a democratic, peaceful Ethiopia offers. Based on this, I would like to offer recommendations in three policy areas for the U.S. Administration and the continued leadership from this Committee:

  • Do everything possible to prevent cycles of violence and mitigate the human consequences of the conflict.
  • Consistent, senior-level messaging. The U.S. Administration and Congress need to continue to send consistent private and public messages about the need to prevent the spread and to de-escalate violence, actively discourage outside military engagement and fervently pursue a political solution. The U.S. can underscore the long-term costs that the conflict will have on Ethiopia’s economy and international image. The U.S. can signal and galvanize broader coordinated support – diplomatic and perhaps technical or financial – for the African Union’s leadership to silence and keep silent the guns.
  • Humanitarian response: Current efforts to secure unhindered humanitarian access to Tigray need to be sustained and operationalized with a clear-eye towards the evolving conflict dynamics and a conflict sensitive approach. Funds and resources to respond to the growing numbers of refugees in eastern Sudan need to be mobilized, as does contingency planning for the possibility of additional conflict-induced displacement in the coming weeks and months. Funding and resources are also needed to respond to the ongoing and unmet humanitarian needs resulting from the internal displacement even prior to the Tigray crisis.
  • Joint, independent investigations and mechanisms: Allegations of incidents that could amount to war crimes have been reported by all parties. Investigation and documentation are needed to deter further violations, mitigate the risks of escalating rhetoric, and to provide a path towards justice and accountability. Preliminary reporting by Amnesty International and the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission need to be bolstered by investigations in other areas where fighting occurred and with those who fled into eastern Sudan. Amidst the deep polarization, competing narratives and potentially complex jurisdictional issues, a joint independent investigation with the UN High Commission for Human Rights or the African Union could bolster the credibility of the EHRC’s reporting and independence. The U.S. Administration and Congress can actively request and provide funding for such investigations.
  • Safeguard the space for inclusive conversations about the transition. In the wake of the crisis between the federal government and the TPLF, there is an even greater urgency to safeguard space for inclusive conversation about the transition process. Difficult conversations will be needed about the redeployment of militias from Tigray and the ways that the military operation has shifted the relationship between Addis Ababa and the regional states. Conducting credible elections will depend on fostering security, trust, and reconciliation. Ethiopians will need to feel confident engaging in political debate and campaigning. And, eventually, agreeing on changes to the federal structure will require a sensitive set of discussions and negotiations. Setting a precedent that such changes will be done through discussion, and not be imposed, will be critical.

With the escalation of conflict, calls for dialogue have been deeply polarizing and civic space has closed. The federal government has expressed its concern that dialogue or negotiations with the TPLF would accord equivalence, promote impunity, and impose an unworkable power sharing arrangement. However, the need for dialogue extends beyond the Tigray crisis. Detention of journalists, political opposition leaders, and civic activists who have voiced dissent with the reform process fuel concerns that the country is sliding back into closed, authoritarian tendencies. As a November 5 statement by USIP’s Senior Study Group on Peace and Security in the Red Sea Arena warned that neither an inclusive political dialogue nor free and fair elections can “be possible while many of the country’s most prominent political leaders remain in prison.”

Structures and mechanisms for inclusive conversations are needed to safeguard the democratic transition. Ethiopians need to discuss and agree what formats are needed and ways to include those who agree and, more importantly, those who disagree. In other transitions, local and regional dialogue, peace committees and interparty advisory councils have helped to defuse tensions. Civic group have forged coalitions to mobilize peaceful support for a reform agenda and bridge resistance by former and aspiring elites. The African Union envoys and the broader African Peace and Security Architecture can and should be called upon to support these dialogues.

The U.S. government needs to underline in public and private messaging the support for freedom of expression, space for independent journalism, and the need to expand conversations to those who have diverging views. The U.S. government can also express its strong interest in preventing violence through the activation of multiple, reinforcing mechanisms for inclusive conversations. Existing assistance programs in support of the transition and democratic development can be activated to support conversations about what inclusion means and ways that confidence can be built towards dialogue.

  • Engage Ethiopia in the context of a new political and diplomatic strategy for the Red Sea Arena. Between May 2019 and September 2020, USIP convened a bipartisan senior study group to consider the factors that have reshaped the Red Sea arena. The Study Group determined that, in recent years, the geopolitical and geo-economic dynamics of the Horn of Africa have become tied to the Middle East and broader Indian Ocean in a manner unprecedented in the last century. However, U.S. strategy in this evolving environment has struggled to keep pace with these interconnected, complex, and transregional dynamics and to account for the region’s increased relevance to U.S. interests. Three pillars of this new strategic approach need to be brought to bear in supporting the transition in Ethiopia and responding effectively to the current crisis:
  • Overcome the bureaucratic seams between the Africa and Near East bureaus within the U.S. government by designating a special envoy with responsibility for the Red Sea arena or designating the deputy secretary of state as the interagency lead for developing and executing an integrated strategy on the Red Sea arena. The special envoy or deputy secretary should ensure consistent, effective engagement with Gulf countries who have a stake and role in Ethiopia. A standing interagency policy committee (IPC) on the Red Sea arena, co-chaired by the National Security Council senior directors for Africa and the Middle East, can serve to coordinate overall policy approaches and priorities.
  • Realign U.S. assistance to promote inclusive, legitimate governance and economic growth by designating the Horn of Africa as a priority region under the Global Fragility Act, requiring a five-year Integrated Regional Strategy for the Red Sea arena encompassing the State Department, Defense Department, Department of Commerce, and USAID, and establishing a G20 working group on debt relief for the Horn of Africa to catalyze a dialogue among Paris Club and non-Paris Club creditors.
  • Sustain active congressional engagement by strengthening coordination among the relevant congressional bodies on both a transregional (i.e., Africa and Middle East) and interdisciplinary (i.e., foreign affairs, armed services, appropriations) basis, establishing reporting requirements on the destabilizing actions by Middle Eastern states in the Horn of Africa, and encouraging bipartisan congressional champions to provide particular support to the transition in Ethiopia.

Let me conclude by elaborating on this last point in the specific context of Ethiopia. Congress provided clear guidance and leadership on the imperative of prevention through the adoption of the Global Fragility Act. This approach aligns with a broader consensus that a healthy state-society relationship, anchored in accountable, inclusive governance is the most consistent predictor of stability and peace. This all sounds rather theoretical in the abstract. But the crisis in Ethiopia highlights the very real human consequences, the implications for regional stability and the risks of violence and even extremism if we fail to support transitions in line with our own commitments and best practices.

While it is not for the United State to dictate to Ethiopia how to resolve fundamental questions of governance and its constitutional order, the United States does have an interest in ensuring the integrity and stability of the Ethiopia state, that the aspirations of Ethiopia’s citizens for democratic reforms are channeled into a political discourse not suppressed through violence, and that Ethiopia contributes to the stabilizing rather than further destabilizing the volatile Horn of Africa. The United States can and therefore should consider its bilateral relationship with Ethiopia in a manner that accounts for the events of the last month and brings to bear the benchmarks, tools, and approaches in the Global Fragility Act.

Congress can play a vital role in laying out the principles that could form the basis for the new bilateral relationship between the United States and Ethiopia that must by necessity emerge—a bilateral relationship that minimizes the likelihood of state fragmentation and the further internationalization of Ethiopia’s multiplying conflicts.

The views expressed in this testimony are those of the author and not the U.S. Institute of Peace.

This testmony was first published on USIP 

Statement on Ethiopia by the Senior Study Group on Peace and Security in the Red Sea Arena

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Source: USIP

As members of the bipartisan senior study group on peace and security in the Red Sea arena, we are watching with grave concern the situation in Ethiopia. While many of the facts remain unclear, the risks of escalation are certain: Intrastate or interstate conflict would be catastrophic for Ethiopia’s people and for the region and would pose a direct threat to international peace and security. The acceleration of polarization amid violent conflict would also mark the death knell for the country’s nascent reform effort that began two years ago and the promise of a democratic transition that it heralded.

As we cautioned in the study group’s Final Report and Recommendations released on October 29, the fragmentation of Ethiopia would be the largest state collapse in modern history. Ethiopia is five times the size of pre-war Syria by population, and its breakdown would lead to mass interethnic and interreligious conflict; a dangerous vulnerability to exploitation by extremists; an acceleration of illicit trafficking, including of arms; and a humanitarian and security crisis at the crossroads of Africa and the Middle East on a scale that would overshadow any existing conflict in the region, including Yemen. As Ethiopia is currently the leading Troop Contributing Country to the United Nations and the African Union peacekeeping missions in Sudan, South Sudan and Somalia, its collapse would also significantly impact the efforts by both to mitigate and resolve others conflicts in the Horn of Africa.

However severe the events of the last 48 hours and the preceding violence in multiple parts of the country may be, a wider war is not inevitable, nor is it too late to prevent one if Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy and Ethiopia’s federal states exercise responsible leadership. To do so, they must take immediate, visible steps to defuse the crisis and signal to the Ethiopian public a commitment to de-escalation. These steps should include a cessation of military operations and the launch of an inclusive political dialogue that is credible to the Ethiopian people and lays the groundwork for free and fair elections. Neither will be possible while many of the country’s most prominent political leaders remain in prison. In addition, the closing of political space and internet and communication blackouts must be reversed while intercommunal violence and the rise of incitement and hate speech are addressed.

At this crucial inflection point, the United States, its allies and partners in Europe and in the region, the members of the U.N. Security Council and the relevant multilateral organizations, including the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, must speak with one voice in promoting de-escalation on this basis. The United States should support initiatives by Ethiopian religious and civil society leaders to reach a peaceful resolution of the crisis. To reinforce these efforts, the United States, including Congress, should make clear that any change by force or fiat either to Ethiopia’s constitutional order or to its internal or external borders will not be recognized, in line with the African Union’s standards. The United States must also signal that it will hold accountable those responsible for escalation, including any foreign states that exacerbate tensions or provide material support to any of the parties to the conflict. And Ethiopian leaders should refrain from attempting to draw their neighbors into their domestic dispute. Finally, as recommended at length in our recent report, U.S. development and humanitarian assistance should be anchored in a commitment to promoting inclusive, legitimate governance.

Ambassador Johnnie Carson
Senior Advisor to the President, United States Institute of Peace
Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs

Ambassador Wendy Chamberlin
President Emeritus, Middle East Institute
Former Deputy U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
Former USAID Assistant Administrator for Asia-Near East

Ambassador Chester Crocker
James R. Schlesinger Professor of Strategic Studies, Georgetown University
Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs

Ambassador Eric Edelman
Roger Hertog Distinguished Practitioner-in-Residence, School for Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University
Former U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy
Former U.S. Ambassador to Turkey

Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman
Visiting Fellow, Brookings Institution
Senior Fellow, U.N. Foundation
Former U.N. Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs
Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs

Ambassador Michelle Gavin
Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations
Former Senior Director for Africa, U.S. National Security Council
Former U.S. Ambassador to Botswana

Nancy Lindborg
President and CEO, David and Lucile Packard Foundation
Former President, United States Institute of Peace
Former USAID Assistant Administrator for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance

Andrew Natsios
Executive Professor, Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University Former Administrator of USAID
Former Presidential Special Envoy for Sudan

General Joseph L. Votel
President and CEO, Business Executives for National Security
Former Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command and U.S. Central Comman

“America First” and Implications for US Strategy in the Horn of Africa

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Source: Small Wars | Richard McManamon

Abstract

Since taking office, President Trump has challenged the global order with his “America First” approach. He has questioned the role of the US and its Allies within NATO, exited the Paris Climate Accord, and entered into a trade battle with China. At the same time, the Trump administration has positioned both Russia and China as strategic rivals to the US and the new rise to great power competition. In the last decade, the US has witnessed aggressive actions by both countries in an effort to carve out new spheres of influence.

As the administration takes action to increase America’s competitive edge, President Trump’s foreign policies, specifically to the Horn of Africa, have been inconsistent resulting in a less strategic approach. It would appear as the US switches focus to great power competition, support to Africa decreases. This is not only a lost opportunity for the US to challenge China and Russia indirectly, but more importantly, allows these countries to exploit a gap and gain further influence throughout the region. The Horn of Africa continues to be a nexus for geopolitics and it’s critical that an America First approach does not undermine the US ability to maintain influence in the region.

The unprecedented election of Donald Trump in 2016 precipitated some substantial shifts in global order, especially regarding China and Russia. Russia demonstrated its ability to challenge existing borders and sovereignty by interventions in Ukraine and Georgia, while China has pushed its Belt and Road Initiative further across the globe. As both Russia and China continue such efforts to extend their global presence, it is perceived by some observers that these countries are creating new spheres of influence across the globe.

In thinking of spheres of influence, the Horn of Africa remains a strategic nexus for the US, Europe, and the Middle East due to its location and connection to trade. Following the region’s independence after World War II, many African states such as Somalia have struggled to build institutions that provide consistent essential services and overall security for their population.[1] The vulnerabilities facing the Horn are extensive and complicated, requiring a more comprehensive US strategy to better address the various threats. Compounding existing vulnerabilities, these threats are typically not confined to one state but affect the entire region. The systemic nature of these vulnerabilities is evidenced by repeated instances where one country’s crisis spreads across borders and into neighboring states.

Since 2017 in terms of foreign and security policy, the Trump administration placed a significant focus on the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and more recently, the Afghanistan peace talks while Africa has been under prioritized. Minimizing focus on Africa, especially the Horn of Africa, has the potential to present significant challenges for the US into the future. In this article, I argue that one of the prominent reasons for this low prioritization is President Trump’s “America First” approach to foreign policy. Additionally, the high turnover rate within the Trump administration among senior leaders has remained high and has likely caused significant disruptions in a comprehensive foreign strategy, specifically regarding Africa.

If the United States is to see another four years of the Trump administration, foreign policy changes must be enacted to secure US interests while strengthening the country’s allies, including in the region of the Horn of Africa. Additionally, a rise of great power competition will likely mean the Trump administration will continue to exercise the military as a principal tool in foreign policy. The implications of such action have the potential to undermine global order and push the US toward new conflicts.[2] Moreover, the significant ramifications for continuously expanding the military and using it as a primary tool for diplomacy are that the US ends up with a military-focused strategy that could result in another arms race with Russia. A comprehensive strategy that balances all the instruments of national power is essential to meet the challenges and objectives for the US and would better mitigate the consequences from a military-heavy foreign policy that focuses on the short term at the expense of long-term strategic gains. Trump’s emphasis on the military as the primary tool of foreign policy comes with inherent risks that may conflict with his intentions of reducing US forces abroad. These risks include potentially escalating already volatile conditions with countries such as North Korea and Iran.

America First

The Trump administration has positioned China and Russia as rivals that are challenging the US through political, military, and economic means.[3] In doing so, Trump has taken action to combat these perceived threats through executive orders, sanctions, and tariffs to increase America’s competitive edge. Additionally, the Trump administration renegotiated the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 2020, placed tariffs against China, exited the Paris Climate Accord in 2019, and left the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018.

Thus far, the Trump administration has taken broad action concerning long-standing agreements to make the US more competitive both domestically and internationally. Furthermore, Trump has publicly questioned the utility for the US regarding multilateralism.[4] Since taking office, President Trump has targeted NATO and challenged the organization’s policies and procedures. During his visit to Brussels in 2018, he stated that he believed European countries were taking advantage of US military resources and not paying their fair share.[5] This aggressive approach toward allies can draw significant media attention and other consequences, and I argue it damages the US’s reputation and its international relations in the long run. Additionally, Trump’s speeches at the UN projected an approach favoring nationalism over globalism,[6] which further underlines his America First platform for the United States going into the future. The implications of this approach highlight to the world that Trump is focusing his foreign policy in a way that quite literally puts the US “first”. The ramifications of a paradigm shift towards “America alone” and increasing isolationism are extremely dangerous, as globalization has connected countries and regions of the world like never before. Economies, markets, and industries are all interconnected in some form, and for a major actor such as the US to pursue a drastic foreign policy that excludes US partners may be detrimental to the country in the long-term.

In the short-term, the US has seen the effects of the trade war with China, which has caused significant swings in the stock markets.[7] Furthermore, the recent pandemic has raised questions on the source for many medications that are used by millions of Americans. An argument could be made for select drugs to be made in the US for national security reasons, but on a broader scale the issue of cost comes into play when contemplating drugs made only in the US. It is no secret that the US has one of the highest prices for prescription drugs, and it is possible that abandoning established supply chains with foreign countries could result in even higher costs for the average American.[8] Lastly, while President Trump has questioned the value of multilateralism, US strategy toward Africa has been inconsistent at times, placing the US at a disadvantage during the time of great power competition.

African Strategy

United States foreign security policy in Africa is at the time of writing guided by President Trump’s National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2017. The NSS references growing economies on the continent and vast partnership opportunities for the US and Africa as their markets and economies grow. The strategy, however, also mentions concerns about corruption and weak governance. Furthermore, the NSS explicitly highlights China’s growing presence within Africa and how select Chinese practices weaken the continent’s ability to build sustainable development.[9] Likewise, the NSS states, “China and Russia target their investments in the developing world to expand influence and gain competitive advantages against the United States.”[10]

Since the publication of the NSS in 2017, US foreign policy towards Africa has fallen short for multiple reasons. Firstly, the Trump administration has experienced significant turnover in crucial personnel over the past three years. Peter Schraeder highlights that in the first twenty months of the new administration, the President had three different National Security Advisors, and Robert O’Brien was appointed as the fourth advisor in September of 2019.[11] Moreover, this high turnover rate puts the US at a significant disadvantage by owing to a lack of continuity and to the varying goals of each advisor. Brookings reports that among members of Trump’s executive office, he has experienced an 86 percent turnover rate, and 38 percent of those positions have experienced two or more replacements.[12] Similarly, Schraeder describes how the sudden removal of Secretary of State Rex Tillerson sent a negative message to Africa, as the President replaced him immediately following a trip to numerous African states.[13] The dismissal of Tillerson signaled to African countries that the validity of their conversations with the Secretary of State was in question and future cooperation with the US remained uncertain. Secondly, the Trump administration has looked to shift priorities away from Africa as the administration focuses on increased power competition with China and Russia. Mary Beth Long, a former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, stated: “We’re not even clear from an intelligence standpoint on what the underpinnings of a strategy would attempt to address and in part that’s because we have inadequate resources dedicated to the African continent.”[14]

Thirdly, in early 2020, the Pentagon ordered a review of forces within Africa by Defense Secretary Esper to see if troops can be realigned to other mission priorities.[15] This review comes at a critical juncture as great power competition with Russia and China has increased while the security environment in the Horn of Africa has remained fragile. It’s important to the US that during the review, the Pentagon considers that the US can effectively challenge Russia and China within the Horn as part of their broader great power competition. Furthermore, reducing US assets in the region can allow China to exploit the minimal US presence and also presents opportunities for further instability across the region. Highlighting this tenuous environment, the US experienced its first attack by Al-Shabaab, which killed three Americans at an airfield in Manda Bay, Kenya, on January 5, 2020.[16] This attack stresses the fragile environment throughout the Horn and the need for targeted US support to safeguard US interests throughout the region.

In addition to the impeachment trial of President Trump and the upcoming 2020 elections, the White House has been dealing with an array of global issues including, but not limited, a trade war with China, negotiations with the Taliban in Afghanistan, and managing the global coronavirus pandemic. While these global issues are all a significant demand on the US resources, it would appear that Africa is falling lower on the US priority list. This should be a concern as it provides China and Russia the opportunity to expand and increase their overall influence in the region at the cost of the US. Moreover, the region’s populace continues to suffer from instability, violence from groups such as Al-Shabaab, and weak institutions that lack the ability to provide basic services.

US Future in Africa

US troop levels do not on their own determine presence and influence in Africa, and over the years the US has also become a meaningful trading partner to the continent, showing the role of economic engagement. However, today China has surpassed the US as Africa’s largest trading partner.[17] While President Trump has talked of increasing cooperation with Africa, his current foreign policy severely hinders its ability to do so. Trump’s administration launched a US initiative called “Prosper Africa” with the intent of growing partnerships between the US and Africa and empowering US private sector involvement in Africa.[18] Long-term collaboration and globalization have intertwined economies, and the US shares the same concerns many African states do regarding insecurity throughout the region. However, without a clear, consistent foreign policy and African strategy, the effectiveness of any initiative will be mired. As the US continues its role in the region, it must develop an effective approach that balances national competitiveness, securing national interests, and strengthening relations with African leaders across the region.

One example of an US initiative program is the International Development Finance Corporation (DFC). In 2019 the US government created the DFC, which forms a consolidated effort with the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and the US Agency for International Development (USAID). The DFC attempts to further US foreign policy and private sector competitiveness through multiple mediums, including equity financing, debt financing, political risk insurance, and technical development.[19] While the DFC operates worldwide, the level of involvement within the Horn of Africa is relatively limited compared to many other regions of the world except for Kenya. Somalia and Ethiopia make up only three projects consisting of nearly US $13 million, whereas Colombia has ten projects totaling over $1 billion and Sri Lanka has four projects totaling $19 million.[20] As the Trump administration places Russia and China as primary competitors on the world stage, not challenging them within the Horn of Africa is a severe US shortcoming. If the US is entering into another era of great power competition, the US must look to challenge China directly and indirectly in areas such as the Horn of Africa. To meet this challenge, the US needs to increase and diversify DFC efforts in the region while maximizing the partnerships and programs it has already developed. While US investment in the region is critical, the effective use of military and diplomatic powers will play an increasingly important role to the Horn, which can significantly aid in US influence and further strengthen US-Africa relations.

Great Power Competition in Africa

As the Trump administration looks to the future, the administration must develop a comprehensive strategy for the continent and especially the Horn of Africa. The geopolitics of the Horn cannot be understated, and the volume of foreign actors throughout the region highlights this importance. If the US pursues an America alone-type foreign policy, it risks alienating many African states that have developed relations with the US over decades. Furthermore, this isolation-like approach will push African leaders to other more developed nations like Russia and China, undermining the US efforts toward great power competition.

The next decade will likely play a decisive role throughout the region, as China strives to expand its Belt and Road Initiative further, and the US reevaluates its presence in Africa. If the US prioritizes great power competition as stated in the NSS, the US needs to challenge China and Russia indirectly in places such as the Horn of Africa. An effective strategy within the region allows for significant benefits in line with US national interests.

Although the current roles of China and Russia in the Horn of Africa may appear insignificant than other regions, it is critical given contemporary debates on security and global order, regional security, and challenges to political and economic US national interests. Furthermore, the US can challenge China and Russia as part of great-power competitions both directly and indirectly, for example through the US private sector taking a larger portion of African market share and increasing specific investment into the region. An effective strategy in the Horn of Africa must limit China’s and Russia’s expansion and increase US interests with an eye on long-term effects while building African capacity and security.

Endnotes

[1] J. J. Messner et al., Fragile States Index Annual Report 2019 (Washington, DC: The Fund for Peace, 2019), https://fragilestatesindex.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/9511904-fragilestatesindex.pdf.

[2] David Barno and Nora Bensahel, “Trump’s Next Task: Learning the Limits of Military Power,” War on the Rocks, May 2, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/05/trumps-next-task-learning-the-limits-of-military-power/.

[3] White House, National Security Strategy (Washington, D. C: White House, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.

[4] Demetri Sevastopulo and Peter Spiegel, “Donald Trump Questions US Role in NATO,” Financial Times, March 21, 2016, https://www.ft.com/content/2695854c-efaf-11e5-a609-e9f2438ee05b.

[5] Michael Birnbaum and Seung Min Kim, “Trump Calls Out NATO Members, Demands More Spending,” The Mercury News, July 11, 2018, last updated July 12, 2018, https://www.mercurynews.com/2018/07/11/trump-calls-out-nato-members-demands-more-spending/.

[6] Julian Borger, “Donald Trump Denounces ‘Globalism’ in Nationalist Address to UN,” The Guardian, September 24, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/sep/24/donald-trump-un-address-denounces-globalism.

[7] Reshma Kapadia, “There’s a Trade Deal with China. Here’s Why the Stock Market Isn’t Thrilled,” Barrons, December 13, 2019, https://www.barrons.com/articles/u-s-china-trade-deal-confusion-stocks-are-volatile-51576254365.

[8] Hannah Kuchler, “Why Prescription Drugs Cost so Much More in America.” Financial Times, September 18, 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/e92dbf94-d9a2-11e9-8f9b-77216ebe1f17.

[9] White House, National Security Strategy (Washington, D. C: White House, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.

[10] Ibid., 38.

[11] Peter J. Schraeder, “Making America Great Again’ Against the Backdrop of an ‘Africa Rising’? The Trump Administration and Africa’s Marginalization within US Foreign Policy,” Seton Hall Journal of Diplomacy & International Relations 20, no. 1 (Fall/Winter 2018), https://nduezproxy.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com.nduezproxy.idm.oclc.org/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip,url,uid&db=tsh&AN=136124986&site=eds-live&scope=site.

[12] Kathryn Dunn Tenpas, “Tracking Turnover in the Trump Administration,” Brookings, May 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/research/tracking-turnover-in-the-trump-administration/.

[13] Peter J. Schraeder, “Making America Great Again,”2018.

[14] Katie Williams, “From Small Wars to Great Power, Trump’s Africa Reset could Change US Military’s Role,” Defense One, December 12, 2018, https://www.defenseone.com/politics/2018/12/small-wars-great-power-trumps-africa-reset-could-change-us-militarys-role/153485/.

[15] Lara Seligman and Robbie Gramer, “Pentagon Debates Drawdown in Africa, South America,” Foreign Policy, January 30, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/30/pentagon-troop-drawdown-africa-south-america-sahel-capitol-hill-congress-trump/.

[16] Wynne Davis, “3 Americans Killed in Attack on Kenyan Airfield by Al-Shabab Militants,” NPR.com, January 5, 2020, https://www.npr.org/2020/01/05/793752674/airfield-used-by-u-s-forces-in-kenya-comes-under-attack-by-al-shabab-militants.

[17] Lauren Blanchard and Sarah Collins, China’s Engagement in Djibouti, CRS Report No. IF11304 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF11304.pdf.

[18] International Trade Administration, “Prosper Africa,” US Department of Commerce, accessed January 14, 2020, https://www.trade.gov/prosper-africa.

[19] DFC.gov, “US International Development Finance Corporation,” DFC.gov, https://www.dfc.gov/who-we-are.

[20] U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, “Active DFC Projects-Map View,” DFC.gov, project date as of December 31, 2019, https://www3.opic.gov/ActiveProjectsMap/Default.aspx#

What Ethiopia’s Brewing Conflict Means for the Country—and the Region

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Source: Small Wars | Aly Verjee and Susan Stigant | USIP Publication

A protracted conflict between the federal government and the Tigray region is still not inevitable, but it will require both sides to choose another path.

Violent conflict between the federal government of Ethiopia and the federal state of Tigray, in the country’s north, began November 4 and quickly escalated. USIP’s Aly Verjee and Susan Stigant discuss the crisis and identify what could be done to avoid further violent conflict in east Africa’s most populous country.

Unfortunately, violence is not new to Ethiopia; already, there are over 1.4 million conflict-affected internally displaced persons in the country. What is the broader significance of this latest violence between the federal government and the Tigray region?

Stigant: The rapidity of the escalation of violence between Tigray and Addis Ababa is concerning in itself, given the stakes for Ethiopia’s peace and stability. This conflict has the potential to quickly become more polarized and increase violence throughout Ethiopian society. Already, the Tigray region has called for the full mobilization of all citizens to fight. The federal government, led by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, has also used uncompromising language to justify his government’s actions. As the allegations and incidents mount—including possible war crimes—and the number of people affected increases, it will become much harder to find a peaceful solution.

At the same time, solely focusing on what is going on today in Tigray risks obscuring broader concerns about violence, democratic backsliding, and repression elsewhere in the country. As a horrific example of the type of violence in Ethiopia that has become all too common, on November 1, ethnically targeted killings left at least 54 people dead in a schoolyard in the Wollega zone of Oromia state. Throughout western Ethiopia, communal violence has only increased since 2018. In southern Ethiopia, tensions remain high, as the consequences of the model of ethnic federalism continue to unfold.

Verjee: As I warned in April 2019, tensions between the regions have the potential to overwhelm the political management capacity of the center. The conflict in Tigray has already pulled in forces from the neighboring Amhara Regional State to fight the Tigrayans. The leadership of the Somali Regional State has also taken the side of the federal government in the dispute. In the broader context, it does not really matter who is responsible for starting the violence; all Ethiopians, no matter their ethnicity, have to find a way to live side-by-side, which will not be accomplished by jailing or killing the political and military elite of Tigray. The ruling party of Tigray, the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), which once led the ruling party coalition that preceded the Abiy government, are no angels. But for the federal government to risk throwing the whole country into a protracted civil conflict—with significant cross-border consequences—is also highly unfortunate.

Already, a humanitarian crisis is in the making. More than 11,000 refugees have already crossed the border with Sudan, with thousands more almost certain to follow. Drawing in Eritrea and Sudan into the conflict may easily bring in other regional and extra-regional powers, leaving the Horn of Africa in a complicated, messy crisis from which it may take many years to recover, at a cost of thousands of lives. As the USIP Red Sea Senior Study Group recently warned, “Intrastate or interstate conflict would be catastrophic for Ethiopia’s people and for the region and would pose a direct threat to international peace and security.”

The dispute between Tigray and the federal government has been festering for some time. Could violence be avoided?

Stigant: The federal government has characterized its action as a rule of law operation to uphold the constitution, and that it would act with “utmost care for the overall wellbeing, safety and security of our citizens.” The federal government has described the September 2020 elections held by the Tigray region as illegitimate and has objected to equating the federal government to the TPLF. While there are more than two sides to every story, there is little doubt that relations were strained with Tigray. That said, the paramount constitutional right of any citizen is the right to life. Before resorting to military action and the attendant deaths of Ethiopian citizens, every other possibility needed to be exhausted, even if the Tigray authorities were being uncooperative. More pragmatically, the use of force rarely works to sustain a political settlement, as the history of Ethiopia has shown on numerous occasions.

As the cornerstone of his rule, Prime Minister Abiy set out a philosophy of medemer, or coming together, to overcome the divisions of the past. Less than a year ago, in accepting the Nobel Peace Prize, Abiy mentioned the word love seven times, and the words forgiveness and reconciliation four times each. Ethiopia does not need Abiy to love Tigray, nor vice versa; but forgiveness and reconciliation cannot occur if belligerent parties do not show restraint.

Verjee: The federal government has already suspended fiscal transfers to Tigray and cut off communications and cross-border trade. Even if the allegation that the TPLF posed an imminent threat by its purported seizure of weapons and a military base is entirely accurate, a proportionate, limited response was the most that could be justified. Although the federal government has said that its operations will be time limited, Abiy has also said that he will not rest until the “the criminal junta is disarmed, legitimate administration in the region restored, and fugitives apprehended and brought to justice,” which are objectives that could take months, if not years, to achieve. Although the warning signs have been there for some time, a protracted violent conflict is still not inevitable, but it will require both sides to choose another path.

Abiy should also consider that his own position as head of the government comes in the context of an ongoing debate about the future of the constitutional order of Ethiopia. Were it not for COVID-19, Ethiopia should have held elections this year, in which Abiy would have had the opportunity to obtain a democratic mandate. Abiy may be prime minister and enjoy the powers of that office but should consider his administration bound by norms that limit the actions of an unelected official.

To date, the federal government has rejected mediation of this crisis. Going forward, what role should national and international actors play to try and de-escalate the situation?

Stigant: For years, Ethiopia has been at the heart of establishing regional and continental mechanisms for addressing violent conflict. These include the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism of the regional intergovernmental organization IGAD, which Ethiopia chaired for years, and the Peace and Security Council and the Panel of the Wise of the African Union (AU). As the AU’s host nation, there is arguably a special responsibility on Ethiopia to call on these indigenous African institutions not as an intrusion on sovereignty, but to model exemplary behavior for all African states.

Domestically, there have been multiple calls for a national dialogue to forge a political agreement regarding the conduct of elections and then on the constitutional order following the elections. As violence escalates in the country, it becomes both more urgent and more challenging to move a dialogue process forward. While the federal government has already announced such an effort, any initiative will need to be revisited in light of the changing circumstances. Ultimately, the credibility of any dialogue will be judged on the extent to which it includes key groups, reaches agreement on preparatory steps and confidence-building measures, and demonstrates that people can have genuine, safe, and frank conversations.

Verjee: The United States, the European Union, and the United Kingdom, all leading humanitarian donors, should urgently articulate the acute priority of preserving and enhancing humanitarian access to Tigray on the ground, to internally displaced persons moving to other states of Ethiopia, and to the refugees in Sudan. There is no acceptable reason for impeding this kind of access.

More broadly, as USIP’s Payton Knopf has written, international inertia on Ethiopia cannot be justified by imperfect or incomplete information. While American leverage on Ethiopia has been damaged by President Trump’s remarks on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, Ethiopia remains a vital strategic partner for the United States in matters of regional security, counterterrorism, migration, and peacekeeping. China is also massively invested in Ethiopia, in many deals that were reached in the days of the rule of the TPLF. Therefore, the United States, China, and others have a mutual interest in seeing a quick end to hostilities, creating the space for other forms of dialogue and discussion. While a formal international mediation process may not be necessary, honest international brokers should urgently convey to both sides, in unequivocal terms, their expectation and hope that hostilities should be halted without further delay.

Ethiopia’s Problems Will Not End with a Military Victory

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Substantial efforts are needed to reduce political tensions ahead of elections in 2021.

USIP Publication: Aly Verjee | Tuesday, November 24, 2020

As violence continues over control of the northern Ethiopian region of Tigray, Ethiopia’s future remains unsettled, even if the conflict ends soon. Achieving the federal government’s security objectives in Tigray is unlikely to resolve both new and entrenched political challenges, and already delayed national elections, now expected in 2021, may prove a severe test of Ethiopia’s political order, and consequently affect broader regional stability. Reconciling the electoral process with efforts for reconciliation and national dialogue is now even more imperative.

The Conflict in Tigray

War sometimes starts like clockwork but predicting the date on which a conflict will end often leads to disappointment. Yet from the start of armed hostilities with the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed promised the conflict would be swift and decisive. On November 6, Abiy wrote that “operations by federal defense forces underway in Northern Ethiopia have clear, limited and achievable objectives.” On November 9, the prime minister said the military operation “will wrap up soon,” and the next day, that “our law enforcement operations in Tigray are proceeding as planned: operations will cease as soon as the criminal junta is disarmed, legitimate administration in the region restored, and fugitives apprehended and brought to justice—all of them rapidly coming within reach.” Claims that the conflict will be short-lived have also been echoed by senior American officials: U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia Michael Raynor told journalists on November 19 that “another aspect of this is the Ethiopian government continues to articulate a vision of the military conflict coming to an end fairly soon, a week or two from now.”

Despite limitations on independent reporting and the severing of most communications, the federal government has announced significant military advances, capturing a number of important towns and cities in Tigray, including Shire on November 17, Axum and Adwa on November 20, and Adigrat on November 21. The TPLF has made counterclaims: that it inflicted significant casualties on federal forces in Raya and to have repulsed federal forces in Mehoni and Zalambessa. For the federal government, taking control of the state capital of Tigray, and its largest city, Mekelle, is now the principal remaining tactical military objective.

However, even if Abiy’s military objectives are quickly achieved, experiences of warfare in northern Ethiopia dating back a century suggest that it is much easier to capture territory than it is to hold it. It is unclear what a successful strategy for the federal government will be if it is able to capture Tigray’s urban centers but cannot command the widespread acceptance of Tigray’s people. While the fighting of the last few weeks may have significantly degraded the TPLF’s military capacity, it is unlikely that the federal government can entirely subdue the TPLF as a political entity, which retains the support of a substantial number of Tigrayans. Further, the TPLF’s historic capacity to wage guerrilla warfare from the rural mountains of Tigray may not be definitively eroded by its losses in conventional warfare.

While some in the federal government have indicated that they would accept a refashioned TPLF led by moderates, external efforts to re-engineer the party may well be counterproductive and only risk further alienating some Tigrayan constituencies. Therefore, as focused on their immediate objectives and consequently as reluctant to seek dialogue and compromise as they may be, the parties in conflict may find that a negotiated settlement may ultimately be the only realistic choice, if not imminently, then in the months ahead. Moreover, the federal government must soon confront an even bigger problem in 2021: how to conduct peaceful and credible elections.

The Prospects and Difficulties of Elections

National elections are overdue and are now expected to be held next year. While in February 2020, the National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) announced that elections would be held in August 2020, by the end of March, the Board had decided to indefinitely delay the elections because of the COVID-19 pandemic. As NEBE explained, several important preparatory tasks were unable to be completed in March, meaning that the crucial voter registration exercise, which was expected to register tens of millions of prospective voters, was unable to commence in April.

Beyond the national polls, each regional state of Ethiopia is also due to hold elections for their state legislatures. It was the Tigray region’s decision to proceed with organizing its own elections in September, in defiance of the federal government and without the oversight and participation of the NEBE, that contributed to a deterioration of relations between Tigray and Addis Ababa, and which was a further step toward the violence now occurring.

Even without the impact of COVID-19 and the situation in Tigray, Ethiopia’s next national elections are fraught with difficulty. The polls are expected to be the first competitive elections since 2005 and raise fundamental questions about the future order of the Ethiopian state. Abiy’s new political vehicle, the Ethiopian Prosperity Party, is the national frontrunner, constructed from the former Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front ruling coalition, which was once led by the TPLF. Apart from the TPLF, a number of new opposition political parties are expected to contest the polls.

The challenges faced in administering elections are significant. The first problem is one of election administration, operations and reform: a rush to organize elections in early 2021, as some have suggested, may easily worsen the political situation across the country, as in such a limited time, elections are unlikely to be effectively administered. In May, the NEBE proposed two scenarios on which to base a prospective electoral calendar: the first required 224 days to prepare for and conduct elections, and the second required 276 days. However, at the end of October, NEBE proposed that the elections be held in late May or June 2021, contingent on beginning poll worker training in December and voter registration in January.

As early as December 2018, a USAID pre-elections assessment found that “there is a lack of consensus about specific solutions and timing of reforms in relation to the election cycle, and that information about and support for the reforms is inconsistent. The reform process has been largely elite-driven and concentrated in Addis Ababa, and there is a lack of clarity on a specific road map to achieving the goals set out by the prime minister.” While there has been some important progress since that assessment was made, conducting elections in Ethiopia will be the largest democratic exercise in the country’s history; the technical challenges should not be underestimated and cannot easily be expedited. More recently, NEBE has noted that the possibility of constitutional and electoral reform could also complicate the electoral calendar and has warned, “Preparations for electoral process based on [an] unstable timeline are not advisable. Only once these processes [of constitutional and electoral reform] are completed should an electoral timeline be consulted and announced, and preparations begin in earnest.”

The second, more profound problem in conducting elections concerns broader needs for security, trust, reconciliation, and the ability of Ethiopians to freely engage in open political discourse, debate, and campaigning. Even before the conflict with Tigray, there were more than 1.8 million internally displaced persons in Ethiopia. In May, Amnesty International reported that at least 10,000 people had been “arbitrarily arrested and detained last year as part of the government’s crackdown on armed attacks and violence in Oromia Region,” and in July, that another 5,000 had been arrested following protests the previous month. A number of prominent political figures and journalists were jailed before the Tigray conflict began, and more arrests of journalists have followed this month.

For their part, American officials have asserted that the conflict in Tigray has served to unite Ethiopians. Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Tibor Nagy told journalists on November 19 that “it seems like [the conflict in Tigray] has brought the Ethiopian nation together, at least for the time being, in support of the prime minister …” Ambassador Raynor added that “the rest of the country actually remains quite calm at present, no indications of anyone taking up comparable actions elsewhere, and in fact the opposite. Seemingly both regional governments, federal governments, and large swaths of the people galvanizing around the [federal] government.”

Unfortunately, violence has continued elsewhere in Ethiopia. In a recent tragic incident, the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission reported that at least 34 people were killed in a November 14 attack on a bus in Benishangul. Further, as the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs pointed out on November 20, “Humanitarian partners in Ethiopia are further concerned about the increasing report of violence in Oromia and Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples (SNNP) regions. Violent incidents involving unidentified armed groups have been reported on an almost daily basis, mainly in the Western Oromia region, while several thousand people were reportedly displaced by inter-communal violence in Konso zone, SNNPR on 16 November.” Alas, any short-term increase in perceived or real Ethiopian national unity resulting from the current Tigray confrontation does little to address the problems of arbitrary detention or intercommunal violence elsewhere in the country.

For successful elections to be held, credibly and non-coercively addressing both insecurity and the underlying grievances behind the violence will be essential. An adequate response necessitates efforts at reconciliation, justice, and inclusive dialogue. While wider questions of reconciliation, reform, and elections cannot be the first point on the agenda in any eventual negotiations between the federal government and the TPLF, discussing them cannot be indefinitely avoided, either. More importantly, discussions on such issues must include many more political and civil actors beyond those now in conflict if at least a degree of national consensus is to be achieved. Squaring the electoral preparations and timetable with a plan for reconciliation and national dialogue may thus be imperative for a peaceful future in Ethiopia.

Amid Red Sea Rivalries, Eritrea Plays for Independence

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Source: Small Wars | Harry Verhoeven

President Isaias proposes a regional bloc to balance the rising influence of Gulf states.

When Eritrea’s president last month hosted the leaders of Ethiopia and Somalia to discuss “regional cooperation,” that initiative drew few global headlines. Still, Eritrea’s move should be noted by policymakers and others working for stability in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea region. For years, President Isaias Afwerki’s disdain for multilateral forums such as the African Union, and his strained relations with many governments in the region, have contributed to caricatures of Eritrea as the “North Korea of Africa.” But his invitation for two neighbors to discuss a new regional bloc reflects an important factor in Eritrea’s foreign policy: its efforts to preserve its independence in a fast-evolving geopolitical environment.

Effectively, Isaias’ proposal is a fine-tuning of Eritrea’s alignments amid the growing influence of Arab Gulf states in Africa and consistent with long-standing efforts to preserve its independence, notes Professor Harry Verhoeven, convenor of the Oxford University China-Africa Network.

Eritrea evolved a reputation as perhaps Africa’s most isolated state.  Hasn’t it historically been hostile to regional integration?

Yes and no. Eritrea’s relationship with the idea of regional cooperation has been complex ever since the country gained its independence from Ethiopia in 1993 following a 30-year war. That same year, Eritrean President Isaias Afewerki stunned his African peers when, at a summit of the Organization of African Unity (now the African Union), he publicly repeated criticisms he had formulated as one of Africa’s most formidable guerrilla commanders: the OAU had utterly failed by closing its eyes to the terror inflicted by Ethiopia’s Soviet-backed military dictatorship (the Derg) and he accused his peers of clinging to power while failing to take any meaningful action to address poverty in Africa. From that starting point, Eritrea never invested significant resources in continent-wide diplomacy. When the African Union (AU) imposed sanctions on Eritrea in 2009 for supporting al-Shabab extremists in Somalia and seeking to overthrow the Somali government, Eritrea suspended its participation in the organization and denounced the AU as a lapdog of U.S. imperialism and a mechanism for the hegemonic aspirations of Ethiopia, its main rival.  In addition, Eritrea has twice withdrawn from the East African regional bloc—the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

Still, Eritrea is not by definition opposed to regional cooperation. In the 1990s, Isaias and his fighters formed the vanguard of the wave of leftist African liberation movements that captured power from the Red Sea to the Cape between 1991 and 1997. Together with “comrade-leaders” in Congo, Ethiopia, Rwanda and Uganda, Isaias dreamed of a “Greater Horn of Africa” of like-minded regimes who could offer an alternative to the much-criticized OAU and jointly develop regional investment opportunities to cement ideological solidarity. The government in Asmara sent Eritrean troops, spies and diplomats to support wars against the military-Islamist regime in Sudan and the dictatorship of Mobutu Seso Seko in the Democratic Republic of Congo (then Zaire). These were concrete sacrifices in blood and treasure made by a fragile, small and newly independent Eritrea to further its preferred form of regional integration.

What might Isaias hope to achieve with this new initiative?

Isaias’ proposal to deepen integration between Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia (the so-called “Cushitic Alliance”) is a continuation of efforts he championed in the 1990s to institutionally anchor alliances between governments with a similar political outlook. Just like in the era of the “Greater Horn,” Asmara appears to be proposing new regional norms and understandings of peace and security as well as infrastructure ties to forge a web of partnerships among the participating states.

This said, the disappointments of the past have not been forgotten—most particularly not since the 1998-2000 “war of brothers” with Ethiopia, which ended the dream of the “Greater Horn.” Eritrean diplomacy, especially since that conflict, has been focused on creating space to maneuver and chart a foreign policy independent of Ethiopian hegemony. For almost 20 years, Isaias sought to undermine the Ethiopian government by supporting its domestic opposition as well as its adversaries in Somalia—policies that contributed to the imposition of international sanctions. Eritrea also aligned itself with Ethiopia’s rival, Egypt, and by establishing partnerships with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in which Isaias offered security cooperation—notably the use of Eritrea’s Red Sea port of Assab for operations in the Yemen war—in exchange for economic support against Ethiopian pressures. While this diplomatic choreography failed to stop Ethiopia’s regional ascendancy, it achieved the chief objective of keeping Isaias’ government in power.

Last month’s summit signals a change in the pattern of Isaias’ maneuvering, caused by recent geopolitical shifts. The Gulf states’ projection of power in the Horn of Africa and the European refugee crisis have provided Isaias with diplomatic and financial leverage to move from isolation to regional influence. In addition, the ascension of Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed side-lined Isaias’ Ethiopian nemesis, the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front. That made it possible for Isaias to cooperate with Abiy in quickly negotiating an end to their countries’ “frozen” war. While that peace accord was a domestic popular triumph for both leaders, the rapprochement has stalled and the hoped-for “peace dividends”—economic and democratic—have been disappointing. The rise of the younger Abiy in Addis Ababa has allowed Isaias to pose as the region’s elder statesman and—in last month’s summit conference—to proffer his own idea for cooperation in the Horn of Africa; Isaias’ proposal will in fact undercut Ethiopia’s historic ambitions to once again dominate efforts toward greater regional integration.

Other players are moving to establish regional organizations in the Red Sea area, as Saudi Arabia just did in January. What are the implications of the Eritrean initiative in light of those efforts?

Recent efforts to establish new regional bodies, such as the Council of the Arab and African States of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, or to reinvigorate IGAD or the AU in the Horn of Africa, are ambivalent developments from Eritrea’s perspective. Its priority remains the preservation of its flexibility to shift policies and alignments as necessary to defend its independence, squeezed as it is among larger neighbors. Sudan, Ethiopia and Saudi Arabia have all had their own designs for the region, which have rarely accounted for Eritrean interests. As seen from Asmara, multilateral organizations under the control of actors with hegemonic ambitions are therefore potentially dangerous and better subverted or, if need be, boycotted altogether.

Eritrea joined the Red Sea Council at Riyadh’s unrelenting insistence but likely has no intention of letting the body circumscribe its sovereignty. Membership served the useful purpose of confirming the Saudi-Eritrea relationship and of reminding Ethiopia (which, at the insistence of Egypt, was not invited to join the council) that, despite the outward expressions of fraternity between Abiy and Isaias, Eritrea has strategic options that do not require Ethiopia’s consent.

Similarly, Isaias’ move toward a new grouping with Ethiopia and Somalia is useful to remind old foes in the Horn of Africa (Djibouti and Sudan) and the Gulf states that Eritrea has alternative friends and will not accept a role as regional proxy for Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates. The growing projection of the Gulf states’ power in the Horn helped Isaias to break out of his isolation. But from the Eritrean perspective, that projection is a trend that requires careful management, rather than further encouragement, and that needs to be assessed in terms of its implications for Eritrea’s autonomy going forward.