Tag Archive for: Tigray War

Ethiopia confirms widespread rape in conflict-hit north

NAIROBI (Reuters) – Scores of women have been raped in Ethiopia’s northerly Tigray region, authorities have confirmed, in the chaotic aftermath of an armed conflict last year that ousted the local ruling party.

“We have received the report back from our Taskforce team on the ground in the Tigray region, they have unfortunately established rape has taken place conclusively and without a doubt,” Ethiopian Women’s Minister Filsan Abdullahi tweeted late on Thursday.

Though witnesses, medics and aid workers had spoken of widespread sexual abuse since fighting began in November, Filsan’s comments were the first confirmation by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s government.

The state-appointed Ethiopian Human Rights Commission said that 108 rapes had been reported in Tigray – nearly half in the regional capital Mekelle – in the last two months.

Though Abiy’s federal troops captured Mekelle at the end of November from the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), sporadic fighting has continued, with communications and access to the mountainous region of 5 million people restricted.

While some victims have identified their abusers as federal forces or allied soldiers, Reuters has been unable to independently verify accounts of rape. The government has said it has zero tolerance towards sexual violence.

The Rights Commission said many rapes were likely to have gone unreported.

“The war and the dismantling of the regional administration have led to a rise in gender-based violence in the region. Local structures such as police and health facilities where victims of sexual violence would normally turn to report such crimes are no longer in place,” it said.

Spokesman Adinew Abera said the Women’s Ministry had so far assessed only Mekelle and the nearby town of Quiha, adding: “We will deploy experts to all districts of Tigray. So the number will be higher than what is mentioned.”

A rape survivor’s story emerges from a remote African war

Los Angeles Times | Lucy Kassa, Shashank Bengali | ADDIS ABABA, Ethiopia — The young mother of two was walking with her sister near a desolate highway in northern Ethiopia last month when five men forced them into a pickup truck and drove them to a small building with a metal roof.

The women recognized their captors by their accents and military uniforms: They were soldiers from neighboring Eritrea, which has joined Ethiopian troops in months of fighting against anti-government forces in the Tigray border region.

Mehrawit, 27, was separated from her sister and locked in a room with only a thin, dirty mattress. For two weeks, she said, the Eritrean soldiers gang-raped her repeatedly, fracturing her spine and pelvis and leaving her crumpled on the floor. One day, she counted 15 soldiers who took turns sexually assaulting her over eight hours, her cries of agony punctuated by their laughter.

“I was numb,” she recalled from a hospital bed in the regional capital Mekele, days after she escaped. “I could see their faces. I could hear them giggle. But after a while, I was no longer feeling the pain.”

Her account is one of few emerging from the murky conflict in Tigray, where human rights groups say pro-government forces are sexually abusing civilians in a remote highland region far from the world’s gaze.

With tens of thousands of people reportedly killed, many more having fled their homes and some surviving by eating leaves in mountain villages cut off from phone and internet access, the United Nations has warned that the region of 6 million is edging toward a humanitarian disaster. More than 60,000 have escaped to refugee camps across the border in Sudan.

Compounding the suffering are accounts of gang rapes and other sexual violence by pro-government forces operating with near-total impunity.

As Ethiopia battles to wrest control of Tigray from the regional ruling party, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s government has barred journalists and most humanitarian groups from the area, rejected allegations of abuses and denied — despite credible evidence to the contrary — that Eritrean forces have entered the country. Eritrea’s government also denies involvement in the fighting.

With local Tigrayan paramilitary forces having mostly retreated to mountain areas, Ethiopian and allied troops have gained control of population centers including Mekele, where they have established a transitional government. As some communication links are restored, human rights groups have begun compiling accounts of women bearing telltale signs of sexual violence.

Doctors at Mekele’s main hospital say rape survivors are turning up injured and in tears. More women are seeking counseling, testing for sexually transmitted infections, emergency contraception and abortions. Girls as young as 12 are among those attacked, researchers say.

“Growing reports of rape and other sexual violence in the Tigray region over the last few weeks adds yet another layer to alarming abuses against civilians since the start of the conflict,” said Laetitia Bader, Horn of Africa director at Human Rights Watch.

“These reports bring new urgency for the need for a U.N.-led fact-finding mission into the region, which should also include experts in sexual violence and mental health, to press for credible, fair and safe justice for survivors.”

Last month, United Nations special representative Pramila Patten said she was “greatly concerned by serious allegations of sexual violence” in Tigray. She cited accounts of individuals being forced to rape family members or to have sex with members of the military in exchange for basic goods.

Although Patten did not identify the alleged perpetrators, survivors blame pro-government forces, including Ethiopian and Eritrean troops and paramilitaries from the Amhara region, according to human rights groups.

Mehrawit, whose full name is being withheld under a Times policy not to identify rape survivors, said the Eritrean soldiers did not hide their identities, and cast their actions as revenge against Tigray, whose ruling party, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, led Ethiopia for nearly all of the last three decades.

The TPLF presided over a 1998-2000 war with Eritrea, a former Ethiopian state, in which tens of thousands of soldiers died, many in brutal trench warfare. The conflict ended with Ethiopian troops retaining control of the contested border town of Badme in defiance of a peace agreement.

When Abiy took office in 2018, he agreed to implement the peace deal and ceded the town to Eritrea, ending one of Africa’s longest running conflicts. His efforts earned the 44-year-old leader the Nobel Peace Prize.

Abiy and Eritrean strongman Isaias Afwerki — whose tiny Red Sea nation’s isolationism sometimes garners comparisons to North Korea — now have a shared adversary in the TPLF, which has lost political influence but retains a well-trained paramilitary force estimated at 250,000 troops. In November, capping months of disputes between Tigray and the government in Addis Ababa, Abiy blamed the TPLF for an attack on a federal military base and launched air and ground raids across the region.

That has trapped women like Mehrawit on a perilous landscape of fresh bloodshed mixed with past grievances. She said she cried out to her Eritrean captors: “Are you not our brothers? Why are you this cruel?”

One responded: “You killed our family in the war and took Badme from us. So you deserve to be punished.”

Her ordeal began in early January, when Eritrean troops arrived in her village of Kerestber, about 75 miles north of Mekele. Her family — including her father, 24-year-old sister, aunt and two children ages 7 and 5 — sought safety with relatives in a nearby village.

But there was little to eat there. On the morning of Jan. 9, she and her sister ventured back to Kerestber to collect some crops and check on their house.

Walking back from Kerestber, she said, the Eritrean troops stopped them. Her account was corroborated by a counselor at a rehabilitation center who has interviewed Mehrawit repeatedly, as well as medical records from Ayder Referral Hospital where she was treated. Staff at both facilities spoke on condition of anonymity to shield them from government reprisals.

Mehrawit said that when she and her sister arrived in the Eritreans’ makeshift camp, they saw about eight other Tigrayan women being held. That day, five soldiers took turns raping her. Another day, they brought her sister to her room and made Mehrawit watch as she was raped.

For 15 days, Mehrawit was given almost nothing to eat. Her injuries left her unable to walk. The Eritreans brought more and more women to the camp and began to taunt her, saying she would soon be “thrown away.”

“We’ll bring younger and virgin Tigrayan women next time,” one said.

The soldiers eventually loosened their control. On the night of Jan. 23, she crawled out of the camp and made it to a main road, where she fainted. Her memory remains unclear, but she recalled a motorcycle driver finding her lying next to the asphalt and bringing her to Mekele.

“She has to be in a wheelchair,” he said. “But most of all, her psychological trauma is grave.”

Mehrawit has had no contact with her sister, who she worries may still be in the Eritreans’ custody. Her children and other relatives remain out of phone range. She was transferred to a nongovernmental center for sexual abuse survivors, where a nurse said she suffers from nightmares that soldiers will climb through the windows and attack her.

“There are days when she begs me not to leave her alone,” the nurse said.

In daily sessions with a therapist, Mehrawit often calls out her sister’s name. Again and again, she wonders about the women she left behind in the camp, the therapist said.

Ethiopian officials have publicly denied allegations of rape and other abuses. The interim head of Tigray’s social affairs department, Abrha Desta, did not respond to requests for comment.

But in a closed-door meeting in Mekele last week, Muna Ahmed, the deputy federal minister for women’s affairs, said the government had recorded 113 rape cases in the Tigray conflict, according to a person who was present and spoke on condition of anonymity.

This week, the U.N. World Food Program said the Ethiopian government had agreed to increase access for aid workers in an attempt to speed the delivery of food assistance to 1 million people.

Humanitarian organizations say armed groups have looted and ransacked medical facilities across Tigray, making it difficult for survivors of rape and other crimes to access emergency care. Many others are afraid to come forward, fearing punishment by the federal forces that increasingly hold sway over the region.

A few days after Mehrawit spoke to a Times reporter for this article, she received a phone call from an unknown number. The caller knew she had accused Eritrean soldiers of rape, her therapist said. He warned her not to tell her story again.

Special correspondent Lucy Kassa reported from Addis Ababa and Times staff writer Bengali from Singapore.

Ethiopia: ‘Incomplete but troubling picture’ reveals impact of Tigray crisis on children

UN | Humanitarians are learning more about the dire situation of children in Ethiopia’s Tigray region, where fighting continues between Government troops and regional forces of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). 

As more supplies and emergency personnel reach the area, “an incomplete but troubling picture” is emerging which reveals children are experiencing severe and ongoing harm, the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) reported on Friday.

“The partial picture emerging of the impact the crisis in Tigray has had on children – and the systems and services they rely on – make clear that children are in acute need of protection and assistance”, the agency said in a press release.

“Crucially, the humanitarian community still needs to get beyond major cities and towns into the rural areas, where most of the population live, in order to have a true picture of needs.”

Separation and deep psychological stress

A UNICEF team accompanied by regional health officials travelled to the town of Shire, in Central Tigray, from 4-7 February, bringing six trucks of emergency supplies.  This marked the first UN mission there since the conflict began in November.

Shire has a population of approximately 170,000, and now hosts at least 52,000 internally displaced people (IDPs).  UNICEF and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) are trucking water to the town, where there was no drinking water as the water treatment plant is not functioning.  The mobile network, Internet and banking services are still not working.

Many IDPs are sheltering in schools, none of which are operational, and conditions at displacement sites are dire.

“Many families were separated as they fled, and there were many unaccompanied or separated children among the IDPs”, said UNICEF.  “Many families reported deep psychosocial distress and said they did not feel it was safe to return home, speaking of a persistent and pervasive fear of present and future harm.”

Grave threats for malnourished children

The displaced people said food is their most urgent need. An assessment conducted by UNICEF partners found prevalence of severe acute malnutrition, which is potentially life threatening, was above emergency levels set by the World Health Organization (WHO).

“The very real risk of disease outbreak, coupled with poor access to water, sanitation, hygiene and health services, rising food insecurity and inflation in food prices, poses grave threats for malnourished children”, the agency warned.

UNICEF has dispatched some 655 metric tonnes of supplies to the area, including emergency health kits, therapeutic food and high energy biscuits, and personal protective equipment.  Additional supplies are on the way.

The tragedy of Ethiopia’s conflict in Tigray

Financial Times | Only a national dialogue can truly heal the country’s divisions

Three months after Ethiopian troops started fighting the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, the Tigray region is in desperate straits. Hundreds of thousands of people are displaced and many face hunger or even starvation. It is a distressing echo of 1984, when food was used as a weapon with devastating consequences. In many ways, Ethiopia, one of Africa’s fastest-growing economies, has come so far since then. It would be a tragedy if it slipped back into old patterns.

When the government of Abiy Ahmed, Ethiopia’s Nobel Peace Prize-winning prime minister, dispatched troops last November, he said he was carrying out a simple law-enforcement operation to oust the TPLF, characterised as a “criminal clique”. Leave aside the fact that Abiy once led the security services of a TPLF-led government he now says presided over “27 years of darkness”. His promise that there would be no civilian casualties has proved hollow.

Reports trickling out of Tigray point to gruesome violence. There have been all-too-credible accounts of civilian massacres on all sides. One in the town of Mai-Kadra, in which hundreds are thought to have died, may well have been carried out by TPLF loyalists, as the government says. But other massacres were almost certainly enacted by militiamen from the neighbouring Amhara region, which has been encouraged by Abiy’s government to become involved. Witnesses report house-to-house killings, rapes and the looting of commercial buildings and churches.

The government has insisted its fight is with the TPLF and not the Tigrayan people. But many Tigrayans have been targeted, prevented from travelling or suspended from government jobs. And there is strong evidence that troops from Eritrea, a neighbouring country with decades of loathing for the TPLF, are involved in the fighting — even if both Addis Ababa and Asmara deny it. Some Tigrayans smell a plot to divide their region between Eritrea and Amhara.

The government should allay those fears by insisting that armed forces from both Eritrea and Amhara withdraw. Disputes over land between Tigray and Amhara should be resolved through a boundary commission.

The government in Addis Ababa has severely restricted access to Tigray, both to those wishing to get food and aid in and to those hoping to get reliable information out. This must stop. This week, the government struck a tentative agreement with the World Food Programme to allow in humanitarian aid. This is a good start. But the government must follow through and not slow the process, as it has done before, with unreasonable bureaucratic obstacles.

In the longer run, more effort is needed to solve the deeper questions posed by Ethiopia’s ethnic-federalist constitution. Allies of Abiy see the 1995 document as the “original sin”, the poisonous fruit of a TPLF strategy to divide and rule. Yet many in Ethiopia jealously guard regional independence and what they regard as their separate national identities.

It is a fiendishly difficult circle to square. Authorities should start by releasing opposition leaders, including Jawar Mohammed, now on hunger strike in prison. With opposition figures in jail, national elections scheduled for June 5 will not be credible.

Abiy’s government has chosen to blame the TPLF for all Ethiopia’s ills. It is true the TPLF oversaw a police state for nearly 30 years, albeit one that brought rapid development. It is true too that its leaders were angered by the loss of power. But Ethiopia’s problems go deeper. Without a broader national dialogue, the tensions that erupted in Tigray will erupt somewhere else.

The UN Must Intervene in Tigray

Project Syndicate | Mehari Taddele Maru | When a state fails to prevent or alleviate atrocities within its territory, or if the state itself is the primary perpetrator of such acts, the UN must not stand idly by. There are five reasons why immediate action by the Security Council regarding Ethiopia’s northern region is necessary.

FLORENCE – In a recent interview, Rwandan President Paul Kagame argued that US President Joe Biden’s new administration and the United Nations Security Council should take the lead in addressing the violence and deprivation in Ethiopia’s Tigray region. . Kagame described the situation there as worrying, and said the death toll was too high for the conflict to be left only to Ethiopia or the African Union to manage. As the president of a country that is still dealing with the consequences of the 1994 genocide against its Tutsi population, Kagame speaks with considerable authority here, and deserves to be heard.

There are five reasons why immediate action by the Security Council regarding Tigray is necessary.

First, the likely presence of Eritrean armed forces in Tigray makes the war both a civil and international conflict, and hence within the UN’s remit. Eritrean troops have been implicated in killings and in the forcible return of Eritrean refugees, including through the burning of the Shimelba and Hitsats refugee camps. Some 15,000-20,000 Eritrean refugees are missing, according to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.

Second, the Tigray region is now facing a possible famine, with 2.3 million people in need of emergency aid. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reports that 4.5 million people – 67% of the region’s population – need assistance. Ethiopian federal government forces are said to be obstructing access to aid and clean water. There are also reports of the deliberate destruction of UN food stores and markets.

Third, with up to two million people now internally displaced, Tigray poses a significant burden on the world’s humanitarian resources at a time when the need for them in East Africa has never been higher, owing to COVID-19, locust infestation, and food insecurity. The Ethiopian government’s apparent unwillingness to allow the international community to provide rapid, unconditional, unfettered, and sustained humanitarian access to all parts of Tigray has worsened a dire situation.

Fourth, some UN reports and those of other organizations in Tigray point to possible grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other aspects of international humanitarian law that prohibit starvation of civilians and collective punishment. There are also reports of what may constitute state-led ethnic cleansing and genocide, as well as a “high number of alleged rapes.” Tens of thousands of Tigrayans serving in Ethiopia’s peacekeeping, security, military, police, and intelligence spheres have been dismissed from their jobs and sometimes detained.

Fifth, Ethiopia is so consumed by the fighting in Tigray that it is no longer a source of regional stability, and appears to be renouncing its role as regional peacekeeper. Security tensions and border disputes are mushrooming in the region, mainly between Ethiopia and Sudan, Kenya, and Somalia, with an election-related crisis in Somalia and negotiations over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam increasing the risk of proxy wars. The fragile political transition in Sudan also may be destabilized.

Making matters worse, the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces from peacekeeping missions in Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan seems almost certain to increase instability. In particular, Ethiopian troops’ departure from Somalia, where the AU has conducted its AMISOM peacekeeping mission, could create an opening for the al-Qaeda-linked Al Shabaab to stage a comeback in that country.

When a state fails to prevent or alleviate atrocities within its territory (such as genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes), or if the state itself is the primary perpetrator of such acts, the UN must not stand idly by. After all, only the Security Council can successfully challenge a government’s deliberate obstruction of humanitarian aid.

For these reasons, the Security Council must address the situation in Tigray immediately. It should adopt a resolution aimed at alleviating the suffering in the region through determined international action, and at convincing the Ethiopian government to restore peace there.

Concretely, the resolution should establish a monitoring and verification commission with a mandate to negotiate, observe, monitor, verify, and report on conditions in Tigray. The goals should be the immediate and definitive cessation of hostilities; rapid, unconditional, unfettered, and sustained distribution of aid to all parts of Tigray; the complete withdrawal of any and all external armed forces and groups; and a ceasefire agreement that can lead to a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Tigray.

Ethiopia’s government says that it is ready to work with the international community to ease the suffering in Tigray. That promise must now be put to the test.

Conflict in Tigray: Implications for Ethiopia’s International Standing

Charged Affairs | Since Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed assumed office in April 2018, experts have optimistically predicted the country’s emergence as a regional power. Factors such as a large population, rapid economic growth, and a reform-minded head of government seemed to support this proposition, until recent instability in federal relations threatened an upset to Ethiopia’s position as an emerging power.

After the federal government’s recent incursion into the Tigray region of Ethiopia and subsequent fighting, reports suggest that several thousand citizens are dead and upwards of 40,000 are displaced. The conflict has drawn attention from the African Union and various other international actors. The crisis in Tigray is not an isolated event, but a manifestation of the security threats and political instability plaguing Prime Minister Ahmed Abiy in his campaign for national unity. Should Addis Ababa fail to resolve Ethiopia’s underlying grievances, Ethiopia risks losing both its position as a regional power and its cache as an international partner.

Violence in Tigray commenced in early November 2020 when Abiy ordered federal troops into the region. While the invasion was ostensibly a reaction to looting by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), most observers agree that the military action was intended as punishment after regional leaders held elections last September in defiance of a federal ban. Abiy declared victory on November 28th after federal troops took control of Tigray’s capital, Mekelle. However, fighting in the region remains heavy. International observers have also raised concerns of war crimes after Ethiopian armed forces threatened to target civilians.

At the heart of this contest between Abiy and the TPLF is a debate around Ethiopian governance and the extent to which Addis Ababa should exercise centralized control. The Tigray conflict has highlighted Ethiopia’s unique system of ethnic federalism, which gives semi-autonomous power to the country’s states, each of which was created along ethnic lines. Since this system was first implemented in 1995, certain ethnic groups – notably the Tigray – have enjoyed a degree of political control disproportionate to their demographic representation.

Abiy’s 2018 election marked a challenge to Ethiopia’s status quo. As the country’s first Oromo prime minister, an ethnic group which is demographically dominant but historically marginalized, Abiy has prioritized the blurring of ethnic lines. His program of “Ethiopianization” envisions a unified national identity that would take precedence over ethnic divisions. But after enjoying 15 years of special advantages achieved through their political clout, powerful ethnic groups fear losing their superior position to homogeneity. The resulting discontent has destabilized Ethiopian governance, as regional leaders fight to maintain their power and autonomy while Abiy tries to solidify central control.

The degree of violence seen in Tigray and the seeming intransigence on both sides of the federalism debate has led some analysts to warn of a broader civil war in Ethiopia. These fears are likely overblown. Two months of intense conflict in Tigray have strained TPLF resistance, and no other state in Ethiopia has the economic or military assets to successfully launch a revolt at this scale. However, it is clear that tensions between Addis Ababa and powerful regional contingents are not going away.

Although it received the most press coverage, what happened in Tigray is not an isolated event. Amhara’s attempted regional coup and the Sidama region’s vote for autonomy from the Southern Nationalities, Nations, and People’s Region, both in 2019, represented earlier challenges to Abiy’s anti-federalist agenda. Nationwide, escalating violence from ethnic paramilitary groups has also threatened Ethiopianization. In the face of continuing resistance, Abiy must be prepared to use force to retain control over the country. Tigray demonstrated his military willingness towards this end, and recent purges of opponents from top positions have shorn up his political might. Abiy should also realize that ruling under martial law may seriously jeopardize Ethiopia’s position as a regional leader and international power.

Ethiopia has some natural advantages that set it up as a regional power, including its size and resource wealth. But the country’s leadership has also sought out an expanded role in recent years: Addis Ababa hosts the African Union headquarters; the country’s National Defense Force coordinates and oversees multilateral peace and security operations in the region; and Ethiopian heads of government have mediated conflicts among neighboring states. Today, as Kenyan-Somali ties disintegrate and the U.S. withdrawal from Somalia generates ill-will in the region, strong leadership over the Horn of Africa is more important than ever.

The Tigray situation is already having harmful effects on regional relations. Federal troops came into direct conflict with Ethiopia’s western neighbor after patrol operations “ambushed” Sudanese forces. The burdens that come with mass refugee flows also threaten regional ties, as Tigrayan civilians surge over the border into Sudan and Eritrea. Perhaps the most serious consequence for Ethiopia’s position in East Africa, however, are the indirect effects of Abiy’s battle for centralized control. The guarded militarism inherent in this fight against state autonomy does not lend itself to legitimate leadership, raising the potential for increased distance from neighbors and regional institutions.

Of even greater concern to world leaders is the risk that an Ethiopian implosion could disrupt international security operations in the Horn of Africa. Prime Minister Abiy and his predecessors have operated in close partnership to American and European powers in counterterrorism and anti-piracy initiatives. With terrorist capabilities surging in the region and piracy ramping up off the coast of Somalia, international actors depend on capable, stable partners like Ethiopia. Unless Abiy finds a peaceful and sustainable solution to conflict over federalist governance, Ethiopia will lose its position as that go-to ally

Ethiopia: Government approves ‘first step’ towards Tigray emergency assistance

UN agencies have received approval from the Ethiopian Government for 25 international staff to provide humanitarian assistance inside the country’s conflict-torn Tigray region, the UN Spokesperson said on Monday.

“This clearance is a first step towards ensuring that aid workers in Tigray can deliver and ramp up the response given the rapidly rising needs in the region”, Stéphane Dujarric told journalists at the daily press briefing.

He recalled a number of positive engagements between the Government and senior UN officials, including with Filippo Grandi, High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Gilles Michaud chief of UN Safety and Security and most recently, David Beasley, Executive Director of the World Food Programme (WFP).

“Mr. Beasley has just wrapped up a trip to Ethiopia and he says that WFP has accepted the Government’s request to help authorities and aid partners transport aid into and within Tigray”, informed Mr. Dujarric.

Moreover, WFP has also agreed to provide emergency food aid for up to one million people in Tigray.

The conflict between the Government and regional forces of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) began in early November, when the Prime Minister ordered a military offensive after rebels attacked a federal army base. Government forces reported that the region had been secured at the end of November, but TPLF resistance has continued amid accusations of extrajudicial killings and rights abuses.

Escalating humanitarian needs

Meanwhile, around 60 more humanitarian workers from the UN and non-governmental organizations are awaiting approval in the capital Addis Ababa for deployment to Tigray.

They also look forward to rapid authorizations for any further requests put forward.

“While we welcome these clearances, we remain deeply concerned about the significant escalation in humanitarian needs in Tigray, where people have endured more than three months of conflict with extremely limited assistance”, said the UN spokesperson.

He also expressed unease over continued reports of grave violations against civilians.

“We reiterate our call for the full resumption of free and unconditional access for humanitarian supplies and personnel to the Tigray region”, Mr. Dujarric said, adding that it should include “blanket clearances” for organizations operating in the area, “so that we can immediately reach all the people in need with all the assistance they urgently require”.

EU Accuses Eritrean Forces of Fueling Conflict in Ethiopia

Bloomberg | EU envoy scheduled to meet Ethiopian premier on Tuesday. UN says international staff given approval to travel to Tigray

The European Union accused Eritrean troops of fueling the months-long conflict in Ethiopia’s Tigray region and echoed a U.S. call for their withdrawal.

The presence of Eritrean forces is “exacerbating ethnic violence” in Tigray, the EU said in a statement Monday. Eritrea rejects the accusation and said the EU statement was “appalling,” according to comments posted by Information Minister Yemane Gebremeskel on Twitter on Tuesday.

“The EU statement laments the ‘exacerbation of ethnic violence’ while conveniently forgetting the toxic policy of institutionalized ethnicity and polarization that the now defunct Tigray People’s Liberation Front clique pursued for decades,” Yemane said.

The U.S. said last month there were “credible reports” of Eritrean involvement in the violence in Tigray, which began on Nov. 4 when Ethiopian federal troops declared war on forces loyal to the dissident TPLF. The governments of both Ethiopia and Eritrea have previously denied Eritrean troops are involved in the fighting.

Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s spokeswoman, Billene Seyoum, didn’t respond to a requests for comment sent by text message.

Finnish Foreign Minister Pekka Haavisto, who has been nominated as a special envoy to the region by EU member states, is scheduled to meet Abiy on Tuesday in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa, to discuss the crisis.

In December, the EU suspended almost 90 million euros ($109 million) of budgetary aid to Ethiopia because of the conflict, which the United Nations estimates has killed thousands of people, displaced about 2.2 million others and destroyed 80% of the region’s health centers.

Debt Restructuring

The war threatens to strain government finances already stretched by the Covid-19 pandemic. Last month, the Finance Ministry said it would seek to restructure its external debt under a Group of 20 program to address “pandemic-related financial constraints.” The nation’s $1 billion of 2024 Eurobonds plunged the most on record after the announcement.

Haavisto on Feb. 7 traveled to Sudan, where he held talks with government officials aimed at cooling tensions with Ethiopia after several deadly clashes between the two nations in al-Fashqa, an area of fertile farming land that straddles their border. Officials in Ethiopia’s ethnic Amhara region have pressed the government to seize land that Sudan claims ownership of based on colonial treaties dating back to 1902.

UN agencies on Monday received approval from the government for 25 of its international staff to move into Tigray to help deliver humanitarian aid to the region, Secretary-General Antonio Guterres’ spokesman, Stephane Dujarric, said in a statement.

“We remain deeply concerned about the significant escalation in humanitarian needs in Tigray where people have endured more than three months of conflict with extremely limited assistance,” Dujarric said. “We are also very concerned by reports of grave violations against civilians that we continue to receive.”

Though Ethiopia announced victory in the Tigray war on Nov. 28, the region’s former leader, Debretsion Gebremichael, has vowed to continue fighting.

Fitch Downgrades Ethiopia to ‘CCC’ – Rating Action Commentary

Fitch typically does not assign Outlooks or apply modifiers to sovereigns with a rating of ‘CCC’ or below.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The downgrade reflects the government’s announcement that it is looking to make use of the G20 “Common Framework for Debt Treatments beyond the Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI)” (G20 CF), which although still an untested mechanism, explicitly raises the risk of a default event.

The G20 CF, agreed in November 2020 by the G20 and Paris Club, goes beyond the DSSI that took effect in May 2020, in that it requires countries to seek debt treatment by private creditors and that this should be comparable with the debt treatment provided by official bilateral creditors. This could mean that Ethiopia’s one outstanding Eurobond and other commercial debt would need to be restructured, potentially representing a distressed debt exchange under Fitch’s sovereign rating criteria. There remains uncertainty over how the G20 CF will be implemented in practice, including the requirement for private sector participation and comparable treatment. Fitch’s sovereign ratings apply to borrowing from the private sector, so official bilateral debt relief does not constitute a default, although it can point to increasing credit stress.

Within the context of Paris Club agreements, comparable treatment requirements are not always enforced and the scope of debt included can vary. The Paris Club states that the requirement for comparable treatment by other creditors can be waived in some circumstances, including when the debt represents only a small proportion of the country’s debt burden.

The focus of Ethiopia’s engagement with the G20 CF will be on official bilateral debt, as reprofiling of this will have the biggest impact on overall debt sustainability. Nonetheless, the terms of the framework clearly create risk that private sector creditors will also be negatively affected. The G20 statement on the G20 CF indicates that debt treatments will not typically involve debt write-offs or cancellation unless deemed necessary. The focus will instead be on some combination of lowering coupons and lengthening grace periods and maturities. The extent of debt treatment required will be based upon the outcome of the IMF’s Debt Sustainability Analysis for Ethiopia, which is currently being updated. However, any material change of terms for private creditors, including the lowering of coupons or the extension of maturities, would be consistent with the definition of default in Fitch’s criteria.

The bulk of Ethiopia’s public external debt is official multilateral and bilateral debt. Government and government-guaranteed external debt was USD25 billion in fiscal year 2020 (FY20, which ended in June 2020). Of this, USD3.3 billion was owed to private creditors. This includes Ethiopia’s outstanding USD1 billion Eurobond (1% of GDP) due in December 2024, with minimal annual debt service of USD66 million until the maturity; and USD2.3 billion government-guaranteed debt owed to foreign commercial banks and suppliers. Other SOE debt to private creditors which relates to Ethio Telecom and Ethiopian Airlines is a further USD3.3 billion. While this is not guaranteed by the government, it represents a potential contingent liability.

Ethiopia’s external finances are a rating weakness and this is the main factor behind the intention of using the G20 CF. Persistent current account deficits (CAD), low FX reserves and rising external debt repayments present risks to external debt sustainability. Ethiopia’s external financing requirements, at more than USD5 billion on average in FY21-FY22 including federal government and SOE amortisation, are high relative to FX reserves, which we forecast to remain at around USD3 billion. Reserves cover only around two months of current external payments.

The CAD narrowed to 4.1% of GDP in FY20 as imports declined, maintaining the trend since FY15 when the CAD was 12.5% of GDP. We forecast the CAD to hover around 4% of GDP, although this does not incorporate potential import costs associated with vaccines to combat the coronavirus pandemic. Smaller CADs have not eased pressure on FX reserves because net FDI has been lacklustre (averaging 2.7% of GDP in FY19-FY20) and net external borrowing has moderated with negative net borrowing by SOEs. The central bank has allowed sharper exchange rate depreciation, but the currency nonetheless remains overvalued, with a weaker rate in the parallel market. Proposed sales of mobile licenses and a stake in Ethio Telecom, the state-owned telecoms company, are an upside risk to FDI inflows and reserves in FY21-FY22.

The IMF assessed Ethiopia at high risk of external debt distress in its latest assessment in 2020, with Ethiopia breaching thresholds on external debt service/exports and the present value of external debt/exports. An improvement from high to moderate risk is a central aim of the three-year arrangement with the IMF agreed in late 2019 under the Extended Credit Facility and the Extended Fund Facility. Given the difficulty of substantially boosting exports in the near term, the main route to achieve this is via reducing debt service costs. Within the IMF programme, the authorities planned by the first review to undertake additional reprofiling of bilateral loans but this has not yet happened. The pandemic has placed further emphasis on debt reprofiling.

Ethiopia and the IMF reached staff-level agreement on the first review of the programme in August 2020, but this awaits board approval. The Fund’s press release recognised that performance had mostly been good, but also emphasised the need for financial support from Ethiopia’s international partners including through debt reprofiling.

Ethiopia’s ‘CCC’ IDRs also reflect the following key rating drivers:

Strong economic growth potential and an improving policy framework support the rating, while double-digit inflation, low development and governance indicators and elevated political risks weigh on the rating.

The coronavirus pandemic continues to present significant risks to Ethiopia, but the negative economic impacts since the onset have been somewhat contained so far. Given that the fiscal year ends in June, we do expect more of a hit to growth in FY21 than FY20, but forecast a return to growth rates in the 6%-7% range over the medium term. The government has maintained considerable budgetary discipline, with moderate increases in the general government budget deficit, to 2.8% of GDP, and government debt/GDP (31.5%), while total SOE debt/GDP (25.6%) has fallen. However, the pandemic presents risks of upward pressure on spending. Government financing has continued its transition towards market-based T-bill auctions and away from the long-standing system of direct advances from the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE, the central bank). This is a core part of the IMF programme, which seeks to promote monetary policy reforms to help gradually tackle inflation that has remained extremely high at close to 20%.

The military conflict in the Tigray region from November 2020 has underlined ongoing political risks in Ethiopia as well as for Ethiopia’s international relations. Considerable domestic political uncertainty, related to the delayed 2020 parliamentary election (now planned for June) and ongoing ethnic and regional tensions within the country, remains a risk to Ethiopia’s credit metrics, in Fitch’s view. Greater political unrest could, for example, act as a drag on FDI and tax collection and exert further upward pressure on inflation. It could also lead to worsening relations with some bilateral partners and hold up donor flows, as illustrated by the suspension of some flows from the EU in December.

ESG – Governance: Ethiopia has an ESG Relevance Score (RS) of 5 for both Political Stability and Rights and for the Rule of Law, Institutional and Regulatory Quality and Control of Corruption, as is the case for all sovereigns. Theses scores reflect the high weight that the World Bank Governance Indicators (WBGI) have in our proprietary Sovereign Rating Model. Ethiopia has a low WBGI ranking in the 25th percentile, reflecting in particular political instability, as well as low scores for voice and accountability and regulatory quality.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The main factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative rating action/downgrade:

– Structural Features: Stronger evidence that Ethiopia’s engagement in the G20 CF will lead to comparable treatment for private sector creditors consistent with a default event under Fitch’s criteria.

– External Finances: Increased external vulnerability that heightens the risk of default irrespective of the G20 CF, such as the emergence of external financing gaps and downward pressure on already low foreign-exchange reserves.

The main factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive rating action/upgrade are:

– Structural Features: Clarity that the G20 CF will not lead to a default event.

– External Finances: Stronger external finances with acceleration in exports, for example, leading to smaller CADs and higher foreign-currency reserves.

SOVEREIGN RATING MODEL (SRM) AND QUALITATIVE OVERLAY (QO)

In accordance with the rating criteria for ratings in the ‘CCC’ range and below, Fitch’s sovereign rating committee has not used the SRM and QO to explain the ratings, which are instead guided by the rating definitions.

Fitch’s SRM is the agency’s proprietary multiple regression rating model that employs 18 variables based on three-year centred averages, including one year of forecasts, to produce a score equivalent to a LT FC IDR. Fitch’s QO is a forward-looking qualitative framework designed to allow for adjustment to the SRM output to assign the final rating, reflecting factors within our criteria that are not fully quantifiable and/or not fully reflected in the SRM.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO
International scale credit ratings of Sovereigns, Public Finance and Infrastructure issuers have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive direction) of three notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction) of three notches over three years. The complete span of best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges from ‘AAA’ to ‘D’. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings are based on historical performance. For more information about the methodology used to determine sector-specific best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings, visit [https://www.fitchratings.com/site/re/10111579].

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

We assume that Ethiopia pursues involvement in the G20 CF.

We expect global economic trends and commodity prices to develop as outlined in Fitch’s Global Economic Outlook.

REFERENCES FOR SUBSTANTIALLY MATERIAL SOURCE CITED AS KEY DRIVER OF RATING

The principal sources of information used in the analysis are described in the Applicable Criteria.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Ethiopia has an ESG Relevance Score of 5 for Political Stability and Rights as World Bank Governance Indicators have the highest weight in Fitch’s SRM and are therefore highly relevant to the rating and a key rating driver with a high weight.

Ethiopia has an ESG Relevance Score of 5 for Rule of Law, Institutional & Regulatory Quality and Control of Corruption as World Bank Governance Indicators have the highest weight in Fitch’s SRM and are therefore highly relevant to the rating and are a key rating driver with a high weight.

Ethiopia has an ESG Relevance Score of 4 for Human Rights and Political Freedoms as the Voice and Accountability pillar of the World Bank Governance Indicators is relevant to the rating and a rating driver.

Ethiopia has an ESG Relevance Score of 4 for Creditor Rights as willingness to service and repay debt is relevant to the rating and is a rating driver, as for all sovereigns.

Except for the matters discussed above, the highest level of ESG credit relevance, if present, is a score of 3. This means ESG issues are credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity(ies), either due to their nature or to the way in which they are being managed by the entity(ies). For more information on Fitch’s ESG Relevance Scores, visit www.fitchratings.com/esg.

Additional information is available on www.fitchratings.com

APPLICABLE CRITERIA
Country Ceilings Criteria (pub. 01 Jul 2020)
Sovereign Rating Criteria (pub. 26 Oct 2020) (including rating assumption sensitivity)

APPLICABLE MODELS
Numbers in parentheses accompanying applicable model(s) contain hyperlinks to criteria providing description of model(s).

Country Ceiling Model, v1.7.1 (1)
Debt Dynamics Model, v1.2.1 (1)
Macro-Prudential Indicator Model, v1.5.0 (1)
Sovereign Rating Model, v3.12.1 (1)

ADDITIONAL DISCLOSURES
Dodd-Frank Rating Information Disclosure Form
Solicitation Status
Endorsement Policy

ENDORSEMENT STATUS
Ethiopia EU Endorsed, UK Endorsed


DISCLAIMER

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ENDORSEMENT POLICY

Fitch’s international credit ratings produced outside the EU or the UK, as the case may be, are endorsed for use by regulated entities within the EU or the UK, respectively, for regulatory purposes, pursuant to the terms of the EU CRA Regulation or the UK Credit Rating Agencies (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, as the case may be. Fitch’s approach to endorsement in the EU and the UK can be found on Fitch’s Regulatory Affairs page on Fitch’s website. The endorsement status of international credit ratings is provided within the entity summary page for each rated entity and in the transaction detail pages for structured finance transactions on the Fitch website. These disclosures are updated on a daily basis

1 dead as soldiers fire on protest in Tigray capital: doctor

One person was shot dead Tuesday when soldiers opened fire on an anti-government protest in the capital of Ethiopia’s conflict-hit northern Tigray region, a medical official said.

The protest in the city of Mekele was timed to coincide with a visit by religious leaders from the national capital Addis Ababa, part of an effort by the federal government to show that life is returning to normal in Tigray three months after fighting began.

Groups of young men used stones and burning tyres to block roads in central Mekele, and soldiers used live rounds in at least one location, several witnesses told AFP.

“One dead body already arrived” with gunshot wounds, said a doctor at Ayder Referral Hospital, adding that the victim was “a young man.”

There could be more casualties, said the doctor, who spoke on condition of anonymity for fear of reprisals.

“The head of our transport division was injured. He was beaten by soldiers along with his son and he’s getting treatment in the hospital,” the doctor said.

“He told the physicians that there are lots of injured in the street but nobody is bringing them to the hospital.”

In early November, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed announced military operations against Tigray’s former ruling party, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), saying they responded to TPLF-orchestrated attacks on federal army camps.

Federal forces entered Mekele in late November, and Abiy declared at the time that fighting was “completed”.

But portions of Tigray remain insecure, hindering the distribution of humanitarian assistance, and aid workers are warning of possible widespread starvation.

Mekele residents have also complained that life is far from peaceful in the city, accusing soldiers of using lethal force to enforce a curfew.

President Sahle-Work Zewde visited Mekele over the weekend, telling residents that Abiy’s government was “working to fully restore peace and return the overall activity to normalcy.”

The religious leaders were expected to stay in Tigray for three days and meet with regional government officials and security forces.

Multiple Tigray residents told AFP that many businesses were closed Tuesday, a move intended to show anger with the federal government.

“The government is trying to show the international community that everything is going well in Tigray and peace is already completely stabilised,” said one resident, who also requested anonymity for safety reasons.

“It was like the protest was to prevent this false information,” he said.

Officials from the caretaker administration in Tigray did not respond to requests for comment.