Tag Archive for: Tigray War

Mind Over Matter / Abiy Ahmed’s aim to “Pentecostalize Ethiopian politics”

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The premier believes the power of positive thinking can help him save Ethiopia.

By René Lefort | Ethiopia Insight

Who is Abiy Ahmed, the man who has been Prime Minister of Ethiopia since 2018? In Addis Ababa, the question is often met with awkward silence. Yet the answer is vital to any deeper understanding of the present crisis in Ethiopia, and particularly of a war between the federal government and the Tigrayan authorities, which threatens to lay waste to the country and destabilize the Horn of Africa.

The mainstream interpretation is that the crisis is rooted in a struggle about whether power should lie at the center in Addis Ababa or be distributed among the capitals of the ten regional states. In other words, should Ethiopia be a centralized federation of regions largely defined by geographical boundaries, or a looser confederation of national ethnic entities? Oligarchic interests are also at stake: in Ethiopia, positions in the party-state and personal enrichment—legal or illegal—are inseparable.

But the crisis is not purely of the here and now.

The Ethiopian empire was built in the second half of the 19th century. Its homeland was the northern highlands, its ‘colonies’ all around. Problems arising from this legacy have never been completely resolved, and it is still unclear what kind of state should be constructed on the remains of this empire that is capable of achieving legitimacy among its citizens.

These are issues that cut across the whole of Ethiopia. They have now escalated into a war between the champions of the two rival visions: Abiy for the ‘centrists’ and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) for the ethnic ‘confederalists’. However, from the two, Abiy’s personal stance has had a disproportionate impact.

None of the foreign officials who have met the premier, none of the Ethiopian academics, researchers, experts, or politicians who have worked closely with him or spoken with him at length, have agreed to speak on the record, for fear of reprisals except one. But, privately, these outsiders are almost unanimous. First, they say, Abiy lacks political and historical knowledge. But the remote origins of the crisis in Ethiopia stem from opposing narratives around the country’s imperial history.

More precisely, his speeches and positioning suggest a stereotypical conception of history, rather than a sound and thorough knowledge. Second, they note that his fundamentalist Pentecostalist faith is not a private matter. He belongs to the Mulu Wongel (Full Gospel) Believers Movement, which claims 4.5 million Ethiopian members. According to almost all the interviewees, his faith dictates his political vision and actions. A few among the Ethiopian interviewees believe that he brazenly exploits this faith to reinforce his legitimacy. They agree with a diaspora analyst who argues that “Abiy has deliberately crafted a deceptive ethos as a persuasive tool”.

Whichever is true, the outcome is the same.

Abiy believes that after Ethiopia teetered on the edge of the abyss two or three years ago, when outbreaks of violent unrest threatened the country with disintegration, the only path to salvation is a kind of moral revolution. Medemer, the concept forged by Abiy, translates roughly as “combining and uniting”.

The country will transcend its divisions, mainly ethnic in nature, by gradually coming together around a common set of moral or ethical values: love, forgiveness, reconciliation, etc. Ethiopia first and foremost needs a spiritual revolution, a change of mindset. This, he argues to his entourage, will bring not just peace and harmony, but prosperity.

It is therefore no accident that he chose the name Prosperity Party for the non-ethnic structure he created on the ruins of the former ruling coalition—made up of representatives from the four most powerful regions—which held power for 27 years. The credo of the Prosperity Gospel is that the stronger the belief, the more God will reward the believer with financial blessings. Wealth is a gift from the Almighty to those who deserve it.

There is therefore no contradiction between the strict morality of believers and Abiy’s practice of attracting supporters with gifts and positions. Merera Gudina, chairman of the opposition party Oromo Federalist Congress describes this as the “commercialization of politics”. The researcher Alex de Waal calls this framework a “political marketplace…in the form of exchange of political loyalty or cooperation for payment”.

Individuals, therefore, are at the heart of his political vision. Realities are relative, or must be concealed, as with the total media blackout on the war. He even seems to embrace the concept of ‘alternative facts’, claiming for example, that not a single civilian was killed during the seizures of Tigray’s cities, or that the majority of the refugees in Sudan are young men, despite UN refugee agency reports that most are “women and children”.

Finally, Abiy’s politics are rooted in neither established structures, historical precedent, nor institutions: “Because the truth is with us, no one will stop us… Because we work holding on to the truth, the God of Ethiopia will assist us”. According to the sources interviewed, he believes himself chosen by God as the only man who can save Ethiopia, and that provided that his will is divinely-guided, he will win.

Ethiopia’s recent history has been turbulent.

In 1974, Emperor Haile Selassie, the “conquering lion of the tribe of Judah” and “elect of God”, was deposed by a Soviet-oriented military junta. There followed a long insurgency, led by a mainly Tigrayan armed force, which overthrew the junta in 1991. Once in power, the new government—which had its ideological roots in the Albanian version of Marxism-Leninism—headed a system built around and “democratic centralism” and, latterly, the “developmental state”.

The end of this 44-year ‘materialist’ interregnum was in keeping with the fundamental religiosity of the Ethiopian people. Abiy has embraced it, either by conviction and/or to assert his popularity. He describes Ethiopia as “a nation of the Creator’s cardinal wisdom”. Ethiopians largely hold to an age-old millenarianism, the belief in a prophet who will come to save the country, and Abiy has duly acquired the title of “messiah”. In the words of one adherent, Abiy “wants the soul of our nation to rise and shine once again”, a soul which “has been buried for more than 44 years, damaged and darkened… with evil intent and design”.

For the subjugated peripheral populations, however, this vision is more often perceived as an attempt to return them to a former position of subordination, of assimilation into Abyssinian civilization, a prospect that they fiercely opposed and oppose. The clash between the TPLF and Abiy is therefore not only the expression of two opposing visions and objectives for Ethiopia. It is also a reflection of two approaches, one secular, the other religious, which are irreconcilable.

Abiy recently confessed privately to a foreign official: “My people don’t understand me”. While his popularity has surged among the Amhara after the victory in the conventional war in Tigray, nationally his star is waning. The so-called “law-enforcement operation” in Tigray has taken an ethnic turn, with Amhara police and militia engaging Tigrayan forces and claiming territory. These events conceal a second front, even more perilous in the longer term: the armed civil resistance in parts of Oromia, home to more than a third of the country’s population.

The economy, particularly foreign investment, is in decline rather than showing the promised improvement. A cleansing of Tigrayans has begun in the administration, and in public and even private companies, with the potential to trigger an infernal and self-sustaining cycle. Because his medemer ideology has not percolated downwards, Abiy has reverted to more or less the same heavy-handed methods and disastrous divisive tactics that he won power by opposing. The main opposition figures are in jail, journalists and even some academics are intimidated, sometimes imprisoned.

For onlookers on all sides, domestic and external, even among leaders in the Horn of Africa, the specter that now raises its head is of ethnic slaughter at a scale even more terrible than in former Yugoslavia. They are pleading tirelessly for an “inclusive national dialogue” as the only way to prevent such an outcome. Abiy has systematically refused, either because he sincerely believes he is a messiah, the only one who can “‘Pentecostalize’ Ethiopian politics”, as described by anthropologist Dereje Feyissa, or simply out of a thirst for power.

Geopolitical dynamics in the Horn of Africa

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An Emboldened Horn of Africa Axis and an Unfolding Humanitarian Crisis Await the Biden Administration

By Guled Ahmed | Middle East Institute

Summary

The Biden Administration is set to face a series of challenges in the Horn of Africa. Given growing Russian and Chinese involvement in this strategically important region, U.S. policymakers should be attuned to the historical background and current dynamics in the relevant countries. In the Horn of Africa, the U.S. can ameliorate the COVID-19 pandemic, stem ongoing civil strife, and ease intraregional tensions. To achieve these objectives, the U.S. will need to adopt bold strategies based on lessons from the past. This article provides essential context about the region and proposes policy measures for the incoming administration.

Introduction

As Joe Biden prepares to take office on Jan. 20, 2021, the U.S. and the world are facing multiple crises. Now is one of the worst times in American history as the country struggles through a major economic recession and a pandemic that has taken more than 300,000 American lives. Biden is no stranger to economic crises, having served as vice president under the Obama administration during the Great Recession in 2009. Undoubtedly, Biden’s experience as a senator and VP makes him ready to tackle America’s domestic challenges and to reset relations with its allies.

In the Horn of Africa, his upcoming administration will grapple with longstanding challenges. However, this time, he will have to deal with the emboldened and unchecked leaders of the Horn of Africa — Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed of Ethiopia, President Mohamed Abdullahi (Farmaajo) of Somalia, and President Isaias Afwerki of Eritrea. Recently, the three leaders have formed an axis through the Horn of Africa Cooperation (HoAC) deal to consolidate security, stability, and economic integration.1

The main driver of the HoAC is PM Abiy, who wants to access Somali ports for trade and promote military and economic integration in order to influence Somali politics and economy. More multilateral agreements and initiatives may come on the heels of the HoAC. In the long term, integration may become possible once the three countries stabilize and resolve their border issues.

In terms of foreign involvement in the region, the Horn of Africa could become a theater for the escalating Cold-War-like dynamic between the U.S and Russia. With its increasing power and influence, Russia could repeat strategies from Syria in the Horn of Africa and help prop up leaders of the Horn of Africa Axis who are desperate to stay in power, regardless of the results of democratic elections. Because the incoming Biden Administration will advance human rights and democratic elections, Horn of Africa leaders may turn to Russia for protection instead.

The Unfolding “Triple Threat” Humanitarian Crisis

The Horn of Africa has suffered multiple disasters since the start of 2020, including the COVID-19 pandemic, recurring deadly floods, and devastating locust attacks. Several donors and humanitarian agencies have increased calls for support to tackle the “triple threat” in the region. Even before the current crises, Somalia, one of the world’s most fragile states, suffered droughts in 2017 that impacted more than 6 million inhabitants. In 2018 and 2019, the Shabelle and the Juba river riparians had already experienced recurring cycles of drought and floods. And now for the first time in recorded history, the Shabelle River, which is Somalia’s breadbasket, is under a locust attack. A swarm of locusts can occupy 460 square miles and consume up to 6,000 metric tons of food daily. The current swarms can inflict the equivalent of more than 120,000 hectares of crop damage within the Shabelle River Basin. Combined with flood damages this year and previous instability, Somalia could experience catastrophic food insecurity and mass starvation similar to the horrific 1974 drought.

In Ethiopia, another full-scale humanitarian crisis is unfolding due to the ongoing civil war between the government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) in the Tigray region. Locust attacks have also compounded the impact on citizens. The current invasion of desert locusts is the worst that Ethiopia has experienced in 25 years. Furthermore, the COVID-19 pandemic has hurt economic conditions by restricting the agricultural supply chain, productivity, and cross-border trade. On top of these external factors, agriculture export revenue is already negatively impacted by Ethiopia’s currency devaluation. These conditions could push Ethiopia into starvation, mass migration, and multilateral ethnic conflict, and thus threaten overall regional stability.

Country Profiles from the Horn of Africa

The Post-Cold War Horn of Africa is fragile and susceptible to cyclical crises as a result of conflicts and increased climate change. This region also suffers from the legacy of ruthless dictators, such as Mengistu Mariam of Ethiopia and Siad Barre of Somalia. After both dictators were overthrown, new governments adopted systems of fragile ethnic federalism and decentralization that are now destabilizing the region.

Ethiopia

Ever since Abiy was selected as prime minister in April 2018, violence driven by ethnic tensions has gripped Ethiopia and displaced 1.8 million people. Abiy’s vision of a centralized power controlling the political process and economic development appears to be irreconcilable with the ethnic federalism enshrined under Article 39 of the Ethiopian Constitution. While nationalism has kept Ethiopia together for the past 30 years, it has also created division and hostility between Abiy’s reformist government and the TPLF and Oromo opposition leaders who have returned from exile.

With his political reforms intended to promote Ethiopian nationalism failing, he has also hastened economic liberalization through privatization and currency devaluation. The U.S. dollar has appreciated against the Ethiopian birr by more than 35% as the country simultaneously faces a severe export decline, yearly debt payments surpassing $1 billion, and declining domestic borrowing. Overall, this trend has forced Ethiopia to print money at an unsustainable rate. “Abiynomics” will burden Ethiopia with unpayable IMF loans and Chinese loans to finance dam projects. Furthermore, borrowing has increased the debt-to-GDP ratio to over 50%, a rate that is unsustainable, especially for a country that experiences annual major droughts. This rate of borrowing ultimately forced Ethiopia to reschedule 60% of its loan repayment.

To divert public attention from the impending economic crisis and unrest that have tarnished Abiy’s image, he has turned the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam dispute with Egypt and Sudan into a nationalist rallying cry and canceled an agreed-upon deal. Similarly, opposition groups have accused him of taking advantage of the COVID-19 pandemic to unconstitutionally delay the national election, extending his term for almost another year. These actions have incited major opposition, especially from militias in Oromo and Tigray, which threatened to form a caretaker government following Article 60, Section 5 of the Ethiopian Constitution. Abiy took this threat seriously and decided to jail the outspoken Oromo opposition leader Mohamed Jawar. Furthermore, the federal government declared the regional Tigray elections illegal and imposed an economic embargo, which contributed to the civil war. Despite Abiy claiming victory at the end of November, 2020, the war rages on, with thousands displaced and effects that could destabilize the entire region.

Somalia

In Somalia, Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo became president in February 2017 through indirect elections by tribal chiefs. His election was marred by corruption even though he ran on an anti-corruption platform.5 Despite his promises, Somalia has been named the world’s most corrupt country three times in a row by the Corruption Perceptions Index. Furthermore, despite his anti-Ethiopian platform, Farmaajo became President Abiy’s reliable ally during his tenure.6 Abiy even seem to have convinced Farmaajo of the idea of “Greater Horn of Africa Economic Integration.” The two leaders also have similar political preferences. Both are against federalism and for centralized government, despite the weak Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) that only controls parts of the capital with the help of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the Somalia donors fund. Instead of cooperating with federal member states (FMS), he started dismantling the federal system through electioneering that installed his allies as state leaders. Starting with Southwest State, his forces arrested the likely winner, clearing the path to victory for his hand-picked candidate. This move caused a backlash that was particularly intense in Baidoa, where the Somali National Army along with Ethiopia violently cracked down on protests in December 2018.

In response, UN Somalia Special Representative Nicholas Haysom requested an investigation. Haysom was allegedly expelled so that the Ethiopian Army and Somalia National Army could conceal their crimes and avoid potential prosecution.7 The FGS succeeded in further electioneering by installing their preferred candidate in Galmudug and Hirshabelle states. The FGS was unable to pull off the same feat in Puntland.8 In Jubbaland state, Kenyan AMISOM troops almost clashed with Ethiopian AMISOM troops who are pro-Farmaajo.

Mogadishu, which is in the Benadir region, has become the city with the most internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Africa due to local conflicts. The FGS has paralyzed the city’s economy and mobility, essentially turning it into an open-air prison where IDPs are more than 25% of the population. Not only do the residents of Mogadishu live under difficult circumstances, they also provide taxes to the federal government without enjoying political representation in the Senate. This is because Mogadishu is not recognized as a federal state, which entails less autonomy.

The general condition of Somalia has declined under Farmaajo, The security improvements created by his predecessor, Hassan Sheikh, have vanished. The robust GDP growth of 4% has dropped below 2% and export revenue dropped by 70%, a figure unseen since the 1980s. Foreign direct investment decreased and domestic revenue was below 2016 levels. While not attributable to Farmaajo’s policies, Somalia has also seen a decline in remittances. In an apparent reflection of its corruption, the federal government has camouflaged aid from donors like Qatar as domestic revenue in order to meet debt relief obligations and improve its image abroad.9 Despite Somalia’s lack of financial accountability and illegitimate tax revenue increases, the IMF and World Bank determined that the country has reached the “decision point,” at which heavily indebted poor countries are considered to have met the obligations for interim debt relief. The U.S. has further enabled Farmaajo by supporting debt relief and turning a blind eye on FGS human rights abuses, their war against FMSs, media repression, and deteriorating security. However, the U.S has suspended military aid over corruption concerns.10

As a primary foreign donor to the FGS, Qatar is another important player in the region. Beyond propping up FGS, Qatar has allegedly encouraged violent extremism and instability. A cellphone call obtained by the New York Times captured the Qatari ambassador to Somalia stating that a terrorist bombing in Bosaso was carried out to further Qatari interests.11 Similarly, Somali intelligence chief Fahad Yassin Hajji Dahir, who is alleged to have ties with al-Qaeda, is currently said to be engineering the re-election of Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo.12 This major foreign interference could have serious consequences, such as igniting public unrest and possibly even a civil war similar to that in 1991, which overthrew Siad Barre, Farmaajo’s uncle.13

Eritrea

While there are no major violent conflicts in Eritrea, the government shows many of the same pathologies as Ethiopia and Somalia. Although Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki has rehabilitated his image through the historic peace deal with PM Abiy, he remains a ruthless authoritarian who has been starving his people for the past 20 years. With the peace deal, Isaias Afwerki merely showed the EU a false soft side in order to gain aid and assistance. Thus, the EU diplomats are in essence ignoring the regime’s record of human rights violations and forced labor in order to fund projects that will further Europe’s interest in keeping migrants in Eritrea. The EU has funded infrastructure projects serviced by forced conscript labor, perpetuating a system that the U.N. has defined as “tantamount to slavery.”14 Thus, it seems that the EU has chosen to “hire” a dictator at a low price rather than solve the core issues that cause migration in the first place. This is why the EU Horn of Africa policy is failing: it emboldens dictators to oppress their citizens at the expense of EU taxpayers.

Afwerki is widely unpopular, so he is vulnerable to a potential coup. While Afwerki is a brutal dictator, a coup would certainly be destabilizing. In the past, he narrowly escaped previous coup attempts from dissatisfied armed forces, such as in 2013. It is highly likely that he will face another coup because of his alliance with Abiy, who is particularly disliked among the ethnic Tigray in Eritrea.15

“In the 21st century, the EU and the U.S. have pushed for Horn of Africa integration in three key areas: politics, economics, and security. This encouragement is an important reason why Horn of Africa Axis leaders pursued forming a new regional organization bloc. However, these initiatives have been dead on arrival for various reasons.”

The Return of Russia to the Horn of Africa

Russia has been steadily making inroads with the region’s leaders. While hosting the Sochi Olympics in 2017, Russia seized the opportunity to strengthen its relationship with Africa by organizing the 2019 Russia-Africa summit that saw trade, aid, and military deals offered with no political preconditions. Russia’s goal is to project its power and influence in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea by providing arms and nuclear technology for energy development in exchange for mining natural resources like uranium and gold. Russia is also interested in securing the rights to rare earth elements (REE), which are key ingredients in batteries for electric cars, cell phones, high-tech weapons, and wind turbines. Russia has been steadily accumulating REE to the point where it now has the 4th largest reserves in the world, significantly ahead of the U.S.16

Just outside the Horn of Africa, former Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir signed bilateral agreements with Russian President Vladimir Putin during his November 2017 visit to Russia that included the establishment of a military base in the Red Sea, a nuclear agreement, and modernization of the Sudanese army.17 Similarly, Bashir asked Putin for protection from the U.S.and hired Russian mercenaries to quell citizen uprisings before his overthrow in a military coup.18 It is noteworthy that Bashir’s visit to Russia came after the Trump administration lifted the trade embargo on Sudan and removed it from the travel ban list. This suggests that both the U.S. and Russia are competing for Sudan’s favor.

In the Horn of Africa, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov announced the opening of a logistics center in Eritrea in 2018, but gave few details about its purpose.19 The lack of information likely indicates a larger strategic aim. A Russian logistics center in Eritrea, however, now looks improbable due to the Eritrean government’s realignment toward the UAE and Saudi Arabia, two countries that are loathe to see Russian encroachment in the Red Sea. Opposition from these two Gulf countries will be an obstacle to Russia’s quest to gain influence in the Horn of Africa.

The extent of Russia’s influence on Somalia will largely depend on the results of upcoming elections. One of the candidates for the Somali presidency is former Prime Minister Hassan Ali Khaire, who cofounded Som Oil & Gas. For various reasons, Russia is hoping for his victory. The majority stakeholder in Som Oil & Gas is the Russian national Georgy Djapridze, who is also a close ally of Putin. In November of 2020, Khaire met with Foreign Minister Lavrov to discuss the upcoming elections and the prospects for strengthening Russian-Somali cooperation, particularly trade and economic ties. Such a meeting seems to validate suspicions that Khaire is seeking to obtain Russian assistance in the elections. Given Somalia’s instability, if Khaire wins the presidency he may invite Russian mercenaries to restore order.

In November of 2020, Russia and China indicated their support for the Somali government by abstaining on a vote to renew the UN panel of experts on Somalia, which includes an arms embargo.20 Russia justified its abstention by comparing the vote to lifting the Eritrea embargo in 2018, and China reasoned that the embargo hindered the Somali government’s ability to combat al-Shabab. The true intention behind Russia’s abstention was to protect its interest in selling arms to Somalia, however. China, for its part, wanted to maintain a strong relationship with Somalia, especially as it has received an unmonitored and controversial fishing license from the Somali government. China also supports Somalia on the question of Somaliland.21 China sees Somaliland, a de facto independent state, as analogous to Taiwan. Recognition of Somaliland would thus set a precedent that would undermine the “One China” policy.

The U.S. has left an opening for these powers. The inaction and disengagement of the Trump administration allowed Russia to preemptively protect the region’s new authoritarians. In contrast, the upcoming Biden-Harris administration will likely hold the Horn of Africa Axis accountable for human rights violations and their destabilizing anti-democratic ways. Russia may be a latecomer to the 21st century version of the “Scramble for the Horn of Africa” but won’t mind claiming its spot as a competitor against China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the EU’s initiatives in the Horn of Africa.

Failing Horn of Africa Integration

The idea of integrating the various territories of the Horn of Africa has a long history. Current Horn of Africa integration initiatives echo the idea of “Greater Somalia.” This concept was championed by Benito Mussolini, who hoped to capture British-Somaliland, part of Ethiopia, and Italian Somalia to achieve the grandiose idea of an Italian East Africa empire. Mussolini imagined Italians settling in the territory. He also wanted to connect Assab (a port city in Eritrea) to Mogadishu in order to reduce the export cost of cotton, bananas, and other valuable commodities. In post-colonial times, this vision of integration has been revived and modified. Fidel Castro, for example, proposed a communist federation between Ethiopia and Somalia before the two countries went to war in 1977.

In the 21st century, the EU and the U.S. have pushed for Horn of Africa integration in three key areas: politics, economics, and security. This encouragement is an important reason why Horn of Africa Axis leaders pursued forming a new regional organization bloc. However, these initiatives have been dead on arrival for various reasons.

Events show that the region is disintegrated from a military and political point of view. To give a stark example of regional strife, the Ethiopian army committed war crimes in Somalia in 2006. Ethiopian forces have also not produced tangible results in the war against al-Shabab as a part of the AMISOM force. For its part, the Eritrean government is a former funder of the terrorist group al-Shabab, which has wreaked havoc in Somalia.

Destabilizing actions by Ethiopia and Eritrea in Somalia have precluded political integration. As a former Somali president said, “Simply put, neither Ethiopia nor Somalia is ready for deeper integration. Ethiopia is sliding toward instability and preoccupied with both internal ethnic conflicts and border disputes with Somalia and Eritrea.”22

From an economic point of view, the countries of the Horn of Africa have negligible engagement. This is the case for Eritrea and Somalia. As for Somalia and Ethiopia, several economic barriers currently stand between them. Ethiopia is foreclosing on Somalia’s future water rights by building more dams without consultation, which negatively impacts the Juba and Shabelle rivers. The two countries also do not have a transboundary water agreement, and Ethiopia is notorious for not sharing its river flow data. Already, these actions have contributed to recent floods and droughts according to regional water experts. While cross-border electrification initiatives are pushed by the World Bank and foreign donors to Somalia, they come with high risks such a lack of institutional oversight, infrastructural unpreparedness, and energy security politicization. Furthermore, the two countries have economies that are largely informal and affected by multiple problems such as high inflation, lack of security, indebtedness, high unemployment, and poor infrastructure with limited interconnectedness.

“Without decisive and sustainable policy moves, geopolitical dynamics in the Horn of Africa could sow the seeds for further turmoil within the next 20 years.”

Where the U.S. and EU Are Getting It Wrong

The U.S. has promoted misguided policy in the Horn of Africa region. For example, it supported an Ethiopian incursion into Somalia that resulted in war crimes against residents of Mogadishu in 2006.23 To date, victims have not been awarded any compensation and justice has not been served. In 2010, while speaking at the Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs, current U.S. ambassador to Somalia and former ambassador to Ethiopia(2006-2009), Donald Yamamoto said, “We’ve made a lot of mistakes and Ethiopia’s entry in 2006 was not a really good idea.”

Ambassador Yamamoto would do well to recognize that China poses a threat to U.S. interests in Somalia and to the region as a whole. One way that the U.S. could counter Chinese designs on Somalia is by encouraging the ties between Taiwan and Somaliland. So far, Yamamoto has remained silent about this bilateral relationship even though the U.S National Security Council sent out a congratulatory tweet about this emerging bond between Taiwan and Somaliland. U.S. inaction has emboldened President Farmaajo to align with Beijing.

EU policy toward the Horn of Africa has also yielded mixed results. It is wholly fixated on keeping migrants away from EU shores, making the region a hub for IDPs. The significant presence of IDPs tends to spur conflict. Africa watchers have argued that EU funding without proper checks and balances merely finances kleptocratic authoritarians. This model has already been tested with Turkey in order to keep Syrian refugees outside Europe. A negative consequence of this policy was to give Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan leverage over the EU. While EU leaders claim to want stability for the Horn of Africa, they continue sell arms to the region. In Germany, Chancellor Angela Merkel is pushing arms sales to the region and the continent to counter Russia and China.24 Similarly, French President Emmanuel Macron is helping Abiy develop a navy, despite Ethiopia being landlocked.25

The EU approach to migration, cyclical conflicts, and the impacts of climate change in the Horn of Africa is not working. Rather than throw money at problems, the EU must seek to cultivate good governance and institutions. Perhaps it is time to support an approach to sustainable development that takes power away from dictators and puts it in the hands of local actors. Current strategies have only resulted in mass migration and vulnerable youth who can easily be recruited by extremists. It is not surprising to see recurrent cycles of destruction and humanitarian crises in the region.

Opportunities for Biden

How can the Horn of Africa become peaceful and secure despite high levels of instability, mistrust, and unresolved border issues inherited from colonial times? With the rise of authoritarianism, repressive rule, terrorism, ethnic cleansing, nationalism, economic stagnation, and mass migration, this goal seems to be moving further away. Without decisive and sustainable policy moves, geopolitical dynamics in the Horn of Africa could sow the seeds for further turmoil within the next 20 years. What should the Biden administration do?

China Vaccine Politics

The Pfizer COVID-19 vaccine must be stored at -70 degrees Celsius, which will require costly refrigeration for safe distribution. Unfortunately, almost 40% of the healthcare facilities in Africa don’t have access to electricity, and only 28% of them have reliable electricity. China is speeding up distribution to Africa of its own vaccine, which requires storage at 2 to 8 degrees Celsius. Africa, due to its climate and level of development, may not be able to meet the refrigeration demands for either vaccine. This opens an opportunity for Biden to accelerate vaccine delivery and distribution through humanitarian channels, i.e. USAID and Direct Relief, and through investment channels or public-private partnerships, i.e. the International Development Finance Corporation.

AMISOM in Somalia

Recently the Ethiopian government redeployed 3,000 of its troops from Somalia to the civil war with TPFL.26 The Ethiopian troops in Somalia were ineffective in fighting al-Shabab terrorists, and most of its troops were supporting the government of Somalia to wage war against FMS. The recent U.S. troop pullout under Trump is also likely to embolden al-Shabab to capture more territories. Troops should remain in Somalia, but they should be UN peacekeepers with a five-year mandate rather than ineffective AMISOM troops. Due to their vested interests, countries like Kenya and Ethiopia should be excluded from any peacekeeping mission in Somalia

U.S. Horn of Africa Special Representative

Biden should consider appointing a special representative to oversee security and development in this increasingly important region. The representative’s mandate should also include the Red Sea. This position will help the State Department to better engage regional leaders and allies. Such engagement will help the U.S. to counter the aggressive expansion of Russian and Chinese interest in the region.

Reform Trade

The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) has significantly reduced the continent’s trade deficit with the U.S. to less than $5 billion.27 However, U.S. imports from Sub-Saharan African countries are concentrated in apparel and oil products.28 The Biden administration could increase non-oil exports from the region to the U.S. by prioritizing agro-manufacturing and fish processing industries, setting up more export zones, repealing all Trump tariffs against products that are produced in Africa, and adding new countries to the AGOA, such as Somalia and Eritrea.

War Against al-Shabab

The current government of Somalia has focused on waging war against FMS and instigating clan wars rather than fighting against al-Shabab. The Biden administration should hold Somalia accountable for its failures on human right and counterinsurgency. The administration must adopt diplomatic and economic strategies rather than drones. Furthermore, Biden could consider investing in and providing U.S. army training to local militia and Danab forces. They are more effective than the national army, which is hampered by weak federal institutions.29 Similarly, the Biden administration should invest in a strong finance tracking system and biometric registration, not only to track illegal activities, but also to build a voter registration system and promote democratic elections.
America can no longer sit on the sidelines and allow Russia and China to influence regional leaders, who have become addicted to Chinese predatory loans and Russian AK-47 diplomacy. Biden should implement a strategy that is designed by regional planners and economists, one that is based on strong, democratic institutions with the principle of “one person, one vote” and focuses on capacity building and tangible economic development.

Biden has a difficult task ahead if he is going to de-escalate tensions in the Horn of Africa. His administration has a chance to rectify the mistakes of American presidents over the past half century, who too often turned a blind eye to the destabilizing actions of dictators in the region. It is now or never, and as John F. Kennedy said, “Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make violent revolution inevitable.”

Endnotes

[1] Henneberg, Ingo and Stapel, Sören. “Cooperation and Conflict at the Horn of Africa: A New Regional Bloc Between Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia and Its Consequences for Eastern Africa,” Africa Spectrum, (August 2020). https://doi.org/10.1177/0002039720936689.

[2] Nyabiage, Jevans. “China’s Allies at Loggerheads Over Ethiopia Dam — Will Beijing Intervene?” South China Morning Post, July 26, 2020, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3094650/chinas-allies-loggerheads-over-ethiopia-dam-will-beijing.

[3] Atoma, Bekele. “Jawar Mohammed: The Ethiopian Media Mogul Taking on Abiy Ahmed,” BBC News, July 9, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-53306091.

[4] Elbagir, Nima, Arvanitidis, Barbara, and McSweeney, Eoin. “Forces From Ethiopia’s Tigray Region say Eritrean Troops are Part of the Conflict and the War is Far From Over,” CNN, December 4, 2020, https://www.cnn.com/2020/12/04/africa/ethiopia-war-tplf-exclusive-intl/index.html.

[5] Gettleman, Jeffrey, “Fueled by Bribes, Somalia’s Election Seen as Milestone of Corruption,” The New York Times, February 7, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/07/world/africa/somalia-election-corruption.html.

[6] “Corruption Perceptions Index,” Transparency International, https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2019.

[7] “UN Special Representative to Somalia and Head of UNSOM is “Persona Non Grata” – Somalia’s Foreign Ministry,” Somaliland Chronicle, January 1, 2019, https://somalilandchronicle.com/2019/01/01/un-special-representative-to-somalia-and-head-of-unsom-is-persona-non-grata-somalias-foreign-ministry/.

[8] Hassan, Abdiqani. “Leader of Somalia’s Jubbaland, at Odds With Mogadishu, Wins New Term,” Reuters, August 22, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-politics/president-of-somali-state-of-jubbaland-re-elected-in-divisive-vote-idUSKCN1VC15B?il=0.

[9] Gundel, Joakim. Debt Relief and the Political Marketplace in Somalia. London: London School of Economics Conflict Research Programme, November 2, 2020, http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/107125/1/CRP_debt_relief_and_political_marketplace_somalia.pdf.

[10] Rubin, Michael. “U.S. Ambassador Wasted $1B in Somalia and is Now Funding a Coup,” The Washington Examiner, February 7, 2020, https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/us-ambassador-wasted-1b-in-somalia-and-is-now-funding-a-coup; “Somalia: Journalists Under Attack,” Human Rights Watch, May 3, 2016, https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/05/03/somalia-journalists-under-attack#; Houreld, Katharine. “Exclusive: U.S. Suspends Aid to Somalia’s Battered Military Over Graft,” Reuters, December 14, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-military-exclusive/exclusive-u-s-suspends-aid-to-somalias-battered-military-over-graft-idUSKBN1E81XF.

[11] Bergman, Ronen and Kirkpatrick, David D. “With Guns, Cash, and Terrorism, Gulf States Vie for Power in Somalia,” The New York Times, July 22, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/22/world/africa/somalia-qatar-uae.html.

[12] Rubin, Michael. “Somalia’s Intelligence Chief Worked With an al Qaeda Affiliate, so Why Do We Fund Him?” American Enterprise Institute, November 16, 2020, https://www.aei.org/op-eds/somalias-intelligence-chief-worked-with-an-al-qaeda-affiliate-so-why-do-we-fund-him/; Ali, Abdullahi Mohamed. “Somalia Must Save Itself From Qatar,” The National Interest, June 22, 2020, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/somalia-must-save-itself-qatar-163233.

[13] Henry, Neil. “Rebels Force Somali Leader Out of Capital,” The Washington Post, January 1, 1991, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1991/01/01/rebels-force-somali-leader-out-of-capital/7e7267ef-139c-4108-bf67-73687a26a243/.

[14] Stevis-Gridneff, Matina. “How Forced Labor in Eritrea is Linked to EU-Funded Projects,” The New York Times, January 8, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/08/world/europe/conscription-eritrea-eu.html.

[15] Gettleman, Jeffrey. “Coup Attempt by Rebel Soldiers is Said to Fail in Eritrea,” The New York Times, January 21, 2013, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/22/world/africa/coup-attempt-fails-in-eritrea.html.

[16] “How is Russia Developing Rare Earth Metals?” Mining World Russia, March 3, 2020, https://miningworld.ru/Articles/how-is-russia-developing-rare-earth-metals#:~:text=As%20of%20June%202019%2C%20Russia,and%201.4m%20tons%20respectively.

[17] “Russia to Establish Military Base in Sudan,” Middle East Monitor, November 13, 2020, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20201113-russia-to-establish-military-base-in-sudan/.

[18] “Sudan’s President Bashir Asks Putin for ‘Protection’ From ‘Aggressive U.S.’” France 24, November 23, 2017, https://www.france24.com/en/20171123-sudan-president-bashir-asks-putin-protection-aggressive-us.

[19] Solomon, Salem. “Russia-Eritrea Relations Grow With Planned Logistics Center,” Voice of America, September 2, 2018, https://www.voanews.com/africa/russia-eritrea-relations-grow-planned-logistics-center.

[20] “Adopting Resolution 2551 (2020) by 13 Votes in Favour, 2 Abstentions, Security Council Extends Mandate for Expert Panel on Somalia, Renews Partial Lifting of Arms Embargo,” United Nations Security Council, November 12, 2020, https://www.un.org/press/en/2020/sc14355.doc.htm.

[21] “Report: Somali Fishermen Object to ‘Shocking’ Deal Allowing China in Their Waters,” Stop Illegal Fishing, February 8, 2019, https://stopillegalfishing.com/press-links/report-somali-fishermen-object-to-shocking-deal-allowing-china-in-their-waters/.

[22] Mohamud, Hassan Sheikh. “Somalia Must Learn to Stand Alone,” Foreign Affairs, November 25, 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/africa/2020-11-25/somalia-must-learn-stand-alone.

[23] “Somalia: War Crimes in Mogadishu,” Human Rights Watch, August 13, 2007, https://www.hrw.org/news/2007/08/13/somalia-war-crimes-mogadishu

[24] “Ethiopian Invasion of Somalia, a Debacle U.S. Official Says,” ECADF Ethiopian News, March 13, 2010, https://ecadforum.com/blog1/ethiopian-invasion-of-somalia-a-debacle-u-s-official-says/.

[25] Shelton, Jon. “Angela Merkel Calls for Weapons Exports to Africa,” DW, November 27, 2019, https://www.dw.com/en/angela-merkel-calls-for-weapons-exports-to-africa/a-51441421.

[26] Irish, John. “Ethiopia, France Sign Military, Navy Deal, Turn ‘New Page’ in Ties,” Reuters, March 12, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-france/ethiopia-france-sign-military-navy-deal-turn-new-page-in-ties-idUSKBN1QT2W3.

[27] Marks, Simon. “Ethiopia Withdraws Thousands of Troops From Neighboring Somalia,” Bloomberg, November 13, 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-11-13/ethiopia-withdraws-thousands-of-troops-from-neighboring-somalia.

[28] Grane, Allen. “What is the African Growth and Opportunity Act?” Council on Foreign Relations Africa in Transition, February 17, 2017, https://www.cfr.org/blog/what-african-growth-and-opportunity-act.

[29] U.S. Trade and Investment with Sub-Saharan Africa: Recent Trends and New Developments. Washington D.C.: U.S. International Trade Commission, March 2020, https://agoa.info/images/documents/15766/pub5043-usitc-report.pdf.

[30] Robinson, Colin D. and Matisek, Jahara. “Assistance to Locally Appropriate Military Forces in Southern Somalia,” The RUSI Journal 165, no. 4 (December 8, 2020), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03071847.2020.1830711?journalCode=rusi20&.

Statement on Ethiopia by the Senior Study Group on Peace and Security in the Red Sea Arena

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Source: USIP

As members of the bipartisan senior study group on peace and security in the Red Sea arena, we are watching with grave concern the situation in Ethiopia. While many of the facts remain unclear, the risks of escalation are certain: Intrastate or interstate conflict would be catastrophic for Ethiopia’s people and for the region and would pose a direct threat to international peace and security. The acceleration of polarization amid violent conflict would also mark the death knell for the country’s nascent reform effort that began two years ago and the promise of a democratic transition that it heralded.

As we cautioned in the study group’s Final Report and Recommendations released on October 29, the fragmentation of Ethiopia would be the largest state collapse in modern history. Ethiopia is five times the size of pre-war Syria by population, and its breakdown would lead to mass interethnic and interreligious conflict; a dangerous vulnerability to exploitation by extremists; an acceleration of illicit trafficking, including of arms; and a humanitarian and security crisis at the crossroads of Africa and the Middle East on a scale that would overshadow any existing conflict in the region, including Yemen. As Ethiopia is currently the leading Troop Contributing Country to the United Nations and the African Union peacekeeping missions in Sudan, South Sudan and Somalia, its collapse would also significantly impact the efforts by both to mitigate and resolve others conflicts in the Horn of Africa.

However severe the events of the last 48 hours and the preceding violence in multiple parts of the country may be, a wider war is not inevitable, nor is it too late to prevent one if Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy and Ethiopia’s federal states exercise responsible leadership. To do so, they must take immediate, visible steps to defuse the crisis and signal to the Ethiopian public a commitment to de-escalation. These steps should include a cessation of military operations and the launch of an inclusive political dialogue that is credible to the Ethiopian people and lays the groundwork for free and fair elections. Neither will be possible while many of the country’s most prominent political leaders remain in prison. In addition, the closing of political space and internet and communication blackouts must be reversed while intercommunal violence and the rise of incitement and hate speech are addressed.

At this crucial inflection point, the United States, its allies and partners in Europe and in the region, the members of the U.N. Security Council and the relevant multilateral organizations, including the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, must speak with one voice in promoting de-escalation on this basis. The United States should support initiatives by Ethiopian religious and civil society leaders to reach a peaceful resolution of the crisis. To reinforce these efforts, the United States, including Congress, should make clear that any change by force or fiat either to Ethiopia’s constitutional order or to its internal or external borders will not be recognized, in line with the African Union’s standards. The United States must also signal that it will hold accountable those responsible for escalation, including any foreign states that exacerbate tensions or provide material support to any of the parties to the conflict. And Ethiopian leaders should refrain from attempting to draw their neighbors into their domestic dispute. Finally, as recommended at length in our recent report, U.S. development and humanitarian assistance should be anchored in a commitment to promoting inclusive, legitimate governance.

Ambassador Johnnie Carson
Senior Advisor to the President, United States Institute of Peace
Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs

Ambassador Wendy Chamberlin
President Emeritus, Middle East Institute
Former Deputy U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
Former USAID Assistant Administrator for Asia-Near East

Ambassador Chester Crocker
James R. Schlesinger Professor of Strategic Studies, Georgetown University
Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs

Ambassador Eric Edelman
Roger Hertog Distinguished Practitioner-in-Residence, School for Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University
Former U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy
Former U.S. Ambassador to Turkey

Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman
Visiting Fellow, Brookings Institution
Senior Fellow, U.N. Foundation
Former U.N. Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs
Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs

Ambassador Michelle Gavin
Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations
Former Senior Director for Africa, U.S. National Security Council
Former U.S. Ambassador to Botswana

Nancy Lindborg
President and CEO, David and Lucile Packard Foundation
Former President, United States Institute of Peace
Former USAID Assistant Administrator for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance

Andrew Natsios
Executive Professor, Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University Former Administrator of USAID
Former Presidential Special Envoy for Sudan

General Joseph L. Votel
President and CEO, Business Executives for National Security
Former Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command and U.S. Central Comman

“America First” and Implications for US Strategy in the Horn of Africa

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Source: Small Wars | Richard McManamon

Abstract

Since taking office, President Trump has challenged the global order with his “America First” approach. He has questioned the role of the US and its Allies within NATO, exited the Paris Climate Accord, and entered into a trade battle with China. At the same time, the Trump administration has positioned both Russia and China as strategic rivals to the US and the new rise to great power competition. In the last decade, the US has witnessed aggressive actions by both countries in an effort to carve out new spheres of influence.

As the administration takes action to increase America’s competitive edge, President Trump’s foreign policies, specifically to the Horn of Africa, have been inconsistent resulting in a less strategic approach. It would appear as the US switches focus to great power competition, support to Africa decreases. This is not only a lost opportunity for the US to challenge China and Russia indirectly, but more importantly, allows these countries to exploit a gap and gain further influence throughout the region. The Horn of Africa continues to be a nexus for geopolitics and it’s critical that an America First approach does not undermine the US ability to maintain influence in the region.

The unprecedented election of Donald Trump in 2016 precipitated some substantial shifts in global order, especially regarding China and Russia. Russia demonstrated its ability to challenge existing borders and sovereignty by interventions in Ukraine and Georgia, while China has pushed its Belt and Road Initiative further across the globe. As both Russia and China continue such efforts to extend their global presence, it is perceived by some observers that these countries are creating new spheres of influence across the globe.

In thinking of spheres of influence, the Horn of Africa remains a strategic nexus for the US, Europe, and the Middle East due to its location and connection to trade. Following the region’s independence after World War II, many African states such as Somalia have struggled to build institutions that provide consistent essential services and overall security for their population.[1] The vulnerabilities facing the Horn are extensive and complicated, requiring a more comprehensive US strategy to better address the various threats. Compounding existing vulnerabilities, these threats are typically not confined to one state but affect the entire region. The systemic nature of these vulnerabilities is evidenced by repeated instances where one country’s crisis spreads across borders and into neighboring states.

Since 2017 in terms of foreign and security policy, the Trump administration placed a significant focus on the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and more recently, the Afghanistan peace talks while Africa has been under prioritized. Minimizing focus on Africa, especially the Horn of Africa, has the potential to present significant challenges for the US into the future. In this article, I argue that one of the prominent reasons for this low prioritization is President Trump’s “America First” approach to foreign policy. Additionally, the high turnover rate within the Trump administration among senior leaders has remained high and has likely caused significant disruptions in a comprehensive foreign strategy, specifically regarding Africa.

If the United States is to see another four years of the Trump administration, foreign policy changes must be enacted to secure US interests while strengthening the country’s allies, including in the region of the Horn of Africa. Additionally, a rise of great power competition will likely mean the Trump administration will continue to exercise the military as a principal tool in foreign policy. The implications of such action have the potential to undermine global order and push the US toward new conflicts.[2] Moreover, the significant ramifications for continuously expanding the military and using it as a primary tool for diplomacy are that the US ends up with a military-focused strategy that could result in another arms race with Russia. A comprehensive strategy that balances all the instruments of national power is essential to meet the challenges and objectives for the US and would better mitigate the consequences from a military-heavy foreign policy that focuses on the short term at the expense of long-term strategic gains. Trump’s emphasis on the military as the primary tool of foreign policy comes with inherent risks that may conflict with his intentions of reducing US forces abroad. These risks include potentially escalating already volatile conditions with countries such as North Korea and Iran.

America First

The Trump administration has positioned China and Russia as rivals that are challenging the US through political, military, and economic means.[3] In doing so, Trump has taken action to combat these perceived threats through executive orders, sanctions, and tariffs to increase America’s competitive edge. Additionally, the Trump administration renegotiated the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 2020, placed tariffs against China, exited the Paris Climate Accord in 2019, and left the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018.

Thus far, the Trump administration has taken broad action concerning long-standing agreements to make the US more competitive both domestically and internationally. Furthermore, Trump has publicly questioned the utility for the US regarding multilateralism.[4] Since taking office, President Trump has targeted NATO and challenged the organization’s policies and procedures. During his visit to Brussels in 2018, he stated that he believed European countries were taking advantage of US military resources and not paying their fair share.[5] This aggressive approach toward allies can draw significant media attention and other consequences, and I argue it damages the US’s reputation and its international relations in the long run. Additionally, Trump’s speeches at the UN projected an approach favoring nationalism over globalism,[6] which further underlines his America First platform for the United States going into the future. The implications of this approach highlight to the world that Trump is focusing his foreign policy in a way that quite literally puts the US “first”. The ramifications of a paradigm shift towards “America alone” and increasing isolationism are extremely dangerous, as globalization has connected countries and regions of the world like never before. Economies, markets, and industries are all interconnected in some form, and for a major actor such as the US to pursue a drastic foreign policy that excludes US partners may be detrimental to the country in the long-term.

In the short-term, the US has seen the effects of the trade war with China, which has caused significant swings in the stock markets.[7] Furthermore, the recent pandemic has raised questions on the source for many medications that are used by millions of Americans. An argument could be made for select drugs to be made in the US for national security reasons, but on a broader scale the issue of cost comes into play when contemplating drugs made only in the US. It is no secret that the US has one of the highest prices for prescription drugs, and it is possible that abandoning established supply chains with foreign countries could result in even higher costs for the average American.[8] Lastly, while President Trump has questioned the value of multilateralism, US strategy toward Africa has been inconsistent at times, placing the US at a disadvantage during the time of great power competition.

African Strategy

United States foreign security policy in Africa is at the time of writing guided by President Trump’s National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2017. The NSS references growing economies on the continent and vast partnership opportunities for the US and Africa as their markets and economies grow. The strategy, however, also mentions concerns about corruption and weak governance. Furthermore, the NSS explicitly highlights China’s growing presence within Africa and how select Chinese practices weaken the continent’s ability to build sustainable development.[9] Likewise, the NSS states, “China and Russia target their investments in the developing world to expand influence and gain competitive advantages against the United States.”[10]

Since the publication of the NSS in 2017, US foreign policy towards Africa has fallen short for multiple reasons. Firstly, the Trump administration has experienced significant turnover in crucial personnel over the past three years. Peter Schraeder highlights that in the first twenty months of the new administration, the President had three different National Security Advisors, and Robert O’Brien was appointed as the fourth advisor in September of 2019.[11] Moreover, this high turnover rate puts the US at a significant disadvantage by owing to a lack of continuity and to the varying goals of each advisor. Brookings reports that among members of Trump’s executive office, he has experienced an 86 percent turnover rate, and 38 percent of those positions have experienced two or more replacements.[12] Similarly, Schraeder describes how the sudden removal of Secretary of State Rex Tillerson sent a negative message to Africa, as the President replaced him immediately following a trip to numerous African states.[13] The dismissal of Tillerson signaled to African countries that the validity of their conversations with the Secretary of State was in question and future cooperation with the US remained uncertain. Secondly, the Trump administration has looked to shift priorities away from Africa as the administration focuses on increased power competition with China and Russia. Mary Beth Long, a former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, stated: “We’re not even clear from an intelligence standpoint on what the underpinnings of a strategy would attempt to address and in part that’s because we have inadequate resources dedicated to the African continent.”[14]

Thirdly, in early 2020, the Pentagon ordered a review of forces within Africa by Defense Secretary Esper to see if troops can be realigned to other mission priorities.[15] This review comes at a critical juncture as great power competition with Russia and China has increased while the security environment in the Horn of Africa has remained fragile. It’s important to the US that during the review, the Pentagon considers that the US can effectively challenge Russia and China within the Horn as part of their broader great power competition. Furthermore, reducing US assets in the region can allow China to exploit the minimal US presence and also presents opportunities for further instability across the region. Highlighting this tenuous environment, the US experienced its first attack by Al-Shabaab, which killed three Americans at an airfield in Manda Bay, Kenya, on January 5, 2020.[16] This attack stresses the fragile environment throughout the Horn and the need for targeted US support to safeguard US interests throughout the region.

In addition to the impeachment trial of President Trump and the upcoming 2020 elections, the White House has been dealing with an array of global issues including, but not limited, a trade war with China, negotiations with the Taliban in Afghanistan, and managing the global coronavirus pandemic. While these global issues are all a significant demand on the US resources, it would appear that Africa is falling lower on the US priority list. This should be a concern as it provides China and Russia the opportunity to expand and increase their overall influence in the region at the cost of the US. Moreover, the region’s populace continues to suffer from instability, violence from groups such as Al-Shabaab, and weak institutions that lack the ability to provide basic services.

US Future in Africa

US troop levels do not on their own determine presence and influence in Africa, and over the years the US has also become a meaningful trading partner to the continent, showing the role of economic engagement. However, today China has surpassed the US as Africa’s largest trading partner.[17] While President Trump has talked of increasing cooperation with Africa, his current foreign policy severely hinders its ability to do so. Trump’s administration launched a US initiative called “Prosper Africa” with the intent of growing partnerships between the US and Africa and empowering US private sector involvement in Africa.[18] Long-term collaboration and globalization have intertwined economies, and the US shares the same concerns many African states do regarding insecurity throughout the region. However, without a clear, consistent foreign policy and African strategy, the effectiveness of any initiative will be mired. As the US continues its role in the region, it must develop an effective approach that balances national competitiveness, securing national interests, and strengthening relations with African leaders across the region.

One example of an US initiative program is the International Development Finance Corporation (DFC). In 2019 the US government created the DFC, which forms a consolidated effort with the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and the US Agency for International Development (USAID). The DFC attempts to further US foreign policy and private sector competitiveness through multiple mediums, including equity financing, debt financing, political risk insurance, and technical development.[19] While the DFC operates worldwide, the level of involvement within the Horn of Africa is relatively limited compared to many other regions of the world except for Kenya. Somalia and Ethiopia make up only three projects consisting of nearly US $13 million, whereas Colombia has ten projects totaling over $1 billion and Sri Lanka has four projects totaling $19 million.[20] As the Trump administration places Russia and China as primary competitors on the world stage, not challenging them within the Horn of Africa is a severe US shortcoming. If the US is entering into another era of great power competition, the US must look to challenge China directly and indirectly in areas such as the Horn of Africa. To meet this challenge, the US needs to increase and diversify DFC efforts in the region while maximizing the partnerships and programs it has already developed. While US investment in the region is critical, the effective use of military and diplomatic powers will play an increasingly important role to the Horn, which can significantly aid in US influence and further strengthen US-Africa relations.

Great Power Competition in Africa

As the Trump administration looks to the future, the administration must develop a comprehensive strategy for the continent and especially the Horn of Africa. The geopolitics of the Horn cannot be understated, and the volume of foreign actors throughout the region highlights this importance. If the US pursues an America alone-type foreign policy, it risks alienating many African states that have developed relations with the US over decades. Furthermore, this isolation-like approach will push African leaders to other more developed nations like Russia and China, undermining the US efforts toward great power competition.

The next decade will likely play a decisive role throughout the region, as China strives to expand its Belt and Road Initiative further, and the US reevaluates its presence in Africa. If the US prioritizes great power competition as stated in the NSS, the US needs to challenge China and Russia indirectly in places such as the Horn of Africa. An effective strategy within the region allows for significant benefits in line with US national interests.

Although the current roles of China and Russia in the Horn of Africa may appear insignificant than other regions, it is critical given contemporary debates on security and global order, regional security, and challenges to political and economic US national interests. Furthermore, the US can challenge China and Russia as part of great-power competitions both directly and indirectly, for example through the US private sector taking a larger portion of African market share and increasing specific investment into the region. An effective strategy in the Horn of Africa must limit China’s and Russia’s expansion and increase US interests with an eye on long-term effects while building African capacity and security.

Endnotes

[1] J. J. Messner et al., Fragile States Index Annual Report 2019 (Washington, DC: The Fund for Peace, 2019), https://fragilestatesindex.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/9511904-fragilestatesindex.pdf.

[2] David Barno and Nora Bensahel, “Trump’s Next Task: Learning the Limits of Military Power,” War on the Rocks, May 2, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/05/trumps-next-task-learning-the-limits-of-military-power/.

[3] White House, National Security Strategy (Washington, D. C: White House, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.

[4] Demetri Sevastopulo and Peter Spiegel, “Donald Trump Questions US Role in NATO,” Financial Times, March 21, 2016, https://www.ft.com/content/2695854c-efaf-11e5-a609-e9f2438ee05b.

[5] Michael Birnbaum and Seung Min Kim, “Trump Calls Out NATO Members, Demands More Spending,” The Mercury News, July 11, 2018, last updated July 12, 2018, https://www.mercurynews.com/2018/07/11/trump-calls-out-nato-members-demands-more-spending/.

[6] Julian Borger, “Donald Trump Denounces ‘Globalism’ in Nationalist Address to UN,” The Guardian, September 24, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/sep/24/donald-trump-un-address-denounces-globalism.

[7] Reshma Kapadia, “There’s a Trade Deal with China. Here’s Why the Stock Market Isn’t Thrilled,” Barrons, December 13, 2019, https://www.barrons.com/articles/u-s-china-trade-deal-confusion-stocks-are-volatile-51576254365.

[8] Hannah Kuchler, “Why Prescription Drugs Cost so Much More in America.” Financial Times, September 18, 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/e92dbf94-d9a2-11e9-8f9b-77216ebe1f17.

[9] White House, National Security Strategy (Washington, D. C: White House, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.

[10] Ibid., 38.

[11] Peter J. Schraeder, “Making America Great Again’ Against the Backdrop of an ‘Africa Rising’? The Trump Administration and Africa’s Marginalization within US Foreign Policy,” Seton Hall Journal of Diplomacy & International Relations 20, no. 1 (Fall/Winter 2018), https://nduezproxy.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com.nduezproxy.idm.oclc.org/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip,url,uid&db=tsh&AN=136124986&site=eds-live&scope=site.

[12] Kathryn Dunn Tenpas, “Tracking Turnover in the Trump Administration,” Brookings, May 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/research/tracking-turnover-in-the-trump-administration/.

[13] Peter J. Schraeder, “Making America Great Again,”2018.

[14] Katie Williams, “From Small Wars to Great Power, Trump’s Africa Reset could Change US Military’s Role,” Defense One, December 12, 2018, https://www.defenseone.com/politics/2018/12/small-wars-great-power-trumps-africa-reset-could-change-us-militarys-role/153485/.

[15] Lara Seligman and Robbie Gramer, “Pentagon Debates Drawdown in Africa, South America,” Foreign Policy, January 30, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/30/pentagon-troop-drawdown-africa-south-america-sahel-capitol-hill-congress-trump/.

[16] Wynne Davis, “3 Americans Killed in Attack on Kenyan Airfield by Al-Shabab Militants,” NPR.com, January 5, 2020, https://www.npr.org/2020/01/05/793752674/airfield-used-by-u-s-forces-in-kenya-comes-under-attack-by-al-shabab-militants.

[17] Lauren Blanchard and Sarah Collins, China’s Engagement in Djibouti, CRS Report No. IF11304 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF11304.pdf.

[18] International Trade Administration, “Prosper Africa,” US Department of Commerce, accessed January 14, 2020, https://www.trade.gov/prosper-africa.

[19] DFC.gov, “US International Development Finance Corporation,” DFC.gov, https://www.dfc.gov/who-we-are.

[20] U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, “Active DFC Projects-Map View,” DFC.gov, project date as of December 31, 2019, https://www3.opic.gov/ActiveProjectsMap/Default.aspx#

Who Will Call Out Eritrea’s War Crimes in Tigray?

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By Alex de Waal | World Peace Foundation 

Eritrea has deployed most of its army in Tigray region of Ethiopia. This is no secret. At minimum, 12 divisions have been fighting inside Tigray.

At first, the United States gave Eritrea a free pass, expressing “thanks to Eritrea for not being provoked” into retaliating after a TPLF rocket attack on Asmara. Later it admitted that Eritrea was a belligerent. The United Nations Secretary General repeated Ethiopian PM Abiy Ahmed’s assertion that Eritrean troops had not crossed the border. The Chairperson of the African Union has carefully said nothing on the issue.

It is lawful for a state to request the military assistance of another state. The involvement of Eritrea in Ethiopia isn’t illegal per se.

But there is mounting evidence that activities of Eritrean troops include perpetrating war crimes on a vast scale. Every report from the northern parts of Tigray speaks about Eritrean soldiers looting. They ransacked the town of Shire. They shelled Humera close to the Sudanese border. They systematically dismantled the university and pharmaceutical factory in Adigrat. They stole cars, generators, and high value goods. Now we hear that they are combing ordinary houses in towns and villages, taking such basic items as furniture, doors, and jerrycans. Eritreans are said to have emptied food stores and looted cattle, sheep and goats.

Catholic priests in Eritrea were horrified by the looted items coming into Eritrea from Tigray and admonished anyone buying them. Despite the information blackout, journalists have pieced together enough information on these actions.

International criminal law prohibits a belligerent from removing, destroying or rendering useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population. The fast-approaching humanitarian crisis with at least 2 million displaced is due not only to fighting but to starvation crimes such as these.

Eritrean troops overran and emptied four refugee camps where Eritreans who had escaped their country had been living, until last month under the protection of the Ethiopian government. That’s another violation of international law.

As the weeks pass, it is becoming ever clearer that President Isseyas Afewerki has long planned this war with the intention of annihilating the TPLF and reducing Tigray to a condition of complete incapacity. His strategy is to say nothing and make a fait accompli on the assumption that the world will, in due course, come to live with it.

If anyone should doubt Isseyas’s intent, they should reflect on the way in which he has dealt with domestic opposition. In September 2001, while international attention was consumed by the al-Qaeda attacks on New York and Washington DC, he arrested eleven high-ranking colleagues, heroes of the liberation war, who had called for democratization, and ten journalists. They have never been seen since. After PM Abiy Ahmed visited Asmara in 2018 to end the long-dormant peace process between the two countries, Eritrea did not liberalize or demobilize its army. Nothing was said about political prisoners. Eritreans complained that nothing changed for them. For Pres. Isseyas, it wasn’t peace—it was a new opportunity to consolidate despotism.

Who will call out Eritrea’s role in the destruction of Tigray?

What Ethiopia’s Brewing Conflict Means for the Country—and the Region

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Source: Small Wars | Aly Verjee and Susan Stigant | USIP Publication

A protracted conflict between the federal government and the Tigray region is still not inevitable, but it will require both sides to choose another path.

Violent conflict between the federal government of Ethiopia and the federal state of Tigray, in the country’s north, began November 4 and quickly escalated. USIP’s Aly Verjee and Susan Stigant discuss the crisis and identify what could be done to avoid further violent conflict in east Africa’s most populous country.

Unfortunately, violence is not new to Ethiopia; already, there are over 1.4 million conflict-affected internally displaced persons in the country. What is the broader significance of this latest violence between the federal government and the Tigray region?

Stigant: The rapidity of the escalation of violence between Tigray and Addis Ababa is concerning in itself, given the stakes for Ethiopia’s peace and stability. This conflict has the potential to quickly become more polarized and increase violence throughout Ethiopian society. Already, the Tigray region has called for the full mobilization of all citizens to fight. The federal government, led by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, has also used uncompromising language to justify his government’s actions. As the allegations and incidents mount—including possible war crimes—and the number of people affected increases, it will become much harder to find a peaceful solution.

At the same time, solely focusing on what is going on today in Tigray risks obscuring broader concerns about violence, democratic backsliding, and repression elsewhere in the country. As a horrific example of the type of violence in Ethiopia that has become all too common, on November 1, ethnically targeted killings left at least 54 people dead in a schoolyard in the Wollega zone of Oromia state. Throughout western Ethiopia, communal violence has only increased since 2018. In southern Ethiopia, tensions remain high, as the consequences of the model of ethnic federalism continue to unfold.

Verjee: As I warned in April 2019, tensions between the regions have the potential to overwhelm the political management capacity of the center. The conflict in Tigray has already pulled in forces from the neighboring Amhara Regional State to fight the Tigrayans. The leadership of the Somali Regional State has also taken the side of the federal government in the dispute. In the broader context, it does not really matter who is responsible for starting the violence; all Ethiopians, no matter their ethnicity, have to find a way to live side-by-side, which will not be accomplished by jailing or killing the political and military elite of Tigray. The ruling party of Tigray, the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), which once led the ruling party coalition that preceded the Abiy government, are no angels. But for the federal government to risk throwing the whole country into a protracted civil conflict—with significant cross-border consequences—is also highly unfortunate.

Already, a humanitarian crisis is in the making. More than 11,000 refugees have already crossed the border with Sudan, with thousands more almost certain to follow. Drawing in Eritrea and Sudan into the conflict may easily bring in other regional and extra-regional powers, leaving the Horn of Africa in a complicated, messy crisis from which it may take many years to recover, at a cost of thousands of lives. As the USIP Red Sea Senior Study Group recently warned, “Intrastate or interstate conflict would be catastrophic for Ethiopia’s people and for the region and would pose a direct threat to international peace and security.”

The dispute between Tigray and the federal government has been festering for some time. Could violence be avoided?

Stigant: The federal government has characterized its action as a rule of law operation to uphold the constitution, and that it would act with “utmost care for the overall wellbeing, safety and security of our citizens.” The federal government has described the September 2020 elections held by the Tigray region as illegitimate and has objected to equating the federal government to the TPLF. While there are more than two sides to every story, there is little doubt that relations were strained with Tigray. That said, the paramount constitutional right of any citizen is the right to life. Before resorting to military action and the attendant deaths of Ethiopian citizens, every other possibility needed to be exhausted, even if the Tigray authorities were being uncooperative. More pragmatically, the use of force rarely works to sustain a political settlement, as the history of Ethiopia has shown on numerous occasions.

As the cornerstone of his rule, Prime Minister Abiy set out a philosophy of medemer, or coming together, to overcome the divisions of the past. Less than a year ago, in accepting the Nobel Peace Prize, Abiy mentioned the word love seven times, and the words forgiveness and reconciliation four times each. Ethiopia does not need Abiy to love Tigray, nor vice versa; but forgiveness and reconciliation cannot occur if belligerent parties do not show restraint.

Verjee: The federal government has already suspended fiscal transfers to Tigray and cut off communications and cross-border trade. Even if the allegation that the TPLF posed an imminent threat by its purported seizure of weapons and a military base is entirely accurate, a proportionate, limited response was the most that could be justified. Although the federal government has said that its operations will be time limited, Abiy has also said that he will not rest until the “the criminal junta is disarmed, legitimate administration in the region restored, and fugitives apprehended and brought to justice,” which are objectives that could take months, if not years, to achieve. Although the warning signs have been there for some time, a protracted violent conflict is still not inevitable, but it will require both sides to choose another path.

Abiy should also consider that his own position as head of the government comes in the context of an ongoing debate about the future of the constitutional order of Ethiopia. Were it not for COVID-19, Ethiopia should have held elections this year, in which Abiy would have had the opportunity to obtain a democratic mandate. Abiy may be prime minister and enjoy the powers of that office but should consider his administration bound by norms that limit the actions of an unelected official.

To date, the federal government has rejected mediation of this crisis. Going forward, what role should national and international actors play to try and de-escalate the situation?

Stigant: For years, Ethiopia has been at the heart of establishing regional and continental mechanisms for addressing violent conflict. These include the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism of the regional intergovernmental organization IGAD, which Ethiopia chaired for years, and the Peace and Security Council and the Panel of the Wise of the African Union (AU). As the AU’s host nation, there is arguably a special responsibility on Ethiopia to call on these indigenous African institutions not as an intrusion on sovereignty, but to model exemplary behavior for all African states.

Domestically, there have been multiple calls for a national dialogue to forge a political agreement regarding the conduct of elections and then on the constitutional order following the elections. As violence escalates in the country, it becomes both more urgent and more challenging to move a dialogue process forward. While the federal government has already announced such an effort, any initiative will need to be revisited in light of the changing circumstances. Ultimately, the credibility of any dialogue will be judged on the extent to which it includes key groups, reaches agreement on preparatory steps and confidence-building measures, and demonstrates that people can have genuine, safe, and frank conversations.

Verjee: The United States, the European Union, and the United Kingdom, all leading humanitarian donors, should urgently articulate the acute priority of preserving and enhancing humanitarian access to Tigray on the ground, to internally displaced persons moving to other states of Ethiopia, and to the refugees in Sudan. There is no acceptable reason for impeding this kind of access.

More broadly, as USIP’s Payton Knopf has written, international inertia on Ethiopia cannot be justified by imperfect or incomplete information. While American leverage on Ethiopia has been damaged by President Trump’s remarks on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, Ethiopia remains a vital strategic partner for the United States in matters of regional security, counterterrorism, migration, and peacekeeping. China is also massively invested in Ethiopia, in many deals that were reached in the days of the rule of the TPLF. Therefore, the United States, China, and others have a mutual interest in seeing a quick end to hostilities, creating the space for other forms of dialogue and discussion. While a formal international mediation process may not be necessary, honest international brokers should urgently convey to both sides, in unequivocal terms, their expectation and hope that hostilities should be halted without further delay.

Is the War in Ethiopia’s Tigray Region Ending or Only Just Beginning?

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The Jamestown Foundation | Michael Horton

On November 28, Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali declared victory in his government’s three- week-long war against the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) (al-Jazeera, November 28). Abiy’s declaration followed the seizure by federal troops of Mekelle, which is the capital city of Ethiopia’s Tigray region (Nazret, November 28; Ethiopian News Agency, December 3). The fight for Mekelle, a city of over a half a million, was quickly concluded as TPLF troops carried out a strategic withdrawal from the city. The TPLF, which commands at least 100,000 fighters and possesses an abundance of heavy weaponry, could have fought to retain control of what has long been their seat of power. [1] Instead, they chose to retreat to the surrounding mountains.

This strategic retreat and the TPLF’s long and storied history as skilled guerrilla fighters does not bode well for Prime Minister Abiy’s hasty declaration of victory. Until 2018, the TPLF was the dominant political power in Ethiopia and has governed much of the Tigray region since its rise to prominence in the late 1970s. The armed forces loyal to the TPLF include many of Ethiopia’s most experienced and well-trained officers, NCOs, and enlisted men and women. The TPLF, which oversaw Ethiopia’s brutally efficient internal security service during its time as the country’s preeminent political party (1991-2018), can also draw on hundreds of well-trained intelligence officers and agents.

In addition to its thousands of soldiers, the TPLF has long had access to heavy and medium weaponry dating from its time as the predominant political power. For the three decades in which it dominated Ethiopian politics, the TPLF leadership made sure that ethnic Tigrayan troops received the best weapons and training. While there was an ethnic component to these efforts, the Tigray region shares a border with Eritrea. When the TPLF controlled Ethiopia, it oversaw a costly two-year long war (1998-2000) with Eritrea in which Tigrayan officers held many of the senior commands.

If the TPLF chooses to fight a protracted guerrilla war, it is well prepared to do so. Besides an abundance of capable fighters, intelligence officers, and caches of weaponry, the mountainous Tigray region is ideal terrain for guerrilla warfare. It is also doubtful that the TPLF would feel constrained to limit its attacks to targets within the Tigray region. The TPLF has the means to conduct covert attacks on soft targets throughout Ethiopia. [2]

A War Everyone Knew was Coming

Sidelining elites, especially when they have held power for three decades, is always fraught with potential blowback. Prime Minister Abiy’s rise to power within the ruling coalition party, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), was swift. When Abiy assumed the office of prime minister in April 2018, he lost no time in enacting sweeping and much needed governmental, economic, and security sector reforms. The TPLF, which was the dominant member of the EPRDF governing coalition, had maintained a firm grip on the levers of power since its members overthrew Ethiopia’s Marxist Derg regime led by Mengitsu Haile Mariam in 1991. [3] While the overthrow of the Derg improved the lives of many Ethiopians, the TPLF leadership banned opposition parties, imprisoned dissidents, limited non-state sanctioned media, and was slow to enact needed economic reforms.

In his first months in office, Abiy’s government freed thousands of political prisoners, announced that it would amend Ethiopia’s harsh anti-terrorism law, and allowed for more press freedom. Abiy also tackled constitutional reform as he sought to move away from Ethiopia’s ethnically based federal system. On the international front, Abiy signed a Joint Declaration of Peace and Friendship with Eritrea in July 2018, for which he won the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize. In November 2019, the EPRDF ruling coalition was rolled into a political party called the Prosperity Party, led by Abiy. Notably, the TPLF refused to join the new Prosperity Party Coalition (Africa News, November 21, 2019).

The speed of Abiy’s reforms over the last three years has been nothing short of stunning. The refusal of the TPLF to join the newly formed Prosperity Party in late 2019 was a proverbial shot across the bow. In October 2020, the TPLF leadership denied the Abiy-led government’s right to rule stating that Abiy’s postponement of the August 2020 elections due to COVID-19 violated the constitution (Africa News, June 24; The Reporter May 9). The TPLF held its own regional elections in September of 2020 in the Tigray region (al-Jazeera, September 9; The East African, September 9). The central government in Addis Ababa ruled the election null and void (al-Jazeera, October 19).

While many of the Abiy government’s reforms are laudable, an undercurrent of fear runs alongside them. Many politicians within not only the TPLF, but also within other regional and ethnic political parties worry about the re-centralization of political power at the expense of regional level authority.

These fears were already pervasive in Tigray in September 2019, with many members of the TPLF and the armed forces it commands actively preparing for armed conflict with the national government. During this author’s trip to the Tigray region in September 2019, the tension in what were then TPLF controlled cites of Adwa, Mekelle and Axum was palpable. In the countryside, many communities—those that were able—were setting aside extra stores of grain to guard against shortages arising from a war that many thought imminent.

War and Legitimacy

Over the course of 2019 and into 2020, relations between the federal government and the TPLF steadily deteriorated. Open conflict began on November 4 when military forces loyal to the TPLF launched a preemptive attack on the Ethiopian National Defense Force’s (ENDF) Northern Command Headquarters near Tigray’s capital city of Mekelle (TRT World, December 3). TPLF forces rapidly overran the command headquarters and a number of minor outposts. However, ENDF units, which were prepositioned in preparation for such a conflict, launched successful counter-attacks on multiple fronts within 24 hours of the assault. Within hours ENDF mechanized units seized control of most of Route 1, a major road that connects Mekelle with points north and south, thereby cutting off the city. [4]

The outbreak of hostilities did not come as a surprise to Abiy’s government. Preparations for war by both the ENDF and the TPLF have been underway for months in the case of the former, and likely for much of the last year in the case of the latter. “Prime Minister Abiy and Debretsion Gebremichael (leader of the TPLF and president of the Tigray region) backed each other into a corner,” explained an Ethiopia-based analyst and former security official. “By moving slower with his reforms, especially with political reforms, Abiy could have achieved more and avoided war,” the same analyst explained. “Abiy put the old guard of the TPLF in a position where the only option left for them was to revert to what brought them to power in the first place: war.” [5]

The TPLF, which formed in 1975, grew from a few cells of no more than two hundred men and women into a highly capable political and military organization that would lead the effort to overthrow the Mengitsu regime in May 1991. [6] TPLF leaders combined political acumen with a sophisticated military strategy that embraced guerrilla warfare whilst also preparing and training its fighters to engage in traditional battles involving artillery and tanks. Simultaneously, the TPLF developed an extensive countrywide network of intelligence assets that helped its leaders to liaise with other groups battling the Derg and to coordinate attacks on regime targets.

Despite internecine fighting with rival groups like the Marxist-Leninist League of Tigray (MLLT) and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), the TPLF retained and enhanced its role as Ethiopia’s preeminent rebel group. In 1988, the TPLF helped found the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), the political coalition that dominated Ethiopian politics from the overthrow of Mengitsu in 1991 until its displacement in 2019 by the Prosperity Party.

The TPLF’s role within the EPRDF government was, for much of the last three decades, out of all proportion to the size of the population of Tigray. Tigrayans only make up six percent of Ethiopia’s population of 110 million. The TPLF long justified the disproportionate size of its role in government by pointing to the fact that TPLF fighters made up the largest contingent of those forces that opposed the Derg and battled Eritrea.

“Tigrayans and the TPLF view themselves as Ethiopia’s liberators from the Derg and as its defenders against outside enemies like the Eritreans,” a former member of the TPLF explained. “It is this position as Ethiopia’s liberators and defenders that the TPLF use to justify their power. They will fight to retain what they view as their hard-earned right to govern—at least in Tigray.”

Cycles of Violence: Igniting Ethiopia’s Ethnic and Inter-Religious Tinderbox

At a minimum, the TPLF wants to retain control of the Tigray region. Abiy’s proposed reforms to Ethiopia’s ethnic based federal system are viewed as a direct threat to the TPLF and to what many in the party and Tigray region see as de facto independence. These reforms which aim to weaken Ethiopia’s ethnically based federalism in favor of a pan-nationalist framework are also viewed as a threat to self-determination by other ethnic political parties. The TPLF has long enjoyed a free hand within Tigray where, under the federal system, it is charged with most administrative decisions and affairs. Additionally, the TPLF maintains control of regional police, security services, and militias.

Beyond retaining control of the Tigray region, it is unclear what the TPLF’s ultimate goal might be. The current Ethiopian Constitution, ratified in 1995, guarantees the right of self-determination—and even the right to secede—to every nation and people in Ethiopia. [7] The Abiy government’s declaration of the September 2020 Tigrayan elections as illegal and the suspension of the disbursement of federal funds to the region have both been viewed by the TPLF as attacks on regional autonomy (Ethiopia Insight, October 19).

The measures taken by the Abiy government, while possibly justified, will stoke resentment among Tigrayans. If these actions are followed by punitive military campaigns and ethnic profiling, the TPLF will have no shortage of support for what could be a long and costly war. Unfortunately, incidents of ethnic based violence by the TPLF, the Abiy government, the Ethiopian National Defense Force, and regional militias are already being reported.

TPLF-linked militias are accused of attacking day laborers who belong to the major ethnic Amhara group in the town of May Cadera with machetes. Unverified reports suggest that over 600 civilians were killed in the attack. [8] The attack follows reports of Tigrayans living outside of the Tigray region being imprisoned, fired from their jobs, and expelled from ethnically mixed communities in major cities. [9]  Some reports indicate that militias consisting of ethnic Amharas, known as the Fano, are fighting against the TPLF in southern Tigray. If such ethnic based attacks persist and worsen, the war in Tigray will spread beyond the region’s borders. The TPLF possesses the ability to launch retaliatory attacks on targets outside of Tigray and indeed, as evidenced by rocket attacks on the Eritrean capital of Asmara on November 14 and 27, outside of Ethiopia (al-Jazeera, November 29). [10] Ethnically-driven attacks by any of the warring parties could lead to spiraling violence. The Abiy government has previously accused the TPLF of stoking ethnic tensions in other parts of Ethiopia like Oromia, a regional state of the country, in a bid to destabilize Abiy’s government. [11]

Ethiopia is a tinderbox of ethnic tensions. A rebellion in Tigray and a heavy-handed response by the Abiy government could ignite tensions in other areas like the Oromia regional state, the ethnically Somali regional state in the Ogaden area, the Afar region, and the Gambella region. In the case of Oromia, inter-communal and inter-religious violence have already resulted in hundreds of dead and the internal displacement of thousands. Many of these areas, like most of Ethiopia, are underdeveloped and have derived limited benefit from Ethiopia’s recent economic boom. Most of the gains from the boom remain concentrated among Ethiopia’s elite (with Tigrayans still representing many of these elite stakeholders) in the national capital of Addis Ababa. While Ethiopia, like many African countries, has not suffered much of an impact from the coronavirus pandemic, the economic fallout from international efforts to combat the virus are taking a serious toll on the Ethiopian economy. A slowing economy and reduced international investment as well as rising food prices will further exacerbate ethnic and inter-religious tensions.

While many Ethiopians view the TPLF negatively due to its former primacy in national politics, others are sympathetic to the TPLF’s claim that it is defending regional autonomy. During the 1980s, the TPLF proved adept at building ties with other ethnically based political and rebel groups. [12] The TPLF will pursue a similar strategy if it fights a protracted war in Tigray. The leadership of the TPLF will build on its relations with other political and rebel groups in a bid to combat the Abiy government. Harsh responses by Ethiopia’s security services and military to local protests and/or armed factions will feed existing cycles of violence and start new ones.

Regional Implications

Ethiopia is the preeminent military and economic power in the Horn of Africa. Any serious instability in Ethiopia will impact neighboring countries and the broader region. The war in Tigray is already in danger of destabilizing parts of Kassala state in eastern Sudan which now hosts an estimated 50,000 refugees from Tigray. [13] The Tigray region itself was already home to over 100,000 Eritrean refugees.

The TPLF, which has twice fired rockets into Eritrea, claims that Eritrean troops are aiding Abiy’s war against them. TPLF leaders accuse the Eritrean Army of operating deep within Ethiopia’s northern border, something that U.S. officials have seemingly confirmed (al-Ahram, December 2). [14] The presence of Eritrean troops on Ethiopian territory could easily revive old and long-standing tensions over border areas.

Further afield, Ethiopia has withdrawn large numbers of troops from the ethnically Somali Ogaden to bolster its efforts in Tigray (Somali Affairs, November 3). These units police Ethiopia’s long border with Somalia and periodically operate within Somalia where they aid that country’s fight against al-Shabaab. The Ogaden is also home to the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), which has fought for the right of self-determination for the ethnic Somalis who inhabit the region. The ONLF declared a unilateral ceasefire in 2018 and recently called for all parties in the war in Tigray to negotiate. However, the ONLF, like other rebel groups active in Ethiopia, may take advantage of opportunities arising from a weakened Abiy government.

If the war persists, it has the potential to attract outside powers with an interest in aiding stability in Ethiopia or, conversely, instability. Instability can be easily encouraged through the covert provision of aid and arms to Ethiopia’s armed rebel groups. One need only look at the civil war in Yemen, where at least six outside powers are involved, to see how such events could play out in Ethiopia. Even at this early stage in the war in Tigray, there are unconfirmed reports that in addition to Eritrea, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is involved, at least at a low level, in the conflict. [15]

Outlook

Barring deft and realistic negotiations between the warring parties, the TPLF leadership, or at least factions within the leadership, may launch a long and costly guerrilla war. The TPLF has the means and knowledge to fight a war that could persist—at least on a low level—for years. While the Ethiopian military is capable and well-equipped, it will struggle to contain an insurgency in Tigray’s mountainous terrain. If the Ethiopian military engages in ethnically driven attacks on suspected supporters of the TPLF, the insurgency will only grow and spread. A lengthy war in Tigray will seep into other Ethiopian regions and may attract the benign and malevolent interest of multiple outside powers.

Notes

[1] Estimates of TPLF troop strength range as high as 250,000. It is difficult to assess actual troop strength due to the presence of a large number of informal militias loyal to the TPLF. A more accurate and conservative estimate of the number of men and women in formal and informal fighting forces loyal to the TPLF is 100,000 to 125,000.

[2] Author interview with former government official, September 2019.

[3] The Derg, meaning committee or council, was officially called the Provisional Military Government of Socialist Ethiopia.

[4] Author interview with multiple Ethiopia based analysts, December 2020.

[5] Author interview with former Ethiopia based security official, December 2020.

[6] See: John Young, Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia: The Tigray People’s Liberation Front, 1975-1991 (Cambridge University Press, 2008).

[7] See: https://ethiopianembassy.be/wp-content/uploads/Constitution-of-the-FDRE.pdf

[8] See: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/11/ethiopia-investigation-reveals-evidence-that-scores-of-civilians-were-killed-in-massacre-in-tigray-state/

[9] See: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2018/03/28/the-unenviable-situation-of-tigreans-in-ethiopia/

[10] The TPLF is known to possess BM-21 rocket systems. However, the range on these systems, even with upgrades, is not long enough for the rockets to reach Asmara from Tigrayan territory. Therefore the TPLF’s arsenal may include some other typed of system such as the Chinese manufactured PHL-03 or the Russian made BM-30. Alternatively, the TPLF may have launched the rockets from within Eritrean territory.

[11] See: https://qz.com/africa/1936138/how-ethiopias-ethnic-power-politics-led-to-tigray-conflict/

[12] See: Jenny Hammond, Fire from the Ashes: A Chronicle of the Revolution in Tigray, Ethiopia, 1975-1991 (Red Sea Press, 1998).

[13] See: https://www.unmultimedia.org/tv/unifeed/asset/2586/2586069/

[14] See: https://www.reuters.com/article/ethiopia-conflict-eritrea/exclusive-u-s-thinks-eritrea-has-joined-ethiopian-war-diplomats-say-idUSKBN28I1OX

[15] The UAE has close military to military ties with the ENDF and with the Eritrean government and army. The UAE operates a base in the Eritrean town of Assab where it has based drones and aircraft for use in its war in Yemen. See: https://www.bellingcat.com/news/rest-of-world/2020/11/19/are-emirati-armed-drones-supporting-ethiopia-from-an-eritrean-air-base/

What Ethiopia’s Ethnic Unrest Means for China

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The Diplomat |  China’s massive investments in Ethiopia give it a lot to lose amid renewed sectarian violence.

Media reports have hardly mentioned what the latest episode of sectarian violence in Ethiopia could cost China. Few of the East African country’s foreign investors have more to lose, however. Officials in Beijing see Ethiopia as a hub for the Belt and Road Initiative, an ongoing project to expand China’s sphere of influence by bankrolling infrastructure throughout the Global South. China has poured money into the East African country in a bid to earn its goodwill, but ever-rising tensions between Ethiopian ethnic groups are undermining that strategy.

In early November, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed declared war on the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the ruling party of the Tigray Region. Abiy accused the TPLF – the most influential representative of Ethiopia’s Tigray minority group – of attacking an Ethiopian military base. The Ethiopian National Defense Force’s ensuing foray into the Tigray Region followed months of tensions between the TPLF-led local government and Ethiopia’s central government.

The subsequent conflict had immediate consequences for China, which raced to evacuate several hundred citizens from the Tigray Region. China Gezhouba Group Co. Ltd., a company linked to China’s government, pulled 402 workers from a project near the Tigrayan capital of Mekelle, and 187 employees of the Chinese state-owned enterprise China CAMC Engineering Co. Ltd. fled the area in vehicles. The Chinese Embassy in the Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa said that it assisted with the evacuations of Chinese citizens and other foreign nationals.

Abiy’s war on the TPLF has cast doubt on the future of foreign direct investment in the Tigray Region. The Chinese state-owned enterprise China Communications Construction Company Ltd. built Mekelle’s most important industrial park, and companies from Bangladesh, China, India, and the United Kingdom had expressed interest in operating there prior to Abiy’s offensive. The industrial park’s ability to attract foreign investors looks far less certain now.

Ethiopia seems to recognize the potential adverse effects that sectarian strife could have on its business relationship with China. “We know that safety and security, peace, and stability are key to foreign investors and that’s why we are trying to bring the situation back to normalcy, so that the economic and industrialization process that we have started in Ethiopia could continue without major disruption,” Teshome Toga Chanaka, the Ethiopian ambassador to China, said after announcing the successful evacuations of 600 Chinese from the Tigray Region.

Ethiopia’s military captured Mekelle from the TPLF in late November and appears to have all but defeated the group on the battlefield. Nonetheless, the prospect of a lengthy TPLF insurgency looks likely. This possibility raises the question of when Chinese companies can return to the Tigray Region. Gezhouba Group was working on what China’s state media called a $270 million “water supply project,” an enterprise that has become far riskier since November.

Even if Gezhouba Group does have to postpone or abandon that project, the Tigray Region represents just one aspect of China’s wider investment strategy in Ethiopia. By June 2020, Chinese companies had cemented plans to spend $2.7 billion in the East African country through no less than 1,500 initiatives. Ethiopia imports most of its goods from China and only exports more goods to the United States, China’s main rival in Africa. The East African country has also borrowed $16 billion from China, which amounts to half of Ethiopia’s national debt.

Though China’s wide-ranging financial ties to Ethiopia might cushion the economic fallout from the Tigrayan conflict, they could also become new vulnerabilities. To increase pressure on Abiy, the TPLF might choose to target Chinese projects well outside the Tigray Region. The TPLF’s battle with Ethiopian forces has already spilled into other areas, including the Amhara Region and even Ethiopia’s neighbor Eritrea, another key front for the Belt and Road Initiative.

In addition to the threat from the TPLF, Abiy is contending with an insurgency by the Oromo Liberation Front, which Ethiopian officials blamed for a massacre of civilians from the Amhara ethnic group in the Oromia Region in early November. If this type of sectarian violence becomes typical, China may rethink the wisdom of making further investments in Ethiopia.

China’s own ability to affect the outcomes of these conflicts remains limited. While the Belt and Road Initiative has given China a significant economic presence in Africa, Beijing had limited experience in mediating in the continent’s conflicts, in part due to its longstanding policy of “non-interference.” In a notable exception, China helped broker a fragile peace between Sudan and South Sudan, but internal ethnic conflicts – such as the ones plaguing Ethiopia – are more difficult for Beijing to handle from abroad.

In another telling example, Gezhouba Group and other Chinese companies are assisting Ethiopia with the construction of a controversial dam that contributed to a dispute between Ethiopia and Egypt. Yet American diplomats, not Chinese officials, have taken the lead in helping the two African countries resolve that disagreement.

Amid unrest in Ethiopia, Beijing may turn its attention to less problematic East African endeavors. Djibouti, which hosts a sprawling Chinese military base, looks like an obvious choice for continued investment. China has also attempted to strengthen its ties to Eritrea, where the China Shanghai Corporation for Foreign Economic and Technological Cooperation is building a major road.

Even if China chooses to explore opportunities elsewhere in East Africa, Ethiopia seems likely to top Chinese diplomats’ agenda for East Africa. China and Ethiopia have expressed their enthusiasm for expanding military ties, and officers from the Ethiopian military have even received training in China. The Tigrayan conflict and Oromo insurgency notwithstanding, Ethiopia also offers a much more promising environment for foreign direct investment than other East African countries where China has undertaken diplomatic and economic initiatives.

China’s attempt to invest in the petroleum industry in South Sudan, which has swung in and out of civil war for almost a decade, has yielded mixed results and even led to Chinese deaths. In Somalia, China has fared little better: the militant group al-Shabaab, an affiliate of al-Qaeda, struck the Chinese embassy in Mogadishu with a car bomb back in 2015.

By comparison, Ethiopia’s challenges with militancy seem far easier to manage. In 2018, Abiy concluded peace treaties with Eritrea and a rebel group in the Ethiopian region of Ogaden, ending decades-long conflicts that foreign diplomats had considered intractable. If Abiy takes the same approach to the TPLF insurgency, China appears set to reward Ethiopia with greater investment in the immediate future and stronger diplomatic and military ties down the road.

 

The Ethiopian authorities announced the defeat of TPLF

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PRETORIA | TASS | The rebels are unable to organize any resistance, the office of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed said in a statement.

The defeated structures of the rebels from theTigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF) are unable to organize any resistance. This is stated in a statement released on Monday by the office of Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed.

“The leaders of TPLF are spreading lies that its supporters are capable of creating a threat through prolonged resistance in the mountainous regions of Tigray,” the statement said.

The statement stated that the TPLF cannot be a party to the negotiations, its members will be arrested and brought to justice. “The leadership of the TPLF is trying to obtain international mediation in order to avoid responsibility and trial,” the document says. At the same time, it was emphasized that the government of Ethiopia in the very near future, in coordination with the UN, will begin to return the refugees who left Tigray during the hostilities to their homes, and will provide them with all the necessary assistance.

The federal military operation began in Tigray state on 4 November after rebels from the TPLF attacked Northern Command facilities a day earlier, killed the military who remained loyal to the central government and seized heavy weapons. The combat phase of the operation ended on November 28 with the capture of the capital of Tigraya Mekele by federal troops and the return of Addis Ababa control over all major cities and strategic facilities of the state. The Ethiopian Attorney General’s Office has issued an arrest warrant for about 70 people from the top leaders of the TPLF, they are accused of high treason.

The leaders of the TPLF left Mekele several hours before the federal troops entered the city. The head of the front, Debrezion Geberemichael, said that the fight against the federal government for Tigray’s self-determination will continue.

IPIS Briefing November 2020 – Ethiopia-Tigray Conflict

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Source: IPIS Briefing November 2020

Leader of Tigray’s forces tells Ethiopia PM to ‘stop the madness’ | 30 November 2020 | Al Jazeera

The defiant leader of Ethiopia’s rebellious Tigray region has called on Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed to “stop the madness” and withdraw troops from the region as he asserted that fighting continues “on every front”, two days after the government declared victory.

Ethiopia Rights Commission calls on gov’t to restore communications, basic services in Tigray; calls on independent, transparent investigation into grave rights violations | 30 November 2020 | Addis Standard

In a statement it released today, the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC) said that following the government’s November 28 announcement of “the completion of the final phase and cessation of the military operation in Tigray Region and the outlines of next steps listed therein,” it calls for the government to, among others, restore “telecommunications and provision of basic services,” as well as allow “access to independent and transparent investigation into conducts of grave human rights violations.”

Ethiopian military operation in Tigray is complete, prime minister says | 28 November 2020 | Reuters

Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed said on Saturday that military operations in the restive region of Tigray are complete and federal troops control the regional capital, a major development in a three-week-old war that has shaken the Horn of Africa.

End of the road for TPLF? | 28 November 2020 | The Reporter (Ethiopia)

Surrounded by the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) and the final assault on Mekele already underway, these look like the final days of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). Even underneath the ardent defiance and unexpected claims of victory by the TPLF, there are some subtle admissions of an impending military defeat.

Ethiopia: A dispatch from West Tigray and North Amhara | 27 November 2020 | ICRC

In mid-November, after the first week of clashes in northern Ethiopia, an ICRC team traveled to North Amhara and West Tigray. In this account, Wilson Mondal, field team leader, describes what they saw.

The Situation in Ethiopia is a Unique War and the African Union Has a Legal Duty to Silence the Guns | 26 November 2020 | African Arguments

The onset of a shooting war between Ethiopia’s National Defense Force (ENDF) and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), which began on 4 November 2020, was predictable. The surprise so far has been the reluctance of Ethiopia’s leadership under Nobel Peace Prize-winning Prime Minister, Abiy Ahmed Ali, to accommodate appeals for de-escalation. On 25 November, the Prime Minister took to his twitter-feed to urge “the international community, to refrain from any acts of unwelcome or unlawful interference and respect the fundamental principles of non-intervention under international law.”

Ethiopia’s Tigray crisis: Fears of ethnic profiling stalk conflict | 26 November 2020 | BBC

Some Tigrayans in Ethiopia have described to the BBC how they have been harassed, detained or discriminated against since fighting began in their home region on 4 November.

Why the third layer of Ethiopia’s conflict may be the most worrying | 26 November 2020 | African Arguments

The conflict between Ethiopia’s federal government and the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) is another tragic event for a nation reeling from ethnic-based violence and political assassinations. There have likely been thousands of casualties since the military campaign began on 4 November, and many more have had to flee their homes.

Who Benefits from the Destruction of Ethiopia? | 25 November 2020 | African Arguments

There are a lot of unanswered questions about the war in Ethiopia. Let me pose one more: who stands to gain across the region? Ten years ago the then-Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Meles Zenawi told me, “my nightmare is that we should have an Egyptian agenda financed by Gulf money.” He didn’t foresee state-of-the-art military technology as part of that nightmare.

Q&A: Conflict in Ethiopia and International Law | 25 November 2020 | HRW

On November 4, 2020, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed appeared on state television and acknowledged that he ordered the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) to commence operations against the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) in response to what he described as attacks by TPLF forces on Ethiopian military bases and federal forces in the regional capital of Mekelle, and at other camps in the Tigray region.

Crisis Group links deportation of analyst to comments on Tigray | 25 November 2020 | The East African

There are concerns that Ethiopian authorities are getting uncomfortable with foreign commentators on the ongoing conflicts in the northern region of Tigray, after an analyst was deported.

Éthiopie : une nouvelle guerre de sécession ? | 25 November 2020 | IRIS

Il y a un peu plus d’un an, le Premier ministre éthiopien Abiy Ahmed recevait le prix Nobel de la paix pour avoir enfin mis fin à la guerre avec son voisin érythréen, et pour avoir démocratisé un pays qui était particulièrement répressif. Aujourd’hui le même est à la tête d’un pays qui pourrait se livrer à des massacres de masse dans la région du Tigré.

Tigray Maikadra massacre of civilians is a crime of atrocity: Ethiopian Human Rights Commission | 24 November 2020 | Addis Standard

The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC) has found that an atrocious massacre of civilians has been committed by an informal group of Tigrayan youth known as ‘Samri’, aided and abetted by members of what was then the local administration and security establishment in Maikadra, in Tigray Region’s Western Zone, on November 9th, 2020.

As Ethiopia’s army declares daily victories, its people are being plunged into violence | 24 November 2020 | The Guardian

Stop War Crimes in Ethiopia Today | 23 November 2020 | African Arguments

Ethiopia’s prime minister Abiy Ahmed has promised military victory in Tigray. He says he will capture the capital, Mekelle, and the leadership of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), which he calls a criminal junta. If he succeeds, it will be a pyrrhic victory – prospects for peace, democracy and protection from famine in Ethiopia will be set back a generation.

Ethiopia’s other conflicts | 23 November 2020 | The New Humanitarian

The conflict in Ethiopia’s Tigray region has cost hundreds of lives and sent tens of thousands of people fleeing to Sudan over the past three weeks. But the region is just one of several in the country experiencing violent unrest amid a fraught political transition.

Ethiopia rejects African mediation, pushes toward rebel-held Tigray capital | 21 November 2020 | Reuters

The Ethiopian government rebuffed an African effort to mediate on Saturday, saying its troops had seized another town in their march towards the rebel-held capital of northern Tigray region.

Secret UN report reveals fears of long and bitter war in Ethiopia | 21 November 2020 | The Guardian

Ethiopian national forces are meeting heavy resistance and face a protracted “war of attrition” in the northern region of Tigray, a confidential United Nations assessment reveals.

The Tigrayan Conflict and the Laws of Humanitarian Assistance | 20 November 2020 | Opinio Juris

For over two weeks, violent and escalating clashes in the Tigray region of Ethiopia have resulted in hundreds of deaths, thousands of displaced persons and ever growing humanitarian needs in this mountainous region of northern Ethiopia.

Tigray Population Movement Information bulletin (pdf) | 20 November 2020 | nternational Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)

Since 3 November 2020, A series of escalating clashes between the Ethiopian Federal Government and the Tigray Regional Government has resulted in a growing humanitarian emergency including heavy casualties and population movements both internally and cross border. An estimated 9 million people within or near the Tigray region are at risk due to increasing confrontations.

WHO chief denies Ethiopia’s claim of backing Tigray region | 19 November 2020 | AP

The World Health Organization’s director-general on Thursday denied an allegation from his own country, Ethiopia, that he was lobbying neighboring nations to provide arms and other support to the defiant Tigray region, which has been clashing with the Ethiopian government for two weeks.

Ethiopia, led by a Nobel peace winner, is looking down the barrel of civil war | 19 November 2020 | The Guardian

The humanitarian tragedy is already stretching across borders: 27,000 Ethiopians have crossed the frontier into Sudan in two weeks, the largest influx in 20 years.

Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Trades His Nobel Peace Prize for Civil War | 19 November 2020 | Bloomberg

We may be long past holding laureates of the Nobel Peace Prize to its lofty standards — the cruel cynicism of Henry Kissinger and open bigotry of Aung San Suu Kyi are just two instances of honorees behaving dishonorably — but Abiy Ahmed’s belly flop from the pedestal is nonetheless remarkable. In less than a year since his uplift in Oslo, Ethiopia’s prime minister has embroiled his country in a civil war and brought the Horn of Africa to the edge of chaos.

Operational update on escalating fighting in Tigray and northern Ethiopia | 18 November 2020 | ICRC

In just two weeks, escalating fighting in Tigray and northern Ethiopia has triggered immense suffering and risks spiralling into a wider humanitarian crisis.

Digging Own Grave: The End Days of Ethiopia’s TPLF | 18 November 2020 | CounterCurrents

Previously in power for almost three decades, the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF) of Ethiopia finally is approaching their end days and as we say here in the Horn of Africa, “they are digging their own grave”.

Ethiopia Tigray crisis: Abiy issues ‘ultimatum’ as civilians flee fighting | 18 November 2020 | BBC

Ethiopia’s prime minister has said a military operation against rebel forces in the northern Tigray region is entering its “final phase”. Abiy Ahmed said a three-day deadline given for Tigray’s forces to surrender had now expired.

Ethiopia pushes for Tigray capital, denies ‘ethnic bias’ | 18 November 2020 | Reuters

Ethiopian forces pushed towards the capital of the rebel Tigray region on Wednesday, ignoring international appeals for talks to end the conflict and denying it was targeting any ethnic group.

Peace was swift in Ethiopia under Abiy. War was, too | 17 November 2020 | AP

Abiy Ahmed left Ethiopians breathless when he became the prime minister in 2018, introducing a wave of political reforms in the long-repressive country and announcing a shocking peace with enemy Eritrea.

Factbox: The forces fighting in Ethiopia’s Tigray conflict | 17 November 2020 | Reuters

Ethiopia’s military is fighting battle-hardened troops in the northern Tigray region, threatening stability around the Horn of Africa.

Ethiopia resists mediation as it bombs Tigray capital | 17 November 2020 | DefenceWeb

Ethiopia resisted international pressure for mediation in a war in the country’s north on Monday as its air force bombed the Tigrayan capital Mekelle, according to diplomatic and military sources.

Tigrai National Government Statement (pdf) | 17 November 2020 | Tigrai National Government | Aiga Forum

Abiy Ahmed has regionalised and internationalised the war. But it will not save him from eventual defeat. Dr. Debretsion Gebremichael, President of the Regional State of Tigray has written to more than seventy Heads of states and leaders of regional and international organizations warning the further internationalisation of the war.

Ethiopia says its troops marching on Tigrayan capital | 17 November 2020 | Reuters

Ethiopia said its troops were marching on the capital of the Tigray region on Tuesday after a deadline for rebel forces to surrender passed in a two-week conflict shaking the Horn of Africa and alarming the world.

Factbox: Which countries have stakes in Ethiopia’s war? | 17 November 2020 | Reuters

Ethiopian troops are battling rebellious forces from the country’s northern Tigray region. Fallout from the conflict in Africa’s second most-populous nation is already spilling over into Ethiopia’s neighbours, threatening to further destabilise a fragile region.

The Ongoing Law Enforcement Operations in Tigray: Causes and Objectives | 17 November 2020 | Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia | Ethiopian News Agency

Causes of the Ongoing Law Enforcement Operations: What makes the Law Enforcement Operation directed against the extreme elements of the TPLF clique just and necessary?

Background to the war in Ethiopia for the international media | 17 November 2020 | Committee for Voice of Reason | Aiga Forum

The illegitimate Ethiopian government has imposed a complete shutdown of communication and transportation in and out of the State of Tigray. He has now declared war and mobilized ground and air attacks against the state. This illegitimate government has controlled the local media and is disseminating false information to the international community.

Ethiopian troops ‘liberate’ key town in Tigray, claim officials | 16 November 2020 | The Guardian

Ethiopian troops have advanced further into the northern region of Tigray, seizing a key town on the road to its capital, officials in Addis Ababa have said.

Abiy Ahmed Ali’s war on Tigrai: a guide to its genesis | 16 November 2020 | Yitbarek Mesfin | Aiga Forum

Ethiopia is a very complex country made up of 80 different linguistic groups. Some international reporters are at last beginning to understand the cause of the civil unrest in Ethiopia from the start of Abiy Ahmed’s premiership in 2018. But there is still misunderstanding about the country’s political problems.

Tigray crisis viewpoint: Why Ethiopia is spiralling out of control | 15 November 2020 | BBC

Ethiopia appears to be fast approaching civil war. Fighting between forces loyal to the federal government headed by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) has claimed hundreds of lives and is threatening to rip the country apart.

In escalation of Ethiopia war, Tigray leader says his forces fired rockets at Eritrea | 15 November 2020 | Reuters

The leader of Ethiopia’s rebellious Tigray region confirmed on Sunday that his forces had fired rockets at the airport in Eritrea’s capital, a major escalation that raises fears of a wider war in the Horn of Africa region.

Conflict in Ethiopia’s Tigray Region Widens as Missiles Are Fired at Airports | 14 November 2020 | NYT

Two airports in a state that neighbors Tigray, where Ethiopian troops are fighting local forces, were the targets of rocket fire late on Friday, the government said, as an 11-day conflict in the region widened.

How Abiy is heralding Eritreanization of Ethiopia! | 14 November 2020 | Tedros A. Tsegay | Aiga Forum

Nobel Peace Prize laureate Abiy Ahmed is at war with his own people. He has ordered all state power at his disposal to annihilate the Tigrayan People Liberation Front (TPLF) by opening war from almost all fronts, including from Eritrea using Eritrean soldiers according to eyewitness account, who crossed the border into the Sudan.

Rockets fired at Eritrean capital from Ethiopia, diplomats say | 14 November 2020 | Reuters

At least three rockets were fired at Eritrea’s capital from Ethiopia on Saturday night, five regional diplomats said, a major escalation of a conflict pitting Ethiopian government troops against rebellious local forces in the Tigray region.

Ethiopia: leaders of Tigray region admit they attacked neighbouring Amhara | 14 November 2020 | The Guardian

Leaders of Tigray in Ethiopia’s north on Saturday claimed responsibility for rocket attacks on two airports in a nearby region and threatened to strike neighbouring Eritrea, raising concerns that the escalating conflict could spread across national borders.

Ethiopia’s Tigray crisis: How the conflict could destabilise its neighbours | 14 November 2020 | BBC

The fighting in Ethiopia’s northern Tigray state may not only have drastic implications for the future of the country but could also seriously affect its neighbours.

Ethiopia Tigray crisis: Rights commission to investigate ‘mass killings’ | 14 November 2020 | BBC

Ethiopia’s human rights commission has said it will send a team to investigate reports of mass killings of civilians in the northern Tigray state.

Ethiopian human rights commission says monitoring military operation | 14 November 2020 | New Business Ethiopia

Ethiopian Human Rights Commission Public Statement | 14 November 2020 | Facebook

In its statement the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC) indicated that it has been monitoring closely and is in consultation with the relevant authorities regarding the risk of multidimensional human rights violations arising from the ongoing war in Tigray Region.

Refugee exodus to Sudan swells as war crimes feared in Ethiopia’s Tigray | 13 November 2020 | Reuters

The United Nations voiced concern on Friday that the conflict between Ethiopian government forces and insurgent northern leaders could spiral out of control and said war crimes may already have been committed.

Amnesty International’s Irresponsible Allegations | 13 November 2020 | Elias Dawit | Aiga Forum

Amnesty International, a global human rights organization, issued a statement saying “We have confirmed the massacre of a very large number of civilians, who appear to have been day labourers in no way involved in the ongoing military offensive. This is a horrific tragedy whose true extent only time will tell as communication in Tigray remains shut down,” said Deprose Muchena, Amnesty International’s Director for East and Southern Africa.

Ethiopian police seeking lists of ethnic Tigrayans – U.N. Report | 13 November 2020 | Reuters

Ethiopian police visited a U.N. World Food Programme (WFP) office in Amhara region to request a list of ethnic Tigrayan staff, according to an internal U.N. security report seen by Reuters on Friday.

Ethiopians fleeing to Sudan describe air strikes and machete killings in Tigray | 13 November 2020 | Reuters

Civilians fleeing fighting in Ethiopia’s northern Tigray region described bombing by government warplanes, shooting on the streets and killings by machete, as they joined thousands of refugees crossing into neighbouring Sudan.

Tigray: How Ethiopia reached this crisis point and how it could get out | 13 November 2020 | African Arguments

The current crisis in Tigray has not appeared from the clear blue sky. Its roots are deep in Ethiopia’s history and its outcome will dictate the country’s future. It is unlikely Ethiopia will fall apart. But a period of violence is probable and will continue until there is a further adjustment of government at the centre and a rebalancing of the relationship with the regions. Increased democratisation is one potential solution, but by no means the only outcome.

Ethiopia: Protect People as Tigray Crisis Escalates | 13 November 2020 | HRW

The Ethiopian government and Tigray regional authorities should protect people and property at risk from the fighting. Amid credible reports of increasing casualties, the authorities on both sides should facilitate access for humanitarian groups, stop interrupting essential services, and immediately restore communication services in the region.

Ethiopia claims big advance in Tigray, Amnesty reports mass killing | 12 November 2020 | Reuters

Ethiopia: Investigation reveals evidence that scores of civilians were killed in massacre in Tigray state | 12 November 2020 | Amnesty International

Ethiopia’s military has defeated local forces in the west of Tigray state, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed said on Thursday, accusing his foes of atrocities during a week of fighting that threatens to destabilise the Horn of Africa.

Ethiopia’s Instability Threatens to Engulf Region | 11 November 2020 | VoA

In a country plagued by years of ethnic violence, analysts fear the latest fighting between government troops and regional paramilitary forces in Ethiopia could be the breaking point.

Ethiopian Human Rights Commission condemns more arrest of journalists as police keeps all incommunicado | 11 November 2020 | Addis Standard

The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC) confirmed that four more journalists were arrested overnight. They are Haftu Gebregzhiabher, Tsegaye Hadush, & Abreha Hagos from Ethiopian Press Agency (EPA’s) and Udi Mussa from Oromia Media Network (OMN).

Ethiopian journalists arrested as Tigray conflict worsens, refugees flee to Sudan | 11 November 2020 | Reuters

Ethiopia’s human rights commission condemned the arrest of journalists as Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed pressed ahead with a military offensive in a northern region against local leaders defiant of his authority.

Thousands flee Ethiopia conflict, protests against Tigray’s leaders planned | 11 November 2020 | Reuters

Ethiopian refugees were flooding into Sudan on Wednesday as Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s federal troops battled well-armed local forces in Tigray and protests against the northern region’s leaders were planned elsewhere.

Clashes in Ethiopia’s Tigray region force thousands to flee to Sudan | 11 November 2020 | UNHCR

UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency, is working with authorities in Sudan to provide lifesaving assistance to more than 7,000 refugees from Ethiopia, who have fled across the border in the past two days.

Experts react: Understanding the conflict in Tigray | 11 November 2020 | Atlantic Council

On November 4, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed launched a military offensive against forces of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), which is the governing authority of the northern Ethiopian region of Tigray. Coming after months of rising tensions between the TPLF and the Abiy administration, the latest military action was precipitated by an alleged surprise night-time assault by the TPLF on a major Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) base in Tigray that resulted in the killing of non-Tigrayan soldiers and the attempted looting of heavy artillery and weapons.

Police rearrest Addis Standard’s editor | 10 November 2020 | Addis Standard

The police on duty at Addis Abeba police station have this afternoon rearrested Medihane Ekubamichael, product editor at Addis Standard publication. Medihane was first detained on Saturday November 07 by members of the city’s police and take to undisclosed location.

Police detain Addis Standard’s editor, accuse him of attempt to dismantle the constitution | 9 November 2020 | Addis Standard

Members of Addis Abeba and federal police officer have on Saturday arrested Medihane Ekubamichael, product editor at Addis Standard publication. Jakenn Publishing PLC, the publishers of Addis Standard publication, confirmed that Medihane was arrested and initially taken to undisclosed location on Saturday November 07, from his house in Addis Abeba.

Concern of outright war in Ethiopia grows as PM presses military offensive | 9 November 2020 | Reuters

Ethiopia’s prime minister stepped up a military offensive in the northern region of Tigray on Sunday with air strikes as part of what he called a “law enforcement operation”, increasing fears of outright civil war in Africa’s second-most populous country.

Violence worsens in Ethiopia as hundreds reported to have died in conflict | 9 November 2020 | Businesslive

An escalating conflict in Ethiopia’s restive Tigray region has killed hundreds of people, sources on the government’s side said, even as the prime minister sought on Monday to reassure the world his nation was not sliding into civil war.

Conflict in Ethiopia extends the Greater Middle East’s arc of crisis | 7 November 2020 | ModernDiplomacy

Ethiopia, an African darling of the international community, is sliding towards civil war as the coronavirus pandemic hardens ethnic fault lines. The consequences of prolonged hostilities could echo across East Africa, the Middle East and Europe.

Ethiopia’s PM seeks to regain control over restive Tigray region | 7 November 2020 | Reuters

Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed sought to re-establish authority over the northern Tigray region on Saturday, a day after launching air strikes amid reports that Tigrayan forces had seized control of federal military sites and weapons.

Timeline: Key events leading to Ethiopia’s crisis in Tigray | 6 November 2020 | Reuters

Ethiopia is mobilising troops from around the country and sending them to the northern Tigray region to fight a powerful ethnic faction that led the ruling coalition for decades.

Ethiopia’s Abiy vows to disarm ‘fugitives from justice’ in Tigray campaign | 6 November 2020 | Reuters

Ethiopia’s air force bombed arms depots and destroyed military hardware in the northern Tigray region on Friday, the prime minister said, escalating a war he launched this week against his former ruling coalition allies.

Ethiopia mobilises for war in northern region | 6 November 2020 | DefenceWeb

Ethiopia mobilised for war in the northern Tigray region on Thursday, dashing international hopes of averting a conflict between Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s government and the powerful ethnic faction that led the ruling coalition for decades.

U.N. chief ‘deeply alarmed’ by armed clashes in Ethiopia’s Tigray | 6 November 2020 | Reuters

The head of the United Nations said he was deeply alarmed by fighting in Ethiopia’s northern Tigray region, where federal troops have been exchanging fire with the powerful ethnic faction that led the ruling coalition for decades.

Ethiopia’s PM Abiy defends military operations, others call it war | 6 November 2020 | RFI

The “large-scale law enforcement operation” has “clear, limited and achievable objectives: to restore the rule of law and the constitutional order,” he said on Friday, calling out the Tigray region’s Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) leadership as “fugitives from justice … using the civilian population as human shields.”

As more troops mobilized to northern Ethiopia to join “aimless war” PM Abiy assures operations have “clear, limited & achievable objectives” | 6 November 2020 | Addis Standard

As more troops are being mobilized to join the offensive against TPLF’s regional special forces, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed said military operations by federal defense forces underway in Northern Ethiopia have “clear, limited & achievable objectives.”

Ethiopia’s Premier Orders Troops Into Once-powerful Tigray Region in Major Escalation | 4 November 2020 | VoA

Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed ordered the military to deploy to the Tigray region on Wednesday after accusing the government there of attacking federal troops, a major escalation of a row between the premier and the once-powerful region.

A statement from Jakenn Publishing PLC regarding the blockage of all means of communication in Tigray Regional State | 4 November 2020 | Addis Standard

Jakenn Publishing PLC, the publisher of Addis Standard online magazine expresses its deep regret that due to the blockage of internet, mobile and landline communications, its journalists are unable to provide an inclusive news on the ongoing military engagement between forces of the federal army and Tigray regional state.

National defense forces given order to “start military offensive against TPLF: PM Abiy Ahmed | 3 November 2020 | EthioExplorer

Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has just announced that the National Defense Forces (ENDF), led by a command post, is given order to start military offensive against TPLF in Tigray regional state.

Political Parties Commend HPR Decision to Lift Immunity of 39 Members | 3 November 2020 | Ethiopian News Agency

Representatives of political parties have commended the resolution to lift the immunity of some members of the House of People’s and Representatives (HPR) today.

Army Made a Sharp Riposte against Defiant TPLF Attack | 2 November 2020 | Ethiopian News Agency

Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) has announced on Wednesday that it has successfully contained the attack from the defiance Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and advanced to counteract in a bid to protect the unity of the country.

“Crisis staring” Tigray, Federal governments “in the eye” as army is caught in the mix, relations plummet to new low | 31 October 2020 | Addis Standard

Tensions between the federal and the Tigray Regional State governments have picked up a new twist following a decision by the later to return Brigadier General Jamal Mohammed from Mekelle Alula Abanega Airport.

Splitting Southern Nations region into four can promote peace | 10 October 2020 | Ethiopia Insight

For more than two decades, the question of statehood formation has been raised by identiy-based zones in the Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples’ Regional State (SNNPRS).

House of Federation speaker says establishing transitional government, dispatching federal security forces in Tigray among constitutional options | 2 October 2020 | Addis Standard

Adem Farah, Speaker of the House of Federation (HoF) says there are enough constitutional means to take measures against those endangering the constitution.

OFC calls for “genuine national dialogue” | 30 September 2020 | Oromo Federalist Congress | Addis Standard

“Ethiopia has entered a new year with all its heavy political burdens – with both hope and despair. And without a shadow of doubt, the hoped-for democratic transition is disturbingly failing,” said the opposition Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC) in a statement.

Tigray region says it will defy federal laws enacted as of Oct. 05; EDP calls for transitional gov’t, inclusive dialogue & reconciliation | 29 September 2020 | Addis Standard

In an interview aired on Tigray Mass Media Agency, Asmelash Wolde Sellassie, executive member of Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the governing party of Tigray regional state, said the region will not comply with laws, directives, and regulations, among others, to be enacted by the federal government after its current term in office came to an end on October 05/2020.

Ethiopia files terrorism charges against leading opposition activist | 19 September 2020 | Reuters

Ethiopia has filed terrorism charges against a prominent media mogul and opposition politician from the Oromo ethnic group, Jawar Mohammed, the attorney general’s office said on Saturday.

Regional party wins vote in Ethiopia’s Tigray, challenging federal government | 11 September 2020 | Reuters

The regional ruling party has won a landslide election victory in Ethiopia’s northern Tigray region, officials said on Friday, as a confrontation looms with national authorities who have branded the vote illegal.

Ethiopia bars journalists from flying to Tigray regional vote, passengers say | 7 September 2020 | Reuters

At least 12 people, including four journalists and a senior think tank analyst, were barred on Monday from flying to Tigray, four of the passengers said, after Ethiopian security officials said the region’s elections later this week were illegal.

Ethiopia’s upper house rules Tigray regional vote unconstitutional | 5 September 2020 | Reuters

Ethiopia’s upper house ruled on Saturday that plans by the Tigray region to hold an election on Sept. 9 were unconstitutional, setting up a potential clash between the central government and a powerful ethnic party.

Ethiopia’s Tigray region to holds poll, defying federal government | 4 September 2020 | Reuters

Ethiopia’s northern Tigray region will head to the polls on Wednesday in defiance of the federal government, the latest challenge to Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed from a slew of regional leaders flexing their muscles ahead of next year’s national elections.

Ethiopia’s Tigray region eyes election in challenge to national unity | 5 May 2020 | Reuters

Ethiopia’s Tigray region plans to hold elections, its main party said, setting it on a collision course with the federal government and testing the country’s fragile unity.

Ethiopia postpones August election due to coronavirus | 31 March 2020 | Reuters

Ethiopia has postponed parliamentary elections scheduled for August due to the coronavirus outbreak, the electoral board said on Tuesday, a move endorsed by some key opposition parties.

Ethiopia passes gun control law to tackle surge in violence | 9 January 2020 | Reuters

Ethiopia’s parliament passed legislation on Thursday aimed at curbing gun ownership after a surge in regional ethnic violence blamed on a proliferation of small arms in private hands.

Voting for Internal Secession – Federalism and ethnicity in Ethiopia | 28 November 2019 | Verfassungsblog

20 November 2019 might go down in history as one of the turning points for federalism in Ethiopia. It was the day on which the unparalleled clause of the Ethiopian Constitution, which provides ethnic communities with the right to establish their own state (i.e. subnational unit), was put into practice. Finally, after clamoring for their own state for years, the Sidama, the fifth largest ethnic group in the country, were allowed to have their day in a referendum.

Ethiopia’s ruling coalition agrees to form single party ahead of 2020 vote | 21 November 2019 | Reuters

Ethiopia’s ruling coalition on Thursday approved the merger of three of its four ethnic-based parties into a single national one ahead of the 2020 elections, part of the prime minister’s efforts to unite the country, but one of the parties boycotted the meeting and vote.

Violence during Ethiopian protests was ethnically tinged, say eyewitnesses | 26 October 2019 | Reuters

Much of the fighting seen during protests in Ethiopia this week was ethnically tinged, eyewitnesses said on Saturday, describing attacks by young men from the Oromo ethnic group against people from other ethnic groups.

Abiy Ahmed and the struggle to keep Ethiopia together | 11 October 2019 | The Africa Report

Ethiopia’s ongoing liberalisation and ethnic federalism are creating a combustible situation as ethnic groups seek more autonomy on economic, political and security matters.

Ethiopia to hold autonomy referendum for ethnic Sidama in November | 29 August 2019 | Reuters

Ethiopia on Thursday granted its ethnic Sidama community a referendum in November on self-determination, with a view to creating the country’s 10th autonomous region, Fana news agency reported.

Ethiopia’s opposition parties criticize election law changes | 24 August 2019 | Reuters

Ethiopian lawmakers on Saturday revised election laws to pave the way for polls next year, but some opposition parties said the changes would make it more difficult for them to challenge the ruling coalition.

Regional power grab attempt causes rare discord in Ethiopia coalition | 12 July 2019 | Reuters

A failed regional coup in Ethiopia has exposed rare divisions in the alliance that has dominated the country for three decades, with two of the four ethnic parties that form the ruling coalition trading insults in a public feud.

Abiy Ahmed’s reforms in Ethiopia lift the lid on ethnic tensions | 29 June 2019 | BBC

After launching the most ambitious reforms in his country’s history Ethiopia’s Prime Minister, Abiy Ahmed, is under threat. The murder of his army chief of staff amid an alleged coup attempt in the Amhara region has highlighted the vulnerability of the reform process. The BBC’s Africa Editor, Fergal Keane, analyses the challenge facing the continent’s youngest leader.

Nearly 250 arrested in Ethiopia after foiled coup | 27 June 1019 | Reuters

Nearly 250 people have been arrested in Ethiopia’s capital and the main city in its Amhara region since a coup attempt was foiled, state TV reported on Thursday.

Ethiopia’s ethnic militias in the spotlight after failed coup | 24 June 1019 | Reuters

A foiled coup in the Ethiopian state of Amhara that left five senior officials dead, including the army’s chief of staff, has thrust ethnic militias in one of Africa’s fastest-growing economies into the spotlight.

Ethiopia opposition see dangers if 2020 vote delayed | 21 June 1019 | Reuters

Opposition politicians in Ethiopia are warning against a delay to national elections due in 2020 that would be the first under reformist Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed but are under threat from an explosion of regional ethnic rivalries.

Ethiopia’s Ethnic Federalism: Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution | 23 January 2019 | Verfassungsblog

Lenin once famously said that ‘[t]here are decades where nothing happens; and there are weeks where decades happen’. This aptly describes the dizzying political sea change that Ethiopia has been going through since 2 April 2018, the day that saw the election of Abiy Ahmed as the Prime Minister. Since then, the country has witnessed political reforms that, if sustained, will soon herald a new era of democratization and human rights.

‘Nobody will kneel’: Tigrayans defiant as Ethiopian leader cracks down | 16 December 2018 | Reuters

In the birthplace of the armed struggle that propelled Ethiopia’s ruling coalition to power 27 years ago, there is growing anger as the country’s new prime minister stages a crackdown on the region’s once-powerful leaders.

Secessionism, Federalism and Constitutionalism in Ethiopia | 15 August 2018 | Verfassungsblog

On the morning of 4 August 2018, troops were seen taking over key positions in Jijiga, a capital city of the State of Somali, one of the constituent units of the Ethiopian federation. Heavily armed military vehicles were stationed outside the state parliament, the offices of state government and the state TV station. It was not an invasion by a foreign force. It was a federal intervention.

‘These changes are unprecedented’: how Abiy is upending Ethiopian politics | 8 July 2018 | The Guardian

Abiy Ahmed, the prime minister of Ethiopia, has accelerated a radical reform programme that is overturning politics in the vast, strategically significant African country.

Abiy Ahmed sworn in as Ethiopia’s prime minister | 2 April 2018 | al Jazeera

Ethiopia’s parliament has elected Abiy Ahmed as the new prime minister, a week after the ruling coalition nominated him to succeed Hailemariam Desalegn. Abiy was sworn in on Monday shortly after his election to become Africa’s second-most populous country’s 16th prime minister and the first Oromo to hold Ethiopia’s top seat.