Tag Archive for: Tigray War

UN fears ‘massive’ COVID transmission in Ethiopia’s Tigray

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NAIROBI, Kenya (AP) — The United Nations fears “massive community transmission” of COVID-19 in Ethiopia’s troubled Tigray region, fueled by displacement and the collapse of health services, as humanitarian workers finally begin to access the region two months after fighting began. Hospitals have been looted, even destroyed.

A new U.N. report based on the first on-the-ground assessments confirms some of the grim concerns around Tigray’s some 6 million people since the conflict erupted Nov. 4 between Ethiopian forces and those of the Tigray region.

The crisis has threatened to destabilize one of Africa’s most powerful and populous countries and pull in neighbors like Sudan. Tigray leaders dominated Ethiopia’s government for nearly three decades before Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed came to power and sidelined them amid sweeping reforms that won him the Nobel Peace Prize.

Abiy has rejected international “interference” in the conflict even as the U.N. and others pleaded for weeks for unhindered access to Tigray as food, medicines and other supplies ran out.

Now COVID-19 has emerged as the latest source of alarm. “Only five out of 40 hospitals in Tigray are physically accessible,” the new U.N. report issued Thursday says. “Apart from those in (the Tigray capital) Mekele, the remaining hospitals are looted and many reportedly destroyed.” It does not say who did the looting.

COVID-19 surveillance and control work was interrupted for more than a month in Tigray, and that, along with the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people, “is feared to have facilitated massive community transmission of the pandemic,” the report says.

Ethiopia has one of the highest COVID-19 caseloads on the African continent with more than 127,000 confirmed infections. While its rate of daily cases has declined in recent weeks, officials have not said whether they have been receiving any data from the Tigray region.

“Health facilities outside of major cities are nonfunctional and those in the major cities are partially working with limited to no stock of supplies and absence of health workers,” the U.N. report says.

The report also says the Tigray region remains volatile. “Localized fighting and insecurity continues, with fighting reported in rural areas and in the peripheries of Mekele, Shiraro and Shire among other locations, as of last week,” it says.

The overall humanitarian situation is “dire,” the U.N. says, with food supplies “very limited” and widespread looting reported. “Only locally produced food items are available and at increasing prices, making basic goods unaffordable.” Most Tigray residents are subsistence farmers, and the conflict disrupted the harvest.

Two important camps hosting tens of thousands of refugees from nearby Eritrea remain unreachable — another source of alarm as the presence of Eritrean troops has been confirmed in Tigray.

No one knows how many thousands of people have been killed in the conflict. At least five humanitarian workers have been killed.

Abiy Ahmed and the Consolidation of Ethiopia’s Dictatorship

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As Ethiopia heads toward the delayed elections tentatively now rescheduled for June 5, 2021, Ahmed’s fight not only undercuts his chief rival, who happens to be Tigrayan but enables him to use emergency powers to further erode democracy.

Source: National Interest | Michael Rubin

Africa has, for decades, been a democracy success story albeit one too often ignored in the West. When Ronald Reagan took office, U.S. exports to Africa accounted for only four percent of total U.S. exports and the share of American investment in Africa was even less. Strip away Morocco from the mix, and the proportion of U.S. trade with the continent’s then-fifty-two countries was even less. Freedom was a rare commodity. Freedo House’s Freedom in the World survey for 1983–84 ranked only Botswana, Mauritius, and Nigeria free among African countries. South Africa’s Apartheid regime and Ethiopia’s Derg were both stains on the continent.

As the Cold War ended, democracy bloomed where, for decades, authoritarians had it smothered. In 1990–91, Freedom House listed sixty-five free countries. A decade later, it counted eighty-six free countries. The democratic revolution in Africa contributed to the change. Benin went from a Soviet-style police state to a free state. Cape Verde Ghana, Mali, newly-independent Namibia, and post-Apartheid South Africa also ranked as free states.

Far more countries moved from not free to partly free. Ethiopia, the continent’s second-largest country by population, was one of them. In 1991, longtime Marxist dictator Mengistu Haile Mariam fled the country for Zimbabwe exile. Meles Zenawi took over as a transitional leader and embraced ethno-federalism in order to end the decades of ethnic conflict which Ethiopia had suffered. In May 1995, Ethiopia had its first multi-party elections. Some opposition parties boycotted the polls which many observers nonetheless deemed fair despite ruling authorities taking advantage of state resources. Government harassment of opponents continued, however, and the outbreak of war with Eritrea in 1998 further impeded political liberalization. While the 1995 constitution was progressive, the reality of its implementation often was not. In 2010, against a broad global backdrop of democratic backsliding, Freedom House returned Ethiopia to the ranks of the not free and observed, “Ethiopia’s trajectory has also been negative for a number of years, as Prime Minister Meles Zenawi has persecuted the political opposition, tilted the political playing field, and suppressed civil society.” In 2012, Freedom House returned Ethiopia to the ranks of the unfree. In 2018, it listed Ethiopia in the company of Venezuela, Turkey, and Yemen as having among the most precipitous declines in freedom over the previous decade.

It was perhaps for this reason that the 2018 rise of Abiy Ahmed to Ethiopia’s premiership captivated international diplomats. He succeeded Hailemariam Desalegn who was the first leader in Ethiopia’s history to step down voluntarily. At just forty-one-years-old, Ahmed represented generational change. He came from a security service background, but had a reputation as a reformer. Such optimism about Ahmed’s intentions grew when he sought to end the decades-long stand-off with Eritrea, an initiative which won him the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize in recognition of “his efforts to achieve peace and international cooperation, and in particular for his decisive initiative to resolve the border conflict with neighboring Eritrea.”

There are no shortage of Nobel Peace Prize embarrassments but Ahmed is quickly positioning himself to be among the Norwegian Nobel Committee’s biggest regrets. In hindsight, what the Nobel Committee saw as a bold gamble for peace appears more a premeditated agreement to bury one hatchet to wield another. The Ethiopia-Eritrea border war was likened to a fight between two bald men fighting over a comb. With the border settled, Ahmed could then begin his own assault in conjunction with Eritrean forces on Ethiopia’s northern Tigray region as Ahmed seeks to recentralize Ethiopia and reverse the autonomy enjoyed by Ethiopia’s ethnically diverse regions and enshrined in the 1995 constitution.

The casus belli appears to be a dispute between the Tigray region and Ahmed’s government about his unilateral efforts to expand his mandate. In June 2020, Ahmed announced that he was postponing elections. Supporters said prudence against the backdrop of the coronavirus merited the extension of his term while opponents warned that abrogating the constitution opened the door to reconsolidate dictatorship. In Tigray, the regional government did not recognize the extension of Ahmed’s term and moved forward with its own elections which Ahmed deemed “illegal.” Tigrayan authorities responded by arguing that Ahmed’s condemnation was meaningless as his constitutional mandate expired in October 2020. Perhaps fearing that Tigray’s political defiance could spread to Ethiopia’s other region, in November 2020, Ahmed ordered Ethiopian Defense Forces to occupy Tigray and oust its elected government. The Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front, one of the key forces which overthrew the Derg, dug-in to defend their Tigray’s local autonomy and to stymie rumors plans to transfer territory from their region to neighboring Amhara.

It has been a brutal fight. Ethiopian forces cut off communications to the regional capital Mekelle as Ethiopian forces marched on the city and reportedly subjected it to an artillery barrage. Despite Ethiopia’s repeated denials, Ahmed appointed his own mayor who now admits that Eritrean forces also joined the fighting, a fact the U.S. intelligence community now acknowledges. Eyewitness accounts describe Ethiopian and Eritrean forces summarily executing civilians and looting property. For Ahmed, power motivates, and for Eritrean dictator Isaias Afwerki, cash does. Few having tasted liberty are willing to forfeit it easily, however, and so unrest continues. On Dec. 27, Ethiopia reportedly lost a general.

Like many self-described reformers before him, Ahmed has grown addicted to power. He is not alone. In Somalia, President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo has likewise moved to undermine federalism and restore dictatorial control akin to what Somalia experienced during his uncle Siad Barre’s regime. What makes Ahmed so dangerous is that well-meaning Norwegians bestowed him with the mantle of peacemaker. As Ethiopia heads toward the delayed elections tentatively now rescheduled for June 5, 2021, Ahmed’s fight not only undercuts his chief rival, who happens to be Tigrayan but enables him to use emergency powers to further erode democracy.

It is time for Western countries and African democracies to speak directly about the dangerous path down which Ahmed has sent Ethiopia. Ethiopia is a diverse country, so a centralized dictatorship simply will not work. As Ahmed seeks to substitute nationalist polemics for competence, he appears ready to pick fights not only with Egypt and Sudan, but with Kenya as well. Ahmed’s growing dependence on China increasingly appears less about development and more about finding a backer who will bankroll Ethiopia’s further slide into autocracy. Simply put, increasingly it appears that Ahmed is not the youthful, reformist alternative to Eritrea’s Isaias, but rather his pupil. Isaias brought tragedy to Eritrea. The international community should not be blind as a power-hungry Ahmed risks the same with Ethiopia.

Michael Rubin is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and a frequent author for the National Interest.

What is next for Abiy Ahmed?

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Source: Global Risk Insight | Anthony Morris

The apparent culmination of the Ethiopian government’s ‘law enforcement operation’ in Tigray poses a number of new questions for the future of Africa’s second-most populous country.

The crisis in Ethiopia, which erupted at the start of November, is the culmination of a period of rising tensions between Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s government and the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF).

The TPLF, who headed the ruling coalition in Ethiopia from 1991 to 2017, had grown increasingly frustrated with Abiy’s federalist brand of politics and their subsequent alienation from power. Tensions reached a boiling point when the TPLF refused to follow the federal government’s order to postpone elections in September. This prompted the Prime Minister to launch an army offensive against Tigray in order to ‘enforce the rule of law’ – a decision which reverberated around the Horn of Africa.

As war ensued, many analysts feared the worst. In particular, there was a belief that Tigray – a highly militarised region hardened by years of war – would be extremely difficult to defeat by force, leading to a drawn-out conflict. There were also concerns that the war would exacerbate deepening ethnic divisions throughout the nation, precipitating a ‘Yugoslavia-style’ breakup of the nation.

On the surface at least, the conflict has defied many of these more fatalistic forecasts. The apparent takeover of Mekelle on the 7 December, came as a surprise to many. But what does this latest development in the conflict mean? Despite the apparent victory for the government, violence and instability will continue to plague Ethiopia – both on the Tigrayan front and elsewhere.

The Tigrayan Front

While the conquest of Mekelle is a significant victory for the government, hostility and violence continue to cast a shadow over Tigray. TPLF leader Debretsion Gebremichael claims that fighting is still taking place ‘in three directions’, including near Mekelle. No TPLF leaders have been captured, and no large-scale disarmament has taken place. The renegade forces may be wounded – but they are still very much alive.

The early forecasts that a war with Tigray would be protracted, therefore, may yet prove to be prescient. Guerrilla-style warfare will likely continue in the region until either a negotiated settlement or a military victory.

Though the Ethiopian government has ridiculed the narrative pushed by a number of experts that there would be a ‘protracted insurgency in the rugged mountains of Tigray’, the region’s terrain is unquestionably a boon for rebel forces. The difficulty of pursuing these rebels through the treacherous relief of the region means that a comprehensive military victory for the government’s forces is most likely out of reach, at least in the near future.

The TPLF have remained resolute, despite the setback of losing Mekelle. According to Gebremichael, they ‘are ready to die in defence of [their] right to administer the region’. Northern Ethiopia will thus likely be mired by sporadic, targeted violence for the foreseeable future unless a negotiated solution is reached. This conflict is far from over.

Deepening National Divisions

The Tigrayan crisis is not the only source of violence or ethno-regional division in Ethiopia. The nation, which has a population of over 100 million people, has a long history of domestic tension.

Ethiopia’s disparate peoples are governed by an ethnic federalist system. While in one respect, this system does alleviate ethnic demands for autonomy, it has a corrosive flipside. The regions created are deeply exclusionary, which creates ‘hard’ borders that incite friction.

These borders have historically been flashpoints for conflict, and over the last year, violence along these borders, and elsewhere, has begun to increase.

This map highlights areas that The New Humanitarian has identified as recent ‘flashpoints’ for internecine violence. The widespread nature of these flashpoints paints a picture of the growing instability that has plagued Ethiopia in recent years. The death of an estimated 222 civilians in Benishangul-Gumuz on 23 December is another devastating instance of the impact of this violence.

The Tigray conflict, alongside this violence and ethno-regional strife, has led to some suggestions that Ethiopia could undergo a Yugoslavia-like collapse. The underlying, unresolved grievances around the country that have built up from years of government domination are an undeniable threat to national unity.

However, these fears of collapse have been somewhat overblown. The risk that Ethiopia undergoes any kind of breakup, or is forced to deal with secessionist wars, is very low. Calls for the maintenance of autonomy are not equivalent to clamours for independence. As Adam Adebe, an Ethiopian constitutional scholar points out, ‘secession is not a popular sentiment, even in Tigray’.

There is also a sense that if secession movements were viable, then they would have launched a military campaign at the height of the Tigray conflict, when the Ethiopian army was most vulnerable.

Violence and instability, therefore, will likely continue. Full-scale ‘Balkanisation’ however, is not on the immediate horizon.

How will the situation evolve?

The critical question for Ethiopia’s future, therefore, seems to be whether Abiy will concentrate yet more power in Addis Ababa, and pursue a more authoritarian system of governance, or whether he will seek a negotiated inclusive settlement with regional leaders. Such a compromise is unlikely to be influenced by external forces; Abiy is firmly within the Ethiopian state tradition that abhors foreign intervention in their internal affairs.

Abiy’s relative youth, both as a politician and a Prime Minister, make forecasting somewhat challenging. There are two realistic paths for Ethiopia’s future, which essentially hinge upon Abiy’s political will and willingness to compromise.

Scenario 1: Inclusive Dialogue

Violence and human rights abuses have lost Abiy a huge amount of support internationally, marking a stunning fall from grace since being made a Nobel Peace Laureate in 2019. While the brutality of his response, particularly the way in which it has caused harm to civilians, should be roundly condemned, the role of the TPLF in creating this conflict cannot be dismissed. The Tigrayan leadership persistently undermined Abiy’s government, and knowingly angled for conflict.

Without exculpating this violence, the general thrust of this argument is that at heart, Abiy is not intent on consolidating his authority through force, and even if he were, his power is not established enough for him to survive as a leader by employing these methods. Though some have argued that Abiy is a unitarian, he has never directly disavowed the system, merely pleaded for its reform.

It is in Abiy’s interest, therefore, to broaden his political base by seeking a negotiated settlement with the disparate ethno-regional factions that dominate Ethiopian politics. The elections, which Abiy has said will be held on 5 June 2021, set a clear calendar for any such negotiations.

If the current instability which plagues the country is to settle down, some form of settlement with opposition groups must be reached before these elections. If not, their results will not be recognised by opposition factions or their supporters, which would likely spark mass protest and violence.

It does, therefore, seem likely that talks will be initiated. A satisfactory settlement is certainly a realistic possibility, but will doubtless be complicated.

Scenario 2: Increased Authoritarianism

Alternatively, buoyed by a symbolic victory in Tigray, or frustrated by unproductive dialogue, Abiy could ignore the growing necessity to compromise, and instead tighten his authoritarian grip over the nation, forcing forward an agenda of political centralisation.

This could have devastating effects for Ethiopia, where political authority relies on some degree of regional autonomy and compromise. Internecine violence, which has gradually grown throughout Abiy’s tenure, will likely spiral out of control.

The longer dialogue is delayed, the greater the potential for violence and instability in Ethiopia. The country’s size and significance means that this is not merely a domestic issue. The fallout of the violence and displacement of the Tigray conflict has already had significant regional consequences. Eritrea has sent troops into Tigray in support of Ethiopia, and has been shelled by the TPLF in retaliation. Tens of thousands of refugees have fled into Sudan, creating the conditions for rising tensions on their border with Ethiopia. Finally, the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops in Somalia could sow the seeds for a resurgence of al-Shabaab.

If he goes down this road, therefore, Abiy would not only threaten the stability of his own country, but his actions could plunge the entire Horn of Africa into chaos.

 

All Is Not Quiet on Ethiopia’s Western Front

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How Addis Ababa deals with ethnic violence in the region of Benishangul-Gumuz will determine the country’s future.

BY Foreign Policy | TOM GARDNER  

On Dec. 22, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed visited the vast lowland territory of Metekel in Ethiopia’s far western region of Benishangul-Gumuz, the so-called homeland of five indigenous ethnic groups of which the most populous are the Berta and the Gumuz. It was his first known visit to Metekel, a strategically important area that includes the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and which has been afflicted by an endless string of gruesome, ethnically targeted massacres in recent months. “The desire by enemies to divide Ethiopia along ethnic & religious lines still exists,” Abiy tweeted following a meeting with local residents and officials. “This desire will remain unfulfilled.”

The next day, more than 200 people—ethnic Amharas, Oromos, and Shinasha—in the village of Bekoji were slaughtered by heavily armed men from the local Gumuz ethnic group in a devastating raid that began at dawn. “No value added,” an angry resident of Assosa, the regional capital, told me over the phone after Abiy’s visit. “He came for nothing.”

The trip to Metekel came a little less than a month after Abiy declared victory in the northern region of Tigray, where Ethiopia’s armed forces have been battling the country’s erstwhile ruling party, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), which dominated Ethiopian politics for decades before it was sidelined by Abiy. Yet that war is not over: Fighting persists in several places, and more than 50,000 people have so far fled to Sudan. The TPLF, whose leadership withdrew to the mountains on Nov. 28, continues assaults against a coalition of Ethiopian federal troops, militiamen from the neighboring Amhara region, as well as an unconfirmed number of soldiers from Eritrea to the north.

While the Tigray war rumbles on, violence elsewhere is spreading to an extent the central government cannot ignore.

But the visit to Metekel was a sign that while the Tigray war rumbles on, violence elsewhere is spreading to an extent the central government cannot ignore. Numerous civilians in Wollega, the far west of Oromia, Abiy’s home region, were killed last month, amid fighting between government forces and Oromo insurgents (who have also suffered hundreds of casualties in recent weeks). The government blamed the rebels for carrying out a massacre of at least 19 civilians. As in Metekel, many of these victims were ethnic Amhara living as minorities in the region.

In both territories, the army has been deployed to restore order: The government of Benishangul-Gumuz called for federal assistance four months ago, following a series of killings that began on Sept. 6. (Federal troops were first sent to Wollega in early 2019.) Prefiguring an approach that would soon be taken on a much larger scale in Tigray, security operations reportedly have also involved Amhara regional security forces, which crossed over the border into Metekel.

The deployment of such regional forces—well armed and ethnically exclusive—is a troubling feature of recent conflicts throughout Ethiopia, but Abiy’s extensive reliance on Amhara troops in Tigray, and to a still limited extent in Benishangul-Gumuz, highlights their growing importance to his security strategy, a development viewed with skepticism by some, including those in his own Oromo camp, who resent their ascendancy.

The fighting in Benishangul-Gumuz has since fragmented, with elements of the local regional security apparatus siding with Gumuz militiamen against the federal army and the line between Gumuz combatants and civilians blurring. “The response of the federal army is to take action on all Gumuz because they can’t identify terrorists from civilians,” a driver working for the regional government forces in Metekel told me.

The bloodshed is also increasingly grisly. Witnesses in Metekel report summary executions, the slaughtering of babies, and the disemboweling of corpses by Gumuz militias. Calls for stronger military measures, particularly from Amhara, are growing louder. In early December, Amhara’s chief of police said he had requested permission from the federal government to intervene in Benishangul-Gumuz. A few days later, a spokesperson for the Amhara regional government warned that if massacres continued, then the state would begin a “second chapter” of the war in Tigray—this time in Benishangul-Gumuz. In October, the country’s deputy prime minister, who is ethnic Amhara, called for Amharas in Benishangul-Gumuz to arm themselves. On Dec. 24, Abiy said he was sending even more troops to the region.

Formally incorporated into the Ethiopian Empire in the late 19th century, Benishangul-Gumuz has long been a frontier space between more powerful neighbors: the Sudanese to the west, highland Ethiopians to the northeast, Oromos to the south. Its indigenous populations—of which the Gumuz, Berta, and Shinasha ethnic groups are the largest—were prey to slave-raiding from all three for centuries and treated as racial inferiors for many years after.

Under Ethiopia’s 1995 constitution, which was largely devised by the TPLF, Benishangul-Gumuz was granted a degree of formal autonomy, with leaders drawn from the local elites. The Benishangul-Gumuz constitution, revised in 2002, designated five ethnic groups as “owners” but excluded the many Amharas, Oromos, Tigrayans, and Agaws who are deemed residents, not citizens.

The Benishangul-Gumuz constitution, revised in 2002, designated five ethnic groups as “owners” but excluded the many Amharas, Oromos, Tigrayans, and Agaws who are deemed residents, not citizens.

They are permitted to vote but cannot, in effect, run for elected office—though they are represented to varying degrees in the local bureaucracy. This makes explicit what is only implicit in the federal constitution: a division between “natives” and “outsiders” whose formal rights, in particular to land, are unequal.

Some of these so-called outsiders were settled in the region in the 1980s, as part of the then-military government’s response to the droughts and famines of that decade. But recently their ranks have swelled, with migrants from the densely populated highlands looking for untouched land or work on commercial plantations; Benishangul-Gumuz is one of the few places in Ethiopia where it is still possible to acquire sizable tracts.

In Metekel, this typically meant Gumuz being pushed out by Amharas and Agaws, many of whom were later evicted in turn; in Kamashi, in southern Benishangul-Gumuz, the pressure came from the Oromos of Wollega. The construction of the GERD in Metekel, close to the border with Sudan, has created new jobs and resources that largely benefit non-Gumuz groups; at the same time, though, it has accelerated the scramble for preeminence in the region.

Seen from a longer view, low-intensity violence is less the exception than the norm. Benishangul-Gumuz was also plagued by rebellion and communal conflict in the early 1990s, an era that shares similarities with the messy shift that began in 2018.

Typically, violence was between so-called settlers (known locally as qey, or “light-skinned”) and the indigenous groups, but it also occurred among the so-called outsiders—Oromos, Amharas, Tigrayans, Agaws—too: The brief occupation of Assosa in 1988 by the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) resulted in a massacre of around 300 Amhara peasants. In 2018, after the OLF returned from exile at Abiy’s invitation, there was a renewed bout of violence between the Oromos and Gumuz over land and resources in Kamashi, which includes rich gold deposits. Scores of people died, and some 150,000 were driven from their homes.

But now the violence is a matter of national importance and not only because of its exceptional scale and intensity. It is also an essential part of the arsenal of allegations deployed by the federal government to justify military intervention in Tigray. This was spelled out in a Nov. 12 statement from the prime minister’s office, which claimed that the “hidden hands of the TPLF” were behind killings of civilians in all corners of the country as part of a plot to destabilize the new administration.

A TV documentary produced by the federal police and broadcast on state-owned channels four days earlier was more specific. It claimed that individuals including a Tigrayan businessman in Metekel had been paid by one of the TPLF’s founders, Abay Tsehaye, to organize Gumuz militias and attack Amhara civilians in the region. At other times, the federal government has claimed that the violence has been orchestrated to interrupt the construction of the GERD, a source of tension between Ethiopia and downstream Egypt that Abiy believes the TPLF has tried to exacerbate.

Such notions are also pervasive within the region itself. “The TPLF are the ones disturbing everything, everywhere,” a resident of Assosa told me in October. As in other peripheral parts of Ethiopia, including neighboring Gambella, the relative underdevelopment of Benishangul-Gumuz has long accorded outsiders disproportionate economic power and influence.

The TPLF’s dominance of the previous ruling coalition, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front, and its related patronage networks before 2018 meant Tigrayans were particularly prominent. They owned some of the largest agricultural investments, especially in Metekel, while TPLF-owned or affiliated businesses enjoyed a substantial share of subsidiary contracts in, for instance, the construction sector (as they commonly did elsewhere in Ethiopia).

The fact that the region’s president, Ashadli Hasen, a Berta, was appointed in 2016 and has not been replaced gives an illusion of continuity. But in reality TPLF influence in the region has waned since 2018. Several Tigrayan investors have had their licenses revoked for failing to develop their agricultural leases (a pattern seen elsewhere in the country), while others—reportedly including a wealthy hotel owner in Assosa, according to local sources—have been arrested. Tigrayans are also less prominent in the local bureaucracy than they once were. All this suggests that the carnage in Metekel may be less the result of deliberate sabotage by the TPLF than of a chaotic rush to fill the vacuum that it left behind.

There is, however, little doubt that Amhara civilians have borne the brunt of the bloodshed. Gumuz militias have reportedly told their victims that they would be killed for not respecting orders to leave their region.

“In terms of population, the Amhara are the second most populous in Benishangul-Gumuz. In terms of influence, the Amhara are the most influential, especially in the towns. In terms of the economy, they play a leading role. All these factors contributed to the killings. Why? Because the indigenous populations think the resources are controlled by ‘others,’” a senior Amhara official told me in November.

But it is also clear that violence has gone the other way, too. In 2019, some 200 Gumuz (and Shinasha) were allegedly killed by Amhara militias following tit-for-tat clashes on the Amhara side of the disputed border between the regions, which locals in Benishangul-Gumuz complain went unreported and unpunished. “The government kept silent. They didn’t take action against those who committed that crime,” said Zegeye Belew, a student in Assosa. “Nobody speaks about that genocide.”

During Abiy’s visit, a Gumuz participant in the meeting alleged that Amhara militias and youth groups were “blindly invading” the region in order to grab the land. “They want to chase us away. They’re saying the Gumuz are Sudanese,” he said. “The people of Gumuz were belittled in the past. But now we’re told that we should be exterminated.”

So far the federal government appears to have avoided picking sides. In his speech in Metekel, the prime minister implicitly acknowledged that both sides were at fault and advised neither to pursue revenge. But he also warned the Benishangul-Gumuz leadership that he would take further action if they failed to keep order and indicated that they should heed lessons from what happened in Tigray. On Dec. 23, the regional government said it had arrested several senior Gumuz officials for alleged complicity in the conflict, including the region’s deputy police chief. More than 1,000 people have been arrested and will be detained for three to six months without trial, according to the police.

But should the violence go on much longer, Abiy may find it increasingly difficult to resist pressure from Amhara leaders to take firmer action.

Abiy may find it increasingly difficult to resist pressure from Amhara leaders to take firmer action.

This might, in an extreme scenario, mean giving a green light to the Tigray approach: a full-scale intervention by federal troops, supported by further Amhara security forces, with the goal of removing the regional leadership and installing a regime more amenable to them. Alternatively, Amhara nationalists, whose clout has grown since the start of the war in Tigray, might insist on annexation of parts of Metekel, which they regard as historically theirs.

This is already the case in disputed parts of western and southern Tigray, which—following bloody battles, atrocities, and at least one possible war crime (reportedly by a TPLF-linked militia)—are now effectively under Amhara administration. Benishangul-Gumuz leaders have made it clear that they believe this to be their neighbor’s intention in Metekel, too. “The Amhara people are trying to make Metekel their own,” said a local journalist in Assosa. “So the owners are protesting.”

Such an approach might stamp out attacks on Amharas and other minorities in Metekel. But it would create serious political difficulties for Abiy, not least among his Oromo allies who fear he has already ceded too much to Amhara irredentism and worry the next step is a wholesale rewriting of the 1995 federal constitution.

This controversial document has plenty of support in Oromia and other parts of southern Ethiopia, for ostensibly guaranteeing ethnic self-rule after what those supporters regard as a century or more of Ethiopian imperialism with Amharas at the helm. But it is loathed by many Amharas for its perceived failure to guarantee their rights and security in parts of the country where, for historic reasons, they are settled in large numbers.

Equally, should Amharas be seen to acquire too much of an upper hand in Metekel, Oromos within and outside the ruling party may seek to step up their own demands in Kamashi or even give tacit support to the activities of Oromo insurgents in parts of Metekel itself, thereby turning Benishangul-Gumuz into a proxy battleground between Ethiopia’s two largest ethnic groups.

While Abiy might resist the demands of Amhara nationalists over Metekel, that would risk jettisoning increasingly important allies; he is also under pressure from them to take a stronger line in an increasingly bloody dispute with Sudan over its international border with Amhara. In recent days, federal troops are reported to have been redeployed from Tigray to the Sudan front, where they are again alleged to have fought alongside Amhara militias in a string of clashes around the disputed Fashqa triangle.

These developments are straining already stretched military resources and risk bogging the country down further in interethnic warfare. The alternative would be the sort of all-inclusive national dialogue that puts everything on the table: territorial boundaries, rights and access to land, the political representation of minorities, as well as justice for past crimes. Whichever path is taken, the consequences will be profound and lasting.

Tom Gardner is a journalist based in Addis Ababa, covering Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa.

 

05/01/2021 News and Commentary

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Ethiopia in Crisis

Ethiopia’s total debt reached 51% of its GDP

Ethiopia’s total domestic and foreign debt has reached 54.7 billion US Dollar (2.01 trillion birr)  (50.8 percent of the country’s GDP), according to a recent government debt statement.

Source: Reporter 

Desert outbreak in Ethiopia caused 356, 286 metric tonnes of cereal loss

In a joint assessment report by the Ethiopian government and FAO, the desert outbreak in Ethiopia alone caused 356, 286 metric tonnes of cereal loss, along with the destruction of 197,000 ha of cropland, and 1.35 Million ha of pasturelands.

Source: Space in Africa. Satellite Imagery for the Locust Invasion Crisis in Eastern Africa.

Update: The outbreak of desert locusts could reduce production by 3.8 million quintals (ተከስቶ የነበረው የበረሃ አንበጣ ወረርሽኝ የ3.8 ሚሊዮን ኩንታል ምርት ቅናሽ ሊያመጣ እንደሚችል ተጠቆመ።)

ምንጭ: Reporter

4.5 million people seeking urgent humanitarian assistance in Tigray

According to the Interim government of Tigray, more than 4.5 million Tigrayans (of which roughly half are children) are seeking urgent humanitarian assistance. There are also 2.2 million IDPs within the region.

Source: ETV Tigrigna on Facebook

2.3 Million Children Without Access To Humanitarian Aid

“Following the recent crisis in the Tigray region of Ethiopia, an estimated 2.3 million children have been left without access to necessary humanitarian aid. Critical medical supplies provided by international organizations, including vaccines, emergency medications, and sanitation items, are likely running low, as communication and transportation into the region is limited. … About 45% of those crossing the border into Sudan are children. Those remaining in Tigray are currently living without electricity, and running water.”

Source: The Organization for World Peace

Tigray is an ideal staging post for an insurgency

In 2020 Ethiopia plunged into chaos. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali, fresh off a 2019 Nobel Peace Prize win, has declared war on the restive province of Tigray. The government claims that the military operation ended after the capture of the Tigray capital, but there are fears that a gorilla conflict will drag on. The region is an ideal staging post for an insurgency, featuring rugged mountain terrain as well as the “gateway to hell”, the Danakil Depression. This sparsely populated desert is one of the lowest and hottest places on earth.

Sources: Explorers Web “The World’s Most Dangerous Places”

TPLF will likely continue to exist as a low-intensity insurgency and many local actors will reject the Ethiopian-appointed state leadership.

Source: Stratfor, 2021 Annual Forecast

ENDF graduated newly trained members

The new recruits were drawn from various parts of the country trained in various military techniques in Tolay, Hurso, & BirSheleko training camps.

Source: EBC News on Facebook

GERD and the HoA

Russia to Establish Navy Base in Sudan for at Least 25 Years

Russia has signed an agreement with Sudan to establish a navy base in the African nation for at least a quarter century, part of Moscow’s efforts to expand its global reach.

Source: Military.com

Pompeo signs order removing Sudan from terror sponsors list

Egypt’s leader meets US treasury chief ahead of Sudan visit

The office of President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi said in a statement the president and US Secretary of the Treasury Steven Mnuchin discussed mutual and regional issues, including the latest developments in talks with Sudan and Ethiopia over a disputed dam that Ethiopia is building over the Blue Nile River.

Source: Arab News

Egypt has agreed to reopen airspace with Qatar

 … to end a three-year rift between Qatar, GCC states and Egypt

Source: Doha News

President Trump’s late pullout appears to put politics over antiterror strategy

Since Islamic State lost its physical caliphate in Syria and Iraq, unstable parts of Africa have become more appealing for jihadists looking to claim territory and plot attacks on the West. ISIS has a small presence in Somalia but the greatest threat is al-Shabaab.

Source: WSJ

The U.S. Withdraws from Somalia (Podcast).

Discussing President Trump’s decision to withdraw American force from Somalia.

Source: Long War Journal

The Evolution of the Islamic State Threat in Africa 

Abstract: The annus horribilis Islamic State Central suffered in 2019, during which the group lost the last stretch of its “territorial caliphate” in Iraq and Syria and its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was killed, does not appear to have had a discernible impact on the overall operational trajectory of the Islamic State threat in Africa. Post-2019, the Islamic State’s West Africa Province sustained around the same high level of violence while Islamic State provinces in Libya, Sinai, and Somalia remained pernicious, though generally contained, threats. In some parts of Africa, the group grew as a threat. Both wings of the Islamic State’s new Central Africa Province as well as the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara wing of the Islamic State’s West Africa Province escalated their violent campaigns post-2019. The Islamic State’s province in Algeria remains effectively defunct, and though the Islamic State affiliate in Tunisia failed to conduct major attacks, it remained active. As the authors stress in this article and an upcoming book, the overall resilience of the Islamic State in Africa should not be a surprise; it underscores that while connections were built up between Islamic State Central and its African affiliates—with the former providing, at times, some degree of strategic direction, coordination, and material assistance—the latter have historically evolved under their own steam and acted with a significant degree of autonomy.

Source: Combating Terrorism Center

04/01/2021 – News and Commentary – Tigray War

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Tigray conflict renewed. Sudan refugee crises spiked. 

“The flow of Ethiopian refugees fleeing an armed conflict in Tigray into Sudan has increased over the past few days as the violence has flared up, Sudanese authorities said on Monday. … The number of those fleeing due to the armed conflict, which was renewed between the two parties in recent days, has increased … A total of 61,458 Ethiopians have entered Sudan since the conflict broke out in early November.”

Source: La Prensa Latina

Access to Tigray remains restricted. UK deeply concerned.

“We are deeply worried about the risks the conflict poses to civilian lives and Ethiopia’s overall stability. … Access to Tigray remains restricted.”

Source: African Minister, James Duddridge MP

Interim Mayor of Mekelle admits presence of Eritrean troops in Tigray

“Interim Mayor of Mekelle city, Ataklti Haileselassie, admits presence and participation of Eritrean forces in Tigray war” amid consistent denial by officials both in Addis Ababa and Asmara.

Source: Addis Standard

Amhara police chief admitted preparations already completed before the war brokeout on November 4

Amhara region police chief, Commissioner Abere Adamu, reveals how region’s police force guided federal steel-clad mechanized forces to join “war” in tigray.

Commissioner Abere also revealed that Amhara regional state had “already done [its] homework,” and “deployment of forces had taken place in our borders from east to west. The war started that night after we have already completed our preparations,” he told an audience to several rounds of applause.

Source: Addis Standard

A tripartite talk on GERD resumed, negotations to be held on January 10, 2021.

A tripartite talk on Renaissance Dam resume amid political tensions between Egypt and Ethiopia and border conflict between Sudan and Ethiopia. This week’s talks will pave the way “for the resumption of tripartite negotiations on Sunday January 10 in the hope of concluding by the end of January”, Sudan’s Water Ministry noted.

Source: DW

Sudan boycotted the tripartite ministerial meeting today

“Sudan boycotted the tripartite ministerial meeting held on Monday to discuss the disputed issues regarding the Ethiopian Dam. The meeting was held in the presence of water resources ministers from both Egypt and Ethiopia. … Sudan boycotted the meeting after it had received no response to its call for a bilateral meeting with the experts and observers of the AU on Sunday.”

Source: Daily News Egypt

“Never miss a good chance to shut up.” ― Will Rogers

 “An advisor to occupants of the prime minister’s office for over two decades, Arkebe Oqubay, is vying for the top job at a UN agency.”

Source: Africa Intelligence

Why Ethiopia and Sudan have fallen out over al-Fashaga

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Source: BBC | Alex de Waal, African Analyst

 

The armed clashes along the border between Sudan and Ethiopia are the latest twist in a decades-old history of rivalry between the two countries, though it is rare for the two armies to fight one another directly over territory.

The immediate issue is a disputed area known as al-Fashaga, where the north-west of Ethiopia’s Amhara region meets Sudan’s breadbasket Gedaref state.

Although the approximate border between the two countries is well-known – travellers like to say that Ethiopia starts when the Sudanese plains give way to the first mountains – the exact boundary is rarely demarcated on the ground.

Colonial-era treaties

Borders in the Horn of Africa are fiercely disputed. Ethiopia fought a war with Somalia in 1977 over the disputed region of the Ogaden.

In 1998 it fought Eritrea over a small piece of contested land called Badme.

About 80,000 soldiers died in that war which led to deep bitterness between the countries, especially as Ethiopia refused to withdraw from Badme town even though the International Court of Justice awarded most of the territory to Eritrea.

It was reoccupied by Eritrean troops during the fighting in Tigray in November 2020.

After the 1998 war, Ethiopia and Sudan revived long-dormant talks to settle the exact location of their 744km-long (462 miles) boundary.

The most difficult area to resolve was Fashaga. According to the colonial-era treaties of 1902 and 1907, the international boundary runs to the east.

This means that the land belongs to Sudan – but Ethiopians had settled in the area and were cultivating there and paying their taxes to Ethiopian authorities.

‘Deal condemned as secret bargain’

Negotiations between the two governments reached a compromise in 2008. Ethiopia acknowledged the legal boundary but Sudan permitted the Ethiopians to continue living there undisturbed.

It was a classic case of a ‘soft border’ managed in a way that did not let the location of a ‘hard border’ disrupt the livelihoods of people in the border zone; there was coexistence for decades until just now, when a definitive sovereign line was demanded by Ethiopia.

The Ethiopian delegation to the talks that led to the 2008 compromise was headed by a senior official of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), Abay Tsehaye.

After the TPLF was removed from power in Ethiopia in 2018, ethnic Amhara leaders condemned the deal as a secret bargain and said they had not been properly consulted.

Each side has its own story of what sparked the clash in Fashaga. What happened next is not in dispute: the Sudanese army drove back the Ethiopians and forced the villagers to evacuate.

At a regional summit in Djibouti on 20 December, Sudan’s Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok raised the matter with his Ethiopian counterpart Abiy Ahmed.

They agreed to negotiate, but each has different preconditions. Ethiopia wants the Sudanese to compensate the burned-out communities; Sudan wants a return to the status quo ante.

While the delegates were talking, there was a second clash, which the Sudanese have blamed on Ethiopian troops.

As with most border disputes, each side has a different analysis of history, law, and how to interpret century-old treaties. But it is also a symptom of two bigger issues – each of them unlocked by Mr Abiy’s policy changes.

Territorial claims in Tigray

The Ethiopians who inhabit Fashaga are ethnic Amhara – a constituency that Mr Abiy increasingly hitched his political wagon to after losing significant support in his Oromo ethnic group, the largest in Ethiopia. Amharas are the second largest group in Ethiopia and its historic rulers.

Emboldened by the federal army’s victories in the conflict against the TPLF over the last two months, the Amhara are making territorial claims in Tigray.

After the TPLF retreated, pursued by Amhara regional militia, they hoisted their flags and put up road signs that said “welcome to Amhara”. This was in lands claimed by Amhara state but allocated to Tigray in the 1990s when the TPLF was in power in Ethiopia.

The Fashaga conflict follows the same pattern of claiming sovereignty – except that it is not about Ethiopia’s internal boundaries, but the border with a neighbouring state.

The failure to resolve it peacefully is the indirect result of another of Mr Abiy’s policy reversals: Ethiopia’s foreign relations. For 60 years, Ethiopia’s strategic aim was to contain Egypt, but a year ago Mr Abiy reached out a hand of friendship.

The two countries each regard the River Nile as an existential question.

Egypt sees upstream dams as a threat to its share of the Nile waters, established in colonial era treaties. Ethiopia sees the river as an essential source of hydroelectric power, needed for its economic development.

The dispute came to a head over the construction of the huge Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (Gerd).

The bedrock of the Ethiopian foreign ministry’s hydro-diplomacy used to be a web of alliances among the other upstream African countries.

The aim was to achieve a multi-country comprehensive agreement on sharing the Nile waters. In this forum, Egypt was outnumbered.

Sudan was in the African camp. It was set to gain from the Gerd, which would control flooding, increase irrigation, and provide cheaper electricity.

Egypt wanted straightforward bilateral talks with the aim of preserving its colonial-era entitlement to the majority of the Nile waters.

In October 2019, Mr Abiy flew to the Russia-Africa summit at Sochi. On the side-lines he met Egyptian President Abdul Fattah al-Sisi.

In a single meeting, with no foreign ministry officials present, Mr Abiy upended Ethiopia’s Nile waters strategy.

He agreed to Mr Sisi’s proposal that the US treasury should mediate the dispute on the Gerd. The US leaned towards Egypt.

If the young Ethiopian leader, who had just won the Nobel Peace Prize for ending tensions with Eritrea, thought he could also secure a deal with Egypt, he was wrong. The opposite happened: the 44-year-old cornered himself.

Sudan was the third country invited to negotiate in Washington DC. Vulnerable to US pressure because it desperately needed America to lift financial sanctions imposed when it was designated a “state sponsor of terrorism” in 1993, Sudan fell in with the Egyptian position.

Ethiopian public opinion turned against the American proposals and Mr Abiy was forced to reject them, after which the US suspended some aid to Ethiopia. US President Donald Trump warned that Egypt might “blow up” the dam, and Ethiopia declared a no-fly zone over the region where the dam is located.

‘Pattern of mutual destabilisation’

The Nobel laureate can ill-afford further disputes with Egypt, amidst the conflict in Tigray and the clashes in Fashaga. The latter raise the ghosts of a long history of rivalry between Ethiopia and Sudan.

In the 1980s, Communist Ethiopia armed Sudanese rebels while Sudan aided ethno-nationalist armed groups, including the TPLF. In the 1990s, Sudan supported militant Islamist groups while Ethiopia backed the Sudanese opposition.

With armed clashes and unrest in many parts of Ethiopia, and Sudan’s recent peace deal with rebels in Darfur and the Nuba Mountains still incomplete, each country could readily return to this age-old pattern of mutual destabilisation.

Relations between Sudan and Ethiopia reached their warmest when Mr Abiy flew to Khartoum in June 2019 to encourage pro-democracy protesters and the Sudanese generals to come to agreement on a civilian government following the overthrow of long-term ruler Omar al-Bashir.

It was a characteristic Abiy initiative – high profile and wholly individual – and it needed formalization through the regional body Igad and the diplomatic heavy lifting of others, including the African Union, Arab countries, the US and UK to achieve results.

Sudan Prime Minister Hamdok has tried to return the favour by offering assistance in resolving Ethiopia’s conflict in Tigray. He was rebuffed, most recently at the 20 December summit, at which Mr Abiy insisted that the Ethiopian government would deal with its internal affairs on its own.

As refugees from Tigray continue to flood into Sudan, bringing with them stories of atrocities and hunger, the Ethiopian prime minister may find it more difficult to reject mediation.

He also risks igniting a new round of cross-border antagonism between Ethiopia and Sudan, deepening the crisis in the region.

Ten Elections to Watch in 2021

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Source: Council of Foreign Affairs | by James M. Lindsay

  1. Ethiopian Parliamentary Elections, 2021.

Ethiopians were supposed to go to the polls this past August. That vote was postponed, however, ostensibly because of COVID-19. If the vote is held in 2021, it will take place amid considerable turmoil. In late 2019, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed merged the ruling government coalition into a single political party. It includes nearly every major ethnic party except for the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). The TPLF, which dominated Ethiopian politics before Abiy took office, refused to join. In September, Tigray, which accounts for 6 percent of Ethiopia’s population, defied the federal government and held regional elections. Two months later, Abiy claimed that Tigrayans had attacked a military base. He ordered military retaliation in response and quickly claimed that federal control had been reestablished over Tigray. Fighting has continued, however, and some 50,000 Tigrayans have been displaced. Meanwhile, ethnic violence is rising elsewhere in Ethiopia. Abiy was once seen as a leader who would bring stability and prosperity to Ethiopia—he was awarded the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize. Now he looks to have turned in an autocratic direction by detaining opposition leaders and suppressing political freedoms. The Nobel Peace Prize Committee went so far as to rebuke him, saying it was “deeply concerned” by the situation in Tigray.

2. Ecuadoran General Election, February 7.

3. Dutch General Election, March 17.

4. Peruvian General Election, April 11.

5. Iraqi Parliamentary Elections, June 6.

6. Iranian Presidential Election, June 18.

7. Zambian General Election, August 12. 

8. Hong Kong Legislative Council Elections, September 5.

9. German Federal Election, September 26.

10. Nicaraguan General Election, November 7.

Events in Tigray Overview 2020 – Briefing EEPA HORN No.2 – 31 Dec 2020

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Europe External Programme with Africa is a Belgium-based Centre of Expertise with in-depth knowledge, publications, and networks, specialised in issues of peace building, refugee protection and resilience in the Horn of Africa. EEPA has published extensively on issues related to movement and/or human trafficking of refugees in the Horn of Africa and on the Central Mediterranean Route. It cooperates with a wide network of Universities, research organisations, civil society and experts from Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Djibouti, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Uganda and across Africa. Key in-depth publications can be accessed on the website.

Key points

● More than two million children in Tigray do not have access to food, water and safety and may have been displaced, while there is a severe humanitarian situation regarding
100.000 Eritrean refugees in Tigray; full humanitarian access has not been given.
● Serious concern that war crimes are being committed against civilians in Tigray.
● Military situation likely to evolve into a protracted guerilla war situation.
● Destabilisation of peace in the region.
● Destabilisation in Ethiopia with increased ethnic fighting in the preparation of the elections.
● Facts on the ground in Tigray remain unclear due to a two-month communication lock-down.

Short overview

● Ethiopia PM Abiy claims that the regional government of Tigray state is undermining the central authority of Addis Ababa, by carrying out elections in September 2020, which were
not recognised by Addis Ababa. National elections had been postponed due to the COVID-situation.

● Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) won a new mandate, it claims, through the elections it held. It claims that PM Abiy was in cohoot with Eritrean Pres Isayas to
undermine Tigray.

● PM Abiy ordered a reorganisation of the Northern command of the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF). This constitutes an important part of the ENDF, stationed in Tigray
region due to the earlier conflict with Eritrea. This conflict ended with an agreement between Abiy and Afwerki in July 2018. Abiy ordered the split of the Northern command.

● After PM Abiy sent a general to carry out the division of the Northern command, the TPLF sent him back to Addis Ababa. In a next move, PM Abiy sent troops in a cargo plane on 3
November to the Tigray capital Mekelle. The TPLF ordered the arrest of the troops. Details on what happened with them are missing and contradictory.

● Shooting from the main camp of the Northern Command in Qwiha/Mekelle was reported starting from ca. 10 pm. Different sources claim that some members of the ENDF had sided
with Tigray Defense Forces (TDF) and other parts of the ENDF resisted, which led to bloodshed. Similar events are reported from other military posts in Tigray around the same
time. Sources from inside the TPLF, claimed that it was a pre-emptive strike due to preparations for an immediate attack by the federal government. PM Abiy called a law and order operation with the aim to restore his authority over the region.

● PM Abiy instated a temporary provisional government in Tigray to replace the elected TPLF regional government. He declared a six-month state of emergency in Tigray.

● Operations to get control over the Tigray capital Mekelle started 28th of November. The TPLF withdrew from the capital and the ENDF took control of the capital.

● Eritrea participates in the war, by providing support to Ethiopian troops within Eritrea and by sending troops into Tigray. The latter is denied by both PM Abiy and Eritrea President
Afewerki. However, the evidence from Tigray and Ethiopia is overwhelming. The US State Department declared Eritrea was engaged in the war after studying evidence.

● Tigray has been in shut down since the start of the military hostilities, with no phone, internet and bank access. In Mekelle phone contact was restored in December. More than
two million people do not have access to food, water and safety and are displaced.

Current Military Situation

● ENDF have stated that they control the situation in Tigray regional state.

● This is contradicted by the TPLF and TDF who state they are involved in large parts of Tigray and have claimed victory in several battles in which they would have been able to capture
soldiers, weapons, ammunition and vehicles.

● TPLF had 250.000 troops at the start of the war and claimed it had gained control over parts of the Northern command of the ENDF. This has weakened ENDF, and increased its
dependency on Eritrea. Amharic militia, including the youth militia Fano, are fighting alongside ENDF forces.

● Eritrean troops have been fighting alongside ENDF forces; although it is difficult to give exact numbers, there is reason to believe that an extensive number of divisions and
mechanised divisions of Eritrea are involved.

● The UAE has been alleged of engaging in the war initially by giving air-support with drones flown in from the Eritrea port of Assab, where the UAE has a military base.

Regional Stability in the Horn

Sudan: A border conflict broke out between Sudan and Ethiopia concerning fertile land originally from Sudan but in use by Ethiopian farmers. Both sides mobilised troops and
clashed after Sudanese troops claimed to have been ambushed and soldiers were killed. The army Chief of Staff al-Barun of Sudan personally oversaw the operation.

South Sudan: Ethiopia is the major contributor of UNMISS and UNISFA-Abyei. Ethiopia is the head of the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangement Monitoring and
Verification Mechanism (CTSAMM) and contributes forces to CTSAMM. The crisis in Ethiopia is affecting its ability to engage with South Sudan.

Somalia: Ethnic Tigray troops were removed from AMISOM and replaced by Eritrean troops. AMISOM’s mandate includes overseeing the threats posed by Al Shabaab and other
terrorist groups. In the past Al Shabaab was supported and trained by Eritrea as reported by the UN Monitoring Group.

Refugee situation

Shire, Tigray: four large camps hosting 100.000 refugees from Eritrea under international protection were among the places targeted in the military operations. It is estimated that
thousands of refugees were abducted by Eritrean troops and forcefully returned to Eritrea. Refugees were forced to engage in the fighting against the local population. Refugees were
killed and many fled from the camps. Two camps, Adi Harush and May Aini received the first food aid from World Food Programme on 27 December. The other camps, Shemelba and Hitsats have not received any food for three months. Five humanitarian workers in the camps have been killed.

Eastern Sudan: Over 60.000 refugees from Tigray have arrived in Eastern Sudan. They report massacres and cruel killings and many dead. Many lost their relatives. Ethiopian
troops and militia from Amhara regional state have been reported to block refugees from reaching Sudan.

Addis Ababa: Eritrean refugees who fled from Shire, Tigray to Addis Ababa have been arrested and forcefully transported back to the refugee camps in Tigray, despite the lack of
safety, food and water in those camps and the threat of forced refoulement to Eritrea.

Ethnic profiling, civilian targeting, looting

● Reports of massacres across Tigray, especially in Humera and Adigrat, cruelties and mass executions.

● Widespread profiling of ethnic Tigrayans has been reported in Tigray. In Ethiopia ethnic profiling has affected ethnic Tigrayans, who have been suspended from work, travel and
have been subject to harsh security measures.

● Heavy looting of properties, allegedly by Amhara militia and Eritrean troops, involving universities and laboratories, industries, commercial places, churches, religious sites and
citizens. It is reported that truckloads were transported to Eritrea (military base Asholgol).

Situation in Ethiopia

● In Ethiopia further conflict broke out in the Benishangul-Gumuz region and some officials of the region have been arrested.

● Leaders of the Oromo Liberation Front have been arrested.

● Journalists have been harassed, surveilled, arrested, raising concern of freedom of press.

● National elections have been called by the Ethiopian National Election Board for June 5th.

International response

● AU has appointed 3 special envoys: Mr Joaquim Chissano, former president of Mozambique; Madame Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, former President of Liberia, and Mr Kgalema
Motlanthe, former President of South Africa. The envoys have met with PM Abiy.

● US has repeatedly expressed concern over the developing situation. The US has sent the USS Makin Island ship to the Red Sea to relocate US “forces in Somalia to other East Africa
operating locations while maintaining pressure on violent extremists and supporting partner forces”. US has expressed concern over the situation.

● EU has suspended budget support to Ethiopia due to violation of Human Rights. The EU has called for a ceasefire and full humanitarian access to the Tigray region.

● UN has asked for full humanitarian access to all parts of Tigray and investigations into the allegations related to what may constitute war crimes.

● IGAD has met on 20th December 2020 in Djibouti to discuss the regional situation.

● Sudan and Egypt increased cooperation on military exercises.3rd Jan negotiations are planned on the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam which may further increase tension.

Disclaimer:

All information in this situation report is presented as a fluid update report, as to the best knowledge and understanding of the authors at the moment of publication. EEPA does not claim that the information is correct but verifies to the best of ability within the circumstances. Publication is weighed on the basis of interest to understand potential impacts of events (or perceptions of these) on the situation. Check all information against updates and other media. EEPA does not take responsibility for the use of the information or impact thereof. All information reported originates from third parties and the content of all reported and linked information remains the sole responsibility of these third parties. Report to info@eepa.be any additional information and corrections.

Links of interest

https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/28/world/africa/Ethiopia-Eritrea-Tigray.html
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-arrest/ethiopian-police-arrest-reuters-cameraman-idUSKBN2920AD
https://addisstandard.com/news-local-official-in-amhara-region-accused-sudan-of-invading-large-swaths-of-land-stealing-destroying-more-than-25-m-worth-property/
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/africa/2020-12-30/abiy-ahmeds-crisis-legitimacy
https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2020/12/30/evidence-mounts-that-eritrean-forces-are-in-ethiopia
https://www.google.com/maps/d/u/0/viewer?mid=1ukq3h-fUshA0a0ZDcSI22WHbfC6PnKtX&shorturl=1&ll=26.16920359729128%2C-14.51459589999999&z=2
https://www.ethiopia-insight.com/2020/12/29/the-murky-politics-behind-the-metekel-massacres/
https://www.cfr.org/blog/amid-misinformation-and-suppressed-free-speech-ethiopian-conflict-erodes-abiys-credibility

Ten Conflicts to Watch in 2021

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According to a report by Robert Malley, President and CEO of International Crisis Group, published on Foreign Policy, the War on Tigray is one of the 10 conflicts the world should watch in 2021:

  1. Afghanistan
  2. Ethiopia
  3. The Sahel
  4. Yemen
  5. Venezuela
  6. Somalia
  7. Libya
  8. Iran – United States
  9. Russia – Turkey
  10. Climate Change

Read more