Tag Archive for: Terrorism

Al-Shabaab’s Attack in Ethiopia: One-off Incursion or Persistent Threat?

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JamesTown.Org |  Terrorism Monitor Volume: 20 Issue: 17

Ethiopian forces in July contained and repulsed an attack conducted in the eastern part of the country by Somalia-based al-Shabaab. Fighters from the militant group entered from southwestern Somalia and targeted four border towns in Ethiopia’s Somali regional state known as Ogaden Region. The estimated 500 al-Shabaab fighters had moved 150 kilometers inside Ethiopia before being met by the Ethiopian military and retreating (Garowe Online, July 30). Read more

Iran denies plotting to attack UAE embassy in Ethiopia

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MEMO | Iran has categorically rejected the allegation contained in a New York Times report that it is planning to attack the UAE Embassy in Addis Ababa. The denial was issued by the Iranian Embassy in the Ethiopian capital.

“Neither Ethiopia nor the United Arab Emirates have spoken about Iran’s involvement in these issues,” said the Iranians. “These baseless accusations are fabricated by media outlets that are hostile to the Islamic Republic of Iran, and work as agents of the Zionist entity [Israel].”

Earlier this month, Ethiopia said that it had arrested fifteen members of an underground cell and seized weapons and explosives as part of a plot against the UAE Embassies in Addis Ababa and Khartoum. However, the New York Times claimed that Iran was behind the plot.

Quoting US and Israeli officials, the newspaper said that Iranian intelligence agencies activated a sleeper cell in Addis Ababa late last year to gather intelligence on the US and Israeli embassies in the Ethiopian capital. According to the NYT report, the operation was part of a wider plan by Iran to seek revenge for the killing of Iranian commander Qasem Soleimani with an American drone strike last year, and Israel’s murder of Iran’s chief nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh in November.

Ethiopia Thwarts Iranian Plot to Attack UAE Embassy

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Source | Iran is seeking to “activate sleeper cells” in Africa in order to attack “soft targets” in an attempt to avenge the killing of top commander Qassem Soleimani in a US drone strike and its top nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh in 2020, reported The New York Times.

When Ethiopia’s intelligence agency recently uncovered a cell of 15 people it said were casing the embassy of the United Arab Emirates, along with a cache of weapons and explosives, it claimed to have foiled a major attack with the potential to sow havoc in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa.

But the Ethiopians omitted a key detail about the purported plot: who was behind it.

The only clue was the arrest of a 16th person: Accused of being the ringleader, Ahmed Ismail had been picked up in Sweden with the cooperation of friendly “African, Asian and European intelligence services,” the Ethiopians said.

Now American and Israeli officials say the operation was the work of Iran, whose intelligence service activated a sleeper cell in Addis Ababa last fall with orders to gather intelligence also on the embassies of the United States and Israel, reported the NYT.

They say the Ethiopian operation was part of a wider drive to seek soft targets in African countries where Iran might avenge painful, high-profile losses such as the death of Fakhrizadeh, said to have been killed by Israel in November, and Soleimani, killed by the United States in Iraq just over one year ago.

Citing Western intelligence sources, Rear Adm. Heidi K. Berg, director of intelligence at the Pentagon’s Africa command, said that Iran was behind the 15 people arrested in Ethiopia and that the “mastermind of this foiled plot,” Mr. Ismail, had been arrested in Sweden.

“Ethiopia and Sweden collaborated on the disruption to the plot,” Admiral Berg said in a statement.

Iran denied the accusations. “These are baseless allegations only provoked by the Zionist regime’s malicious media,” said a spokeswoman for the Iranian Embassy in Addis Ababa.

Even so, Ethiopia’s National Intelligence and Security Service said that a second group of plotters had been preparing to hit the Emirati Embassy in Khartoum, Sudan. A Sudanese official confirmed that account.

A senior United States defense official linked the arrests in Ethiopia to a failed Iranian plan to kill the United States ambassador to South Africa, which was reported by Politico in September. The American and Sudanese officials agreed to discuss the matter on condition of anonymity because of its diplomatic and intelligence sensitivity.

Still, much about the Ethiopian arrests and alleged Iranian role remained murky. The Ethiopian police have yet to formally charge the 15 plot suspects, only two of whom have been identified. Israeli officials say that as few as three of them may be actual Iranian operatives, with the others having been caught in the Ethiopian dragnet.

While Admiral Berg confirmed several details about Iran’s role in the Ethiopian arrests, other military and diplomatic officials in Washington declined to discuss it.

In contrast, officials in Israel, whose government is openly hostile to any thaw between Washington and Tehran, highlighted the purported plot as further evidence that Iran cannot be trusted.

For all its efforts, Iran has yet to deliver on its promises of vengeance for its high-profile losses, beyond a missile attack on American forces in Iran in January 2020, days after Soleimani was killed.

Any plan similar to the plot thwarted in Ethiopia, would be a curious choice, given its potential to undermine Joe Biden’s putative nuclear diplomacy with Iran, said Aaron David Miller, a foreign policy expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

“Africa is a relatively easy place to operate, and Ethiopia is preoccupied with other issues,” said Bruce Riedel, a former CIA officer now with the Brookings Institution, according to the NYT.

Meanwhile, the Jewish Chronicle revealed last week that the Israeli Mossad was behind the killing of Fakhrizadeh.

He was “killed by a one-ton automated gun that was smuggled into Iran piece-by-piece by the Mossad,” it reported.

“The 20-plus spy team, which comprised both Israeli and Iranian nationals, carried out the high-tech hit after eight months of painstaking surveillance, intelligence sources disclosed.”

Ethiopia arrests 15 over UAE embassy attack plot: Reports

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Al Jazeera | The country’s intelligence and security service said suspects were working on direction of foreigners, local media report.

Ethiopia’s state-run media have said authorities arrested 15 people over a plot to attack the United Arab Emirates’ embassy in the capital, Addis Ababa.

The Ethiopian Press Agency (EPA) on Wednesday cited a statement from the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) as saying that the suspects were working on foreigners’ direction.

An unspecified amount of arms, explosives and documents were seized during the operation, according to the statement, which was also cited in a report by the state-affiliated FANA news outlet.

“The group took the mission from a foreign terrorist group and was preparing to inflict significant damage on properties and human lives,” EPA said.

There was no immediate comment by the UAE’s foreign ministry or its embassy in Addis Ababa.

A second group of suspects was planning to attack the UAE’s diplomatic mission in neighbouring Sudan, the EPA said.

Ethiopia’s NISS was working with its Sudanese counterparts on that aspect of the plot, the agency said. There was no immediate comment from Sudanese authorities.

In its report, FANA cited the statement as saying that a man named “Ahmed Ismael, who is the leader of the terrorist group and a resident of Sweden, was arrested in Sweden as a result of exchange of information with European, African, and Asian security services”.

The UAE has played a key diplomatic role in bringing longtime foes Ethiopia and Eritrea since Abiy Ahmed became Ethiopia’s prime minister in 2018, while also providing financial contributions to stabilise Ethiopia’s economy.

Ethiopian politician facing terror trial goes on hunger strike

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AFP | A prominent Ethiopian opposition politician charged last year with terrorism faces “permanent health problems” after going on hunger strike for more than a week, his lawyer told AFP Friday.

Jawar Mohammed, a member of the opposition Oromo Federalist Congress, is one of around 20 suspects facing trial for terrorism and other offences in connection with several days of grisly violence that left more than 100 people dead last June and July.

The violence erupted after the shooting death in late June of Hachalu Hundessa, a popular singer from the Oromo ethnic group, Ethiopia’s largest, who channelled Oromo feelings of political and economic marginalisation.

Jawar and Bekele Gerba, another Oromo opposition leader, have been on hunger strike for eight days, while the other defendants “are on their sixth day now”, lawyer Tuli Bayyisa said.

Their demands include improved treatment for visiting family and supporters and, more broadly, an end to legal and other harassment of Oromo opposition politicians, Tuli said.

“They said, ‘This is the only option that we have as far as we are in prison. This is the only means we have to show our peaceful resistance to what is going on in the country,'” Tuli said.

On Thursday the men appeared in court but were too weak to stand, he said.

“They were very, very weak. They have private doctors, and their doctors…. said their health condition is in a critical situation now. Unless the situation is reversed they are going to face some permanent health problems,” he said.

The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, a government-affiliated but independent body, on Friday said it had visited the defendants in Addis Ababa and confirmed they were on hunger strike.

“Very close supervision is required to prevent any grave threat to their health and life,” chief commissioner Daniel Bekele said in a statement, adding that “reasonably justified demands of the prisoners must be addressed”.

Jawar was once seen as an ally of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, Ethiopia’s first Oromo ruler.

But he has since accused Abiy of being a poor advocate of ethnic Oromos’ interests and behaving like a dictator.

Jawar is one of several high-profile opposition politicians behind bars as Ethiopia gears up for long-awaited national elections currently planned for June.

Militants Storm Hotel in Somali Capital and Blasts Rock Area

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NYT | The authorities said there were reports of at least two dead and 11 injured at the Afrik Hotel. A militant group, the Shabab, was believed to be behind the attack.

NAIROBI, Kenya — Militants with the extremist group al-Shabab stormed a major hotel in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, on Sunday evening, the authorities said, raising fears of growing violence in the Horn of Africa nation as it faces a bitterly contested election season and the withdrawal of American troops.

The attack, which began at around 5 p.m. local time, took place at the Afrik Hotel, which is on the road to the city’s major international airport and a popular meeting place for politicians, lawmakers and members of the security services.

Images and video shared on social media showed smoke billowing into the blue skies. Heavy gunfire and blasts were heard in the hotel’s vicinity, according to Ismael Mukhtar Omar, the spokesman of Somalia’s ministry of information.

Authorities said that the Shabab militant group, which is Al Qaeda’s most powerful ally in Africa and has wreaked havoc across East Africa, carried out the attack. Security forces were continuing to engage them inside the hotel Sunday night. A Somali police spokesman, Sadiq Adan Ali, said in a statement that most of the people who were at the hotel had been evacuated.

Abdulkadir Adan, the founder of Aamin Ambulance, Mogadishu’s only free ambulance service, said in a text message that his team had removed the bodies of two people killed in the attack, and had taken another 11 who were injured from the site of the violence.

Mohamed Nur Galal, a former top military general, was killed in the attack, Mr. Omar confirmed in a post on Twitter. Among those rescued were senior federal and regional government officials along with security officers, he added.

The attack came just weeks before a crucial parliamentary and presidential election that has been plagued by disputes over how to properly conduct the voting, creating an impasse that risks delaying the vote and pushing the government past its constitutional term limit.

The disagreements, embroiling the federal and regional governments and opposition parties, have alarmed the United Nations, the United States, the European Union and African states, which have called on the various parties “to resolve the remaining electoral implementation issues in order for credible and inclusive elections to proceed.”

The elections were scheduled for Feb. 8, but that timeline looks unattainable now. President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed has called on regional leaders to meet starting Monday to deal with the electoral crisis.

The tensions over the elections came to the fore last week after heavy infighting broke out between Somali forces and those from the southern region of Jubaland. Somali officials blamed the violence on groups backed by neighboring Kenya, allegations that officials in Nairobi denied. Somalia has severed diplomatic relations with Kenya after accusing it of meddling in its internal affairs.

Somalia is facing a host of other crises, including the coronavirus pandemic, swarms of desert locusts that are destroying crops, and the displacement of tens of thousands of people by seasonal floods late last year.

The Shabab militant group also continues to remain a threat, targeting civilians, government officials and peacekeeping forces besides carrying out attacks on restaurants, hotels and other establishments.

The Qaeda-linked group has financial muscle, too, as is collects millions of dollars in tariffs and payoffs to finances its operations, according to a United Nations Security Council report from last year. The group has been moving this money through Somalia’s banking system and is investing in local businesses and real estate.

Former President Trump, in the waning days of his term, announced an abrupt withdrawal of the 700 American troops from the country, leading observers to worry the pullout would embolden the Shabab and push them to carry out more attacks against the weak but internationally-backed government.

How War in Ethiopia Impacts Red Sea and Horn of Africa Power Politics: The Battle in Tigray and Beyond

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Terrorism Monitor | Michael Horton

Ethiopia is a key prize in the scramble for influence and power in the Horn of Africa and broader Red Sea region. With its natural resources, population of 110 million, and well-equipped military, Ethiopia has become an African power. The nation’s capital, Addis Ababa, moreover, hosts the African Union headquarters, and the country is one of the few African nations never to be colonized. [1] Ethiopia has accordingly long played an outsized role in African and sub-regional politics.

For much of the last decade, successive Ethiopian governments have navigated treacherous regional and global politics by maintaining relations with diverse geopolitical actors. On the global level, Ethiopia has been—and remains—an important U.S. ally, while China accounts for the largest volume of foreign direct investment into Ethiopia. [2] At the regional level, Ethiopia has avoided becoming entangled in the Gulf’s acrimonious power politics between Saudi Arabia and the UAE and their two main adversaries, Qatar and Turkey. All four of those countries nevertheless provide Ethiopia with financial aid and private investment across multiple areas, especially its important agricultural sector. Turkey and the UAE, despite being regional rivals, also both maintain high-level military-to-military relations with Ethiopia.

The ongoing war in Ethiopia’s northernmost Tigray region will test Ethiopia’s strategy of balancing the interests of outside powers with its own need for domestic investment. At the same time, the war, which began on November 4, will present these same outside powers with new opportunities to enhance their relationship with Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali (East African, November 7). However, those and other outside powers will also have ample opportunity to create instability in Ethiopia if they so choose.

Ethiopian Foreign Policy from Balancing to Entanglement

The war in Tigray pits the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) against the Ethiopian government. The TPLF, which dominated Ethiopian politics for much of the last three decades, is a formidable political and military power in its own right. While the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) has made quick progress in capturing major cities in the Tigray region, this was likely due to strategic withdrawals by the TPLF (Nazret, November 19). Such a strategy aligns with the TPLF’s long history of guerrilla warfare.

Barring some negotiated settlement between the TPLF and the Ethiopian government, the war in Tigray will likely evolve into an insurgency that will spill beyond the borders of Tigray. At the same time, the war in Tigray, even if it is contained to TPLF redoubts in the mountains, will attract the interest of outside powers. This is already the case with Eritrea, which has deployed troops within Ethiopia’s borders to help the ENDF bottle up the TPLF. In addition to its three decade-long battle for independence from Ethiopia, Eritrea and Ethiopia fought over disputed border towns from 1998-2000. Eritrea, which was once allied with the TPLF, is now supporting Abiy Ahmed, who signed a peace agreement with Eritrean president Isaias Afewerki in 2018 that ended the two countries’ longstanding border conflict (Addis Fortune, September 22, 2018).

The involvement of Eritrean forces in Ethiopia’s war in Tigray could be a harbinger of things to come. The UAE, which maintains military bases in Eritrea, may also be aiding Abiy Ahmed’s government. Conflicting and unconfirmed reports, for example, indicate the possible deployment of UAE-operated drones from the UAE base in Assab, Eritrea to Tigray. [3] The UAE, which is locked in a cold war with Qatar and Turkey, could try to enhance its relationship with Ethiopia by supporting its fight against the TPLF at the cost of Ethiopia’s relationship with Qatar and Turkey.

Turkey, however, like the UAE, enjoys excellent military-to-military relations with Ethiopia. Due to Ethiopia’s involvement in Somalia, with which it shares a long and largely unguarded border, Turkey works closely with the Ethiopian military and intelligence services. Turkey also regards Somalia, where it maintains its largest overseas military base, as the lynchpin in its strategy to preserve and grow its influence in the Horn of Africa and Red Sea region (Terrorism Monitor, November 20). In mid-November, Ethiopia withdrew large numbers of troops it had deployed in its ethnically Somali Ogaden region and Somalia itself to redeploy them to Tigray (Somali Affairs, November 3). Somalia-based al-Shabaab, therefore, will benefit from gaps left by the Ethiopian forces, and the relationship between Ethiopia and Turkey may deepen as Ankara seizes on opportunities to help Addis Ababa bolster security along its border with Somalia. Turkey also has greater ability than either the UAE or Saudi Arabia to offer the Ethiopian military what it lacks and most desires: drone technology and the expertise to use it (Terrorism Monitor, October 13).

Further afield, China, which has invested billions of dollars in almost every economic sector in Ethiopia, will act to protect those investments. China will make every effort to support stability in Ethiopia. Given China’s pragmatic foreign policy in Africa and in Ethiopia in particular, this support will be cost-effective and possibly covert. There is little doubt that China will aid Abiy Ahmed’s efforts to contain and defeat the TPLF. However, such aid will, as is customary with Chinese foreign policy, come with strings attached. [4]

Water Wars and Instability

On the other side of the equation, Ethiopia’s regional rivals will view limited instability in Ethiopia as a benefit. Ethiopia has completed its Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and, as of July 2020, began filling the dam’s immense reservoir (Nazret, July 16). Egypt views the dam, which impedes the flow of water into the Nile’s primary tributary, the Blue Nile, as an existential threat. [5] Thus far, the two governments have failed to reach an agreement over how they will share the Nile’s water resources.

Over this summer, Egypt reportedly proposed to build a base in the unrecognized Republic of Somaliland (The East African, July 28). It is unlikely the government of Somaliland will accept the proposal. However, it reflects Egypt’s interest in enhancing its relations with other nations in the Horn of Africa and expanding its military’s regional reach as a way of checking what it sees as growing Ethiopian power.

For its part, Sudan, which will benefit from cheap electricity and flood control provided by the GERD, has been more willing to negotiate with Ethiopia on the dam. However, Egypt wields considerable influence in Sudan. The war in Tigray, especially if it is prolonged, may undermine the Ethiopian government’s ability to press forward with what Egypt views as an uncompromising agreement on GERD and hinder Sudan’s possible accommodation with Ethiopia on the dam.

Ethiopia’s Outlook

Ethiopia’s successful foreign policy, which is based on balancing the interests of rival countries in its natural resources and strategic position in exchange for access and investment, could be compromised by sustained war in Tigray. The TPLF is a sophisticated political and military organization that possesses the knowledge and institutional memory that will allow it to engage rival internal and outside powers. Abiy Ahmed’s government will find it requires more and new types of aid to deal with the challenges posed by the TPLF. Receipt of this aid, be it military or financial, will constrain Ethiopia’s nimble and independent foreign policy.

Notes

[1] Ethiopia was occupied by the Italians from 1936-1941. See Jeff Pearce, Prevail: The Inspiring Story of Ethiopia’s Victory over Mussolini’s Invasion (Skyhorse Publishing, 2014).

[2] In 2019, China accounted for the largest volume of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Ethiopia, followed by Saudi Arabia and Turkey.

[3] There are conflicting and unconfirmed reports in Western media on the possible deployment of UAE-operated drones from the UAE’s base in Assab, Eritrea to Tigray. See, for example: https://www.voanews.com/africa/expert-no-evidence-uae-drones-are-being-used-ethiopias-tigray-conflict; https://www.bellingcat.com/news/rest-of-world/2020/11/19/are-emirati-armed-drones-supporting-ethiopia-from-an-eritrean-air-base/; and https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-conflict-idUSKBN27V05M. While deployment of UAE-operated and Chinese-manufactured Wing Loong II drones would be consistent with the UAE’s deployment of drones over Yemen and Libya, it is unlikely at this stage. What is more likely is that the UAE is using surveillance drones within Eritrean territory to monitor incursions into Eritrean territory by TPLF forces.

[4] This is not to say that other countries providing aid, like the United States, do not also expect some kind benefit in return. However, China is particularly adept at incorporating countries into its financial and political web at relatively minimal expense to the Chinese treasury. See Tom Burgis, The Looting Machine: Warlords, Oligarch, Corporations, Smuggler, and the Theft of Africa’s Wealth (Public Affairs, 2016).

[5] For an overview of the complexity surrounding GERD and downstream riparian environments, see: https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-020-19089-x

U.S. Withdrawal from Somalia — SOF

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Source: SOF News | John Friberg

U.S. Africa Command has announced the formation of Joint Task Force Quartz to oversee Operation Octave Quartz – a mission designated to reposition forces from Somalia and continue the assistance effort in Somalia. In early December President Trump and the Department of Defense announced that the United States would remove some 700 military personnel from Somalia. This is an action that Trump had mentioned several times over the past year but had not directed to take place.

Some national security observers applaud the action believing that the situation in Somalia is unsolvable. They point to decades of corruption and conflict and little to show for the millions of dollars and other sacrifices made in Somalia.

However, others say that we are ceding territory to an insurgent / terrorist group affiliated with al Qaeda. These critics say that the group poses a threat to the U.S. – pointing to the attack on Camp Simba in Kenya where Americans lost their lives and to the recent news of a potential plot by an al Shabaab member to hijack an aircraft to conduct an attack in the United States.

The withdrawal is being presented to the U.S. public as a ‘repositioning of forces’. Apparently some of these forces will move into neighboring countries. Djibouti and Kenya share a border with Somalia and have been hosts of U.S. military units and activities for many years.

Joint Task Force Quartz or JTF-Quartz is built around the headquarters of Special Operations Command – Africa. The mission is to oversee Operation Octave Quartz which will reposition U.S. forces from Somalia to other bases in East Africa. JTF Quartz is commanded by the Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAF) commander Maj. Gen. Dag Anderson.

JTF-Quartz components include:

  • Joint Force Special Operations Component Command
  • Joint Force Maritime Component Command
  • Joint Air Component Coordination Element

JTF-Quartz priorities are:

  • safely reposition U.S. forces
  • protect U.S. forces through coordinated and increased force protection measures
  • continue the mission to support regional partners and keep pressure on violent extremists

U.S. Army General Stephen Townsend, the commander of U.S. Africa Command, met with African partners to provide reassurance of a sustained commitment to East Africa security. He says that the U.S. will continue to support enduring partners while maintaining pressure on violent extremist organizations in the region.

“To be clear, the U.S. is not withdrawing or disengaging from East Africa. We remain committed to helping our African partners build a more secure future. We also remain capable of striking Al-Shabaab at any time and place of our choosing – they should not test us.”

General Stephen Townsend, commander of U.S. Africa Command, Dec 2020.

The U.S. and Somalia – Quick Timeline

Cold War. During the Cold War the Horn of Africa region was a focus of attention when it came to competition between the Soviet Union and the United States for influence and military presence. Somalia was a Soviet client state for many years (1970s).

Humanitarian Mission. In the early 1990s the United States committed US forces (including SOF) to Somalia in support of the United Nations humanitarian mission. This support ended when President Clinton ended the U.S. involvement in Somalia after the “Battle of Mogadishu” where 18 US. troops lost their lives during a raid on Somali militia leaders.

Failed State. Since the early 1990s Somalia has been a ‘failed state‘. It has suffered from famine, civil war, corruption, foreign intrigue and meddling, anarchy, and more. For many years it was the center of piracy operating from the coastal area of Somalia.

Fragile State. In 2012 the formation of a federal government provided a central authority that could provide services and security for the Somalia people. However, Somalia is still afflicted with division, political infighting, and corruption and remains a ‘fragile state’.

Al Shabaab. Somalia has been fighting an insurgency by an al Qaeda-affiliated group known as al Shabaab. The group controls much of Somalia – especially in the central and southern portions of the country. Its goal is to establish an Islamic state in Somalia.

US Support. The United States , along with other international partners, are working to stabilize the country and increase the effectiveness of the security forces. The US has been a key supporter of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), provides advice and training to the Somali security forces, and conducts counterterror (CT) missions within Somalia against al Shabaab and the local ISIS affiliate. U.S. Army Special Forces (and other organizations) have been instrumental in standing up the elite Danab Brigade.

Some Americans have lost their lives in the region including a CIA paramilitary officer (Nov 2020), a soldier assigned to 3rd Special Forces (June 2018), and contract pilots and an Army air traffic controller at Camp Simba (Jan 2020) just across the border in Kenya.

Security and Governance. The war in Somalia between government forces and al Shabaab has lasted almost 15 years. The prospects for peace is dismal. International donors are becoming reluctant to pay the expenses of the African Union forces that are deployed in Somalia to assist the government with security. Relations between Somalia and Kenya have frayed. Internal tensions exist between the different regions of Somalia are not good. The various clans and sub-clans in Somalia are constantly at odds with each other and may likely erupt into violence once again.

Great Power Competition. The Defense Department is now focused on strategic competition with China and Russia. To some, that means a shift to the Pacific and Eastern Europe with an emphasis on large conventional forces with the most modern ships, aircraft, and tanks. But to others, this means the competition is more likely to take place around the world in an environment where irregular warfare (some would say political warfare) is where the real competition is.

What Comes Next?

Future of Danab? The planned withdrawal of US forces will include the Special Forces contingent tasked with supporting the Danab special operations unit. Apparently a very small contingent of the US military will remain. The US has funded, trained, and partnered with this 1,000 man unit. It is commonly known that advisor work is best accomplished with person-to-person interaction. The premise that ‘advisor work’ can be accomplished remotely is largely dismissed by most members of the military that have been advisors. Certainly emails, Zoom sessions, video conferences, and phone calls have utility but nothing compares to an advisor on the ground sharing the battlespace.

It will be interesting (and perhaps disappointing) to observe the effectiveness of Danab over the next few years. There is the possibility that U.S. intelligence organizations will maintain a presence as well as private entities providing support, instruction, and advise through contract mechanisms with the State Department or Department of Defense.

Future Prospects? The Somali government has not met the milestones for the development of its security forces – goals set by the United States and the international community. In addition, it has not taken the steps for effective governance to alleviate the root causes of insurgent and tribal conflict. According to U.S. Africa Command al Shabaab remains adaptive, resilient, and capable of attacking US, Western, and partner interests in Somalia and East Africa.

The 19,000-man multinational African Union force will withdraw by the end of 2021. A withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Somalia accompanied by a reduction of ANISOM will likely increase the opportunity for al Shabaab to increase its influence and make further territorial gains. On January 20th a new president will occupy the White House. He may opt to reverse or adjust priorities in the region.

**********

References:

Task Force Quartz. “U.S. Africa Command stands up Joint Task Force – Quartz”, United States Africa Command, December 19, 2020.

IG Report on CT in Africa. The Defense Department posted the quarterly report for counterterrorism operations in East, North, and West Africa. This 98-page report provides information on the security situation in much of Africa to include Somalia. November 2020.

Recent Analysis and Commentary on Somalia.

“Why the Somali Danab SOF is Vital to the US and to Defeating Al-Shabaab”, by Steve Balestrieri, SOFREP, January 13, 2021.

“The Way Forward for the United States in Somalia”, by Stephen M. Schwartz, Foreign Policy Research Institute, January 12, 2021. Schwartz is a former U.S. Ambassador to Somalia (2016-2017).

Will Somalia Be Collateral Damage of Ethiopia’s Tigray Conflict?

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Source: World Politics Review | Peter Kirechu

In November, as the Ethiopian government escalated its military campaign against the northern Tigray region, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed quietly ordered a drawdown of Ethiopian peacekeepers from neighboring Somalia. The scale of the move is still unconfirmed, but as many as 3,000 Ethiopian troops were reportedly redeployed to fight against the regional ruling party in Tigray, the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front, or TPLF. Around 200 to 300 ethnic Tigrayan soldiers in Somalia were also disarmed, and some may have even been purged from the ranks.

The Ethiopian troops’ departure injects additional uncertainty into Somalia’s already precarious security situation, as it struggles to hold federal elections that were scheduled for this month, while containing a long-running insurgency by the violent extremist group al-Shabab. The situation is further complicated by escalating tensions between the federal government, based in Mogadishu, and Somalia’s semiautonomous regional states—a standoff that bears similarities to Ethiopia’s conflict between the federal government and Tigray. Both Abiy and his Somali counterpart, Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed—who is more commonly known by his nickname, Farmajo—have sought to centralize executive authority within their respective federal governments despite sustained and increasingly violent opposition by powerful rivals.

Although Tigrayans make up only around 7 percent of Ethiopia’s population, the TPLF has played an outsized role in Ethiopian politics for decades, largely due to its leadership of the military campaign to overthrow the old communist dictatorship, the Derg, in the 1980s and early 1990s. In 2006, the TPLF-led government sent troops to Somalia to help secure the country’s nascent transition to a federal government after decades of civil war. Ethiopia later joined the African Union mission against al-Shabab as a troop-contributing country in 2014. These deployments helped foster ties between the TPLF and regional state leaders in Somalia, particularly in the south, where al-Shabab is most active.

When Abiy took office in 2018, however, he promptly began sidelining the TPLF, including by dissolving the old ethnic federalist coalition, known as Ethiopian People’s Democratic Front, and replacing it with a single, pan-Ethiopian political party that the TPLF refused to join. Abiy’s campaign to create a strong central government resonated with Farmajo, who has similarly sought to curb the authority of Somalia’s semiautonomous states. Abiy’s efforts to defang the TPLF and remove ethnic Tigrayans from the ranks of peacekeepers in Somalia can thus be seen as part of a burgeoning partnership between the Somali and Ethiopian leaders, united by their mutual desire to centralize federal power and weaken the political influence of domestic rivals in both countries.

Abiy and Farmajo share a mutual suspicion of the TPLF’s enduring influence within the Ethiopian military and security services. This deep-seated mistrust likely informed the disarming of Tigrayan peacekeepers in Somalia in November, which Abiy’s government defended as an effort to root out the “infiltration of TPLF elements in various entities.” Prior to the recent drawdown, Ethiopia had nearly 4,000 troops assigned to the United Nations Mission in Somalia, or AMISOM, targeting al-Shabab, and an additional 4,000 troops supporting a separate bilateral security agreement between the Somali and Ethiopian governments.

Farmajo is running for a second term in a presidential election that is scheduled for next month, but is likely to be delayed. If his reelection bid is successful—not a certain prospect—his political survival would be influenced by the outcome of the Ethiopian offensive in Tigray. Sporadic fighting is continuing despite Abiy’s declaration of victory in late November, after federal troops captured the regional capital, Mekelle. A decisive defeat of the heavily armed and well-trained TPLF troops would strengthen Abiy’s grip on the military, and may also weaken the TPLF’s historical ties to allies in Somalia, especially those in its southern and central federal member states.

An enduring guerrilla insurgency in Tigray will likely stress Ethiopia’s military resources and raise the prospect of additional drawdowns from the Somalia mission.

Here, Farmajo’s efforts to marginalize his political opponents have been bolstered by Ethiopia’s military presence. It is also in these Somali heartland regions, the epicenter of the al-Shabab insurgency, where Farmajo’s efforts to expand federal authority have faced the most resistance. In 2018, he intervened in a local election in Somalia’s South West state to prevent a former al-Shabab leader and defector, Mukhtar Robow, from competing in the state’s presidential election. Farmajo’s federal government reportedly orchestrated Robow’s arbitrary arrest and detention by Ethiopian security forces, leading to his withdrawal from the race, and the subsequent election of a Farmajo ally.

And last March, Farmajo unsuccessfully tried to intervene to prevent the reelection of Ahmed Madobe, a key political opponent who serves as president of Somalia’s southernmost regional state, Jubaland. Here, again, Farmajo leveraged Ethiopia’s military presence and political support in a bid to unseat an incumbent and expand the federal government’s writ of authority. This effort sparked violent clashes between federal troops and Jubaland’s forces, and drew in both Kenya and Ethiopia—two troop-contributing countries in the AMISOM mission that stand on opposite sides of the fractious dispute in Jubaland.

Kenya has long supported the Jubaland administration of Madobe, a former ally of al-Shabab who now opposes the group. Madobe led the 2012 military campaign that ousted al-Shabab from Kismayo, the regional capital, and has since enjoyed Kenya’s military and political backing. Madobe also has historical ties to the former TPLF-led government in Addis Ababa, dating back to Ethiopia’s military campaign against Islamist extremists in southern Somalia during the 2000s.

Today, al-Shabab has been beaten back from Jubaland’s cities, but it still maintains a presence in rural parts of the state. Kenya, which has suffered from deadly al-Shabab attacks in the past, views Jubaland—and therefore Madobe—as an essential security buffer on its northeastern border with Somalia. Abiy, on the other hand, is suspicious of Madobe’s historical links with the TPLF, as well as other Ethiopian groups that are opposed to Abiy’s agenda.

These tensions imperil AMISOM’s already beleaguered campaign against Al-Shabab, which took a hit from the sudden withdrawal of U.S. troops that President Donald Trump ordered last month. National interests have long driven countries’ decisions on participation in the AMISOM mission, but the rift between Kenya and Ethiopia—and each country’s divergent support for rival domestic factions inside Somalia—fundamentally weakens the AMISOM mission. These tensions may not spill into direct confrontation, but they create an additional wedge that the resurgent al-Shabab can exploit to advance its military and political objectives.

The conflict in Tigray only exacerbates these exigent rifts. An enduring guerrilla insurgency in Tigray will likely stress Ethiopia’s military resources and raise the prospect of additional drawdowns from the Somalia mission. A conclusive TPLF defeat, on the other hand, would embolden Abiy’s centralization campaign—an outcome that would resonate in Somalia and strengthen Farmajo’s like-minded agenda.

While prospects for a negotiated settlement in Tigray are still uncertain, it presents the best opportunity to mediate the Ethiopian federal government’s rivalries with the TPLF and other regional state rivals. Such an outcome could also provide a viable blueprint for the negotiation to ease federal-regional tensions in Somalia, where the effects of the Tigray conflict will likely reverberate for many months to come.

Peter Kirechu is the former director of the Conflict Finance and Irregular Threats Program at the Center for Advanced Defense Studies (C4ADS). He is a specialist on illicit transnational networks in the Middle East and Africa.

Trump’s Withdrawal From Somalia Is a Security Threat. Biden Should Reverse It

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Source: Foreign Policy | Abdi Yusuf

U.S. troops are scheduled to leave the country on Jan. 15, opening the door for al-Shabab terrorists to step up their attacks. The new administration should recommit to protecting the country.

Years of hard-fought gains to stabilize Somalia and defeat the al-Shabab terrorist group are now endangered by President Donald Trump’s threat to withdraw U.S. forces. Not unlike the fragile gains the United States achieved defeating the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, Somalia’s future rests on sound judgment and Washington’s continued engagement. Without persistent pressure from U.S. forces, al-Shabab’s leaders will be able to emerge from hiding, reorganize, and conduct attacks not just in Somalia but across the region, including against key U.S. allies such as Ethiopia and Kenya. However, there’s still time to change course. The current administration’s Jan. 15 deadline to withdraw U.S. troops from Somalia is rapidly approaching.

In all likelihood, the Trump administration will not reverse course on any major policy decision in the lead-up to President-elect Joe Biden’s inauguration on Jan. 20, and the withdrawal will continue as planned. If this is indeed the case, Biden must move swiftly after inauguration to redeploy troops back to their original bases in Somalia.

Biden must move swiftly after inauguration to redeploy troops back to their original bases in Somalia.

Not doing so risks Somalia falling back into the hands of al-Shabab and endangers the lives of not only Somalia’s citizens but those from Western countries residing in the region.

Since 1991, the ongoing civil war in Somalia has killed more than 300,000 people and injured countless others. As the country recovers, a continuing U.S. presence will be crucial to maintaining stability.

Currently, Somalia is showing signs of recovery and gradually becoming a popular destination for business, mainly due to its enhanced security situation in recent years. The persistent efforts of the international community, led by the United States, have made this possible. For decades, the U.S. government has provided training and equipment to Somalia’s armed forces. The U.S.-trained unit Danab conducted many successful operations against al-Shabab, which has killed more than 4,000 people, including Americans.

Two months ago, a CIA paramilitary officer was killed while fighting alongside Danab. In early 2020, al-Shabab launched an attack against U.S. forces in Kenya, killing three Americans and destroying a U.S. surveillance plane.

These sacrifices have not been in vain. Thanks to U.S. involvement in Somalia, a 9/11-style attack against the U.S. homeland was recently foiled—a reminder of the mutually beneficial relationship between the two countries.

This relationship is now at risk. On Dec. 4, Trump ordered the removal of U.S. soldiers from Somalia by early 2021.

The proposed withdrawal comes at an especially critical time and is a risk to the stability of the entire region. Indeed, Ethiopia is in the middle of a civil war and has withdrawn thousands of its troops who had been helping the Somali army fight against al-Shabab. Kenya-Somalia relations are at their lowest point in years, and domestic tensions are high over the upcoming elections and a string of attacks and assassinations. If the United States goes ahead with its withdrawal, it could have a huge impact on stability in Somalia, deal a major blow to morale among Somalia’s armed forces, and raise questions about U.S. credibility.

The proposed withdrawal comes at an especially critical time and is a risk to the stability of the entire region.

U.S. Defense Department officials claim the United States will “retain the capability to conduct targeted counterterrorism operations in Somalia, and collect early warnings and indicators.” However, in the eyes of many Somalis, Washington is abandoning the country. “Al-Shabab will frame this as a victory,” said Omar Mahmood, a senior Somalia analyst at the International Crisis Group. “They will use it as evidence of their ability to take on a world power like the United States and force them to leave Somalia.”

U.S. officials claim that moving troops to neighboring countries such as Kenya and Djibouti will have no major consequences. Somali officials disagree; former Danab chief Col. Ahmed Abdullahi Sheikh criticized the move, saying that the U.S. military “can launch and stage operations from countries like Djibouti and Kenya, but it’s not the same as being in the country. … You can’t train a force remotely.” U.S. support in planning and launching raids in Somalia is a critical component of the fight against al-Shabab—one that cannot easily be replaced.

It is true that a permanent U.S. military presence in Somalia is not a long-term solution. However, this transition should happen with the help of the international community. The Somali government has started to see success toward building an effective security force, thanks in large part to Washington’s unwavering support for Somalia and its people. With U.S. support, the Somali army was able to reduce al-Shabab’s military capabilities, diminish its territorial control, and bring peace back to large areas of Somalia. But the group remains a persistent threat to the region.

Now more than ever, Somalia needs the support of the United States. Leaving Somalia to fend for itself would risk erasing years of progress. Al-Shabab could reconquer territory, strengthen its military capabilities, and increase its stranglehold over the Somali people. “It’s my hope therefore that the U.S. government will reevaluate its decision and hopefully change,” one Danab officer—who prefers to remain anonymous—told me.

The Biden administration needs to increase U.S. efforts in Somalia in order to strengthen the government’s capabilities to contain the threat posed by al-Shabab. The first step Biden can take would be an immediate redeployment, followed by concrete assurances of future U.S. support. Otherwise, America’s hard-fought efforts to bring peace and stability to Somalia will have been in vain.

Abdi Yusuf is an international affairs researcher and a freelance writer based in Nairobi.