Tag Archive for: Sudan

‘We don’t want war with Ethiopia,’ Sudan’s Sovereign Council says

Ahram Online | The spokesperson argued the only way the border conflict can be solved is through resorting to technical committees that will handle the demarcation process.

The spokesperson of Sudan’s Sovereign Council, the transitional civilian-military body which governs the country, said that Khartoum “doesn’t want war with Ethiopia,” amid an ongoing dispute along the 1600-km border between the two countries.

Speaking to Al-Arabiya on Friday, Mohamed Al-Fakki stressed that Sudan is “capable of protecting our lands and restoring those left with Ethiopia,” adding that his country does not seek either a direct or proxy war with Addis Ababa.

“We only want our land,” Al-Fakki explained, adding that “the eruption of war between Sudan and Ethiopia is not in the region’s interest.”

Al-Fakki, moreover, highlighted that Sudan “entered the territories peacefully,” and that “If Sudan wants war, we would have entered Al-Fashqa since day one.”

“Why would Ethiopia accept to demarcate the border with Juba on basis of the 1902 [Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty] deal and refuse to have a similar one with Sudan,” Al-Fakki asked.

He also argued that the only way this border conflict can be solved is through resorting to technical committees that will handle the demarcation process.

Sudan has complained for years about attacks by Ethiopian farmers against its territories, counting on the support of Ethiopian militias to expel Sudanese citizens from their homes and take their possessions.

Last month, Sudan accused Ethiopia forces and militias of attacking Sudanese troops along the border, leaving four dead and more than 20 injured.

Media reports suggest that the conflict has taken place in agricultural land in Al-Fashqa, an eastern border region inside Sudan’s national boundaries, where Khartoum recently deployed troops.

In December, Sudan’s Information Minister Faisal Saleh told Reuters that “our army will do its duty to take back all our land, currently our army has taken back between 60 and 70 percent of Sudanese land.”

Saleh explained that Sudanese forces had clashed and acted defensively for two days against Ethiopian “regular forces” not militias.

“Sudanese intelligence reports confirmed that the organisation, training and arming of the forces that attacked were not militias but regular forces,” said Saleh.

Last month, both sides concluded a two-day meeting with the High-Level Political Committee that took place between top-level officials from the two countries.

The meeting was attended by Ethiopia’s Deputy Prime Minister and Top Diplomat Demeke Mekonnen, while Sudan’s Cabinet Affairs Minister Omar Munis led his country’s delegation.

No settlement has been reached so far on the border dispute, as military tensions along the borders continue to persist.

Is Egypt behind Sudanese escalation on border with Ethiopia

Source: Al-Monitor | Khalid Hassan

With the intensifying border conflict between Sudan and Ethiopia and the success of the Sudanese army in controlling the border areas where Ethiopian farmers have been living for decades, Ethiopia has been hurling accusations of a third party planning, funding and executing the recent confrontations on the border between the two countries.

Sudan’s Sovereignty Council Chairman Abdul Fattah Burhan said at a Jan. 16 press conference that deployment of Sudanese troops on the border with Ethiopia and the army’s control of the border areas were driven by domestic willingness, rather than foreign incitement. He denied the presence of any party pitting Sudan against Ethiopia.

Burhan’s comments came in response to Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s statement on Dec. 24 claiming that several parties, which he did not name, seek to undermine the relations between Ethiopia and Sudan and that these parties — in reference to Egypt — plotted, funded and executed the recent border confrontations between the two countries.

The Sudanese-Ethiopian border has been witnessing in the past weeks unprecedented escalation between the Sudanese army and its Ethiopian counterpart over the disputed al-Faqsha border region.

On Jan. 13, the Sudanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that a military Ethiopian aircraft entered Sudanese airspace, warning that such a move could have serious repercussions.

On Jan. 12, Sudan announced that al-Liya and Koli areas in al-Fashqa locality in western Sudan suffered an armed aggression from Ethiopian militias, killing five women and a child.

On Jan. 11, the Ethiopian military aircraft executed its first air sorties on the border areas in the Amhara region near eastern Sundus in the eastern Sudanese Qallabat locality.

The latest Ethiopian escalation comes after Sudanese troops launched a military attack on the border area and took control of al-Faqsha region on Dec. 31. In a Jan. 12 statement, Ethiopian Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Dina Mufti, accused Sudan of infiltrating into Ethiopian territories.

In light of the escalating conflict between the two countries, a high-ranking Sudanese convoy headed to Egypt Jan. 14 in an urgent visit and met with President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. They discussed the border developments between Sudan and Ethiopia.

Directly after the meeting, Sudan announced Jan. 14 a ban on civil aviation and overflights in the airspace of the Gedaref state on the border with Ethiopia, thus prompting questions about the implication of Cairo in the crisis and whether it is using Sudan to pressure Ethiopia in the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) crisis.

Ethiopian writer specializing in Ethiopian affairs Noureddin Abda told Al-Monitor that Sudan has been leaning toward escalation as of late. Its intervention to control the border area, its strict stances and withdrawal from the latest negotiations on the GERD, and its accusation of Ethiopia of being stubborn all prove this. He said that Sudan has adopted a completely different strategy in its relations with Ethiopia lately.

On Nov. 18, Sudan announced its withdrawal from the GERD negotiations between Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan.

On Jan. 11, the Sudanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that it would resort to other options if the African Union (AU) does not play a greater role in the GERD talks.

Abda noted, “The Egyptian role has been clear since the onset of the [border] crisis, when Egypt announced its full support for Sudan, which was followed by unprecedented Sudanese escalation on the borders through military mobilization and Burhan’s repeated visits to the borderline and his refusal of a truce.”

On Jan. 2, Sisi expressed in a phone call with Burhan his country’s complete support for Sudan in various fields, in light of the tight relations between the national security of both Egypt and Sudan.

On Jan. 13, Burhan and senior army commanders headed to the border area with Ethiopia where they stressed the ability of the armed forces to protect the land and maintain the country’s security.

Shifaa Afari, a writer and analyst specialized in African affairs, told Al-Monitor that Ethiopia is in a critical state and is avoiding escalation. For that reason, it is seeking a truce as it would be the biggest loser in the war. He said, “Ethiopia is a disintegrated state, especially following the Tigray war, and any escalation would negatively impact its situation.”

On Nov. 5, Ethiopia waged a military operation on the Tigray region in the north of the country to regain control of it.

On Dec. 24, Ahmed said that his government was intent on halting disputes and stopping clashes between the Ethiopian federal forces and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front for good on the borders.

Afari believes that Egypt will directly intervene if an all-out military confrontation breaks out between Ethiopia and Sudan.

Samir Ghattas, head of the Middle East Forum for Strategic Studies, argued that Egypt does not want to show its support for Sudan publicly. He noted that Egypt will back Sudan militarily, economically and politically, but without being in the spotlight, in an attempt to garner Sudanese support to pressure Ethiopia in the GERD issue.

“Egypt is well aware that Sudan is key for the course of negotiations, given the Ethiopian obstinacy. Therefore it has sought to tighten its military and political ties with Sudan and succeeded,” he said.

On Nov. 1, official spokesperson for the Egyptian army Tamer al-Rifai said that the commanders of the Egyptian and Sudanese armies who met in Khartoum agreed to boost cooperation in the fields of training, exchange of expertise and border security.

On Nov. 14, the Egyptian army launched joint military exercises between Egypt and Sudan, the first such drills between Egyptian and Sudanese special air forces.

On Nov. 20, Egypt’s National Organization for Military Production signed a memorandum of understanding with Sudan’s Military Industry Corporation to boost cooperation across all fields of military production.

Ghattas concluded, “It is true that Egypt played a role in the recent Sudanese escalation, but it does not want to stir a complete military confrontation between them [Sudan and Ethiopia]. It only wants a military escalation to achieve a political solution, which is the delay of the second filling of the GERD until a final solution is reached, since filling the dam has negative repercussions on the flow of water to Egypt.”

On Aug. 20, 2020, Ahmed said that the second phase of filling the GERD’s reservoir would start in August and that Ethiopia will not wait until the negotiations conclude to begin the filling operation. Around 18.4 billion cubic meters are expected to be filled, he added

Ghattas expects Ethiopia to cave in to Egyptian and Sudanese pressure and to delay filling the dam until the negotiations are concluded, especially since Ahmed does not want to open new fronts with the internal elections just around the corner.

On Dec. 25, the Electoral Council in Ethiopia announced its plan to organize parliamentary elections June 5.

UK backs Sudan economic reforms with over $50 million

Source: AP | Noha Elhennawy 

Britain’s foreign secretary announced Thursday that his government would offer more than $50 million to help poor Sudanese families as their government embarks upon major austerity measures to revive its battered economy, Sudan’s state news agency reported.

On a visit to Khartoum, Dominic Raab and Sudanese Minister of Finance and Economic Planning Heba Mohamed Ali Ahmed signed a memorandum of understanding under which Britain commits to disbursing economic aid worth 40 million British pounds, or about $54.8 million, to the African country, SUNA reported.

Sudan is on a fragile path to democratic rule after a popular uprising led the military to overthrow longtime autocrat Omar al-Bashir in April 2019, after nearly three decades of rule. A military-civilian government is now in power but struggles with a wide range of economic challenges, including crippling debt, widespread shortages of essential goods such as fuel, bread and medicine, and a three-digit inflation rate.

“This is the first visit by a British foreign secretary to Sudan in more than ten years,” said Rosie Diyas, Britain’s spokesperson for the Mideast and North Africa. “The visit aims at supporting Sudan’s transition to democracy and civilian rule.”

The British aid will finance cash handouts to 1.6 million poor Sudanese, said Diyas. Aid recipients are expected to be those most hit by the economic reforms, slashing of subsidies and the reduction of public spending that the Sudanese government is expected to implement in order to reduce its huge public deficit.

Sudan’s transitional government has been racing against the clock to garner economic and political support of Western powers in order to end decades of its pariah status and secure reliefs of its crippling debt.

In the weeks before leaving office, former President Donald Trump removed Sudan from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, a move that allows Khartoum to get international loans. Sudan’s economy has suffered from decades of U.S. sanctions and mismanagement under al-Bashir, who had ruled the country since a 1989 Islamist-backed military coup. The removal of the terror designation came after Sudan followed in the footsteps of other key Arab countries, including the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, by normalizing relations with Israel.

Last year, Western and Arab countries pledged a total of $1.8 billion in aid to back Sudan at a donor meeting in Berlin. At the time, Britain pledged 66 million euros, more than $186 million.

According to Diyas, the U.K. has also offered another $6.87 million in aid to address Sudan’s urgent needs emanating from the influx of more than 50,000 Ethiopian refugees, who have recently fled their country following the eruption of war in Ethiopia’s Tigray province.

Shortly before boarding his Ethiopia-bound plane, Raab told reporters at Khartoum’s airport that his government hopes Ethiopia and Sudan can resolve the ongoing border dispute in “a sensible way”.

In recent weeks, the Sudanese army has deployed thousands of troops along the Ethiopian border and reclaimed territories controlled by Ethiopian militias. The Sudanese advances came on the heels of cross-border attacks that killed and wounded many Sudanese troops. The border tension raised concerns over a potential military conflict between the neighboring countries.

“We have a longstanding friendship with Sudan and likewise a strong partnership with Ethiopia. Our message is, let’s not at this precarious moment for the region see an escalation of tension,” said Raab, adding that he would reiterate the same message to the Ethiopians during his visit there.

SUNA reported that Raab had met with Gen. Abdel-Fattah Burhan, head of Sudan’s ruling sovereign council, Sudan’s prime minister, Abdalla Hamdok, and acting Foreign Minister Omar Qamar al-Din.

Raab had also meant to discuss with Sudanese officials the ongoing water dispute between Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia, SUNA reported earlier. The news agency did not later say if anything came out of those discussions. The dispute is about Ethiopia’s construction of a controversial dam on the Blue Nile River, the main tributary of the Nile, which Egypt says endangers its critical share of the Nile waters.

Britain understands Sudan’s position on Ethiopia dam negotiations, says ambassador

MEMO | The UK Ambassador to Sudan, Irfan Siddiq, said on Tuesday that his country understands Sudan’s position on the negotiations over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance DamAnadolu News Agency reported.

Mr. Siddiq added during a meeting in Khartoum with the Sudanese Minister of Irrigation and Water Resources, Dr Yasir Mohamed, that London would support the dam negotiations until Sudan, Ethiopia and Egypt reach a satisfactory agreement, the Sudanese Irrigation Ministry said in a statement.

Last week, the Sudanese Foreign Minister, Omar Qamar al-Din announced that his country had submitted a list of conditions to the African Union before it returned to meaningful negotiations over the Renaissance Dam, noting that Khartoum was considering alternative options, which he did not clarify.

On 10 January, the Sudanese News Agency reported that the meeting of ministers of foreign affairs and irrigation of Sudan, Egypt and Ethiopia have failed to reach an acceptable formula to continue negotiations on the Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.

For nine years, the three countries have been locked in stalled negotiations over the dam.

Sudan calls on Ethiopia to withdraw its forces from the disputed Al-Fashaqa region

Source: Ecofin Agency |

Following an emergency meeting of its Security and Defense Council on Jan 17, Sudan called on the Ethiopian government to withdraw its forces from the Al-Fashaqa region, which the two countries have been disputing on for years.

“Despite the military mobilization and build-up carried out by Ethiopia in the areas facing our forces in Al-Fashaqa, we confirm that our forces will remain in their lands to preserve sovereignty stipulated in the charters and agreements that affirm Sudan’s entitlement,” Sudanese Defense Minister Lieutenant General Yassin Ibrahim Yassin said in a press release.

He called on Ethiopia to “withdraw its forces from the remaining positions it still occupies in Maraghad, Khor Hamar, and Ghatar (in the Al-Fashaqa region, ed) as soon as possible in compliance with international treaties and the sustainability of good-neighborly relations.”

The battle between the two countries over this region, inhabited by Ethiopian farmers (who operate land claimed by Sudan), has sharply increased in recent weeks. On Thursday, Sudanese authorities banned flights over the border area after declaring that an Ethiopian military plane had violated Sudanese airspace in a “dangerous and unjustified escalation.” The allegations were denied on Friday by the Ethiopian army chief of staff, General Berhanu Gula.

Last week, Sudan claimed at least five people died in border attacks by Ethiopian government-backed militias and that it will use all “available means” to respond. Earlier in December, Sudan accused Ethiopian “forces and militias” of ambushing Sudanese troops along the border, killing four people and wounding more than 20. The incident resulted in a large number of Sudanese military backups being sent to the border with Ethiopia to “recover land usurped by Ethiopian militias.”

Abdel-Fattah al-Burhan, Chairman of the Sovereignty Council of Sudan, said on Saturday his country did not mean to start a war with Ethiopia and has no interest in doing so. Sudan just wants to protect its border rights.

In a press conference on Friday, the Ethiopian army chief of staff also said Addis Ababa has no interest in going to war with Sudan. He added that if the Ethiopian army went to war, “we would not hide.”

The commander of the Ethiopian army added that a small group within the Sudanese government is working for the benefit of a third party and is standing behind the incursions.

The Al-Fashaqa region borders the Tigray region of Ethiopia where the Ethiopian government has been waging a military campaign against the TPLF since November; a conflict that has led to the exodus of more than 45,000 Ethiopian refugees to Sudan, according to the United Nations.

Tensions escalate between Ethiopia and Sudan

DW | The already-uneasy relationship between the two countries is showing signs of simmering over into protracted conflict. But how did it reach this point?

Tensions between Ethiopia and Sudan continued to escalate on Tuesday, less than a week after Sudan accused an Ethiopian military aircraft of crossing into Sudan.

The Sudanese army reportedly advanced to the west of Ethiopia’s Gondar region near the border, while residents and government officials claimed some members of the military looted cattle and burned farmlands belonging to Ethiopian farmers.

Ethiopia-Sudan relations have long hinged on mutual suspicion and disagreements over territory.

A fragile peace between the two countries began to unravel in November 2020 after conflict broke out in Ethiopia’s northern Tigray region along the disputed border.

What’s going on with the border?

The border between Ethiopia and Sudan has been disputed for more than a century, with a number of failed attempts to negotiate an agreement on exactly where the border should run.

Treaties drawn up in 1902 and 1907 between Ethiopia and Britain were intended to define the border between Sudan and Ethiopia.

But Ethiopia has long claimed that parts of the land given to Sudan actually belong to them.

“This issue has been shelved for some time and although there was Ethiopian agriculture activity in these areas, there seemed to be an understanding that it didn’t mean it was Ethiopian land,” William Davison, a senior analyst for Ethiopia at International Crisis Group told DW.

Decades of friction and negotiations seemingly ended in 2008 when a ‘soft border’ compromise was reached between the countries.

However, this agreement began to unravel after Ethiopia’s Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) was removed from power in 2018.

The Ethiopia delegation’s head of the 2008 border talks, Abay Tsehaye, was a senior official of the TPLF, which ethnic Amhara leaders have since labeled a secret deal.

Initially, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s friendly relationship with his Sudanese counterpart was cause for optimism.

“After Abiy Ahmed took power, [Abdalla] Hamdok became the Prime Minister [of Sudan],” Phillip C. Jahn the Resident Representative of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Sudan told DW.

“He has spent a long part of his career in Ethiopia, so he knows a lot of people in the TPLF, but he’s also very close to Abiy Ahmed.”

However, attempts to resolve the issue at a regional summit in December 2020 were unsuccessful. Shortly afterwards, clashes between the Sudanese army and Ethiopian shifta forces took place on farmlands in the border area.

“Exactly what has triggered [Sudan’s] assertive move is not clear, but it is that assertiveness that Ethiopia believes goes against the agreements that the parties had to resolve this through negotiations that had led to the tensions,” said Davison.

Tigray conflict sparks Sudanese reaction

Ethiopia is also still reeling from an ongoing armed conflict in the northern Tigray region near the Sudanese border, possibly triggering fears on the Sudan’s side that the Ethiopians may try and take some of the disputed amid the chaos.

“When Amhara nationalists and other elements in Amhara regional state reclaimed territory in Tigray that they say historically was Amhara, they are also looking at regions that were historically part of [Ethiopia],” said Davison.

“This is believed to have led to some concerns in Sudan that the Amhara farmers will consolidate their occupation of these areas which Sudan considered Sudanese.”

Ethiopia’s ambassador in Khartoum, Yibeltal Aemero, also accused the Sudanese military of taking advantage of the Tigray crisis to take control of the disputed land.

“When the Ethiopian National Defense forces moved to Tigray region on November 4, 2020 for the law enforcement majors, the Sudanese army took the advantage and entered deep inside Ethiopian territory, looted properties, burned camps, detained, attacked and killed the Ethiopians while displacing thousands,” said Aemero.

Although Ethiopian government forces declared victory over the TPLF in the northern Tigray region in November, sporadic fighting continues in a number of areas, while the humanitarian situation continues to worsen, prompting calls for access from international aid groups.

Dam friction

Away from the core issue of the border, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam also looms over Ethiopia and Sudan’s tense relationship.

Ethiopia began building the dam in April 2011 about 20 kilometers east of Sudan’s border. Once complete, it will be Africa’s largest hydroelectric power plant. However, no agreement on the use of Nile waters has been reached – much to the concern of Sudan, which relies heavily on the Nile reservoirs for agriculture.

“Sudan was supportive of the Renaissance Dam, which of course can be beneficial to Sudan in terms of electricity, reducing flooding, enhancing irrigation,” explains Davison. “But in the last couple of years Sudan has taken a more assertive stance, it’s stressed its concerns about how the joint operation of the dam and the Sudanese dams are going to be managed…and that’s led to some tensions in the relationship with Ethiopia.”

Is conflict on the horizon?

Despite Sudan’s increasing assertiveness, Jahn said a protracted conflict is not in the best interests of the Sudanese interim government, or the Sudanese people.

“Sudan is in a deep government crisis with hyperinflation,” said Jahn. “It is in the process of negotiating a new government with the rebel groups, the civilian side and the military, which has been repeatedly postponed … Sudan cannot afford this conflict at the moment.”

Still, some civilians are already preparing to get their families near the border out of harm’s way.

“A lot of people in Khartoum are travelling to the east and relocating their family members to the cities,” said Jahn. “So everybody is very afraid of an upcoming conflict.”

But Davison believes that war between Ethiopia and Sudan is “by no means inevitable.”

“We have reached a rather sticky point…but there is also plenty of opportunity for the parties to pull back and take themselves away from the prospect of conflict,” he said.

“The prospect of Ethiopia opening up another major military front is worrying because the country is already very fragile and if it were to have more internal instability that would also have regional ramifications.”

Sudan demands Ethiopia withdraw its forces from ‘occupied territories’ and halt military buildup

AMN NEWS | On Sunday evening, the Sudanese Security and Defense Council appealed to Ethiopia to “withdraw its forces from the remaining positions it still occupies in Maraghad, Khor Hamar and Ghatar as soon as possible in compliance with international treaties and the sustainability of good-neighborly relations.”

The Sudanese Defense Minister, Lieutenant General Yassin Ibrahim Yassin, stated that “the council was informed of the developments on the eastern borders,” saying that “despite the military mobilization and build-up carried out by Ethiopia in the areas facing our forces in Al-Fashaqa, we confirm that our forces will remain in their lands in order to preserve sovereignty stipulated in the charters and agreements that affirm Sudan’s entitlement,” the Sudanese News Agency (SUNA) reported.

During his meeting with Tut Qalwak, advisor to the President of Southern Sudan, Sudanese Prime Minister Abdullah Hamdok announced Khartoum’s approval of Juba’s mediation to resolve the border dispute with Ethiopia, which has worsened in recent weeks between Sudan and Ethiopia.

On Saturday, Al-Burhan stated that “the conflict with Ethiopia is old and the neighbors attacked Sudanese farmers and seized their lands for decades,” adding that “recognizing the Sudanese areas in which the Sudanese army has recently deployed removes obstacles to relations between the two countries.”

Sudanese troops have been deployed on the border in agreement with Ethiopia’s PM: al-Burhan

Source: Sudan Tribune

The head of the Sudanese Sovereign Council, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, disclosed Saturday that he had agreed with the Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed to deploy the Sudanese troops to secure the borders between countries.

On the first of November 2020, days before the attack of the Ethiopian federal army on the TPLF forces in Tigray region, al-Burhan travelled to Ethiopia together with Omer Gamar Eldin the Foreign Minister, Jamal Abdel Majeed the head of the General Intelligence Service, and Yasir Mohamed Osman the head of the Military Intelligence.

Al-Burhan told a gathering of businessmen and entrepreneurs to support the Sudanese army that his army has no intention to wage war against Ethiopia. He added that the army has been deployed within the Sudanese borders.

“I visited Ethiopia shortly before the events, and we agreed with the Prime Minister of Ethiopia that the Sudanese armed forces would close the Sudanese borders to prevent border infiltration to and from Sudan by an armed party,” he said.

“Actually, this is what the (Sudanese) armed forces have done to secure the international borders and have stopped there,” he further added.

His statements suggest that Abiy Ahmed spoke with him about these plans before to launch the military operation on the TPLF positions in Tigray few days after

He further described as “inaccurate” statements by Ethiopian officials saying that Sudanese military are implementing the agenda of a third party.

Ethiopian officials kept repeating that some people in the Sudanese government are implementing plans by a third party to harm their country without naming it.

Al-Burhan who worked in the border army during long years said he had participated four years ago in joint committees to discuss placing border markers on the ground and forming joint forces, adding nobody raised doubts on Sudan’s ownership of any border area.

“Four years ago, I was based with a military force in the Qalaa Alluban area, in which were killed six Sudanese women a few days ago. During that time, the Ethiopians argued that they had internal problems and that the situation did not allow marking the borders,” he said.

“The political leadership at the time assessed the situation and gave us instructions to withdraw, ” he added referring to the former president Omer al-Bashir who is accused of facilitating the occupation of Sudanese borderland for over 20 years.

He further said that the statements by Ethiopian officials claiming several border areas are a new development that requires to defend the integrity of the Sudanese territory.

(ST)

Brookings: Internal and external conflicts compound in Ethiopia

Source: Brookings | Chris Heitzig

In recent weeks, tensions between Ethiopia and Sudan over the disputed Al-Fashqa region have flared up, including an attack on Tuesday that left 80 civilians dead, according to Sudan’s Foreign Ministry. The latest violence comes in the wake of fatal attacks in the region last month that killed more than 220 people. The situation is complicated by a multitude of actors, including gangs, which Sudanese officials have claimed are responsible for some of the violence. On Tuesday, Ethiopia indicated that it was losing patience for Sudan’s militarization on the border of the disputed territory. Sudan has blamed Ethiopian military forces for escalating conflict in the region and reported on Wednesday that an Ethiopian military aircraft had recently entered into Sudanese territory.

A new round of negotiations to resolve the dispute over the filling of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam was short-lived, as the three countries concluded on January 10 without a resolution. In separate statements, Ethiopia and Egypt faulted Sudan for the latest impasse. The statement released by Egypt’s foreign ministry read, “Sudan insisted on the assigning of African Union experts to offer solutions to contentious issues … a proposal which Egypt and Ethiopia have reservations about.” Sudan, however, claims the stalemate stems from Ethiopia’s determination to fill the reservoir with 13.5 million cubic meters of water this year in the face of objections from other countries in the region. “We cannot continue this vicious cycle of circular talks indefinitely,” said Sudanese Irrigation Minister Yasir Abbas.

These tensions continue to mount despite the fragile situation within Ethiopia itself. Last week, a senior Ethiopian military official confirmed that Eritrean troops were indeed present in the country’s Tigray region, which has been the source of infighting for several months. Humanitarians fear that fighting in that region has rendered the local population vulnerable to displacement and food insecurity. Last week, the United Nations expressed in a report the fear that Tigray could also be a source of “massive community transmission” of COVID-19 due to the suspension of health services caused by the conflict.

Canada Should Support Ethiopia

The conflict between Tigray and Ethiopia could cause rifts with other African regions. Canada’s truth and reconciliation experience could help.

Source: Policy Options Politiques | Ann Fitz-Gerald, Hugh Segal

The conflict between the Ethiopian federal government and a group from within its northern state of Tigray has ended according to the Ethiopian government. The view of some analysts is that in this post-conflict phase, there remain risks of insurgency from peripheral regions of Tigray. Rather than any organized armed conflict, or armed regrouping by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the more likely outcome is ongoing sporadic violence leading up to delayed federal elections in Ethiopia, now scheduled for June 2021.

Ethiopia is a significant player in Africa’s future. Canada should support its efforts to limit further violence by considering its experience in other similar international challenges. In the wake of its newly brokered partnership with Ethiopia following Prime Minister’s Justin Trudeau’s visit to Addis Ababa in 2020, it’s time for Canada to use its experience in support of peace and progress in Ethiopia, and across the African continent more generally.

Border tensions could bring other countries into the fray

Of increasing concern for the resolution of conflict in Tigray are recent border tensions between Ethiopia and neighbouring Sudan regarding land that has long been inhabited by Ethiopian farmers in the agricultural region of al-Fashqua. Although precise borders in this area have been contested peacefully since the 1896-1902 Ethiopian-British negotiations, otherwise cordial relations between the two allied countries now appear threatened.

Any new Sudanese hostility towards Ethiopia’s border region could compel Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed to act militarily. This in turn could spur Egypt to become involved to protect its interests vis-à-vis the Ethiopian Grand Renaissance Dam. The dam draws from the Abay River or Blue Nile, which is the main tributary of the Nile River, on which Egypt depends. Heightened Ethiopia-Sudan tensions, and the prospect of Egypt backing Sudan’s position, risks magnifying regional instability. Having these tensions become an international issue will further complicate matters for Prime Minister Ahmed, and potentially undermine and distract from the urgent internal healing and rebuilding processes in Tigray.

Internationalization of Sudan-Ethiopia tensions could realign interests of some groups and create wider internal cracks in an already challenging federalist arrangement in Ethiopia. This is why the international community must keep front and centre the peacebuilding process in Tigray – which requires the confidence and commitment of the Tigrayan people.

Ethiopia’s close partners have concerns about the conflict, which is constraining any unconditional offers of help. Disabled network communications and a lack of access to the conflict area have restricted reliable and verified situational analyses. This suggests that a wide range of perceptions could be influencing the international position on the conflict. International concerns include the role of Eritrea, which neighbours Tigray to its north, and the Amhara Regional State of Ethiopia, neighbouring to the south, in the conflict; media arrests and detentions; and issues concerning humanitarian access and alleged civilian casualties. That some Ethiopia-based advocacy organizations and international actors are not viewed as free from bias is further obscuring clarity around the situation.

Post-conflict dialogue and regional security structures

To heal from the past, there needs to be a post-conflict dialogue, which considers lessons learned from past Truth and Reconciliation Commissions held in other countries. A wider national dialogue has always been planned in Ethiopia, but because there has been so much dispute over the facts of the conflict, this dialogue process may become challenged. To an extent, this is understandable in a diverse and internally competitive, ethnic federalist system which leaves little, if any, room for perceived impartiality and independence, particularly with nine regional ethnic states and two federally administered city-states. It will, however, be essential to establish the truth regarding the facts of the conflict in order to navigate through the national dialogue process that the government seeks to facilitate.

But even if the details surrounding the conflict are established and agreed upon, the challenge then becomes the reform of the regional security structures. If this is not addressed in parallel to dialogue processes, governance and national stability will continue to be undermined.

While the constitution permits the formation of regional security forces to protect the interests of regional states, the relative strength of these security forces has amplified over the years to levels and conduct beyond the scope of the constitution. These regional militia forces have included a “Liyu Hail” (special force) capability which, like the broader regional force, is accountable directly to the regional president.

Precedent for this “Liyu” paramilitary wing was set in Ethiopia’s eastern Somali regional state. Set up originally to defend the region against the threat of an Ogaden National Liberation Front-led insurgency, the loosely structured force subsequently committed grave atrocities and human rights abuses. This Liyu concept of policing was copied in the regional states of Oromia and Amhara, and continued to grow in capacity after Prime Minister Abiy came to power.

Tigray’s regional security architecture is no exception to this setup. It was already quite expansive due to the northern region’s lead role in supporting the armed insurgency which, in 1991, overthrew the Derg military dictatorship. Tigray further increased its militia capacity following both forced and voluntary 2018 retirements of senior Tigrayan officers of the national defence forces, which brought an influx of experienced and knowledgeable operational leaders back to the region.

Truth and clarity are also required on issues concerning regional security structures, not only in Tigray but also in other regions with large militia build up. A recently reformed legal proclamation restricting the development of civil society groups with an interest in security studies has, since 1991, limited useful national data on this issue.

There is ambiguity surrounding the number of sworn members of regional and special forces, the types of weapons they can use, and the circumstances in which force can be deployed. The prospect for future regional-federal tensions will only increase if regional militia and special forces, with different lines of authority than federal forces, are maintained.  Clarity around these issues is particularly important for a pluralist democratic federalist system, which could benefit from different political party affiliations co-existing between regional and federal jurisdictions in the future.

The Ethiopian government should consider inviting a respected, independent and impartial adjudicator to assist with post-conflict dialogue and strategic communications. This would add legitimacy to the country’s reporting on key issues – clarity which is vital to the relationship between the Tigrayan population and the federal government. Too much of the federal government’s focus is on fire-fighting less-than-substantiated allegations, which only legitimizes the allegations and dilutes the progress required on the key priorities of healing and reconciliation.

Based on its view that outside mediation was neither desired nor appropriate, the Ethiopian government declined the African Union’s arbitrary appointment of three former presidents as mediators. The government has initiated a broader national dialogue involving a Reconciliation Commission and an independent committee of facilitators. Independent adjudication to verify alleged facts on the ground from the Tigray conflict is necessary to give traction to this homegrown dialogue process.

Drawing from international lessons learned

There is a long history of truth and reconciliation commissioners in South Africa, Australia and Canada. In South Africa, the process involved creating a forum where victims and perpetrators could testify without fear of prosecution on the cruelty of Apartheid. In Canada, the process was initiated by Prime Minister Stephen Harper following his apology to Indigenous Peoples for the cruelty and trauma of Residential schools. The process helped establish the truth and form a basis for reparations for survivors. The lack of commonly shared “truth” in Ethiopia between some groups creates a need for a commission. The commission would investigate the legitimate concerns that moderate and non-violent Tigrayans might have, allowing Abiy’s government to make progress towards strengthening the Ethiopian federation.

A commission could specify the nature of its mission and the questions it would consider before preparing its recommendations. Two co-chairs, perhaps a prominent and respected Ethiopian academic or judicial figure well-versed in the unique structures of Ethiopian federalism, and an external eminent person, could – together with regional religious and traditional leaders — oversee the data collection, data processing and subsequent dialogue concerning conflict-related issues.

Canada’s contribution to the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning of paramilitary weapons, as part of the Northern Ireland peace process, has relevance to this proposal. Former Chief of Defence Staff, John de Chastelain, supported by reputable Finnish and American representatives, was chosen to chair the commission. The appointment of a Catholic bishop to work with General Chastelain as co-chair for the commission resonates with the integral role of traditional and religious leaders in supporting Ethiopia’s conflict resolution tradition.

An active or retired military leader may be a good choice for co-chairing the Ethiopian commission, because of the non-partisan nature of the military. Such a leader would bring knowledge and insight when developing a workable solution for Ethiopia’s regional security structures.

Knowledge of the country, its federal dynamics, as well as experience with the Tigrayan people, matters. A reputable individual who served with the UN Mission in Eritrea and Ethiopia (UNMEE) following the 1998-2000 Ethiopian-Eritrea conflict could be of value. Canada played a very positive role in that UN mission.

For Canada, beyond the implicit value of supporting democratic federalism in Ethiopia, and contributing to peace, stability and opportunity across the African continent, there is an opportunity to make real the professed global engagement implicit in the “Canada is back slogan. Foreign policy is about principles, values and interests, and how competently a government advances them in complex global contexts. With recent events in the United States impacting on the perception of its own soft power equity, Canada should not reduce its own soft power projection – one supported by a strong commitment to democratic norms.

Canada’s impact in the past – in Cyprus, in the Middle East and Suez, in Sri Lanka, in Bosnia, on the ending of Apartheid in South Africa – has been real because Canadian leaders and diplomats engaged in situations where Canada could play a constructive role.

Ethiopia plays a major role in the future of Africa. Its legitimate effort at addressing, what appears to have been, an attempted armed attack from some TPLF elements, could benefit from Canadian support and involvement. Canada has genuine experience in similar contexts in other international challenges. It is time to offer that experience in support of peaceful resolution, conciliation and progress in Ethiopia.