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Ethiopia’s Abiy Ahmed goes from flying start to a quicksand of troubles

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The National News | Prime minister faces civil war, ethnic divisions and simmering disputes with neighbours.

For Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, the promise and optimism he projected when he took the reins in the Horn of Africa nation three years ago must have become a fading memory.

Those expectations have been replaced by a civil war, widening ethnic schisms and a growing crisis with neighbouring Sudan and fellow Nile basin nation Egypt.

Since winning the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize after forging peace with arch-enemy Eritrea in his first year in office, the prime minister has gone from being his country’s beacon of hope for unity and economic prosperity to a leader who shows little tolerance for dissent.

Significantly, Ethiopia’s woes and Mr Abiy’s own political predicament cast a dark shadow on the Horn of Africa and beyond.

“The high expectations of 2018 have proved to be misplaced,” said William Davison, the leading Ethiopia expert at the International Crisis Group, a conflict-prevention organisation headquartered in Brussels.

“Everything that’s happening now demonstrates that hopes for a smooth transition to peaceful multi-party democracy were naive.”

Unrest in Ethiopia – at about 110 million people the second most populous African nation – could force millions to flee their homes and take refuge in neighbouring nations.

Addis Ababa also hosts the headquarters of the African Union and the country is among Africa’s largest contributors of peacekeepers. Some of its population share the same ethnic background with cousins in countries like South Sudan and Somalia.

With a burgeoning economy and the potential to export cheap electricity from its nearly completed Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Nile, Ethiopia has been viewed as a future engine for growth in the Horn of Africa and beyond.

Of all its troubles, the war between federal forces and separatist rebels in the northern Tigray region is by far the most worrisome.

Besides the financial and human cost of a full-fledged military operation raging there since November, the reported involvement of government-sanctioned militias from the powerful Amhara group threatens to deepen ethnic schisms and extend the conflict beyond Ethiopia’s borders.

The militias are believed to have wrested control of areas of Tigray they claim to historically belong to the Amhara.

There are also indications that forces from neighbouring Eritrea, a longtime enemy of Tigrayans, are fighting on the side of the government, something that could only perpetuate the conflict in Tigray, according to analysts.

There are credible reports of systematic atrocities and looting of heritage sites in the Tigray conflict committed by all parties, analysts said.

“Abiy has been undone by the Tigray conflict and he has administered brutal suppression of Tigrayans and brought the Amhara there to be their overlords,” said Gihad Auda, a political science professor at Cairo’s Helwan university.

The conflict in Tigray and the participation of the Amhara in the fighting have also inflamed a border crisis between Ethiopia and Sudan, which moved in December to regain control of some of its territory which had been settled by Amhara farmers for decades.

The Sudanese military’s operations in the area triggered deadly clashes with Ethiopian forces and allied militias, including mortar shelling and cross-border raids. The latest of these clashes took place on Thursday when one Sudanese soldier was killed and eight others were wounded, according to the Sudanese military.

The areas of Tigray seized by Amhara militias border Sudan, raising the likelihood of further clashes. Moreover, Ethiopia insisted that it will not negotiate on resolving the border crisis before Sudan pulls its troops from the areas retaken from Amhara farmers, a position rejected by Sudan.

Tensions between the neighbours have already been raised by the long-simmering dispute over Ethiopia’s new dam, located less than 20 kilometres from the Sudanese border.

Sudan wants Ethiopia to enter into a legally binding deal to share information and data on the operation of the dam to prevent flooding and the disruption of its own power-generating dams on the Blue Nile. Ethiopia will agree only to non-binding recommendations.

The dispute over the dam also involves downstream Egypt, which is alarmed by the possibility that the giant structure would significantly reduce its vital share of the Nile waters.

On the other hand, the dam has become a rare rallying point for Ethiopians, making it impossible for Mr Abiy to offer compromises on its operation to the Egyptians and Sudanese, according to the analysts.

“Ethiopia’s problems are converging in a negative way with its neighbours,” said Michael Hanna of the Century Foundation in New York.

“Facts on the ground are facts on the ground and neither Egypt nor Sudan can do anything about it. Time is on Ethiopia’s side since 2011 [when construction of the dam began] but its internal issues are complicating efforts to resolve the dispute over the dam and other issues.”

In all likelihood, according to Mr Davison, Mr Abiy’s party will retain power following elections scheduled for June, but that is unlikely to narrow Ethiopia’s domestic fault lines.

“For that, the country needs to embark on a comprehensive and inclusive national dialogue to try and come to terms with the past and chart a more harmonious way forward.”

Ethiopia arrests 15 over UAE embassy attack plot: Reports

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Al Jazeera | The country’s intelligence and security service said suspects were working on direction of foreigners, local media report.

Ethiopia’s state-run media have said authorities arrested 15 people over a plot to attack the United Arab Emirates’ embassy in the capital, Addis Ababa.

The Ethiopian Press Agency (EPA) on Wednesday cited a statement from the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) as saying that the suspects were working on foreigners’ direction.

An unspecified amount of arms, explosives and documents were seized during the operation, according to the statement, which was also cited in a report by the state-affiliated FANA news outlet.

“The group took the mission from a foreign terrorist group and was preparing to inflict significant damage on properties and human lives,” EPA said.

There was no immediate comment by the UAE’s foreign ministry or its embassy in Addis Ababa.

A second group of suspects was planning to attack the UAE’s diplomatic mission in neighbouring Sudan, the EPA said.

Ethiopia’s NISS was working with its Sudanese counterparts on that aspect of the plot, the agency said. There was no immediate comment from Sudanese authorities.

In its report, FANA cited the statement as saying that a man named “Ahmed Ismael, who is the leader of the terrorist group and a resident of Sweden, was arrested in Sweden as a result of exchange of information with European, African, and Asian security services”.

The UAE has played a key diplomatic role in bringing longtime foes Ethiopia and Eritrea since Abiy Ahmed became Ethiopia’s prime minister in 2018, while also providing financial contributions to stabilise Ethiopia’s economy.

Sudan army clashes with Ethiopia forces, regains control of seized borderland

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MEMO | Border clashes between the Sudanese army and Ethiopian forces were renewed in Al-Fashqa Al-Sughra on Thursday. Sudanese sources have confirmed that the army has regained control of new lands previously seized by Ethiopian forces.

The clashes that took place on Thursday were confirmed by Sudanese local media, the Sudan Tribune, Al-Sudani and Altaghyeer, reporting that fatalities and injuries occurred on the Sudanese side due to the fighting.

The Sudan Tribune reported that the Sudanese army on Thursday recovered an area on the borders following clashes with Ethiopian forces and militias in Al-Fashqa Al-Sughra, resulting in one death and eight injuries in the Sudanese forces.

The news website quoted military sources stating that the army managed to re-control the area of Cumbo Melkamu located in Al-Fashqa Al-Sughra, adjacent to the border strip with the Ethiopian Amhara region.

The news was also confirmed by Altaghyeer newspaper, quoting a military source stating: “The army forces liberated one of the Sudanese areas on the eastern borders.”

The military source confirmed that the area of Cumbo Melkamu had also been re-controlled by Sudanese troops.

Al-Sudani newspaper quoted eyewitnesses in the village of Barakat Noreen, claiming that Ethiopian forces attacked Sudanese forces, who responded and took control of the territory.

Recently, the borders between Khartoum and Addis Ababa witnessed significant developments, which led to an intervention by the Sudanese army with the aim of “regaining control of all of its territories.”

Sudan previously accused Ethiopia of supporting militias in usurping its lands, while Addis Ababa denied the allegations, amid stalled border demarcation negotiations between the two sides.

On 19 December, Sudan announced sending military reinforcements to the border area with Ethiopia, to “regain control over its usurped lands from an Ethiopian militia” in Al-Fashqa.

Prior to that, on 16 December, the Sudanese army announced the fall of casualties and losing military equipment in an attack launched by an Ethiopian militia in lands near Al-Fashqa.

The conflict in Al-Fashqa border area has been ongoing for decades, but it was limited to incidents between Ethiopian and Sudanese farmers, as Ethiopian gunmen frequently attacked Sudanese farmers for the purpose of looting and plundering. According to Khartoum, many were killed and injured in these aggressions.

The exceptionally fertile lands of Al-Fashqa are divided into three regions: Al-Fashqa Al-Kubra, Al-Fashqa Al-Sughra and the Southern Region.

Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam generates grand hostility with Egypt

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Daily Maverik 168 | Can SA help to defuse the tensions growing over Ethiopia’s giant project on the Nile? Egypt fears it will cut water flow, on which it depends. But Sudan and Ethiopia need the power. The clock is ticking.

South Africa has been quietly but urgently trying to defuse what many fear is a ticking time bomb: the bitter dispute between Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan over the giant GERD dam that Ethiopia is building on the Blue Nile.

Egypt says GERD – the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam – presents it with an existential threat because it will significantly reduce the flow of the Nile, on which it depends for almost all of its water.

Ethiopia, meanwhile, insists that it needs the vast reservoir, which will eventually hold some 74 billion cubic metres of Nile water, to drive about 6,000 MW of hydroelectric power, which it badly needs for the development of its mostly impoverished people.

Sudan sits somewhere between the other two, literally and figuratively. It hopes to benefit from the electricity GERD – which is just across its border – will provide, but is also concerned by the potential impact on its own water supply.

Negotiations among the three countries, mediated by the US and the World Bank, broke down last year when Ethiopia rejected a US-drafted compromise. Egypt then proposed to take the dispute to the UN Security Council.

At that point President Cyril Ramaphosa, acting as African Union chairperson, intervened and at a meeting on 26 June 2020 of the AU Bureau (heads of state representing the continent’s five regions), the leaders of the three disputing parties agreed to the AU – in effect South Africa – taking over the mediation, in the spirit of “African solutions for African problems”.

The Bureau gave the mediator and negotiators just two weeks to resolve the issue and report back. That proved overly ambitious.

The AU-South Africa mediation got off to a shaky start. At the AU Bureau meeting, Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan had undertaken to refrain from “taking any action that may jeopardise or complicate the AU-led process aimed at finding an acceptable solution on all outstanding matters”.

This was taken by the other parties as a commitment by Ethiopia not to start filling the dam unilaterally, as it had recently threatened to do when the rainy season arrived.

Photo: The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (Hellen Natu)
Yet, within a matter of days, Ethiopia did begin filling the dam, justifying this unilateral action on the grounds that filling the dam was an inherent part of the construction process.

For a few tense days, everyone wondered how Egypt, in particular, would respond to Ethiopia’s actions. But Cairo was persuaded to swallow its pride and the negotiations continued. Six months later, though, they remain unresolved.

The issues are undoubtedly intractable because they concern the management and use of a scarce, critical and common resource – water.

The Institute for Security Studies (ISS) PSC Report has noted that Egypt and Sudan would like Ethiopia to guarantee a minimum outflow of water from the GERD’s reservoir, based on historical average discharge.

“This involves compensating for any shortfall in water flow caused by drought or future upstream use,” the ISS said.

Ethiopia believes that this means Egypt and Sudan are demanding, in effect, that it should not use any of the waters of the Blue Nile – which would basically be to continue the guarantee of the “natural and historical right of Egypt to the waters of the Nile”, which Britain, as the colonial power, granted almost a century ago.

“This is untenable, in Ethiopia’s view, as it compromises the ability of the GERD to operate at full capacity, and infringes upon its rights to use the Nile waters and undertake future developments on the Blue Nile,” the ISS says.

As Egyptian foreign minister Sameh Shoukry told the UN Security Council last year, Egypt wants the operations of the dam

to be governed by a legally binding instrument, including an independent dispute resolution mechanism. Ethiopia rejects this as an unacceptable intrusion on its sovereignty, insisting that any disagreements or disputes over the operation of the dam should be resolved by consensus in negotiations with Egypt and Sudan.

Though the GERD is now only to be used for hydroelectric power, which means that Ethiopia will be using but not consuming the waters of the Blue Nile, Egypt in particular fears that Ethiopia might decide in future to consume the water – for agriculture, say. It, therefore, wants guarantees now that this will not happen, guarantees Ethiopia is not willing to give.

As a result of such deep differences, the negotiations remain stalemated six months after South Africa took over the mediation.

South African officials say Pretoria presented to the three parties a compromise proposal drafted by three AU experts, based on their understanding of the positions of the negotiating countries.

Ethiopia and Sudan accepted this proposal, but Egypt rejected it, based merely on procedural grounds, he said.

In fact, it is clear that Egypt also has a problem with the substance of the proposal, though no one is saying exactly what.

So it’s now likely that Ramaphosa will call another meeting of the AU Bureau to try to plot a way forward. It is unclear if Pretoria will be able to see this mediation through to a solution, because Ramaphosa’s chairing of the AU ends next week, on 6 February, at the annual AU summit. There is some talk, though, of South Africa being asked to continue as mediator of the GERD negotiations anyway.

Meanwhile, the clock keeps ticking on this dispute, with another possible flashpoint looming in mid-2021, when Ethiopia is likely to embark on the next phase of filling the dam as the summer rains fall.

What happens if no agreement has been reached by then is unclear. Back in 2013, at a meeting between then Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi and senior officials and party leaders – a meeting that was mistakenly transmitted to the public – the possibility of taking military action against the dam was raised.

Could it come to that? Probably not. The political fallout for Egypt would be immense. But, for a country that has characterised GERD as a life-or-death issue, it’s hard to be sure.

As Ethiopia fills its Nile dam, regional rivalries overflow

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The Christian Monitor | When African Union-mediated talks between Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan over a Nile River dam broke down yet again last month, it didn’t mark a new disagreement over sharing vital water resources.

Rather, it was a case of regional rivalries trumping understandings about science and cooperation that have been laid out by African and Western mediators in multiple draft agreements.

Since then, Egypt’s media have sounded war drums, and a border territory dispute between Sudan and Ethiopia has erupted into violence.

At the center of the dispute is the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), built by successive governments in Addis Ababa with the goal of pulling millions out of poverty.

The turbines of the dam, located near the source of the Blue Nile in northwest Ethiopia, are to generate 6,000 megawatts of hydropower – critical in a country where more than half of the population, some 50 million people, are without access to electricity, and demand for power is increasing by 30% annually.

The solution to Egypt and Sudan’s resulting water-security concerns, observers say, is simple: coordination and data-sharing.

Yet even amid indications that the revival of traditional American diplomacy could help resolve the dam dispute, observers say mediators must also confront currents stronger than the Nile itself: nationalism, territorial disputes, and a struggle over supremacy in the Horn of Africa.

Regional supremacy

For Ethiopia, the dam project promises to fuel the country’s ascendance as a geopolitical player. Even amid the struggle over the future of the country that last November erupted into war in Ethiopia’s northern Tigray region, the dam remains a cause that unites the diverse nation.

“There has been among the government and broadly the Ethiopian people a sense of unfairness, that as a poor country we have not been able to utilize a natural resource that springs out of Ethiopia,” says Awol Allo, an Ethiopian analyst and lecturer at Britain’s Keele University.

“This dam project signals the revival of the Ethiopian state after the decades of shame, poverty, and famine it has been identified with.”

A sense of personal investment and national unity around the dam solidified after the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and other lenders refused to fund the GERD. Ethiopia in 2010 decided to go it alone, paying for it with government funds and bonds purchased by private citizens, and broke ground on the project in 2011.

“Every Ethiopian sees themselves as a stakeholder in a project that is not just about energy needs, but a statement that Ethiopia is a significant, powerful country that can go at it alone and assert itself on the regional stage,” Mr. Allo says.

Downstream drama

The draft agreements notwithstanding, the water-sharing disputes between Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia have only deepened since construction completed on the GERD in 2020 and Addis Ababa began filling the reservoirs in July.

Downstream countries long used to the unrestricted flow of the Nile for their farming and fresh water are alarmed by the dam’s potential impact on their water and food security.

Egypt, 1,000 miles downstream from the dam, has laid a historic claim on a lion’s share of water from the Nile and views GERD as a national security threat. Egypt currently depends on the Nile for 90% of its fresh water and the vast majority of irrigation water for crops to feed its 105 million citizens. It is also concerned with potential flooding and drought.

Egypt and Sudan decry the lack of technical studies and assessments of the dam’s environmental and social impact downstream.

Tensions are now high as Addis Ababa is set to fill the dam’s reservoir with an additional 11 billion cubic meters this year after the initial 4.9 BCM it filled in July 2020. The dam has a total capacity of 74 BCM. “The biggest problem is not knowing how Ethiopia intends to use and operate the dam, what times of year, what quantities, and what will be the impact,” says Amal Kandeel, an environmental and policy consultant and former director of the Climate Change, Environment and Security Program at the Middle East Institute. “Downstream countries can’t plan without knowing; they need clarity.

“Egypt will not benefit from the dam,” she says. “But if there is coordination, facts, evidence, and data shared transparently at the minimum, any potential harm will be reduced.”

For Egypt, a “humiliation”

Egypt’s inability to stop or influence the project has become a symbol of the government’s inward-looking focus the past decade and its withdrawal from the Arab and African stage, which domestic critics say has dramatically reduced Egypt’s geopolitical significance.

Egyptian insiders privately say the prospect of Ethiopian control over the most populous Arab country’s water and food security is viewed as “a humiliation,” driving Cairo’s hard line.

“For 50 or 60 years, Egypt was the biggest geopolitical actor, not only in the Middle East, but the northeast Horn of Africa as well,” says Horn of Africa analyst Rashid Abdi.

“Times have changed, you have new governments that are becoming more assertive on the regional and world stage and acting independently,” he says. “It is a natural progression that Egypt is finding uncomfortable.”

Egypt has pushed for intervention by the United States, its Arab allies, and the U.N. Security Council. In June, Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry warned of conflict should the United Nations fail to intervene.

After the talks’ breakdown last month, Egyptian state-influenced media clamored for the use of “force” against Ethiopia, advocating surgical strikes on the GERD’s electricity infrastructure.

For Sudan, it’s good, but ….

Meanwhile, regional alliances and a century-old border dispute have transformed Ethiopia’s northwest neighbor from a quiet supporter of the dam to a spoiler.

Observers and experts agree: The GERD’s benefits for Sudan are many.

The dam, 20 miles from the Sudan-Ethiopia border, will reduce flooding that has devastated Sudan in the past. Blue Nile flooding destroyed one-third of cultivated farming land in the country last year, destroying 100,000 homes and killing 100 people, deepening Sudan’s economic crisis.

The reduction in flooding and sharing of irrigation water would help Sudan cultivate more than 50 million hectares of arable land abandoned due to flooding and mismanagement, a critical boost to an agricultural sector that is Sudan’s largest employer and accounts for 30% of the country’s gross domestic product.

Ethiopia has also vowed to export cheap electricity to Sudan.

“Honest people in Khartoum will tell you that the dam is a net positive from all logical, logistical, and economic perspectives. Objectively, Sudan would benefit from the dam,” says Jonas Horner, Sudan analyst and deputy director for the Horn of Africa at the International Crisis Group.

“But it is not quite as simple as that,” he says, pointing to Sudan’s need to balance regional alliances.

Khartoum – militarily close to Egypt, diplomatically indebted to Ethiopia, and financially and politically dependent on Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, who are allied with Egypt – is reluctant both to appear to support the dam, on the one hand, or come down hard on Addis Ababa, on the other.

This complicated balancing act was disrupted in December by the violent reignition of a century-old Sudan-Ethiopia border dispute.

Sudanese patrols have come under shelling allegedly at the hands of Ethiopian militias, and the Sudanese army and Ethiopian federal forces have clashed multiple times this month.

Ethiopian officials blame Cairo for stoking the tensions, alleging an Egyptian plot to prolong conflict and derail the GERD’s completion.

Traditional American diplomacy

Observers agree the dispute provides an opportunity for the Biden administration to demonstrate its vowed return to traditional American diplomacy.

The Trump administration’s few forays into the GERD dispute favored Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, a Trump ally. Last July the Trump administration partially suspended American assistance to Ethiopia after Addis Ababa rejected a draft agreement compiled by Washington that it saw as heavily favoring Cairo. President Donald Trump publicly warned that Cairo would “blow up that dam” should talks fail.

In contrast, President Joe Biden’s secretary of state, Antony Blinken, vowed in his confirmation hearing last month to conduct “active engagement” to address a rise in tensions that “has the potential to be destabilizing throughout the Horn of Africa,” indicating that he is considering appointing a special U.S. envoy for the Horn of Africa.

But observers caution that the Biden administration must untangle the web of regional politics, nationalist fervor, and power plays in order to get the three states back to the basics: water.

“The war in Tigray has created instability in the Ethiopian state, and now you have the border issue with Sudan that is clearly linked to the GERD issue. You have domestic actors in each of these countries lobbying external actors to advance their interests,” says Mr. Allo.

“It will be difficult for any U.S. administration with all the goodwill in the world to mend things.”

Five Reasons why the UN Security Council needs to deal with the humanitarian crisis in Ethiopia

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World Peace Foundation | Alex de Waal | 14.12.2020

Today, the UN Security Council members are expected to discuss the humanitarian crisis in Tigray.

It’s a matter for UN Security Council urgent business for several reasons.

First, it’s an internationalized crisis: there are over 45,000 refugees in Sudan and within weeks there could be three times that number. There are over 100,000 Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia, and the Eritrean army has overrun their camps and is reportedly forcing conscripting youth, while the Federal Government is proposing to send over 100 Eritreans who made it as far as Addis Ababa back to Tigray, likely into the hands of the Eritrean army.

Second, there’s little doubt that starvation crimes are being committed in Tigray. There is good reason to suppose that parties to the conflict—the Ethiopian federal forces and militia, the Tigrayan forces and the Eritrean army—are violating the prohibition on using starvation as a weapon. These violations demand an international investigation.

Third, Ethiopia will be asking international donors—including the United States, Europe and Japan, among others—to foot the bill. Just five years ago, Ethiopia was on the point of graduating from the status of famine-prone country, with its large-scale pathbreaking programs for food security. Not only is there a vast manmade food crisis enveloping Tigray, but it’s now deeply uncertain whether Ethiopia can muster the financial and institutional capacity to deal with a large-scale nationwide food security challenge such as that which threatened in 2015. Having invested heavily over the last 25 years in the achievements of Ethiopia’s pro-poor developmental state and famine prevention mechanisms, international aid donors have a legitimate interest in preventing relapse.

Fourth, the African Union has failed Ethiopia thus far. There has been no African Union Peace and Security Council meeting on the topic. South Africa discouraged the UN Security Council for discussing the conflict. The African Union envoys were rebuffed. Yesterday, Sudanese Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok announced an emergency summit of the InterGovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) on Ethiopia. His initiative needs the highest level of international backing.

Fifth, under UN Security Council resolution 2417 of May 2018, the United Nations Secretary General is required to report swiftly to the Council on any situation of armed conflict that threatens widespread food insecurity. The Ethiopian and Eritrean war in Tigray is precisely such a scenario for enacting this provision.

Rising tension as Ethiopia and Sudan deadlocked on border dispute

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Al Jazeera | Bickering over contested farmland along the border has in recent weeks deteriorated into armed clashes.

Age-old territorial claims are threatening to embroil Ethiopia and Sudan into armed conflict, as bickering over disputed strips of farmland in recent weeks has boiled over into the most serious escalation of border tensions in years.

The uptick in skirmishes initially involving militias from the two countries saw the neighbours’ national armies intervene – and by mid-December, both countries had massed soldiers along the frontier in the al-Fashaga region.

Last month, Sudan closed its airspace over the region alleging that an Ethiopian fighter jet had infiltrated Sudanese airspace.

Al-Fashaga, where the contested farmlands at the heart of the dispute lie, runs about 100 square miles (259 square kilometres) along the joint border of Ethiopia’s northwestern frontier and eastern Sudan.

For decades, farmers from both countries have harvested crops with little care for border markings in the area amid sporadic flare-ups.

Attempts to properly demarcate the border date back to a treaty signed in 1902 between then British-ruled Sudan and Ethiopia. But the ambiguity along certain border points left the issue unresolved and demarcation has remained a sticking point between the two countries, particularly since Sudan gained independence in 1955.

The flashpoint of the recent bickering was a December 15 ambush, reportedly carried out in the area by Ethiopian militia backed by Ethiopian soldiers.

The attack is said to have killed several Sudanese military officers, and it provoked a rare condemnation from Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, who said on Twitter Sudan’s forces would be prepared to “repel” military aggression.

With his country already engulfed in a brutal war in its northern Tigray region, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed responded with a reconciliatory call for calm. “Such incidents will not break the bond b/n our two countries as we always use dialogue to resolve issues,” he said in a tweet.

But Sudan struck back, mobilising soldiers towards contested areas and announcing that it had retaken them by New Year’s day.

“Our military is engaged elsewhere, they took advantage of that,” Ethiopian military chief General Birhanu Jula said of Sudan’s recent military manoeuvres.

“This should have been solved amicably. Sudan needs to choose dialogue, as there are third party actors who want to see our countries divided,” he added, strongly hinting at Egypt, with whom Ethiopia is engaged in a diplomatic spat over the construction of a massive hydroelectric power dam on the Blue Nile River.

Egypt says the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) project threatens the water supply and livelihood of its farmers downstream. Thinly veiled accusations that Egypt coerced Sudan into its heavy-handed military approach were largely fuelled by Egypt’s issuing a statement last month backing Sudan in the affair.

Despite Sudan finding itself at odds with Ethiopia over GERD amid seemingly stonewalled tripartite efforts on reaching an agreement on the dam’s construction, Khartoum and Addis Ababa have generally enjoyed warm ties. In 2019, Abiy acted as a mediator between Sudan’s military and pro-democracy leaders in an attempt to ease the political crisis that gripped the country in the wake of the removal of longtime ruler Omar al-Bashir.

Since early November, Sudan has allowed more than 50,000 Ethiopians fleeing the country’s war in Tigray to shelter at refugee camps in its territory.

But both countries have made notable shifts in policy regarding the border dispute.

Previous Ethiopian administrations were far more accommodating of Sudan’s territorial claims. In 2009, Ethiopia’s former Prime Minister Meles Zenawi relinquished control of strips of land on the border to Sudan, as part of agreements that caused an uproar in Ethiopia when made public.

Despite Ethiopia’s concessions, Sudan’s al-Bashir made no concrete effort to militarise its border and prevent the odd raid into its territory by Ethiopian militia.

But under Abiy, Ethiopia appears to have backtracked on past agreements and could yet stake a claim for some of the coveted farmland. Sudan’s tolerance, meanwhile, has thinned considerably amid the rising tensions, which have sparked calls for de-escalation.

Saudi Arabia has reportedly offered to help reconcile the feuding parties, while UK Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab recently met officials from both sides and urged them to sort out their differences.

“The UK is a friend to both countries,” Raab’s office said in a statement sent to Al Jazeera. “We want to see the tensions settled not just for Ethiopia and Sudan, but also for the region as a whole.”

While the diplomatic community’s efforts are yet to be exhausted, Raab’s call for roundtable talks has received a lukewarm response.

“We are thankful for the mediation offers, but Sudanese forces needs to vacate our land and return to their territory,” Ethiopia’s Foreign Ministry Spokesman Dina Mufti told assembled press in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa, last week. “When this occurs, we will gladly attend roundtable talks.”

Sudan denies it is occupying Ethiopian territory.

Gridlocked, the two states remain perilously close to a breakout of fresh hostilities. Experts believe that domestic political wrangling in both countries might be behind their somewhat uncompromising stances. Meanwhile, the possibility of domestic political foes interpreting any concessions on al-Fashaga as weakness and the odds of provoking the ire of each country’s nationalist camp could further fuel the standoff.

“Ethiopia is reticent about the al-Fashaga crisis because it touches on Prime Minister Abiy’s grip on power and the interests of the Amhara [Ethiopian region bordering al-Fashaga], his only ethnic support base,” said Rashid Abdi, a researcher and Horn of Africa analyst.

“Whereas in Sudan, a new conflict could complicate the political transition and sow divisions. The army can use war as excuse to reconsolidate power and edge out the civilians,” he added.

UAE: The scramble for the Horn of Africa

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MEMO | The United Arab Emirates is waging a war for influence over the Horn of Africa.

Since the 2011 Arab Spring the United Arab Emirates has been taking an active role in a number of hotspots from Egypt, Libya to Yemen. The Gulf nation has spent $26 billion annually on its defence budget since 2016 and this is expected to increase to $37.8 billion by 2025, according to Research and Markets.

A growing security and war industry with military deployments abroad, US generals often refer to the Sheikhdom as ‘Little Sparta’. As of 2020, The UAE has military bases in Eritrea, Djibouti and Somaliland, which further indicates the importance of the Horn of Africa to Abu Dhabi. The region offers excellent access to the Red Sea, the Mediterranean and the Gulf of Aden, all of which are vital to the Emirates’ economic future as a global trading hub. The military bases ensure Abu Dhabi can see off threats to its interests and secure its influence over East Africa at a time when it is expanding its income streams away from the petrodollar.

The 2015 war in Yemen and the 2017 blockade of Qatar have seen Abu Dhabi take a more aggressive role in East Africa.

Countries in the Horn of Africa have by and large welcomed growing ties with the Arab World, but in 2017 following the breaking of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, Egypt with Qatar, countries across the world were pushed to take sides.

Somalia

Although the 2017 Gulf Crisis now looks like it is coming to an end, the countries in the Horn of Africa have already paid the price for it. Somalia found itself at the unwelcome end of the dispute.

Like other Horn of Africa countries, the Somali government adopted a neutral stance towards the Qatar dispute. The UAE, however, saw Mogadishu as silently in the pro-Qatar camp and Abu Dhabi was not pleased.

In 2017, as President Mohamed Abdul lahi Farmaajo assumed office, reports circulated that Qatar and Turkey had funded his campaign and further claims of officials appointed to prominent positions within Farmaajo’s administration having ties to Doha and Ankara unnerved Abu Dhabi.

The Somali government alleges the UAE is now actively destabilising the country, accusing it of funding opposition forces. These suspicions intensified after Dubai Ports World, DP World, bypassed the central government of Somalia and signed a deal with the semi-autonomous region of Somaliland to develop and operate Berbera port. DP World even brought in Ethiopian investment and gave Addis Ababa a stake in the port.

Mogadishu declared the deal illegal and tried to block it by taking out a complaint with the Arab League. Somaliland leader, Muse Bihi Abdi, said Farmaajo’s government was declaring war by attempting to block the deal. Under the deal, Somaliland stands to get investments of up to $442 million and a separate agreement with Abu Dhabi to allow the UAE’s military bases in the region could bring in a further $1 billion, according to the International Crisis Group.

Decades of civil war and the presence of extremist groups makes Somalia a very fragile country, fears UAE involvement could harm the country are a cause of constant concern for Mogadishu.

Sudan

In 1989, Omar Al-Bashir, a military commander, launched a coup and seized political power in Sudan. By 1993, he declared himself president and his political party, the National Congress, became the dominant political force. The National Congress is Muslim Brotherhood aligned and as such was generally treated with suspicion by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. However, in the 2010s, Al-Bashir’s regime began distancing itself from the brotherhood in order to improve its relations with the GCC countries.

Closer relations with Saudi Arabia and the UAE had a price. In 2015, Riyadh formed a coalition to intervene militarily in Yemen. In 2011, the Yemeni government led by Ali Abdullah Saleh faced mass street protests known as the ‘Arab Spring’, the pressure would force him to step down in 2012. The power vacuum led to large parts of the country being taken over by the Iranian-backed Houthi group. The Saudi-led coalition aimed to crush the Houthis and declared war on them. Sudan became an important member of the war coalition.

In 2018, a popular uprising took place against Omar Al-Bashir and in April 2019 the military forced him from power. The military then formed a new government with civil opposition groups with the aim of transforming Sudan into a fully-fledged democracy and the UAE moved to minimise the potential damage to its interests caused by the revolution.

However, the fall of Al-Bashir means the UAE’s position in Sudan is not guaranteed and some fear the Emirates could try to subvert Sudan’s democratic transition.

Ethiopia

Ethiopia seems to have benefitted hugely from its partnership with the UAE, as the East African country has emerged as a big investment opportunity.

In February 2020, the UAE agreed to invest $100 million to support micro, medium and small scale projects across the country. Additionally, the UAE has pledged to build an oil pipeline between Ethiopia and Eritrea, which will provide the landlocked nation much needed energy.

Indeed this energy deal is possible after the UAE engineered a peace treaty between Eritrea and Ethiopia in 2018. The peace agreement was held up as an example of the UAE’s prowess. Ethiopia managed to gain these benefits while avoiding the polarising effects of the Qatar blockade.

In November 2020, armed conflict broke out in Ethiopia’s Tigray region between government forces and a powerful regional rebel army. The rebels’ leader openly accused the United Arab Emirates of carrying out a drone strike on Tigray, from its base in Eritrea, at the behest of Addis Ababa. While evidence has yet to emerge of the strike, it does indicate there is some local anxiety about the role Abu Dhabi might be playing in this potentially explosive situation.

Ethiopia could cause issues for the UAE and Saudi Arabia, as another close ally of the Gulf States, Egypt, has expressed anger at Addis Ababa’s dam across the River Nile. The Renaissance Dam built by Ethiopia reduces Nile water levels in Egypt, harming its energy, economic and environmental needs. Negotiations to find a solution keep breaking down and regional tensions are high.

The Horn of Africa is the playground for rising UAE aspirations and is a microcosm of what the UAE aims to replicate across the African continent. Much of this is driven by the decline of US influence globally, new regional alliances and powerhouses are emerging to manage international security. However, the UAE does not exercise total control over East Africa and is still in the early stages of developing its reach and influence. The Horn is full of flashpoints and the UAE could either help stabilise or destabilise the region.

France – Official statement on the situation in Ethiopia

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Situation in Tigray

(29 January 2021)

France is extremely concerned by the gravity of the humanitarian and food crisis in Tigray and reiterates its call to the Ethiopian government to facilitate access to the region – including the Hitsats and Shimelba refugee camps – by the UN and humanitarian organizations.

Repeated and consistent allegations of serious human rights violations in the Tigray region cannot be ignored. France urges the Ethiopian authorities to facilitate independent investigations and to take the legal actions they had announced.

France applauds the strong commitment on the part of the United Nations as reflected by current missions in Ethiopia led by David Beasley, Executive Director of the World Food Programme, and Filippo Grandi, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. It hopes these missions will help accelerate the delivery of humanitarian aid to the people of Tigray and the many displaced persons and refugees there. It welcomes EU efforts in Ethiopia and the mission led by Finnish Minister for Foreign Affairs Pekka Haavisto.

France is also concerned by tensions on the border between Ethiopia and Sudan and calls on the two neighboring countries to avoid any military escalation and resolve this dispute through dialogue.

Attack On Civilians In The Benishangul-Gumuz Region

(23 December 2020)

France condemns in the strongest possible terms the attack in the Benishangul-Gumuz region in western Ethiopia that took the lives of more than a hundred civilians, according to the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission.

The perpetrators of these crimes must be prosecuted and brought to justice.

France expresses its solidarity and offers its sincere condolences to the victims’ families. It calls for a return to peaceful coexistence and the rule of law, the only way to break the cycle of violence in Ethiopia.

Meeting between Mr Jean-Yves Le Drian and Mr Demeke Mekonnen, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia

(26 November 2020)

Mr Jean-Yves Le Drian, Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs, had a meeting today with Mr Demeke Mekonnen, Ethiopia’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The Minister took the opportunity presented by the meeting to express our deep concern about the escalation of violence in the Tigray region and the worsening humanitarian situation in Ethiopia and Sudan.

The Minister reiterated our condemnation of the ethnically-motivated violence and our call for measures to be put in place as swiftly as possible to protect civilians.

He supported the United Nations’ calls for humanitarian access to be allowed to the areas affected by the conflict, and expressed France’s support for the African Union chair’s initiative to find a political solution to the crisis.

Situation in the Tigray region

(23 November 2020)

France is concerned by the deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Ethiopia, the Tigray region and Sudan.

It condemns the ethnic violence and calls for the swift institution of measures to protect civilian populations.

France supports the UN’s requests for humanitarian access.

France backs the approach taken by the UN Secretary-General and the initiatives taken by South Africa as Chair of the African Union to resolve the conflict.

Foreign meddling as a source of state fragility in Ethiopia

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MEMO Opinion | State fragility is a multidimensional concept that is often characterized by deficiencies in one or more areas of the core functions of the state: legitimacy, authority (competing claimants to power), and capacity (weak capacity to provide basic government functions). State fragility poses a serious problem for many developing countries as it leads to human flight and economic decline. Since 2015, for example, only five countries (Afghanistan, Somalia, S. Sudan, and Syria) have generated over 60 per cent of the 15 million refugees.

In many cases, state fragility is not just due to domestic political tensions, but a result of foreign intrusion into the affairs of countries. External intervention includes, but is not limited to, external support for factions opposed to the government, covert operations by foreign forces to destabilize the government, as well as foreign governments’ influence on outside actors such as multilateral agencies to suspend budget support, foreign aid, and other funding.

Negotiations have been underway between Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan to reach a fair and balanced agreement that preserves the water rights of all three countries. This includes agreement on mechanisms for resolving disputes and ways to coordinate and exchange information regarding the operation of water dams in each country. The parties need to depoliticize their argument and use reliable science-based solutions that do not disadvantage the interests of any party.

While these negotiations are underway, Egypt has resorted to clandestine measures to achieve its narrow objectives. One is to destabilize the Ethiopian regime, for example, by providing financial and military support to political opponents, arming and training militants from Benishangul-Gumuz (the area where the dam is located) to carry out incidences of mass violence to create overall instability in the region. There is also increasing evidence that Egypt has also encouraged the Sudanese government’s takeover of several Ethiopian towns on the border (they made a statement that they support Sudan in its border conflict with Ethiopia). This is all because Ethiopia decided to exercise its legal right to build a dam within its domestic borders. This right is consistent with domestic and international law. Even though 85 per cent of Nile river water originates in Ethiopia, nearly all consumption and use occur downstream in Egypt and Sudan.

In many cases, Egypt has been breaking off the negotiations creating abnormal delays, disregarding the agreed procedures, and refusing to consider adverse proposals or interests. These are actions that amount to breaches of good faith and most likely abuse of the rights of states.

International law obliges states to negotiate disputes in good faith that arise in connection with the use and protection of shared natural resources. The essential nature of the obligation is for the parties to make efforts to strive towards an agreement that reconciles their competing rights of use. Good faith negotiations also include not advancing wholly self-serving legal arguments that undermine the rights of other parties, and not resorting to extra-legal measures to advance your goals.

In negotiations, it is essential to realize that successful negotiation is a joint effort. The use of direct or indirect pressure on other parties will harden positions and derail any efforts to reach an agreement.

Egyptian meddling in Ethiopia’s internal affairs to achieve its narrow goals on the dam is likely to have serious ramifications beyond the existing dispute at hand. Firstly, beyond its potential benefit, the dam issue is personal for most Ethiopians. Millions of citizens contributed out of their meager earnings to build the dam. Any effort by other nations that undermines the completion and use of the dam would be treated as an act of war by most people.

Secondly, Egypt and Ethiopia are important countries in the region with centuries of history and civilization. Their actions set a precedent in the region. It sends the message that if you don’t get your way through negotiation, you can bully your negotiating partner into submission.

Thirdly, such meddling will not achieve its objectives. Given Ethiopia’s anti-colonial past and resistance to foreign aggression, it is likely to harden the country’s position on the dam. This may be the most accommodating Ethiopian government that is willing to resolve disputes through negotiation. Future governments are likely to take the hardline position and resist any future negotiations that compromise their autonomy on the dam.

Fourthly, in spite of their long history and civilization, both countries face severe development challenges: high levels of poverty, income inequality, poor governance, and political instability. They are far behind in extending to their citizens the opportunities to fulfil their aspirations for a better life. The Fund for Peace, which prepares the State Fragility Index for 178 countries, ranks Egypt as the 35th most fragile state behind Angola and Mauritania (Ethiopia is ranked 21st) for 2020. The evaluation is based on social cohesion, economic indicators (economic decline, income inequality, human flight, and brain drain), political indicators (human rights, rule of law, state legitimacy, and public services), and social factors such as demographic pressures, refugees and internally-displaced people and external intervention. Such foreign meddling is not without cost for Egypt, which desperately needs these resources to build schools, infrastructure, and healthcare for its people.

Political observers of the Middle East suggest that such foreign meddling is intended to divert attention away from the critical issues facing the country such as poor governance, democracy, and human rights, and help it to gain some political legitimacy by appearing as a defender of the national interest.

Finally, such actions poison the well of Egypt-Ethiopia relations and create a sense of hostility between the two peoples who have lived peacefully for generations. Most people think that these actions do not reflect the will of the Egyptian people and are solely an act of a rogue regime that is out of touch.

It is time to stop foreign meddling and get back to work to bring about a mutually satisfactory solution by way of compromise, even if it means the relinquishment of strongly held positions and a willingness to meet the other side partway. Any attempt to destabilize your negotiating partner to achieve your goals, or insist upon the complete capitulation of your partner, is bad policy and will not work.