SOMALIA

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The Three-Country Alliance Against Tigray Might Jeopardize Ethiopia’s Future – Analysis

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Eurasia Review | Martin Plaut

The Tigray war has turned into an all-out conflict, pitting Tigrayan forces loyal to the Tigray People’s Liberation front (TPLF) against Ethiopian federal troops, the Eritrean army, Amhara militia and – as revealed last week – Somali soldiers.

Despite what would seem to be overwhelming odds against them, the Tigrayans appear to be holding their own in large areas of the region.

Both Eritrea and Somalia routinely deny any involvement in the war, but the evidence of their presence is strong.

On December 8, Reuters reported that “a U.S. government source and five regional diplomats” told them the US believes Eritrean soldiers have crossed into Ethiopia. The EU and UK support this assessment.

A senior Ethiopian general confirmed that Eritrean troops were in Tigray. Major General Belay Seyoum, head of the Northern Command, described the presence of foreign forces on Ethiopian soil as “painful”.

The Eritrea-Ethiopia-Somali alliance

The alliance has its origins in the ending of hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Much of the groundwork for this rapprochement was done by the United States, with Donald Yamamoto playing a critical role behind the scenes, although Washington could hardly have envisaged where this would lead.

On July 8-9, 2018 Prime Minister Abiy visited Asmara to seal the peace between Eritrea and Ethiopia. In the same month, the ice between Eritrea and Somalia was broken, with a three-day visit by Somali President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed to Asmara. It was the first visit by a Somali president to Eritrea since it gained independence from Ethiopia in 1993. The two nations have not had diplomatic ties in nearly 15 years.

Abdinur Mohamed, a spokesman for the Somali president, said on Twitter that the country “is ready to write a new chapter of its relations with Eritrea.” Economic and security concerns are at the top of the agenda, as well as “regional issues of interest to both countries,” Eritrea’s information ministry said.

There were further bilateral visits in August 2018 and April 2019. This culminated in a summit between the leaders of Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia on January 27, 2020, held in Asmara.

The communique committed the three leaders to consolidate “peace, stability, and security as well as promoting economic and social development. They also agreed to bolster their joint efforts to foster effective regional cooperation.”

There was no press conference at which the details of the agreement might be explained. The public was left in the dark about what the leaders were planning.

Further meetings took place in the run-up to the outbreak of war in Tigray:

  • Prime Minister Abiy made a rare visit to the Eritrea main training base at Sawa in July 2020.
  • Somali President Farmajo arrived in Asmara on 4 October.
  • President Isaias went to Ethiopia on October 14-15. This trip included seeing the Ethiopian air-force base at Bishofu.

Within three weeks, on November 4, 2020, the Tigray war erupted. Is it credible that the war was not discussed, and a strategy agreed between the three leaders at these meetings?

War aims

The first priority of the alliance is to remove the Tigrayan administration from Tigray. President Isaias has long loathed the TPLF. This goes back to the 1970’s and 80’s when the Eritreans and Tigrayans fell out over ideology, tactics and strategy.

Prime Minister Abiy also wants to rid himself of the vestiges of power of the previous Ethiopian government, which the TPLF controlled. He is attempting to reverse their policy of “ethnic federalism.”

Beyond this, outlines of a plan were revealed when information was leaked about a meeting held by President Isaias just prior to the outbreak of the war.

According to reports citing well-placed sources, President Isaias brought together his closest confidantes on the eve of the Tigray war. He said that Eritrea had to accept that it had a small economy and a lengthy Red Sea coast that it cannot patrol on its own. He suggested forming some sort of “union” with Ethiopia, at least in terms of economic co-operation and maritime security.

If accurate, President Isaias appeared to have echoed Abiy’s grandiose dream of re-establishing the old empire-state of Ethiopia. This includes suggestions that the Ethiopian navy could be reconstructed – a proposal supported by France. This would require the use of Eritrean ports which were once home to the Imperial Ethiopian Navy.

The idea of some form of union may not be as far-fetched as it would appear, despite the fact Isaias previously led Eritrea’s decades-long war to gain independence from Ethiopia.

It should not be forgotten that when President Isaias made his first visit to Addis Ababa in July 2018 he made what many Eritreans regarded as an extraordinary offer: for a joint administration of both countries.

“This is a historic day for all of us,” President Isaias Afwerki said. “Anyone who thinks the people of Eritrea and Ethiopia are separated is considered as naïve from now on.”  In a speech, Abiy said the countries had agreed to develop together and that Isaias had offered to help “lead this great nation.” He added that “we have finally found our sister nation after many years of hiding.”

This vision – of co-suzerainty – or a revised form of federation, appears to be behind the current conflict.

Regional blocs

In September 2020 Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia held their third trilateral meeting. They proposed to form a new regional bloc, which has been referred to as the “Horn of Africa Cooperation”.

The flaw in this proposal was commented on at the time. “Creating an economic and political bloc may seem a solution to bring peace and boost trade. But it risks sparking distrust from other East African countries, and with the other regional body, IGAD,” the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, which Eritrea has long distrusted.

The Horn of Africa Cooperation could be linked to the wider ambition of the Saudis to extend their influence in the Horn of Africa. The “Council of the Arab and African States bordering the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden” was launched in January 2020. This new Arab-African alliance has eight members: Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Jordan and Yemen.

Conclusion

These plans depend on succeeding to crush the Tigrayans. At the moment this appears a distant prospect, despite Prime Minister Abiy’s assertion in November that it was little more than a “law enforcement”  operation that would soon be over.

If the war goes badly, and Eritrea, Somalia and the rest of Ethiopia becomes sucked into the conflict, the conflict could threaten the future of Ethiopia itself.  This was the warning from senior African experts at the US Institute of Peace.

“As members of the bipartisan senior study group on peace and security in the Red Sea arena, we are watching with grave concern the situation in Ethiopia. While many of the facts remain unclear, the risks of escalation are certain: Intrastate or interstate conflict would be catastrophic for Ethiopia’s people and for the region and would pose a direct threat to international peace and security.

The acceleration of polarization amid violent conflict would also mark the death knell for the country’s nascent reform effort that began two years ago and the promise of a democratic transition that it heralded.

As we cautioned in the study group’s Final Report and Recommendations released on October 29, the fragmentation of Ethiopia would be the largest state collapse in modern history. Ethiopia is five times the size of pre-war Syria by population, and its breakdown would lead to mass interethnic and interreligious conflict; a dangerous vulnerability to exploitation by extremists; an acceleration of illicit trafficking, including of arms; and a humanitarian and security crisis at the crossroads of Africa and the Middle East on a scale that would overshadow any existing conflict in the region, including Yemen.

As Ethiopia is currently the leading Troop Contributing Country to the United Nations and the African Union peacekeeping missions in Sudan, South Sudan and Somalia, its collapse would also significantly impact the efforts by both to mitigate and resolve others conflicts in the Horn of Africa.”

U.S. Withdrawal from Somalia — SOF

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Source: SOF News | John Friberg

U.S. Africa Command has announced the formation of Joint Task Force Quartz to oversee Operation Octave Quartz – a mission designated to reposition forces from Somalia and continue the assistance effort in Somalia. In early December President Trump and the Department of Defense announced that the United States would remove some 700 military personnel from Somalia. This is an action that Trump had mentioned several times over the past year but had not directed to take place.

Some national security observers applaud the action believing that the situation in Somalia is unsolvable. They point to decades of corruption and conflict and little to show for the millions of dollars and other sacrifices made in Somalia.

However, others say that we are ceding territory to an insurgent / terrorist group affiliated with al Qaeda. These critics say that the group poses a threat to the U.S. – pointing to the attack on Camp Simba in Kenya where Americans lost their lives and to the recent news of a potential plot by an al Shabaab member to hijack an aircraft to conduct an attack in the United States.

The withdrawal is being presented to the U.S. public as a ‘repositioning of forces’. Apparently some of these forces will move into neighboring countries. Djibouti and Kenya share a border with Somalia and have been hosts of U.S. military units and activities for many years.

Joint Task Force Quartz or JTF-Quartz is built around the headquarters of Special Operations Command – Africa. The mission is to oversee Operation Octave Quartz which will reposition U.S. forces from Somalia to other bases in East Africa. JTF Quartz is commanded by the Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAF) commander Maj. Gen. Dag Anderson.

JTF-Quartz components include:

  • Joint Force Special Operations Component Command
  • Joint Force Maritime Component Command
  • Joint Air Component Coordination Element

JTF-Quartz priorities are:

  • safely reposition U.S. forces
  • protect U.S. forces through coordinated and increased force protection measures
  • continue the mission to support regional partners and keep pressure on violent extremists

U.S. Army General Stephen Townsend, the commander of U.S. Africa Command, met with African partners to provide reassurance of a sustained commitment to East Africa security. He says that the U.S. will continue to support enduring partners while maintaining pressure on violent extremist organizations in the region.

“To be clear, the U.S. is not withdrawing or disengaging from East Africa. We remain committed to helping our African partners build a more secure future. We also remain capable of striking Al-Shabaab at any time and place of our choosing – they should not test us.”

General Stephen Townsend, commander of U.S. Africa Command, Dec 2020.

The U.S. and Somalia – Quick Timeline

Cold War. During the Cold War the Horn of Africa region was a focus of attention when it came to competition between the Soviet Union and the United States for influence and military presence. Somalia was a Soviet client state for many years (1970s).

Humanitarian Mission. In the early 1990s the United States committed US forces (including SOF) to Somalia in support of the United Nations humanitarian mission. This support ended when President Clinton ended the U.S. involvement in Somalia after the “Battle of Mogadishu” where 18 US. troops lost their lives during a raid on Somali militia leaders.

Failed State. Since the early 1990s Somalia has been a ‘failed state‘. It has suffered from famine, civil war, corruption, foreign intrigue and meddling, anarchy, and more. For many years it was the center of piracy operating from the coastal area of Somalia.

Fragile State. In 2012 the formation of a federal government provided a central authority that could provide services and security for the Somalia people. However, Somalia is still afflicted with division, political infighting, and corruption and remains a ‘fragile state’.

Al Shabaab. Somalia has been fighting an insurgency by an al Qaeda-affiliated group known as al Shabaab. The group controls much of Somalia – especially in the central and southern portions of the country. Its goal is to establish an Islamic state in Somalia.

US Support. The United States , along with other international partners, are working to stabilize the country and increase the effectiveness of the security forces. The US has been a key supporter of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), provides advice and training to the Somali security forces, and conducts counterterror (CT) missions within Somalia against al Shabaab and the local ISIS affiliate. U.S. Army Special Forces (and other organizations) have been instrumental in standing up the elite Danab Brigade.

Some Americans have lost their lives in the region including a CIA paramilitary officer (Nov 2020), a soldier assigned to 3rd Special Forces (June 2018), and contract pilots and an Army air traffic controller at Camp Simba (Jan 2020) just across the border in Kenya.

Security and Governance. The war in Somalia between government forces and al Shabaab has lasted almost 15 years. The prospects for peace is dismal. International donors are becoming reluctant to pay the expenses of the African Union forces that are deployed in Somalia to assist the government with security. Relations between Somalia and Kenya have frayed. Internal tensions exist between the different regions of Somalia are not good. The various clans and sub-clans in Somalia are constantly at odds with each other and may likely erupt into violence once again.

Great Power Competition. The Defense Department is now focused on strategic competition with China and Russia. To some, that means a shift to the Pacific and Eastern Europe with an emphasis on large conventional forces with the most modern ships, aircraft, and tanks. But to others, this means the competition is more likely to take place around the world in an environment where irregular warfare (some would say political warfare) is where the real competition is.

What Comes Next?

Future of Danab? The planned withdrawal of US forces will include the Special Forces contingent tasked with supporting the Danab special operations unit. Apparently a very small contingent of the US military will remain. The US has funded, trained, and partnered with this 1,000 man unit. It is commonly known that advisor work is best accomplished with person-to-person interaction. The premise that ‘advisor work’ can be accomplished remotely is largely dismissed by most members of the military that have been advisors. Certainly emails, Zoom sessions, video conferences, and phone calls have utility but nothing compares to an advisor on the ground sharing the battlespace.

It will be interesting (and perhaps disappointing) to observe the effectiveness of Danab over the next few years. There is the possibility that U.S. intelligence organizations will maintain a presence as well as private entities providing support, instruction, and advise through contract mechanisms with the State Department or Department of Defense.

Future Prospects? The Somali government has not met the milestones for the development of its security forces – goals set by the United States and the international community. In addition, it has not taken the steps for effective governance to alleviate the root causes of insurgent and tribal conflict. According to U.S. Africa Command al Shabaab remains adaptive, resilient, and capable of attacking US, Western, and partner interests in Somalia and East Africa.

The 19,000-man multinational African Union force will withdraw by the end of 2021. A withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Somalia accompanied by a reduction of ANISOM will likely increase the opportunity for al Shabaab to increase its influence and make further territorial gains. On January 20th a new president will occupy the White House. He may opt to reverse or adjust priorities in the region.

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References:

Task Force Quartz. “U.S. Africa Command stands up Joint Task Force – Quartz”, United States Africa Command, December 19, 2020.

IG Report on CT in Africa. The Defense Department posted the quarterly report for counterterrorism operations in East, North, and West Africa. This 98-page report provides information on the security situation in much of Africa to include Somalia. November 2020.

Recent Analysis and Commentary on Somalia.

“Why the Somali Danab SOF is Vital to the US and to Defeating Al-Shabaab”, by Steve Balestrieri, SOFREP, January 13, 2021.

“The Way Forward for the United States in Somalia”, by Stephen M. Schwartz, Foreign Policy Research Institute, January 12, 2021. Schwartz is a former U.S. Ambassador to Somalia (2016-2017).

In Somalia, mothers fear sons were sent to Ethiopia conflict

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MOGADISHU, Somalia (AP | Washington Post) — Pressure is growing on Somalia’s government amid allegations that Somali soldiers have been sent to fight in neighboring Ethiopia’s deadly Tigray conflict.

Mothers have held rare protests in Somalia’s capital, Mogadishu, and elsewhere, demanding to know the fate of their children who originally were sent to Eritrea for military training. They fear their children have been deployed to the Tigray region, where Ethiopian forces have been fighting Tigray ones since November in a conflict that threatens to destabilize the Horn of Africa.

“I heard that our children who were sent to Eritrea for military training have been taken and their responsibility was turned over to (Ethiopian Prime Minister) Abiy Ahmed to fight for him,” Fatuma Moallim Abdulle, the mother of 20-year-old soldier Ahmed Ibrahim Jumaleh, told The Associated Press.

“According to the information I gathered, our children were taken straight to Mekele city,” the capital of the Tigray region, she said. “You may understand how I feel, I am a mother who carried her child for nine months in my belly, that’s my blood and flesh.”

Ethiopia this week denied reports of the presence of Somali soldiers in Tigray, and it continued to deny the presence of Eritrean ones.

Abiy made peace with neighboring Eritrea in 2018, for which he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Now critics say Ethiopian and Eritrean forces have teamed up in the conflict against a common enemy in the now-fugitive Tigray leaders, who dominated Ethiopia’s government for nearly three decades before Abiy took office and embarked on around of regional peacemaking that included Somalia.

Somalia President Abdullahi Mohamed Abdullahi has been asked by the head of the country’s parliamentary committee on foreign affairs, Abdulqadir Ossoble Ali, to investigate allegations of participation in the Tigray conflict.

“We have the oversight right to check what our government is doing,” Ali wrote in the letter distributed to media outlets.

And the former deputy director for Somalia’s intelligence agency, Ismael Dahir Osman, has said “it is a question worth asking why these soldiers are not yet back home after more than a year when their training would have concluded long ago.”

Somalia’s information minister, Osman Abokor Dubbe, this week denied the “propaganda” that Somali soldiers who had been outside the country for training have been involved in the Tigray conflict.

“There are no Somali troops requested by the Ethiopian government to fight for them and fight in Tigray,” he said.

The issue has emerged at a sensitive time in Somalia. The country is set to hold national elections in the coming weeks, but two federal states have refused to participate and the opposition accuses the president of trying to push ahead with a partial vote.

“The parents of those children keep calling us and they don’t have any contact with their children, and some of them were told that their boys have died,” one opposition presidential candidate, Abdurahman Abdishakur Warsame, told the AP. “According to the information we’re receiving, those boys were taken to the war in northern Ethiopia. We’re calling for an independent national commission to investigate the matter, and if it is proven to be true, it will amount to treason of national scale.”

Ethiopia Denies Somalia Forces Involved in Fighting in Tigray

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Bloomberg | By Simon Marks and Mohammed Omar Ahmed

  • Somali lawmaker has asked president to investigate issue
  • Claim follows reports that Eritrea forces deployed in Ethiopia

Ethiopia’s government denied that Somali soldiers fought alongside federal troops in the ongoing conflict in its Tigray region.

The head of Somalia’s parliamentary committee on foreign affairs on Jan. 18 asked Somali President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed to investigate complaints by family members that their sons had gone missing while fighting in Ethiopia. Somalia’s former deputy spy chief said in an interview this week with local broadcaster GoobJoog TV that hundreds of Somali soldiers may have died in the clashes.

The use of Somali troops would provide more evidence that the war in Tigray, which the Ethiopian government has characterized as a domestic issue, has grown into a regional confrontation. Tigray’s leaders last year alleged that troops from neighboring Eritrea were also involved in the conflict, prompting the U.S. to call for their withdrawal.

“We have seen reports about Eritrean troops that have crossed into Ethiopia,” Ethiopian Foreign Ministry spokesman Dina Mufti said in a statement. “We are also witnessing similar reports about Somalian soldiers participating in the same campaign. Both of these claims are false and unfounded.”

Regional Ties

The involvement of Somali troops, if confirmed, could stem from a tripartite accord signed between the leaders of Ethiopia, Somalia and Eritrea in 2018 aimed at strengthening regional security and economic ties, said Omar Mahmood, a senior Somalia analyst for the International Crisis Group.

“One outgrowth of this has been the Eritrean training of Somali troops,” Mahmood said. “It is these troops that are now alleged to have been present during the fighting in Tigray, and suffered high casualties.”

Somali Information Minister Osman Dubbe told reporters in Mogadishu earlier that reports of its fighters going missing were “fabricated” for political reasons. Somalia is preparing to hold presidential elections next month.

The Ethiopian government and the dissident Tigray People’s Liberation Front have been at war since Nov. 4. Many of the TPLF’s senior leaders are still at large, though several key members of the party — including four of its nine-member executive committee — have been either captured or killed in the past two weeks.

The conflict has threatened to spill into neighboring Sudan. Earlier this month, it and Ethiopia traded accusations of breaching each other’s border, leading to deadly clashes around al-Fashqa, an area of fertile farming land that straddles the two nations.

U.K. Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab, speaking Thursday during a trip to Sudan for talks with the transitional government, called for the two countries to avoid escalating tensions. He’s due in Ethiopia later in the day.

— With assistance by Michael Gunn

Hundreds of Somali soldiers killed in Tigray war

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Suna Times – Former deputy head of Somalia’s Intelligence Agency Abdisalan Guled said hundreds of Somali recruits deployed by Eritrea to Tigray region were killed in the initial offensive in the northern Ethiopian region.

Former deputy head of the Somali Intelligence Agency (NISA) Abdisalan Guled, in an interview with Kulmiye radio based in Mogadishu, stated that he received information saying that 370 Somali recruits trained by Eritrea had been killed in the recent war in Ethiopia’s Tigray region.

“Following an investigation and contacts I made with different people, it was confirmed that 4000 Somali soldiers participated in Tigray war, who were fighting alongside Ethiopian and Eritrean forces against the TPLF,” said Abdisalan Guled.

“I was shocked when I was told that nearly 400 of those Somali recruits trained by Eritrea were killed and hundreds more were wounded [in Tigray war], and those wounded were returned to Eritrea.”

Abisalan Guled citing Ethiopian military sources told Kulmiye radio that “only a few men have survived from recruits numbered between 900 and 1100 who had been deployed on just one frontline, nearly all of them were killed,”

Speaking further, Mr Guled said he was told that the Somali recruits thrown into the battle were led by Eritrean military officers.

“When i asked the officers, they told me that Somalia had signed agreement with Ethiopia and Eritrea that required Farmajo [Somalia’s president] to prepare Somali troops who would take part in the stabilization of Tigray, which he accepted,”

The former deputy head of the Somali Intelligence Services said president Farmajo had requested his Eritrean counterpart not to return those soldiers to their country if he does not win reelection.

“I have heard two days ago that president Farmajo said ‘those soldiers should not be returned home, if I win reelection the matter will be discussed with me, if I don’t return, it will be dealt with those in power but during this sensitive election time I should not be given information on whether they are alive or dead’.”

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Alternative Sources:

Exclusive: Hundreds of Somali Troops Used as Cannon Fodder in Ethiopia’s Tigray War

‘Nearly 400’ Somalia army soldiers killed in Tigray war: Ex-deputy Spy Chief

U.S. military completes removal of troops from Somalia

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Global News – AP |  Cara Anna 

The U.S. military says its troop withdrawal from Somalia is complete, in one of the last actions of President Donald Trump’s presidency.

Some experts have warned that the withdrawal of an estimated 700 U.S. military personnel comes at the worst possible time for Somalia, as the al-Qaida-linked al-Shabab extremist group improves its bomb-making skills and continues to attack military and civilian targets even in the capital, Mogadishu. The withdrawal comes less than a month before Somalia is set to hold a national election.

The U.S. personnel trained and supported Somali forces, including its elite special forces, in counter-terror operations. They are being moved to other African countries such as neighbouring Kenya and Djibouti, home of the only permanent U.S. military base in Africa, but U.S. Africa Command spokesman Col. Chris Karns would not say how many are going where.

Asked whether the administration of President-elect Joe Biden will reverse the withdrawal, Karns replied in an email: “It would be inappropriate for us to speculate or engage in hypotheticals.”

Karns said the operation enters its “next phase of periodic engagement with Somali security forces.” He would not go into details.

The withdrawal was announced late last year, with a Jan. 15 deadline. The U.S. military, which has carried out a growing number of airstrikes against al-Shabab and a small band of fighters linked to the Islamic State group during Trump’s administration, says it will continue to pressure al-Shabab. The extremist group has an estimated 5,000 to 10,000 fighters.

Those Somali forces, even U.S. assessments have said, are not ready to take over responsibility for the country’s security, especially as a 19,000-strong multinational African Union force is also set to withdraw by the end of this year.

The U.S. Africa Command commander, Gen. Stephen Townsend, noted “no serious injuries or significant loss of equipment, despite significant efforts to target us by al-Shabab” during the “intense” operation to remove the U.S. personnel.

Townsend on Saturday visited Manda Bay in Kenya, where the U.S. Africa Command said “substantial enhancements have been made to physical security” after a deadly al-Shabab attack a year ago destroyed U.S. aircraft used against it in Somalia.

Will Somalia Be Collateral Damage of Ethiopia’s Tigray Conflict?

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Source: World Politics Review | Peter Kirechu

In November, as the Ethiopian government escalated its military campaign against the northern Tigray region, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed quietly ordered a drawdown of Ethiopian peacekeepers from neighboring Somalia. The scale of the move is still unconfirmed, but as many as 3,000 Ethiopian troops were reportedly redeployed to fight against the regional ruling party in Tigray, the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front, or TPLF. Around 200 to 300 ethnic Tigrayan soldiers in Somalia were also disarmed, and some may have even been purged from the ranks.

The Ethiopian troops’ departure injects additional uncertainty into Somalia’s already precarious security situation, as it struggles to hold federal elections that were scheduled for this month, while containing a long-running insurgency by the violent extremist group al-Shabab. The situation is further complicated by escalating tensions between the federal government, based in Mogadishu, and Somalia’s semiautonomous regional states—a standoff that bears similarities to Ethiopia’s conflict between the federal government and Tigray. Both Abiy and his Somali counterpart, Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed—who is more commonly known by his nickname, Farmajo—have sought to centralize executive authority within their respective federal governments despite sustained and increasingly violent opposition by powerful rivals.

Although Tigrayans make up only around 7 percent of Ethiopia’s population, the TPLF has played an outsized role in Ethiopian politics for decades, largely due to its leadership of the military campaign to overthrow the old communist dictatorship, the Derg, in the 1980s and early 1990s. In 2006, the TPLF-led government sent troops to Somalia to help secure the country’s nascent transition to a federal government after decades of civil war. Ethiopia later joined the African Union mission against al-Shabab as a troop-contributing country in 2014. These deployments helped foster ties between the TPLF and regional state leaders in Somalia, particularly in the south, where al-Shabab is most active.

When Abiy took office in 2018, however, he promptly began sidelining the TPLF, including by dissolving the old ethnic federalist coalition, known as Ethiopian People’s Democratic Front, and replacing it with a single, pan-Ethiopian political party that the TPLF refused to join. Abiy’s campaign to create a strong central government resonated with Farmajo, who has similarly sought to curb the authority of Somalia’s semiautonomous states. Abiy’s efforts to defang the TPLF and remove ethnic Tigrayans from the ranks of peacekeepers in Somalia can thus be seen as part of a burgeoning partnership between the Somali and Ethiopian leaders, united by their mutual desire to centralize federal power and weaken the political influence of domestic rivals in both countries.

Abiy and Farmajo share a mutual suspicion of the TPLF’s enduring influence within the Ethiopian military and security services. This deep-seated mistrust likely informed the disarming of Tigrayan peacekeepers in Somalia in November, which Abiy’s government defended as an effort to root out the “infiltration of TPLF elements in various entities.” Prior to the recent drawdown, Ethiopia had nearly 4,000 troops assigned to the United Nations Mission in Somalia, or AMISOM, targeting al-Shabab, and an additional 4,000 troops supporting a separate bilateral security agreement between the Somali and Ethiopian governments.

Farmajo is running for a second term in a presidential election that is scheduled for next month, but is likely to be delayed. If his reelection bid is successful—not a certain prospect—his political survival would be influenced by the outcome of the Ethiopian offensive in Tigray. Sporadic fighting is continuing despite Abiy’s declaration of victory in late November, after federal troops captured the regional capital, Mekelle. A decisive defeat of the heavily armed and well-trained TPLF troops would strengthen Abiy’s grip on the military, and may also weaken the TPLF’s historical ties to allies in Somalia, especially those in its southern and central federal member states.

An enduring guerrilla insurgency in Tigray will likely stress Ethiopia’s military resources and raise the prospect of additional drawdowns from the Somalia mission.

Here, Farmajo’s efforts to marginalize his political opponents have been bolstered by Ethiopia’s military presence. It is also in these Somali heartland regions, the epicenter of the al-Shabab insurgency, where Farmajo’s efforts to expand federal authority have faced the most resistance. In 2018, he intervened in a local election in Somalia’s South West state to prevent a former al-Shabab leader and defector, Mukhtar Robow, from competing in the state’s presidential election. Farmajo’s federal government reportedly orchestrated Robow’s arbitrary arrest and detention by Ethiopian security forces, leading to his withdrawal from the race, and the subsequent election of a Farmajo ally.

And last March, Farmajo unsuccessfully tried to intervene to prevent the reelection of Ahmed Madobe, a key political opponent who serves as president of Somalia’s southernmost regional state, Jubaland. Here, again, Farmajo leveraged Ethiopia’s military presence and political support in a bid to unseat an incumbent and expand the federal government’s writ of authority. This effort sparked violent clashes between federal troops and Jubaland’s forces, and drew in both Kenya and Ethiopia—two troop-contributing countries in the AMISOM mission that stand on opposite sides of the fractious dispute in Jubaland.

Kenya has long supported the Jubaland administration of Madobe, a former ally of al-Shabab who now opposes the group. Madobe led the 2012 military campaign that ousted al-Shabab from Kismayo, the regional capital, and has since enjoyed Kenya’s military and political backing. Madobe also has historical ties to the former TPLF-led government in Addis Ababa, dating back to Ethiopia’s military campaign against Islamist extremists in southern Somalia during the 2000s.

Today, al-Shabab has been beaten back from Jubaland’s cities, but it still maintains a presence in rural parts of the state. Kenya, which has suffered from deadly al-Shabab attacks in the past, views Jubaland—and therefore Madobe—as an essential security buffer on its northeastern border with Somalia. Abiy, on the other hand, is suspicious of Madobe’s historical links with the TPLF, as well as other Ethiopian groups that are opposed to Abiy’s agenda.

These tensions imperil AMISOM’s already beleaguered campaign against Al-Shabab, which took a hit from the sudden withdrawal of U.S. troops that President Donald Trump ordered last month. National interests have long driven countries’ decisions on participation in the AMISOM mission, but the rift between Kenya and Ethiopia—and each country’s divergent support for rival domestic factions inside Somalia—fundamentally weakens the AMISOM mission. These tensions may not spill into direct confrontation, but they create an additional wedge that the resurgent al-Shabab can exploit to advance its military and political objectives.

The conflict in Tigray only exacerbates these exigent rifts. An enduring guerrilla insurgency in Tigray will likely stress Ethiopia’s military resources and raise the prospect of additional drawdowns from the Somalia mission. A conclusive TPLF defeat, on the other hand, would embolden Abiy’s centralization campaign—an outcome that would resonate in Somalia and strengthen Farmajo’s like-minded agenda.

While prospects for a negotiated settlement in Tigray are still uncertain, it presents the best opportunity to mediate the Ethiopian federal government’s rivalries with the TPLF and other regional state rivals. Such an outcome could also provide a viable blueprint for the negotiation to ease federal-regional tensions in Somalia, where the effects of the Tigray conflict will likely reverberate for many months to come.

Peter Kirechu is the former director of the Conflict Finance and Irregular Threats Program at the Center for Advanced Defense Studies (C4ADS). He is a specialist on illicit transnational networks in the Middle East and Africa.

Trump’s Withdrawal From Somalia Is a Security Threat. Biden Should Reverse It

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Source: Foreign Policy | Abdi Yusuf

U.S. troops are scheduled to leave the country on Jan. 15, opening the door for al-Shabab terrorists to step up their attacks. The new administration should recommit to protecting the country.

Years of hard-fought gains to stabilize Somalia and defeat the al-Shabab terrorist group are now endangered by President Donald Trump’s threat to withdraw U.S. forces. Not unlike the fragile gains the United States achieved defeating the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, Somalia’s future rests on sound judgment and Washington’s continued engagement. Without persistent pressure from U.S. forces, al-Shabab’s leaders will be able to emerge from hiding, reorganize, and conduct attacks not just in Somalia but across the region, including against key U.S. allies such as Ethiopia and Kenya. However, there’s still time to change course. The current administration’s Jan. 15 deadline to withdraw U.S. troops from Somalia is rapidly approaching.

In all likelihood, the Trump administration will not reverse course on any major policy decision in the lead-up to President-elect Joe Biden’s inauguration on Jan. 20, and the withdrawal will continue as planned. If this is indeed the case, Biden must move swiftly after inauguration to redeploy troops back to their original bases in Somalia.

Biden must move swiftly after inauguration to redeploy troops back to their original bases in Somalia.

Not doing so risks Somalia falling back into the hands of al-Shabab and endangers the lives of not only Somalia’s citizens but those from Western countries residing in the region.

Since 1991, the ongoing civil war in Somalia has killed more than 300,000 people and injured countless others. As the country recovers, a continuing U.S. presence will be crucial to maintaining stability.

Currently, Somalia is showing signs of recovery and gradually becoming a popular destination for business, mainly due to its enhanced security situation in recent years. The persistent efforts of the international community, led by the United States, have made this possible. For decades, the U.S. government has provided training and equipment to Somalia’s armed forces. The U.S.-trained unit Danab conducted many successful operations against al-Shabab, which has killed more than 4,000 people, including Americans.

Two months ago, a CIA paramilitary officer was killed while fighting alongside Danab. In early 2020, al-Shabab launched an attack against U.S. forces in Kenya, killing three Americans and destroying a U.S. surveillance plane.

These sacrifices have not been in vain. Thanks to U.S. involvement in Somalia, a 9/11-style attack against the U.S. homeland was recently foiled—a reminder of the mutually beneficial relationship between the two countries.

This relationship is now at risk. On Dec. 4, Trump ordered the removal of U.S. soldiers from Somalia by early 2021.

The proposed withdrawal comes at an especially critical time and is a risk to the stability of the entire region. Indeed, Ethiopia is in the middle of a civil war and has withdrawn thousands of its troops who had been helping the Somali army fight against al-Shabab. Kenya-Somalia relations are at their lowest point in years, and domestic tensions are high over the upcoming elections and a string of attacks and assassinations. If the United States goes ahead with its withdrawal, it could have a huge impact on stability in Somalia, deal a major blow to morale among Somalia’s armed forces, and raise questions about U.S. credibility.

The proposed withdrawal comes at an especially critical time and is a risk to the stability of the entire region.

U.S. Defense Department officials claim the United States will “retain the capability to conduct targeted counterterrorism operations in Somalia, and collect early warnings and indicators.” However, in the eyes of many Somalis, Washington is abandoning the country. “Al-Shabab will frame this as a victory,” said Omar Mahmood, a senior Somalia analyst at the International Crisis Group. “They will use it as evidence of their ability to take on a world power like the United States and force them to leave Somalia.”

U.S. officials claim that moving troops to neighboring countries such as Kenya and Djibouti will have no major consequences. Somali officials disagree; former Danab chief Col. Ahmed Abdullahi Sheikh criticized the move, saying that the U.S. military “can launch and stage operations from countries like Djibouti and Kenya, but it’s not the same as being in the country. … You can’t train a force remotely.” U.S. support in planning and launching raids in Somalia is a critical component of the fight against al-Shabab—one that cannot easily be replaced.

It is true that a permanent U.S. military presence in Somalia is not a long-term solution. However, this transition should happen with the help of the international community. The Somali government has started to see success toward building an effective security force, thanks in large part to Washington’s unwavering support for Somalia and its people. With U.S. support, the Somali army was able to reduce al-Shabab’s military capabilities, diminish its territorial control, and bring peace back to large areas of Somalia. But the group remains a persistent threat to the region.

Now more than ever, Somalia needs the support of the United States. Leaving Somalia to fend for itself would risk erasing years of progress. Al-Shabab could reconquer territory, strengthen its military capabilities, and increase its stranglehold over the Somali people. “It’s my hope therefore that the U.S. government will reevaluate its decision and hopefully change,” one Danab officer—who prefers to remain anonymous—told me.

The Biden administration needs to increase U.S. efforts in Somalia in order to strengthen the government’s capabilities to contain the threat posed by al-Shabab. The first step Biden can take would be an immediate redeployment, followed by concrete assurances of future U.S. support. Otherwise, America’s hard-fought efforts to bring peace and stability to Somalia will have been in vain.

Abdi Yusuf is an international affairs researcher and a freelance writer based in Nairobi.

 

ISIS, Reborn: The Islamic State’s African Revival is a Lethal Blind Spot

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Source: National Interest | Jordan Cope

With four burgeoning safe havens, ISIS has revived in Sub-Sahara and could be deadlier than ever.

ISIS–

Before 9/11, many forget that Osama Bin Laden largely made a name for himself in Sub-Saharan Africa. In Sudan, he conceived his Islamic Army Shura, laying “the groundwork for a true global terrorist network” known as Al Qaeda.

There, Bin Laden largely began to call for jihad against Western forces and gained the prowess to export terrorism against American targets, hence Al Qaeda’s attacks on U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, just two years after his expulsion.

History might just be repeating itself as the West forgets its lessons and again neglects Sub-Sahara’s intensifying terrorism.

The consequences could be grave. Just cue 2019, when a Kenyan Al Qaeda affiliate plotted to hijack a plane and execute a 9/11-style attack.

While the attack was foiled, its scare overshadows a troubled decade, in which Sub-Saharan Africa witnessed an unprecedented resurgence in Islamist groups, with Islamic State (ISIS) affiliates displacing millions while seeking to establish bases in six African countries, and at times, hosting territory the size of Belgium.

Raising further alarm, experts have described 2020 as a breakout year for ISIS affiliates, an unsurprising reality given the attacks that recently claimed fifty in Mozambique and 100 in Niger.

While history echoes, ISIS’s pivot to Africa and new festering hotspots therein could prove more dangerous than those of its Middle Eastern past.

There, ISIS has strategically established territory in cross-border zones. This tactic has allowed it to conduct attacks and disappear across borders, rendering it effectively untouchable to all affected countries—which are amongst the world’s most impoverished and unprepared to dislodge ISIS. Some hotspots also approximate natural resource basins, whose wealth, if seized, could enormously enrich the ISIS network and its capabilities.

Given the implications of inaction—an emboldened ISIS network with multiple safe havens from which it can attack the West—ISIS’s African presence commands greater attention as a top security concern.

Four hot spots warrant attention. First is West Africa, which endures multiple internal insurgencies. Most concerning is that governing Boko Haram whose presence envelopes Nigeria, Chad, Niger, and Cameroon.

Since 2009, Boko Haram has killed 36,000 and displaced 2.5 million civilians while seeking to establish a caliphate and depose Nigeria’s government. While it coordinated with Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb post-2010, in 2016, the group splintered, with one faction continuing with allegiance to the Islamic State West Africa Province, and the other remaining steadfast to Abubakar Shekau’s faction.

While Boko Haram’s territory once matched Belgium in size, the group’s division cost territory. Nevertheless, its presence in Nigeria’s Borno state looms large, and its positioning couldn’t be more conveniently located at the crossroads of four countries.

Such positioning has allowed Boko Haram to disappear into Chad. Last year it conducted perhaps the deadliest terrorist attack in the country’s history—killing ninety-two. It also infiltrated Niger, where it claimed twenty-eight lives and razed 800 homes, and Cameroon, where in one attack it killed seventeen.

With Nigeria unable to contain Boko Haram, it remains questionable whether any of the aforementioned countries can do so, especially given their military and economic inferiority. Whereas Nigeria’s military ranks 42nd out of 138 surveyed countries, those of the others rank no higher than 87th.

They also lack financial resources, ranking amongst the world’s poorest. Out of 190 surveyed geographic entities, Nigeria and Cameroon ranked 141st and 145th, while Chad and Niger ranked below 174th in GDP per capita.

Not to mention, Chad, the next best militarily after Nigeria, overcame a recession and had to rely on France to subvert a coup—all just in the last four years. Chad cannot afford this vulnerability as ISIS festers and its southern oil fields beckon, posing a potential lifeline and revenue source for ISIS if captured.

West Africa’s other great insurgency engrosses Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. There, the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara has conquered “ungoverned space” where the three “failing” states meet.

With Mali and Burkina Faso ranking no higher than 165th in terms of GDP per capita and 96th in military might, the two likely will not fare better in preempting another impending ISIS safe-haven.

ISIS’s next major hot spot situates East Africa, particularly Mozambique’s northern border with Tanzania, where ISIS affiliates have killed 2,000 and displaced 430,000 civilians since 2017.

In Mozambique, the Islamic State in the Central African Province has captured “four tourist islands,” and Mocimboa da Praia, a port in the state of Cabo Delgado, which straddles Tanzania and boasts tremendous resource wealth—natural gas and ruby reserves approximating $50 billion in value—that if seized could enrich ISIS’s network.

ISIS has also used this position to infiltrate Tanzania, hence its October invasion, where 300 fighters killed twenty before retreating to Mozambique.

Mozambique and Tanzania’s economies and militaries rank inferior to those of Nigeria’s, suggesting that the two might struggle to suppress this third prospective safe-haven.

Quickly deserving mention is the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)—a group with suspected ISIS-links—and its stronghold over the mountains straddling the DRC and Uganda, from Rwenzori to Ituri, where “[m]uch of the [DRC’s] gold is mined.”

While the Salafist organization has existed since 1995, it has become rather deadly recently, killing 800 Congolese civilians in 2020. While the DRC’s military ranks 71st, its economy ranks amongst the poorest, 185th.

If left unchecked, the ADF could become another asset in ISIS’s portfolio, granting ISIS pivotal access to another cross-border zone, to invaluable gold mines, and to a foothold in the DRC—the world’s most endowed per resource wealth.

With four burgeoning safe havens, ISIS has revived in Sub-Sahara and could be deadlier than ever. Embedding at the cross borders of failing countries, ISIS has achieved near untouchability. With no Sub-Saharan government able to contain its expansion in a resource-rich area, the West, whatever its response, must urgently react before ISIS can multiply its capabilities and international reach to an unparalleled degree. Let us not forget the lessons of Sudan.

 

Jordan Cope is a fellow for Middle East Forum’s Islamist Watch project. He is also regarded as an expert in the Middle East. Follow him on Twitter.

Image: Nigerian soldiers hold up a Boko Haram flag that they had seized in the recently retaken town of Damasak, Nigeria, March 18, 2015. Reuters/Emmanuel Braun.

Somalia: America’s Next “Afghanistan?”

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Source: 1945.com | Edward Chang

On March 3, 1994, the United States military accomplished what has become unthinkable today – complete a total withdrawal from an ongoing conflict.

After the political fiasco wrought by the Battle of Mogadishu on October 3 the year prior – immortalized in the book and motion picture adaptation Black Hawk Down – President Bill Clinton ordered an end to the American military intervention in Somalia, which began late in the George H.W. Bush administration as a part of an international humanitarian effort. Somalia had been wracked by civil war since the fall of the incumbent Communist military dictatorship in 1991, leading to a state of near-anarchy and brutal civil war to fill the power vacuum.

27 years later, it is deja vu all over again as U.S. troops once again find themselves leaving Somalia at the orders of outgoing President Donald Trump. Only this time, it is not a withdrawal, but a relocation. Most of the approximately 700 troops in Somalia are being re-deployed to friendlier countries in the region, including Africa Command’s in-theater forward headquarters, Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti. Meanwhile, a small number of troops will remain in Somalia to continue a mission begun in the mid-2000s, during one of the most intense cycles of the War on Terror.

In other words, America’s military posture in the Horn of Africa remains largely unchanged.

Though the public is less aware of U.S. military involvement in Somalia versus Afghanistan and Iraq, it is no less emblematic of America’s difficulty in ending the “endless wars.” The humanitarian intervention, which began in December 1992, was ultimately the first foray into a country the U.S. still cannot quit. Less than 10 years after the ’94 withdrawal, Somalia was again being eyed as a target in the War on Terror. Through three administrations, covert military actions were taken through the intelligence community, special operations forces, and mostly unmanned airstrikes, an effort that dramatically escalated during the Trump administration.

The ultimate benefit of these operations remains in doubt. In December, the Justice Department announced it had charged Cholo Abdi Abdullah, an operative for Somalia-based jihadist militant group al-Shabaab, an al-Qaeda affiliate. Abdullah had been arrested in 2019 in the Philippines for plotting a 9/11-style terror attack on the U.S., using a hijacking and a commercial airliner as a missile. Some commentators cited the plot to criticize Pres. Trump’s decision to withdraw from Somalia.

However, the plot not only ensued despite the military offensive against al-Shabaab in Somalia, but much of it was also orchestrated far from the group’s “safe haven.” It is not clear how authorities were alerted to and thwarted the plot, but the fact it went as far as it did despite such intense counter-terrorism efforts is troubling. Anecdotal evidence from one journalist suggests the offensive approach to terror in Somalia is actually having a counter-intuitive effect, making al-Shabaab more capable of implementing terrorism overseas.

There is plenty of room for debate on these questions. However, there exists something of a consensus that al-Shabaab constitutes the next big terror threat to the U.S. This consensus first publicly emerged during the Obama administration, when the group carried out the Westgate mall attack in Nairobi, Kenya on September 21, 2013. During the next few years, concerns increased that al-Shabaab could strike the American homeland, possibly through sympathizers in places like Minnesota, where a large Somali-American community exists. In early 2015, the Mall of America was specifically cited as a target of attack by the group, and numerous Americans have been arrested and charged with aiding al-Shabaab.

More recently, Michael Rubin of the American Enterprise Institute compared threats against the U.S. made by Hassan Dahir Aweys, an Islamist leader associated with al-Shabaab, to statements made by Osama bin Laden in the 1990s, culminating in the devastation of 9/11. The group has racked up quite the death toll, attempting an airline bombing in 2016, executing a dual truck bombing in October 2017 that killed over 500, a January 2020 attack that killed three Americans and destroyed multiple aircraft and ground vehicles, and numerous other deadly incidents, including one already in 2021.

What this all points to is a jihadist group that is becoming increasingly dangerous and as active as al-Qaeda, Hamas, and ISIS. Like the former, but not the latter two, al-Shabaab clearly has global designs and appears to possess the fundamental capacity necessary to attempt such attacks, along with potential insiders in the U.S.

Judging the likelihood of a devastating terrorist attack by al-Shabaab on U.S. soil is something of a fool’s errand since nobody wants an attack to happen and such a likelihood can only be assessed in the event an actual plot is put into play. What has become clear is that if a major terror attack were to occur on U.S. soil that can be traced back to al-Shabaab, then this would make Somalia a primary focus of American foreign policy once more. The withdrawal of troops from the country would appear, in retrospect, to have been a serious mistake and military intervention in the country would again escalate.

In fact, a war in Somalia is virtually assured in response to a successful al-Shabaab operation. Unlike Afghanistan 2001, U.S. forces are already in-theater and would have the support of a friendly regime in Mogadishu. This makes military retaliation much easier to facilitate. A massive ground intervention, like the one seen in Afghanistan and Iraq, or even Somalia back in the days of George H.W. Bush, is unlikely and unnecessary, given the existing footprint, the non-necessity of regime change, and the lack of a conventional military threat. This war will instead involve larger numbers of intelligence operatives and special operations forces on the ground, accompanied by precision airstrikes, a sophisticated approach that has become the choice of policymakers seeking to fight terror at as low a cost as possible with as great an impact as possible.

But this also means the U.S. will find itself fighting in Somalia for a long time. The bitter experience of the last 20 years has proven that insurgency, militancy, and terrorism are extremely difficult, if not impossible, to eradicate and the cost of waging endless war adds up over time. It seems a small price to pay for safety, but as memory of the last terror attack recedes amongst the public, questions about the mission will surely rise. Meanwhile, that same memory of the last attack will make policymakers reticent about withdrawing troops from Somalia, just as they are unwilling to withdraw troops from Afghanistan and Iraq today, even with public sentiment firmly in the “withdrawal” camp.

For now, the U.S. should proceed with its Somalia exit. Meanwhile, it ought to be hoped the fight will continue successfully in the cloak-and-dagger world to avoid terrorists from drawing America back into another endless war.

Edward Chang is a defense, military, and foreign policy writer. His writing has most prominently appeared in The American Conservative, The Federalist, The National Interest, and Spectator USA. Follow him on Twitter at @Edward_Chang_8.