Tag Archive for: Military

The Future of Warfare in 2030

Source: RAND research

Overview

Who will the United States fight against and who will fight with it? Where will these future conflicts be fought? What will future conflicts look like? How will they be fought? And why will the United States go to war? This report is the overview in a series that draws on a wide variety of data sets, secondary sources, and an extensive set of interviews in eight countries around the globe to answer these questions. The authors conclude that the United States will confront a series of deepening strategic dilemmas in 2030. U.S. adversaries—China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and terrorist groups—will likely remain constant, but U.S. allies are liable to change, and the location of where the United States is most likely to fight wars may not match the locations where conflicts could be most dangerous to U.S. interests. The joint force will likely face at least four types of conflict, each requiring a somewhat different suite of capabilities, but the U.S. ability to resource such a diverse force will likely decline. Above all, barring any radical attempt to alter the trajectory, the United States in 2030 could progressively lose the initiative to dictate strategic outcomes and to shape when and why the wars of the future occur. To meet future demands, the joint force and the U.S. Air Force should invest in more precision, information, and automation; build additional capacity; maintain a robust forward posture; and reinforce agility at all levels of warfare.

Key Findings

The list of U.S. adversaries is likely to remain fixed, but the list of U.S. allies is likely to change

  • China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and terrorist groups will remain top U.S. adversaries.
  • China’s growing influence likely will alter the list of U.S. allies in Asia as countries hedge against Chinese power.
  • In Europe, traditional U.S. allies’ will and capacity to exert force, particularly overseas, will likely decline.

Location of U.S. conflicts can be parsed by likelihood or by risk

  • Three major regions—the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East—are all likely areas for the next war; the Middle East appears most likely, although the Indo-Pacific might pose the greatest danger.

Future conflicts will probably stem from four basic archetypes, namely

  • Counterterrorism,
  • Gray-zone conflicts,
  • Asymmetric fights, and
  • High-end fights

Four overarching trends could shape when and why the United States might go to war

  • U.S. ability to use sanctions in lieu of violence will decline as U.S. and allied economic power declines in relative terms.
  • The rise of strongmen across Asia, Europe, and the Middle East could decrease checks and balances and create incentives for future conflict.
  • As American adversaries become more assertive and push up against U.S. allies’ redlines, the United States could be faced with the difficult choice of entering into a war it does not want or abandoning an ally.
  • External forces could generate conflict, such as accidents and inadvertent escalation, a crisis resulting from climate change, or conflict over scarce resources.

Recommendations

  • Future conflicts will likely place a premium on being able to operate at range. Staying outside adversaries’ missile ranges and basing from afar both could be important factors, and the U.S. military should invest in these capabilities.
  • The United States should invest in increasing military precision to avoid the legal and political backlash that comes with civilian casualties.
  • All branches of the military will need to enhance their information warfare capabilities, especially for gray-zone operations.
  • Because of the trend toward greater use of artificial intelligence, the military will need to invest in automation.

Are Emirati Armed Drones Supporting Ethiopia from an Eritrean Air Base?

Source: Billing Cat | November 19, 2020

Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed declares that the war in the Tigray Region has entered its “final phase”.

The conflict broke out on November 4 when the country’s central government accused the region’s local authorities of holding “illegal” elections and seizing a military base. Thousands of civilians have fled to neigbouring Sudan as the federal army advances towards the regional capital of Mekelle.

Tigray politicians have claimed that they are under attack “on several fronts” — including neighbouring Eritrea, with which the region shares a long border. As Regional President Debretsion Gebremichael recently told Reuters, “our country is attacking us with a foreign country, Eritrea. Treason!”

Getachew Reda, a senior advisor to Gebremichael, made more detailed claims about the use of drones:

The Ethiopian Prime Minister has only stated that the Air Force conducted ‘targeted strikes’  against the militants without specifying the weapons used.

Could Emirati drones or other drones have been used in these airstrikes?

So far, there’s no evidence for that particular claim.

Satellite imagery obtained by Bellingcat suggests that the United Arab Emirates air base in Assab, Eritrea is indeed home to drones consistent with China’s Wing Loong II model of armed uncrewed aerial vehicles.

The imagery, provided by Planet Labs, shows a drone with a wingspan of just over 20 metres, matching the features of the drone model produced by China’s Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group.

The UAE acquired Wing Loong II drones in 2017. They have also used the drones to conduct operations in Yemen in the war against various militant groups, including the Houthis.

Satellite imagery from Planet Labs. Used with permission

The drones seen in these images are consistent with those operated by the UAE. Furthermore, the recently built drone hangars at the base suggest a larger presence of drones in the area, though their active deployment over Ethiopia is not yet confirmed. However, the imagery provides a strong indication of the possibility for their use. However, the Ethiopian Air Force also operates Russian-made MiG-23 and Sukhoi-27 jet fighters and attack helicopters that could also have been used in the strikes.

Footage uploaded via Facebook and shared Deutsche Welle’s Amharic-language service indicated that jet fighters have been active around Mekelle, where they are claimed to be involved in airstrikes:

The birth of a drone base

Drones aren’t new to this region. In 2015, what is likely a Chinese-produced Wing Loong I drone was spotted at the Assab airbase. This model is the predecessor of the Wing Loong II, which only entered service after 2018.

In 2016 an analysis by Stratfor detailed the construction of the base and its growth for both aerial and naval capabilities, providing the UAE with operational capability for its campaign in Yemen. Once again, satellite imagery shows a Wing Loong I drone standing outside two drone shelters at the north side of the tarmac.

A Sentinel-2 timelapse of the base comparing January 2017 with November 2020 reveals the large scale expansion of the base’s infrastructure.

Timelapse image: Sentinel Hub / Creative Commons

Two drone hangars were constructed sometime in April 2018, but in November 2019, a third hangar appeared on Sentinel-2 imagery.

The construction and lease of the base to the UAE by Eritrea has been condemned by the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea as a violation of the UN arms embargo on the two Horn of Africa states.

The current Planet Labs imagery also shows three crates next to the hangars at Assab Airbase, which could be evidence of shipping. Similar crates are used for the US-produced MQ-9 Reaper drones, as shown in an image released by the British Ministry of Defence.

According to the Twitter OSINT investigator Obretix, similar containers have also been noticed at other bases with confirmed Wing Loong II drones, such as in Egypt:

Furthermore, similar crates are visible on satellite imagery from this airbase in Iraq, which hosts US MQ-1 Grey Eagle and MQ-9  Reaper drones:

The UAE have also operated Wing Loong II drones over Libya in support of the opposition Libyan National Army (LNA) lead by the warlord Khalifa Haftar. According to the UN, at least 800 drone strikes in support of the LNA had taken place by November 2019, some of which had claimed civilian casualties. Satellite imagery confirms their presence on bases both in Libya as well as in Egypt.

The UAE also operates the US-produced General Atomic Predator XP unarmed drones. Moreover, the outgoing Trump administration has just approved the sales of MQ-9 Reaper drones to the UAE, provoking protest from human rights groups due to the Emirates’ poor human rights record and the relentless airstrikes by a Saudi and UAE led coalition in Yemen, which has caused high numbers of civilian casualties.

There are also media reports that Ethiopia has procured Chinese CH-4 armed drones, yet so far no open-source confirmation has been found which might indicate the presence of drones at known bases of the Ethiopian airforce. However, other clues could take the form of information from communications stations or satellite imagery showing the aforementioned shipping containers, as explained here by the Bard Center for the Study of the Drone.

Possible, but improbable

In sum, the claims made by the Tigray forces are not impossible, but so far they seem improbable.

Satellite imagery confirms the presence of Chinese-produced drones at the UAE’s military base in Assab, but that is all it confirms. There is currently no further evidence that these same drones have been involved in operations in support of the Ethiopian airforce, though there have been confirmed sightings of Ethiopian jet fighters in the conflict zone.

With thanks to Adam Rawnsley @arawnsley and Frank Slijper @FrankSlijper for feedback

Russia Planning Major Naval Base in Sudan

Source: Military Watch Magazine

New Facility to Service Nuclear Assets

The Russian Defence Ministry is planning to build a naval base on Sudan’s east coast, which would provide the Navy with its second overseas facility after the one on Syria’s  Tartus following the closure of bases in Cuba and Vietnam. The facility was referred to as a “logistical support centre” where “repairs and resupply operations and rest for crew members” can take place, with a draft agreement already having been signed. The facility would have a capacity for 300 military and civilian personnel and four ships, and would be able to accommodate nuclear vessels, making it significantly larger than the Syrian facility at least before its wartime expansion after 2016. It remains uncertain what kind of warships the facility is deigned to accommodate, and whether heavier warships such as battlecruisers will also be accommodated. The base will be located on the northern outskirts of Port Sudan, and Russia will also gain the right to transport “weapons, ammunition and equipment” for the base through Sudanese ports and airports.

Russian Navy Slava Class Missile Cruiser | Military Watch Magazine

 

Sudan’s military establishment has maintained close defence ties with Russia, despite a Western-backed coup in the country in April 2019 ousting the longtime President Omar Al Bashir who was closely aligned with Moscow. Under Al Bashir’s rule Sudan and Russia were discussing the possibility of a naval base from at least late 2017, alongside the potential sale of advanced Su-30SM and Su-35 fighters to the Sudanese Air Force. Al Bashir had personally appealed to Russian President Vladimir Putin in a visit to Moscow in 2017 to help support Sudan against ongoing Western efforts to partition the country through subversion. Sudan has faced serious political and economic crises since the coup, with the country’s political future highly uncertain. The draft agreement for the naval facility stipulates that its establishment “meets the goals of maintaining peace and stability in the region, is defensive and is not aimed against other countries,” with Sudanese forces maintaining the right to use the mooring area. The deal will stand for 25 years after its signing, and could represent a game changer for the balance of power in the Red Sea as Russia establishes a sizeable military presence in the area. Such a development could also give more clout to Sudan’s military establishment, which is thought to be seeking to contain the empowerment of pro-Western elements in the country