Tag Archive for: Horn of Africa

Statement on Ethiopia by the Senior Study Group on Peace and Security in the Red Sea Arena

Source: USIP

As members of the bipartisan senior study group on peace and security in the Red Sea arena, we are watching with grave concern the situation in Ethiopia. While many of the facts remain unclear, the risks of escalation are certain: Intrastate or interstate conflict would be catastrophic for Ethiopia’s people and for the region and would pose a direct threat to international peace and security. The acceleration of polarization amid violent conflict would also mark the death knell for the country’s nascent reform effort that began two years ago and the promise of a democratic transition that it heralded.

As we cautioned in the study group’s Final Report and Recommendations released on October 29, the fragmentation of Ethiopia would be the largest state collapse in modern history. Ethiopia is five times the size of pre-war Syria by population, and its breakdown would lead to mass interethnic and interreligious conflict; a dangerous vulnerability to exploitation by extremists; an acceleration of illicit trafficking, including of arms; and a humanitarian and security crisis at the crossroads of Africa and the Middle East on a scale that would overshadow any existing conflict in the region, including Yemen. As Ethiopia is currently the leading Troop Contributing Country to the United Nations and the African Union peacekeeping missions in Sudan, South Sudan and Somalia, its collapse would also significantly impact the efforts by both to mitigate and resolve others conflicts in the Horn of Africa.

However severe the events of the last 48 hours and the preceding violence in multiple parts of the country may be, a wider war is not inevitable, nor is it too late to prevent one if Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy and Ethiopia’s federal states exercise responsible leadership. To do so, they must take immediate, visible steps to defuse the crisis and signal to the Ethiopian public a commitment to de-escalation. These steps should include a cessation of military operations and the launch of an inclusive political dialogue that is credible to the Ethiopian people and lays the groundwork for free and fair elections. Neither will be possible while many of the country’s most prominent political leaders remain in prison. In addition, the closing of political space and internet and communication blackouts must be reversed while intercommunal violence and the rise of incitement and hate speech are addressed.

At this crucial inflection point, the United States, its allies and partners in Europe and in the region, the members of the U.N. Security Council and the relevant multilateral organizations, including the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, must speak with one voice in promoting de-escalation on this basis. The United States should support initiatives by Ethiopian religious and civil society leaders to reach a peaceful resolution of the crisis. To reinforce these efforts, the United States, including Congress, should make clear that any change by force or fiat either to Ethiopia’s constitutional order or to its internal or external borders will not be recognized, in line with the African Union’s standards. The United States must also signal that it will hold accountable those responsible for escalation, including any foreign states that exacerbate tensions or provide material support to any of the parties to the conflict. And Ethiopian leaders should refrain from attempting to draw their neighbors into their domestic dispute. Finally, as recommended at length in our recent report, U.S. development and humanitarian assistance should be anchored in a commitment to promoting inclusive, legitimate governance.

Ambassador Johnnie Carson
Senior Advisor to the President, United States Institute of Peace
Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs

Ambassador Wendy Chamberlin
President Emeritus, Middle East Institute
Former Deputy U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
Former USAID Assistant Administrator for Asia-Near East

Ambassador Chester Crocker
James R. Schlesinger Professor of Strategic Studies, Georgetown University
Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs

Ambassador Eric Edelman
Roger Hertog Distinguished Practitioner-in-Residence, School for Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University
Former U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy
Former U.S. Ambassador to Turkey

Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman
Visiting Fellow, Brookings Institution
Senior Fellow, U.N. Foundation
Former U.N. Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs
Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs

Ambassador Michelle Gavin
Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations
Former Senior Director for Africa, U.S. National Security Council
Former U.S. Ambassador to Botswana

Nancy Lindborg
President and CEO, David and Lucile Packard Foundation
Former President, United States Institute of Peace
Former USAID Assistant Administrator for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance

Andrew Natsios
Executive Professor, Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University Former Administrator of USAID
Former Presidential Special Envoy for Sudan

General Joseph L. Votel
President and CEO, Business Executives for National Security
Former Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command and U.S. Central Comman

“America First” and Implications for US Strategy in the Horn of Africa

Source: Small Wars | Richard McManamon

Abstract

Since taking office, President Trump has challenged the global order with his “America First” approach. He has questioned the role of the US and its Allies within NATO, exited the Paris Climate Accord, and entered into a trade battle with China. At the same time, the Trump administration has positioned both Russia and China as strategic rivals to the US and the new rise to great power competition. In the last decade, the US has witnessed aggressive actions by both countries in an effort to carve out new spheres of influence.

As the administration takes action to increase America’s competitive edge, President Trump’s foreign policies, specifically to the Horn of Africa, have been inconsistent resulting in a less strategic approach. It would appear as the US switches focus to great power competition, support to Africa decreases. This is not only a lost opportunity for the US to challenge China and Russia indirectly, but more importantly, allows these countries to exploit a gap and gain further influence throughout the region. The Horn of Africa continues to be a nexus for geopolitics and it’s critical that an America First approach does not undermine the US ability to maintain influence in the region.

The unprecedented election of Donald Trump in 2016 precipitated some substantial shifts in global order, especially regarding China and Russia. Russia demonstrated its ability to challenge existing borders and sovereignty by interventions in Ukraine and Georgia, while China has pushed its Belt and Road Initiative further across the globe. As both Russia and China continue such efforts to extend their global presence, it is perceived by some observers that these countries are creating new spheres of influence across the globe.

In thinking of spheres of influence, the Horn of Africa remains a strategic nexus for the US, Europe, and the Middle East due to its location and connection to trade. Following the region’s independence after World War II, many African states such as Somalia have struggled to build institutions that provide consistent essential services and overall security for their population.[1] The vulnerabilities facing the Horn are extensive and complicated, requiring a more comprehensive US strategy to better address the various threats. Compounding existing vulnerabilities, these threats are typically not confined to one state but affect the entire region. The systemic nature of these vulnerabilities is evidenced by repeated instances where one country’s crisis spreads across borders and into neighboring states.

Since 2017 in terms of foreign and security policy, the Trump administration placed a significant focus on the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and more recently, the Afghanistan peace talks while Africa has been under prioritized. Minimizing focus on Africa, especially the Horn of Africa, has the potential to present significant challenges for the US into the future. In this article, I argue that one of the prominent reasons for this low prioritization is President Trump’s “America First” approach to foreign policy. Additionally, the high turnover rate within the Trump administration among senior leaders has remained high and has likely caused significant disruptions in a comprehensive foreign strategy, specifically regarding Africa.

If the United States is to see another four years of the Trump administration, foreign policy changes must be enacted to secure US interests while strengthening the country’s allies, including in the region of the Horn of Africa. Additionally, a rise of great power competition will likely mean the Trump administration will continue to exercise the military as a principal tool in foreign policy. The implications of such action have the potential to undermine global order and push the US toward new conflicts.[2] Moreover, the significant ramifications for continuously expanding the military and using it as a primary tool for diplomacy are that the US ends up with a military-focused strategy that could result in another arms race with Russia. A comprehensive strategy that balances all the instruments of national power is essential to meet the challenges and objectives for the US and would better mitigate the consequences from a military-heavy foreign policy that focuses on the short term at the expense of long-term strategic gains. Trump’s emphasis on the military as the primary tool of foreign policy comes with inherent risks that may conflict with his intentions of reducing US forces abroad. These risks include potentially escalating already volatile conditions with countries such as North Korea and Iran.

America First

The Trump administration has positioned China and Russia as rivals that are challenging the US through political, military, and economic means.[3] In doing so, Trump has taken action to combat these perceived threats through executive orders, sanctions, and tariffs to increase America’s competitive edge. Additionally, the Trump administration renegotiated the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 2020, placed tariffs against China, exited the Paris Climate Accord in 2019, and left the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018.

Thus far, the Trump administration has taken broad action concerning long-standing agreements to make the US more competitive both domestically and internationally. Furthermore, Trump has publicly questioned the utility for the US regarding multilateralism.[4] Since taking office, President Trump has targeted NATO and challenged the organization’s policies and procedures. During his visit to Brussels in 2018, he stated that he believed European countries were taking advantage of US military resources and not paying their fair share.[5] This aggressive approach toward allies can draw significant media attention and other consequences, and I argue it damages the US’s reputation and its international relations in the long run. Additionally, Trump’s speeches at the UN projected an approach favoring nationalism over globalism,[6] which further underlines his America First platform for the United States going into the future. The implications of this approach highlight to the world that Trump is focusing his foreign policy in a way that quite literally puts the US “first”. The ramifications of a paradigm shift towards “America alone” and increasing isolationism are extremely dangerous, as globalization has connected countries and regions of the world like never before. Economies, markets, and industries are all interconnected in some form, and for a major actor such as the US to pursue a drastic foreign policy that excludes US partners may be detrimental to the country in the long-term.

In the short-term, the US has seen the effects of the trade war with China, which has caused significant swings in the stock markets.[7] Furthermore, the recent pandemic has raised questions on the source for many medications that are used by millions of Americans. An argument could be made for select drugs to be made in the US for national security reasons, but on a broader scale the issue of cost comes into play when contemplating drugs made only in the US. It is no secret that the US has one of the highest prices for prescription drugs, and it is possible that abandoning established supply chains with foreign countries could result in even higher costs for the average American.[8] Lastly, while President Trump has questioned the value of multilateralism, US strategy toward Africa has been inconsistent at times, placing the US at a disadvantage during the time of great power competition.

African Strategy

United States foreign security policy in Africa is at the time of writing guided by President Trump’s National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2017. The NSS references growing economies on the continent and vast partnership opportunities for the US and Africa as their markets and economies grow. The strategy, however, also mentions concerns about corruption and weak governance. Furthermore, the NSS explicitly highlights China’s growing presence within Africa and how select Chinese practices weaken the continent’s ability to build sustainable development.[9] Likewise, the NSS states, “China and Russia target their investments in the developing world to expand influence and gain competitive advantages against the United States.”[10]

Since the publication of the NSS in 2017, US foreign policy towards Africa has fallen short for multiple reasons. Firstly, the Trump administration has experienced significant turnover in crucial personnel over the past three years. Peter Schraeder highlights that in the first twenty months of the new administration, the President had three different National Security Advisors, and Robert O’Brien was appointed as the fourth advisor in September of 2019.[11] Moreover, this high turnover rate puts the US at a significant disadvantage by owing to a lack of continuity and to the varying goals of each advisor. Brookings reports that among members of Trump’s executive office, he has experienced an 86 percent turnover rate, and 38 percent of those positions have experienced two or more replacements.[12] Similarly, Schraeder describes how the sudden removal of Secretary of State Rex Tillerson sent a negative message to Africa, as the President replaced him immediately following a trip to numerous African states.[13] The dismissal of Tillerson signaled to African countries that the validity of their conversations with the Secretary of State was in question and future cooperation with the US remained uncertain. Secondly, the Trump administration has looked to shift priorities away from Africa as the administration focuses on increased power competition with China and Russia. Mary Beth Long, a former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, stated: “We’re not even clear from an intelligence standpoint on what the underpinnings of a strategy would attempt to address and in part that’s because we have inadequate resources dedicated to the African continent.”[14]

Thirdly, in early 2020, the Pentagon ordered a review of forces within Africa by Defense Secretary Esper to see if troops can be realigned to other mission priorities.[15] This review comes at a critical juncture as great power competition with Russia and China has increased while the security environment in the Horn of Africa has remained fragile. It’s important to the US that during the review, the Pentagon considers that the US can effectively challenge Russia and China within the Horn as part of their broader great power competition. Furthermore, reducing US assets in the region can allow China to exploit the minimal US presence and also presents opportunities for further instability across the region. Highlighting this tenuous environment, the US experienced its first attack by Al-Shabaab, which killed three Americans at an airfield in Manda Bay, Kenya, on January 5, 2020.[16] This attack stresses the fragile environment throughout the Horn and the need for targeted US support to safeguard US interests throughout the region.

In addition to the impeachment trial of President Trump and the upcoming 2020 elections, the White House has been dealing with an array of global issues including, but not limited, a trade war with China, negotiations with the Taliban in Afghanistan, and managing the global coronavirus pandemic. While these global issues are all a significant demand on the US resources, it would appear that Africa is falling lower on the US priority list. This should be a concern as it provides China and Russia the opportunity to expand and increase their overall influence in the region at the cost of the US. Moreover, the region’s populace continues to suffer from instability, violence from groups such as Al-Shabaab, and weak institutions that lack the ability to provide basic services.

US Future in Africa

US troop levels do not on their own determine presence and influence in Africa, and over the years the US has also become a meaningful trading partner to the continent, showing the role of economic engagement. However, today China has surpassed the US as Africa’s largest trading partner.[17] While President Trump has talked of increasing cooperation with Africa, his current foreign policy severely hinders its ability to do so. Trump’s administration launched a US initiative called “Prosper Africa” with the intent of growing partnerships between the US and Africa and empowering US private sector involvement in Africa.[18] Long-term collaboration and globalization have intertwined economies, and the US shares the same concerns many African states do regarding insecurity throughout the region. However, without a clear, consistent foreign policy and African strategy, the effectiveness of any initiative will be mired. As the US continues its role in the region, it must develop an effective approach that balances national competitiveness, securing national interests, and strengthening relations with African leaders across the region.

One example of an US initiative program is the International Development Finance Corporation (DFC). In 2019 the US government created the DFC, which forms a consolidated effort with the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and the US Agency for International Development (USAID). The DFC attempts to further US foreign policy and private sector competitiveness through multiple mediums, including equity financing, debt financing, political risk insurance, and technical development.[19] While the DFC operates worldwide, the level of involvement within the Horn of Africa is relatively limited compared to many other regions of the world except for Kenya. Somalia and Ethiopia make up only three projects consisting of nearly US $13 million, whereas Colombia has ten projects totaling over $1 billion and Sri Lanka has four projects totaling $19 million.[20] As the Trump administration places Russia and China as primary competitors on the world stage, not challenging them within the Horn of Africa is a severe US shortcoming. If the US is entering into another era of great power competition, the US must look to challenge China directly and indirectly in areas such as the Horn of Africa. To meet this challenge, the US needs to increase and diversify DFC efforts in the region while maximizing the partnerships and programs it has already developed. While US investment in the region is critical, the effective use of military and diplomatic powers will play an increasingly important role to the Horn, which can significantly aid in US influence and further strengthen US-Africa relations.

Great Power Competition in Africa

As the Trump administration looks to the future, the administration must develop a comprehensive strategy for the continent and especially the Horn of Africa. The geopolitics of the Horn cannot be understated, and the volume of foreign actors throughout the region highlights this importance. If the US pursues an America alone-type foreign policy, it risks alienating many African states that have developed relations with the US over decades. Furthermore, this isolation-like approach will push African leaders to other more developed nations like Russia and China, undermining the US efforts toward great power competition.

The next decade will likely play a decisive role throughout the region, as China strives to expand its Belt and Road Initiative further, and the US reevaluates its presence in Africa. If the US prioritizes great power competition as stated in the NSS, the US needs to challenge China and Russia indirectly in places such as the Horn of Africa. An effective strategy within the region allows for significant benefits in line with US national interests.

Although the current roles of China and Russia in the Horn of Africa may appear insignificant than other regions, it is critical given contemporary debates on security and global order, regional security, and challenges to political and economic US national interests. Furthermore, the US can challenge China and Russia as part of great-power competitions both directly and indirectly, for example through the US private sector taking a larger portion of African market share and increasing specific investment into the region. An effective strategy in the Horn of Africa must limit China’s and Russia’s expansion and increase US interests with an eye on long-term effects while building African capacity and security.

Endnotes

[1] J. J. Messner et al., Fragile States Index Annual Report 2019 (Washington, DC: The Fund for Peace, 2019), https://fragilestatesindex.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/9511904-fragilestatesindex.pdf.

[2] David Barno and Nora Bensahel, “Trump’s Next Task: Learning the Limits of Military Power,” War on the Rocks, May 2, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/05/trumps-next-task-learning-the-limits-of-military-power/.

[3] White House, National Security Strategy (Washington, D. C: White House, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.

[4] Demetri Sevastopulo and Peter Spiegel, “Donald Trump Questions US Role in NATO,” Financial Times, March 21, 2016, https://www.ft.com/content/2695854c-efaf-11e5-a609-e9f2438ee05b.

[5] Michael Birnbaum and Seung Min Kim, “Trump Calls Out NATO Members, Demands More Spending,” The Mercury News, July 11, 2018, last updated July 12, 2018, https://www.mercurynews.com/2018/07/11/trump-calls-out-nato-members-demands-more-spending/.

[6] Julian Borger, “Donald Trump Denounces ‘Globalism’ in Nationalist Address to UN,” The Guardian, September 24, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/sep/24/donald-trump-un-address-denounces-globalism.

[7] Reshma Kapadia, “There’s a Trade Deal with China. Here’s Why the Stock Market Isn’t Thrilled,” Barrons, December 13, 2019, https://www.barrons.com/articles/u-s-china-trade-deal-confusion-stocks-are-volatile-51576254365.

[8] Hannah Kuchler, “Why Prescription Drugs Cost so Much More in America.” Financial Times, September 18, 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/e92dbf94-d9a2-11e9-8f9b-77216ebe1f17.

[9] White House, National Security Strategy (Washington, D. C: White House, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.

[10] Ibid., 38.

[11] Peter J. Schraeder, “Making America Great Again’ Against the Backdrop of an ‘Africa Rising’? The Trump Administration and Africa’s Marginalization within US Foreign Policy,” Seton Hall Journal of Diplomacy & International Relations 20, no. 1 (Fall/Winter 2018), https://nduezproxy.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com.nduezproxy.idm.oclc.org/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip,url,uid&db=tsh&AN=136124986&site=eds-live&scope=site.

[12] Kathryn Dunn Tenpas, “Tracking Turnover in the Trump Administration,” Brookings, May 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/research/tracking-turnover-in-the-trump-administration/.

[13] Peter J. Schraeder, “Making America Great Again,”2018.

[14] Katie Williams, “From Small Wars to Great Power, Trump’s Africa Reset could Change US Military’s Role,” Defense One, December 12, 2018, https://www.defenseone.com/politics/2018/12/small-wars-great-power-trumps-africa-reset-could-change-us-militarys-role/153485/.

[15] Lara Seligman and Robbie Gramer, “Pentagon Debates Drawdown in Africa, South America,” Foreign Policy, January 30, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/30/pentagon-troop-drawdown-africa-south-america-sahel-capitol-hill-congress-trump/.

[16] Wynne Davis, “3 Americans Killed in Attack on Kenyan Airfield by Al-Shabab Militants,” NPR.com, January 5, 2020, https://www.npr.org/2020/01/05/793752674/airfield-used-by-u-s-forces-in-kenya-comes-under-attack-by-al-shabab-militants.

[17] Lauren Blanchard and Sarah Collins, China’s Engagement in Djibouti, CRS Report No. IF11304 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF11304.pdf.

[18] International Trade Administration, “Prosper Africa,” US Department of Commerce, accessed January 14, 2020, https://www.trade.gov/prosper-africa.

[19] DFC.gov, “US International Development Finance Corporation,” DFC.gov, https://www.dfc.gov/who-we-are.

[20] U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, “Active DFC Projects-Map View,” DFC.gov, project date as of December 31, 2019, https://www3.opic.gov/ActiveProjectsMap/Default.aspx#

What Ethiopia’s Brewing Conflict Means for the Country—and the Region

Source: Small Wars | Aly Verjee and Susan Stigant | USIP Publication

A protracted conflict between the federal government and the Tigray region is still not inevitable, but it will require both sides to choose another path.

Violent conflict between the federal government of Ethiopia and the federal state of Tigray, in the country’s north, began November 4 and quickly escalated. USIP’s Aly Verjee and Susan Stigant discuss the crisis and identify what could be done to avoid further violent conflict in east Africa’s most populous country.

Unfortunately, violence is not new to Ethiopia; already, there are over 1.4 million conflict-affected internally displaced persons in the country. What is the broader significance of this latest violence between the federal government and the Tigray region?

Stigant: The rapidity of the escalation of violence between Tigray and Addis Ababa is concerning in itself, given the stakes for Ethiopia’s peace and stability. This conflict has the potential to quickly become more polarized and increase violence throughout Ethiopian society. Already, the Tigray region has called for the full mobilization of all citizens to fight. The federal government, led by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, has also used uncompromising language to justify his government’s actions. As the allegations and incidents mount—including possible war crimes—and the number of people affected increases, it will become much harder to find a peaceful solution.

At the same time, solely focusing on what is going on today in Tigray risks obscuring broader concerns about violence, democratic backsliding, and repression elsewhere in the country. As a horrific example of the type of violence in Ethiopia that has become all too common, on November 1, ethnically targeted killings left at least 54 people dead in a schoolyard in the Wollega zone of Oromia state. Throughout western Ethiopia, communal violence has only increased since 2018. In southern Ethiopia, tensions remain high, as the consequences of the model of ethnic federalism continue to unfold.

Verjee: As I warned in April 2019, tensions between the regions have the potential to overwhelm the political management capacity of the center. The conflict in Tigray has already pulled in forces from the neighboring Amhara Regional State to fight the Tigrayans. The leadership of the Somali Regional State has also taken the side of the federal government in the dispute. In the broader context, it does not really matter who is responsible for starting the violence; all Ethiopians, no matter their ethnicity, have to find a way to live side-by-side, which will not be accomplished by jailing or killing the political and military elite of Tigray. The ruling party of Tigray, the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), which once led the ruling party coalition that preceded the Abiy government, are no angels. But for the federal government to risk throwing the whole country into a protracted civil conflict—with significant cross-border consequences—is also highly unfortunate.

Already, a humanitarian crisis is in the making. More than 11,000 refugees have already crossed the border with Sudan, with thousands more almost certain to follow. Drawing in Eritrea and Sudan into the conflict may easily bring in other regional and extra-regional powers, leaving the Horn of Africa in a complicated, messy crisis from which it may take many years to recover, at a cost of thousands of lives. As the USIP Red Sea Senior Study Group recently warned, “Intrastate or interstate conflict would be catastrophic for Ethiopia’s people and for the region and would pose a direct threat to international peace and security.”

The dispute between Tigray and the federal government has been festering for some time. Could violence be avoided?

Stigant: The federal government has characterized its action as a rule of law operation to uphold the constitution, and that it would act with “utmost care for the overall wellbeing, safety and security of our citizens.” The federal government has described the September 2020 elections held by the Tigray region as illegitimate and has objected to equating the federal government to the TPLF. While there are more than two sides to every story, there is little doubt that relations were strained with Tigray. That said, the paramount constitutional right of any citizen is the right to life. Before resorting to military action and the attendant deaths of Ethiopian citizens, every other possibility needed to be exhausted, even if the Tigray authorities were being uncooperative. More pragmatically, the use of force rarely works to sustain a political settlement, as the history of Ethiopia has shown on numerous occasions.

As the cornerstone of his rule, Prime Minister Abiy set out a philosophy of medemer, or coming together, to overcome the divisions of the past. Less than a year ago, in accepting the Nobel Peace Prize, Abiy mentioned the word love seven times, and the words forgiveness and reconciliation four times each. Ethiopia does not need Abiy to love Tigray, nor vice versa; but forgiveness and reconciliation cannot occur if belligerent parties do not show restraint.

Verjee: The federal government has already suspended fiscal transfers to Tigray and cut off communications and cross-border trade. Even if the allegation that the TPLF posed an imminent threat by its purported seizure of weapons and a military base is entirely accurate, a proportionate, limited response was the most that could be justified. Although the federal government has said that its operations will be time limited, Abiy has also said that he will not rest until the “the criminal junta is disarmed, legitimate administration in the region restored, and fugitives apprehended and brought to justice,” which are objectives that could take months, if not years, to achieve. Although the warning signs have been there for some time, a protracted violent conflict is still not inevitable, but it will require both sides to choose another path.

Abiy should also consider that his own position as head of the government comes in the context of an ongoing debate about the future of the constitutional order of Ethiopia. Were it not for COVID-19, Ethiopia should have held elections this year, in which Abiy would have had the opportunity to obtain a democratic mandate. Abiy may be prime minister and enjoy the powers of that office but should consider his administration bound by norms that limit the actions of an unelected official.

To date, the federal government has rejected mediation of this crisis. Going forward, what role should national and international actors play to try and de-escalate the situation?

Stigant: For years, Ethiopia has been at the heart of establishing regional and continental mechanisms for addressing violent conflict. These include the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism of the regional intergovernmental organization IGAD, which Ethiopia chaired for years, and the Peace and Security Council and the Panel of the Wise of the African Union (AU). As the AU’s host nation, there is arguably a special responsibility on Ethiopia to call on these indigenous African institutions not as an intrusion on sovereignty, but to model exemplary behavior for all African states.

Domestically, there have been multiple calls for a national dialogue to forge a political agreement regarding the conduct of elections and then on the constitutional order following the elections. As violence escalates in the country, it becomes both more urgent and more challenging to move a dialogue process forward. While the federal government has already announced such an effort, any initiative will need to be revisited in light of the changing circumstances. Ultimately, the credibility of any dialogue will be judged on the extent to which it includes key groups, reaches agreement on preparatory steps and confidence-building measures, and demonstrates that people can have genuine, safe, and frank conversations.

Verjee: The United States, the European Union, and the United Kingdom, all leading humanitarian donors, should urgently articulate the acute priority of preserving and enhancing humanitarian access to Tigray on the ground, to internally displaced persons moving to other states of Ethiopia, and to the refugees in Sudan. There is no acceptable reason for impeding this kind of access.

More broadly, as USIP’s Payton Knopf has written, international inertia on Ethiopia cannot be justified by imperfect or incomplete information. While American leverage on Ethiopia has been damaged by President Trump’s remarks on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, Ethiopia remains a vital strategic partner for the United States in matters of regional security, counterterrorism, migration, and peacekeeping. China is also massively invested in Ethiopia, in many deals that were reached in the days of the rule of the TPLF. Therefore, the United States, China, and others have a mutual interest in seeing a quick end to hostilities, creating the space for other forms of dialogue and discussion. While a formal international mediation process may not be necessary, honest international brokers should urgently convey to both sides, in unequivocal terms, their expectation and hope that hostilities should be halted without further delay.

‘Abiy Ahmed had to punish those seeking to break up Ethiopia’ – Djibouti President

Source: The African Report

The deadly conflict between Ethiopia’s federal government and Tigrayan rebels continues to intensify, especially after Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed issued a warning on Sunday to surrender within 72 hours. But despite international calls for a cease in action, many regional neighbours, including the small state of Djibouti, are supporting the PM’s stance.

With less than five months to go before the presidential election, Djibouti’s head of state takes stock of his efforts to tackle economic and social issues, internal opposition, a war in Ethiopia and the country’s relations with China, France and the United States.

The virus quietly arrived in Djibouti one evening in mid-March 2020, aboard a Spanish military plane that had taken off from Seville. Eight months later, the silent killer continues to lurk in spite of the health authorities’ swift implementation of the “three Ts” (test, trace and treat), with 8% of the country’s population tested to date, i.e., the highest rate in the region.

Economic slowdown

Though the government of this city-state with 1 million residents has taken an optimistic view of the future – it forecasts a return to growth in 2021 – the fallout of the COVID-19 pandemic is weighing heavily on its economy, which was in full swing before it ground to a halt. The Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway line, one of the country’s essential arteries, is running on a reduced schedule, while the stately hotel located in the continent’s largest free zone, just a few kilometres away from the capital, remains hopelessly empty.

But according to Aboubaker Omar Hadi, president of the Djibouti Ports & Free Zones Authority and one of Ismaïl Omar Guelleh’s closest associates, “It’s merely a setback, our fundamentals are strong.”

“Fundamentals”? The former French colony is ideally located along the world’s second-busiest shipping route, a gateway to trade with a wide swath of Africa, backed by a market of 400 million people. Its strategic geographic location is also a coveted spot for foreign military bases. Lastly, it also has political stability going for it: contrary to what happens elsewhere, Djibouti’s elections aren’t highly tense affairs.

Unshakeable calm

These advantages – combined with a government that the opposition calls authoritarian and which, it’s true, prioritises development and the fight against endemic poverty and unemployment over the expansion of freedoms – explain the unshakeable calm of President Guelleh, 73, who has been running the country since 1999.

Although he still refuses to say as much, no one in Djibouti has any doubt that the leader, who welcomed one of our reporters at the presidential palace for a long interview, will stand for re-election next April. He is the clear favourite, as if the exercise were a one-horse race.

Among the numerous Djibouti hub development projects you have launched in recent months in spite of the pandemic, ranging from the new Damerjog oil terminal to the capital’s business district, not to mention the ship maintenance yard, one in particular has attracted a lot of attention: the road corridor connecting the Port of Tadjoura to northern Ethiopia. Are you looking to gain a competitive edge over Eritrea’s Port of Massawa, which underwent a major renovation after the thaw in relations between Addis Ababa and Asmara?

Ismaïl Omar Guelleh: In the long run, yes, we always need to be a few steps ahead. But competition between Djibouti and Eritrea isn’t imminent: connecting Massawa via a modern railway line requires extremely costly and complex rehabilitation, upgrading and construction works given the region’s hilly topography.

Another competitor, one that poses a greater short-term challenge, is the Port of Berbera in Somaliland, in which your former partner, the Emirati company DP World, plans to invest massively.

Massively? I haven’t heard anything of the sort so far, other than project proposals. DP World excels at creating buzz, but then, in the end, nothing happens. You don’t even see the slightest crane in the sky. We are paid to know.

On that note, how is the commercial dispute between Djibouti and DP World, which you sidelined from managing the Port of Doraleh two years back, going?

The court proceedings are still under way in London and will perhaps begin soon in the United States. These people who stubbornly refuse to sit down and have a discussion with us aren’t interested in money. They’re too rich for that. What they want is for their old monopoly status to be fully reinstated. Their attitude stems from a desire to wield geopolitical control over all the region’s ports. But Djibouti isn’t just another square on a chessboard: we will not go back to the way things were.

In mid-September, you launched the Djibouti Sovereign Fund, which will be funded to the tune of $1.5bn over the next decade and whose sole shareholder is the government. Usually, sovereign wealth funds are the prerogative of rich countries. What is the point of the fund?

“We don’t have oil, but we have ideas”: do you remember that French saying from the 1970s? Well, that’s us, too. I asked Lionel Zinsou and Donald Kaberuka to conduct a feasibility study, one that draws on successful sovereign wealth funds, such as those created by Senegal and Singapore.
What we want to do is free ourselves somewhat from conventional debt-driven growth models, pool our domestic resources to create a leverage effect, attract new financing, promote business and job creation, and, lastly, increase our overall wealth.

The Djibouti Sovereign Fund is up and running now. The implementing decrees have been signed. The team is in place and headed by a former Senegalese official specialising in these matters, whom I poached from President Macky Sall with his authorisation. This fund, which I directly oversee, belongs to Djibouti and the Djiboutian people.

The debt Djibouti owes China has for a long time been seen as excessive. Is this still the case today?

Our “Chinese debt” is much lower than what some have said. It amounts to $450m, compared with Ethiopia’s $16bn and Kenya’s $20bn. We have worked really hard on debt restructuring and servicing. The company managing the Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway line, which is the main source of this debt, will be privatised, with Ethiopia and Djibouti retaining ownership of the infrastructure.

Is the railway line profitable?

To make a profit, it needs to reach a frequency of 10 trains a day as soon as possible. That’s our aim. For the time being, because of the COVID-19 pandemic, we are seeing a rate of two to three trains a day.

Youth employment and inclusive growth are the main challenges facing your country, which has a structural poverty rate that encompasses almost 40% of the population. How are you addressing these challenges?

We are constantly working to implement a wide range of measures in the areas of affordable housing, health, education and professional training. The share of the population suffering from what is called “multidimensional poverty” has decreased by more than 15% over the past eight years, especially in rural areas. GDP per capita, which indicates the purchasing power of Djiboutians, has risen by 10% over the same period.

These statistics are encouraging, but we’re not there yet. Our goal is to triple per capita income within 15 years. Social well-being needs to increase in line with our economic growth.

Are you starting to see the beginnings of a middle class?

“Beginnings” is the right word. The cost of living here is high, mostly due to the cost of energy, which is why there are a growing number of wind and solar energy projects.

Ethiopia is a key economic partner for Djibouti. Since Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed took power in 2018, this country of 110 million people is caught between centrifugal forces that threaten its unity. Are you concerned about the situation?

Of course. From the days of the Ethiopian Empire through Meles Zenawi’s leadership, not to mention Mengistu Haile Mariam’s dictatorship, “togetherness” has always been the exception, not the rule, in the country. One group has always dominated another. Ahmed, whose intentions were good, tried to change that. He’s a born optimist, both a politician, military man and very devout evangelical Christian.

But he is coming up against heavy resistance, particularly in the Tigray region, where the population lives under the rule of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front [TPLF]. So, the situation is difficult. That said, our personal and bilateral relations are good.

On 4 November, Ahmed launched a military offensive against the Tigray forces. Was war the only solution?

Let’s try to put ourselves in Ahmed’s shoes. Ethiopia is faced with a major problem: a political organisation known as the TPLF is stripping its federal authority and has structured itself so as to bring the central government to its knees.

Ethiopia’s prime minister has two options to choose from: one, he can negotiate with Tigray’s government, with each party separate and on an equal footing. This can only lead to the partition of Ethiopia, as it will set a precedent under which other regional groups will be able to assert their own secessionist claims. Two, he can restore law and order at the federal level, and punish those seeking to break up the country.

I think Ahmed has taken the second route, which will allow the population to elect their own leaders. That’s why he moved to replace the regional administration and dissolved Tigray’s parliament. It’s clear that as a country that shares its borders with Ethiopia and could thus be impacted by the conflict, Djibouti has one single wish: that peace be restored.

Al-Shabaab, a terrorist group that holds sway in Somalia, is considered al-Qaida’s best organised and most active arm in the world. How is it that this militia continues to pose such a threat, despite the presence of a military mission of 22,000 men – including a contingent from Djibouti – and numerous US drone strikes?

We haven’t yet managed to eliminate the leaders of this terrorist group. But we must, because Al-Shabaab has expanded its influence to the criminal economy, to the extent that it has become a sort of mafia. In the Port of Mogadishu, few containers escape their control: they tax, racketeer, traffic and, more than anything else, corrupt many important figures. They use refugee camps as a recruitment channel, offering young unemployed people food while also indoctrinating, training and arming them.

Legislative elections are scheduled to be held in Somalia in 2021. I fear we will end up with a parliament indirectly controlled by Al-Shabaab because they’ll have bought the support of some of the MPs. The risk that this group poses for the entire region has never been greater.

And Djibouti, with its foreign military bases, is a choice target for these terrorists, who have previously attacked Kenya and Uganda . . .

Yes, that’s clear. They attacked us in 2014. But we’re extremely vigilant, and our intelligence and security agencies are always on high alert.

What gives us the upper hand is that these extremists have virtually no ties to our population: when they try to infiltrate our communities, they are quickly spotted. Also, to get to Djibouti, they have to slip through the net of the Puntland and Somaliland police forces.

Why has the restoration of diplomatic relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea still not had the slightest positive effect on your relationship with Eritrea’s president, Issayas Afeworki?

I met with Issayas in Jeddah in September 2018, but neither the Saudi’s mediation team nor Ahmed’s efforts produced a “peace of the braves”. This is despite the fact that I took the step of releasing 19 Eritrean prisoners of war, which Asmara didn’t want, it seems.

The only explanation I see for this stonewalling is a psychological one: Issayas is unyielding and resentful, and we won’t repeat the exercise. The former Ethiopian prime minister, Meles Zenawi, had warned me: “Once you’re mad at him, he never forgets.”

Several Arab Muslim countries – Bahrain, Sudan and the United Arab Emirates – have announced they are normalising relations with Israel. Will Djibouti follow suit?

No, because the conditions aren’t ripe. We neither have a problem with the Jews as a people nor the Israelis as a nation. Some of them even come to Djibouti on business with their passport, and Djibouti’s citizens have been able to travel to Israel for 25 years now.

However, we take issue with the Israeli government because they’re denying Palestinians their inalienable rights. All we ask that the government do is make one gesture of peace, and we will make 10 in return. But I’m afraid they’ll never do that.

The US has raised concerns about your relations with China on several occasions. It has even been reported that an American general suggested that Beijing had “purchased” the Port of Djibouti. Have these suspicions been cleared up?

They were totally baseless, but I’m not sure they’ve gone away. For instance, we don’t understand why the $25m loan the World Bank promised us in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic has taken so long to materialise. The president of the World Bank, David Malpass, is a US citizen. Is there a causal connection? I wonder.

And yet you agreed to let the US army occupy the largest foreign military base in Djibouti. Don’t these kinds of activities sometimes encroach on your sovereignty?

We see to it that that doesn’t happen, but it’s not always easy. In 2013, we allowed the United States to use the French military’s Chabelley Airfield, located some 10 kilometres from Djibouti-Ambouli International Airport, as a base for their unmanned aircraft. Since then, the base has become exclusively reserved for the US military.

No one can get in, neither us nor the French. It’s a problem we need to sort out.

You’ve often complained that France doesn’t show much interest in Djibouti, including economically speaking. Has that changed since French President Emmanuel Macron’s visit in March 2019?

Not really, unfortunately. In East Africa, the French only seem interested in Kenya and Ethiopia, with mixed results. Of course, the French electric utility company Engie is investing in Djibouti’s solar and wind power sector, and a delegation from MEDEF [a French business confederation] plans to pay us a visit in January. That’s better than nothing.

But I think that Paris should realise that Djibouti is more than just a strategic geographic location. Djibouti also has a position in the global economy. Others have come to this realisation, and an increasing number of young Djiboutians speak English, which is the language of business in our corner of the world.

Djibouti forcefully pushed to get a seat as a non-permanent member on the UN Security Council but was pipped at the post by Kenya last June. How did you feel about that?

We felt it was unfair and that the African Union had failed us, as they weren’t able to handle the problem. Kenya forced its way through, with the complicity of some Southern African countries, by casting aside every best practice. Nairobi spent a lot of money to get that seat. However, we did manage to prevent our rival from securing a majority and we’ve learned our lesson for next time. You can rest assured that we’ll try again.

Why are you so adamant about putting Djibouti on the world stage? You’ve opened close to 50 embassies, which is a substantial number for a small country of 1 million residents.

Because that’s the only way for us to avoid getting swallowed up in the melting pot of globalisation!

Thirty years ago, Djibouti was only on the map for the former colonial power. Today, we’re on the cusp of becoming a global hub. It’s a matter of political will.

Six months back, a Djiboutian air force pilot named Fouad Youssouf Ali was extradited from Ethiopia. He has been detained in Djibouti ever since, and his fate has troubled some members of the public as well as human rights activists, who consider him a political prisoner. When will he be tried?

He’ll be tried, but justice takes time here, just as in France. As for the rest, this person isn’t a prisoner of conscience. He’s a former air force lieutenant and deserter who tried to fly a plane to reach Eritrea, meaning hostile territory, but ultimately fled to Ethiopia. Can you name a single other country that wouldn’t have charged such a person under the same circumstances?

His prison conditions have sparked concern in Djibouti and Ali Sabieh, the city he’s from. Could the conflict between the Issa and Afar clans, which caused so much harm to the country at the beginning of the 1990s, rear its head again?

Over the past 20 or so years, we have made every effort to strengthen our sense of national unity and to instil a spirit of citizenship. There have never been more interclan marriages between the Issas and Afars than there are today. If there’s one point we are perfectly at ease with, it’s that one.

Why does Djibouti still not have any private, independent media outlets?

Because it’s expensive, quite simply, and the market is small. A few projects are under way in the digital sphere, but the financing capabilities in this area are nowhere near those of Somalia, where tribal solidarity is fully intact.

An online media outlet close to the opposition, “La voix de Djibouti” [The Voice of Djibouti], regularly complains that its journalists are harassed by the police. Isn’t such a practice counter to the principle of freedom of expression enshrined in Djibouti’s constitution?

That media outlet isn’t close to the opposition; it’s an opposition website based in Brussels, Belgium. The correspondents you are talking about aren’t registered journalists, but instead nobodies – some of whom are barely literate – presenting themselves as such. For that matter, we haven’t jailed anyone.

You’re confronted with a determined opposition, whose leaders are divided, including when it comes to their methods of action. Do you benefit from that?

I think it’s too bad. Every democracy needs an opposition that believes in discussion, comparing policies and the country’s future. Our opposition can be summed up by the slogan “Me or chaos”. Whether it’s Daher Ahmed Farah, Abdourahman Mohamed Guelleh or Adan Mohamed Abdou, none of them abide by the rules for forming a party. A party isn’t just some group you register with a founder and 10 or so members that never holds a convention. But we prefer to look the other way.

This state of things came about because the Islamist faction of this coalition, MoDeL [Movement for Democracy and Freedom] – the local chapter of the Muslim Brotherhood – used religion as a mobilising force. We have taken the necessary measures to reduce its impact. The coalition’s main leaders have left Djibouti for Turkey and Canada, where they have nothing other than Facebook to try to indoctrinate followers.

As for sermons, their content is strictly regulated and comes under the exclusive remit of the Ministry of Muslim Affairs. Sermons are sent to each mosque by email, and imams can’t add a single word to them during Friday prayers. I think the French authorities would do well to follow in our footsteps in this regard. It’s the only way to prevent extremism from thriving.

But there isn’t just the main weekly prayer. What about the other sermons?

In Djibouti, imams and muezzins are civil servants paid by the state. If they let a person use their platform to glorify violence and jihad and utter slogans and insults, they’ll be held accountable for it and immediately punished. In this sense, you could say that we have them by the strings. But there’s less and less of a need for us to do this because our religious leaders are increasingly better trained and educated. They realise that true Islam is about knowledge and tolerance.

The presidential election is scheduled to take place in April 2021. Will you stand for a fifth term?

I can’t state my position on that matter at this time. We have to let the country and administration do what they have to do. I’ll make an announcement very shortly, inshallah.

As you must know, no one in Djibouti has any doubt about your stance on that point . . .

Really? Well, give me a bit of time to answer.

‘We call on the EU to appoint a Horn of Africa envoy’

EU Observer | Dear Excellencies Charles Michel (president of the EU Council), Ursula von der Leyen (president of the EU Commission) and David Sassoli (president of the European Parliament),

A call to the EU to urgently engage in peace efforts for the Horn of Africa.

The European Union must immediately appoint senior high-level envoys for the Horn of Africa to engage in and provide support to international, in particular African, efforts to curb the crisis in the Horn of Africa.

The UN has called for an immediate ceasefire of all hostilities.

According to the UN, 4,000 people a day are fleeing to Sudan from Ethiopia.

The UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Filippo Grandi, has called for a humanitarian corridor to reach the 96,000 refugees and internally-displaced persons in refugee camps in Sudan and in northern Ethiopia.

The UN is already preparing to receive 200,000 refugees in Sudan. An old refugee camp, that served during the 1984 famine, is sadly brought in use again.

The UN secretary general, António Guterres, has stated the hope that “Ethiopia will be able to find the peace it needs for its development and the wellbeing of its people.”

This crisis rightly has the full attention of the African continent.

The chair of the African Union, Cyril Ramaphosa, has appointed three elderly statespersons as envoys: Joaquim Chissano, former president of the Republic of Mozambique; Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, former president of the Republic of Liberia, and Kgalema Motlanthe, former president of the Republic of South Africa – as special envoys of the African Union. Their efforts should be supported.

Unfortunately, the military interventions are not the only problem in the region.

After the lost harvest due to the destruction by locust swarms, food reserves are in severe jeopardy.

The conflict is now contributing to an already dire situation.

A new famine of most severe proportions is looming. The current crisis comes on top of the Covid-19 pandemic, leaving children out of school for six months already. It affects tens of thousands of children in precarious situations, often separated from parents and guardians.

Ethiopia is globally renowned for its world cultural heritage representing one of the oldest human civilisations of which Ethiopians and Africans are rightly proud.

The UNESCO world heritage site in Aksum, other heritage sites and religious centres are now under threat. This tragedy is compounded by a terrible loss of innocent lives, sexual violence and a destabilising refugee crisis.

This regional crisis in the Horn of Africa requires the immediate attention of the EU at the highest level. The EU should call on the experience of statespersons to contribute as high-level envoys to the efforts of the African Union and the UN.

Yours,

Professor Dr Mirjam van Reisen, professor of international relations, innovation and care, Tilburg University

Plus 51 other signatories.

U.N. Fears Ethiopia Purging Ethnic Tigrayan Officers From Its Peacekeeping Missions

Foreign Policy | An internal United Nations document shows concern those troops could face torture or execution.

The Ethiopian government has been rounding up ethnic Tigrayan security forces deployed in United Nations and African peacekeeping missions abroad and forcing them onto flights to the Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa, where it is feared they may face torture or even execution, according to an internal U.N. account.

The moves come as Ethiopia is preparing a military offensive against the capital of the country’s Tigray region, Mekelle. Conflict erupted earlier this month between federal and Tigrayan forces in the ethnically divided nation, which for decades was under de facto rule by the minority Tigrayans. The alarm inside the U.N. suggests that Ethiopia’s Nobel Peace Prize-winning prime minister, Abiy Ahmed, may be expanding the country’s weekslong conflict beyond the country’s borders. It has alarmed human rights advocates and U.N. officials, who fear that the U.N. blue helmets may be persecuted upon their arrival back in Ethiopia.

The targeting of Tigrayan military officers in foreign peacekeeping and military operations comes amid rising fears that an Ethiopian government offensive against Tigrayan rebels inside Ethiopia could devolve into ethnic cleansing, with atrocities reported on both sides. The human rights watchdog Amnesty International recently issued a report detailing “the massacre of a very large number of civilians” in northern Ethiopia earlier this month, allegedly by groups loyal to the Tigrayan forces, in a grim harbinger of violence to come. Meanwhile, refugees fleeing the violence said they were targeted because they were Tigrayan.

In South Sudan earlier this month, Ethiopian soldiers disarmed a senior ethnic Ethiopian Tigrayan officer, escorted him to the capital of Juba, and forced him onto a Nov. 11 Ethiopian Airlines flight to Addis Ababa, according to the internal account, which was reviewed by Foreign Policy.

Ten days later, the Ethiopian contingent at the U.N. base in Juba reportedly detained three other Tigrayan officers. The officers, according to the internal account, “were coerced to take the Ethiopian Airlines flight from Juba to Addis Ababa. As of now their whereabouts are unknown.”

The U.N. Mission in South Sudan, or UNMISS, “has become aware that three soldiers were repatriated back to their country on Saturday without the Mission’s knowledge,” a senior U.N. official at the mission said. “Our Human Rights Division is working to follow up on their situation.”

“If there are any incidents where personnel are discriminated against or have their rights violated because of their ethnicity or they have concerns about their situation, this may involve a human rights violation under international law,” the official added. “As a result, the UNMISS Human Rights Division is currently liaising with the Ethiopian peacekeeping command in South Sudan and has requested access to any contingent personnel who might, for any reason, be compelled to return home and be in need of protection.”

The crackdown has spread to other African countries where Ethiopian peacekeepers and troops are deployed, including in Abyei, a disputed territory claimed by Sudan and South Sudan, and Somalia, where thousands of Ethiopian troops have been helping the government fight Islamist al-Shabab militants. As many as 40 Tigrayan officers and soldiers serving in the African Union Mission in Somalia have also been recalled to Ethiopia, according to one diplomatic source.

At Ethiopia’s U.N. mission in New York, the senior military attaché who oversaw peacekeeping issues, a Tigrayan, was fired after just months on the job, precipitating the purge of other Tigrayan officers from peacekeeping missions abroad, diplomatic sources said.

Ethiopia has seen deepening conflict between the country’s Tigray minority—which accounts for just over 6 percent of the population but played a dominant role in Ethiopia’s political life for decades, and whose status was reinforced under Meles Zenawi, an ethnic Tigrayan who served as prime minister and president of Ethiopia from 1991 until his death in August 2012—and the country’s largest ethnic groups including the Amhara and Oromo, who account for more than 60 percent of the county’s population.

During Meles’s tenure, Tigrayans were given key posts in the government and the military, and they continue to hold key leadership positions in overseas peacekeeping missions, raising questions about the ability of Ethiopian contingents to function following a purge. But the Tigrayans’ privileged position has been threatened since the election of Abiy, an ethnic Oromo, in 2018.

The latest crisis follows a recent dispute between the federal government and the Tigrayan regional government over the decision to postpone national and regional elections in the midst of the coronavirus pandemic. Tigray’s local leaders went ahead with an election, which resulted in the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) winning all the seats. The federal parliament declared the vote null, and federal troops are seeking to impose military control over the Tigray region.

The conflict in Ethiopia has killed hundreds—and perhaps thousands—of people and sparked a new refugee crisis in what is historically one of the most politically unstable regions of the world. Some 30,000 refugees have fled from Ethiopia into neighboring Sudan in recent weeks, fueling concerns that the new refugee influx could destabilize Sudan’s fragile transitional government.

Senior U.S. officials have called for an end to hostilities and independent investigations into the reports of civilian massacres.

“The ethnic dimension is one that everybody is very concerned about,” said Tibor Nagy, the top State Department diplomat on Africa, in a briefing with reporters on Nov. 19.

Nagy also condemned the TPLF’s reported missile attacks on neighboring Eritrea earlier this month, calling it an attempt to “internationalize the conflict” that “make[s] the situation more dangerous.”

The conflict has also taken on an economic lens. “This war is ultimately a battle for control of Ethiopia’s economy, its natural resources, and the billions of dollars the country receives annually from international donors and lenders,” Kassahun Melesse, an assistant professor of applied economics at Oregon State University, wrote recently in Foreign Policy. “Access to those riches is a function of who heads the federal government—which the TPLF controlled for nearly three decades before Abiy came to power in April 2018, following widespread protests against the TPLF-led government.”

“In other words, this is not a conflict over who gets to rule Tigray, a small region whose population accounts for a mere 6 percent of Ethiopia’s more than 110 million people,” Melesse wrote. “It is a fight over who gets to dominate the commanding heights of the country’s economy, a prize that Tigray’s regional leaders once held and are determined to recapture at any cost.”

That struggle is playing out in U.N. peacekeeping missions.

Ethiopia is one of the two largest contributors to U.N. peacekeeping missions, with more than 6,700 uniformed personnel, most serving in Darfur, Abyei, and South Sudan. Tigrayans have played a key role in U.N. peacekeeping operations.

Earlier this month, Ethiopia recalled more than 3,000 troops from Somalia to reinforce its military operations against the Tigrayans. The government disarmed between 200 and 300 Tigrayan soldiers who were posted in Somalia, U.S. and U.N. officials said.

“The peacekeepers are not being disarmed due to ethnicity but due to infiltration of TPLF elements in various entities which is part of an ongoing investigation,” an Ethiopian government task force told Reuters, which previously reported on the Tigrayan soldiers in Somalia being disarmed.

“All officers and soldiers from Tigray were arrested and detained upon arrival in Addis,” according to the U.N. account reviewed by Foreign Policy. “There are reports that some have been subjected to torture and extra-judicial killing.”

Privately, U.S. officials fear that the massive withdrawal of troops will leave Somalia, already one of the world’s most fragile states, in a precarious position and vulnerable to new offensives from terrorist groups such as al-Shabab.

In Abyei, the U.N.’s Tigrayan deputy force commander, Brig. Gen. Negassi Tikue Lewte, disappeared from the U.N.’s radar after traveling to Addis Ababa earlier this month. The brigadier general—who is serving under a U.N. contract—made a request for leave on Nov. 15. Shortly after, Ethiopia sent the U.N. a diplomatic note informing it to find another officer to fill the position.

“He was apparently recalled to Ethiopia and since then his whereabouts seem unknown,” according to the internal U.N. account.

The purge has raised complicated legal and political challenges for the U.N., which traditionally defers to foreign military contingents to manage troop rotations and handle disciplinary issues. The Ethiopian government has privately insisted that the repatriated Tigrayan troops and officers are simply on leave. But at least one of the officers, the deputy force commander in Abyei, is serving under a U.N. contract, imposing a greater responsibility on the U.N. to ensure his protection.

The U.N.’s peacekeeping department’s spokesperson, Nick Birnback, confirmed that the organization is “aware of the issue; we are very concerned and we are taking this matter extremely seriously.”

“At the moment, we are ascertaining all the relevant facts and we are or will be in touch with all relevant peace operations and governments in this regard,” Birnback added. “All troop-contributing countries have obligations under applicable international law, in accordance with relevant norms, standards and instruments.”

The Ethiopian missions in the United States did not respond to requests for comment. But human rights advocates have voiced concern about the reports.

“If reports of discriminatory Ethiopian repatriation of ethnic Tigrayan peacekeepers are true, they are deeply disturbing, given credible reports of profiling and arbitrary arrest of ethnic Tigrayans in Ethiopia,” said Louis Charbonneau, the U.N. director for Human Rights Watch.

“If the reports are confirmed, the U.N. should also consider suspending Ethiopian participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations,” Charbonneau added. “The U.N. needs to send a clear message to all governments that it will not ignore abuses against peacekeepers serving under the U.N. flag.”

Are Emirati Armed Drones Supporting Ethiopia from an Eritrean Air Base?

Source: Billing Cat | November 19, 2020

Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed declares that the war in the Tigray Region has entered its “final phase”.

The conflict broke out on November 4 when the country’s central government accused the region’s local authorities of holding “illegal” elections and seizing a military base. Thousands of civilians have fled to neigbouring Sudan as the federal army advances towards the regional capital of Mekelle.

Tigray politicians have claimed that they are under attack “on several fronts” — including neighbouring Eritrea, with which the region shares a long border. As Regional President Debretsion Gebremichael recently told Reuters, “our country is attacking us with a foreign country, Eritrea. Treason!”

Getachew Reda, a senior advisor to Gebremichael, made more detailed claims about the use of drones:

The Ethiopian Prime Minister has only stated that the Air Force conducted ‘targeted strikes’  against the militants without specifying the weapons used.

Could Emirati drones or other drones have been used in these airstrikes?

So far, there’s no evidence for that particular claim.

Satellite imagery obtained by Bellingcat suggests that the United Arab Emirates air base in Assab, Eritrea is indeed home to drones consistent with China’s Wing Loong II model of armed uncrewed aerial vehicles.

The imagery, provided by Planet Labs, shows a drone with a wingspan of just over 20 metres, matching the features of the drone model produced by China’s Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group.

The UAE acquired Wing Loong II drones in 2017. They have also used the drones to conduct operations in Yemen in the war against various militant groups, including the Houthis.

Satellite imagery from Planet Labs. Used with permission

The drones seen in these images are consistent with those operated by the UAE. Furthermore, the recently built drone hangars at the base suggest a larger presence of drones in the area, though their active deployment over Ethiopia is not yet confirmed. However, the imagery provides a strong indication of the possibility for their use. However, the Ethiopian Air Force also operates Russian-made MiG-23 and Sukhoi-27 jet fighters and attack helicopters that could also have been used in the strikes.

Footage uploaded via Facebook and shared Deutsche Welle’s Amharic-language service indicated that jet fighters have been active around Mekelle, where they are claimed to be involved in airstrikes:

The birth of a drone base

Drones aren’t new to this region. In 2015, what is likely a Chinese-produced Wing Loong I drone was spotted at the Assab airbase. This model is the predecessor of the Wing Loong II, which only entered service after 2018.

In 2016 an analysis by Stratfor detailed the construction of the base and its growth for both aerial and naval capabilities, providing the UAE with operational capability for its campaign in Yemen. Once again, satellite imagery shows a Wing Loong I drone standing outside two drone shelters at the north side of the tarmac.

A Sentinel-2 timelapse of the base comparing January 2017 with November 2020 reveals the large scale expansion of the base’s infrastructure.

Timelapse image: Sentinel Hub / Creative Commons

Two drone hangars were constructed sometime in April 2018, but in November 2019, a third hangar appeared on Sentinel-2 imagery.

The construction and lease of the base to the UAE by Eritrea has been condemned by the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea as a violation of the UN arms embargo on the two Horn of Africa states.

The current Planet Labs imagery also shows three crates next to the hangars at Assab Airbase, which could be evidence of shipping. Similar crates are used for the US-produced MQ-9 Reaper drones, as shown in an image released by the British Ministry of Defence.

According to the Twitter OSINT investigator Obretix, similar containers have also been noticed at other bases with confirmed Wing Loong II drones, such as in Egypt:

Furthermore, similar crates are visible on satellite imagery from this airbase in Iraq, which hosts US MQ-1 Grey Eagle and MQ-9  Reaper drones:

The UAE have also operated Wing Loong II drones over Libya in support of the opposition Libyan National Army (LNA) lead by the warlord Khalifa Haftar. According to the UN, at least 800 drone strikes in support of the LNA had taken place by November 2019, some of which had claimed civilian casualties. Satellite imagery confirms their presence on bases both in Libya as well as in Egypt.

The UAE also operates the US-produced General Atomic Predator XP unarmed drones. Moreover, the outgoing Trump administration has just approved the sales of MQ-9 Reaper drones to the UAE, provoking protest from human rights groups due to the Emirates’ poor human rights record and the relentless airstrikes by a Saudi and UAE led coalition in Yemen, which has caused high numbers of civilian casualties.

There are also media reports that Ethiopia has procured Chinese CH-4 armed drones, yet so far no open-source confirmation has been found which might indicate the presence of drones at known bases of the Ethiopian airforce. However, other clues could take the form of information from communications stations or satellite imagery showing the aforementioned shipping containers, as explained here by the Bard Center for the Study of the Drone.

Possible, but improbable

In sum, the claims made by the Tigray forces are not impossible, but so far they seem improbable.

Satellite imagery confirms the presence of Chinese-produced drones at the UAE’s military base in Assab, but that is all it confirms. There is currently no further evidence that these same drones have been involved in operations in support of the Ethiopian airforce, though there have been confirmed sightings of Ethiopian jet fighters in the conflict zone.

With thanks to Adam Rawnsley @arawnsley and Frank Slijper @FrankSlijper for feedback

Egypt Deploys its Most Advanced Fighters to Sudan For Joint Exercises Amid Political Uncertainty

Source: Military Watch Magazine

The Egyptian Air Force has deployed a contingent of its most capable fighter aircraft, the MiG-29M, to neighbouring Sudan for the Protectors of the Nile 2020 military exercises. This follows a Western-backed coup in Khartoum in 2019 which saw the administration of longstanding Western adversary Omar Al Bashir toppled, with Sudan’s political future still uncertain as nationalist, pro-Western, Islamist and other factions continue to vie for influence. The MiG-29M deployments has been met with a number of different interpretations, including a sign of support for the Sudanese Military amid growing instability internally. The Sudanese Air Force itself operates the MiG-29 as its primary frontline fighter, albeit the older but still relatively modern MiG-29SE variant, which until 2015 had a significant qualitative edge over anything in the Egyptian fleet due largely to its use of active radar guided R-77 missiles. Egypt itself was able to acquire the R-77 from 2015 alongside its MiG-29M jets – providing the most advanced air to air missile in both fleets and Egypt’s only active radar guided missile with a range exceeding 100km.

Sudanese Air Force MiG-29 Fighters Escort Su-24M Strike Fighter | Military Watch Magazine

 

Interoperability between Egyptian and Sudanese air units is expected to be high, and could improve considerably as the two carry out more joint exercises. With Cairo aligning itself closely with Russian since the overthrow of its Western backed Islamist government in 2013, and opposing Western designs in both Syria and Libya, greater Egyptian involvement in Sudan has the potential to tip the balance against of Western interests in the country, reversing many of the gains made since the coup against the Bashir government. While relations between the two East African states have historically been far from positive, with territorial disputes surrounding the Egyptian-held Hala’ib triangle area ongoing, the emergence of common perceived threats to both countries could well lead to the forging of a robust partnership.

The X Factor in China-UAE Relations: The Horn of Africa

The Diplomat | From port competition to the Somaliland issue, China and the UAE’s conflicting interests in the region are not easy to reconcile.

May 03, 2019

On April 26, Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid al-Makhtoum, the ruler of Dubai, signed $3.4 billion in investment deals between the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and China. These contracts were hailed in Dubai-based news outlet, Khaleej Times, as a catalyst for a UAE role in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Overall, annual trade between China and the UAE is expected to increase to $106 billion by 2022.

While this major boost to the China-UAE economic partnership follows years of strengthening trade links, the foreign policies of both countries are not aligned in numerous respects. The most commonly cited obstacles to a durable China-UAE partnership stem from Beijing’s deepening economic links with Iran and Qatar, but conflicting interests on the Horn of Africa could also emerge as a cleavage between the two countries. The primary areas of contention between China and the UAE in the Horn of Africa relate to trade policy and the status of Somaliland, an autonomous region of Somalia that has independence aspirations.

Latent China-UAE tensions over trade policy have persisted since Djibouti rankled Dubai-based port company DP World by selling a 23.5 percent stake in Doraleh Container Terminal to China Merchants Port Holding Company (CMP) in 2013. Relations between DP World and CMP have since deteriorated considerably. In November 2018, DP World filed a lawsuit against CMP and accused the Chinese port company of breaching its contractual obligations. Frustration with CMP’s conduct caused the DP World chairman, Sultan Ahmed bin Sulayem, to condemn China’s “predatory” trade practices and accuse China of engaging in debt trap diplomacy at the January 2019 Davos World Economic Forum.

While UAE officials have cautiously framed the DP World-CMP incident as an isolated case and insisted that Abu Dhabi will not take sides in the U.S.-China trade dispute, the ambitious trade policies of both countries suggest that China-UAE trade conflicts in the Horn of Africa could become more frequent. As China’s economic interests on the Red Sea continue to grow, the UAE could see the leverage accrued by its investments in critical ports, like Saudi Arabia’s Jeddah and Somaliland’s Berbera, be eroded by Chinese competition, resulting in new sources of tension.

In addition to trade disputes, differing views between China and the UAE on the status of Somaliland could emerge as a future source of friction between the two countries. As UAE-Somalia relations have deteriorated markedly since Mogadishu refused to join the blockade against Qatar in June 2017, Abu Dhabi has deepened its relationship with Somaliland. The UAE plans to have an operational military base in Berbera by June 2019 and has trained Somaliland’s military personnel as part of this basing agreement.

Ali Bakeer, an expert on the Gulf region at Ankara’s ORSAM think tank, told The Diplomat, that the UAE’s investments in Somaliland aim to separate the autonomous region from Somalia and resemble Abu Dhabi’s support for separatist enclaves in other regions, like southern Yemen and northern Syria. This policy is squarely at odds with China’s efforts to promote power centralization in Somalia, and frequently stated opposition to external interference regarding Somaliland’s status. As China strengthens its pivot toward Somalia, due to Somaliland’s objection to Mogadishu’s decision to grant Chinese ships fishing rights in Somaliland ports, this policy divergence could sharpen in the months to come.

In spite of these disagreements, the China-UAE relationship in the Horn of Africa has yet to devolve into a state of strategic competition. The UAE remains focused on restricting Turkey’s influence on the Red Sea, as Ankara’s close ties with Somalia and burgeoning relationship with Sudan threaten to undercut Abu Dhabi’s geopolitical aspirations. China is the UAE’s leading supplier of manufactured goods and industrial materials, and Abu Dhabi’s BRI integration goals also restrict its ability to directly confront China in the Horn of Africa.

The most significant geostrategic risk that could convert latent China-UAE tensions on the Horn of Africa into a more hostile relationship is Abu Dhabi’s continued militarization of the region. The UAE’s takeover of the Yemeni island of Socotra in May 2018 highlighted its willingness to unilaterally use military force to bolster its regional influence. Although the UAE ultimately withdrew from Socotra as a result of Saudi Arabia’s mediation efforts, concerns are growing that the UAE’s aggressive pursuit of new bases in the Horn of Africa will exacerbate regional power rivalries and trigger an accidental interstate conflict.

Although Chinese officials have remained silent about the UAE’s activities in the Horn of Africa, Beijing’s numerous investments in Somalia, Djibouti, and Ethiopia ensure that it does not want the region to become subjected to an interstate conflict. In order to highlight its desire to avoid an interstate war, China has emphasized the stabilizing nature of its base in Djibouti and has offered to mediate border disputes between Eritrea and Djibouti.

To the UAE’s credit, Abu Dhabi played a crucial role in successful resolution of the Ethiopia-Eritrea protracted conflict in June 2018, and these diplomatic actions reflect its interest in preserving collective security on the Horn of Africa. Nevertheless, the UAE’s continued hostility toward Somalia suggests that it is not universally committed to this goal. If Abu Dhabi’s tensions with Mogadishu persist as Ethiopia seeks to mediate a truce between Somalia and Somaliland, the credibility of the UAE’s efforts to frame itself as a stabilizing force in the Horn of Africa could be tarnished and tensions with China might commensurately rise.

Although the China-UAE bilateral relationship is rapidly strengthening, especially in the economic sphere, both countries possess conflicting interests in the Horn of Africa that are not easily reconcilable. While these disagreements are unlikely to threaten the UAE’s aspirations of BRI inclusion or its trade deals with China, they add a layer of tension to the Beijing-Abu Dhabi relationship that could surface in a more significant way in the event of renewed conflict on the Horn of Africa.

Will Ethiopia-Eritrea Peace Last?

National Interest | Michael Rubin | History warns the relationship between these two countries could suddenly turn sour again.

When Eritrea won its independence in 1993 after a thirty-year struggle against Ethiopia, there was optimism that peace would hold. Long-time dictator Mengistu Haile Mariam resigned on May 21, 1991, and fled into exile in Zimbabwe. Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki and the new Ethiopian leader Meles Zenawi had been comrades-in-arms against Mengistu’s regime. It looked like the two would lead their respective countries into a period of both peace and prosperity. In a book review for the Financial Times, British writer John Ryle recalled a 1995 celebration in the northern Ethiopian town of Mekelle:

“The two guerrilla movements had fought together to defeat the Derg, then – unprecedentedly – agreed to an amicable secession. In western diplomatic circles, Meles and Isaias were being touted as a new breed of African statesman. That evening on the outskirts of Mekelle, I watched as Meles, Isaias and other guests, serenaded by Mahmud Ahmed, a veteran Ethiopian pop star, danced together in the moonlight.”

Such episodes would not last. Just three years later, a series of skirmishes between Eritrea and Ethiopia over relatively minor border disputes would erupt into a full-scale conflict. The land they disputed had no real resources. It seemed so irrelevant that the conflict was often described as “two bald men fighting over a comb.”

Whereas Isaias and Meles once danced at Mekelle, soon Eritrean aircraft were bombing it. Sniper fire, artillery barrages, tank fire, air raids, and land grabs slowed into a stalemate and World War I-like trench warfare replete with human wave assaults. By the time both sides agreed to a ceasefire, at least one hundred thousand Ethiopians and Eritreans had died in combat. The peace was cold, however, and at times it appeared as if hostilities might again erupt.

Both countries used the crisis as an excuse to clamp down. Whereas once diplomats and analysts hoped Eritrea might become a democracy, it quickly descended into autocracy. In 1999, Freedom House lowered its rating to “not free.” Isaias used the conflict to institute near-indefinite conscription—lasting decades and often indistinguishable from slavery. Ethiopia, meanwhile, while never quite as extreme, also slipped back into repression.

That Eritrea and Ethiopia have been a hairs’ trigger away from renewed conflict made their sudden 2018 rapprochement all the more remarkable. Many observers credit the Ethiopian parliament’s appointment of Abiy Ahmed, a young former guerilla fighter and intelligence officer who had previously led Ethiopia’s equivalent of the National Security Agency. His political work—efforts to address both youth unemployment and the plight of the displaced as well as his ability to build cross-ethnic coalitions—shot him to prominence.

Abiy called for peace upon his inauguration and wasted no time to pursue it. Even seasoned veterans in the region, however, were surprised by the speed with which Isaias reciprocated his efforts. In September 2018, the two leaders signed a peace agreement in Saudi Arabia. The rapprochement has been rapid, as Ethiopians and Eritreans reunite families and resume trade. There is widespread speculation that Abiy could win the Nobel Peace Prize.

Alas, while Abiy appears sincere, it is far from clear Ethiopia-Eritrea peace will last. Here’s the problem. The seventy-three-year-old Isaias sees himself less as an equal to the forty-two-year-old Abiy than as a father figure and guide. Even at the best of times, Isaias’ concept of diplomacy is dictating his position and then waiting for opponents to accept it without any compromise. When the adversary or partner is a generational younger, the chances that Isaias will compromise recede from miniscule to nonexistent. Bilateral issues will inevitably arise, and it is unclear whether ordinary Ethiopians—let alone a fictitious political coalition—will back repeated Abiy’s concessions. After all, from the Ethiopian perspective, they are now Africa’s second most populous country after Nigeria and, with more than 100 million, they dominate East Africa. Isaias sees Eritrea and Ethiopia as equal, but Ethiopians will never accept equality with a country whose population is just one-twentieth of their own.

So, when Isaias raises a complaint and Abiy has no room to maneuver, what Isaias do? In the past, Isaias has shown a willingness to subordinate regional security and his country’s economic health for the sake of his own twisted sense of personal honor. Just as Isaias and Meles went from comrades and friends to enemies within just a few months, so too could Isaias and Abiy. Add into the mix that Ethiopia is growing more democratic while Eritrea has become the North Korea of the African continent, and Isaias has personal reasons to put the brakes on or even reverse the peace. Isaias may temporarily welcome the economic infusion that peace brings his devastated and impoverished country, but he will not continue it at the expense of his own power.

Is peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea a good thing? Certainly. But optimism should not cloud diplomats and analysts to reality, nor do dictators like Isaias suddenly change their stripes or behaviors overnight. Realism dictates not only rightly celebrating progress, but also recognizing just how tenuous it may be and planning proactively for the chance that the rapprochement might be fleeting.

Michael Rubin is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute.