HORN OF AFRICA

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Ethiopia’s worsening crisis threatens regional, Mideast security

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Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed (C-L) meets with members of Sudan’s ruling military council after his arrival at Khartoum International Airport, Sudan, June 7, 2019. Photo by Ashraf Shazly/AFP via Getty Images.

Source: Al-Monitor | Payton Knopf and Jeffrey Feltman

With the Horn of Africa increasingly becoming an integral part of the Middle East’s security landscape, the fallout from Ethiopia’s current crisis will have a significant impact on states of the region.

The Gulf Arabs recognize a strategic reality that has eluded the stove-piped US foreign and security policy bureaucracy for too long: The Horn of Africa is an integral part of the Middle East’s security landscape, and increasingly so. No country demonstrates this more clearly than Ethiopia. That country’s escalating internal crises pose an increasingly grave threat not only to the country’s citizens but to international peace and security and to the interests of the United States and its partners in the Middle East, principally Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

As a recent bipartisan study group convened by the US Institute of Peace (USIP) concluded, developments in the Horn of Africa are not only shaped by the states of the Middle East “but also have a direct impact on [these states’] political, economic, and security environments.” Ethiopia’s internal and external borders are being changed violently, and the centrifugal forces of nationalism that now dominate Ethiopian politics are indicative of the weakness of the central state, not the strength of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed or the federal government. These intrastate fissures are undermining the country’s territorial integrity and morphing into interstate conflicts involving, to date, Eritrea and Sudan.

The armed confrontation that erupted Nov. 3 between the federal government and the regional government in Tigray state precipitated what Abiy characterized as a “domestic law enforcement operation.” The involvement of Eritrean combat forces, however, as well as the federal government’s use of airstrikes, mechanized ground units and ethnic militias undermines the credibility of that characterization. Similarly, assertions that the operation has succeeded in stabilizing Tigray is belied by the persistent violence in the region; a worsening humanitarian emergency; the government’s unwillingness to allow adequate access for a humanitarian response; and reports of severe human rights abuses, including of Eritrean refugees in Tigray being killed or forcibly returned to Eritrea.

The war in Tigray is symptomatic of a national political crisis in Ethiopia, which preceded Nov. 3 but has been exacerbated by the nationalist rivalries that have been unleashed since then. Much of western Tigray may now be occupied by Amhara regional state forces, and a border war has erupted between Amhara militias and the Sudanese military. Ethnically motivated killings of Amhara, Oromo and others in Benishangul-Gumuz regional state have precipitated the intervention of Amhara security forces, an unprecedented military deployment by one of Ethiopia’s states into another. In addition, the federal government has been engaged in an intensifying campaign against insurgents in Oromia regional state for months. While each of these conflicts involve historic and complex claims over territory, resources, identity and political representation, the pursuit of those claims by force of arms has set the country on a trajectory toward fragmentation.

The fallout for the states of the Middle East is significant

First, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have both made considerable political and economic investments in the leadership in Addis Ababa, Cairo and Khartoum, investments that will be undermined by bourgeoning conflict among the three. Egyptian-Ethiopian relations have long been strained by the dispute over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), and Ethiopian-Sudanese relations have become increasingly toxic due not only to the GERD but to the border conflict. The recent spike in violence in Benishangul-Gumuz, where the dam is located, could also pose a threat to the control and function of the dam itself. The Nile is an emotive and sensitive issue in Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan, and the crisis facing Abiy’s government makes any realistic compromise even more difficult.

Second, Ethiopia’s fragmentation could portend displacement on a scale not seen in modern times. In 2018-19, approximately 300,000 people — the vast majority of whom were Ethiopian and Eritrean — fled the Horn of Africa for Yemen, in spite of that country’s civil war. As the USIP senior study group report warned, the breakdown of Ethiopia — a country of over 110 million people — would “result in a refugee crisis that could easily dwarf that figure.” Over 56,000 refugees have already fled from Tigray into Sudan since November. Large-scale refugee outflows could destabilize Sudan’s delicate transition, and the consequences of state collapse in Ethiopia would also certainly extend across the Red Sea.

Third, calls for the secession of one or more of Ethiopia’s states are gaining steam, which would put additional strain on the already fraying state system in the Middle East, wracked as it is by the ongoing wars in Libya, Syria and Yemen. Somewhat unique among world regions, the Horn of Africa has several recent experiences with secession — Eritrea from Ethiopia in 1993, South Sudan from Sudan in 2011 and the self-declared independence of Somaliland from Somalia in 2001. The prospects and ramifications of further changes to the regional order should not be underestimated.

Fourth, the risk of radicalization is real should extremist groups exploit the political and security crises inside Ethiopia, particularly if Abiy and his supporters continue to reject dialogue as a means of channeling political grievance. For example, al-Shabab, the Islamic State or al-Qaeda could play for advantage inside Ethiopia’s Somali region or among disaffected and disenfranchised Muslim communities in Oromia and elsewhere.

Brute force is no more likely to be successful in Ethiopia than it has been in Syria in preserving the integrity of the state or in mitigating threats to its neighbors or to the states of the Middle East. Nor can elections that Abiy has announced for June be credible, free or fair in the current political and security climate and therefore able to reconcile the competing visions for the country’s future. The political transitions that have unfolded in Ethiopia and Sudan in the last two years in fact illustrate that the restive and youthful body politics of the Horn of Africa are too diverse, pluralistic and eager for political change for authoritarian repression to result in stability.

Ethiopia’s recent history provides a sobering precedent.  In 2015-16, large-scale protests against Ethiopia’s federal government, which was then dominated by Tigray’s ruling party, was met by a military crackdown that both failed to quell the unrest and led to expanding violence. The widening political and security catastrophe only abated with the resignation of former Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn, the promise of a new political dispensation heralded by Abiy’s accession to the premiership and his articulation of a reform agenda that included a loosening of restrictions on civic space and the prospect of a more inclusive political discourse.

Similarly, when a junta deposed Omar al-Bashir following months of nationwide protests in Sudan, there were those within the security services and among their supporters abroad who argued that stability could be achieved through military rule. This proved elusive, however, amid the massacre of protesters at a sit-in in Khartoum and continued mass demonstrations demanding civilian rule. Following talks between the junta and the umbrella group representing the protesters, an agreement was reached to form a transitional government based on a cohabitation arrangement between a civilian-led Cabinet and a council chaired by the military until elections in 2022 — an agreement due, in part, to diplomatic coordination between the United States and the Gulf. While fragile, this negotiated arrangement has so far averted fears of a slide into civil war akin to that of Libya, and Sudan is now a more responsible member of the international community than it has been at any time in the last three decades.

The Gulf states’ policies toward the Horn of Africa are undoubtedly rooted in their own strategic and political calculations. They understand that the two sides of the Red Sea comprise an integrated region that transcends the geographic distinctions between Africa and the Middle East. The close bilateral relationships that Saudi Arabia and the UAE have cultivated with Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia, alongside Abu Dhabi’s historic ties with Asmara, can be strong assets in stabilizing the Horn of Africa in the long term. The long-awaited reconciliation among the Gulf Cooperation Council countries could also alleviate competitive pressures in Somalia, where Qatar has supported the federal government and the UAE has backed the federal member states.

US-Gulf coordination is needed most urgently, however, in the case of Ethiopia. The Gulf states’ explicit or implicit support for Abiy’s shortsighted approach or for Eritrean military intervention not only risks implicating the Gulf in the humanitarian emergency in Tigray but damaging their own strategic interests as the Ethiopian state deteriorates. While Abiy and the federal government continue to prejudice military action over dialogue — not just with Tigrayan leaders but across the political spectrum — there is an urgent need for a process that provides an opportunity to build a new national consensus in Ethiopia, including an understanding of the electoral calendar. The United States and its Gulf partners must cooperate in promoting and supporting such an effort.

Strong Defence on a Shoestring Budget: How Capable Are Ethiopia’s Armed Forces?

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Source: Military Watch Magazine

Ethiopia has long faced a precarious security situation, enduring threats from a number of sources including the Al Shabab militant group operating from neighbouring Somalia, territorial disputes with neighbouring Eritrea which is highly militarised and fields a relatively well trained force of over half a million, and the Egyptian Air Force due to ongoing possibility of attacks on Ethiopian damming infrastructure over water rights. Despite this, Ethiopia has maintained one of the smallest defence expenditures on the African continent relative to the size of its economy – allocating just 0.8% of GDP to the military. By contrast, the higher income economies of neighbouring Sudan and Egypt spend 2.6% and 1.7% respectively, while Eritrea is estimate to spend over 4% of GDP on its armed forces. Ethiopia’s expenditures amount to around $330 million per year, a very low figure to maintain a modern military. Despite its very conservative budget, the East African state has become a potent force capable of securing itself against numerous threats, with the European Union’s representative in East Africa Alexander Rondos having stated to this effect that the Ethiopians “scare the hell out of everybody” – Al Shabab included.

Ethiopia has in recent years invested in modernising its air defence capabilities, deploying Russian Pantsir air defence combat vehicles from 2019 and modernising its S-75 high altitude systems with modern electronic warfare countermeasures. Modernised S-75 systems have demonstrated the ability to seriously threaten fourth generation fighters in the past when properly used, and Ethiopian forces have compensated for one of the system’s primary weaknesses, their lack of mobility, by mounting them on the chassis of T-55 battle tanks to considerably improve their survivability. The Ethiopian Air Force is also among the most capable in Africa, ranked fourth on the continent in 2020, with a buildup of modern fourth generation fighters having begun in the mid-1990s during the country’s war with Eritrea. At the time, with Eritrea purchasing of MiG-29 medium weight fourth generation jets, Ethiopia acquired a sizeable fleet of 12-16 Su-27 heavyweight aircraft which were the most capable fighters available for export at the time. The Su-27 fleet has since seen some conservative modernisation efforts, although Ethiopia has not sought to expand their capabilities with more costly investments in R-77 active radar guided air to air missiles or Irbis-E radars as Russia has done under the Su-27SM2 program. Even without such upgrades Ethiopian Su-27s are still considered the sixth most capable fighters in Africa, after having been comfortably in first place when initially purchased. They are the only Su-27s in the world which have seen air to air combat against other fighter aircraft, downing four Eritrean MiG-29s during the war for no losses with kills primarily achieved within visual range.

Ethiopian Air Force Su-27 Heavyweight Fighters | ©Military Watch Magazine

To provide air support for its ground forces Ethiopia has reconfigured its second class of fighter, the third generation MiG-23, to deploy almost exclusively for such a role. It also deploys an unknown number of Su-25 attack jets and 18 Mi-24/35 attack helicopters, all of which are capable of providing close air support to ground units. Looking to ground units, the country deploys a respectable 135,000 man strong professional army, with North Korean Ch’onma Ho battle tanks and second hand Ukrainian T-72 tanks forming the bulk of its armoured units. Approximately 200 of each are in service. North Korea has also supplied VTT-323 APCs and M-1977 self propelled artillery systems, and has provided extensive assistance in developing a domestic arms industry capable of producing BM-21 rocket launchers, rocket propelled grenades, small arms and ammunition. These were set up in the mid 2000s, and Ethiopia has continued to benefit greatly from its defence ties to the East Asian state since.

The Ethiopian military appears to have learned from its war with Eritrea that relying on large numbers of poorly trained and scarcely armed personnel would expose it to massive casualties. A focus on large manpower, while attractive given the size of the population and the very low living costs in the country,  proved almost entirely ineffective against the Eritrean military in the early stages of the war, and only the rapid development of a more elite force with better training, better arms and proper air support allowed it to push back and recover territory lost in the war’s initial stages. Indeed, the Ethiopian military received support and training for both its People’s Militia and its special forces from North Korean specialists at the Tarek Army Camp and other facilities. The relatively small size of the country’s armed forces today, and its reputation for very high training standards and effectiveness, has largely come as a consequence.

Egyptian Air Force Su-35 Heavyweight Fighter | ©Military Watch Magazine

Ethiopia’s military today remains a highly trained and experienced force, and is the fourth largest contributor to international peacekeeping missions in the world in manpower which has provided operational experience in a number of theatres. Reliance on an elite but relatively small military, a highly elite Air Force, well trained pilots, soldiers and special forces, and close military cooperation with North Korea which has provided valuable knowhow and technologies, have helped establish it as a formidable military power and highly secure state in the face of a number of major threats. Eritrea for its part, observing the causes of its neighbour’s success, has itself since 2000 also invested in both developing military ties to North Korea as well as acquiring Su-27 fighters for its Air Force. Nevertheless, security challenges remain very serious, with instability in neighbouring Sudan following following a Western-backed coup removing one of Addis Ababa’s closest security partners and a bulkwark against possible Egyptian interventionism. Moreover, the rapid modernisation of the Egyptian Air Force since 2013 has ended Ethiopia’s considerable former qualitative advantage, and Egypt’s acquisition of Su-35 aircraft has for the first time provided it with a fighter with the endurance needed to carry out effective strike operations against Ethiopian targets.

Reports of Egyptian plans to build a military base in neighbouring Somaliland have only made the security situation more tense, and could lead Ethiopia to invest in more advanced weaponry – possibly including new fighter aircraft such as the Russian MiG-35 or new air defence platforms like the North Korean Pyongae-5 or its more recent successor. With the country continuing to enjoy high levels of economic growth, far exceeding those of its neighbours including Egypt, Ethiopia’s defence budget is likely to increase considerably over the coming decade. This will provide greater opportunities for its traditional arms suppliers such as North Korea, Russia and Ukraine, and could see it emerge as a much more formidable military power.

The Middle East Cold War Behind the Ethiopian Crisis

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On the ground, the fight between the Federal Army and TPLF troops has been determined by drones. The drones take off from the base of Assab that is operated by the UAE, formerly used as a base for its military operations in Yemen.

Source: Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI) | Federico Donelli

The operation conducted by the Ethiopian Federal Army in the northern Tigray region threatens to trigger a further wave of instability in one of the most vulnerable areas of the world. Ethiopia is the keystone of a very fragile arc of instability that has Afghanistan on one side, and Libya on the other. Accordingly, it would be narrow-minded to consider the impact of the current crisis on the Horn of Africa alone. By examining it from a regional angle, it is possible to identify a variety of issues that render the context highly volatile. These concerns range from the outstanding dispute over water in the Nile Basin to the two proxy conflicts in Yemen and Libya, passing through the complex Sudanese political transition to the weak sovereignty of the Somali government. The scenario sketched thus provides both the suitable milieu for the spread of transnational challenges – Islamic radicalism, internally displaced persons, human smuggling, piracy, warlords – and the ideal arena for competition among external actors.

Since 2011, the most fragile countries of the above-mentioned arc of instability have become the battleground of the new cold war among the leading players of the Middle East. As in post-World War Two, the United States and the Soviet Union brought competition and clashes into the so-called ‘Third World’, nowadays, the small-to-medium Middle Eastern powers have broadened the arena beyond traditional regional borders. Among the determinants of this dynamic are both the opportunity offered by the permissive multipolar order at the global level and the need to preserve domestic order. Specifically, to avoid spillover effects that would threaten the survival of their regimes, the Middle Eastern players have exploited the fragility or even the collapse of some states (Yemen, Libya, Syria, Somalia, Sudan, Iraq) to export competition into third country contexts. The struggle has in some cases turned into violent conflicts, either through direct intervention (Syria, Yemen) or through the backing of local groups (Libya). In other cases, it has become a war of friction aimed not only to gain influence but, above all, to reduce rivals’ gains. The relational concept of power drives the current Middle Eastern chessboard. The Horn of Africa, due to its strategic centrality (Red Sea, Yemen, Suez) and its historical-cultural proximity, has witnessed a process of gradual ‘Middle-Easternisation’ in recent years. In other words, local dynamics have been partly absorbed and partly superseded by regional logic and interactions.

Ethiopia has partially escaped from these logics thanks to its political and economic weight. Further, Addis Ababa has tried to profit as much as possible from the Middle Eastern scramble. Evidence of this can be found in the fact that all the Middle Eastern players have tried to nurture diplomatic and trade relations with Addis Ababa. Recent developments, however, seem to have thrown Ethiopia into the melee. In 2018, the rise of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Aly to government has been marked by the normalisation of relations with Eritrea. The ‘peace-cum-security pact’ was signed in 2018 in Jeddah. Far from being symbolic, the choice was indicative of the role played by two Gulf monarchies – Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) – in the rapprochement between Eritrea and Ethiopia. Few international observers at the time of the signing imagined that one of the Ethiopian prime minister’s mid-term goals was to hit the Tigray (Tigray People’s Liberation Front, TPLF) elite. A target that has become evident in recent weeks when the advance of the Ethiopian army toward Tigray’s capital, Mekelle, has been supported politically and, according to the TPLF forces also militarily, by the Asmara government. On the ground, the fight between the Federal Army and TPLF troops has been determined by drones. The drones take off from the base of Assab that is operated by the UAE, formerly used as a base for its military operations in Yemen.

Despite the TPLF’s allegations, it is not possible to assert a direct involvement of either the KSA or the UAE in the Ethiopian crisis. However, it is also appropriate to consider their role from behind the scenes. In so doing, it should be noted that although the regional policy of the KSA and the UAE is usually portrayed as a shared one, in practice there are several points of disagreement. Different positions have emerged in two regional scenarios where the KSA and the UAE are involved and operative: the war in Yemen, and the transition in Sudan. Even the stance that the two Gulf monarchies have adopted in the wake of the recent U.S. presidential elections would seem to distance them from each other. There has been growing concern in Riyadh that the Biden administration may assume a less tolerant attitude towards Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s methods. The comeback on the political scene of the Saudi King Salman bin Abdulaziz and the attempts to ease tensions with Turkey and Qatar would seem to be two significant clues. In Abu Dhabi, on the contrary, there would seem to be a rush to exploit the free rein guaranteed by Trump’s presidency. Hence the Emirates have been accelerating their plans for normalization with Israel, but also for the building of new alignments, as demonstrated by the joint drills with Egypt and Russia. As shown by the Russian talks to establish a naval base in Sudan, Egypt and Russia would seem to become the main partners of the Emirates in the Horn of Africa. A trio that stands to fill the vacuum left by the United States.

From the angle of the Middle East cold war, the UAE and Egypt are the two actors who could gain the most from Ethiopian instability. In the worst-case scenario for Addis Ababa, the resistance of the TPLF could turn into armed guerrilla warfare; in the best case, it would lead to a complicated process of post-war reconstruction and trust-building in the Tigray region. In both cases, Ethiopia should devote its resources to the domestic field. A context of instability that would benefit Egypt and the UAE more than any other players in the area. In fact, a weak Ethiopia would give a further boost to Egyptian ambitions in the region; the balance of power in the Nile waters issue would change. Likewise, the African Union – whose headquarters are in Addis Ababa – could reconsider its intransigent position towards Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi. For the UAE, a weakened Ethiopia as a commercial-military dependent would fit in with its overall designs on the region. Furthermore, the Ethiopian crisis may affect Somalia, an already fragile state whose security is also ensured by AMISOM troops (mostly Ethiopians). A new wave of turmoil in Somalia would undermine the system-building projects of the two main UAE-Egypt rivals – Qatar and Turkey -, and generate new challenges and vulnerabilities in the whole Horn of Africa.

Talks Over Ethiopia’s GERD Reached A Deadlock

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Talks Over Ethiopia’s Nile Dam Hit Another Deadlock, Egypt Says Bloomberg

Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia failed to agree on the way forward for talks on Ethiopia’s giant dam on a Nile River tributary, Egypt’s Foreign Ministry said in a statement.

The matter is being referred back to the chairman of the African Union, which is mediating the discussions, the ministry and Sudan’s state news agency SUNA both said.

 

Renaissance Dam talks resume after Sudanese blockage Arab News

The Sudanese delegation said it demanded a comprehensive agreement that addresses all issues related to the dam. It also said that the AU should play a more effective leadership role in the negotiation.

Egyptian Minister of Irrigation Mohamed Abdel Aty met with the US Secretary of the Treasury Steven Mnuchin last week to review negotiations on the GERD and Egypt’s desire to complete the negotiations.

 

GERD negotiations reach a dead-end. Ahram-Online

“Sudan insisted on the necessity of delegating the African Union appointed experts to present solutions to the disputed issues in the talks and to elaborate on the GERD agreement; something which both Egypt and Ethiopia rejected because the negotiation process, as well as the right to draft the texts and provisions of the filling and operating agreement of the GERD, are fundamental rights for the three countries,” said the Egyptian statement.

“We cannot continue this vicious cycle of round talks indefinitely, considering that the GERD represents a direct threat to the Roseires Dam, which has a reservoir capacity less than 10% of the GERD’s capacity if the filing and the operations of the GERD starts without an agreement and daily exchange of information,” said Sudanese Minister of Irrigation and Water Resources Yasser Abbas.

 

Sudan refuses to split GERD negotiations into two agreements. LomaZoma

Sudan refused Sunday to split agreements on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), for the first filling and permanent operation as two separate agreements.

“Sudan does not tolerate nor can it bear to proceed with endless negotiations, without results or solutions,” Abbas said.

 

Nile dam row: Egypt, Ethiopia, Sudan fail to reach consensus on negotiation mechanism MENAFN

Sudan insisted on the need for mandated experts designated by the African Union (AU) to propose solutions to the contentious issues under negotiation, and to draft an agreement.

Both Egypt and Ethiopia rejected the Sudanese proposal, as they stressed the right of the three parties to formulate the agreement. This is especially as the AU experts have no experience in the technical issues related to the project.

The meeting concluded that the South Africa’s representative would submit a report to South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, on the outcomes of the talks to consider the coming step.

Suspected Chinese hackers stole camera footage from African Union

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Source: Reuters | Raphael Satter

WASHINGTON (Reuters) – As diplomats gathered at the African Union’s headquarters earlier this year to prepare for its annual leaders’ summit, employees of the international organization made a disturbing discovery.

Someone was stealing footage from their own security cameras.

Acting on a tip from Japanese cyber researchers, the African Union’s (AU) technology staffers discovered that a group of suspected Chinese hackers had rigged a cluster of servers in the basement of an administrative annex to quietly siphon surveillance videos from across the AU’s sprawling campus in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia’s capital.

The security breach was carried out by a Chinese hacking group nicknamed “Bronze President,” according to a five-page internal memo reviewed by Reuters. It said the affected cameras covered “AU offices, parking areas, corridors, and meeting rooms.”

“We cannot estimate the quantity and value of the data which have been stolen,” the memo continued, adding that while AU technicians had managed to interrupt the flow of data, the hackers could easily regain the upper hand.

“We are still weak to prevent another attack,” the memo said.

The alert, drafted in late January and circulated to senior officials, provides a glimpse of how world powers are jockeying for influence and visibility at the continent’s paramount pan-African organization. Some American and European officials have voiced concern as Beijing has stepped in to meet the AU’s needs – part of an Africa-wide shift that has seen China become the continent’s top creditor. Chinese workers built the AU’s showpiece new conference center in 2012 and Chinese technicians still help maintain the organization’s digital infrastructure.

The Chinese mission to the AU said in an email that “the AU side has not mentioned being hacked on any occasion” and that Africa and China are “good friends, partners and brothers.”

“We never interfere in Africa’s internal affairs and wouldn’t do anything that harms the interests of the African side,” the email said.

Repeated messages sent to AU spokesperson Ebba Kalondo asking about the January breach were marked as “read” but went unanswered.

Longstanding doubts over Beijing’s role at the AU spilled into the open in 2018, when French newspaper Le Monde reported here that AU employees had found that the servers at the new conference center were sending copies of their contents to Shanghai every night and that the building itself had been honeycombed with listening devices.

Both the AU and the Chinese government vehemently denied the report at the time, but a former AU official told Reuters the article in Le Monde was accurate and had put officials there on high alert over cyberespionage.

The former official said the latest breach was discovered following a tip from Japan’s Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT), which in a Jan. 17 email alerted AU officials to unusual traffic between the international organization’s network and a domain associated with Bronze President.

Koichiro Komiyama, who directs the global coordination division of Japan’s CERT, confirmed to Reuters that he sent the warning after a fellow researcher discovered the malicious traffic while picking through the hacking group’s old infrastructure.

The AU memo said that, within days of Komiyama’s email, the AU’s information technology team had traced the suspicious traffic to a set of servers in the basement of the organization’s Building C – part of an older complex across the road from the new conference center.

The memo said the hackers were able to siphon off “a huge volume of traffic” from the servers by hiding it in the regular flow of data leaving the AU’s network during business hours, even pausing their data theft during lunch.

Secureworks, an arm of Dell Technologies Inc which has been tracking Bronze President since 2018, confirmed that the malicious domain identified by Japan’s CERT was linked to the hackers.

Secureworks researcher Mark Osborn said his company had seen strong evidence that Bronze President operated from China, adding that it had been detected in several espionage campaigns targeting China’s neighbors, including Mongolia and India.

Any official protest over the spying is unlikely, according to the former AU official. He said China plays a critical role in keeping the organization running, including during an incident in June when part of the AU’s network was knocked out by a power failure and Chinese technicians swiftly repaired the damage.

For that reason, the former official expects that the surveillance camera incident – like the listening devices reported in 2018 – would be swept under the rug.

“Attacking the Chinese, for us, it’s a very bad idea,” he said.

 

Reporting by Raphael Satter; editing by Jonathan Weber and Edward Tobin

Somalia: America’s Next “Afghanistan?”

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Source: 1945.com | Edward Chang

On March 3, 1994, the United States military accomplished what has become unthinkable today – complete a total withdrawal from an ongoing conflict.

After the political fiasco wrought by the Battle of Mogadishu on October 3 the year prior – immortalized in the book and motion picture adaptation Black Hawk Down – President Bill Clinton ordered an end to the American military intervention in Somalia, which began late in the George H.W. Bush administration as a part of an international humanitarian effort. Somalia had been wracked by civil war since the fall of the incumbent Communist military dictatorship in 1991, leading to a state of near-anarchy and brutal civil war to fill the power vacuum.

27 years later, it is deja vu all over again as U.S. troops once again find themselves leaving Somalia at the orders of outgoing President Donald Trump. Only this time, it is not a withdrawal, but a relocation. Most of the approximately 700 troops in Somalia are being re-deployed to friendlier countries in the region, including Africa Command’s in-theater forward headquarters, Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti. Meanwhile, a small number of troops will remain in Somalia to continue a mission begun in the mid-2000s, during one of the most intense cycles of the War on Terror.

In other words, America’s military posture in the Horn of Africa remains largely unchanged.

Though the public is less aware of U.S. military involvement in Somalia versus Afghanistan and Iraq, it is no less emblematic of America’s difficulty in ending the “endless wars.” The humanitarian intervention, which began in December 1992, was ultimately the first foray into a country the U.S. still cannot quit. Less than 10 years after the ’94 withdrawal, Somalia was again being eyed as a target in the War on Terror. Through three administrations, covert military actions were taken through the intelligence community, special operations forces, and mostly unmanned airstrikes, an effort that dramatically escalated during the Trump administration.

The ultimate benefit of these operations remains in doubt. In December, the Justice Department announced it had charged Cholo Abdi Abdullah, an operative for Somalia-based jihadist militant group al-Shabaab, an al-Qaeda affiliate. Abdullah had been arrested in 2019 in the Philippines for plotting a 9/11-style terror attack on the U.S., using a hijacking and a commercial airliner as a missile. Some commentators cited the plot to criticize Pres. Trump’s decision to withdraw from Somalia.

However, the plot not only ensued despite the military offensive against al-Shabaab in Somalia, but much of it was also orchestrated far from the group’s “safe haven.” It is not clear how authorities were alerted to and thwarted the plot, but the fact it went as far as it did despite such intense counter-terrorism efforts is troubling. Anecdotal evidence from one journalist suggests the offensive approach to terror in Somalia is actually having a counter-intuitive effect, making al-Shabaab more capable of implementing terrorism overseas.

There is plenty of room for debate on these questions. However, there exists something of a consensus that al-Shabaab constitutes the next big terror threat to the U.S. This consensus first publicly emerged during the Obama administration, when the group carried out the Westgate mall attack in Nairobi, Kenya on September 21, 2013. During the next few years, concerns increased that al-Shabaab could strike the American homeland, possibly through sympathizers in places like Minnesota, where a large Somali-American community exists. In early 2015, the Mall of America was specifically cited as a target of attack by the group, and numerous Americans have been arrested and charged with aiding al-Shabaab.

More recently, Michael Rubin of the American Enterprise Institute compared threats against the U.S. made by Hassan Dahir Aweys, an Islamist leader associated with al-Shabaab, to statements made by Osama bin Laden in the 1990s, culminating in the devastation of 9/11. The group has racked up quite the death toll, attempting an airline bombing in 2016, executing a dual truck bombing in October 2017 that killed over 500, a January 2020 attack that killed three Americans and destroyed multiple aircraft and ground vehicles, and numerous other deadly incidents, including one already in 2021.

What this all points to is a jihadist group that is becoming increasingly dangerous and as active as al-Qaeda, Hamas, and ISIS. Like the former, but not the latter two, al-Shabaab clearly has global designs and appears to possess the fundamental capacity necessary to attempt such attacks, along with potential insiders in the U.S.

Judging the likelihood of a devastating terrorist attack by al-Shabaab on U.S. soil is something of a fool’s errand since nobody wants an attack to happen and such a likelihood can only be assessed in the event an actual plot is put into play. What has become clear is that if a major terror attack were to occur on U.S. soil that can be traced back to al-Shabaab, then this would make Somalia a primary focus of American foreign policy once more. The withdrawal of troops from the country would appear, in retrospect, to have been a serious mistake and military intervention in the country would again escalate.

In fact, a war in Somalia is virtually assured in response to a successful al-Shabaab operation. Unlike Afghanistan 2001, U.S. forces are already in-theater and would have the support of a friendly regime in Mogadishu. This makes military retaliation much easier to facilitate. A massive ground intervention, like the one seen in Afghanistan and Iraq, or even Somalia back in the days of George H.W. Bush, is unlikely and unnecessary, given the existing footprint, the non-necessity of regime change, and the lack of a conventional military threat. This war will instead involve larger numbers of intelligence operatives and special operations forces on the ground, accompanied by precision airstrikes, a sophisticated approach that has become the choice of policymakers seeking to fight terror at as low a cost as possible with as great an impact as possible.

But this also means the U.S. will find itself fighting in Somalia for a long time. The bitter experience of the last 20 years has proven that insurgency, militancy, and terrorism are extremely difficult, if not impossible, to eradicate and the cost of waging endless war adds up over time. It seems a small price to pay for safety, but as memory of the last terror attack recedes amongst the public, questions about the mission will surely rise. Meanwhile, that same memory of the last attack will make policymakers reticent about withdrawing troops from Somalia, just as they are unwilling to withdraw troops from Afghanistan and Iraq today, even with public sentiment firmly in the “withdrawal” camp.

For now, the U.S. should proceed with its Somalia exit. Meanwhile, it ought to be hoped the fight will continue successfully in the cloak-and-dagger world to avoid terrorists from drawing America back into another endless war.

Edward Chang is a defense, military, and foreign policy writer. His writing has most prominently appeared in The American Conservative, The Federalist, The National Interest, and Spectator USA. Follow him on Twitter at @Edward_Chang_8.

 

China Has Been Spying on the African Union Headquarters

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Beijing has gone out of its way to gain information on African leaders in order to compel and coerce them into supporting China’s international goals.

Source: National Interest | Joshua Meservey

Last week, a report emerged that hackers, probably from China, had been filching security camera footage from inside the African Union headquarters building in Ethiopia. Several years ago, AU technicians discovered that the building’s Huawei-provided servers were daily exporting their data to Shanghai, and that the walls of the Chinese-built headquarters were peppered with listening devices.

It is a strange way for Beijing to treat a continent whose rulers have emerged as key backers of its international agenda. Yet the Chinese government’s spying, which almost certainly extends far beyond the African Union headquarters, may in fact be one of the reasons why African rulers are willing to defend Beijing’s increasingly indefensible actions.

Beijing’s opportunities for eavesdropping in Africa are vast. Chinese companies—many of which are state-owned, all of which are legally obliged to cooperate with the Chinese Communist Party on intelligence matters—have built at least 186 government buildings in Africa, including presidential residences, ministries of foreign affairs, and parliament buildings. Huawei has built more than 70 percent of the continent’s 4G networks and at least fourteen intra-governmental ICT networks, including a data center in Zambia that houses the entirety of the government’s records.

The report—now confirmed by two other media outlets—that broke the original story of the Chinese government’s AU spying demonstrates what Beijing can do with a structure one of its company builds. The AU’s compromised ICT system was also provided by Huawei, whose equipment is often swiss chees-ed with security vulnerabilities that make them easily exploitable. Given Huawei’s links to China’s Ministry of State Security, it beggars belief that Beijing lacks anything less than an excellent idea of how to access those backdoors.

Beijing has many reasons to take advantage of the spying opportunities its companies’ activities in Africa provides. It can eavesdrop on the sensitive conversations they have with their non-African counterparts, and the Chinese government might be able to gather useful economic information it can pass to its many companies operating on the continent.

Yet as the Chinese government becomes more aggressive internationally, it likely increasingly values the information it gathers in Africa for its use in maintaining and expanding African decisionmakers’ support for Beijing’s global agenda. African states are consistent apologists for the Chinese regime’s oppression of its ethnic and religious minorities, vote frequently with Beijing at the United Nations (often in opposition to the United States), and usually back Chinese candidates vying for leadership of important international agencies.

Recent bombshell revelations demonstrate Beijing’s commitment to influencing foreign leaders. A Chinese spy named Christine Fang spent years developing personal ties with local politicians primarily from California. Fang arranged donations for, and even managed to place at least one intern with, U.S. Rep. Eric Swalwell, who is now a current member of the sensitive House Intelligence Committee (Swalwell cut ties with Fang after receiving an FBI briefing about her spying).

In early December, Director of National Intelligence John Ratcliffe wrote of a Chinese influence campaign aimed at “several dozen“ Congressmen and Congressional aides. China, in fact, targets Congress six times more frequently than does Russia, according to Ratcliffe. Meanwhile, a branch of the Chinese Communist Party known as the International Department, which is responsible for cultivating sympathy for the CCP with foreign politicians, claims to have ties with over 600 political groups in more than 160 countries.

African leaders, of course, do not need to be persuaded to accommodate China on certain issues. Many of their countries face a massive infrastructure gap, and Beijing is often happy to open its wallet for infrastructure projects. Affordable Chinese products, especially tech such as smartphones, are popular on the continent as well.

Yet the Chinese government spends a lot of time and energy trying to influence African leaders to support Beijing’s agenda at a level beyond what simple concern for their countries’ national interests would prompt. These charm campaigns include everything from bribery to throwing up flashy infrastructure projects during election times to lavishing “no-strings-attached” aid on rulers to feed their patronage networks.

The information that Beijing appears to be hoovering up daily is of obvious use for those kinds of influence operations. It could offer insights into an official’s habits, personality, and proclivities that would help Beijing effectively cajole or coerce him or her. A key element of Christina Fang’s approach was to get as close as possible to her targets; electronic surveillance access to a target’s most sensitive haunts would offer the sort of extensive surveillance a human spy could only dream of.

China has built access to African leaders that will be impossible to roll back in the immediate term. Washington, however, can begin building a response that is as patient and far-seeing as China’s strategy has been. One element of that must be complicating what is currently Beijing’s almost unfettered surveillance access to Africa.

Joshua Meservey is a Senior Policy Analyst specializing in Africa and the Middle East at The Heritage Foundation.

U.S. Military Base Penetrated By Somali Militants

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Military Watch | Dash-8 Spy Plane and C-146 Transport Destroyed

The Somali militant group Al Shabab launched a successful attack on a U.S. military base in Kenya, the Manda Bay Airfield, on January 5th. The attack follows longstanding tensions between the group and American forces in the region, and amid at time when the U.S. is expanding its military presence in East Africa. A spokesman for U.S. Africa Command stayed regarding the attack: “U.S. Africa Command acknowledges there was an attack at Manda Bay Airfield, Kenya and is monitoring the situation.” The attack was eventually repelled with four militants killed, but they succeeded in neutralising multiple American aircraft on the ground including a C-146A Wolfhound tactical transport and a Dash-8 spy plane. The Dash-8 is equipped with synthetic aperture radar capable detecting ground targets across an area nearly two miles wide, depending on its fight altitude, and also deploys a sensor turret with electro-optical and infrared cameras. Al Shabab claimed it had inflicted heavy casualties on U.S. and Kenyan forces, but this has yet to be confirmed. Al Shabab has been designated a terrorist organisation by a number of Western states, including, Australia, Canada, the United States, New Zealand and Britain, as well was by the United Arab Emirates and Singapore.

The Potential Impact Of Us Troop Withdrawal For The Future Of Somalia

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The decision of the outgoing Trump administration to pull out US troops from Somalia by 15 January has come at a particularly critical period for the East African region. This could have broader security and humanitarian implications, threatening the progress of the past decade and leaving the country exposed to the influence of regional actors. 

Source: Global Risk Insight

The changing security landscape and the limits of Somalia’s military dependence

On 4 December 2020, President Trump announced the withdrawal of the US from Somalia by 15 January 2021. This decision serves the administration’s stated goal of reducing US presence globally, including in Afghanistan and Iraq. Specifically, the US is expected to withdraw all of its 700 troops in Somalia, which mainly have been tasked with providing training and conducting counterterrorism missions against al-Shabaab and IS. It is expected that the US forces will continue conducting airstrikes against al-Qaeda’s affiliate, al-Shabaab, operating from the US stations in nearby Kenya and Djibouti. In fact, the majority of US forces in Somali will be redeployed to these two neighbouring countries. 

In November 2020 the country’s greatest security guarantor in the region, Ethiopia was caught into a one-month internal conflict with its own breakaway region of Tigray, exposing Somalia’s security dependence. Prioritising the conflict in its own territory, Addis Ababa withdrew its own troops from its neighbouring state in order to redeploy them in the fight against Tigray People’s Liberation Front.  Following Ethiopia’s withdrawal of its non-AMISOM forces (approximately 600 troops) from Somalia, Trump administration’s decision could leave a disastrous security vacuum.

Even though 80% of governmental employees are employed in Somalia’s security sector, the local community, sub-federal authorities and the national government itself have historically relied on the role of militia groups in the fight against insurgents or terrorists. These state-aligned groups of militias have often taken advantage of their importance by exercising abusive power and control at local level. Absent of the US military presence in Somalia, and given the reduced Ethiopian military footprint, the complementary importance of these groups to the Somalian official security forces could increase, sustaining a culture of impunity and questioning the rule of law and the long-term stability.

The local political context and the security situation

The withdrawal of US troops from Somalian soil takes place during a peculiar period for Somalia. Firstly, Somalia is expected to hold both parliamentary and presidential elections in the next two months. A standoff between the ruling party and the opposition groups has currently stalled the electoral procedure. Initial deadlines have already been missed. The public is increasingly losing faith in the electoral process as competing interests between federal and regional authorities and groups could threaten the current fragile balance.

Secondly, the state of Somalia is currently fighting against both Al-Shabaab in its southern and central regions, and the Islamic State in Puntland, a self-administering entity since the late 1990s. Even though Al-Shabaab officially holds control of less territory compared to 2011, the organisation is increasingly pervasive across Somalian territory, including in Somaliland and Puntland. It is currently in charge of a parallel system of governance, relying heavily on the extraction of money, crops and other resources from the rural population in the areas of its control. Bombing attacks against civilians and suicide attacks launched in Somalia’s capital, Mogadishu, by Al-Shabaab have intensified in 2020. Since 2010, it has been responsible for the deaths of over 4,000 civilians. Indeed, the US withdrawal means a blow for the Somali forces – in both psychological and operational terms –  at a critical stage in their fight against these terrorist groups and their efforts to secure the Horn of Africa.

Regional competition and intra-national divisions

As the US is stepping out of the country, regional powerful actors are vying for greater influence, adding Somalia to their broader geopolitical calculations. Thus, Somalia has become a theatre of the regional competition in the Gulf between the competing blocks of Turkey and Qatar on the one side, and Saudi Arabia and UAE on the other.

Turkey, one of the first countries to establish diplomatic relations with Somalia following the termination of its civil war in 2011, was among the key contributors to the humanitarian relief efforts during the drought of the same year. Since then, Ankara has expanded its presence both commercially and militarily.  Additionally, Mogadishu was one of the few regional capitals choosing to abstain from the blockade against Qatar imposed by Saudi Arabia, Egypt, UAE and Bahrain in 2017. Since then, Qatar has politically and diplomatically backed Somalia’s current president and has pledged significant economic support, mainly through financial and infrastructural aid. Currently, Doha is moving ahead with the construction of a new port in the central Somalian town of Hobyo.

On the other hand, UAE maintains military presence in Somaliland, a non-recognised self-declared country internationally considered to be part of Somalia, while Saudi Arabia has recognised Somaliland’s passports. Moreover, the UAE has cultivated ties with opposition parties and other federal states within the country, mostly through its own economic aid and investments. For the time being, the influence of the two regional blocks in Somalia has been restrained.

Finally, with regards to the US interest and the broader geopolitical implications, the withdrawal could also allow China, a country maintaining a naval base in neighbouring Djibouti and increasingly concerned about further potential instability in the Horn of Africa due to its ambitious geo-economic projects. Filling the void, Beijing could choose to step up its maritime security cooperation with US partners present in the region, such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Similarly, the US strong presence in the area has so far prevented Russia from establishing a naval base in the Horn of Africa. However, the current developments could embolden Kremlin’s reported plans of establishing their own base in Somaliland’s port of Berbera. 

Interstate regional competitions through proxies and the support of opposing local parties in intra-state power plays could prove detrimental to the country’s fragile internal unity, undermining years of state-building efforts. Additionally, Somalia’s state structures, including the local police and the security forces, are struggling in the fight against phenomena of endemic corruption and fiscal mismanagement. Given these chronic problems, underpaid governmental forces are subject to foreign influence, bribing and infiltrations, providing foreign actors with a fertile ground for maneuvers.

The examples of proxy wars in a variety of different ongoing conflicts (Yemen, Syria, Libya), largely driven by the geopolitical aspirations of regional powerhouses, could serve as a cautionary tale for Somalia, a country characterised by ethnic divisions. Overall, the vacuum created by the US withdrawal could render Somalia into an increasingly geopolitically  contested  arena.

The volatile situation in the Horn of Africa and the upcoming Biden Administration

Hence, the international community needs to pay closer attention to the Horn of Africa. Past experience has shown that societal unrest and conflicts – both inter-state and intra-state ones- in this region are closely interconnected. Presently, it remains unclear whether the upcoming Biden administration will reverse the withdrawal decision.  Nevertheless, the capacity of the Somalian state to exercise monopoly of control remains highly relied on the US’ high profile alignment with its government in the security sphere. A resurgence of terrorist groups such as Al-Shabaab in Somalia remains more likely in 2021, following the US withdrawal and could result in another humanitarian and refugee crisis with a potential spillover of violence.

Geopolitical dynamics in the Horn of Africa

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An Emboldened Horn of Africa Axis and an Unfolding Humanitarian Crisis Await the Biden Administration

By Guled Ahmed | Middle East Institute

Summary

The Biden Administration is set to face a series of challenges in the Horn of Africa. Given growing Russian and Chinese involvement in this strategically important region, U.S. policymakers should be attuned to the historical background and current dynamics in the relevant countries. In the Horn of Africa, the U.S. can ameliorate the COVID-19 pandemic, stem ongoing civil strife, and ease intraregional tensions. To achieve these objectives, the U.S. will need to adopt bold strategies based on lessons from the past. This article provides essential context about the region and proposes policy measures for the incoming administration.

Introduction

As Joe Biden prepares to take office on Jan. 20, 2021, the U.S. and the world are facing multiple crises. Now is one of the worst times in American history as the country struggles through a major economic recession and a pandemic that has taken more than 300,000 American lives. Biden is no stranger to economic crises, having served as vice president under the Obama administration during the Great Recession in 2009. Undoubtedly, Biden’s experience as a senator and VP makes him ready to tackle America’s domestic challenges and to reset relations with its allies.

In the Horn of Africa, his upcoming administration will grapple with longstanding challenges. However, this time, he will have to deal with the emboldened and unchecked leaders of the Horn of Africa — Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed of Ethiopia, President Mohamed Abdullahi (Farmaajo) of Somalia, and President Isaias Afwerki of Eritrea. Recently, the three leaders have formed an axis through the Horn of Africa Cooperation (HoAC) deal to consolidate security, stability, and economic integration.1

The main driver of the HoAC is PM Abiy, who wants to access Somali ports for trade and promote military and economic integration in order to influence Somali politics and economy. More multilateral agreements and initiatives may come on the heels of the HoAC. In the long term, integration may become possible once the three countries stabilize and resolve their border issues.

In terms of foreign involvement in the region, the Horn of Africa could become a theater for the escalating Cold-War-like dynamic between the U.S and Russia. With its increasing power and influence, Russia could repeat strategies from Syria in the Horn of Africa and help prop up leaders of the Horn of Africa Axis who are desperate to stay in power, regardless of the results of democratic elections. Because the incoming Biden Administration will advance human rights and democratic elections, Horn of Africa leaders may turn to Russia for protection instead.

The Unfolding “Triple Threat” Humanitarian Crisis

The Horn of Africa has suffered multiple disasters since the start of 2020, including the COVID-19 pandemic, recurring deadly floods, and devastating locust attacks. Several donors and humanitarian agencies have increased calls for support to tackle the “triple threat” in the region. Even before the current crises, Somalia, one of the world’s most fragile states, suffered droughts in 2017 that impacted more than 6 million inhabitants. In 2018 and 2019, the Shabelle and the Juba river riparians had already experienced recurring cycles of drought and floods. And now for the first time in recorded history, the Shabelle River, which is Somalia’s breadbasket, is under a locust attack. A swarm of locusts can occupy 460 square miles and consume up to 6,000 metric tons of food daily. The current swarms can inflict the equivalent of more than 120,000 hectares of crop damage within the Shabelle River Basin. Combined with flood damages this year and previous instability, Somalia could experience catastrophic food insecurity and mass starvation similar to the horrific 1974 drought.

In Ethiopia, another full-scale humanitarian crisis is unfolding due to the ongoing civil war between the government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) in the Tigray region. Locust attacks have also compounded the impact on citizens. The current invasion of desert locusts is the worst that Ethiopia has experienced in 25 years. Furthermore, the COVID-19 pandemic has hurt economic conditions by restricting the agricultural supply chain, productivity, and cross-border trade. On top of these external factors, agriculture export revenue is already negatively impacted by Ethiopia’s currency devaluation. These conditions could push Ethiopia into starvation, mass migration, and multilateral ethnic conflict, and thus threaten overall regional stability.

Country Profiles from the Horn of Africa

The Post-Cold War Horn of Africa is fragile and susceptible to cyclical crises as a result of conflicts and increased climate change. This region also suffers from the legacy of ruthless dictators, such as Mengistu Mariam of Ethiopia and Siad Barre of Somalia. After both dictators were overthrown, new governments adopted systems of fragile ethnic federalism and decentralization that are now destabilizing the region.

Ethiopia

Ever since Abiy was selected as prime minister in April 2018, violence driven by ethnic tensions has gripped Ethiopia and displaced 1.8 million people. Abiy’s vision of a centralized power controlling the political process and economic development appears to be irreconcilable with the ethnic federalism enshrined under Article 39 of the Ethiopian Constitution. While nationalism has kept Ethiopia together for the past 30 years, it has also created division and hostility between Abiy’s reformist government and the TPLF and Oromo opposition leaders who have returned from exile.

With his political reforms intended to promote Ethiopian nationalism failing, he has also hastened economic liberalization through privatization and currency devaluation. The U.S. dollar has appreciated against the Ethiopian birr by more than 35% as the country simultaneously faces a severe export decline, yearly debt payments surpassing $1 billion, and declining domestic borrowing. Overall, this trend has forced Ethiopia to print money at an unsustainable rate. “Abiynomics” will burden Ethiopia with unpayable IMF loans and Chinese loans to finance dam projects. Furthermore, borrowing has increased the debt-to-GDP ratio to over 50%, a rate that is unsustainable, especially for a country that experiences annual major droughts. This rate of borrowing ultimately forced Ethiopia to reschedule 60% of its loan repayment.

To divert public attention from the impending economic crisis and unrest that have tarnished Abiy’s image, he has turned the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam dispute with Egypt and Sudan into a nationalist rallying cry and canceled an agreed-upon deal. Similarly, opposition groups have accused him of taking advantage of the COVID-19 pandemic to unconstitutionally delay the national election, extending his term for almost another year. These actions have incited major opposition, especially from militias in Oromo and Tigray, which threatened to form a caretaker government following Article 60, Section 5 of the Ethiopian Constitution. Abiy took this threat seriously and decided to jail the outspoken Oromo opposition leader Mohamed Jawar. Furthermore, the federal government declared the regional Tigray elections illegal and imposed an economic embargo, which contributed to the civil war. Despite Abiy claiming victory at the end of November, 2020, the war rages on, with thousands displaced and effects that could destabilize the entire region.

Somalia

In Somalia, Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo became president in February 2017 through indirect elections by tribal chiefs. His election was marred by corruption even though he ran on an anti-corruption platform.5 Despite his promises, Somalia has been named the world’s most corrupt country three times in a row by the Corruption Perceptions Index. Furthermore, despite his anti-Ethiopian platform, Farmaajo became President Abiy’s reliable ally during his tenure.6 Abiy even seem to have convinced Farmaajo of the idea of “Greater Horn of Africa Economic Integration.” The two leaders also have similar political preferences. Both are against federalism and for centralized government, despite the weak Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) that only controls parts of the capital with the help of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the Somalia donors fund. Instead of cooperating with federal member states (FMS), he started dismantling the federal system through electioneering that installed his allies as state leaders. Starting with Southwest State, his forces arrested the likely winner, clearing the path to victory for his hand-picked candidate. This move caused a backlash that was particularly intense in Baidoa, where the Somali National Army along with Ethiopia violently cracked down on protests in December 2018.

In response, UN Somalia Special Representative Nicholas Haysom requested an investigation. Haysom was allegedly expelled so that the Ethiopian Army and Somalia National Army could conceal their crimes and avoid potential prosecution.7 The FGS succeeded in further electioneering by installing their preferred candidate in Galmudug and Hirshabelle states. The FGS was unable to pull off the same feat in Puntland.8 In Jubbaland state, Kenyan AMISOM troops almost clashed with Ethiopian AMISOM troops who are pro-Farmaajo.

Mogadishu, which is in the Benadir region, has become the city with the most internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Africa due to local conflicts. The FGS has paralyzed the city’s economy and mobility, essentially turning it into an open-air prison where IDPs are more than 25% of the population. Not only do the residents of Mogadishu live under difficult circumstances, they also provide taxes to the federal government without enjoying political representation in the Senate. This is because Mogadishu is not recognized as a federal state, which entails less autonomy.

The general condition of Somalia has declined under Farmaajo, The security improvements created by his predecessor, Hassan Sheikh, have vanished. The robust GDP growth of 4% has dropped below 2% and export revenue dropped by 70%, a figure unseen since the 1980s. Foreign direct investment decreased and domestic revenue was below 2016 levels. While not attributable to Farmaajo’s policies, Somalia has also seen a decline in remittances. In an apparent reflection of its corruption, the federal government has camouflaged aid from donors like Qatar as domestic revenue in order to meet debt relief obligations and improve its image abroad.9 Despite Somalia’s lack of financial accountability and illegitimate tax revenue increases, the IMF and World Bank determined that the country has reached the “decision point,” at which heavily indebted poor countries are considered to have met the obligations for interim debt relief. The U.S. has further enabled Farmaajo by supporting debt relief and turning a blind eye on FGS human rights abuses, their war against FMSs, media repression, and deteriorating security. However, the U.S has suspended military aid over corruption concerns.10

As a primary foreign donor to the FGS, Qatar is another important player in the region. Beyond propping up FGS, Qatar has allegedly encouraged violent extremism and instability. A cellphone call obtained by the New York Times captured the Qatari ambassador to Somalia stating that a terrorist bombing in Bosaso was carried out to further Qatari interests.11 Similarly, Somali intelligence chief Fahad Yassin Hajji Dahir, who is alleged to have ties with al-Qaeda, is currently said to be engineering the re-election of Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo.12 This major foreign interference could have serious consequences, such as igniting public unrest and possibly even a civil war similar to that in 1991, which overthrew Siad Barre, Farmaajo’s uncle.13

Eritrea

While there are no major violent conflicts in Eritrea, the government shows many of the same pathologies as Ethiopia and Somalia. Although Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki has rehabilitated his image through the historic peace deal with PM Abiy, he remains a ruthless authoritarian who has been starving his people for the past 20 years. With the peace deal, Isaias Afwerki merely showed the EU a false soft side in order to gain aid and assistance. Thus, the EU diplomats are in essence ignoring the regime’s record of human rights violations and forced labor in order to fund projects that will further Europe’s interest in keeping migrants in Eritrea. The EU has funded infrastructure projects serviced by forced conscript labor, perpetuating a system that the U.N. has defined as “tantamount to slavery.”14 Thus, it seems that the EU has chosen to “hire” a dictator at a low price rather than solve the core issues that cause migration in the first place. This is why the EU Horn of Africa policy is failing: it emboldens dictators to oppress their citizens at the expense of EU taxpayers.

Afwerki is widely unpopular, so he is vulnerable to a potential coup. While Afwerki is a brutal dictator, a coup would certainly be destabilizing. In the past, he narrowly escaped previous coup attempts from dissatisfied armed forces, such as in 2013. It is highly likely that he will face another coup because of his alliance with Abiy, who is particularly disliked among the ethnic Tigray in Eritrea.15

“In the 21st century, the EU and the U.S. have pushed for Horn of Africa integration in three key areas: politics, economics, and security. This encouragement is an important reason why Horn of Africa Axis leaders pursued forming a new regional organization bloc. However, these initiatives have been dead on arrival for various reasons.”

The Return of Russia to the Horn of Africa

Russia has been steadily making inroads with the region’s leaders. While hosting the Sochi Olympics in 2017, Russia seized the opportunity to strengthen its relationship with Africa by organizing the 2019 Russia-Africa summit that saw trade, aid, and military deals offered with no political preconditions. Russia’s goal is to project its power and influence in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea by providing arms and nuclear technology for energy development in exchange for mining natural resources like uranium and gold. Russia is also interested in securing the rights to rare earth elements (REE), which are key ingredients in batteries for electric cars, cell phones, high-tech weapons, and wind turbines. Russia has been steadily accumulating REE to the point where it now has the 4th largest reserves in the world, significantly ahead of the U.S.16

Just outside the Horn of Africa, former Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir signed bilateral agreements with Russian President Vladimir Putin during his November 2017 visit to Russia that included the establishment of a military base in the Red Sea, a nuclear agreement, and modernization of the Sudanese army.17 Similarly, Bashir asked Putin for protection from the U.S.and hired Russian mercenaries to quell citizen uprisings before his overthrow in a military coup.18 It is noteworthy that Bashir’s visit to Russia came after the Trump administration lifted the trade embargo on Sudan and removed it from the travel ban list. This suggests that both the U.S. and Russia are competing for Sudan’s favor.

In the Horn of Africa, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov announced the opening of a logistics center in Eritrea in 2018, but gave few details about its purpose.19 The lack of information likely indicates a larger strategic aim. A Russian logistics center in Eritrea, however, now looks improbable due to the Eritrean government’s realignment toward the UAE and Saudi Arabia, two countries that are loathe to see Russian encroachment in the Red Sea. Opposition from these two Gulf countries will be an obstacle to Russia’s quest to gain influence in the Horn of Africa.

The extent of Russia’s influence on Somalia will largely depend on the results of upcoming elections. One of the candidates for the Somali presidency is former Prime Minister Hassan Ali Khaire, who cofounded Som Oil & Gas. For various reasons, Russia is hoping for his victory. The majority stakeholder in Som Oil & Gas is the Russian national Georgy Djapridze, who is also a close ally of Putin. In November of 2020, Khaire met with Foreign Minister Lavrov to discuss the upcoming elections and the prospects for strengthening Russian-Somali cooperation, particularly trade and economic ties. Such a meeting seems to validate suspicions that Khaire is seeking to obtain Russian assistance in the elections. Given Somalia’s instability, if Khaire wins the presidency he may invite Russian mercenaries to restore order.

In November of 2020, Russia and China indicated their support for the Somali government by abstaining on a vote to renew the UN panel of experts on Somalia, which includes an arms embargo.20 Russia justified its abstention by comparing the vote to lifting the Eritrea embargo in 2018, and China reasoned that the embargo hindered the Somali government’s ability to combat al-Shabab. The true intention behind Russia’s abstention was to protect its interest in selling arms to Somalia, however. China, for its part, wanted to maintain a strong relationship with Somalia, especially as it has received an unmonitored and controversial fishing license from the Somali government. China also supports Somalia on the question of Somaliland.21 China sees Somaliland, a de facto independent state, as analogous to Taiwan. Recognition of Somaliland would thus set a precedent that would undermine the “One China” policy.

The U.S. has left an opening for these powers. The inaction and disengagement of the Trump administration allowed Russia to preemptively protect the region’s new authoritarians. In contrast, the upcoming Biden-Harris administration will likely hold the Horn of Africa Axis accountable for human rights violations and their destabilizing anti-democratic ways. Russia may be a latecomer to the 21st century version of the “Scramble for the Horn of Africa” but won’t mind claiming its spot as a competitor against China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the EU’s initiatives in the Horn of Africa.

Failing Horn of Africa Integration

The idea of integrating the various territories of the Horn of Africa has a long history. Current Horn of Africa integration initiatives echo the idea of “Greater Somalia.” This concept was championed by Benito Mussolini, who hoped to capture British-Somaliland, part of Ethiopia, and Italian Somalia to achieve the grandiose idea of an Italian East Africa empire. Mussolini imagined Italians settling in the territory. He also wanted to connect Assab (a port city in Eritrea) to Mogadishu in order to reduce the export cost of cotton, bananas, and other valuable commodities. In post-colonial times, this vision of integration has been revived and modified. Fidel Castro, for example, proposed a communist federation between Ethiopia and Somalia before the two countries went to war in 1977.

In the 21st century, the EU and the U.S. have pushed for Horn of Africa integration in three key areas: politics, economics, and security. This encouragement is an important reason why Horn of Africa Axis leaders pursued forming a new regional organization bloc. However, these initiatives have been dead on arrival for various reasons.

Events show that the region is disintegrated from a military and political point of view. To give a stark example of regional strife, the Ethiopian army committed war crimes in Somalia in 2006. Ethiopian forces have also not produced tangible results in the war against al-Shabab as a part of the AMISOM force. For its part, the Eritrean government is a former funder of the terrorist group al-Shabab, which has wreaked havoc in Somalia.

Destabilizing actions by Ethiopia and Eritrea in Somalia have precluded political integration. As a former Somali president said, “Simply put, neither Ethiopia nor Somalia is ready for deeper integration. Ethiopia is sliding toward instability and preoccupied with both internal ethnic conflicts and border disputes with Somalia and Eritrea.”22

From an economic point of view, the countries of the Horn of Africa have negligible engagement. This is the case for Eritrea and Somalia. As for Somalia and Ethiopia, several economic barriers currently stand between them. Ethiopia is foreclosing on Somalia’s future water rights by building more dams without consultation, which negatively impacts the Juba and Shabelle rivers. The two countries also do not have a transboundary water agreement, and Ethiopia is notorious for not sharing its river flow data. Already, these actions have contributed to recent floods and droughts according to regional water experts. While cross-border electrification initiatives are pushed by the World Bank and foreign donors to Somalia, they come with high risks such a lack of institutional oversight, infrastructural unpreparedness, and energy security politicization. Furthermore, the two countries have economies that are largely informal and affected by multiple problems such as high inflation, lack of security, indebtedness, high unemployment, and poor infrastructure with limited interconnectedness.

“Without decisive and sustainable policy moves, geopolitical dynamics in the Horn of Africa could sow the seeds for further turmoil within the next 20 years.”

Where the U.S. and EU Are Getting It Wrong

The U.S. has promoted misguided policy in the Horn of Africa region. For example, it supported an Ethiopian incursion into Somalia that resulted in war crimes against residents of Mogadishu in 2006.23 To date, victims have not been awarded any compensation and justice has not been served. In 2010, while speaking at the Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs, current U.S. ambassador to Somalia and former ambassador to Ethiopia(2006-2009), Donald Yamamoto said, “We’ve made a lot of mistakes and Ethiopia’s entry in 2006 was not a really good idea.”

Ambassador Yamamoto would do well to recognize that China poses a threat to U.S. interests in Somalia and to the region as a whole. One way that the U.S. could counter Chinese designs on Somalia is by encouraging the ties between Taiwan and Somaliland. So far, Yamamoto has remained silent about this bilateral relationship even though the U.S National Security Council sent out a congratulatory tweet about this emerging bond between Taiwan and Somaliland. U.S. inaction has emboldened President Farmaajo to align with Beijing.

EU policy toward the Horn of Africa has also yielded mixed results. It is wholly fixated on keeping migrants away from EU shores, making the region a hub for IDPs. The significant presence of IDPs tends to spur conflict. Africa watchers have argued that EU funding without proper checks and balances merely finances kleptocratic authoritarians. This model has already been tested with Turkey in order to keep Syrian refugees outside Europe. A negative consequence of this policy was to give Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan leverage over the EU. While EU leaders claim to want stability for the Horn of Africa, they continue sell arms to the region. In Germany, Chancellor Angela Merkel is pushing arms sales to the region and the continent to counter Russia and China.24 Similarly, French President Emmanuel Macron is helping Abiy develop a navy, despite Ethiopia being landlocked.25

The EU approach to migration, cyclical conflicts, and the impacts of climate change in the Horn of Africa is not working. Rather than throw money at problems, the EU must seek to cultivate good governance and institutions. Perhaps it is time to support an approach to sustainable development that takes power away from dictators and puts it in the hands of local actors. Current strategies have only resulted in mass migration and vulnerable youth who can easily be recruited by extremists. It is not surprising to see recurrent cycles of destruction and humanitarian crises in the region.

Opportunities for Biden

How can the Horn of Africa become peaceful and secure despite high levels of instability, mistrust, and unresolved border issues inherited from colonial times? With the rise of authoritarianism, repressive rule, terrorism, ethnic cleansing, nationalism, economic stagnation, and mass migration, this goal seems to be moving further away. Without decisive and sustainable policy moves, geopolitical dynamics in the Horn of Africa could sow the seeds for further turmoil within the next 20 years. What should the Biden administration do?

China Vaccine Politics

The Pfizer COVID-19 vaccine must be stored at -70 degrees Celsius, which will require costly refrigeration for safe distribution. Unfortunately, almost 40% of the healthcare facilities in Africa don’t have access to electricity, and only 28% of them have reliable electricity. China is speeding up distribution to Africa of its own vaccine, which requires storage at 2 to 8 degrees Celsius. Africa, due to its climate and level of development, may not be able to meet the refrigeration demands for either vaccine. This opens an opportunity for Biden to accelerate vaccine delivery and distribution through humanitarian channels, i.e. USAID and Direct Relief, and through investment channels or public-private partnerships, i.e. the International Development Finance Corporation.

AMISOM in Somalia

Recently the Ethiopian government redeployed 3,000 of its troops from Somalia to the civil war with TPFL.26 The Ethiopian troops in Somalia were ineffective in fighting al-Shabab terrorists, and most of its troops were supporting the government of Somalia to wage war against FMS. The recent U.S. troop pullout under Trump is also likely to embolden al-Shabab to capture more territories. Troops should remain in Somalia, but they should be UN peacekeepers with a five-year mandate rather than ineffective AMISOM troops. Due to their vested interests, countries like Kenya and Ethiopia should be excluded from any peacekeeping mission in Somalia

U.S. Horn of Africa Special Representative

Biden should consider appointing a special representative to oversee security and development in this increasingly important region. The representative’s mandate should also include the Red Sea. This position will help the State Department to better engage regional leaders and allies. Such engagement will help the U.S. to counter the aggressive expansion of Russian and Chinese interest in the region.

Reform Trade

The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) has significantly reduced the continent’s trade deficit with the U.S. to less than $5 billion.27 However, U.S. imports from Sub-Saharan African countries are concentrated in apparel and oil products.28 The Biden administration could increase non-oil exports from the region to the U.S. by prioritizing agro-manufacturing and fish processing industries, setting up more export zones, repealing all Trump tariffs against products that are produced in Africa, and adding new countries to the AGOA, such as Somalia and Eritrea.

War Against al-Shabab

The current government of Somalia has focused on waging war against FMS and instigating clan wars rather than fighting against al-Shabab. The Biden administration should hold Somalia accountable for its failures on human right and counterinsurgency. The administration must adopt diplomatic and economic strategies rather than drones. Furthermore, Biden could consider investing in and providing U.S. army training to local militia and Danab forces. They are more effective than the national army, which is hampered by weak federal institutions.29 Similarly, the Biden administration should invest in a strong finance tracking system and biometric registration, not only to track illegal activities, but also to build a voter registration system and promote democratic elections.
America can no longer sit on the sidelines and allow Russia and China to influence regional leaders, who have become addicted to Chinese predatory loans and Russian AK-47 diplomacy. Biden should implement a strategy that is designed by regional planners and economists, one that is based on strong, democratic institutions with the principle of “one person, one vote” and focuses on capacity building and tangible economic development.

Biden has a difficult task ahead if he is going to de-escalate tensions in the Horn of Africa. His administration has a chance to rectify the mistakes of American presidents over the past half century, who too often turned a blind eye to the destabilizing actions of dictators in the region. It is now or never, and as John F. Kennedy said, “Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make violent revolution inevitable.”

Endnotes

[1] Henneberg, Ingo and Stapel, Sören. “Cooperation and Conflict at the Horn of Africa: A New Regional Bloc Between Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia and Its Consequences for Eastern Africa,” Africa Spectrum, (August 2020). https://doi.org/10.1177/0002039720936689.

[2] Nyabiage, Jevans. “China’s Allies at Loggerheads Over Ethiopia Dam — Will Beijing Intervene?” South China Morning Post, July 26, 2020, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3094650/chinas-allies-loggerheads-over-ethiopia-dam-will-beijing.

[3] Atoma, Bekele. “Jawar Mohammed: The Ethiopian Media Mogul Taking on Abiy Ahmed,” BBC News, July 9, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-53306091.

[4] Elbagir, Nima, Arvanitidis, Barbara, and McSweeney, Eoin. “Forces From Ethiopia’s Tigray Region say Eritrean Troops are Part of the Conflict and the War is Far From Over,” CNN, December 4, 2020, https://www.cnn.com/2020/12/04/africa/ethiopia-war-tplf-exclusive-intl/index.html.

[5] Gettleman, Jeffrey, “Fueled by Bribes, Somalia’s Election Seen as Milestone of Corruption,” The New York Times, February 7, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/07/world/africa/somalia-election-corruption.html.

[6] “Corruption Perceptions Index,” Transparency International, https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2019.

[7] “UN Special Representative to Somalia and Head of UNSOM is “Persona Non Grata” – Somalia’s Foreign Ministry,” Somaliland Chronicle, January 1, 2019, https://somalilandchronicle.com/2019/01/01/un-special-representative-to-somalia-and-head-of-unsom-is-persona-non-grata-somalias-foreign-ministry/.

[8] Hassan, Abdiqani. “Leader of Somalia’s Jubbaland, at Odds With Mogadishu, Wins New Term,” Reuters, August 22, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-politics/president-of-somali-state-of-jubbaland-re-elected-in-divisive-vote-idUSKCN1VC15B?il=0.

[9] Gundel, Joakim. Debt Relief and the Political Marketplace in Somalia. London: London School of Economics Conflict Research Programme, November 2, 2020, http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/107125/1/CRP_debt_relief_and_political_marketplace_somalia.pdf.

[10] Rubin, Michael. “U.S. Ambassador Wasted $1B in Somalia and is Now Funding a Coup,” The Washington Examiner, February 7, 2020, https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/us-ambassador-wasted-1b-in-somalia-and-is-now-funding-a-coup; “Somalia: Journalists Under Attack,” Human Rights Watch, May 3, 2016, https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/05/03/somalia-journalists-under-attack#; Houreld, Katharine. “Exclusive: U.S. Suspends Aid to Somalia’s Battered Military Over Graft,” Reuters, December 14, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-military-exclusive/exclusive-u-s-suspends-aid-to-somalias-battered-military-over-graft-idUSKBN1E81XF.

[11] Bergman, Ronen and Kirkpatrick, David D. “With Guns, Cash, and Terrorism, Gulf States Vie for Power in Somalia,” The New York Times, July 22, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/22/world/africa/somalia-qatar-uae.html.

[12] Rubin, Michael. “Somalia’s Intelligence Chief Worked With an al Qaeda Affiliate, so Why Do We Fund Him?” American Enterprise Institute, November 16, 2020, https://www.aei.org/op-eds/somalias-intelligence-chief-worked-with-an-al-qaeda-affiliate-so-why-do-we-fund-him/; Ali, Abdullahi Mohamed. “Somalia Must Save Itself From Qatar,” The National Interest, June 22, 2020, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/somalia-must-save-itself-qatar-163233.

[13] Henry, Neil. “Rebels Force Somali Leader Out of Capital,” The Washington Post, January 1, 1991, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1991/01/01/rebels-force-somali-leader-out-of-capital/7e7267ef-139c-4108-bf67-73687a26a243/.

[14] Stevis-Gridneff, Matina. “How Forced Labor in Eritrea is Linked to EU-Funded Projects,” The New York Times, January 8, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/08/world/europe/conscription-eritrea-eu.html.

[15] Gettleman, Jeffrey. “Coup Attempt by Rebel Soldiers is Said to Fail in Eritrea,” The New York Times, January 21, 2013, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/22/world/africa/coup-attempt-fails-in-eritrea.html.

[16] “How is Russia Developing Rare Earth Metals?” Mining World Russia, March 3, 2020, https://miningworld.ru/Articles/how-is-russia-developing-rare-earth-metals#:~:text=As%20of%20June%202019%2C%20Russia,and%201.4m%20tons%20respectively.

[17] “Russia to Establish Military Base in Sudan,” Middle East Monitor, November 13, 2020, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20201113-russia-to-establish-military-base-in-sudan/.

[18] “Sudan’s President Bashir Asks Putin for ‘Protection’ From ‘Aggressive U.S.’” France 24, November 23, 2017, https://www.france24.com/en/20171123-sudan-president-bashir-asks-putin-protection-aggressive-us.

[19] Solomon, Salem. “Russia-Eritrea Relations Grow With Planned Logistics Center,” Voice of America, September 2, 2018, https://www.voanews.com/africa/russia-eritrea-relations-grow-planned-logistics-center.

[20] “Adopting Resolution 2551 (2020) by 13 Votes in Favour, 2 Abstentions, Security Council Extends Mandate for Expert Panel on Somalia, Renews Partial Lifting of Arms Embargo,” United Nations Security Council, November 12, 2020, https://www.un.org/press/en/2020/sc14355.doc.htm.

[21] “Report: Somali Fishermen Object to ‘Shocking’ Deal Allowing China in Their Waters,” Stop Illegal Fishing, February 8, 2019, https://stopillegalfishing.com/press-links/report-somali-fishermen-object-to-shocking-deal-allowing-china-in-their-waters/.

[22] Mohamud, Hassan Sheikh. “Somalia Must Learn to Stand Alone,” Foreign Affairs, November 25, 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/africa/2020-11-25/somalia-must-learn-stand-alone.

[23] “Somalia: War Crimes in Mogadishu,” Human Rights Watch, August 13, 2007, https://www.hrw.org/news/2007/08/13/somalia-war-crimes-mogadishu

[24] “Ethiopian Invasion of Somalia, a Debacle U.S. Official Says,” ECADF Ethiopian News, March 13, 2010, https://ecadforum.com/blog1/ethiopian-invasion-of-somalia-a-debacle-u-s-official-says/.

[25] Shelton, Jon. “Angela Merkel Calls for Weapons Exports to Africa,” DW, November 27, 2019, https://www.dw.com/en/angela-merkel-calls-for-weapons-exports-to-africa/a-51441421.

[26] Irish, John. “Ethiopia, France Sign Military, Navy Deal, Turn ‘New Page’ in Ties,” Reuters, March 12, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-france/ethiopia-france-sign-military-navy-deal-turn-new-page-in-ties-idUSKBN1QT2W3.

[27] Marks, Simon. “Ethiopia Withdraws Thousands of Troops From Neighboring Somalia,” Bloomberg, November 13, 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-11-13/ethiopia-withdraws-thousands-of-troops-from-neighboring-somalia.

[28] Grane, Allen. “What is the African Growth and Opportunity Act?” Council on Foreign Relations Africa in Transition, February 17, 2017, https://www.cfr.org/blog/what-african-growth-and-opportunity-act.

[29] U.S. Trade and Investment with Sub-Saharan Africa: Recent Trends and New Developments. Washington D.C.: U.S. International Trade Commission, March 2020, https://agoa.info/images/documents/15766/pub5043-usitc-report.pdf.

[30] Robinson, Colin D. and Matisek, Jahara. “Assistance to Locally Appropriate Military Forces in Southern Somalia,” The RUSI Journal 165, no. 4 (December 8, 2020), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03071847.2020.1830711?journalCode=rusi20&.