HORN OF AFRICA

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Britain understands Sudan’s position on Ethiopia dam negotiations, says ambassador

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MEMO | The UK Ambassador to Sudan, Irfan Siddiq, said on Tuesday that his country understands Sudan’s position on the negotiations over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, Anadolu News Agency reported.

Mr. Siddiq added during a meeting in Khartoum with the Sudanese Minister of Irrigation and Water Resources, Dr Yasir Mohamed, that London would support the dam negotiations until Sudan, Ethiopia and Egypt reach a satisfactory agreement, the Sudanese Irrigation Ministry said in a statement.

Last week, the Sudanese Foreign Minister, Omar Qamar al-Din announced that his country had submitted a list of conditions to the African Union before it returned to meaningful negotiations over the Renaissance Dam, noting that Khartoum was considering alternative options, which he did not clarify.

On 10 January, the Sudanese News Agency reported that the meeting of ministers of foreign affairs and irrigation of Sudan, Egypt and Ethiopia have failed to reach an acceptable formula to continue negotiations on the Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.

For nine years, the three countries have been locked in stalled negotiations over the dam.

Sudan calls on Ethiopia to withdraw its forces from the disputed Al-Fashaqa region

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Source: Ecofin Agency |

Following an emergency meeting of its Security and Defense Council on Jan 17, Sudan called on the Ethiopian government to withdraw its forces from the Al-Fashaqa region, which the two countries have been disputing on for years.

“Despite the military mobilization and build-up carried out by Ethiopia in the areas facing our forces in Al-Fashaqa, we confirm that our forces will remain in their lands to preserve sovereignty stipulated in the charters and agreements that affirm Sudan’s entitlement,” Sudanese Defense Minister Lieutenant General Yassin Ibrahim Yassin said in a press release.

He called on Ethiopia to “withdraw its forces from the remaining positions it still occupies in Maraghad, Khor Hamar, and Ghatar (in the Al-Fashaqa region, ed) as soon as possible in compliance with international treaties and the sustainability of good-neighborly relations.”

The battle between the two countries over this region, inhabited by Ethiopian farmers (who operate land claimed by Sudan), has sharply increased in recent weeks. On Thursday, Sudanese authorities banned flights over the border area after declaring that an Ethiopian military plane had violated Sudanese airspace in a “dangerous and unjustified escalation.” The allegations were denied on Friday by the Ethiopian army chief of staff, General Berhanu Gula.

Last week, Sudan claimed at least five people died in border attacks by Ethiopian government-backed militias and that it will use all “available means” to respond. Earlier in December, Sudan accused Ethiopian “forces and militias” of ambushing Sudanese troops along the border, killing four people and wounding more than 20. The incident resulted in a large number of Sudanese military backups being sent to the border with Ethiopia to “recover land usurped by Ethiopian militias.”

Abdel-Fattah al-Burhan, Chairman of the Sovereignty Council of Sudan, said on Saturday his country did not mean to start a war with Ethiopia and has no interest in doing so. Sudan just wants to protect its border rights.

In a press conference on Friday, the Ethiopian army chief of staff also said Addis Ababa has no interest in going to war with Sudan. He added that if the Ethiopian army went to war, “we would not hide.”

The commander of the Ethiopian army added that a small group within the Sudanese government is working for the benefit of a third party and is standing behind the incursions.

The Al-Fashaqa region borders the Tigray region of Ethiopia where the Ethiopian government has been waging a military campaign against the TPLF since November; a conflict that has led to the exodus of more than 45,000 Ethiopian refugees to Sudan, according to the United Nations.

Tensions escalate between Ethiopia and Sudan

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DW | The already-uneasy relationship between the two countries is showing signs of simmering over into protracted conflict. But how did it reach this point?

Tensions between Ethiopia and Sudan continued to escalate on Tuesday, less than a week after Sudan accused an Ethiopian military aircraft of crossing into Sudan.

The Sudanese army reportedly advanced to the west of Ethiopia’s Gondar region near the border, while residents and government officials claimed some members of the military looted cattle and burned farmlands belonging to Ethiopian farmers.

Ethiopia-Sudan relations have long hinged on mutual suspicion and disagreements over territory.

A fragile peace between the two countries began to unravel in November 2020 after conflict broke out in Ethiopia’s northern Tigray region along the disputed border.

What’s going on with the border?

The border between Ethiopia and Sudan has been disputed for more than a century, with a number of failed attempts to negotiate an agreement on exactly where the border should run.

Treaties drawn up in 1902 and 1907 between Ethiopia and Britain were intended to define the border between Sudan and Ethiopia.

But Ethiopia has long claimed that parts of the land given to Sudan actually belong to them.

“This issue has been shelved for some time and although there was Ethiopian agriculture activity in these areas, there seemed to be an understanding that it didn’t mean it was Ethiopian land,” William Davison, a senior analyst for Ethiopia at International Crisis Group told DW.

Decades of friction and negotiations seemingly ended in 2008 when a ‘soft border’ compromise was reached between the countries.

However, this agreement began to unravel after Ethiopia’s Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) was removed from power in 2018.

The Ethiopia delegation’s head of the 2008 border talks, Abay Tsehaye, was a senior official of the TPLF, which ethnic Amhara leaders have since labeled a secret deal.

Initially, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s friendly relationship with his Sudanese counterpart was cause for optimism.

“After Abiy Ahmed took power, [Abdalla] Hamdok became the Prime Minister [of Sudan],” Phillip C. Jahn the Resident Representative of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Sudan told DW.

“He has spent a long part of his career in Ethiopia, so he knows a lot of people in the TPLF, but he’s also very close to Abiy Ahmed.”

However, attempts to resolve the issue at a regional summit in December 2020 were unsuccessful. Shortly afterwards, clashes between the Sudanese army and Ethiopian shifta forces took place on farmlands in the border area.

“Exactly what has triggered [Sudan’s] assertive move is not clear, but it is that assertiveness that Ethiopia believes goes against the agreements that the parties had to resolve this through negotiations that had led to the tensions,” said Davison.

Tigray conflict sparks Sudanese reaction

Ethiopia is also still reeling from an ongoing armed conflict in the northern Tigray region near the Sudanese border, possibly triggering fears on the Sudan’s side that the Ethiopians may try and take some of the disputed amid the chaos.

“When Amhara nationalists and other elements in Amhara regional state reclaimed territory in Tigray that they say historically was Amhara, they are also looking at regions that were historically part of [Ethiopia],” said Davison.

“This is believed to have led to some concerns in Sudan that the Amhara farmers will consolidate their occupation of these areas which Sudan considered Sudanese.”

Ethiopia’s ambassador in Khartoum, Yibeltal Aemero, also accused the Sudanese military of taking advantage of the Tigray crisis to take control of the disputed land.

“When the Ethiopian National Defense forces moved to Tigray region on November 4, 2020 for the law enforcement majors, the Sudanese army took the advantage and entered deep inside Ethiopian territory, looted properties, burned camps, detained, attacked and killed the Ethiopians while displacing thousands,” said Aemero.

Although Ethiopian government forces declared victory over the TPLF in the northern Tigray region in November, sporadic fighting continues in a number of areas, while the humanitarian situation continues to worsen, prompting calls for access from international aid groups.

Dam friction

Away from the core issue of the border, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam also looms over Ethiopia and Sudan’s tense relationship.

Ethiopia began building the dam in April 2011 about 20 kilometers east of Sudan’s border. Once complete, it will be Africa’s largest hydroelectric power plant. However, no agreement on the use of Nile waters has been reached – much to the concern of Sudan, which relies heavily on the Nile reservoirs for agriculture.

“Sudan was supportive of the Renaissance Dam, which of course can be beneficial to Sudan in terms of electricity, reducing flooding, enhancing irrigation,” explains Davison. “But in the last couple of years Sudan has taken a more assertive stance, it’s stressed its concerns about how the joint operation of the dam and the Sudanese dams are going to be managed…and that’s led to some tensions in the relationship with Ethiopia.”

Is conflict on the horizon?

Despite Sudan’s increasing assertiveness, Jahn said a protracted conflict is not in the best interests of the Sudanese interim government, or the Sudanese people.

“Sudan is in a deep government crisis with hyperinflation,” said Jahn. “It is in the process of negotiating a new government with the rebel groups, the civilian side and the military, which has been repeatedly postponed … Sudan cannot afford this conflict at the moment.”

Still, some civilians are already preparing to get their families near the border out of harm’s way.

“A lot of people in Khartoum are travelling to the east and relocating their family members to the cities,” said Jahn. “So everybody is very afraid of an upcoming conflict.”

But Davison believes that war between Ethiopia and Sudan is “by no means inevitable.”

“We have reached a rather sticky point…but there is also plenty of opportunity for the parties to pull back and take themselves away from the prospect of conflict,” he said.

“The prospect of Ethiopia opening up another major military front is worrying because the country is already very fragile and if it were to have more internal instability that would also have regional ramifications.”

Sudan demands Ethiopia withdraw its forces from ‘occupied territories’ and halt military buildup

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AMN NEWS | On Sunday evening, the Sudanese Security and Defense Council appealed to Ethiopia to “withdraw its forces from the remaining positions it still occupies in Maraghad, Khor Hamar and Ghatar as soon as possible in compliance with international treaties and the sustainability of good-neighborly relations.”

The Sudanese Defense Minister, Lieutenant General Yassin Ibrahim Yassin, stated that “the council was informed of the developments on the eastern borders,” saying that “despite the military mobilization and build-up carried out by Ethiopia in the areas facing our forces in Al-Fashaqa, we confirm that our forces will remain in their lands in order to preserve sovereignty stipulated in the charters and agreements that affirm Sudan’s entitlement,” the Sudanese News Agency (SUNA) reported.

During his meeting with Tut Qalwak, advisor to the President of Southern Sudan, Sudanese Prime Minister Abdullah Hamdok announced Khartoum’s approval of Juba’s mediation to resolve the border dispute with Ethiopia, which has worsened in recent weeks between Sudan and Ethiopia.

On Saturday, Al-Burhan stated that “the conflict with Ethiopia is old and the neighbors attacked Sudanese farmers and seized their lands for decades,” adding that “recognizing the Sudanese areas in which the Sudanese army has recently deployed removes obstacles to relations between the two countries.”

Canada Should Support Ethiopia

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The conflict between Tigray and Ethiopia could cause rifts with other African regions. Canada’s truth and reconciliation experience could help.

Source: Policy Options Politiques | Ann Fitz-Gerald, Hugh Segal

The conflict between the Ethiopian federal government and a group from within its northern state of Tigray has ended according to the Ethiopian government. The view of some analysts is that in this post-conflict phase, there remain risks of insurgency from peripheral regions of Tigray. Rather than any organized armed conflict, or armed regrouping by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the more likely outcome is ongoing sporadic violence leading up to delayed federal elections in Ethiopia, now scheduled for June 2021.

Ethiopia is a significant player in Africa’s future. Canada should support its efforts to limit further violence by considering its experience in other similar international challenges. In the wake of its newly brokered partnership with Ethiopia following Prime Minister’s Justin Trudeau’s visit to Addis Ababa in 2020, it’s time for Canada to use its experience in support of peace and progress in Ethiopia, and across the African continent more generally.

Border tensions could bring other countries into the fray

Of increasing concern for the resolution of conflict in Tigray are recent border tensions between Ethiopia and neighbouring Sudan regarding land that has long been inhabited by Ethiopian farmers in the agricultural region of al-Fashqua. Although precise borders in this area have been contested peacefully since the 1896-1902 Ethiopian-British negotiations, otherwise cordial relations between the two allied countries now appear threatened.

Any new Sudanese hostility towards Ethiopia’s border region could compel Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed to act militarily. This in turn could spur Egypt to become involved to protect its interests vis-à-vis the Ethiopian Grand Renaissance Dam. The dam draws from the Abay River or Blue Nile, which is the main tributary of the Nile River, on which Egypt depends. Heightened Ethiopia-Sudan tensions, and the prospect of Egypt backing Sudan’s position, risks magnifying regional instability. Having these tensions become an international issue will further complicate matters for Prime Minister Ahmed, and potentially undermine and distract from the urgent internal healing and rebuilding processes in Tigray.

Internationalization of Sudan-Ethiopia tensions could realign interests of some groups and create wider internal cracks in an already challenging federalist arrangement in Ethiopia. This is why the international community must keep front and centre the peacebuilding process in Tigray – which requires the confidence and commitment of the Tigrayan people.

Ethiopia’s close partners have concerns about the conflict, which is constraining any unconditional offers of help. Disabled network communications and a lack of access to the conflict area have restricted reliable and verified situational analyses. This suggests that a wide range of perceptions could be influencing the international position on the conflict. International concerns include the role of Eritrea, which neighbours Tigray to its north, and the Amhara Regional State of Ethiopia, neighbouring to the south, in the conflict; media arrests and detentions; and issues concerning humanitarian access and alleged civilian casualties. That some Ethiopia-based advocacy organizations and international actors are not viewed as free from bias is further obscuring clarity around the situation.

Post-conflict dialogue and regional security structures

To heal from the past, there needs to be a post-conflict dialogue, which considers lessons learned from past Truth and Reconciliation Commissions held in other countries. A wider national dialogue has always been planned in Ethiopia, but because there has been so much dispute over the facts of the conflict, this dialogue process may become challenged. To an extent, this is understandable in a diverse and internally competitive, ethnic federalist system which leaves little, if any, room for perceived impartiality and independence, particularly with nine regional ethnic states and two federally administered city-states. It will, however, be essential to establish the truth regarding the facts of the conflict in order to navigate through the national dialogue process that the government seeks to facilitate.

But even if the details surrounding the conflict are established and agreed upon, the challenge then becomes the reform of the regional security structures. If this is not addressed in parallel to dialogue processes, governance and national stability will continue to be undermined.

While the constitution permits the formation of regional security forces to protect the interests of regional states, the relative strength of these security forces has amplified over the years to levels and conduct beyond the scope of the constitution. These regional militia forces have included a “Liyu Hail” (special force) capability which, like the broader regional force, is accountable directly to the regional president.

Precedent for this “Liyu” paramilitary wing was set in Ethiopia’s eastern Somali regional state. Set up originally to defend the region against the threat of an Ogaden National Liberation Front-led insurgency, the loosely structured force subsequently committed grave atrocities and human rights abuses. This Liyu concept of policing was copied in the regional states of Oromia and Amhara, and continued to grow in capacity after Prime Minister Abiy came to power.

Tigray’s regional security architecture is no exception to this setup. It was already quite expansive due to the northern region’s lead role in supporting the armed insurgency which, in 1991, overthrew the Derg military dictatorship. Tigray further increased its militia capacity following both forced and voluntary 2018 retirements of senior Tigrayan officers of the national defence forces, which brought an influx of experienced and knowledgeable operational leaders back to the region.

Truth and clarity are also required on issues concerning regional security structures, not only in Tigray but also in other regions with large militia build up. A recently reformed legal proclamation restricting the development of civil society groups with an interest in security studies has, since 1991, limited useful national data on this issue.

There is ambiguity surrounding the number of sworn members of regional and special forces, the types of weapons they can use, and the circumstances in which force can be deployed. The prospect for future regional-federal tensions will only increase if regional militia and special forces, with different lines of authority than federal forces, are maintained.  Clarity around these issues is particularly important for a pluralist democratic federalist system, which could benefit from different political party affiliations co-existing between regional and federal jurisdictions in the future.

The Ethiopian government should consider inviting a respected, independent and impartial adjudicator to assist with post-conflict dialogue and strategic communications. This would add legitimacy to the country’s reporting on key issues – clarity which is vital to the relationship between the Tigrayan population and the federal government. Too much of the federal government’s focus is on fire-fighting less-than-substantiated allegations, which only legitimizes the allegations and dilutes the progress required on the key priorities of healing and reconciliation.

Based on its view that outside mediation was neither desired nor appropriate, the Ethiopian government declined the African Union’s arbitrary appointment of three former presidents as mediators. The government has initiated a broader national dialogue involving a Reconciliation Commission and an independent committee of facilitators. Independent adjudication to verify alleged facts on the ground from the Tigray conflict is necessary to give traction to this homegrown dialogue process.

Drawing from international lessons learned

There is a long history of truth and reconciliation commissioners in South Africa, Australia and Canada. In South Africa, the process involved creating a forum where victims and perpetrators could testify without fear of prosecution on the cruelty of Apartheid. In Canada, the process was initiated by Prime Minister Stephen Harper following his apology to Indigenous Peoples for the cruelty and trauma of Residential schools. The process helped establish the truth and form a basis for reparations for survivors. The lack of commonly shared “truth” in Ethiopia between some groups creates a need for a commission. The commission would investigate the legitimate concerns that moderate and non-violent Tigrayans might have, allowing Abiy’s government to make progress towards strengthening the Ethiopian federation.

A commission could specify the nature of its mission and the questions it would consider before preparing its recommendations. Two co-chairs, perhaps a prominent and respected Ethiopian academic or judicial figure well-versed in the unique structures of Ethiopian federalism, and an external eminent person, could – together with regional religious and traditional leaders — oversee the data collection, data processing and subsequent dialogue concerning conflict-related issues.

Canada’s contribution to the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning of paramilitary weapons, as part of the Northern Ireland peace process, has relevance to this proposal. Former Chief of Defence Staff, John de Chastelain, supported by reputable Finnish and American representatives, was chosen to chair the commission. The appointment of a Catholic bishop to work with General Chastelain as co-chair for the commission resonates with the integral role of traditional and religious leaders in supporting Ethiopia’s conflict resolution tradition.

An active or retired military leader may be a good choice for co-chairing the Ethiopian commission, because of the non-partisan nature of the military. Such a leader would bring knowledge and insight when developing a workable solution for Ethiopia’s regional security structures.

Knowledge of the country, its federal dynamics, as well as experience with the Tigrayan people, matters. A reputable individual who served with the UN Mission in Eritrea and Ethiopia (UNMEE) following the 1998-2000 Ethiopian-Eritrea conflict could be of value. Canada played a very positive role in that UN mission.

For Canada, beyond the implicit value of supporting democratic federalism in Ethiopia, and contributing to peace, stability and opportunity across the African continent, there is an opportunity to make real the professed global engagement implicit in the “Canada is back” slogan. Foreign policy is about principles, values and interests, and how competently a government advances them in complex global contexts. With recent events in the United States impacting on the perception of its own soft power equity, Canada should not reduce its own soft power projection – one supported by a strong commitment to democratic norms.

Canada’s impact in the past – in Cyprus, in the Middle East and Suez, in Sri Lanka, in Bosnia, on the ending of Apartheid in South Africa – has been real because Canadian leaders and diplomats engaged in situations where Canada could play a constructive role.

Ethiopia plays a major role in the future of Africa. Its legitimate effort at addressing, what appears to have been, an attempted armed attack from some TPLF elements, could benefit from Canadian support and involvement. Canada has genuine experience in similar contexts in other international challenges. It is time to offer that experience in support of peaceful resolution, conciliation and progress in Ethiopia.

Will Somalia Be Collateral Damage of Ethiopia’s Tigray Conflict?

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Source: World Politics Review | Peter Kirechu

In November, as the Ethiopian government escalated its military campaign against the northern Tigray region, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed quietly ordered a drawdown of Ethiopian peacekeepers from neighboring Somalia. The scale of the move is still unconfirmed, but as many as 3,000 Ethiopian troops were reportedly redeployed to fight against the regional ruling party in Tigray, the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front, or TPLF. Around 200 to 300 ethnic Tigrayan soldiers in Somalia were also disarmed, and some may have even been purged from the ranks.

The Ethiopian troops’ departure injects additional uncertainty into Somalia’s already precarious security situation, as it struggles to hold federal elections that were scheduled for this month, while containing a long-running insurgency by the violent extremist group al-Shabab. The situation is further complicated by escalating tensions between the federal government, based in Mogadishu, and Somalia’s semiautonomous regional states—a standoff that bears similarities to Ethiopia’s conflict between the federal government and Tigray. Both Abiy and his Somali counterpart, Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed—who is more commonly known by his nickname, Farmajo—have sought to centralize executive authority within their respective federal governments despite sustained and increasingly violent opposition by powerful rivals.

Although Tigrayans make up only around 7 percent of Ethiopia’s population, the TPLF has played an outsized role in Ethiopian politics for decades, largely due to its leadership of the military campaign to overthrow the old communist dictatorship, the Derg, in the 1980s and early 1990s. In 2006, the TPLF-led government sent troops to Somalia to help secure the country’s nascent transition to a federal government after decades of civil war. Ethiopia later joined the African Union mission against al-Shabab as a troop-contributing country in 2014. These deployments helped foster ties between the TPLF and regional state leaders in Somalia, particularly in the south, where al-Shabab is most active.

When Abiy took office in 2018, however, he promptly began sidelining the TPLF, including by dissolving the old ethnic federalist coalition, known as Ethiopian People’s Democratic Front, and replacing it with a single, pan-Ethiopian political party that the TPLF refused to join. Abiy’s campaign to create a strong central government resonated with Farmajo, who has similarly sought to curb the authority of Somalia’s semiautonomous states. Abiy’s efforts to defang the TPLF and remove ethnic Tigrayans from the ranks of peacekeepers in Somalia can thus be seen as part of a burgeoning partnership between the Somali and Ethiopian leaders, united by their mutual desire to centralize federal power and weaken the political influence of domestic rivals in both countries.

Abiy and Farmajo share a mutual suspicion of the TPLF’s enduring influence within the Ethiopian military and security services. This deep-seated mistrust likely informed the disarming of Tigrayan peacekeepers in Somalia in November, which Abiy’s government defended as an effort to root out the “infiltration of TPLF elements in various entities.” Prior to the recent drawdown, Ethiopia had nearly 4,000 troops assigned to the United Nations Mission in Somalia, or AMISOM, targeting al-Shabab, and an additional 4,000 troops supporting a separate bilateral security agreement between the Somali and Ethiopian governments.

Farmajo is running for a second term in a presidential election that is scheduled for next month, but is likely to be delayed. If his reelection bid is successful—not a certain prospect—his political survival would be influenced by the outcome of the Ethiopian offensive in Tigray. Sporadic fighting is continuing despite Abiy’s declaration of victory in late November, after federal troops captured the regional capital, Mekelle. A decisive defeat of the heavily armed and well-trained TPLF troops would strengthen Abiy’s grip on the military, and may also weaken the TPLF’s historical ties to allies in Somalia, especially those in its southern and central federal member states.

An enduring guerrilla insurgency in Tigray will likely stress Ethiopia’s military resources and raise the prospect of additional drawdowns from the Somalia mission.

Here, Farmajo’s efforts to marginalize his political opponents have been bolstered by Ethiopia’s military presence. It is also in these Somali heartland regions, the epicenter of the al-Shabab insurgency, where Farmajo’s efforts to expand federal authority have faced the most resistance. In 2018, he intervened in a local election in Somalia’s South West state to prevent a former al-Shabab leader and defector, Mukhtar Robow, from competing in the state’s presidential election. Farmajo’s federal government reportedly orchestrated Robow’s arbitrary arrest and detention by Ethiopian security forces, leading to his withdrawal from the race, and the subsequent election of a Farmajo ally.

And last March, Farmajo unsuccessfully tried to intervene to prevent the reelection of Ahmed Madobe, a key political opponent who serves as president of Somalia’s southernmost regional state, Jubaland. Here, again, Farmajo leveraged Ethiopia’s military presence and political support in a bid to unseat an incumbent and expand the federal government’s writ of authority. This effort sparked violent clashes between federal troops and Jubaland’s forces, and drew in both Kenya and Ethiopia—two troop-contributing countries in the AMISOM mission that stand on opposite sides of the fractious dispute in Jubaland.

Kenya has long supported the Jubaland administration of Madobe, a former ally of al-Shabab who now opposes the group. Madobe led the 2012 military campaign that ousted al-Shabab from Kismayo, the regional capital, and has since enjoyed Kenya’s military and political backing. Madobe also has historical ties to the former TPLF-led government in Addis Ababa, dating back to Ethiopia’s military campaign against Islamist extremists in southern Somalia during the 2000s.

Today, al-Shabab has been beaten back from Jubaland’s cities, but it still maintains a presence in rural parts of the state. Kenya, which has suffered from deadly al-Shabab attacks in the past, views Jubaland—and therefore Madobe—as an essential security buffer on its northeastern border with Somalia. Abiy, on the other hand, is suspicious of Madobe’s historical links with the TPLF, as well as other Ethiopian groups that are opposed to Abiy’s agenda.

These tensions imperil AMISOM’s already beleaguered campaign against Al-Shabab, which took a hit from the sudden withdrawal of U.S. troops that President Donald Trump ordered last month. National interests have long driven countries’ decisions on participation in the AMISOM mission, but the rift between Kenya and Ethiopia—and each country’s divergent support for rival domestic factions inside Somalia—fundamentally weakens the AMISOM mission. These tensions may not spill into direct confrontation, but they create an additional wedge that the resurgent al-Shabab can exploit to advance its military and political objectives.

The conflict in Tigray only exacerbates these exigent rifts. An enduring guerrilla insurgency in Tigray will likely stress Ethiopia’s military resources and raise the prospect of additional drawdowns from the Somalia mission. A conclusive TPLF defeat, on the other hand, would embolden Abiy’s centralization campaign—an outcome that would resonate in Somalia and strengthen Farmajo’s like-minded agenda.

While prospects for a negotiated settlement in Tigray are still uncertain, it presents the best opportunity to mediate the Ethiopian federal government’s rivalries with the TPLF and other regional state rivals. Such an outcome could also provide a viable blueprint for the negotiation to ease federal-regional tensions in Somalia, where the effects of the Tigray conflict will likely reverberate for many months to come.

Peter Kirechu is the former director of the Conflict Finance and Irregular Threats Program at the Center for Advanced Defense Studies (C4ADS). He is a specialist on illicit transnational networks in the Middle East and Africa.

Trump’s Withdrawal From Somalia Is a Security Threat. Biden Should Reverse It

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Source: Foreign Policy | Abdi Yusuf

U.S. troops are scheduled to leave the country on Jan. 15, opening the door for al-Shabab terrorists to step up their attacks. The new administration should recommit to protecting the country.

Years of hard-fought gains to stabilize Somalia and defeat the al-Shabab terrorist group are now endangered by President Donald Trump’s threat to withdraw U.S. forces. Not unlike the fragile gains the United States achieved defeating the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, Somalia’s future rests on sound judgment and Washington’s continued engagement. Without persistent pressure from U.S. forces, al-Shabab’s leaders will be able to emerge from hiding, reorganize, and conduct attacks not just in Somalia but across the region, including against key U.S. allies such as Ethiopia and Kenya. However, there’s still time to change course. The current administration’s Jan. 15 deadline to withdraw U.S. troops from Somalia is rapidly approaching.

In all likelihood, the Trump administration will not reverse course on any major policy decision in the lead-up to President-elect Joe Biden’s inauguration on Jan. 20, and the withdrawal will continue as planned. If this is indeed the case, Biden must move swiftly after inauguration to redeploy troops back to their original bases in Somalia.

Biden must move swiftly after inauguration to redeploy troops back to their original bases in Somalia.

Not doing so risks Somalia falling back into the hands of al-Shabab and endangers the lives of not only Somalia’s citizens but those from Western countries residing in the region.

Since 1991, the ongoing civil war in Somalia has killed more than 300,000 people and injured countless others. As the country recovers, a continuing U.S. presence will be crucial to maintaining stability.

Currently, Somalia is showing signs of recovery and gradually becoming a popular destination for business, mainly due to its enhanced security situation in recent years. The persistent efforts of the international community, led by the United States, have made this possible. For decades, the U.S. government has provided training and equipment to Somalia’s armed forces. The U.S.-trained unit Danab conducted many successful operations against al-Shabab, which has killed more than 4,000 people, including Americans.

Two months ago, a CIA paramilitary officer was killed while fighting alongside Danab. In early 2020, al-Shabab launched an attack against U.S. forces in Kenya, killing three Americans and destroying a U.S. surveillance plane.

These sacrifices have not been in vain. Thanks to U.S. involvement in Somalia, a 9/11-style attack against the U.S. homeland was recently foiled—a reminder of the mutually beneficial relationship between the two countries.

This relationship is now at risk. On Dec. 4, Trump ordered the removal of U.S. soldiers from Somalia by early 2021.

The proposed withdrawal comes at an especially critical time and is a risk to the stability of the entire region. Indeed, Ethiopia is in the middle of a civil war and has withdrawn thousands of its troops who had been helping the Somali army fight against al-Shabab. Kenya-Somalia relations are at their lowest point in years, and domestic tensions are high over the upcoming elections and a string of attacks and assassinations. If the United States goes ahead with its withdrawal, it could have a huge impact on stability in Somalia, deal a major blow to morale among Somalia’s armed forces, and raise questions about U.S. credibility.

The proposed withdrawal comes at an especially critical time and is a risk to the stability of the entire region.

U.S. Defense Department officials claim the United States will “retain the capability to conduct targeted counterterrorism operations in Somalia, and collect early warnings and indicators.” However, in the eyes of many Somalis, Washington is abandoning the country. “Al-Shabab will frame this as a victory,” said Omar Mahmood, a senior Somalia analyst at the International Crisis Group. “They will use it as evidence of their ability to take on a world power like the United States and force them to leave Somalia.”

U.S. officials claim that moving troops to neighboring countries such as Kenya and Djibouti will have no major consequences. Somali officials disagree; former Danab chief Col. Ahmed Abdullahi Sheikh criticized the move, saying that the U.S. military “can launch and stage operations from countries like Djibouti and Kenya, but it’s not the same as being in the country. … You can’t train a force remotely.” U.S. support in planning and launching raids in Somalia is a critical component of the fight against al-Shabab—one that cannot easily be replaced.

It is true that a permanent U.S. military presence in Somalia is not a long-term solution. However, this transition should happen with the help of the international community. The Somali government has started to see success toward building an effective security force, thanks in large part to Washington’s unwavering support for Somalia and its people. With U.S. support, the Somali army was able to reduce al-Shabab’s military capabilities, diminish its territorial control, and bring peace back to large areas of Somalia. But the group remains a persistent threat to the region.

Now more than ever, Somalia needs the support of the United States. Leaving Somalia to fend for itself would risk erasing years of progress. Al-Shabab could reconquer territory, strengthen its military capabilities, and increase its stranglehold over the Somali people. “It’s my hope therefore that the U.S. government will reevaluate its decision and hopefully change,” one Danab officer—who prefers to remain anonymous—told me.

The Biden administration needs to increase U.S. efforts in Somalia in order to strengthen the government’s capabilities to contain the threat posed by al-Shabab. The first step Biden can take would be an immediate redeployment, followed by concrete assurances of future U.S. support. Otherwise, America’s hard-fought efforts to bring peace and stability to Somalia will have been in vain.

Abdi Yusuf is an international affairs researcher and a freelance writer based in Nairobi.

 

Sudan sends delegation to neighboring countries, bans aviation over state bordering Ethiopia

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Sudan sends delegation to neighboring countries to talk over the country’s border dispute with Ethiopia. 

Sudan’s Transitional Council and the Joint Council of Ministers have decided to visit neighboring countries regarding the country’s border dispute with Ethiopia, Al Ain News reported.

Authorities are reportedly in Cairo, Asmara, Juba and Saudi Arabia to explain the situation.

Lieutenant General Shamsedin Kabashi, a member of the Transitional Federal Council (TFP) is in South Sudan, Lieutenant General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, vice chairman of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Eritrea, Lieutenant General Ibrahim Jabir, a member of the Transitional Federal Council (TFP) in Chad, and Mohammed Faki Suleiman in Saudi Arabia.

Acting Foreign Minister Omar Kemedin, Chief of Intelligence General Jamal Aden Omar, Information Minister Faisal Mohammed Salih and Lieutenant General Sham Il-Dean Kabashi, a member of the Transitional Council, left for Cairo today.

Lt. Gen. Abdulfatah Alburhan visited the Ethiopia-Sudan border. Reportedly, he told members of the defense force that he will not leave the area as it belongs to Sudan.

Aviation banned

On Thursday Sudan announced a ban on civil aviation in the airspace of Al-Qadarif state which borders Ethiopia, citing security reasons, Anadolu Agency reported.

“The Ministry of Defense has sent a decision to the Civil Aviation Authority to prevent flying over the airspace of Al-Qadarif State,” Abdelhafez Abdelrahim, the spokesman for the Sudanese Civil Aviation Authority, told Anadolu Agency.

The decision was based on “security reasons,” he added.

The two East African nations have been locked in a border dispute since December when Sudanese forces crossed into Ethiopia saying they were reclaiming their lands.

Sudan blames Ethiopia for civilian deaths amid fears of new conflict

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Source: The National News

Relations between the two governments, which both field substantial armed forces, are rapidly worsening.

Sudan says government-backed Ethiopian militiamen killed five women and a child during a raid just inside its territory, further fuelling tension in the border region.

On Wednesday, Sudan warned of “dangerous consequences” for bilateral relations after an Ethiopian warplane breached Sudanese airspace in the border area, according to a foreign ministry statement. It did not specify the type of Ethiopian aircraft or say how long it stayed inside Sudanese airspace.

“The Foreign Ministry condemns this escalation by the Ethiopian side and demand that such acts are not repeated in the future,” it said.

Also on Wednesday, a Sudanese military helicopter crashed while attempting to land at an airport in the eastern Qadaref region at the end of what the military said was a reconnaissance mission. The two-man crew, both flight captains, survived the crash, it added without giving more details. It was not immediately clear whether the helicopter crew’s mission was related in any way to the tension on the border with Ethiopia.

Ethiopia’s alleged aerial intrusion came one day after Addis Ababa warned Khartoum that it was running out of patience with its continued military build-up in the border region, an area at the centre of a decades-old territorial dispute.

The two countries have been sharply at odds over a Nile dam being built by Ethiopia.

Ethiopia warned Sudan that it was running out of patience with its continued military build-up in the border region, an area at the centre of a decades-old territorial dispute.

The area in question, Al Fashqa, is within Sudan’s international boundaries, but has long been settled by Ethiopian farmers, and late last year suffered weeks of clashes between forces from the two sides.

“The Sudanese side seems to be pushing in so as to inflame the situation on the ground,” Ethiopian foreign ministry spokesman Dina Mufti said on Tuesday. “Is Ethiopia going to start a war? Well, we are saying let’s work on diplomacy.”

On the same day, Sudan’s foreign ministry strongly condemned the militia raid in its eastern breadbasket Qadaref region and called on the international community to work for the cessation of such actions.

It blamed the raid on the Al Shifta militia, an outfit widely believed to enjoy the informal backing of the Ethiopian military.

Two Sudanese women were also missing after the Monday raid, the government said.

Monday’s raid was the latest in a series of violent incidents in recent weeks in the border region. Sudanese troops moved to retake border areas long held by Ethiopia and defended by government-linked militias, who also allegedly operate smuggling rings.

The fighting in Ethiopia’s Tigray region forced at least 50,000 of its residents to flee their homes and seek refuge in Sudan.

Ethiopia accuses the Sudanese military of infiltrating its territory, saying Sudan was seeking to take advantage of the conflict against separatist rebels in Tigray.

Sudan’s information minister Faisal Saleh denied the Ethiopian charges.

“We fear that these comments contain a hostile position towards Sudan,” Mr Saleh said.

“We ask of Ethiopia to stop attacking Sudanese territory and Sudanese farmers.”

He also said late on Tuesday that a joint committee set up last month to resolve differences over the border has so far failed to make any progress.

Sudan and Ethiopia have long had problems along their porous border, whose demarcation was determined in agreements reached early in the last century. The two countries are bound by close cultural ties but, in various conflicts since the 1950s, both sides have supported rebel groups fighting the other’s government.

The latest round of tension on the Sudanese-Ethiopian border, however, comes at a critical time in relations.

Water wars?

The latest round of tension on the border, however, comes at a critical time in relations.

Sudan is seething over Ethiopia’s recent announcement that it would go ahead with a second filling of the water reservoir behind the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, starting this summer.

According to Addis Ababa, this would happen regardless of whether an agreement on the operation of the dam was reached with downstream Sudan and Egypt. Ethiopia began the initial filling of the dam last summer, without giving prior notice to either Egypt or Sudan.

The nearly complete hydroelectric dam, Africa’s largest, is built less than 20 kilometres from the border with Sudan and on completion, is expected to generate 6,000 megawatts of power.

For Sudan, the absence of co-ordination on the operation of the dam could potentially spell disaster for its eastern region, through flooding and the disablement of its own hydroelectric dams on the Nile. For Egypt, the dam could mean a significant reduction in its vital share of the Nile’s waters, something Cairo says it will not tolerate.

Sudan and Egypt have been trying to persuade Ethiopia to enter a legally binding deal on the operation of the dam as well as agree on mechanisms for resolving future disputes. Ethiopia favours recommendations, rather than a binding deal.

The latest round of negotiations on the dam collapsed this week when Sudan insisted that experts from the African Union be given a greater role in drafting an agreement.

Ethiopia and Egypt rejected the suggestion, insisting the three nations must maintain ownership of the negotiating process.

ISIS, Reborn: The Islamic State’s African Revival is a Lethal Blind Spot

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Source: National Interest | Jordan Cope

With four burgeoning safe havens, ISIS has revived in Sub-Sahara and could be deadlier than ever.

ISIS–

Before 9/11, many forget that Osama Bin Laden largely made a name for himself in Sub-Saharan Africa. In Sudan, he conceived his Islamic Army Shura, laying “the groundwork for a true global terrorist network” known as Al Qaeda.

There, Bin Laden largely began to call for jihad against Western forces and gained the prowess to export terrorism against American targets, hence Al Qaeda’s attacks on U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, just two years after his expulsion.

History might just be repeating itself as the West forgets its lessons and again neglects Sub-Sahara’s intensifying terrorism.

The consequences could be grave. Just cue 2019, when a Kenyan Al Qaeda affiliate plotted to hijack a plane and execute a 9/11-style attack.

While the attack was foiled, its scare overshadows a troubled decade, in which Sub-Saharan Africa witnessed an unprecedented resurgence in Islamist groups, with Islamic State (ISIS) affiliates displacing millions while seeking to establish bases in six African countries, and at times, hosting territory the size of Belgium.

Raising further alarm, experts have described 2020 as a breakout year for ISIS affiliates, an unsurprising reality given the attacks that recently claimed fifty in Mozambique and 100 in Niger.

While history echoes, ISIS’s pivot to Africa and new festering hotspots therein could prove more dangerous than those of its Middle Eastern past.

There, ISIS has strategically established territory in cross-border zones. This tactic has allowed it to conduct attacks and disappear across borders, rendering it effectively untouchable to all affected countries—which are amongst the world’s most impoverished and unprepared to dislodge ISIS. Some hotspots also approximate natural resource basins, whose wealth, if seized, could enormously enrich the ISIS network and its capabilities.

Given the implications of inaction—an emboldened ISIS network with multiple safe havens from which it can attack the West—ISIS’s African presence commands greater attention as a top security concern.

Four hot spots warrant attention. First is West Africa, which endures multiple internal insurgencies. Most concerning is that governing Boko Haram whose presence envelopes Nigeria, Chad, Niger, and Cameroon.

Since 2009, Boko Haram has killed 36,000 and displaced 2.5 million civilians while seeking to establish a caliphate and depose Nigeria’s government. While it coordinated with Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb post-2010, in 2016, the group splintered, with one faction continuing with allegiance to the Islamic State West Africa Province, and the other remaining steadfast to Abubakar Shekau’s faction.

While Boko Haram’s territory once matched Belgium in size, the group’s division cost territory. Nevertheless, its presence in Nigeria’s Borno state looms large, and its positioning couldn’t be more conveniently located at the crossroads of four countries.

Such positioning has allowed Boko Haram to disappear into Chad. Last year it conducted perhaps the deadliest terrorist attack in the country’s history—killing ninety-two. It also infiltrated Niger, where it claimed twenty-eight lives and razed 800 homes, and Cameroon, where in one attack it killed seventeen.

With Nigeria unable to contain Boko Haram, it remains questionable whether any of the aforementioned countries can do so, especially given their military and economic inferiority. Whereas Nigeria’s military ranks 42nd out of 138 surveyed countries, those of the others rank no higher than 87th.

They also lack financial resources, ranking amongst the world’s poorest. Out of 190 surveyed geographic entities, Nigeria and Cameroon ranked 141st and 145th, while Chad and Niger ranked below 174th in GDP per capita.

Not to mention, Chad, the next best militarily after Nigeria, overcame a recession and had to rely on France to subvert a coup—all just in the last four years. Chad cannot afford this vulnerability as ISIS festers and its southern oil fields beckon, posing a potential lifeline and revenue source for ISIS if captured.

West Africa’s other great insurgency engrosses Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. There, the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara has conquered “ungoverned space” where the three “failing” states meet.

With Mali and Burkina Faso ranking no higher than 165th in terms of GDP per capita and 96th in military might, the two likely will not fare better in preempting another impending ISIS safe-haven.

ISIS’s next major hot spot situates East Africa, particularly Mozambique’s northern border with Tanzania, where ISIS affiliates have killed 2,000 and displaced 430,000 civilians since 2017.

In Mozambique, the Islamic State in the Central African Province has captured “four tourist islands,” and Mocimboa da Praia, a port in the state of Cabo Delgado, which straddles Tanzania and boasts tremendous resource wealth—natural gas and ruby reserves approximating $50 billion in value—that if seized could enrich ISIS’s network.

ISIS has also used this position to infiltrate Tanzania, hence its October invasion, where 300 fighters killed twenty before retreating to Mozambique.

Mozambique and Tanzania’s economies and militaries rank inferior to those of Nigeria’s, suggesting that the two might struggle to suppress this third prospective safe-haven.

Quickly deserving mention is the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)—a group with suspected ISIS-links—and its stronghold over the mountains straddling the DRC and Uganda, from Rwenzori to Ituri, where “[m]uch of the [DRC’s] gold is mined.”

While the Salafist organization has existed since 1995, it has become rather deadly recently, killing 800 Congolese civilians in 2020. While the DRC’s military ranks 71st, its economy ranks amongst the poorest, 185th.

If left unchecked, the ADF could become another asset in ISIS’s portfolio, granting ISIS pivotal access to another cross-border zone, to invaluable gold mines, and to a foothold in the DRC—the world’s most endowed per resource wealth.

With four burgeoning safe havens, ISIS has revived in Sub-Sahara and could be deadlier than ever. Embedding at the cross borders of failing countries, ISIS has achieved near untouchability. With no Sub-Saharan government able to contain its expansion in a resource-rich area, the West, whatever its response, must urgently react before ISIS can multiply its capabilities and international reach to an unparalleled degree. Let us not forget the lessons of Sudan.

 

Jordan Cope is a fellow for Middle East Forum’s Islamist Watch project. He is also regarded as an expert in the Middle East. Follow him on Twitter.

Image: Nigerian soldiers hold up a Boko Haram flag that they had seized in the recently retaken town of Damasak, Nigeria, March 18, 2015. Reuters/Emmanuel Braun.