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US businessmen are close to exploiting Ethiopia’s oil plans in a multibillion-dollar scheme

January 1, 2021/0 Comments/in Economy, English, External/by Solomon

Source: Quartz Africa | By Zecharias Zelalm

An Ethiopian-American investor and his partners are on the brink of pulling off an elaborate scheme that may unfairly take advantage of Ethiopia’s long-held ambitions to build its own oil & gas industry and become energy independent.

Nebiyu Getachew, 48, chief executive of GreenComm Technologies, a Virginia-based energy firm, signed a $3.6 billion deal with Ethiopia’s ministry of Mines and Petroleum on April 28 to construct an oil refinery in Ethiopia’s oil-rich Somali region.

But checks reveal little evidence GreenComm Technologies and its key executives have the expertise or experience to take on this major project. The company has no known industry credentials and has been delisted from the Virginia corporate database on two occasions, likely for failure to pay company registration fees on time. Read more

Geopolitical dynamics in the Horn of Africa

December 25, 2020/0 Comments/in Analysis, English, External, Politics/by Solomon

An Emboldened Horn of Africa Axis and an Unfolding Humanitarian Crisis Await the Biden Administration

By Guled Ahmed | Middle East Institute

Summary

The Biden Administration is set to face a series of challenges in the Horn of Africa. Given growing Russian and Chinese involvement in this strategically important region, U.S. policymakers should be attuned to the historical background and current dynamics in the relevant countries. In the Horn of Africa, the U.S. can ameliorate the COVID-19 pandemic, stem ongoing civil strife, and ease intraregional tensions. To achieve these objectives, the U.S. will need to adopt bold strategies based on lessons from the past. This article provides essential context about the region and proposes policy measures for the incoming administration.

Introduction

As Joe Biden prepares to take office on Jan. 20, 2021, the U.S. and the world are facing multiple crises. Now is one of the worst times in American history as the country struggles through a major economic recession and a pandemic that has taken more than 300,000 American lives. Biden is no stranger to economic crises, having served as vice president under the Obama administration during the Great Recession in 2009. Undoubtedly, Biden’s experience as a senator and VP makes him ready to tackle America’s domestic challenges and to reset relations with its allies.

In the Horn of Africa, his upcoming administration will grapple with longstanding challenges. However, this time, he will have to deal with the emboldened and unchecked leaders of the Horn of Africa — Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed of Ethiopia, President Mohamed Abdullahi (Farmaajo) of Somalia, and President Isaias Afwerki of Eritrea. Recently, the three leaders have formed an axis through the Horn of Africa Cooperation (HoAC) deal to consolidate security, stability, and economic integration.1

The main driver of the HoAC is PM Abiy, who wants to access Somali ports for trade and promote military and economic integration in order to influence Somali politics and economy. More multilateral agreements and initiatives may come on the heels of the HoAC. In the long term, integration may become possible once the three countries stabilize and resolve their border issues.

In terms of foreign involvement in the region, the Horn of Africa could become a theater for the escalating Cold-War-like dynamic between the U.S and Russia. With its increasing power and influence, Russia could repeat strategies from Syria in the Horn of Africa and help prop up leaders of the Horn of Africa Axis who are desperate to stay in power, regardless of the results of democratic elections. Because the incoming Biden Administration will advance human rights and democratic elections, Horn of Africa leaders may turn to Russia for protection instead.

The Unfolding “Triple Threat” Humanitarian Crisis

The Horn of Africa has suffered multiple disasters since the start of 2020, including the COVID-19 pandemic, recurring deadly floods, and devastating locust attacks. Several donors and humanitarian agencies have increased calls for support to tackle the “triple threat” in the region. Even before the current crises, Somalia, one of the world’s most fragile states, suffered droughts in 2017 that impacted more than 6 million inhabitants. In 2018 and 2019, the Shabelle and the Juba river riparians had already experienced recurring cycles of drought and floods. And now for the first time in recorded history, the Shabelle River, which is Somalia’s breadbasket, is under a locust attack. A swarm of locusts can occupy 460 square miles and consume up to 6,000 metric tons of food daily. The current swarms can inflict the equivalent of more than 120,000 hectares of crop damage within the Shabelle River Basin. Combined with flood damages this year and previous instability, Somalia could experience catastrophic food insecurity and mass starvation similar to the horrific 1974 drought.

In Ethiopia, another full-scale humanitarian crisis is unfolding due to the ongoing civil war between the government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) in the Tigray region. Locust attacks have also compounded the impact on citizens. The current invasion of desert locusts is the worst that Ethiopia has experienced in 25 years. Furthermore, the COVID-19 pandemic has hurt economic conditions by restricting the agricultural supply chain, productivity, and cross-border trade. On top of these external factors, agriculture export revenue is already negatively impacted by Ethiopia’s currency devaluation. These conditions could push Ethiopia into starvation, mass migration, and multilateral ethnic conflict, and thus threaten overall regional stability.

Country Profiles from the Horn of Africa

The Post-Cold War Horn of Africa is fragile and susceptible to cyclical crises as a result of conflicts and increased climate change. This region also suffers from the legacy of ruthless dictators, such as Mengistu Mariam of Ethiopia and Siad Barre of Somalia. After both dictators were overthrown, new governments adopted systems of fragile ethnic federalism and decentralization that are now destabilizing the region.

Ethiopia

Ever since Abiy was selected as prime minister in April 2018, violence driven by ethnic tensions has gripped Ethiopia and displaced 1.8 million people. Abiy’s vision of a centralized power controlling the political process and economic development appears to be irreconcilable with the ethnic federalism enshrined under Article 39 of the Ethiopian Constitution. While nationalism has kept Ethiopia together for the past 30 years, it has also created division and hostility between Abiy’s reformist government and the TPLF and Oromo opposition leaders who have returned from exile.

With his political reforms intended to promote Ethiopian nationalism failing, he has also hastened economic liberalization through privatization and currency devaluation. The U.S. dollar has appreciated against the Ethiopian birr by more than 35% as the country simultaneously faces a severe export decline, yearly debt payments surpassing $1 billion, and declining domestic borrowing. Overall, this trend has forced Ethiopia to print money at an unsustainable rate. “Abiynomics” will burden Ethiopia with unpayable IMF loans and Chinese loans to finance dam projects. Furthermore, borrowing has increased the debt-to-GDP ratio to over 50%, a rate that is unsustainable, especially for a country that experiences annual major droughts. This rate of borrowing ultimately forced Ethiopia to reschedule 60% of its loan repayment.

To divert public attention from the impending economic crisis and unrest that have tarnished Abiy’s image, he has turned the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam dispute with Egypt and Sudan into a nationalist rallying cry and canceled an agreed-upon deal. Similarly, opposition groups have accused him of taking advantage of the COVID-19 pandemic to unconstitutionally delay the national election, extending his term for almost another year. These actions have incited major opposition, especially from militias in Oromo and Tigray, which threatened to form a caretaker government following Article 60, Section 5 of the Ethiopian Constitution. Abiy took this threat seriously and decided to jail the outspoken Oromo opposition leader Mohamed Jawar. Furthermore, the federal government declared the regional Tigray elections illegal and imposed an economic embargo, which contributed to the civil war. Despite Abiy claiming victory at the end of November, 2020, the war rages on, with thousands displaced and effects that could destabilize the entire region.

Somalia

In Somalia, Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo became president in February 2017 through indirect elections by tribal chiefs. His election was marred by corruption even though he ran on an anti-corruption platform.5 Despite his promises, Somalia has been named the world’s most corrupt country three times in a row by the Corruption Perceptions Index. Furthermore, despite his anti-Ethiopian platform, Farmaajo became President Abiy’s reliable ally during his tenure.6 Abiy even seem to have convinced Farmaajo of the idea of “Greater Horn of Africa Economic Integration.” The two leaders also have similar political preferences. Both are against federalism and for centralized government, despite the weak Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) that only controls parts of the capital with the help of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the Somalia donors fund. Instead of cooperating with federal member states (FMS), he started dismantling the federal system through electioneering that installed his allies as state leaders. Starting with Southwest State, his forces arrested the likely winner, clearing the path to victory for his hand-picked candidate. This move caused a backlash that was particularly intense in Baidoa, where the Somali National Army along with Ethiopia violently cracked down on protests in December 2018.

In response, UN Somalia Special Representative Nicholas Haysom requested an investigation. Haysom was allegedly expelled so that the Ethiopian Army and Somalia National Army could conceal their crimes and avoid potential prosecution.7 The FGS succeeded in further electioneering by installing their preferred candidate in Galmudug and Hirshabelle states. The FGS was unable to pull off the same feat in Puntland.8 In Jubbaland state, Kenyan AMISOM troops almost clashed with Ethiopian AMISOM troops who are pro-Farmaajo.

Mogadishu, which is in the Benadir region, has become the city with the most internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Africa due to local conflicts. The FGS has paralyzed the city’s economy and mobility, essentially turning it into an open-air prison where IDPs are more than 25% of the population. Not only do the residents of Mogadishu live under difficult circumstances, they also provide taxes to the federal government without enjoying political representation in the Senate. This is because Mogadishu is not recognized as a federal state, which entails less autonomy.

The general condition of Somalia has declined under Farmaajo, The security improvements created by his predecessor, Hassan Sheikh, have vanished. The robust GDP growth of 4% has dropped below 2% and export revenue dropped by 70%, a figure unseen since the 1980s. Foreign direct investment decreased and domestic revenue was below 2016 levels. While not attributable to Farmaajo’s policies, Somalia has also seen a decline in remittances. In an apparent reflection of its corruption, the federal government has camouflaged aid from donors like Qatar as domestic revenue in order to meet debt relief obligations and improve its image abroad.9 Despite Somalia’s lack of financial accountability and illegitimate tax revenue increases, the IMF and World Bank determined that the country has reached the “decision point,” at which heavily indebted poor countries are considered to have met the obligations for interim debt relief. The U.S. has further enabled Farmaajo by supporting debt relief and turning a blind eye on FGS human rights abuses, their war against FMSs, media repression, and deteriorating security. However, the U.S has suspended military aid over corruption concerns.10

As a primary foreign donor to the FGS, Qatar is another important player in the region. Beyond propping up FGS, Qatar has allegedly encouraged violent extremism and instability. A cellphone call obtained by the New York Times captured the Qatari ambassador to Somalia stating that a terrorist bombing in Bosaso was carried out to further Qatari interests.11 Similarly, Somali intelligence chief Fahad Yassin Hajji Dahir, who is alleged to have ties with al-Qaeda, is currently said to be engineering the re-election of Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo.12 This major foreign interference could have serious consequences, such as igniting public unrest and possibly even a civil war similar to that in 1991, which overthrew Siad Barre, Farmaajo’s uncle.13

Eritrea

While there are no major violent conflicts in Eritrea, the government shows many of the same pathologies as Ethiopia and Somalia. Although Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki has rehabilitated his image through the historic peace deal with PM Abiy, he remains a ruthless authoritarian who has been starving his people for the past 20 years. With the peace deal, Isaias Afwerki merely showed the EU a false soft side in order to gain aid and assistance. Thus, the EU diplomats are in essence ignoring the regime’s record of human rights violations and forced labor in order to fund projects that will further Europe’s interest in keeping migrants in Eritrea. The EU has funded infrastructure projects serviced by forced conscript labor, perpetuating a system that the U.N. has defined as “tantamount to slavery.”14 Thus, it seems that the EU has chosen to “hire” a dictator at a low price rather than solve the core issues that cause migration in the first place. This is why the EU Horn of Africa policy is failing: it emboldens dictators to oppress their citizens at the expense of EU taxpayers.

Afwerki is widely unpopular, so he is vulnerable to a potential coup. While Afwerki is a brutal dictator, a coup would certainly be destabilizing. In the past, he narrowly escaped previous coup attempts from dissatisfied armed forces, such as in 2013. It is highly likely that he will face another coup because of his alliance with Abiy, who is particularly disliked among the ethnic Tigray in Eritrea.15

“In the 21st century, the EU and the U.S. have pushed for Horn of Africa integration in three key areas: politics, economics, and security. This encouragement is an important reason why Horn of Africa Axis leaders pursued forming a new regional organization bloc. However, these initiatives have been dead on arrival for various reasons.”

The Return of Russia to the Horn of Africa

Russia has been steadily making inroads with the region’s leaders. While hosting the Sochi Olympics in 2017, Russia seized the opportunity to strengthen its relationship with Africa by organizing the 2019 Russia-Africa summit that saw trade, aid, and military deals offered with no political preconditions. Russia’s goal is to project its power and influence in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea by providing arms and nuclear technology for energy development in exchange for mining natural resources like uranium and gold. Russia is also interested in securing the rights to rare earth elements (REE), which are key ingredients in batteries for electric cars, cell phones, high-tech weapons, and wind turbines. Russia has been steadily accumulating REE to the point where it now has the 4th largest reserves in the world, significantly ahead of the U.S.16

Just outside the Horn of Africa, former Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir signed bilateral agreements with Russian President Vladimir Putin during his November 2017 visit to Russia that included the establishment of a military base in the Red Sea, a nuclear agreement, and modernization of the Sudanese army.17 Similarly, Bashir asked Putin for protection from the U.S.and hired Russian mercenaries to quell citizen uprisings before his overthrow in a military coup.18 It is noteworthy that Bashir’s visit to Russia came after the Trump administration lifted the trade embargo on Sudan and removed it from the travel ban list. This suggests that both the U.S. and Russia are competing for Sudan’s favor.

In the Horn of Africa, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov announced the opening of a logistics center in Eritrea in 2018, but gave few details about its purpose.19 The lack of information likely indicates a larger strategic aim. A Russian logistics center in Eritrea, however, now looks improbable due to the Eritrean government’s realignment toward the UAE and Saudi Arabia, two countries that are loathe to see Russian encroachment in the Red Sea. Opposition from these two Gulf countries will be an obstacle to Russia’s quest to gain influence in the Horn of Africa.

The extent of Russia’s influence on Somalia will largely depend on the results of upcoming elections. One of the candidates for the Somali presidency is former Prime Minister Hassan Ali Khaire, who cofounded Som Oil & Gas. For various reasons, Russia is hoping for his victory. The majority stakeholder in Som Oil & Gas is the Russian national Georgy Djapridze, who is also a close ally of Putin. In November of 2020, Khaire met with Foreign Minister Lavrov to discuss the upcoming elections and the prospects for strengthening Russian-Somali cooperation, particularly trade and economic ties. Such a meeting seems to validate suspicions that Khaire is seeking to obtain Russian assistance in the elections. Given Somalia’s instability, if Khaire wins the presidency he may invite Russian mercenaries to restore order.

In November of 2020, Russia and China indicated their support for the Somali government by abstaining on a vote to renew the UN panel of experts on Somalia, which includes an arms embargo.20 Russia justified its abstention by comparing the vote to lifting the Eritrea embargo in 2018, and China reasoned that the embargo hindered the Somali government’s ability to combat al-Shabab. The true intention behind Russia’s abstention was to protect its interest in selling arms to Somalia, however. China, for its part, wanted to maintain a strong relationship with Somalia, especially as it has received an unmonitored and controversial fishing license from the Somali government. China also supports Somalia on the question of Somaliland.21 China sees Somaliland, a de facto independent state, as analogous to Taiwan. Recognition of Somaliland would thus set a precedent that would undermine the “One China” policy.

The U.S. has left an opening for these powers. The inaction and disengagement of the Trump administration allowed Russia to preemptively protect the region’s new authoritarians. In contrast, the upcoming Biden-Harris administration will likely hold the Horn of Africa Axis accountable for human rights violations and their destabilizing anti-democratic ways. Russia may be a latecomer to the 21st century version of the “Scramble for the Horn of Africa” but won’t mind claiming its spot as a competitor against China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the EU’s initiatives in the Horn of Africa.

Failing Horn of Africa Integration

The idea of integrating the various territories of the Horn of Africa has a long history. Current Horn of Africa integration initiatives echo the idea of “Greater Somalia.” This concept was championed by Benito Mussolini, who hoped to capture British-Somaliland, part of Ethiopia, and Italian Somalia to achieve the grandiose idea of an Italian East Africa empire. Mussolini imagined Italians settling in the territory. He also wanted to connect Assab (a port city in Eritrea) to Mogadishu in order to reduce the export cost of cotton, bananas, and other valuable commodities. In post-colonial times, this vision of integration has been revived and modified. Fidel Castro, for example, proposed a communist federation between Ethiopia and Somalia before the two countries went to war in 1977.

In the 21st century, the EU and the U.S. have pushed for Horn of Africa integration in three key areas: politics, economics, and security. This encouragement is an important reason why Horn of Africa Axis leaders pursued forming a new regional organization bloc. However, these initiatives have been dead on arrival for various reasons.

Events show that the region is disintegrated from a military and political point of view. To give a stark example of regional strife, the Ethiopian army committed war crimes in Somalia in 2006. Ethiopian forces have also not produced tangible results in the war against al-Shabab as a part of the AMISOM force. For its part, the Eritrean government is a former funder of the terrorist group al-Shabab, which has wreaked havoc in Somalia.

Destabilizing actions by Ethiopia and Eritrea in Somalia have precluded political integration. As a former Somali president said, “Simply put, neither Ethiopia nor Somalia is ready for deeper integration. Ethiopia is sliding toward instability and preoccupied with both internal ethnic conflicts and border disputes with Somalia and Eritrea.”22

From an economic point of view, the countries of the Horn of Africa have negligible engagement. This is the case for Eritrea and Somalia. As for Somalia and Ethiopia, several economic barriers currently stand between them. Ethiopia is foreclosing on Somalia’s future water rights by building more dams without consultation, which negatively impacts the Juba and Shabelle rivers. The two countries also do not have a transboundary water agreement, and Ethiopia is notorious for not sharing its river flow data. Already, these actions have contributed to recent floods and droughts according to regional water experts. While cross-border electrification initiatives are pushed by the World Bank and foreign donors to Somalia, they come with high risks such a lack of institutional oversight, infrastructural unpreparedness, and energy security politicization. Furthermore, the two countries have economies that are largely informal and affected by multiple problems such as high inflation, lack of security, indebtedness, high unemployment, and poor infrastructure with limited interconnectedness.

“Without decisive and sustainable policy moves, geopolitical dynamics in the Horn of Africa could sow the seeds for further turmoil within the next 20 years.”

Where the U.S. and EU Are Getting It Wrong

The U.S. has promoted misguided policy in the Horn of Africa region. For example, it supported an Ethiopian incursion into Somalia that resulted in war crimes against residents of Mogadishu in 2006.23 To date, victims have not been awarded any compensation and justice has not been served. In 2010, while speaking at the Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs, current U.S. ambassador to Somalia and former ambassador to Ethiopia(2006-2009), Donald Yamamoto said, “We’ve made a lot of mistakes and Ethiopia’s entry in 2006 was not a really good idea.”

Ambassador Yamamoto would do well to recognize that China poses a threat to U.S. interests in Somalia and to the region as a whole. One way that the U.S. could counter Chinese designs on Somalia is by encouraging the ties between Taiwan and Somaliland. So far, Yamamoto has remained silent about this bilateral relationship even though the U.S National Security Council sent out a congratulatory tweet about this emerging bond between Taiwan and Somaliland. U.S. inaction has emboldened President Farmaajo to align with Beijing.

EU policy toward the Horn of Africa has also yielded mixed results. It is wholly fixated on keeping migrants away from EU shores, making the region a hub for IDPs. The significant presence of IDPs tends to spur conflict. Africa watchers have argued that EU funding without proper checks and balances merely finances kleptocratic authoritarians. This model has already been tested with Turkey in order to keep Syrian refugees outside Europe. A negative consequence of this policy was to give Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan leverage over the EU. While EU leaders claim to want stability for the Horn of Africa, they continue sell arms to the region. In Germany, Chancellor Angela Merkel is pushing arms sales to the region and the continent to counter Russia and China.24 Similarly, French President Emmanuel Macron is helping Abiy develop a navy, despite Ethiopia being landlocked.25

The EU approach to migration, cyclical conflicts, and the impacts of climate change in the Horn of Africa is not working. Rather than throw money at problems, the EU must seek to cultivate good governance and institutions. Perhaps it is time to support an approach to sustainable development that takes power away from dictators and puts it in the hands of local actors. Current strategies have only resulted in mass migration and vulnerable youth who can easily be recruited by extremists. It is not surprising to see recurrent cycles of destruction and humanitarian crises in the region.

Opportunities for Biden

How can the Horn of Africa become peaceful and secure despite high levels of instability, mistrust, and unresolved border issues inherited from colonial times? With the rise of authoritarianism, repressive rule, terrorism, ethnic cleansing, nationalism, economic stagnation, and mass migration, this goal seems to be moving further away. Without decisive and sustainable policy moves, geopolitical dynamics in the Horn of Africa could sow the seeds for further turmoil within the next 20 years. What should the Biden administration do?

China Vaccine Politics

The Pfizer COVID-19 vaccine must be stored at -70 degrees Celsius, which will require costly refrigeration for safe distribution. Unfortunately, almost 40% of the healthcare facilities in Africa don’t have access to electricity, and only 28% of them have reliable electricity. China is speeding up distribution to Africa of its own vaccine, which requires storage at 2 to 8 degrees Celsius. Africa, due to its climate and level of development, may not be able to meet the refrigeration demands for either vaccine. This opens an opportunity for Biden to accelerate vaccine delivery and distribution through humanitarian channels, i.e. USAID and Direct Relief, and through investment channels or public-private partnerships, i.e. the International Development Finance Corporation.

AMISOM in Somalia

Recently the Ethiopian government redeployed 3,000 of its troops from Somalia to the civil war with TPFL.26 The Ethiopian troops in Somalia were ineffective in fighting al-Shabab terrorists, and most of its troops were supporting the government of Somalia to wage war against FMS. The recent U.S. troop pullout under Trump is also likely to embolden al-Shabab to capture more territories. Troops should remain in Somalia, but they should be UN peacekeepers with a five-year mandate rather than ineffective AMISOM troops. Due to their vested interests, countries like Kenya and Ethiopia should be excluded from any peacekeeping mission in Somalia

U.S. Horn of Africa Special Representative

Biden should consider appointing a special representative to oversee security and development in this increasingly important region. The representative’s mandate should also include the Red Sea. This position will help the State Department to better engage regional leaders and allies. Such engagement will help the U.S. to counter the aggressive expansion of Russian and Chinese interest in the region.

Reform Trade

The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) has significantly reduced the continent’s trade deficit with the U.S. to less than $5 billion.27 However, U.S. imports from Sub-Saharan African countries are concentrated in apparel and oil products.28 The Biden administration could increase non-oil exports from the region to the U.S. by prioritizing agro-manufacturing and fish processing industries, setting up more export zones, repealing all Trump tariffs against products that are produced in Africa, and adding new countries to the AGOA, such as Somalia and Eritrea.

War Against al-Shabab

The current government of Somalia has focused on waging war against FMS and instigating clan wars rather than fighting against al-Shabab. The Biden administration should hold Somalia accountable for its failures on human right and counterinsurgency. The administration must adopt diplomatic and economic strategies rather than drones. Furthermore, Biden could consider investing in and providing U.S. army training to local militia and Danab forces. They are more effective than the national army, which is hampered by weak federal institutions.29 Similarly, the Biden administration should invest in a strong finance tracking system and biometric registration, not only to track illegal activities, but also to build a voter registration system and promote democratic elections.
America can no longer sit on the sidelines and allow Russia and China to influence regional leaders, who have become addicted to Chinese predatory loans and Russian AK-47 diplomacy. Biden should implement a strategy that is designed by regional planners and economists, one that is based on strong, democratic institutions with the principle of “one person, one vote” and focuses on capacity building and tangible economic development.

Biden has a difficult task ahead if he is going to de-escalate tensions in the Horn of Africa. His administration has a chance to rectify the mistakes of American presidents over the past half century, who too often turned a blind eye to the destabilizing actions of dictators in the region. It is now or never, and as John F. Kennedy said, “Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make violent revolution inevitable.”

Endnotes

[1] Henneberg, Ingo and Stapel, Sören. “Cooperation and Conflict at the Horn of Africa: A New Regional Bloc Between Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia and Its Consequences for Eastern Africa,” Africa Spectrum, (August 2020). https://doi.org/10.1177/0002039720936689.

[2] Nyabiage, Jevans. “China’s Allies at Loggerheads Over Ethiopia Dam — Will Beijing Intervene?” South China Morning Post, July 26, 2020, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3094650/chinas-allies-loggerheads-over-ethiopia-dam-will-beijing.

[3] Atoma, Bekele. “Jawar Mohammed: The Ethiopian Media Mogul Taking on Abiy Ahmed,” BBC News, July 9, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-53306091.

[4] Elbagir, Nima, Arvanitidis, Barbara, and McSweeney, Eoin. “Forces From Ethiopia’s Tigray Region say Eritrean Troops are Part of the Conflict and the War is Far From Over,” CNN, December 4, 2020, https://www.cnn.com/2020/12/04/africa/ethiopia-war-tplf-exclusive-intl/index.html.

[5] Gettleman, Jeffrey, “Fueled by Bribes, Somalia’s Election Seen as Milestone of Corruption,” The New York Times, February 7, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/07/world/africa/somalia-election-corruption.html.

[6] “Corruption Perceptions Index,” Transparency International, https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2019.

[7] “UN Special Representative to Somalia and Head of UNSOM is “Persona Non Grata” – Somalia’s Foreign Ministry,” Somaliland Chronicle, January 1, 2019, https://somalilandchronicle.com/2019/01/01/un-special-representative-to-somalia-and-head-of-unsom-is-persona-non-grata-somalias-foreign-ministry/.

[8] Hassan, Abdiqani. “Leader of Somalia’s Jubbaland, at Odds With Mogadishu, Wins New Term,” Reuters, August 22, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-politics/president-of-somali-state-of-jubbaland-re-elected-in-divisive-vote-idUSKCN1VC15B?il=0.

[9] Gundel, Joakim. Debt Relief and the Political Marketplace in Somalia. London: London School of Economics Conflict Research Programme, November 2, 2020, http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/107125/1/CRP_debt_relief_and_political_marketplace_somalia.pdf.

[10] Rubin, Michael. “U.S. Ambassador Wasted $1B in Somalia and is Now Funding a Coup,” The Washington Examiner, February 7, 2020, https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/us-ambassador-wasted-1b-in-somalia-and-is-now-funding-a-coup; “Somalia: Journalists Under Attack,” Human Rights Watch, May 3, 2016, https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/05/03/somalia-journalists-under-attack#; Houreld, Katharine. “Exclusive: U.S. Suspends Aid to Somalia’s Battered Military Over Graft,” Reuters, December 14, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-military-exclusive/exclusive-u-s-suspends-aid-to-somalias-battered-military-over-graft-idUSKBN1E81XF.

[11] Bergman, Ronen and Kirkpatrick, David D. “With Guns, Cash, and Terrorism, Gulf States Vie for Power in Somalia,” The New York Times, July 22, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/22/world/africa/somalia-qatar-uae.html.

[12] Rubin, Michael. “Somalia’s Intelligence Chief Worked With an al Qaeda Affiliate, so Why Do We Fund Him?” American Enterprise Institute, November 16, 2020, https://www.aei.org/op-eds/somalias-intelligence-chief-worked-with-an-al-qaeda-affiliate-so-why-do-we-fund-him/; Ali, Abdullahi Mohamed. “Somalia Must Save Itself From Qatar,” The National Interest, June 22, 2020, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/somalia-must-save-itself-qatar-163233.

[13] Henry, Neil. “Rebels Force Somali Leader Out of Capital,” The Washington Post, January 1, 1991, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1991/01/01/rebels-force-somali-leader-out-of-capital/7e7267ef-139c-4108-bf67-73687a26a243/.

[14] Stevis-Gridneff, Matina. “How Forced Labor in Eritrea is Linked to EU-Funded Projects,” The New York Times, January 8, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/08/world/europe/conscription-eritrea-eu.html.

[15] Gettleman, Jeffrey. “Coup Attempt by Rebel Soldiers is Said to Fail in Eritrea,” The New York Times, January 21, 2013, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/22/world/africa/coup-attempt-fails-in-eritrea.html.

[16] “How is Russia Developing Rare Earth Metals?” Mining World Russia, March 3, 2020, https://miningworld.ru/Articles/how-is-russia-developing-rare-earth-metals#:~:text=As%20of%20June%202019%2C%20Russia,and%201.4m%20tons%20respectively.

[17] “Russia to Establish Military Base in Sudan,” Middle East Monitor, November 13, 2020, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20201113-russia-to-establish-military-base-in-sudan/.

[18] “Sudan’s President Bashir Asks Putin for ‘Protection’ From ‘Aggressive U.S.’” France 24, November 23, 2017, https://www.france24.com/en/20171123-sudan-president-bashir-asks-putin-protection-aggressive-us.

[19] Solomon, Salem. “Russia-Eritrea Relations Grow With Planned Logistics Center,” Voice of America, September 2, 2018, https://www.voanews.com/africa/russia-eritrea-relations-grow-planned-logistics-center.

[20] “Adopting Resolution 2551 (2020) by 13 Votes in Favour, 2 Abstentions, Security Council Extends Mandate for Expert Panel on Somalia, Renews Partial Lifting of Arms Embargo,” United Nations Security Council, November 12, 2020, https://www.un.org/press/en/2020/sc14355.doc.htm.

[21] “Report: Somali Fishermen Object to ‘Shocking’ Deal Allowing China in Their Waters,” Stop Illegal Fishing, February 8, 2019, https://stopillegalfishing.com/press-links/report-somali-fishermen-object-to-shocking-deal-allowing-china-in-their-waters/.

[22] Mohamud, Hassan Sheikh. “Somalia Must Learn to Stand Alone,” Foreign Affairs, November 25, 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/africa/2020-11-25/somalia-must-learn-stand-alone.

[23] “Somalia: War Crimes in Mogadishu,” Human Rights Watch, August 13, 2007, https://www.hrw.org/news/2007/08/13/somalia-war-crimes-mogadishu

[24] “Ethiopian Invasion of Somalia, a Debacle U.S. Official Says,” ECADF Ethiopian News, March 13, 2010, https://ecadforum.com/blog1/ethiopian-invasion-of-somalia-a-debacle-u-s-official-says/.

[25] Shelton, Jon. “Angela Merkel Calls for Weapons Exports to Africa,” DW, November 27, 2019, https://www.dw.com/en/angela-merkel-calls-for-weapons-exports-to-africa/a-51441421.

[26] Irish, John. “Ethiopia, France Sign Military, Navy Deal, Turn ‘New Page’ in Ties,” Reuters, March 12, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-france/ethiopia-france-sign-military-navy-deal-turn-new-page-in-ties-idUSKBN1QT2W3.

[27] Marks, Simon. “Ethiopia Withdraws Thousands of Troops From Neighboring Somalia,” Bloomberg, November 13, 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-11-13/ethiopia-withdraws-thousands-of-troops-from-neighboring-somalia.

[28] Grane, Allen. “What is the African Growth and Opportunity Act?” Council on Foreign Relations Africa in Transition, February 17, 2017, https://www.cfr.org/blog/what-african-growth-and-opportunity-act.

[29] U.S. Trade and Investment with Sub-Saharan Africa: Recent Trends and New Developments. Washington D.C.: U.S. International Trade Commission, March 2020, https://agoa.info/images/documents/15766/pub5043-usitc-report.pdf.

[30] Robinson, Colin D. and Matisek, Jahara. “Assistance to Locally Appropriate Military Forces in Southern Somalia,” The RUSI Journal 165, no. 4 (December 8, 2020), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03071847.2020.1830711?journalCode=rusi20&.

Statement on Ethiopia by the Senior Study Group on Peace and Security in the Red Sea Arena

December 24, 2020/0 Comments/in Analysis, English, External, Politics/by Solomon

Source: USIP

As members of the bipartisan senior study group on peace and security in the Red Sea arena, we are watching with grave concern the situation in Ethiopia. While many of the facts remain unclear, the risks of escalation are certain: Intrastate or interstate conflict would be catastrophic for Ethiopia’s people and for the region and would pose a direct threat to international peace and security. The acceleration of polarization amid violent conflict would also mark the death knell for the country’s nascent reform effort that began two years ago and the promise of a democratic transition that it heralded.

As we cautioned in the study group’s Final Report and Recommendations released on October 29, the fragmentation of Ethiopia would be the largest state collapse in modern history. Ethiopia is five times the size of pre-war Syria by population, and its breakdown would lead to mass interethnic and interreligious conflict; a dangerous vulnerability to exploitation by extremists; an acceleration of illicit trafficking, including of arms; and a humanitarian and security crisis at the crossroads of Africa and the Middle East on a scale that would overshadow any existing conflict in the region, including Yemen. As Ethiopia is currently the leading Troop Contributing Country to the United Nations and the African Union peacekeeping missions in Sudan, South Sudan and Somalia, its collapse would also significantly impact the efforts by both to mitigate and resolve others conflicts in the Horn of Africa.

However severe the events of the last 48 hours and the preceding violence in multiple parts of the country may be, a wider war is not inevitable, nor is it too late to prevent one if Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy and Ethiopia’s federal states exercise responsible leadership. To do so, they must take immediate, visible steps to defuse the crisis and signal to the Ethiopian public a commitment to de-escalation. These steps should include a cessation of military operations and the launch of an inclusive political dialogue that is credible to the Ethiopian people and lays the groundwork for free and fair elections. Neither will be possible while many of the country’s most prominent political leaders remain in prison. In addition, the closing of political space and internet and communication blackouts must be reversed while intercommunal violence and the rise of incitement and hate speech are addressed.

At this crucial inflection point, the United States, its allies and partners in Europe and in the region, the members of the U.N. Security Council and the relevant multilateral organizations, including the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, must speak with one voice in promoting de-escalation on this basis. The United States should support initiatives by Ethiopian religious and civil society leaders to reach a peaceful resolution of the crisis. To reinforce these efforts, the United States, including Congress, should make clear that any change by force or fiat either to Ethiopia’s constitutional order or to its internal or external borders will not be recognized, in line with the African Union’s standards. The United States must also signal that it will hold accountable those responsible for escalation, including any foreign states that exacerbate tensions or provide material support to any of the parties to the conflict. And Ethiopian leaders should refrain from attempting to draw their neighbors into their domestic dispute. Finally, as recommended at length in our recent report, U.S. development and humanitarian assistance should be anchored in a commitment to promoting inclusive, legitimate governance.

Ambassador Johnnie Carson
Senior Advisor to the President, United States Institute of Peace
Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs

Ambassador Wendy Chamberlin
President Emeritus, Middle East Institute
Former Deputy U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
Former USAID Assistant Administrator for Asia-Near East

Ambassador Chester Crocker
James R. Schlesinger Professor of Strategic Studies, Georgetown University
Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs

Ambassador Eric Edelman
Roger Hertog Distinguished Practitioner-in-Residence, School for Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University
Former U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy
Former U.S. Ambassador to Turkey

Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman
Visiting Fellow, Brookings Institution
Senior Fellow, U.N. Foundation
Former U.N. Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs
Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs

Ambassador Michelle Gavin
Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations
Former Senior Director for Africa, U.S. National Security Council
Former U.S. Ambassador to Botswana

Nancy Lindborg
President and CEO, David and Lucile Packard Foundation
Former President, United States Institute of Peace
Former USAID Assistant Administrator for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance

Andrew Natsios
Executive Professor, Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University Former Administrator of USAID
Former Presidential Special Envoy for Sudan

General Joseph L. Votel
President and CEO, Business Executives for National Security
Former Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command and U.S. Central Comman

“America First” and Implications for US Strategy in the Horn of Africa

December 24, 2020/0 Comments/in Analysis, English, External, Politics/by Solomon

Source: Small Wars | Richard McManamon

Abstract

Since taking office, President Trump has challenged the global order with his “America First” approach. He has questioned the role of the US and its Allies within NATO, exited the Paris Climate Accord, and entered into a trade battle with China. At the same time, the Trump administration has positioned both Russia and China as strategic rivals to the US and the new rise to great power competition. In the last decade, the US has witnessed aggressive actions by both countries in an effort to carve out new spheres of influence.

As the administration takes action to increase America’s competitive edge, President Trump’s foreign policies, specifically to the Horn of Africa, have been inconsistent resulting in a less strategic approach. It would appear as the US switches focus to great power competition, support to Africa decreases. This is not only a lost opportunity for the US to challenge China and Russia indirectly, but more importantly, allows these countries to exploit a gap and gain further influence throughout the region. The Horn of Africa continues to be a nexus for geopolitics and it’s critical that an America First approach does not undermine the US ability to maintain influence in the region.

The unprecedented election of Donald Trump in 2016 precipitated some substantial shifts in global order, especially regarding China and Russia. Russia demonstrated its ability to challenge existing borders and sovereignty by interventions in Ukraine and Georgia, while China has pushed its Belt and Road Initiative further across the globe. As both Russia and China continue such efforts to extend their global presence, it is perceived by some observers that these countries are creating new spheres of influence across the globe.

In thinking of spheres of influence, the Horn of Africa remains a strategic nexus for the US, Europe, and the Middle East due to its location and connection to trade. Following the region’s independence after World War II, many African states such as Somalia have struggled to build institutions that provide consistent essential services and overall security for their population.[1] The vulnerabilities facing the Horn are extensive and complicated, requiring a more comprehensive US strategy to better address the various threats. Compounding existing vulnerabilities, these threats are typically not confined to one state but affect the entire region. The systemic nature of these vulnerabilities is evidenced by repeated instances where one country’s crisis spreads across borders and into neighboring states.

Since 2017 in terms of foreign and security policy, the Trump administration placed a significant focus on the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and more recently, the Afghanistan peace talks while Africa has been under prioritized. Minimizing focus on Africa, especially the Horn of Africa, has the potential to present significant challenges for the US into the future. In this article, I argue that one of the prominent reasons for this low prioritization is President Trump’s “America First” approach to foreign policy. Additionally, the high turnover rate within the Trump administration among senior leaders has remained high and has likely caused significant disruptions in a comprehensive foreign strategy, specifically regarding Africa.

If the United States is to see another four years of the Trump administration, foreign policy changes must be enacted to secure US interests while strengthening the country’s allies, including in the region of the Horn of Africa. Additionally, a rise of great power competition will likely mean the Trump administration will continue to exercise the military as a principal tool in foreign policy. The implications of such action have the potential to undermine global order and push the US toward new conflicts.[2] Moreover, the significant ramifications for continuously expanding the military and using it as a primary tool for diplomacy are that the US ends up with a military-focused strategy that could result in another arms race with Russia. A comprehensive strategy that balances all the instruments of national power is essential to meet the challenges and objectives for the US and would better mitigate the consequences from a military-heavy foreign policy that focuses on the short term at the expense of long-term strategic gains. Trump’s emphasis on the military as the primary tool of foreign policy comes with inherent risks that may conflict with his intentions of reducing US forces abroad. These risks include potentially escalating already volatile conditions with countries such as North Korea and Iran.

America First

The Trump administration has positioned China and Russia as rivals that are challenging the US through political, military, and economic means.[3] In doing so, Trump has taken action to combat these perceived threats through executive orders, sanctions, and tariffs to increase America’s competitive edge. Additionally, the Trump administration renegotiated the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 2020, placed tariffs against China, exited the Paris Climate Accord in 2019, and left the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018.

Thus far, the Trump administration has taken broad action concerning long-standing agreements to make the US more competitive both domestically and internationally. Furthermore, Trump has publicly questioned the utility for the US regarding multilateralism.[4] Since taking office, President Trump has targeted NATO and challenged the organization’s policies and procedures. During his visit to Brussels in 2018, he stated that he believed European countries were taking advantage of US military resources and not paying their fair share.[5] This aggressive approach toward allies can draw significant media attention and other consequences, and I argue it damages the US’s reputation and its international relations in the long run. Additionally, Trump’s speeches at the UN projected an approach favoring nationalism over globalism,[6] which further underlines his America First platform for the United States going into the future. The implications of this approach highlight to the world that Trump is focusing his foreign policy in a way that quite literally puts the US “first”. The ramifications of a paradigm shift towards “America alone” and increasing isolationism are extremely dangerous, as globalization has connected countries and regions of the world like never before. Economies, markets, and industries are all interconnected in some form, and for a major actor such as the US to pursue a drastic foreign policy that excludes US partners may be detrimental to the country in the long-term.

In the short-term, the US has seen the effects of the trade war with China, which has caused significant swings in the stock markets.[7] Furthermore, the recent pandemic has raised questions on the source for many medications that are used by millions of Americans. An argument could be made for select drugs to be made in the US for national security reasons, but on a broader scale the issue of cost comes into play when contemplating drugs made only in the US. It is no secret that the US has one of the highest prices for prescription drugs, and it is possible that abandoning established supply chains with foreign countries could result in even higher costs for the average American.[8] Lastly, while President Trump has questioned the value of multilateralism, US strategy toward Africa has been inconsistent at times, placing the US at a disadvantage during the time of great power competition.

African Strategy

United States foreign security policy in Africa is at the time of writing guided by President Trump’s National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2017. The NSS references growing economies on the continent and vast partnership opportunities for the US and Africa as their markets and economies grow. The strategy, however, also mentions concerns about corruption and weak governance. Furthermore, the NSS explicitly highlights China’s growing presence within Africa and how select Chinese practices weaken the continent’s ability to build sustainable development.[9] Likewise, the NSS states, “China and Russia target their investments in the developing world to expand influence and gain competitive advantages against the United States.”[10]

Since the publication of the NSS in 2017, US foreign policy towards Africa has fallen short for multiple reasons. Firstly, the Trump administration has experienced significant turnover in crucial personnel over the past three years. Peter Schraeder highlights that in the first twenty months of the new administration, the President had three different National Security Advisors, and Robert O’Brien was appointed as the fourth advisor in September of 2019.[11] Moreover, this high turnover rate puts the US at a significant disadvantage by owing to a lack of continuity and to the varying goals of each advisor. Brookings reports that among members of Trump’s executive office, he has experienced an 86 percent turnover rate, and 38 percent of those positions have experienced two or more replacements.[12] Similarly, Schraeder describes how the sudden removal of Secretary of State Rex Tillerson sent a negative message to Africa, as the President replaced him immediately following a trip to numerous African states.[13] The dismissal of Tillerson signaled to African countries that the validity of their conversations with the Secretary of State was in question and future cooperation with the US remained uncertain. Secondly, the Trump administration has looked to shift priorities away from Africa as the administration focuses on increased power competition with China and Russia. Mary Beth Long, a former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, stated: “We’re not even clear from an intelligence standpoint on what the underpinnings of a strategy would attempt to address and in part that’s because we have inadequate resources dedicated to the African continent.”[14]

Thirdly, in early 2020, the Pentagon ordered a review of forces within Africa by Defense Secretary Esper to see if troops can be realigned to other mission priorities.[15] This review comes at a critical juncture as great power competition with Russia and China has increased while the security environment in the Horn of Africa has remained fragile. It’s important to the US that during the review, the Pentagon considers that the US can effectively challenge Russia and China within the Horn as part of their broader great power competition. Furthermore, reducing US assets in the region can allow China to exploit the minimal US presence and also presents opportunities for further instability across the region. Highlighting this tenuous environment, the US experienced its first attack by Al-Shabaab, which killed three Americans at an airfield in Manda Bay, Kenya, on January 5, 2020.[16] This attack stresses the fragile environment throughout the Horn and the need for targeted US support to safeguard US interests throughout the region.

In addition to the impeachment trial of President Trump and the upcoming 2020 elections, the White House has been dealing with an array of global issues including, but not limited, a trade war with China, negotiations with the Taliban in Afghanistan, and managing the global coronavirus pandemic. While these global issues are all a significant demand on the US resources, it would appear that Africa is falling lower on the US priority list. This should be a concern as it provides China and Russia the opportunity to expand and increase their overall influence in the region at the cost of the US. Moreover, the region’s populace continues to suffer from instability, violence from groups such as Al-Shabaab, and weak institutions that lack the ability to provide basic services.

US Future in Africa

US troop levels do not on their own determine presence and influence in Africa, and over the years the US has also become a meaningful trading partner to the continent, showing the role of economic engagement. However, today China has surpassed the US as Africa’s largest trading partner.[17] While President Trump has talked of increasing cooperation with Africa, his current foreign policy severely hinders its ability to do so. Trump’s administration launched a US initiative called “Prosper Africa” with the intent of growing partnerships between the US and Africa and empowering US private sector involvement in Africa.[18] Long-term collaboration and globalization have intertwined economies, and the US shares the same concerns many African states do regarding insecurity throughout the region. However, without a clear, consistent foreign policy and African strategy, the effectiveness of any initiative will be mired. As the US continues its role in the region, it must develop an effective approach that balances national competitiveness, securing national interests, and strengthening relations with African leaders across the region.

One example of an US initiative program is the International Development Finance Corporation (DFC). In 2019 the US government created the DFC, which forms a consolidated effort with the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and the US Agency for International Development (USAID). The DFC attempts to further US foreign policy and private sector competitiveness through multiple mediums, including equity financing, debt financing, political risk insurance, and technical development.[19] While the DFC operates worldwide, the level of involvement within the Horn of Africa is relatively limited compared to many other regions of the world except for Kenya. Somalia and Ethiopia make up only three projects consisting of nearly US $13 million, whereas Colombia has ten projects totaling over $1 billion and Sri Lanka has four projects totaling $19 million.[20] As the Trump administration places Russia and China as primary competitors on the world stage, not challenging them within the Horn of Africa is a severe US shortcoming. If the US is entering into another era of great power competition, the US must look to challenge China directly and indirectly in areas such as the Horn of Africa. To meet this challenge, the US needs to increase and diversify DFC efforts in the region while maximizing the partnerships and programs it has already developed. While US investment in the region is critical, the effective use of military and diplomatic powers will play an increasingly important role to the Horn, which can significantly aid in US influence and further strengthen US-Africa relations.

Great Power Competition in Africa

As the Trump administration looks to the future, the administration must develop a comprehensive strategy for the continent and especially the Horn of Africa. The geopolitics of the Horn cannot be understated, and the volume of foreign actors throughout the region highlights this importance. If the US pursues an America alone-type foreign policy, it risks alienating many African states that have developed relations with the US over decades. Furthermore, this isolation-like approach will push African leaders to other more developed nations like Russia and China, undermining the US efforts toward great power competition.

The next decade will likely play a decisive role throughout the region, as China strives to expand its Belt and Road Initiative further, and the US reevaluates its presence in Africa. If the US prioritizes great power competition as stated in the NSS, the US needs to challenge China and Russia indirectly in places such as the Horn of Africa. An effective strategy within the region allows for significant benefits in line with US national interests.

Although the current roles of China and Russia in the Horn of Africa may appear insignificant than other regions, it is critical given contemporary debates on security and global order, regional security, and challenges to political and economic US national interests. Furthermore, the US can challenge China and Russia as part of great-power competitions both directly and indirectly, for example through the US private sector taking a larger portion of African market share and increasing specific investment into the region. An effective strategy in the Horn of Africa must limit China’s and Russia’s expansion and increase US interests with an eye on long-term effects while building African capacity and security.

Endnotes

[1] J. J. Messner et al., Fragile States Index Annual Report 2019 (Washington, DC: The Fund for Peace, 2019), https://fragilestatesindex.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/9511904-fragilestatesindex.pdf.

[2] David Barno and Nora Bensahel, “Trump’s Next Task: Learning the Limits of Military Power,” War on the Rocks, May 2, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/05/trumps-next-task-learning-the-limits-of-military-power/.

[3] White House, National Security Strategy (Washington, D. C: White House, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.

[4] Demetri Sevastopulo and Peter Spiegel, “Donald Trump Questions US Role in NATO,” Financial Times, March 21, 2016, https://www.ft.com/content/2695854c-efaf-11e5-a609-e9f2438ee05b.

[5] Michael Birnbaum and Seung Min Kim, “Trump Calls Out NATO Members, Demands More Spending,” The Mercury News, July 11, 2018, last updated July 12, 2018, https://www.mercurynews.com/2018/07/11/trump-calls-out-nato-members-demands-more-spending/.

[6] Julian Borger, “Donald Trump Denounces ‘Globalism’ in Nationalist Address to UN,” The Guardian, September 24, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/sep/24/donald-trump-un-address-denounces-globalism.

[7] Reshma Kapadia, “There’s a Trade Deal with China. Here’s Why the Stock Market Isn’t Thrilled,” Barrons, December 13, 2019, https://www.barrons.com/articles/u-s-china-trade-deal-confusion-stocks-are-volatile-51576254365.

[8] Hannah Kuchler, “Why Prescription Drugs Cost so Much More in America.” Financial Times, September 18, 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/e92dbf94-d9a2-11e9-8f9b-77216ebe1f17.

[9] White House, National Security Strategy (Washington, D. C: White House, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.

[10] Ibid., 38.

[11] Peter J. Schraeder, “Making America Great Again’ Against the Backdrop of an ‘Africa Rising’? The Trump Administration and Africa’s Marginalization within US Foreign Policy,” Seton Hall Journal of Diplomacy & International Relations 20, no. 1 (Fall/Winter 2018), https://nduezproxy.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com.nduezproxy.idm.oclc.org/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip,url,uid&db=tsh&AN=136124986&site=eds-live&scope=site.

[12] Kathryn Dunn Tenpas, “Tracking Turnover in the Trump Administration,” Brookings, May 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/research/tracking-turnover-in-the-trump-administration/.

[13] Peter J. Schraeder, “Making America Great Again,”2018.

[14] Katie Williams, “From Small Wars to Great Power, Trump’s Africa Reset could Change US Military’s Role,” Defense One, December 12, 2018, https://www.defenseone.com/politics/2018/12/small-wars-great-power-trumps-africa-reset-could-change-us-militarys-role/153485/.

[15] Lara Seligman and Robbie Gramer, “Pentagon Debates Drawdown in Africa, South America,” Foreign Policy, January 30, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/30/pentagon-troop-drawdown-africa-south-america-sahel-capitol-hill-congress-trump/.

[16] Wynne Davis, “3 Americans Killed in Attack on Kenyan Airfield by Al-Shabab Militants,” NPR.com, January 5, 2020, https://www.npr.org/2020/01/05/793752674/airfield-used-by-u-s-forces-in-kenya-comes-under-attack-by-al-shabab-militants.

[17] Lauren Blanchard and Sarah Collins, China’s Engagement in Djibouti, CRS Report No. IF11304 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF11304.pdf.

[18] International Trade Administration, “Prosper Africa,” US Department of Commerce, accessed January 14, 2020, https://www.trade.gov/prosper-africa.

[19] DFC.gov, “US International Development Finance Corporation,” DFC.gov, https://www.dfc.gov/who-we-are.

[20] U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, “Active DFC Projects-Map View,” DFC.gov, project date as of December 31, 2019, https://www3.opic.gov/ActiveProjectsMap/Default.aspx#

What Ethiopia’s Brewing Conflict Means for the Country—and the Region

December 15, 2020/0 Comments/in Analysis, English, External, Politics/by Solomon

Source: Small Wars | Aly Verjee and Susan Stigant | USIP Publication

A protracted conflict between the federal government and the Tigray region is still not inevitable, but it will require both sides to choose another path.

Violent conflict between the federal government of Ethiopia and the federal state of Tigray, in the country’s north, began November 4 and quickly escalated. USIP’s Aly Verjee and Susan Stigant discuss the crisis and identify what could be done to avoid further violent conflict in east Africa’s most populous country.

Unfortunately, violence is not new to Ethiopia; already, there are over 1.4 million conflict-affected internally displaced persons in the country. What is the broader significance of this latest violence between the federal government and the Tigray region?

Stigant: The rapidity of the escalation of violence between Tigray and Addis Ababa is concerning in itself, given the stakes for Ethiopia’s peace and stability. This conflict has the potential to quickly become more polarized and increase violence throughout Ethiopian society. Already, the Tigray region has called for the full mobilization of all citizens to fight. The federal government, led by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, has also used uncompromising language to justify his government’s actions. As the allegations and incidents mount—including possible war crimes—and the number of people affected increases, it will become much harder to find a peaceful solution.

At the same time, solely focusing on what is going on today in Tigray risks obscuring broader concerns about violence, democratic backsliding, and repression elsewhere in the country. As a horrific example of the type of violence in Ethiopia that has become all too common, on November 1, ethnically targeted killings left at least 54 people dead in a schoolyard in the Wollega zone of Oromia state. Throughout western Ethiopia, communal violence has only increased since 2018. In southern Ethiopia, tensions remain high, as the consequences of the model of ethnic federalism continue to unfold.

Verjee: As I warned in April 2019, tensions between the regions have the potential to overwhelm the political management capacity of the center. The conflict in Tigray has already pulled in forces from the neighboring Amhara Regional State to fight the Tigrayans. The leadership of the Somali Regional State has also taken the side of the federal government in the dispute. In the broader context, it does not really matter who is responsible for starting the violence; all Ethiopians, no matter their ethnicity, have to find a way to live side-by-side, which will not be accomplished by jailing or killing the political and military elite of Tigray. The ruling party of Tigray, the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), which once led the ruling party coalition that preceded the Abiy government, are no angels. But for the federal government to risk throwing the whole country into a protracted civil conflict—with significant cross-border consequences—is also highly unfortunate.

Already, a humanitarian crisis is in the making. More than 11,000 refugees have already crossed the border with Sudan, with thousands more almost certain to follow. Drawing in Eritrea and Sudan into the conflict may easily bring in other regional and extra-regional powers, leaving the Horn of Africa in a complicated, messy crisis from which it may take many years to recover, at a cost of thousands of lives. As the USIP Red Sea Senior Study Group recently warned, “Intrastate or interstate conflict would be catastrophic for Ethiopia’s people and for the region and would pose a direct threat to international peace and security.”

The dispute between Tigray and the federal government has been festering for some time. Could violence be avoided?

Stigant: The federal government has characterized its action as a rule of law operation to uphold the constitution, and that it would act with “utmost care for the overall wellbeing, safety and security of our citizens.” The federal government has described the September 2020 elections held by the Tigray region as illegitimate and has objected to equating the federal government to the TPLF. While there are more than two sides to every story, there is little doubt that relations were strained with Tigray. That said, the paramount constitutional right of any citizen is the right to life. Before resorting to military action and the attendant deaths of Ethiopian citizens, every other possibility needed to be exhausted, even if the Tigray authorities were being uncooperative. More pragmatically, the use of force rarely works to sustain a political settlement, as the history of Ethiopia has shown on numerous occasions.

As the cornerstone of his rule, Prime Minister Abiy set out a philosophy of medemer, or coming together, to overcome the divisions of the past. Less than a year ago, in accepting the Nobel Peace Prize, Abiy mentioned the word love seven times, and the words forgiveness and reconciliation four times each. Ethiopia does not need Abiy to love Tigray, nor vice versa; but forgiveness and reconciliation cannot occur if belligerent parties do not show restraint.

Verjee: The federal government has already suspended fiscal transfers to Tigray and cut off communications and cross-border trade. Even if the allegation that the TPLF posed an imminent threat by its purported seizure of weapons and a military base is entirely accurate, a proportionate, limited response was the most that could be justified. Although the federal government has said that its operations will be time limited, Abiy has also said that he will not rest until the “the criminal junta is disarmed, legitimate administration in the region restored, and fugitives apprehended and brought to justice,” which are objectives that could take months, if not years, to achieve. Although the warning signs have been there for some time, a protracted violent conflict is still not inevitable, but it will require both sides to choose another path.

Abiy should also consider that his own position as head of the government comes in the context of an ongoing debate about the future of the constitutional order of Ethiopia. Were it not for COVID-19, Ethiopia should have held elections this year, in which Abiy would have had the opportunity to obtain a democratic mandate. Abiy may be prime minister and enjoy the powers of that office but should consider his administration bound by norms that limit the actions of an unelected official.

To date, the federal government has rejected mediation of this crisis. Going forward, what role should national and international actors play to try and de-escalate the situation?

Stigant: For years, Ethiopia has been at the heart of establishing regional and continental mechanisms for addressing violent conflict. These include the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism of the regional intergovernmental organization IGAD, which Ethiopia chaired for years, and the Peace and Security Council and the Panel of the Wise of the African Union (AU). As the AU’s host nation, there is arguably a special responsibility on Ethiopia to call on these indigenous African institutions not as an intrusion on sovereignty, but to model exemplary behavior for all African states.

Domestically, there have been multiple calls for a national dialogue to forge a political agreement regarding the conduct of elections and then on the constitutional order following the elections. As violence escalates in the country, it becomes both more urgent and more challenging to move a dialogue process forward. While the federal government has already announced such an effort, any initiative will need to be revisited in light of the changing circumstances. Ultimately, the credibility of any dialogue will be judged on the extent to which it includes key groups, reaches agreement on preparatory steps and confidence-building measures, and demonstrates that people can have genuine, safe, and frank conversations.

Verjee: The United States, the European Union, and the United Kingdom, all leading humanitarian donors, should urgently articulate the acute priority of preserving and enhancing humanitarian access to Tigray on the ground, to internally displaced persons moving to other states of Ethiopia, and to the refugees in Sudan. There is no acceptable reason for impeding this kind of access.

More broadly, as USIP’s Payton Knopf has written, international inertia on Ethiopia cannot be justified by imperfect or incomplete information. While American leverage on Ethiopia has been damaged by President Trump’s remarks on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, Ethiopia remains a vital strategic partner for the United States in matters of regional security, counterterrorism, migration, and peacekeeping. China is also massively invested in Ethiopia, in many deals that were reached in the days of the rule of the TPLF. Therefore, the United States, China, and others have a mutual interest in seeing a quick end to hostilities, creating the space for other forms of dialogue and discussion. While a formal international mediation process may not be necessary, honest international brokers should urgently convey to both sides, in unequivocal terms, their expectation and hope that hostilities should be halted without further delay.

Ethiopia’s Problems Will Not End with a Military Victory

November 30, 2020/0 Comments/in Analysis, English, Ethiopia, Politics/by Solomon

Substantial efforts are needed to reduce political tensions ahead of elections in 2021.

USIP Publication: Aly Verjee | Tuesday, November 24, 2020

As violence continues over control of the northern Ethiopian region of Tigray, Ethiopia’s future remains unsettled, even if the conflict ends soon. Achieving the federal government’s security objectives in Tigray is unlikely to resolve both new and entrenched political challenges, and already delayed national elections, now expected in 2021, may prove a severe test of Ethiopia’s political order, and consequently affect broader regional stability. Reconciling the electoral process with efforts for reconciliation and national dialogue is now even more imperative.

The Conflict in Tigray

War sometimes starts like clockwork but predicting the date on which a conflict will end often leads to disappointment. Yet from the start of armed hostilities with the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed promised the conflict would be swift and decisive. On November 6, Abiy wrote that “operations by federal defense forces underway in Northern Ethiopia have clear, limited and achievable objectives.” On November 9, the prime minister said the military operation “will wrap up soon,” and the next day, that “our law enforcement operations in Tigray are proceeding as planned: operations will cease as soon as the criminal junta is disarmed, legitimate administration in the region restored, and fugitives apprehended and brought to justice—all of them rapidly coming within reach.” Claims that the conflict will be short-lived have also been echoed by senior American officials: U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia Michael Raynor told journalists on November 19 that “another aspect of this is the Ethiopian government continues to articulate a vision of the military conflict coming to an end fairly soon, a week or two from now.”

Despite limitations on independent reporting and the severing of most communications, the federal government has announced significant military advances, capturing a number of important towns and cities in Tigray, including Shire on November 17, Axum and Adwa on November 20, and Adigrat on November 21. The TPLF has made counterclaims: that it inflicted significant casualties on federal forces in Raya and to have repulsed federal forces in Mehoni and Zalambessa. For the federal government, taking control of the state capital of Tigray, and its largest city, Mekelle, is now the principal remaining tactical military objective.

However, even if Abiy’s military objectives are quickly achieved, experiences of warfare in northern Ethiopia dating back a century suggest that it is much easier to capture territory than it is to hold it. It is unclear what a successful strategy for the federal government will be if it is able to capture Tigray’s urban centers but cannot command the widespread acceptance of Tigray’s people. While the fighting of the last few weeks may have significantly degraded the TPLF’s military capacity, it is unlikely that the federal government can entirely subdue the TPLF as a political entity, which retains the support of a substantial number of Tigrayans. Further, the TPLF’s historic capacity to wage guerrilla warfare from the rural mountains of Tigray may not be definitively eroded by its losses in conventional warfare.

While some in the federal government have indicated that they would accept a refashioned TPLF led by moderates, external efforts to re-engineer the party may well be counterproductive and only risk further alienating some Tigrayan constituencies. Therefore, as focused on their immediate objectives and consequently as reluctant to seek dialogue and compromise as they may be, the parties in conflict may find that a negotiated settlement may ultimately be the only realistic choice, if not imminently, then in the months ahead. Moreover, the federal government must soon confront an even bigger problem in 2021: how to conduct peaceful and credible elections.

The Prospects and Difficulties of Elections

National elections are overdue and are now expected to be held next year. While in February 2020, the National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) announced that elections would be held in August 2020, by the end of March, the Board had decided to indefinitely delay the elections because of the COVID-19 pandemic. As NEBE explained, several important preparatory tasks were unable to be completed in March, meaning that the crucial voter registration exercise, which was expected to register tens of millions of prospective voters, was unable to commence in April.

Beyond the national polls, each regional state of Ethiopia is also due to hold elections for their state legislatures. It was the Tigray region’s decision to proceed with organizing its own elections in September, in defiance of the federal government and without the oversight and participation of the NEBE, that contributed to a deterioration of relations between Tigray and Addis Ababa, and which was a further step toward the violence now occurring.

Even without the impact of COVID-19 and the situation in Tigray, Ethiopia’s next national elections are fraught with difficulty. The polls are expected to be the first competitive elections since 2005 and raise fundamental questions about the future order of the Ethiopian state. Abiy’s new political vehicle, the Ethiopian Prosperity Party, is the national frontrunner, constructed from the former Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front ruling coalition, which was once led by the TPLF. Apart from the TPLF, a number of new opposition political parties are expected to contest the polls.

The challenges faced in administering elections are significant. The first problem is one of election administration, operations and reform: a rush to organize elections in early 2021, as some have suggested, may easily worsen the political situation across the country, as in such a limited time, elections are unlikely to be effectively administered. In May, the NEBE proposed two scenarios on which to base a prospective electoral calendar: the first required 224 days to prepare for and conduct elections, and the second required 276 days. However, at the end of October, NEBE proposed that the elections be held in late May or June 2021, contingent on beginning poll worker training in December and voter registration in January.

As early as December 2018, a USAID pre-elections assessment found that “there is a lack of consensus about specific solutions and timing of reforms in relation to the election cycle, and that information about and support for the reforms is inconsistent. The reform process has been largely elite-driven and concentrated in Addis Ababa, and there is a lack of clarity on a specific road map to achieving the goals set out by the prime minister.” While there has been some important progress since that assessment was made, conducting elections in Ethiopia will be the largest democratic exercise in the country’s history; the technical challenges should not be underestimated and cannot easily be expedited. More recently, NEBE has noted that the possibility of constitutional and electoral reform could also complicate the electoral calendar and has warned, “Preparations for electoral process based on [an] unstable timeline are not advisable. Only once these processes [of constitutional and electoral reform] are completed should an electoral timeline be consulted and announced, and preparations begin in earnest.”

The second, more profound problem in conducting elections concerns broader needs for security, trust, reconciliation, and the ability of Ethiopians to freely engage in open political discourse, debate, and campaigning. Even before the conflict with Tigray, there were more than 1.8 million internally displaced persons in Ethiopia. In May, Amnesty International reported that at least 10,000 people had been “arbitrarily arrested and detained last year as part of the government’s crackdown on armed attacks and violence in Oromia Region,” and in July, that another 5,000 had been arrested following protests the previous month. A number of prominent political figures and journalists were jailed before the Tigray conflict began, and more arrests of journalists have followed this month.

For their part, American officials have asserted that the conflict in Tigray has served to unite Ethiopians. Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Tibor Nagy told journalists on November 19 that “it seems like [the conflict in Tigray] has brought the Ethiopian nation together, at least for the time being, in support of the prime minister …” Ambassador Raynor added that “the rest of the country actually remains quite calm at present, no indications of anyone taking up comparable actions elsewhere, and in fact the opposite. Seemingly both regional governments, federal governments, and large swaths of the people galvanizing around the [federal] government.”

Unfortunately, violence has continued elsewhere in Ethiopia. In a recent tragic incident, the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission reported that at least 34 people were killed in a November 14 attack on a bus in Benishangul. Further, as the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs pointed out on November 20, “Humanitarian partners in Ethiopia are further concerned about the increasing report of violence in Oromia and Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples (SNNP) regions. Violent incidents involving unidentified armed groups have been reported on an almost daily basis, mainly in the Western Oromia region, while several thousand people were reportedly displaced by inter-communal violence in Konso zone, SNNPR on 16 November.” Alas, any short-term increase in perceived or real Ethiopian national unity resulting from the current Tigray confrontation does little to address the problems of arbitrary detention or intercommunal violence elsewhere in the country.

For successful elections to be held, credibly and non-coercively addressing both insecurity and the underlying grievances behind the violence will be essential. An adequate response necessitates efforts at reconciliation, justice, and inclusive dialogue. While wider questions of reconciliation, reform, and elections cannot be the first point on the agenda in any eventual negotiations between the federal government and the TPLF, discussing them cannot be indefinitely avoided, either. More importantly, discussions on such issues must include many more political and civil actors beyond those now in conflict if at least a degree of national consensus is to be achieved. Squaring the electoral preparations and timetable with a plan for reconciliation and national dialogue may thus be imperative for a peaceful future in Ethiopia.

‘Abiy Ahmed had to punish those seeking to break up Ethiopia’ – Djibouti President

November 25, 2020/0 Comments/in English, External, Politics/by Solomon

Source: The African Report

The deadly conflict between Ethiopia’s federal government and Tigrayan rebels continues to intensify, especially after Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed issued a warning on Sunday to surrender within 72 hours. But despite international calls for a cease in action, many regional neighbours, including the small state of Djibouti, are supporting the PM’s stance.

With less than five months to go before the presidential election, Djibouti’s head of state takes stock of his efforts to tackle economic and social issues, internal opposition, a war in Ethiopia and the country’s relations with China, France and the United States.

The virus quietly arrived in Djibouti one evening in mid-March 2020, aboard a Spanish military plane that had taken off from Seville. Eight months later, the silent killer continues to lurk in spite of the health authorities’ swift implementation of the “three Ts” (test, trace and treat), with 8% of the country’s population tested to date, i.e., the highest rate in the region.

Economic slowdown

Though the government of this city-state with 1 million residents has taken an optimistic view of the future – it forecasts a return to growth in 2021 – the fallout of the COVID-19 pandemic is weighing heavily on its economy, which was in full swing before it ground to a halt. The Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway line, one of the country’s essential arteries, is running on a reduced schedule, while the stately hotel located in the continent’s largest free zone, just a few kilometres away from the capital, remains hopelessly empty.

But according to Aboubaker Omar Hadi, president of the Djibouti Ports & Free Zones Authority and one of Ismaïl Omar Guelleh’s closest associates, “It’s merely a setback, our fundamentals are strong.”

“Fundamentals”? The former French colony is ideally located along the world’s second-busiest shipping route, a gateway to trade with a wide swath of Africa, backed by a market of 400 million people. Its strategic geographic location is also a coveted spot for foreign military bases. Lastly, it also has political stability going for it: contrary to what happens elsewhere, Djibouti’s elections aren’t highly tense affairs.

Unshakeable calm

These advantages – combined with a government that the opposition calls authoritarian and which, it’s true, prioritises development and the fight against endemic poverty and unemployment over the expansion of freedoms – explain the unshakeable calm of President Guelleh, 73, who has been running the country since 1999.

Although he still refuses to say as much, no one in Djibouti has any doubt that the leader, who welcomed one of our reporters at the presidential palace for a long interview, will stand for re-election next April. He is the clear favourite, as if the exercise were a one-horse race.

Among the numerous Djibouti hub development projects you have launched in recent months in spite of the pandemic, ranging from the new Damerjog oil terminal to the capital’s business district, not to mention the ship maintenance yard, one in particular has attracted a lot of attention: the road corridor connecting the Port of Tadjoura to northern Ethiopia. Are you looking to gain a competitive edge over Eritrea’s Port of Massawa, which underwent a major renovation after the thaw in relations between Addis Ababa and Asmara?

Ismaïl Omar Guelleh: In the long run, yes, we always need to be a few steps ahead. But competition between Djibouti and Eritrea isn’t imminent: connecting Massawa via a modern railway line requires extremely costly and complex rehabilitation, upgrading and construction works given the region’s hilly topography.

Another competitor, one that poses a greater short-term challenge, is the Port of Berbera in Somaliland, in which your former partner, the Emirati company DP World, plans to invest massively.

Massively? I haven’t heard anything of the sort so far, other than project proposals. DP World excels at creating buzz, but then, in the end, nothing happens. You don’t even see the slightest crane in the sky. We are paid to know.

On that note, how is the commercial dispute between Djibouti and DP World, which you sidelined from managing the Port of Doraleh two years back, going?

The court proceedings are still under way in London and will perhaps begin soon in the United States. These people who stubbornly refuse to sit down and have a discussion with us aren’t interested in money. They’re too rich for that. What they want is for their old monopoly status to be fully reinstated. Their attitude stems from a desire to wield geopolitical control over all the region’s ports. But Djibouti isn’t just another square on a chessboard: we will not go back to the way things were.

In mid-September, you launched the Djibouti Sovereign Fund, which will be funded to the tune of $1.5bn over the next decade and whose sole shareholder is the government. Usually, sovereign wealth funds are the prerogative of rich countries. What is the point of the fund?

“We don’t have oil, but we have ideas”: do you remember that French saying from the 1970s? Well, that’s us, too. I asked Lionel Zinsou and Donald Kaberuka to conduct a feasibility study, one that draws on successful sovereign wealth funds, such as those created by Senegal and Singapore.
What we want to do is free ourselves somewhat from conventional debt-driven growth models, pool our domestic resources to create a leverage effect, attract new financing, promote business and job creation, and, lastly, increase our overall wealth.

The Djibouti Sovereign Fund is up and running now. The implementing decrees have been signed. The team is in place and headed by a former Senegalese official specialising in these matters, whom I poached from President Macky Sall with his authorisation. This fund, which I directly oversee, belongs to Djibouti and the Djiboutian people.

The debt Djibouti owes China has for a long time been seen as excessive. Is this still the case today?

Our “Chinese debt” is much lower than what some have said. It amounts to $450m, compared with Ethiopia’s $16bn and Kenya’s $20bn. We have worked really hard on debt restructuring and servicing. The company managing the Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway line, which is the main source of this debt, will be privatised, with Ethiopia and Djibouti retaining ownership of the infrastructure.

Is the railway line profitable?

To make a profit, it needs to reach a frequency of 10 trains a day as soon as possible. That’s our aim. For the time being, because of the COVID-19 pandemic, we are seeing a rate of two to three trains a day.

Youth employment and inclusive growth are the main challenges facing your country, which has a structural poverty rate that encompasses almost 40% of the population. How are you addressing these challenges?

We are constantly working to implement a wide range of measures in the areas of affordable housing, health, education and professional training. The share of the population suffering from what is called “multidimensional poverty” has decreased by more than 15% over the past eight years, especially in rural areas. GDP per capita, which indicates the purchasing power of Djiboutians, has risen by 10% over the same period.

These statistics are encouraging, but we’re not there yet. Our goal is to triple per capita income within 15 years. Social well-being needs to increase in line with our economic growth.

Are you starting to see the beginnings of a middle class?

“Beginnings” is the right word. The cost of living here is high, mostly due to the cost of energy, which is why there are a growing number of wind and solar energy projects.

Ethiopia is a key economic partner for Djibouti. Since Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed took power in 2018, this country of 110 million people is caught between centrifugal forces that threaten its unity. Are you concerned about the situation?

Of course. From the days of the Ethiopian Empire through Meles Zenawi’s leadership, not to mention Mengistu Haile Mariam’s dictatorship, “togetherness” has always been the exception, not the rule, in the country. One group has always dominated another. Ahmed, whose intentions were good, tried to change that. He’s a born optimist, both a politician, military man and very devout evangelical Christian.

But he is coming up against heavy resistance, particularly in the Tigray region, where the population lives under the rule of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front [TPLF]. So, the situation is difficult. That said, our personal and bilateral relations are good.

On 4 November, Ahmed launched a military offensive against the Tigray forces. Was war the only solution?

Let’s try to put ourselves in Ahmed’s shoes. Ethiopia is faced with a major problem: a political organisation known as the TPLF is stripping its federal authority and has structured itself so as to bring the central government to its knees.

Ethiopia’s prime minister has two options to choose from: one, he can negotiate with Tigray’s government, with each party separate and on an equal footing. This can only lead to the partition of Ethiopia, as it will set a precedent under which other regional groups will be able to assert their own secessionist claims. Two, he can restore law and order at the federal level, and punish those seeking to break up the country.

I think Ahmed has taken the second route, which will allow the population to elect their own leaders. That’s why he moved to replace the regional administration and dissolved Tigray’s parliament. It’s clear that as a country that shares its borders with Ethiopia and could thus be impacted by the conflict, Djibouti has one single wish: that peace be restored.

Al-Shabaab, a terrorist group that holds sway in Somalia, is considered al-Qaida’s best organised and most active arm in the world. How is it that this militia continues to pose such a threat, despite the presence of a military mission of 22,000 men – including a contingent from Djibouti – and numerous US drone strikes?

We haven’t yet managed to eliminate the leaders of this terrorist group. But we must, because Al-Shabaab has expanded its influence to the criminal economy, to the extent that it has become a sort of mafia. In the Port of Mogadishu, few containers escape their control: they tax, racketeer, traffic and, more than anything else, corrupt many important figures. They use refugee camps as a recruitment channel, offering young unemployed people food while also indoctrinating, training and arming them.

Legislative elections are scheduled to be held in Somalia in 2021. I fear we will end up with a parliament indirectly controlled by Al-Shabaab because they’ll have bought the support of some of the MPs. The risk that this group poses for the entire region has never been greater.

And Djibouti, with its foreign military bases, is a choice target for these terrorists, who have previously attacked Kenya and Uganda . . .

Yes, that’s clear. They attacked us in 2014. But we’re extremely vigilant, and our intelligence and security agencies are always on high alert.

What gives us the upper hand is that these extremists have virtually no ties to our population: when they try to infiltrate our communities, they are quickly spotted. Also, to get to Djibouti, they have to slip through the net of the Puntland and Somaliland police forces.

Why has the restoration of diplomatic relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea still not had the slightest positive effect on your relationship with Eritrea’s president, Issayas Afeworki?

I met with Issayas in Jeddah in September 2018, but neither the Saudi’s mediation team nor Ahmed’s efforts produced a “peace of the braves”. This is despite the fact that I took the step of releasing 19 Eritrean prisoners of war, which Asmara didn’t want, it seems.

The only explanation I see for this stonewalling is a psychological one: Issayas is unyielding and resentful, and we won’t repeat the exercise. The former Ethiopian prime minister, Meles Zenawi, had warned me: “Once you’re mad at him, he never forgets.”

Several Arab Muslim countries – Bahrain, Sudan and the United Arab Emirates – have announced they are normalising relations with Israel. Will Djibouti follow suit?

No, because the conditions aren’t ripe. We neither have a problem with the Jews as a people nor the Israelis as a nation. Some of them even come to Djibouti on business with their passport, and Djibouti’s citizens have been able to travel to Israel for 25 years now.

However, we take issue with the Israeli government because they’re denying Palestinians their inalienable rights. All we ask that the government do is make one gesture of peace, and we will make 10 in return. But I’m afraid they’ll never do that.

The US has raised concerns about your relations with China on several occasions. It has even been reported that an American general suggested that Beijing had “purchased” the Port of Djibouti. Have these suspicions been cleared up?

They were totally baseless, but I’m not sure they’ve gone away. For instance, we don’t understand why the $25m loan the World Bank promised us in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic has taken so long to materialise. The president of the World Bank, David Malpass, is a US citizen. Is there a causal connection? I wonder.

And yet you agreed to let the US army occupy the largest foreign military base in Djibouti. Don’t these kinds of activities sometimes encroach on your sovereignty?

We see to it that that doesn’t happen, but it’s not always easy. In 2013, we allowed the United States to use the French military’s Chabelley Airfield, located some 10 kilometres from Djibouti-Ambouli International Airport, as a base for their unmanned aircraft. Since then, the base has become exclusively reserved for the US military.

No one can get in, neither us nor the French. It’s a problem we need to sort out.

You’ve often complained that France doesn’t show much interest in Djibouti, including economically speaking. Has that changed since French President Emmanuel Macron’s visit in March 2019?

Not really, unfortunately. In East Africa, the French only seem interested in Kenya and Ethiopia, with mixed results. Of course, the French electric utility company Engie is investing in Djibouti’s solar and wind power sector, and a delegation from MEDEF [a French business confederation] plans to pay us a visit in January. That’s better than nothing.

But I think that Paris should realise that Djibouti is more than just a strategic geographic location. Djibouti also has a position in the global economy. Others have come to this realisation, and an increasing number of young Djiboutians speak English, which is the language of business in our corner of the world.

Djibouti forcefully pushed to get a seat as a non-permanent member on the UN Security Council but was pipped at the post by Kenya last June. How did you feel about that?

We felt it was unfair and that the African Union had failed us, as they weren’t able to handle the problem. Kenya forced its way through, with the complicity of some Southern African countries, by casting aside every best practice. Nairobi spent a lot of money to get that seat. However, we did manage to prevent our rival from securing a majority and we’ve learned our lesson for next time. You can rest assured that we’ll try again.

Why are you so adamant about putting Djibouti on the world stage? You’ve opened close to 50 embassies, which is a substantial number for a small country of 1 million residents.

Because that’s the only way for us to avoid getting swallowed up in the melting pot of globalisation!

Thirty years ago, Djibouti was only on the map for the former colonial power. Today, we’re on the cusp of becoming a global hub. It’s a matter of political will.

Six months back, a Djiboutian air force pilot named Fouad Youssouf Ali was extradited from Ethiopia. He has been detained in Djibouti ever since, and his fate has troubled some members of the public as well as human rights activists, who consider him a political prisoner. When will he be tried?

He’ll be tried, but justice takes time here, just as in France. As for the rest, this person isn’t a prisoner of conscience. He’s a former air force lieutenant and deserter who tried to fly a plane to reach Eritrea, meaning hostile territory, but ultimately fled to Ethiopia. Can you name a single other country that wouldn’t have charged such a person under the same circumstances?

His prison conditions have sparked concern in Djibouti and Ali Sabieh, the city he’s from. Could the conflict between the Issa and Afar clans, which caused so much harm to the country at the beginning of the 1990s, rear its head again?

Over the past 20 or so years, we have made every effort to strengthen our sense of national unity and to instil a spirit of citizenship. There have never been more interclan marriages between the Issas and Afars than there are today. If there’s one point we are perfectly at ease with, it’s that one.

Why does Djibouti still not have any private, independent media outlets?

Because it’s expensive, quite simply, and the market is small. A few projects are under way in the digital sphere, but the financing capabilities in this area are nowhere near those of Somalia, where tribal solidarity is fully intact.

An online media outlet close to the opposition, “La voix de Djibouti” [The Voice of Djibouti], regularly complains that its journalists are harassed by the police. Isn’t such a practice counter to the principle of freedom of expression enshrined in Djibouti’s constitution?

That media outlet isn’t close to the opposition; it’s an opposition website based in Brussels, Belgium. The correspondents you are talking about aren’t registered journalists, but instead nobodies – some of whom are barely literate – presenting themselves as such. For that matter, we haven’t jailed anyone.

You’re confronted with a determined opposition, whose leaders are divided, including when it comes to their methods of action. Do you benefit from that?

I think it’s too bad. Every democracy needs an opposition that believes in discussion, comparing policies and the country’s future. Our opposition can be summed up by the slogan “Me or chaos”. Whether it’s Daher Ahmed Farah, Abdourahman Mohamed Guelleh or Adan Mohamed Abdou, none of them abide by the rules for forming a party. A party isn’t just some group you register with a founder and 10 or so members that never holds a convention. But we prefer to look the other way.

This state of things came about because the Islamist faction of this coalition, MoDeL [Movement for Democracy and Freedom] – the local chapter of the Muslim Brotherhood – used religion as a mobilising force. We have taken the necessary measures to reduce its impact. The coalition’s main leaders have left Djibouti for Turkey and Canada, where they have nothing other than Facebook to try to indoctrinate followers.

As for sermons, their content is strictly regulated and comes under the exclusive remit of the Ministry of Muslim Affairs. Sermons are sent to each mosque by email, and imams can’t add a single word to them during Friday prayers. I think the French authorities would do well to follow in our footsteps in this regard. It’s the only way to prevent extremism from thriving.

But there isn’t just the main weekly prayer. What about the other sermons?

In Djibouti, imams and muezzins are civil servants paid by the state. If they let a person use their platform to glorify violence and jihad and utter slogans and insults, they’ll be held accountable for it and immediately punished. In this sense, you could say that we have them by the strings. But there’s less and less of a need for us to do this because our religious leaders are increasingly better trained and educated. They realise that true Islam is about knowledge and tolerance.

The presidential election is scheduled to take place in April 2021. Will you stand for a fifth term?

I can’t state my position on that matter at this time. We have to let the country and administration do what they have to do. I’ll make an announcement very shortly, inshallah.

As you must know, no one in Djibouti has any doubt about your stance on that point . . .

Really? Well, give me a bit of time to answer.

Are Emirati Armed Drones Supporting Ethiopia from an Eritrean Air Base?

November 20, 2020/0 Comments/in Analysis, English, External, Politics/by Solomon

Source: Billing Cat | November 19, 2020

Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed declares that the war in the Tigray Region has entered its “final phase”.

The conflict broke out on November 4 when the country’s central government accused the region’s local authorities of holding “illegal” elections and seizing a military base. Thousands of civilians have fled to neigbouring Sudan as the federal army advances towards the regional capital of Mekelle.

Tigray politicians have claimed that they are under attack “on several fronts” — including neighbouring Eritrea, with which the region shares a long border. As Regional President Debretsion Gebremichael recently told Reuters, “our country is attacking us with a foreign country, Eritrea. Treason!”

Getachew Reda, a senior advisor to Gebremichael, made more detailed claims about the use of drones:

The Ethiopian Prime Minister has only stated that the Air Force conducted ‘targeted strikes’ against the militants without specifying the weapons used.

Could Emirati drones or other drones have been used in these airstrikes?

So far, there’s no evidence for that particular claim.

Satellite imagery obtained by Bellingcat suggests that the United Arab Emirates air base in Assab, Eritrea is indeed home to drones consistent with China’s Wing Loong II model of armed uncrewed aerial vehicles.

The imagery, provided by Planet Labs, shows a drone with a wingspan of just over 20 metres, matching the features of the drone model produced by China’s Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group.

The UAE acquired Wing Loong II drones in 2017. They have also used the drones to conduct operations in Yemen in the war against various militant groups, including the Houthis.

Satellite imagery from Planet Labs. Used with permission

The drones seen in these images are consistent with those operated by the UAE. Furthermore, the recently built drone hangars at the base suggest a larger presence of drones in the area, though their active deployment over Ethiopia is not yet confirmed. However, the imagery provides a strong indication of the possibility for their use. However, the Ethiopian Air Force also operates Russian-made MiG-23 and Sukhoi-27 jet fighters and attack helicopters that could also have been used in the strikes.

Footage uploaded via Facebook and shared Deutsche Welle’s Amharic-language service indicated that jet fighters have been active around Mekelle, where they are claimed to be involved in airstrikes:

The birth of a drone base

Drones aren’t new to this region. In 2015, what is likely a Chinese-produced Wing Loong I drone was spotted at the Assab airbase. This model is the predecessor of the Wing Loong II, which only entered service after 2018.

In 2016 an analysis by Stratfor detailed the construction of the base and its growth for both aerial and naval capabilities, providing the UAE with operational capability for its campaign in Yemen. Once again, satellite imagery shows a Wing Loong I drone standing outside two drone shelters at the north side of the tarmac.

A Sentinel-2 timelapse of the base comparing January 2017 with November 2020 reveals the large scale expansion of the base’s infrastructure.

Timelapse image: Sentinel Hub / Creative Commons

Two drone hangars were constructed sometime in April 2018, but in November 2019, a third hangar appeared on Sentinel-2 imagery.

The construction and lease of the base to the UAE by Eritrea has been condemned by the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea as a violation of the UN arms embargo on the two Horn of Africa states.

The current Planet Labs imagery also shows three crates next to the hangars at Assab Airbase, which could be evidence of shipping. Similar crates are used for the US-produced MQ-9 Reaper drones, as shown in an image released by the British Ministry of Defence.

According to the Twitter OSINT investigator Obretix, similar containers have also been noticed at other bases with confirmed Wing Loong II drones, such as in Egypt:

Furthermore, similar crates are visible on satellite imagery from this airbase in Iraq, which hosts US MQ-1 Grey Eagle and MQ-9 Reaper drones:

The UAE have also operated Wing Loong II drones over Libya in support of the opposition Libyan National Army (LNA) lead by the warlord Khalifa Haftar. According to the UN, at least 800 drone strikes in support of the LNA had taken place by November 2019, some of which had claimed civilian casualties. Satellite imagery confirms their presence on bases both in Libya as well as in Egypt.

The UAE also operates the US-produced General Atomic Predator XP unarmed drones. Moreover, the outgoing Trump administration has just approved the sales of MQ-9 Reaper drones to the UAE, provoking protest from human rights groups due to the Emirates’ poor human rights record and the relentless airstrikes by a Saudi and UAE led coalition in Yemen, which has caused high numbers of civilian casualties.

There are also media reports that Ethiopia has procured Chinese CH-4 armed drones, yet so far no open-source confirmation has been found which might indicate the presence of drones at known bases of the Ethiopian airforce. However, other clues could take the form of information from communications stations or satellite imagery showing the aforementioned shipping containers, as explained here by the Bard Center for the Study of the Drone.

Possible, but improbable

In sum, the claims made by the Tigray forces are not impossible, but so far they seem improbable.

Satellite imagery confirms the presence of Chinese-produced drones at the UAE’s military base in Assab, but that is all it confirms. There is currently no further evidence that these same drones have been involved in operations in support of the Ethiopian airforce, though there have been confirmed sightings of Ethiopian jet fighters in the conflict zone.

With thanks to Adam Rawnsley @arawnsley and Frank Slijper @FrankSlijper for feedback

Russia Opening Major Military Base in Sudan

November 18, 2020/0 Comments/in English, External, Politics/by Solomon

Source: Military Watch Magazine

The announcement of plans for the establishment of a Russian naval base on Sudan’s east coast, which has reportedly been under consideration since 2017 but is thought to have been delayed by a Western backed coup in the African country in April 2019, has given are grounds for speculation that Russia could be planning to reestablish a stronger naval presence overseas by opening further facilities in other vital theatres. Late in 2017 the Head of the Russian Defense and Security Committee Viktor Bondarev suggested that Moscow could consider restoring its military presences in Cuba and Vietnam, referring to these countries as Russia’s “historical partners” on the basis that both hosted Soviet military facilities during the Cold War and relied heavily on Soviet support to counter Western threats. Bondarev stated that restoring the country’s military presence was in the “interests of international security,” as a result of “intensified U.S. aggression.”

Russia’s only foreign military facilities outside the former Soviet Union are in Syria, where the country maintains both a key naval base on the Mediterranean Sea in Latakia province, and the nearby Khmemim Airbase which was established in September 2015 to facilitate a contribution to the Syrian government’s war effort. Facilities in Sudan are expected o be ambitious in size, according to the recently released plans, and will have a capacity for 300 military and civilian personnel and four ships including nuclear vessels, indicating that Moscow is willing to invest in such projects to enhance its maritime power projection capabilities and boost its overseas presence. Facilities in Vietnam and Cuba however would allow Russia to project power to strategically critical regions, the former being the most hotly contested and arguably the most strategically critical in the world today, and the latter placing Russian assets near the American coast – and in a strong position to support nearby Venezuela and Bolivia which are important strategic partners. With Russia gently rebalancing its military towards a greater focus on East Asia, Vietnam is a potentially ideal host for historical, political and geographic reasons. Neither China nor North Korea are expected to allow any permanent foreign military presence on their soil, and facilities on Russian territory are effectively boxed in by the Japanese islands, where there is a heavy U.S. presence, which impede open access to the Pacific.

Regarding to the potential for future foreign military facilities, Victor Bondarev stated: “I believe under the condition of increased tension in the world and frank intervention in the internal affairs of other countries – Russia’s historical partners – our return to Latin America is not ruled out. Of course, this should be coordinated with the Cubans… We should also think about our Navy’s return to Vietnam with the permission of the [Vietnamese] government.” He stressed that such steps would be effective responses to increased U.S. assertiveness in both regions. Bondarev has been far from alone in calls for such action, with his statement coming just hours after the first deputy chairman of the Russian parliament’s upper chamber’s Defense and Security Committee, Frants Klintsevich, called for a reopening of military facilities in Cuba specifically. Given the generally low endurance of post-Soviet Russian surface warships, which are no heaver than frigates, the existence of overseas bases is particularly highly valued. Russia’s most heavily armed Soviet era warships, the Kirov Class nuclear powered battlecruisers, are currently undergoing a comprehensive and very ambitious refurbishment which will allow them to deploy considerable force for port visits across much of the world as required – with these having a higher endurance than any surface combatant fielded by any other country.

In 2016 Russian lawmakers Valery Rushkin and Sergei Obukhov submitted a letter to Russian President Vladimir Putin, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu calling on them to consider the restoration of overseas military bases. This development came two years after the Crimean crisis and the sharp deterioration of relations with the West, and following the establishment of Khmeimim Airbase and beginning of a successful military campaign in Syria in 2015. Amid growing tensions with the Western Bloc, and in light of Russia’s expanding roles in both the Pacific and South America, such plans may well come to fruition – in particular if the upcoming U.S. administration recommits the United States to the Pivot to Asia initiative. A Russian military presence would shift the balance of power in both regions significantly against the favour of Western interests, and whether the facilities are naval or air bases they are likely to deploy a number asymmetric military assets such as hypersonic missiless to compensate for a smaller presence. In Vietnam in particular, it would also provide opportunities for more joint military exercises and potentially increase the appeal of more Russian arms purchases for the Vietnamese military – which is considered a leading client for several next generation weapons systems.

Russia Planning Major Naval Base in Sudan

November 16, 2020/0 Comments/in English, External, Politics/by Solomon

Source: Military Watch Magazine

New Facility to Service Nuclear Assets

The Russian Defence Ministry is planning to build a naval base on Sudan’s east coast, which would provide the Navy with its second overseas facility after the one on Syria’s Tartus following the closure of bases in Cuba and Vietnam. The facility was referred to as a “logistical support centre” where “repairs and resupply operations and rest for crew members” can take place, with a draft agreement already having been signed. The facility would have a capacity for 300 military and civilian personnel and four ships, and would be able to accommodate nuclear vessels, making it significantly larger than the Syrian facility at least before its wartime expansion after 2016. It remains uncertain what kind of warships the facility is deigned to accommodate, and whether heavier warships such as battlecruisers will also be accommodated. The base will be located on the northern outskirts of Port Sudan, and Russia will also gain the right to transport “weapons, ammunition and equipment” for the base through Sudanese ports and airports.

Russian Navy Slava Class Missile Cruiser | Military Watch Magazine

Sudan’s military establishment has maintained close defence ties with Russia, despite a Western-backed coup in the country in April 2019 ousting the longtime President Omar Al Bashir who was closely aligned with Moscow. Under Al Bashir’s rule Sudan and Russia were discussing the possibility of a naval base from at least late 2017, alongside the potential sale of advanced Su-30SM and Su-35 fighters to the Sudanese Air Force. Al Bashir had personally appealed to Russian President Vladimir Putin in a visit to Moscow in 2017 to help support Sudan against ongoing Western efforts to partition the country through subversion. Sudan has faced serious political and economic crises since the coup, with the country’s political future highly uncertain. The draft agreement for the naval facility stipulates that its establishment “meets the goals of maintaining peace and stability in the region, is defensive and is not aimed against other countries,” with Sudanese forces maintaining the right to use the mooring area. The deal will stand for 25 years after its signing, and could represent a game changer for the balance of power in the Red Sea as Russia establishes a sizeable military presence in the area. Such a development could also give more clout to Sudan’s military establishment, which is thought to be seeking to contain the empowerment of pro-Western elements in the country