Tag Archive for: Geopolitics

Sudan says Ethiopian military plane crossed its border

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Ethiopia denies Sudan’s claim, which it said was a ‘dangerous escalation’ in the border dispute between both sides.

Sudan says an Ethiopian military aircraft entered its airspace in “a dangerous escalation” to a border dispute that has seen deadly clashes in recent weeks.

“In a dangerous and unjustified escalation, an Ethiopian military aircraft penetrated the Sudanese-Ethiopian borders,” Sudan’s foreign ministry said in a statement on Wednesday, adding that the move “could have dangerous ramifications and cause more tension in the border region”.

The ministry also warned Ethiopia against repeating “such hostilities”.

An Ethiopian military spokesman, General Mohamed Tessema, told the AFP news agency he had no “tangible information” on Sudan’s allegations and the situation at the border was “normal” on Wednesday.

Separately, a Sudanese military helicopter, loaded with weapons and ammunition, crashed on Wednesday shortly after taking off from an airport in an eastern province that borders Ethiopia, according to the state-run Sudan News Agency (SUNA).

“A military helicopter crashed at Wad Zayed airport in Gedarif State … when the crew tried to land the plane shortly after taking off,” SUNA reported.

The report said the plane caught fire after hitting the ground, adding that “all three members of the crew survived”.

High tensions

Tensions have been running high between the two countries over the Al-Fashaqa region, where Ethiopian farmers cultivate fertile land claimed by Sudan.

Al-Fashaqa region – which has seen sporadic clashes over the years – borders Ethiopia’s troubled Tigray region where deadly conflict erupted in November between Ethiopia’s federal and Tigray’s regional forces.

In December last year, Sudan accused Ethiopian “forces and militias” of ambushing its troops along the border, leaving four dead and more than 20 wounded.

Ethiopia said Sudanese military forces “organised attacks … using heavy machine guns” in December last year.

On Tuesday, Addis Ababa claimed Sudanese forces were pushing further into the border region and warned that while it “gives priority to peace”, it has “its limit”.

In response, Sudan’s information minister and government spokesman Faisal Mohamed Saleh said Khartoum did not want war with Ethiopia but its forces would respond to any aggression.

Khartoum also accused Ethiopian armed men of killing five women and a child on Monday in the area, calling it a “brutal aggression”.

The two sides held border talks last month, and Sudan declared its army had restored control over all border territory that had been taken over by Ethiopian farmers.

The border dispute comes at a sensitive time between the two countries, who along with Egypt have recently hit another impasse in talks over the massive Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Blue Nile River.

 

Source: Al Jazeera and News Agencies

 

Ethiopia’s worsening crisis threatens regional, Mideast security

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security

Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed (C-L) meets with members of Sudan’s ruling military council after his arrival at Khartoum International Airport, Sudan, June 7, 2019. Photo by Ashraf Shazly/AFP via Getty Images.

Source: Al-Monitor | Payton Knopf and Jeffrey Feltman

With the Horn of Africa increasingly becoming an integral part of the Middle East’s security landscape, the fallout from Ethiopia’s current crisis will have a significant impact on states of the region.

The Gulf Arabs recognize a strategic reality that has eluded the stove-piped US foreign and security policy bureaucracy for too long: The Horn of Africa is an integral part of the Middle East’s security landscape, and increasingly so. No country demonstrates this more clearly than Ethiopia. That country’s escalating internal crises pose an increasingly grave threat not only to the country’s citizens but to international peace and security and to the interests of the United States and its partners in the Middle East, principally Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

As a recent bipartisan study group convened by the US Institute of Peace (USIP) concluded, developments in the Horn of Africa are not only shaped by the states of the Middle East “but also have a direct impact on [these states’] political, economic, and security environments.” Ethiopia’s internal and external borders are being changed violently, and the centrifugal forces of nationalism that now dominate Ethiopian politics are indicative of the weakness of the central state, not the strength of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed or the federal government. These intrastate fissures are undermining the country’s territorial integrity and morphing into interstate conflicts involving, to date, Eritrea and Sudan.

The armed confrontation that erupted Nov. 3 between the federal government and the regional government in Tigray state precipitated what Abiy characterized as a “domestic law enforcement operation.” The involvement of Eritrean combat forces, however, as well as the federal government’s use of airstrikes, mechanized ground units and ethnic militias undermines the credibility of that characterization. Similarly, assertions that the operation has succeeded in stabilizing Tigray is belied by the persistent violence in the region; a worsening humanitarian emergency; the government’s unwillingness to allow adequate access for a humanitarian response; and reports of severe human rights abuses, including of Eritrean refugees in Tigray being killed or forcibly returned to Eritrea.

The war in Tigray is symptomatic of a national political crisis in Ethiopia, which preceded Nov. 3 but has been exacerbated by the nationalist rivalries that have been unleashed since then. Much of western Tigray may now be occupied by Amhara regional state forces, and a border war has erupted between Amhara militias and the Sudanese military. Ethnically motivated killings of Amhara, Oromo and others in Benishangul-Gumuz regional state have precipitated the intervention of Amhara security forces, an unprecedented military deployment by one of Ethiopia’s states into another. In addition, the federal government has been engaged in an intensifying campaign against insurgents in Oromia regional state for months. While each of these conflicts involve historic and complex claims over territory, resources, identity and political representation, the pursuit of those claims by force of arms has set the country on a trajectory toward fragmentation.

The fallout for the states of the Middle East is significant

First, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have both made considerable political and economic investments in the leadership in Addis Ababa, Cairo and Khartoum, investments that will be undermined by bourgeoning conflict among the three. Egyptian-Ethiopian relations have long been strained by the dispute over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), and Ethiopian-Sudanese relations have become increasingly toxic due not only to the GERD but to the border conflict. The recent spike in violence in Benishangul-Gumuz, where the dam is located, could also pose a threat to the control and function of the dam itself. The Nile is an emotive and sensitive issue in Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan, and the crisis facing Abiy’s government makes any realistic compromise even more difficult.

Second, Ethiopia’s fragmentation could portend displacement on a scale not seen in modern times. In 2018-19, approximately 300,000 people — the vast majority of whom were Ethiopian and Eritrean — fled the Horn of Africa for Yemen, in spite of that country’s civil war. As the USIP senior study group report warned, the breakdown of Ethiopia — a country of over 110 million people — would “result in a refugee crisis that could easily dwarf that figure.” Over 56,000 refugees have already fled from Tigray into Sudan since November. Large-scale refugee outflows could destabilize Sudan’s delicate transition, and the consequences of state collapse in Ethiopia would also certainly extend across the Red Sea.

Third, calls for the secession of one or more of Ethiopia’s states are gaining steam, which would put additional strain on the already fraying state system in the Middle East, wracked as it is by the ongoing wars in Libya, Syria and Yemen. Somewhat unique among world regions, the Horn of Africa has several recent experiences with secession — Eritrea from Ethiopia in 1993, South Sudan from Sudan in 2011 and the self-declared independence of Somaliland from Somalia in 2001. The prospects and ramifications of further changes to the regional order should not be underestimated.

Fourth, the risk of radicalization is real should extremist groups exploit the political and security crises inside Ethiopia, particularly if Abiy and his supporters continue to reject dialogue as a means of channeling political grievance. For example, al-Shabab, the Islamic State or al-Qaeda could play for advantage inside Ethiopia’s Somali region or among disaffected and disenfranchised Muslim communities in Oromia and elsewhere.

Brute force is no more likely to be successful in Ethiopia than it has been in Syria in preserving the integrity of the state or in mitigating threats to its neighbors or to the states of the Middle East. Nor can elections that Abiy has announced for June be credible, free or fair in the current political and security climate and therefore able to reconcile the competing visions for the country’s future. The political transitions that have unfolded in Ethiopia and Sudan in the last two years in fact illustrate that the restive and youthful body politics of the Horn of Africa are too diverse, pluralistic and eager for political change for authoritarian repression to result in stability.

Ethiopia’s recent history provides a sobering precedent.  In 2015-16, large-scale protests against Ethiopia’s federal government, which was then dominated by Tigray’s ruling party, was met by a military crackdown that both failed to quell the unrest and led to expanding violence. The widening political and security catastrophe only abated with the resignation of former Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn, the promise of a new political dispensation heralded by Abiy’s accession to the premiership and his articulation of a reform agenda that included a loosening of restrictions on civic space and the prospect of a more inclusive political discourse.

Similarly, when a junta deposed Omar al-Bashir following months of nationwide protests in Sudan, there were those within the security services and among their supporters abroad who argued that stability could be achieved through military rule. This proved elusive, however, amid the massacre of protesters at a sit-in in Khartoum and continued mass demonstrations demanding civilian rule. Following talks between the junta and the umbrella group representing the protesters, an agreement was reached to form a transitional government based on a cohabitation arrangement between a civilian-led Cabinet and a council chaired by the military until elections in 2022 — an agreement due, in part, to diplomatic coordination between the United States and the Gulf. While fragile, this negotiated arrangement has so far averted fears of a slide into civil war akin to that of Libya, and Sudan is now a more responsible member of the international community than it has been at any time in the last three decades.

The Gulf states’ policies toward the Horn of Africa are undoubtedly rooted in their own strategic and political calculations. They understand that the two sides of the Red Sea comprise an integrated region that transcends the geographic distinctions between Africa and the Middle East. The close bilateral relationships that Saudi Arabia and the UAE have cultivated with Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia, alongside Abu Dhabi’s historic ties with Asmara, can be strong assets in stabilizing the Horn of Africa in the long term. The long-awaited reconciliation among the Gulf Cooperation Council countries could also alleviate competitive pressures in Somalia, where Qatar has supported the federal government and the UAE has backed the federal member states.

US-Gulf coordination is needed most urgently, however, in the case of Ethiopia. The Gulf states’ explicit or implicit support for Abiy’s shortsighted approach or for Eritrean military intervention not only risks implicating the Gulf in the humanitarian emergency in Tigray but damaging their own strategic interests as the Ethiopian state deteriorates. While Abiy and the federal government continue to prejudice military action over dialogue — not just with Tigrayan leaders but across the political spectrum — there is an urgent need for a process that provides an opportunity to build a new national consensus in Ethiopia, including an understanding of the electoral calendar. The United States and its Gulf partners must cooperate in promoting and supporting such an effort.

Strong Defence on a Shoestring Budget: How Capable Are Ethiopia’s Armed Forces?

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Source: Military Watch Magazine

Ethiopia has long faced a precarious security situation, enduring threats from a number of sources including the Al Shabab militant group operating from neighbouring Somalia, territorial disputes with neighbouring Eritrea which is highly militarised and fields a relatively well trained force of over half a million, and the Egyptian Air Force due to ongoing possibility of attacks on Ethiopian damming infrastructure over water rights. Despite this, Ethiopia has maintained one of the smallest defence expenditures on the African continent relative to the size of its economy – allocating just 0.8% of GDP to the military. By contrast, the higher income economies of neighbouring Sudan and Egypt spend 2.6% and 1.7% respectively, while Eritrea is estimate to spend over 4% of GDP on its armed forces. Ethiopia’s expenditures amount to around $330 million per year, a very low figure to maintain a modern military. Despite its very conservative budget, the East African state has become a potent force capable of securing itself against numerous threats, with the European Union’s representative in East Africa Alexander Rondos having stated to this effect that the Ethiopians “scare the hell out of everybody” – Al Shabab included.

Ethiopia has in recent years invested in modernising its air defence capabilities, deploying Russian Pantsir air defence combat vehicles from 2019 and modernising its S-75 high altitude systems with modern electronic warfare countermeasures. Modernised S-75 systems have demonstrated the ability to seriously threaten fourth generation fighters in the past when properly used, and Ethiopian forces have compensated for one of the system’s primary weaknesses, their lack of mobility, by mounting them on the chassis of T-55 battle tanks to considerably improve their survivability. The Ethiopian Air Force is also among the most capable in Africa, ranked fourth on the continent in 2020, with a buildup of modern fourth generation fighters having begun in the mid-1990s during the country’s war with Eritrea. At the time, with Eritrea purchasing of MiG-29 medium weight fourth generation jets, Ethiopia acquired a sizeable fleet of 12-16 Su-27 heavyweight aircraft which were the most capable fighters available for export at the time. The Su-27 fleet has since seen some conservative modernisation efforts, although Ethiopia has not sought to expand their capabilities with more costly investments in R-77 active radar guided air to air missiles or Irbis-E radars as Russia has done under the Su-27SM2 program. Even without such upgrades Ethiopian Su-27s are still considered the sixth most capable fighters in Africa, after having been comfortably in first place when initially purchased. They are the only Su-27s in the world which have seen air to air combat against other fighter aircraft, downing four Eritrean MiG-29s during the war for no losses with kills primarily achieved within visual range.

Ethiopian Air Force Su-27 Heavyweight Fighters | ©Military Watch Magazine

To provide air support for its ground forces Ethiopia has reconfigured its second class of fighter, the third generation MiG-23, to deploy almost exclusively for such a role. It also deploys an unknown number of Su-25 attack jets and 18 Mi-24/35 attack helicopters, all of which are capable of providing close air support to ground units. Looking to ground units, the country deploys a respectable 135,000 man strong professional army, with North Korean Ch’onma Ho battle tanks and second hand Ukrainian T-72 tanks forming the bulk of its armoured units. Approximately 200 of each are in service. North Korea has also supplied VTT-323 APCs and M-1977 self propelled artillery systems, and has provided extensive assistance in developing a domestic arms industry capable of producing BM-21 rocket launchers, rocket propelled grenades, small arms and ammunition. These were set up in the mid 2000s, and Ethiopia has continued to benefit greatly from its defence ties to the East Asian state since.

The Ethiopian military appears to have learned from its war with Eritrea that relying on large numbers of poorly trained and scarcely armed personnel would expose it to massive casualties. A focus on large manpower, while attractive given the size of the population and the very low living costs in the country,  proved almost entirely ineffective against the Eritrean military in the early stages of the war, and only the rapid development of a more elite force with better training, better arms and proper air support allowed it to push back and recover territory lost in the war’s initial stages. Indeed, the Ethiopian military received support and training for both its People’s Militia and its special forces from North Korean specialists at the Tarek Army Camp and other facilities. The relatively small size of the country’s armed forces today, and its reputation for very high training standards and effectiveness, has largely come as a consequence.

Egyptian Air Force Su-35 Heavyweight Fighter | ©Military Watch Magazine

Ethiopia’s military today remains a highly trained and experienced force, and is the fourth largest contributor to international peacekeeping missions in the world in manpower which has provided operational experience in a number of theatres. Reliance on an elite but relatively small military, a highly elite Air Force, well trained pilots, soldiers and special forces, and close military cooperation with North Korea which has provided valuable knowhow and technologies, have helped establish it as a formidable military power and highly secure state in the face of a number of major threats. Eritrea for its part, observing the causes of its neighbour’s success, has itself since 2000 also invested in both developing military ties to North Korea as well as acquiring Su-27 fighters for its Air Force. Nevertheless, security challenges remain very serious, with instability in neighbouring Sudan following following a Western-backed coup removing one of Addis Ababa’s closest security partners and a bulkwark against possible Egyptian interventionism. Moreover, the rapid modernisation of the Egyptian Air Force since 2013 has ended Ethiopia’s considerable former qualitative advantage, and Egypt’s acquisition of Su-35 aircraft has for the first time provided it with a fighter with the endurance needed to carry out effective strike operations against Ethiopian targets.

Reports of Egyptian plans to build a military base in neighbouring Somaliland have only made the security situation more tense, and could lead Ethiopia to invest in more advanced weaponry – possibly including new fighter aircraft such as the Russian MiG-35 or new air defence platforms like the North Korean Pyongae-5 or its more recent successor. With the country continuing to enjoy high levels of economic growth, far exceeding those of its neighbours including Egypt, Ethiopia’s defence budget is likely to increase considerably over the coming decade. This will provide greater opportunities for its traditional arms suppliers such as North Korea, Russia and Ukraine, and could see it emerge as a much more formidable military power.

The Middle East Cold War Behind the Ethiopian Crisis

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On the ground, the fight between the Federal Army and TPLF troops has been determined by drones. The drones take off from the base of Assab that is operated by the UAE, formerly used as a base for its military operations in Yemen.

Source: Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI) | Federico Donelli

The operation conducted by the Ethiopian Federal Army in the northern Tigray region threatens to trigger a further wave of instability in one of the most vulnerable areas of the world. Ethiopia is the keystone of a very fragile arc of instability that has Afghanistan on one side, and Libya on the other. Accordingly, it would be narrow-minded to consider the impact of the current crisis on the Horn of Africa alone. By examining it from a regional angle, it is possible to identify a variety of issues that render the context highly volatile. These concerns range from the outstanding dispute over water in the Nile Basin to the two proxy conflicts in Yemen and Libya, passing through the complex Sudanese political transition to the weak sovereignty of the Somali government. The scenario sketched thus provides both the suitable milieu for the spread of transnational challenges – Islamic radicalism, internally displaced persons, human smuggling, piracy, warlords – and the ideal arena for competition among external actors.

Since 2011, the most fragile countries of the above-mentioned arc of instability have become the battleground of the new cold war among the leading players of the Middle East. As in post-World War Two, the United States and the Soviet Union brought competition and clashes into the so-called ‘Third World’, nowadays, the small-to-medium Middle Eastern powers have broadened the arena beyond traditional regional borders. Among the determinants of this dynamic are both the opportunity offered by the permissive multipolar order at the global level and the need to preserve domestic order. Specifically, to avoid spillover effects that would threaten the survival of their regimes, the Middle Eastern players have exploited the fragility or even the collapse of some states (Yemen, Libya, Syria, Somalia, Sudan, Iraq) to export competition into third country contexts. The struggle has in some cases turned into violent conflicts, either through direct intervention (Syria, Yemen) or through the backing of local groups (Libya). In other cases, it has become a war of friction aimed not only to gain influence but, above all, to reduce rivals’ gains. The relational concept of power drives the current Middle Eastern chessboard. The Horn of Africa, due to its strategic centrality (Red Sea, Yemen, Suez) and its historical-cultural proximity, has witnessed a process of gradual ‘Middle-Easternisation’ in recent years. In other words, local dynamics have been partly absorbed and partly superseded by regional logic and interactions.

Ethiopia has partially escaped from these logics thanks to its political and economic weight. Further, Addis Ababa has tried to profit as much as possible from the Middle Eastern scramble. Evidence of this can be found in the fact that all the Middle Eastern players have tried to nurture diplomatic and trade relations with Addis Ababa. Recent developments, however, seem to have thrown Ethiopia into the melee. In 2018, the rise of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Aly to government has been marked by the normalisation of relations with Eritrea. The ‘peace-cum-security pact’ was signed in 2018 in Jeddah. Far from being symbolic, the choice was indicative of the role played by two Gulf monarchies – Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) – in the rapprochement between Eritrea and Ethiopia. Few international observers at the time of the signing imagined that one of the Ethiopian prime minister’s mid-term goals was to hit the Tigray (Tigray People’s Liberation Front, TPLF) elite. A target that has become evident in recent weeks when the advance of the Ethiopian army toward Tigray’s capital, Mekelle, has been supported politically and, according to the TPLF forces also militarily, by the Asmara government. On the ground, the fight between the Federal Army and TPLF troops has been determined by drones. The drones take off from the base of Assab that is operated by the UAE, formerly used as a base for its military operations in Yemen.

Despite the TPLF’s allegations, it is not possible to assert a direct involvement of either the KSA or the UAE in the Ethiopian crisis. However, it is also appropriate to consider their role from behind the scenes. In so doing, it should be noted that although the regional policy of the KSA and the UAE is usually portrayed as a shared one, in practice there are several points of disagreement. Different positions have emerged in two regional scenarios where the KSA and the UAE are involved and operative: the war in Yemen, and the transition in Sudan. Even the stance that the two Gulf monarchies have adopted in the wake of the recent U.S. presidential elections would seem to distance them from each other. There has been growing concern in Riyadh that the Biden administration may assume a less tolerant attitude towards Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s methods. The comeback on the political scene of the Saudi King Salman bin Abdulaziz and the attempts to ease tensions with Turkey and Qatar would seem to be two significant clues. In Abu Dhabi, on the contrary, there would seem to be a rush to exploit the free rein guaranteed by Trump’s presidency. Hence the Emirates have been accelerating their plans for normalization with Israel, but also for the building of new alignments, as demonstrated by the joint drills with Egypt and Russia. As shown by the Russian talks to establish a naval base in Sudan, Egypt and Russia would seem to become the main partners of the Emirates in the Horn of Africa. A trio that stands to fill the vacuum left by the United States.

From the angle of the Middle East cold war, the UAE and Egypt are the two actors who could gain the most from Ethiopian instability. In the worst-case scenario for Addis Ababa, the resistance of the TPLF could turn into armed guerrilla warfare; in the best case, it would lead to a complicated process of post-war reconstruction and trust-building in the Tigray region. In both cases, Ethiopia should devote its resources to the domestic field. A context of instability that would benefit Egypt and the UAE more than any other players in the area. In fact, a weak Ethiopia would give a further boost to Egyptian ambitions in the region; the balance of power in the Nile waters issue would change. Likewise, the African Union – whose headquarters are in Addis Ababa – could reconsider its intransigent position towards Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi. For the UAE, a weakened Ethiopia as a commercial-military dependent would fit in with its overall designs on the region. Furthermore, the Ethiopian crisis may affect Somalia, an already fragile state whose security is also ensured by AMISOM troops (mostly Ethiopians). A new wave of turmoil in Somalia would undermine the system-building projects of the two main UAE-Egypt rivals – Qatar and Turkey -, and generate new challenges and vulnerabilities in the whole Horn of Africa.

Suspected Chinese hackers stole camera footage from African Union

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Source: Reuters | Raphael Satter

WASHINGTON (Reuters) – As diplomats gathered at the African Union’s headquarters earlier this year to prepare for its annual leaders’ summit, employees of the international organization made a disturbing discovery.

Someone was stealing footage from their own security cameras.

Acting on a tip from Japanese cyber researchers, the African Union’s (AU) technology staffers discovered that a group of suspected Chinese hackers had rigged a cluster of servers in the basement of an administrative annex to quietly siphon surveillance videos from across the AU’s sprawling campus in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia’s capital.

The security breach was carried out by a Chinese hacking group nicknamed “Bronze President,” according to a five-page internal memo reviewed by Reuters. It said the affected cameras covered “AU offices, parking areas, corridors, and meeting rooms.”

“We cannot estimate the quantity and value of the data which have been stolen,” the memo continued, adding that while AU technicians had managed to interrupt the flow of data, the hackers could easily regain the upper hand.

“We are still weak to prevent another attack,” the memo said.

The alert, drafted in late January and circulated to senior officials, provides a glimpse of how world powers are jockeying for influence and visibility at the continent’s paramount pan-African organization. Some American and European officials have voiced concern as Beijing has stepped in to meet the AU’s needs – part of an Africa-wide shift that has seen China become the continent’s top creditor. Chinese workers built the AU’s showpiece new conference center in 2012 and Chinese technicians still help maintain the organization’s digital infrastructure.

The Chinese mission to the AU said in an email that “the AU side has not mentioned being hacked on any occasion” and that Africa and China are “good friends, partners and brothers.”

“We never interfere in Africa’s internal affairs and wouldn’t do anything that harms the interests of the African side,” the email said.

Repeated messages sent to AU spokesperson Ebba Kalondo asking about the January breach were marked as “read” but went unanswered.

Longstanding doubts over Beijing’s role at the AU spilled into the open in 2018, when French newspaper Le Monde reported here that AU employees had found that the servers at the new conference center were sending copies of their contents to Shanghai every night and that the building itself had been honeycombed with listening devices.

Both the AU and the Chinese government vehemently denied the report at the time, but a former AU official told Reuters the article in Le Monde was accurate and had put officials there on high alert over cyberespionage.

The former official said the latest breach was discovered following a tip from Japan’s Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT), which in a Jan. 17 email alerted AU officials to unusual traffic between the international organization’s network and a domain associated with Bronze President.

Koichiro Komiyama, who directs the global coordination division of Japan’s CERT, confirmed to Reuters that he sent the warning after a fellow researcher discovered the malicious traffic while picking through the hacking group’s old infrastructure.

The AU memo said that, within days of Komiyama’s email, the AU’s information technology team had traced the suspicious traffic to a set of servers in the basement of the organization’s Building C – part of an older complex across the road from the new conference center.

The memo said the hackers were able to siphon off “a huge volume of traffic” from the servers by hiding it in the regular flow of data leaving the AU’s network during business hours, even pausing their data theft during lunch.

Secureworks, an arm of Dell Technologies Inc which has been tracking Bronze President since 2018, confirmed that the malicious domain identified by Japan’s CERT was linked to the hackers.

Secureworks researcher Mark Osborn said his company had seen strong evidence that Bronze President operated from China, adding that it had been detected in several espionage campaigns targeting China’s neighbors, including Mongolia and India.

Any official protest over the spying is unlikely, according to the former AU official. He said China plays a critical role in keeping the organization running, including during an incident in June when part of the AU’s network was knocked out by a power failure and Chinese technicians swiftly repaired the damage.

For that reason, the former official expects that the surveillance camera incident – like the listening devices reported in 2018 – would be swept under the rug.

“Attacking the Chinese, for us, it’s a very bad idea,” he said.

 

Reporting by Raphael Satter; editing by Jonathan Weber and Edward Tobin

Somalia: America’s Next “Afghanistan?”

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Source: 1945.com | Edward Chang

On March 3, 1994, the United States military accomplished what has become unthinkable today – complete a total withdrawal from an ongoing conflict.

After the political fiasco wrought by the Battle of Mogadishu on October 3 the year prior – immortalized in the book and motion picture adaptation Black Hawk Down – President Bill Clinton ordered an end to the American military intervention in Somalia, which began late in the George H.W. Bush administration as a part of an international humanitarian effort. Somalia had been wracked by civil war since the fall of the incumbent Communist military dictatorship in 1991, leading to a state of near-anarchy and brutal civil war to fill the power vacuum.

27 years later, it is deja vu all over again as U.S. troops once again find themselves leaving Somalia at the orders of outgoing President Donald Trump. Only this time, it is not a withdrawal, but a relocation. Most of the approximately 700 troops in Somalia are being re-deployed to friendlier countries in the region, including Africa Command’s in-theater forward headquarters, Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti. Meanwhile, a small number of troops will remain in Somalia to continue a mission begun in the mid-2000s, during one of the most intense cycles of the War on Terror.

In other words, America’s military posture in the Horn of Africa remains largely unchanged.

Though the public is less aware of U.S. military involvement in Somalia versus Afghanistan and Iraq, it is no less emblematic of America’s difficulty in ending the “endless wars.” The humanitarian intervention, which began in December 1992, was ultimately the first foray into a country the U.S. still cannot quit. Less than 10 years after the ’94 withdrawal, Somalia was again being eyed as a target in the War on Terror. Through three administrations, covert military actions were taken through the intelligence community, special operations forces, and mostly unmanned airstrikes, an effort that dramatically escalated during the Trump administration.

The ultimate benefit of these operations remains in doubt. In December, the Justice Department announced it had charged Cholo Abdi Abdullah, an operative for Somalia-based jihadist militant group al-Shabaab, an al-Qaeda affiliate. Abdullah had been arrested in 2019 in the Philippines for plotting a 9/11-style terror attack on the U.S., using a hijacking and a commercial airliner as a missile. Some commentators cited the plot to criticize Pres. Trump’s decision to withdraw from Somalia.

However, the plot not only ensued despite the military offensive against al-Shabaab in Somalia, but much of it was also orchestrated far from the group’s “safe haven.” It is not clear how authorities were alerted to and thwarted the plot, but the fact it went as far as it did despite such intense counter-terrorism efforts is troubling. Anecdotal evidence from one journalist suggests the offensive approach to terror in Somalia is actually having a counter-intuitive effect, making al-Shabaab more capable of implementing terrorism overseas.

There is plenty of room for debate on these questions. However, there exists something of a consensus that al-Shabaab constitutes the next big terror threat to the U.S. This consensus first publicly emerged during the Obama administration, when the group carried out the Westgate mall attack in Nairobi, Kenya on September 21, 2013. During the next few years, concerns increased that al-Shabaab could strike the American homeland, possibly through sympathizers in places like Minnesota, where a large Somali-American community exists. In early 2015, the Mall of America was specifically cited as a target of attack by the group, and numerous Americans have been arrested and charged with aiding al-Shabaab.

More recently, Michael Rubin of the American Enterprise Institute compared threats against the U.S. made by Hassan Dahir Aweys, an Islamist leader associated with al-Shabaab, to statements made by Osama bin Laden in the 1990s, culminating in the devastation of 9/11. The group has racked up quite the death toll, attempting an airline bombing in 2016, executing a dual truck bombing in October 2017 that killed over 500, a January 2020 attack that killed three Americans and destroyed multiple aircraft and ground vehicles, and numerous other deadly incidents, including one already in 2021.

What this all points to is a jihadist group that is becoming increasingly dangerous and as active as al-Qaeda, Hamas, and ISIS. Like the former, but not the latter two, al-Shabaab clearly has global designs and appears to possess the fundamental capacity necessary to attempt such attacks, along with potential insiders in the U.S.

Judging the likelihood of a devastating terrorist attack by al-Shabaab on U.S. soil is something of a fool’s errand since nobody wants an attack to happen and such a likelihood can only be assessed in the event an actual plot is put into play. What has become clear is that if a major terror attack were to occur on U.S. soil that can be traced back to al-Shabaab, then this would make Somalia a primary focus of American foreign policy once more. The withdrawal of troops from the country would appear, in retrospect, to have been a serious mistake and military intervention in the country would again escalate.

In fact, a war in Somalia is virtually assured in response to a successful al-Shabaab operation. Unlike Afghanistan 2001, U.S. forces are already in-theater and would have the support of a friendly regime in Mogadishu. This makes military retaliation much easier to facilitate. A massive ground intervention, like the one seen in Afghanistan and Iraq, or even Somalia back in the days of George H.W. Bush, is unlikely and unnecessary, given the existing footprint, the non-necessity of regime change, and the lack of a conventional military threat. This war will instead involve larger numbers of intelligence operatives and special operations forces on the ground, accompanied by precision airstrikes, a sophisticated approach that has become the choice of policymakers seeking to fight terror at as low a cost as possible with as great an impact as possible.

But this also means the U.S. will find itself fighting in Somalia for a long time. The bitter experience of the last 20 years has proven that insurgency, militancy, and terrorism are extremely difficult, if not impossible, to eradicate and the cost of waging endless war adds up over time. It seems a small price to pay for safety, but as memory of the last terror attack recedes amongst the public, questions about the mission will surely rise. Meanwhile, that same memory of the last attack will make policymakers reticent about withdrawing troops from Somalia, just as they are unwilling to withdraw troops from Afghanistan and Iraq today, even with public sentiment firmly in the “withdrawal” camp.

For now, the U.S. should proceed with its Somalia exit. Meanwhile, it ought to be hoped the fight will continue successfully in the cloak-and-dagger world to avoid terrorists from drawing America back into another endless war.

Edward Chang is a defense, military, and foreign policy writer. His writing has most prominently appeared in The American Conservative, The Federalist, The National Interest, and Spectator USA. Follow him on Twitter at @Edward_Chang_8.

 

China Has Been Spying on the African Union Headquarters

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Beijing has gone out of its way to gain information on African leaders in order to compel and coerce them into supporting China’s international goals.

Source: National Interest | Joshua Meservey

Last week, a report emerged that hackers, probably from China, had been filching security camera footage from inside the African Union headquarters building in Ethiopia. Several years ago, AU technicians discovered that the building’s Huawei-provided servers were daily exporting their data to Shanghai, and that the walls of the Chinese-built headquarters were peppered with listening devices.

It is a strange way for Beijing to treat a continent whose rulers have emerged as key backers of its international agenda. Yet the Chinese government’s spying, which almost certainly extends far beyond the African Union headquarters, may in fact be one of the reasons why African rulers are willing to defend Beijing’s increasingly indefensible actions.

Beijing’s opportunities for eavesdropping in Africa are vast. Chinese companies—many of which are state-owned, all of which are legally obliged to cooperate with the Chinese Communist Party on intelligence matters—have built at least 186 government buildings in Africa, including presidential residences, ministries of foreign affairs, and parliament buildings. Huawei has built more than 70 percent of the continent’s 4G networks and at least fourteen intra-governmental ICT networks, including a data center in Zambia that houses the entirety of the government’s records.

The report—now confirmed by two other media outlets—that broke the original story of the Chinese government’s AU spying demonstrates what Beijing can do with a structure one of its company builds. The AU’s compromised ICT system was also provided by Huawei, whose equipment is often swiss chees-ed with security vulnerabilities that make them easily exploitable. Given Huawei’s links to China’s Ministry of State Security, it beggars belief that Beijing lacks anything less than an excellent idea of how to access those backdoors.

Beijing has many reasons to take advantage of the spying opportunities its companies’ activities in Africa provides. It can eavesdrop on the sensitive conversations they have with their non-African counterparts, and the Chinese government might be able to gather useful economic information it can pass to its many companies operating on the continent.

Yet as the Chinese government becomes more aggressive internationally, it likely increasingly values the information it gathers in Africa for its use in maintaining and expanding African decisionmakers’ support for Beijing’s global agenda. African states are consistent apologists for the Chinese regime’s oppression of its ethnic and religious minorities, vote frequently with Beijing at the United Nations (often in opposition to the United States), and usually back Chinese candidates vying for leadership of important international agencies.

Recent bombshell revelations demonstrate Beijing’s commitment to influencing foreign leaders. A Chinese spy named Christine Fang spent years developing personal ties with local politicians primarily from California. Fang arranged donations for, and even managed to place at least one intern with, U.S. Rep. Eric Swalwell, who is now a current member of the sensitive House Intelligence Committee (Swalwell cut ties with Fang after receiving an FBI briefing about her spying).

In early December, Director of National Intelligence John Ratcliffe wrote of a Chinese influence campaign aimed at “several dozen“ Congressmen and Congressional aides. China, in fact, targets Congress six times more frequently than does Russia, according to Ratcliffe. Meanwhile, a branch of the Chinese Communist Party known as the International Department, which is responsible for cultivating sympathy for the CCP with foreign politicians, claims to have ties with over 600 political groups in more than 160 countries.

African leaders, of course, do not need to be persuaded to accommodate China on certain issues. Many of their countries face a massive infrastructure gap, and Beijing is often happy to open its wallet for infrastructure projects. Affordable Chinese products, especially tech such as smartphones, are popular on the continent as well.

Yet the Chinese government spends a lot of time and energy trying to influence African leaders to support Beijing’s agenda at a level beyond what simple concern for their countries’ national interests would prompt. These charm campaigns include everything from bribery to throwing up flashy infrastructure projects during election times to lavishing “no-strings-attached” aid on rulers to feed their patronage networks.

The information that Beijing appears to be hoovering up daily is of obvious use for those kinds of influence operations. It could offer insights into an official’s habits, personality, and proclivities that would help Beijing effectively cajole or coerce him or her. A key element of Christina Fang’s approach was to get as close as possible to her targets; electronic surveillance access to a target’s most sensitive haunts would offer the sort of extensive surveillance a human spy could only dream of.

China has built access to African leaders that will be impossible to roll back in the immediate term. Washington, however, can begin building a response that is as patient and far-seeing as China’s strategy has been. One element of that must be complicating what is currently Beijing’s almost unfettered surveillance access to Africa.

Joshua Meservey is a Senior Policy Analyst specializing in Africa and the Middle East at The Heritage Foundation.

The Future of Warfare in 2030

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Source: RAND research

Overview

Who will the United States fight against and who will fight with it? Where will these future conflicts be fought? What will future conflicts look like? How will they be fought? And why will the United States go to war? This report is the overview in a series that draws on a wide variety of data sets, secondary sources, and an extensive set of interviews in eight countries around the globe to answer these questions. The authors conclude that the United States will confront a series of deepening strategic dilemmas in 2030. U.S. adversaries—China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and terrorist groups—will likely remain constant, but U.S. allies are liable to change, and the location of where the United States is most likely to fight wars may not match the locations where conflicts could be most dangerous to U.S. interests. The joint force will likely face at least four types of conflict, each requiring a somewhat different suite of capabilities, but the U.S. ability to resource such a diverse force will likely decline. Above all, barring any radical attempt to alter the trajectory, the United States in 2030 could progressively lose the initiative to dictate strategic outcomes and to shape when and why the wars of the future occur. To meet future demands, the joint force and the U.S. Air Force should invest in more precision, information, and automation; build additional capacity; maintain a robust forward posture; and reinforce agility at all levels of warfare.

Key Findings

The list of U.S. adversaries is likely to remain fixed, but the list of U.S. allies is likely to change

  • China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and terrorist groups will remain top U.S. adversaries.
  • China’s growing influence likely will alter the list of U.S. allies in Asia as countries hedge against Chinese power.
  • In Europe, traditional U.S. allies’ will and capacity to exert force, particularly overseas, will likely decline.

Location of U.S. conflicts can be parsed by likelihood or by risk

  • Three major regions—the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East—are all likely areas for the next war; the Middle East appears most likely, although the Indo-Pacific might pose the greatest danger.

Future conflicts will probably stem from four basic archetypes, namely

  • Counterterrorism,
  • Gray-zone conflicts,
  • Asymmetric fights, and
  • High-end fights

Four overarching trends could shape when and why the United States might go to war

  • U.S. ability to use sanctions in lieu of violence will decline as U.S. and allied economic power declines in relative terms.
  • The rise of strongmen across Asia, Europe, and the Middle East could decrease checks and balances and create incentives for future conflict.
  • As American adversaries become more assertive and push up against U.S. allies’ redlines, the United States could be faced with the difficult choice of entering into a war it does not want or abandoning an ally.
  • External forces could generate conflict, such as accidents and inadvertent escalation, a crisis resulting from climate change, or conflict over scarce resources.

Recommendations

  • Future conflicts will likely place a premium on being able to operate at range. Staying outside adversaries’ missile ranges and basing from afar both could be important factors, and the U.S. military should invest in these capabilities.
  • The United States should invest in increasing military precision to avoid the legal and political backlash that comes with civilian casualties.
  • All branches of the military will need to enhance their information warfare capabilities, especially for gray-zone operations.
  • Because of the trend toward greater use of artificial intelligence, the military will need to invest in automation.

The Potential Impact Of Us Troop Withdrawal For The Future Of Somalia

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The decision of the outgoing Trump administration to pull out US troops from Somalia by 15 January has come at a particularly critical period for the East African region. This could have broader security and humanitarian implications, threatening the progress of the past decade and leaving the country exposed to the influence of regional actors. 

Source: Global Risk Insight

The changing security landscape and the limits of Somalia’s military dependence

On 4 December 2020, President Trump announced the withdrawal of the US from Somalia by 15 January 2021. This decision serves the administration’s stated goal of reducing US presence globally, including in Afghanistan and Iraq. Specifically, the US is expected to withdraw all of its 700 troops in Somalia, which mainly have been tasked with providing training and conducting counterterrorism missions against al-Shabaab and IS. It is expected that the US forces will continue conducting airstrikes against al-Qaeda’s affiliate, al-Shabaab, operating from the US stations in nearby Kenya and Djibouti. In fact, the majority of US forces in Somali will be redeployed to these two neighbouring countries. 

In November 2020 the country’s greatest security guarantor in the region, Ethiopia was caught into a one-month internal conflict with its own breakaway region of Tigray, exposing Somalia’s security dependence. Prioritising the conflict in its own territory, Addis Ababa withdrew its own troops from its neighbouring state in order to redeploy them in the fight against Tigray People’s Liberation Front.  Following Ethiopia’s withdrawal of its non-AMISOM forces (approximately 600 troops) from Somalia, Trump administration’s decision could leave a disastrous security vacuum.

Even though 80% of governmental employees are employed in Somalia’s security sector, the local community, sub-federal authorities and the national government itself have historically relied on the role of militia groups in the fight against insurgents or terrorists. These state-aligned groups of militias have often taken advantage of their importance by exercising abusive power and control at local level. Absent of the US military presence in Somalia, and given the reduced Ethiopian military footprint, the complementary importance of these groups to the Somalian official security forces could increase, sustaining a culture of impunity and questioning the rule of law and the long-term stability.

The local political context and the security situation

The withdrawal of US troops from Somalian soil takes place during a peculiar period for Somalia. Firstly, Somalia is expected to hold both parliamentary and presidential elections in the next two months. A standoff between the ruling party and the opposition groups has currently stalled the electoral procedure. Initial deadlines have already been missed. The public is increasingly losing faith in the electoral process as competing interests between federal and regional authorities and groups could threaten the current fragile balance.

Secondly, the state of Somalia is currently fighting against both Al-Shabaab in its southern and central regions, and the Islamic State in Puntland, a self-administering entity since the late 1990s. Even though Al-Shabaab officially holds control of less territory compared to 2011, the organisation is increasingly pervasive across Somalian territory, including in Somaliland and Puntland. It is currently in charge of a parallel system of governance, relying heavily on the extraction of money, crops and other resources from the rural population in the areas of its control. Bombing attacks against civilians and suicide attacks launched in Somalia’s capital, Mogadishu, by Al-Shabaab have intensified in 2020. Since 2010, it has been responsible for the deaths of over 4,000 civilians. Indeed, the US withdrawal means a blow for the Somali forces – in both psychological and operational terms –  at a critical stage in their fight against these terrorist groups and their efforts to secure the Horn of Africa.

Regional competition and intra-national divisions

As the US is stepping out of the country, regional powerful actors are vying for greater influence, adding Somalia to their broader geopolitical calculations. Thus, Somalia has become a theatre of the regional competition in the Gulf between the competing blocks of Turkey and Qatar on the one side, and Saudi Arabia and UAE on the other.

Turkey, one of the first countries to establish diplomatic relations with Somalia following the termination of its civil war in 2011, was among the key contributors to the humanitarian relief efforts during the drought of the same year. Since then, Ankara has expanded its presence both commercially and militarily.  Additionally, Mogadishu was one of the few regional capitals choosing to abstain from the blockade against Qatar imposed by Saudi Arabia, Egypt, UAE and Bahrain in 2017. Since then, Qatar has politically and diplomatically backed Somalia’s current president and has pledged significant economic support, mainly through financial and infrastructural aid. Currently, Doha is moving ahead with the construction of a new port in the central Somalian town of Hobyo.

On the other hand, UAE maintains military presence in Somaliland, a non-recognised self-declared country internationally considered to be part of Somalia, while Saudi Arabia has recognised Somaliland’s passports. Moreover, the UAE has cultivated ties with opposition parties and other federal states within the country, mostly through its own economic aid and investments. For the time being, the influence of the two regional blocks in Somalia has been restrained.

Finally, with regards to the US interest and the broader geopolitical implications, the withdrawal could also allow China, a country maintaining a naval base in neighbouring Djibouti and increasingly concerned about further potential instability in the Horn of Africa due to its ambitious geo-economic projects. Filling the void, Beijing could choose to step up its maritime security cooperation with US partners present in the region, such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Similarly, the US strong presence in the area has so far prevented Russia from establishing a naval base in the Horn of Africa. However, the current developments could embolden Kremlin’s reported plans of establishing their own base in Somaliland’s port of Berbera. 

Interstate regional competitions through proxies and the support of opposing local parties in intra-state power plays could prove detrimental to the country’s fragile internal unity, undermining years of state-building efforts. Additionally, Somalia’s state structures, including the local police and the security forces, are struggling in the fight against phenomena of endemic corruption and fiscal mismanagement. Given these chronic problems, underpaid governmental forces are subject to foreign influence, bribing and infiltrations, providing foreign actors with a fertile ground for maneuvers.

The examples of proxy wars in a variety of different ongoing conflicts (Yemen, Syria, Libya), largely driven by the geopolitical aspirations of regional powerhouses, could serve as a cautionary tale for Somalia, a country characterised by ethnic divisions. Overall, the vacuum created by the US withdrawal could render Somalia into an increasingly geopolitically  contested  arena.

The volatile situation in the Horn of Africa and the upcoming Biden Administration

Hence, the international community needs to pay closer attention to the Horn of Africa. Past experience has shown that societal unrest and conflicts – both inter-state and intra-state ones- in this region are closely interconnected. Presently, it remains unclear whether the upcoming Biden administration will reverse the withdrawal decision.  Nevertheless, the capacity of the Somalian state to exercise monopoly of control remains highly relied on the US’ high profile alignment with its government in the security sphere. A resurgence of terrorist groups such as Al-Shabaab in Somalia remains more likely in 2021, following the US withdrawal and could result in another humanitarian and refugee crisis with a potential spillover of violence.

Why Ethiopia and Sudan have fallen out over al-Fashaga

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Source: BBC | Alex de Waal, African Analyst

 

The armed clashes along the border between Sudan and Ethiopia are the latest twist in a decades-old history of rivalry between the two countries, though it is rare for the two armies to fight one another directly over territory.

The immediate issue is a disputed area known as al-Fashaga, where the north-west of Ethiopia’s Amhara region meets Sudan’s breadbasket Gedaref state.

Although the approximate border between the two countries is well-known – travellers like to say that Ethiopia starts when the Sudanese plains give way to the first mountains – the exact boundary is rarely demarcated on the ground.

Colonial-era treaties

Borders in the Horn of Africa are fiercely disputed. Ethiopia fought a war with Somalia in 1977 over the disputed region of the Ogaden.

In 1998 it fought Eritrea over a small piece of contested land called Badme.

About 80,000 soldiers died in that war which led to deep bitterness between the countries, especially as Ethiopia refused to withdraw from Badme town even though the International Court of Justice awarded most of the territory to Eritrea.

It was reoccupied by Eritrean troops during the fighting in Tigray in November 2020.

After the 1998 war, Ethiopia and Sudan revived long-dormant talks to settle the exact location of their 744km-long (462 miles) boundary.

The most difficult area to resolve was Fashaga. According to the colonial-era treaties of 1902 and 1907, the international boundary runs to the east.

This means that the land belongs to Sudan – but Ethiopians had settled in the area and were cultivating there and paying their taxes to Ethiopian authorities.

‘Deal condemned as secret bargain’

Negotiations between the two governments reached a compromise in 2008. Ethiopia acknowledged the legal boundary but Sudan permitted the Ethiopians to continue living there undisturbed.

It was a classic case of a ‘soft border’ managed in a way that did not let the location of a ‘hard border’ disrupt the livelihoods of people in the border zone; there was coexistence for decades until just now, when a definitive sovereign line was demanded by Ethiopia.

The Ethiopian delegation to the talks that led to the 2008 compromise was headed by a senior official of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), Abay Tsehaye.

After the TPLF was removed from power in Ethiopia in 2018, ethnic Amhara leaders condemned the deal as a secret bargain and said they had not been properly consulted.

Each side has its own story of what sparked the clash in Fashaga. What happened next is not in dispute: the Sudanese army drove back the Ethiopians and forced the villagers to evacuate.

At a regional summit in Djibouti on 20 December, Sudan’s Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok raised the matter with his Ethiopian counterpart Abiy Ahmed.

They agreed to negotiate, but each has different preconditions. Ethiopia wants the Sudanese to compensate the burned-out communities; Sudan wants a return to the status quo ante.

While the delegates were talking, there was a second clash, which the Sudanese have blamed on Ethiopian troops.

As with most border disputes, each side has a different analysis of history, law, and how to interpret century-old treaties. But it is also a symptom of two bigger issues – each of them unlocked by Mr Abiy’s policy changes.

Territorial claims in Tigray

The Ethiopians who inhabit Fashaga are ethnic Amhara – a constituency that Mr Abiy increasingly hitched his political wagon to after losing significant support in his Oromo ethnic group, the largest in Ethiopia. Amharas are the second largest group in Ethiopia and its historic rulers.

Emboldened by the federal army’s victories in the conflict against the TPLF over the last two months, the Amhara are making territorial claims in Tigray.

After the TPLF retreated, pursued by Amhara regional militia, they hoisted their flags and put up road signs that said “welcome to Amhara”. This was in lands claimed by Amhara state but allocated to Tigray in the 1990s when the TPLF was in power in Ethiopia.

The Fashaga conflict follows the same pattern of claiming sovereignty – except that it is not about Ethiopia’s internal boundaries, but the border with a neighbouring state.

The failure to resolve it peacefully is the indirect result of another of Mr Abiy’s policy reversals: Ethiopia’s foreign relations. For 60 years, Ethiopia’s strategic aim was to contain Egypt, but a year ago Mr Abiy reached out a hand of friendship.

The two countries each regard the River Nile as an existential question.

Egypt sees upstream dams as a threat to its share of the Nile waters, established in colonial era treaties. Ethiopia sees the river as an essential source of hydroelectric power, needed for its economic development.

The dispute came to a head over the construction of the huge Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (Gerd).

The bedrock of the Ethiopian foreign ministry’s hydro-diplomacy used to be a web of alliances among the other upstream African countries.

The aim was to achieve a multi-country comprehensive agreement on sharing the Nile waters. In this forum, Egypt was outnumbered.

Sudan was in the African camp. It was set to gain from the Gerd, which would control flooding, increase irrigation, and provide cheaper electricity.

Egypt wanted straightforward bilateral talks with the aim of preserving its colonial-era entitlement to the majority of the Nile waters.

In October 2019, Mr Abiy flew to the Russia-Africa summit at Sochi. On the side-lines he met Egyptian President Abdul Fattah al-Sisi.

In a single meeting, with no foreign ministry officials present, Mr Abiy upended Ethiopia’s Nile waters strategy.

He agreed to Mr Sisi’s proposal that the US treasury should mediate the dispute on the Gerd. The US leaned towards Egypt.

If the young Ethiopian leader, who had just won the Nobel Peace Prize for ending tensions with Eritrea, thought he could also secure a deal with Egypt, he was wrong. The opposite happened: the 44-year-old cornered himself.

Sudan was the third country invited to negotiate in Washington DC. Vulnerable to US pressure because it desperately needed America to lift financial sanctions imposed when it was designated a “state sponsor of terrorism” in 1993, Sudan fell in with the Egyptian position.

Ethiopian public opinion turned against the American proposals and Mr Abiy was forced to reject them, after which the US suspended some aid to Ethiopia. US President Donald Trump warned that Egypt might “blow up” the dam, and Ethiopia declared a no-fly zone over the region where the dam is located.

‘Pattern of mutual destabilisation’

The Nobel laureate can ill-afford further disputes with Egypt, amidst the conflict in Tigray and the clashes in Fashaga. The latter raise the ghosts of a long history of rivalry between Ethiopia and Sudan.

In the 1980s, Communist Ethiopia armed Sudanese rebels while Sudan aided ethno-nationalist armed groups, including the TPLF. In the 1990s, Sudan supported militant Islamist groups while Ethiopia backed the Sudanese opposition.

With armed clashes and unrest in many parts of Ethiopia, and Sudan’s recent peace deal with rebels in Darfur and the Nuba Mountains still incomplete, each country could readily return to this age-old pattern of mutual destabilisation.

Relations between Sudan and Ethiopia reached their warmest when Mr Abiy flew to Khartoum in June 2019 to encourage pro-democracy protesters and the Sudanese generals to come to agreement on a civilian government following the overthrow of long-term ruler Omar al-Bashir.

It was a characteristic Abiy initiative – high profile and wholly individual – and it needed formalization through the regional body Igad and the diplomatic heavy lifting of others, including the African Union, Arab countries, the US and UK to achieve results.

Sudan Prime Minister Hamdok has tried to return the favour by offering assistance in resolving Ethiopia’s conflict in Tigray. He was rebuffed, most recently at the 20 December summit, at which Mr Abiy insisted that the Ethiopian government would deal with its internal affairs on its own.

As refugees from Tigray continue to flood into Sudan, bringing with them stories of atrocities and hunger, the Ethiopian prime minister may find it more difficult to reject mediation.

He also risks igniting a new round of cross-border antagonism between Ethiopia and Sudan, deepening the crisis in the region.