Tag Archive for: Geopolitics

How War in Ethiopia Impacts Red Sea and Horn of Africa Power Politics: The Battle in Tigray and Beyond

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Terrorism Monitor | Michael Horton

Ethiopia is a key prize in the scramble for influence and power in the Horn of Africa and broader Red Sea region. With its natural resources, population of 110 million, and well-equipped military, Ethiopia has become an African power. The nation’s capital, Addis Ababa, moreover, hosts the African Union headquarters, and the country is one of the few African nations never to be colonized. [1] Ethiopia has accordingly long played an outsized role in African and sub-regional politics.

For much of the last decade, successive Ethiopian governments have navigated treacherous regional and global politics by maintaining relations with diverse geopolitical actors. On the global level, Ethiopia has been—and remains—an important U.S. ally, while China accounts for the largest volume of foreign direct investment into Ethiopia. [2] At the regional level, Ethiopia has avoided becoming entangled in the Gulf’s acrimonious power politics between Saudi Arabia and the UAE and their two main adversaries, Qatar and Turkey. All four of those countries nevertheless provide Ethiopia with financial aid and private investment across multiple areas, especially its important agricultural sector. Turkey and the UAE, despite being regional rivals, also both maintain high-level military-to-military relations with Ethiopia.

The ongoing war in Ethiopia’s northernmost Tigray region will test Ethiopia’s strategy of balancing the interests of outside powers with its own need for domestic investment. At the same time, the war, which began on November 4, will present these same outside powers with new opportunities to enhance their relationship with Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali (East African, November 7). However, those and other outside powers will also have ample opportunity to create instability in Ethiopia if they so choose.

Ethiopian Foreign Policy from Balancing to Entanglement

The war in Tigray pits the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) against the Ethiopian government. The TPLF, which dominated Ethiopian politics for much of the last three decades, is a formidable political and military power in its own right. While the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) has made quick progress in capturing major cities in the Tigray region, this was likely due to strategic withdrawals by the TPLF (Nazret, November 19). Such a strategy aligns with the TPLF’s long history of guerrilla warfare.

Barring some negotiated settlement between the TPLF and the Ethiopian government, the war in Tigray will likely evolve into an insurgency that will spill beyond the borders of Tigray. At the same time, the war in Tigray, even if it is contained to TPLF redoubts in the mountains, will attract the interest of outside powers. This is already the case with Eritrea, which has deployed troops within Ethiopia’s borders to help the ENDF bottle up the TPLF. In addition to its three decade-long battle for independence from Ethiopia, Eritrea and Ethiopia fought over disputed border towns from 1998-2000. Eritrea, which was once allied with the TPLF, is now supporting Abiy Ahmed, who signed a peace agreement with Eritrean president Isaias Afewerki in 2018 that ended the two countries’ longstanding border conflict (Addis Fortune, September 22, 2018).

The involvement of Eritrean forces in Ethiopia’s war in Tigray could be a harbinger of things to come. The UAE, which maintains military bases in Eritrea, may also be aiding Abiy Ahmed’s government. Conflicting and unconfirmed reports, for example, indicate the possible deployment of UAE-operated drones from the UAE base in Assab, Eritrea to Tigray. [3] The UAE, which is locked in a cold war with Qatar and Turkey, could try to enhance its relationship with Ethiopia by supporting its fight against the TPLF at the cost of Ethiopia’s relationship with Qatar and Turkey.

Turkey, however, like the UAE, enjoys excellent military-to-military relations with Ethiopia. Due to Ethiopia’s involvement in Somalia, with which it shares a long and largely unguarded border, Turkey works closely with the Ethiopian military and intelligence services. Turkey also regards Somalia, where it maintains its largest overseas military base, as the lynchpin in its strategy to preserve and grow its influence in the Horn of Africa and Red Sea region (Terrorism Monitor, November 20). In mid-November, Ethiopia withdrew large numbers of troops it had deployed in its ethnically Somali Ogaden region and Somalia itself to redeploy them to Tigray (Somali Affairs, November 3). Somalia-based al-Shabaab, therefore, will benefit from gaps left by the Ethiopian forces, and the relationship between Ethiopia and Turkey may deepen as Ankara seizes on opportunities to help Addis Ababa bolster security along its border with Somalia. Turkey also has greater ability than either the UAE or Saudi Arabia to offer the Ethiopian military what it lacks and most desires: drone technology and the expertise to use it (Terrorism Monitor, October 13).

Further afield, China, which has invested billions of dollars in almost every economic sector in Ethiopia, will act to protect those investments. China will make every effort to support stability in Ethiopia. Given China’s pragmatic foreign policy in Africa and in Ethiopia in particular, this support will be cost-effective and possibly covert. There is little doubt that China will aid Abiy Ahmed’s efforts to contain and defeat the TPLF. However, such aid will, as is customary with Chinese foreign policy, come with strings attached. [4]

Water Wars and Instability

On the other side of the equation, Ethiopia’s regional rivals will view limited instability in Ethiopia as a benefit. Ethiopia has completed its Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and, as of July 2020, began filling the dam’s immense reservoir (Nazret, July 16). Egypt views the dam, which impedes the flow of water into the Nile’s primary tributary, the Blue Nile, as an existential threat. [5] Thus far, the two governments have failed to reach an agreement over how they will share the Nile’s water resources.

Over this summer, Egypt reportedly proposed to build a base in the unrecognized Republic of Somaliland (The East African, July 28). It is unlikely the government of Somaliland will accept the proposal. However, it reflects Egypt’s interest in enhancing its relations with other nations in the Horn of Africa and expanding its military’s regional reach as a way of checking what it sees as growing Ethiopian power.

For its part, Sudan, which will benefit from cheap electricity and flood control provided by the GERD, has been more willing to negotiate with Ethiopia on the dam. However, Egypt wields considerable influence in Sudan. The war in Tigray, especially if it is prolonged, may undermine the Ethiopian government’s ability to press forward with what Egypt views as an uncompromising agreement on GERD and hinder Sudan’s possible accommodation with Ethiopia on the dam.

Ethiopia’s Outlook

Ethiopia’s successful foreign policy, which is based on balancing the interests of rival countries in its natural resources and strategic position in exchange for access and investment, could be compromised by sustained war in Tigray. The TPLF is a sophisticated political and military organization that possesses the knowledge and institutional memory that will allow it to engage rival internal and outside powers. Abiy Ahmed’s government will find it requires more and new types of aid to deal with the challenges posed by the TPLF. Receipt of this aid, be it military or financial, will constrain Ethiopia’s nimble and independent foreign policy.

Notes

[1] Ethiopia was occupied by the Italians from 1936-1941. See Jeff Pearce, Prevail: The Inspiring Story of Ethiopia’s Victory over Mussolini’s Invasion (Skyhorse Publishing, 2014).

[2] In 2019, China accounted for the largest volume of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Ethiopia, followed by Saudi Arabia and Turkey.

[3] There are conflicting and unconfirmed reports in Western media on the possible deployment of UAE-operated drones from the UAE’s base in Assab, Eritrea to Tigray. See, for example: https://www.voanews.com/africa/expert-no-evidence-uae-drones-are-being-used-ethiopias-tigray-conflict; https://www.bellingcat.com/news/rest-of-world/2020/11/19/are-emirati-armed-drones-supporting-ethiopia-from-an-eritrean-air-base/; and https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-conflict-idUSKBN27V05M. While deployment of UAE-operated and Chinese-manufactured Wing Loong II drones would be consistent with the UAE’s deployment of drones over Yemen and Libya, it is unlikely at this stage. What is more likely is that the UAE is using surveillance drones within Eritrean territory to monitor incursions into Eritrean territory by TPLF forces.

[4] This is not to say that other countries providing aid, like the United States, do not also expect some kind benefit in return. However, China is particularly adept at incorporating countries into its financial and political web at relatively minimal expense to the Chinese treasury. See Tom Burgis, The Looting Machine: Warlords, Oligarch, Corporations, Smuggler, and the Theft of Africa’s Wealth (Public Affairs, 2016).

[5] For an overview of the complexity surrounding GERD and downstream riparian environments, see: https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-020-19089-x

UAE: The scramble for the Horn of Africa

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MEMO | The United Arab Emirates is waging a war for influence over the Horn of Africa.

Since the 2011 Arab Spring the United Arab Emirates has been taking an active role in a number of hotspots from Egypt, Libya to Yemen. The Gulf nation has spent $26 billion annually on its defence budget since 2016 and this is expected to increase to $37.8 billion by 2025, according to Research and Markets.

A growing security and war industry with military deployments abroad, US generals often refer to the Sheikhdom as ‘Little Sparta’. As of 2020, The UAE has military bases in Eritrea, Djibouti and Somaliland, which further indicates the importance of the Horn of Africa to Abu Dhabi. The region offers excellent access to the Red Sea, the Mediterranean and the Gulf of Aden, all of which are vital to the Emirates’ economic future as a global trading hub. The military bases ensure Abu Dhabi can see off threats to its interests and secure its influence over East Africa at a time when it is expanding its income streams away from the petrodollar.

The 2015 war in Yemen and the 2017 blockade of Qatar have seen Abu Dhabi take a more aggressive role in East Africa.

Countries in the Horn of Africa have by and large welcomed growing ties with the Arab World, but in 2017 following the breaking of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, Egypt with Qatar, countries across the world were pushed to take sides.

Somalia

Although the 2017 Gulf Crisis now looks like it is coming to an end, the countries in the Horn of Africa have already paid the price for it. Somalia found itself at the unwelcome end of the dispute.

Like other Horn of Africa countries, the Somali government adopted a neutral stance towards the Qatar dispute. The UAE, however, saw Mogadishu as silently in the pro-Qatar camp and Abu Dhabi was not pleased.

In 2017, as President Mohamed Abdul lahi Farmaajo assumed office, reports circulated that Qatar and Turkey had funded his campaign and further claims of officials appointed to prominent positions within Farmaajo’s administration having ties to Doha and Ankara unnerved Abu Dhabi.

The Somali government alleges the UAE is now actively destabilising the country, accusing it of funding opposition forces. These suspicions intensified after Dubai Ports World, DP World, bypassed the central government of Somalia and signed a deal with the semi-autonomous region of Somaliland to develop and operate Berbera port. DP World even brought in Ethiopian investment and gave Addis Ababa a stake in the port.

Mogadishu declared the deal illegal and tried to block it by taking out a complaint with the Arab League. Somaliland leader, Muse Bihi Abdi, said Farmaajo’s government was declaring war by attempting to block the deal. Under the deal, Somaliland stands to get investments of up to $442 million and a separate agreement with Abu Dhabi to allow the UAE’s military bases in the region could bring in a further $1 billion, according to the International Crisis Group.

Decades of civil war and the presence of extremist groups makes Somalia a very fragile country, fears UAE involvement could harm the country are a cause of constant concern for Mogadishu.

Sudan

In 1989, Omar Al-Bashir, a military commander, launched a coup and seized political power in Sudan. By 1993, he declared himself president and his political party, the National Congress, became the dominant political force. The National Congress is Muslim Brotherhood aligned and as such was generally treated with suspicion by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. However, in the 2010s, Al-Bashir’s regime began distancing itself from the brotherhood in order to improve its relations with the GCC countries.

Closer relations with Saudi Arabia and the UAE had a price. In 2015, Riyadh formed a coalition to intervene militarily in Yemen. In 2011, the Yemeni government led by Ali Abdullah Saleh faced mass street protests known as the ‘Arab Spring’, the pressure would force him to step down in 2012. The power vacuum led to large parts of the country being taken over by the Iranian-backed Houthi group. The Saudi-led coalition aimed to crush the Houthis and declared war on them. Sudan became an important member of the war coalition.

In 2018, a popular uprising took place against Omar Al-Bashir and in April 2019 the military forced him from power. The military then formed a new government with civil opposition groups with the aim of transforming Sudan into a fully-fledged democracy and the UAE moved to minimise the potential damage to its interests caused by the revolution.

However, the fall of Al-Bashir means the UAE’s position in Sudan is not guaranteed and some fear the Emirates could try to subvert Sudan’s democratic transition.

Ethiopia

Ethiopia seems to have benefitted hugely from its partnership with the UAE, as the East African country has emerged as a big investment opportunity.

In February 2020, the UAE agreed to invest $100 million to support micro, medium and small scale projects across the country. Additionally, the UAE has pledged to build an oil pipeline between Ethiopia and Eritrea, which will provide the landlocked nation much needed energy.

Indeed this energy deal is possible after the UAE engineered a peace treaty between Eritrea and Ethiopia in 2018. The peace agreement was held up as an example of the UAE’s prowess. Ethiopia managed to gain these benefits while avoiding the polarising effects of the Qatar blockade.

In November 2020, armed conflict broke out in Ethiopia’s Tigray region between government forces and a powerful regional rebel army. The rebels’ leader openly accused the United Arab Emirates of carrying out a drone strike on Tigray, from its base in Eritrea, at the behest of Addis Ababa. While evidence has yet to emerge of the strike, it does indicate there is some local anxiety about the role Abu Dhabi might be playing in this potentially explosive situation.

Ethiopia could cause issues for the UAE and Saudi Arabia, as another close ally of the Gulf States, Egypt, has expressed anger at Addis Ababa’s dam across the River Nile. The Renaissance Dam built by Ethiopia reduces Nile water levels in Egypt, harming its energy, economic and environmental needs. Negotiations to find a solution keep breaking down and regional tensions are high.

The Horn of Africa is the playground for rising UAE aspirations and is a microcosm of what the UAE aims to replicate across the African continent. Much of this is driven by the decline of US influence globally, new regional alliances and powerhouses are emerging to manage international security. However, the UAE does not exercise total control over East Africa and is still in the early stages of developing its reach and influence. The Horn is full of flashpoints and the UAE could either help stabilise or destabilise the region.

Pterosaur Rainbow drones (UAV) are put into battle, attacking Ethiopian rebels at night, killing 500 people on the spot

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UAV Network 2020-11-30 | The Asian-African conflict that was just quelled a while ago finally ended with Azerbaijan’s victory. In this war, drones as a new type of military weapons showed up on the battlefield, and soon won the world’s Concerned, some experts even predict that in future wars, drones will replace armed helicopters and become the new darling on the battlefield. This is true when used in the recent conflict between Ethiopia and the “rebels”.

Satellite data provided by a US space company recently showed that buildings in areas where Ethiopia was engaged in combat with rebels were suspected of being subjected to a wide range of precision-guided strikes, and the rebels who used buildings as shelters suffered a devastating blow. In this attack, at least 500 rebels were wiped out on the spot. The Ethiopian government forces had absolute initiative at the beginning of the battle. Such a precise air strike was definitely not done by the Su-27 of the Ethiopian Air Force. It was the Ethiopian Air Force that used the killer weapon. Judging from the current situation in Ethiopia, Ethiopia and the UAE Air Force stationed in Eritrea both use this killer weapon: it is possible to armed drones. The Ethiopian side uses the Rainbow 4 weapon. The man-machine, and the UAE Air Force, is likely to use the Pterosaur 2 armed drone.

Read More China Has Been Spying On The African Union Headquarters

Both of these drones are excellent products manufactured in China, and have been exported to many countries and regions in the world. The Pterosaur 2 was developed by my country’s Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group. The aerodynamic layout of the Pterosaur 2 and the previous Pterosaur domestic UAV is generally similar, but the size of the Pterosaur 2 is almost a circle larger than the Pterosaur, so Compared with the pterosaur, the descendant pterosaur 2 has a significant improvement over the pterosaur in terms of bomb load and maximum range. In the seven years since it was put on the market, the Pterosaur 2 has been successfully equipped in many countries, and it has achieved normalized applications. It has also performed well in actual combat. The Rainbow 4 UAV is my country’s “Rainbow” series UAV Representative products in China are also exported to the Middle East and Europe.

Read More The UAE supports Ethiopia and dispatched drones to fight the rebels

And it shines in the struggle against the armed elements. Both types of drones represent the advanced level of Chinese drones. Compared with UAVs produced in the United States, U.S.-made UAVs have always been popular in the international arms market before China’s UAV momentum has risen, but since Chinese UAVs entered the international market many countries were immediately attracted by the ultra-high cost performance of our drones. At the same time, our drones are more durable than American drones, easy to maintain, which has successfully shaken the US drones in the international market. Dominance.

In this conflict, Ethiopia once again used Chinese domestic drones. Obviously, after the conflict in the Tigray region, the use of drones in modern warfare has also been attracted by countries all over the world and started imitation.

The Ethiopian army’s offensive is fierce, and the Russian observers are very emotional: so many advanced Eastern weapons

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NetEase | According to a report by the Russian Satellite News Agency on January 21, the Ethiopian army’s offensive was very fierce. Russian observers were very impressed by the fact that so many advanced Eastern weapons appeared.

Ethiopia has been facing internal and external troubles recently. Since November last year, the domestic situation in Ethiopia has been escalating. The conflict between the previous ruling department and the current one has intensified, and even military means have been used. Before the current leader Abiy came to power, the core faction of the Egyptian side was the Tigray Front, but after Abiy came to power, the front was excluded, and the conflict between the two sides escalated. Dissatisfied with Abi’s management, Tigray even held a local election in September last year. Recently, the military conflicts between the two sides have been escalating. According to the announcement by the Ethiopian National Defense Forces, the military has killed many senior Tigray officials. Among them was the former Minister of Foreign Affairs who refused to surrender and was killed in fighting that broke out in the Tigray region. With the expansion of the Ethiopian civil war, the exchange of fire between Ethiopia and the Sudanese army has gradually become fierce, and Sudan took this opportunity to launch an attack on Ethiopia. In response, the Ethiopian army began to strengthen its deployment on the border and began to take action. Not long ago, a large number of elite Ethiopian troops launched an overnight attack and snatched a missile from the Tigray rebels. The battle once attracted many onlookers.

Related sources said that the recent offensive by the Ethiopian army has been very fierce, and even a large number of weapons from the east have been deployed. The Ethiopian army even dispatched S300 air defense missiles and armored S1 air defense missile systems from Russia. Ethiopia also has many of the 56-type submachine guns, 63-type assault rifles, 40 rockets, pterosaur drones, M20 tactical ballistic missiles and A200 long-range rockets produced by our country.

In particular, the M20 tactical ballistic missile and the A200 long-range rocket have become the focus of contention between Ethiopia and the rebels. The M20 ballistic missile is a short-range ballistic missile developed by the Chinese Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation. This type of missile adopts an integrated design of vehicle transportation, erection and launch, a double cone aerodynamic shape, and an X-shaped tail rudder. The missile is powered by a single-stage solid propellant rocket engine, satellite guidance and inertial navigation, and full-range guidance, with high guidance accuracy and strong penetration capability. The missile has a length of 7.8 meters, a diameter of 0.75 meters, a take-off weight of 4,010 kilograms, and a warhead weight of 480 kilograms. The rocket model of the A200 system developed by China is A20011, with a length of 7.2 meters, a diameter of 300 mm, and a mass of about 840 kg. The maximum range has been further increased to 200 kilometers. The rocket uses advanced GPS and INS composite guidance, head-body separation technology, and achieves maneuvering flight capabilities. The accuracy of the rocket has been greatly improved. The CEP is less than when the entire blasting warhead equivalent to 150 kg of TNT is used. At 30 meters, the CEP of the warhead of the armor-piercing submunition with 390 rounds of bullets is also less than 45 meters, which has reached the level of mainstream short-range ballistic missiles.

The Russian observers were very emotional. They did not expect Ethiopia, an unheard-of African country, to possess weapons such as high-precision tactical ballistic missiles. Especially Ethiopia has so many advanced Eastern weapons, no wonder it is so violent. And we can see the popularity of these advanced Eastern weapons.

The UAE supports Ethiopia and dispatched drones to fight the rebels

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UAV Network | Tencent QQ | Ethiopia: the price is too good

According to a report by TASS News Agency on December 3, the UAV deployed by the UAE in Eritrea recently participated in the Ethiopian civil war and achieved “impressive” results. Under the continuous bombing of drones, the Tigray People’s Army kept retreating, and there was no way to deal with it. The rebels could no longer hold it, and began to surrender. On December 1, the Ethiopian government stated that senior officials of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) had surrendered to the Ethiopian army. The official who surrendered was Kerya Ibrahim, one of the nine important leaders of the TPLF.

The price of a U.S.-made Predator drone is about US$5 million, and the price of an American Reaper drone is about US$15 million. In contrast, the cost of a Chinese-made pterosaur drone is only about $1 million. But the performance of the Pterosaur UAV is not much different from that of the U.S. Predator. The Pterosaur UAV can also realize the integration of investigation and fighting, and has many actual combat records. The difference between the Pterosaur UAV and the Predator is mainly due to the relatively weak engine performance, which leads to the difference in the maximum ammunition capacity of the Pterosaur and the Predator. But if the price factor is taken into account, this may not be a problem at all. In addition, there are many restrictions on the purchase of U.S. military drones, but there are no more restrictions on the purchase of pterosaur drones. You can buy your own equipment and you can use it whatever you want.

In the civil war in Ethiopia, the pterosaur drones undertook a 24-hour non-stop bombing mission, which destroyed the rebels to life. In fact, the conflict between Ethiopia and Tigray was not a day or two; the government forces did not quickly win the victory over the rebels. The biggest difference was that there was no help from drones. The Ethiopian army has a lot of advanced equipment, including AR-2 rockets, etc., but it cannot fully utilize the advantages of these equipment. Tigray armed with rockets in hand and the government army are very impressive. But when the pterosaur drones joined, the situation changed quickly. Death was hovering over the heads of the rebels for 24 hours, and any heavy weapons that appeared would be quickly attacked. The drones made the rebels feel powerless, and the destruction of the period was terrible.

The Ethiopian military believes that these Pterosaur drones are too valuable. In fact, this batch of UAVs is not Ethiopian, it is likely to be the UAE. The UAE built military bases in the area in 2015 and deployed multiple pterosaur UAVs to fight against Husai. The UAE supports Ethiopia and dispatched drones to fight the rebels. After the Ethiopian army has seen the power of the pterosaur drone, it is believed that it will also have the idea of ​​buying it. After all, it can have the ability to attack the ground without spending a lot of money, which is impossible for manned fighters. UAVs are very attractive to Ethiopia.

In recent years, drones have appeared on the battlefield more and more and have played a very important role. Both the TB-2 UAV and the Pterosaur UAV participated in the battlefield in Libya. The TB-2 UAV successfully destroyed multiple armored S air defense systems. The Pterosaur UAV pressed the GNA army before the Turkish army entered the battle. In the Naka conflict, Azerbaijan used Turkish TB-2 UAVs to destroy several Russian-made Sam-8 air defense systems, S300 air defense systems, and a large number of T72 tanks, which played an important role in winning the war. In the civil war in Ethiopia, drones once again played an important role. Many practical examples show that for small countries, drones may be more useful than manned fighters.

UK backs Sudan economic reforms with over $50 million

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Source: AP | Noha Elhennawy 

Britain’s foreign secretary announced Thursday that his government would offer more than $50 million to help poor Sudanese families as their government embarks upon major austerity measures to revive its battered economy, Sudan’s state news agency reported.

On a visit to Khartoum, Dominic Raab and Sudanese Minister of Finance and Economic Planning Heba Mohamed Ali Ahmed signed a memorandum of understanding under which Britain commits to disbursing economic aid worth 40 million British pounds, or about $54.8 million, to the African country, SUNA reported.

Sudan is on a fragile path to democratic rule after a popular uprising led the military to overthrow longtime autocrat Omar al-Bashir in April 2019, after nearly three decades of rule. A military-civilian government is now in power but struggles with a wide range of economic challenges, including crippling debt, widespread shortages of essential goods such as fuel, bread and medicine, and a three-digit inflation rate.

“This is the first visit by a British foreign secretary to Sudan in more than ten years,” said Rosie Diyas, Britain’s spokesperson for the Mideast and North Africa. “The visit aims at supporting Sudan’s transition to democracy and civilian rule.”

The British aid will finance cash handouts to 1.6 million poor Sudanese, said Diyas. Aid recipients are expected to be those most hit by the economic reforms, slashing of subsidies and the reduction of public spending that the Sudanese government is expected to implement in order to reduce its huge public deficit.

Sudan’s transitional government has been racing against the clock to garner economic and political support of Western powers in order to end decades of its pariah status and secure reliefs of its crippling debt.

In the weeks before leaving office, former President Donald Trump removed Sudan from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, a move that allows Khartoum to get international loans. Sudan’s economy has suffered from decades of U.S. sanctions and mismanagement under al-Bashir, who had ruled the country since a 1989 Islamist-backed military coup. The removal of the terror designation came after Sudan followed in the footsteps of other key Arab countries, including the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, by normalizing relations with Israel.

Last year, Western and Arab countries pledged a total of $1.8 billion in aid to back Sudan at a donor meeting in Berlin. At the time, Britain pledged 66 million euros, more than $186 million.

According to Diyas, the U.K. has also offered another $6.87 million in aid to address Sudan’s urgent needs emanating from the influx of more than 50,000 Ethiopian refugees, who have recently fled their country following the eruption of war in Ethiopia’s Tigray province.

Shortly before boarding his Ethiopia-bound plane, Raab told reporters at Khartoum’s airport that his government hopes Ethiopia and Sudan can resolve the ongoing border dispute in “a sensible way”.

In recent weeks, the Sudanese army has deployed thousands of troops along the Ethiopian border and reclaimed territories controlled by Ethiopian militias. The Sudanese advances came on the heels of cross-border attacks that killed and wounded many Sudanese troops. The border tension raised concerns over a potential military conflict between the neighboring countries.

“We have a longstanding friendship with Sudan and likewise a strong partnership with Ethiopia. Our message is, let’s not at this precarious moment for the region see an escalation of tension,” said Raab, adding that he would reiterate the same message to the Ethiopians during his visit there.

SUNA reported that Raab had met with Gen. Abdel-Fattah Burhan, head of Sudan’s ruling sovereign council, Sudan’s prime minister, Abdalla Hamdok, and acting Foreign Minister Omar Qamar al-Din.

Raab had also meant to discuss with Sudanese officials the ongoing water dispute between Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia, SUNA reported earlier. The news agency did not later say if anything came out of those discussions. The dispute is about Ethiopia’s construction of a controversial dam on the Blue Nile River, the main tributary of the Nile, which Egypt says endangers its critical share of the Nile waters.

Britain understands Sudan’s position on Ethiopia dam negotiations, says ambassador

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MEMO | The UK Ambassador to Sudan, Irfan Siddiq, said on Tuesday that his country understands Sudan’s position on the negotiations over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, Anadolu News Agency reported.

Mr. Siddiq added during a meeting in Khartoum with the Sudanese Minister of Irrigation and Water Resources, Dr Yasir Mohamed, that London would support the dam negotiations until Sudan, Ethiopia and Egypt reach a satisfactory agreement, the Sudanese Irrigation Ministry said in a statement.

Last week, the Sudanese Foreign Minister, Omar Qamar al-Din announced that his country had submitted a list of conditions to the African Union before it returned to meaningful negotiations over the Renaissance Dam, noting that Khartoum was considering alternative options, which he did not clarify.

On 10 January, the Sudanese News Agency reported that the meeting of ministers of foreign affairs and irrigation of Sudan, Egypt and Ethiopia have failed to reach an acceptable formula to continue negotiations on the Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.

For nine years, the three countries have been locked in stalled negotiations over the dam.

Trump’s Withdrawal From Somalia Is a Security Threat. Biden Should Reverse It

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Source: Foreign Policy | Abdi Yusuf

U.S. troops are scheduled to leave the country on Jan. 15, opening the door for al-Shabab terrorists to step up their attacks. The new administration should recommit to protecting the country.

Years of hard-fought gains to stabilize Somalia and defeat the al-Shabab terrorist group are now endangered by President Donald Trump’s threat to withdraw U.S. forces. Not unlike the fragile gains the United States achieved defeating the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, Somalia’s future rests on sound judgment and Washington’s continued engagement. Without persistent pressure from U.S. forces, al-Shabab’s leaders will be able to emerge from hiding, reorganize, and conduct attacks not just in Somalia but across the region, including against key U.S. allies such as Ethiopia and Kenya. However, there’s still time to change course. The current administration’s Jan. 15 deadline to withdraw U.S. troops from Somalia is rapidly approaching.

In all likelihood, the Trump administration will not reverse course on any major policy decision in the lead-up to President-elect Joe Biden’s inauguration on Jan. 20, and the withdrawal will continue as planned. If this is indeed the case, Biden must move swiftly after inauguration to redeploy troops back to their original bases in Somalia.

Biden must move swiftly after inauguration to redeploy troops back to their original bases in Somalia.

Not doing so risks Somalia falling back into the hands of al-Shabab and endangers the lives of not only Somalia’s citizens but those from Western countries residing in the region.

Since 1991, the ongoing civil war in Somalia has killed more than 300,000 people and injured countless others. As the country recovers, a continuing U.S. presence will be crucial to maintaining stability.

Currently, Somalia is showing signs of recovery and gradually becoming a popular destination for business, mainly due to its enhanced security situation in recent years. The persistent efforts of the international community, led by the United States, have made this possible. For decades, the U.S. government has provided training and equipment to Somalia’s armed forces. The U.S.-trained unit Danab conducted many successful operations against al-Shabab, which has killed more than 4,000 people, including Americans.

Two months ago, a CIA paramilitary officer was killed while fighting alongside Danab. In early 2020, al-Shabab launched an attack against U.S. forces in Kenya, killing three Americans and destroying a U.S. surveillance plane.

These sacrifices have not been in vain. Thanks to U.S. involvement in Somalia, a 9/11-style attack against the U.S. homeland was recently foiled—a reminder of the mutually beneficial relationship between the two countries.

This relationship is now at risk. On Dec. 4, Trump ordered the removal of U.S. soldiers from Somalia by early 2021.

The proposed withdrawal comes at an especially critical time and is a risk to the stability of the entire region. Indeed, Ethiopia is in the middle of a civil war and has withdrawn thousands of its troops who had been helping the Somali army fight against al-Shabab. Kenya-Somalia relations are at their lowest point in years, and domestic tensions are high over the upcoming elections and a string of attacks and assassinations. If the United States goes ahead with its withdrawal, it could have a huge impact on stability in Somalia, deal a major blow to morale among Somalia’s armed forces, and raise questions about U.S. credibility.

The proposed withdrawal comes at an especially critical time and is a risk to the stability of the entire region.

U.S. Defense Department officials claim the United States will “retain the capability to conduct targeted counterterrorism operations in Somalia, and collect early warnings and indicators.” However, in the eyes of many Somalis, Washington is abandoning the country. “Al-Shabab will frame this as a victory,” said Omar Mahmood, a senior Somalia analyst at the International Crisis Group. “They will use it as evidence of their ability to take on a world power like the United States and force them to leave Somalia.”

U.S. officials claim that moving troops to neighboring countries such as Kenya and Djibouti will have no major consequences. Somali officials disagree; former Danab chief Col. Ahmed Abdullahi Sheikh criticized the move, saying that the U.S. military “can launch and stage operations from countries like Djibouti and Kenya, but it’s not the same as being in the country. … You can’t train a force remotely.” U.S. support in planning and launching raids in Somalia is a critical component of the fight against al-Shabab—one that cannot easily be replaced.

It is true that a permanent U.S. military presence in Somalia is not a long-term solution. However, this transition should happen with the help of the international community. The Somali government has started to see success toward building an effective security force, thanks in large part to Washington’s unwavering support for Somalia and its people. With U.S. support, the Somali army was able to reduce al-Shabab’s military capabilities, diminish its territorial control, and bring peace back to large areas of Somalia. But the group remains a persistent threat to the region.

Now more than ever, Somalia needs the support of the United States. Leaving Somalia to fend for itself would risk erasing years of progress. Al-Shabab could reconquer territory, strengthen its military capabilities, and increase its stranglehold over the Somali people. “It’s my hope therefore that the U.S. government will reevaluate its decision and hopefully change,” one Danab officer—who prefers to remain anonymous—told me.

The Biden administration needs to increase U.S. efforts in Somalia in order to strengthen the government’s capabilities to contain the threat posed by al-Shabab. The first step Biden can take would be an immediate redeployment, followed by concrete assurances of future U.S. support. Otherwise, America’s hard-fought efforts to bring peace and stability to Somalia will have been in vain.

Abdi Yusuf is an international affairs researcher and a freelance writer based in Nairobi.

 

Without U.S. Aid, Where Would Egypt Turn?

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Terminating U.S. aid to Cairo would jeopardize the long-standing U.S.-Egyptian relationship and regional stability for years to come.

As a candidate, Joe Biden issued a stern warning to Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, pledging “no more blank checks for Trump’s favorite dictator.” Biden and his team have signaled they would limit or in some cases halt support for countries based on their human rights records, including Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

Biden’s team has threatened to condition the $1.5 annual bilateral aid the United States has provided Egypt since 1946. Following the Egypt-Israel peace treaty, which was signed subsequent to the Camp David Accords in 1979, U.S. military and economic assistance to Cairo has increased significantly. Every U.S. administration has justified the continuation of aid to Cairo as necessary for sustaining regional stability, safeguarding U.S. interests, and prolonging cooperation with the Egyptian military.

Limiting U.S. aid to Cairo would jeopardize the long-standing U.S.-Egyptian relationship for years to come. At the same time, denunciations over El-Sisi’s human rights record are legitimate. During his presidency, El-Sisi has unjustly imprisoned human rights defenders, journalists and activists in Egypt, reversing freedoms achieved in the 2011 Arab Spring uprising. However, terminating dialogue with Cairo would be harmful to regional security, as Egypt would lean on other human rights abusers for support instead.

El-Sisi took this threat seriously and in recent months began veering Egypt away from the U.S. and towards Western adversaries—including China. On August 5, Egypt agreed to let China establish a Mediterranean container terminal in Abu Qir, extending China’s reach and ability to bolster its One Belt One Road initiative in the Middle East. El-Sisi’s outreach to China poses severe implications for U.S. policy as it demonstrates Egypt’s willingness to work with Western adversaries to ensure its economic and military security.

Biden’s Middle East team must also consider the importance of sustained Israeli-Egyptian cooperation while it contemplates potential Egypt policy agendas. Four decades of peace between Israel and Egypt have been a highly important asset to the region. Since both countries signed the 1979 peace accord, Egypt has played an essential role in safeguarding Israel’s security on its western border with Gaza, which has been controlled by Hamas since 2007. Cairo and Tel Aviv’s shared disdain for the de facto governing authority in Gaza has contributed to their common ground. Egyptian and Israeli forces have worked together to counter the Sinai insurgency, an ongoing ISIS affiliated uprising on the peninsula. If the United States terminates supporting Egypt’s collaborative counter-terror efforts through military technology transfers and monetary aid, the Cairo-Tel Aviv relationship will be tested.

In addition to the Israel-Egypt relationship, cooperation between the United States and Egypt significantly cuts across multiple spheres, including security, counterterrorism, and intelligence. Both the Obama and Trump administrations defended continual aid to Egypt as crucial for regional stability. In 2013 the Obama administration partially halted its supply of military equipment to Egypt following the coup d’état that brought President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi to power. However, these limitations were lifted two years later in the “name of U.S. national security,” according to Obama administration officials. The equipment freeze was reversed since Egypt’s counter-terrorism efforts and anti-ISIS operations in the Sinai region and Libya were prioritized.

French President Emmanuel Macron recently faced pressure to limit and condition the sale of weapons to Egypt on the basis of human rights violations. However, Macron chose a different course than what Biden reportedly is planning. During a joint news conference in Paris with Egyptian President El-Sisi on December 7, Macron announced France would not abide by this strategy as it would be a detriment to Cairo’s ability to counter terrorism in the region. Macron stated he “would not condition matters of defense and economic cooperation on these disagreements (over human rights)…it is more effective to have a policy of demanding dialogue than a boycott which would only reduce the effectiveness of one our partners in the fight against terrorism.”

Terminating dialogue with Egypt will not lead to the cessation of human rights violations. In order to sustain its counter-terror capabilities and economic security, El-Sisi will unquestionably look to other authoritarian human rights abusers, including China and Russia, as replacements for support. The United States often has to make difficult national security decisions to cooperate with states with poor human rights records. Instead of boycotting Cairo and ultimately pushing them toward unsavory new partnerships, the U.S. could take up a two-track approach to Egypt, prioritizing the advancement of security issues while simultaneously pushing for improvements in human rights.

Maya Carlin is an Analyst with the Center for Security Policy located in Washington DC. She is a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel, where she completed her MA in Counter-terrorism and Homeland Security.

ISIS, Reborn: The Islamic State’s African Revival is a Lethal Blind Spot

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Source: National Interest | Jordan Cope

With four burgeoning safe havens, ISIS has revived in Sub-Sahara and could be deadlier than ever.

ISIS–

Before 9/11, many forget that Osama Bin Laden largely made a name for himself in Sub-Saharan Africa. In Sudan, he conceived his Islamic Army Shura, laying “the groundwork for a true global terrorist network” known as Al Qaeda.

There, Bin Laden largely began to call for jihad against Western forces and gained the prowess to export terrorism against American targets, hence Al Qaeda’s attacks on U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, just two years after his expulsion.

History might just be repeating itself as the West forgets its lessons and again neglects Sub-Sahara’s intensifying terrorism.

The consequences could be grave. Just cue 2019, when a Kenyan Al Qaeda affiliate plotted to hijack a plane and execute a 9/11-style attack.

While the attack was foiled, its scare overshadows a troubled decade, in which Sub-Saharan Africa witnessed an unprecedented resurgence in Islamist groups, with Islamic State (ISIS) affiliates displacing millions while seeking to establish bases in six African countries, and at times, hosting territory the size of Belgium.

Raising further alarm, experts have described 2020 as a breakout year for ISIS affiliates, an unsurprising reality given the attacks that recently claimed fifty in Mozambique and 100 in Niger.

While history echoes, ISIS’s pivot to Africa and new festering hotspots therein could prove more dangerous than those of its Middle Eastern past.

There, ISIS has strategically established territory in cross-border zones. This tactic has allowed it to conduct attacks and disappear across borders, rendering it effectively untouchable to all affected countries—which are amongst the world’s most impoverished and unprepared to dislodge ISIS. Some hotspots also approximate natural resource basins, whose wealth, if seized, could enormously enrich the ISIS network and its capabilities.

Given the implications of inaction—an emboldened ISIS network with multiple safe havens from which it can attack the West—ISIS’s African presence commands greater attention as a top security concern.

Four hot spots warrant attention. First is West Africa, which endures multiple internal insurgencies. Most concerning is that governing Boko Haram whose presence envelopes Nigeria, Chad, Niger, and Cameroon.

Since 2009, Boko Haram has killed 36,000 and displaced 2.5 million civilians while seeking to establish a caliphate and depose Nigeria’s government. While it coordinated with Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb post-2010, in 2016, the group splintered, with one faction continuing with allegiance to the Islamic State West Africa Province, and the other remaining steadfast to Abubakar Shekau’s faction.

While Boko Haram’s territory once matched Belgium in size, the group’s division cost territory. Nevertheless, its presence in Nigeria’s Borno state looms large, and its positioning couldn’t be more conveniently located at the crossroads of four countries.

Such positioning has allowed Boko Haram to disappear into Chad. Last year it conducted perhaps the deadliest terrorist attack in the country’s history—killing ninety-two. It also infiltrated Niger, where it claimed twenty-eight lives and razed 800 homes, and Cameroon, where in one attack it killed seventeen.

With Nigeria unable to contain Boko Haram, it remains questionable whether any of the aforementioned countries can do so, especially given their military and economic inferiority. Whereas Nigeria’s military ranks 42nd out of 138 surveyed countries, those of the others rank no higher than 87th.

They also lack financial resources, ranking amongst the world’s poorest. Out of 190 surveyed geographic entities, Nigeria and Cameroon ranked 141st and 145th, while Chad and Niger ranked below 174th in GDP per capita.

Not to mention, Chad, the next best militarily after Nigeria, overcame a recession and had to rely on France to subvert a coup—all just in the last four years. Chad cannot afford this vulnerability as ISIS festers and its southern oil fields beckon, posing a potential lifeline and revenue source for ISIS if captured.

West Africa’s other great insurgency engrosses Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. There, the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara has conquered “ungoverned space” where the three “failing” states meet.

With Mali and Burkina Faso ranking no higher than 165th in terms of GDP per capita and 96th in military might, the two likely will not fare better in preempting another impending ISIS safe-haven.

ISIS’s next major hot spot situates East Africa, particularly Mozambique’s northern border with Tanzania, where ISIS affiliates have killed 2,000 and displaced 430,000 civilians since 2017.

In Mozambique, the Islamic State in the Central African Province has captured “four tourist islands,” and Mocimboa da Praia, a port in the state of Cabo Delgado, which straddles Tanzania and boasts tremendous resource wealth—natural gas and ruby reserves approximating $50 billion in value—that if seized could enrich ISIS’s network.

ISIS has also used this position to infiltrate Tanzania, hence its October invasion, where 300 fighters killed twenty before retreating to Mozambique.

Mozambique and Tanzania’s economies and militaries rank inferior to those of Nigeria’s, suggesting that the two might struggle to suppress this third prospective safe-haven.

Quickly deserving mention is the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)—a group with suspected ISIS-links—and its stronghold over the mountains straddling the DRC and Uganda, from Rwenzori to Ituri, where “[m]uch of the [DRC’s] gold is mined.”

While the Salafist organization has existed since 1995, it has become rather deadly recently, killing 800 Congolese civilians in 2020. While the DRC’s military ranks 71st, its economy ranks amongst the poorest, 185th.

If left unchecked, the ADF could become another asset in ISIS’s portfolio, granting ISIS pivotal access to another cross-border zone, to invaluable gold mines, and to a foothold in the DRC—the world’s most endowed per resource wealth.

With four burgeoning safe havens, ISIS has revived in Sub-Sahara and could be deadlier than ever. Embedding at the cross borders of failing countries, ISIS has achieved near untouchability. With no Sub-Saharan government able to contain its expansion in a resource-rich area, the West, whatever its response, must urgently react before ISIS can multiply its capabilities and international reach to an unparalleled degree. Let us not forget the lessons of Sudan.

 

Jordan Cope is a fellow for Middle East Forum’s Islamist Watch project. He is also regarded as an expert in the Middle East. Follow him on Twitter.

Image: Nigerian soldiers hold up a Boko Haram flag that they had seized in the recently retaken town of Damasak, Nigeria, March 18, 2015. Reuters/Emmanuel Braun.