Tag Archive for: Crisis in Ethiopia

Ethiopia: Contemplating Elections and the Prospects for Peaceful Reform

Source: USIP  April 29, 2021 |  Amid ongoing violence across the country, the vote may offer opportunities to support political dialogue and decrease polarization.

Ethiopia is approaching parliamentary elections on June 5. This will be the first vote since the process of reform launched in 2018 by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, and the stakes are extremely high. Elections to the next national parliament, the House of People’s Representatives, may determine future decisions about the structure of the country and consolidate the ruling party’s power. While the short-term outlook for the vote is unlikely to change, the election may offer opportunities to support political dialogue which could sustain important reforms and decrease polarization. Still, amid ongoing violence across Ethiopia, including in Tigray, voting in some areas will either not take place or will only be possible to hold under troubling security conditions, which may limit participation.

Researchers Lidet Tadesse Shiferaw and Terrence Lyons and USIP’s Aly Verjee discuss what is at stake in these elections, how ongoing violence could impact the electoral process and how the United States can help advance political reform in Ethiopia.

What is at stake in the June 2021 elections in Ethiopia?

Lidet: The election may shape both short-term political reforms and Ethiopia’s long-term trajectory. Ultimately, the election may shift the balance of power between ethno-nationalists and nationalists. Ethno-nationalists emphasize the primacy of ethnic identity as a political organizing principle. They advocate for the implementation of the self-determination of nations, nationalities and peoples in Ethiopia through self-governing, ethnically constituted regions. This is the system established by Ethiopia’s current constitution. Nationalists instead contend that citizenship, rather than ethnic or group identity, be the primary political organizing principle. They propose that ethno-linguistic demographic distribution alone is insufficient to determine how the federation is structured. Today’s political parties span the spectrum of these two political visions. The parties that secure significant shares in the next parliament and which go on to form the government will thus seek to advance their preferred vision of how Ethiopia’s state is organized.

Lyons: The elections are central to Abiy’s claims of legitimacy. The current parliament is composed of members elected in 2015 when the previous ruling party and its affiliates won 100 percent of the seats. Abiy came to office with promises of democratization and prosperity that earned him extraordinary goodwill but today Ethiopia faces its greatest crisis in decades: a brutal civil war and massive humanitarian emergency that involves neighboring Eritrea, allegations of ethnic cleansing and ghastly reports of rape in the northern Tigray region. At the same time, political violence has erupted across Ethiopia, notably in the highly populous Oromo and Amhara regions. The election will not be held in Tigray and will be held under troubling security conditions and federal military supervision in several other areas. Prospects for political reform that seemed so promising in 2018 are in question.

Verjee: In addition to the parliamentary election, residents of five zones (the zone is the administrative structure below a regional state) and one district in southern Ethiopia are due to vote in a referendum to create a new regional state. The South West Regional State is almost certain to be approved and augur another change to internal boundaries which continues the slow unravelling of Ethiopia’s most ethnically diverse region, following the similar Sidama referendum in 2019.

How do these elections compare to prior elections?

Lyons: From 1995 to 2015, polls were held every five years but, with the exception of very contentious elections in 2005 that ended in a crackdown and the arrest of leading opposition leaders, have not offered voters a meaningful choice. While elections were generally peaceful and voter turnout high, they were largely non-competitive. Government harassment led major opposition parties to boycott most votes. Instead of offering citizens a meaningful opportunity to choose their leaders, elections in Ethiopia have served to consolidate the ruling party’s power. The 2021 process differs from the past in several ways, notably with regard to the independent National Election Board (NEBE) and the involvement of several new opposition parties, but it seems likely that the upcoming vote will resemble the past with regards to the limits on participation.

Lidet: Compared to previous elections, today’s political field is formally wider now that exiled opposition parties have returned following the reforms of 2018. However, several opposition figures complain of political harassment, some prominent and controversial opposition leaders are in prison, and at least two political parties have decided to pull out of the race. Whether a decision to boycott is appropriate is debated: Critics point out that one of these parties participated in previous elections despite harassment and other process deficiencies. But their absence, as well as that of some other key political figures, diminishes the competitiveness of the election.

Another important change is social media. In previous elections, the use of social media was negligible. Traditional media, especially print, played a tremendous role in the flow of information and voter education in the 2005 electoral process. Independent media was very restricted in Ethiopia following the 2005 election. Today, social media is increasingly accessible and popular in Ethiopia and has become a preferred platform for information dissemination and consequently both political mobilization and exclusion. In a context of inadequate digital literacy and socio-political polarization, social media platforms are fraught with disinformation and misinformation, used to disseminate hate speech, and even incite violence. This challenge is not unique to Ethiopia, but it is the first time Ethiopians must reckon with the impacts of social media in an electoral process.

Does violence in several parts of Ethiopia affect the electoral process?

Verjee: NEBE has recently reported relatively low levels of voter registration, and as registration was about to conclude last week, decided to extend the registration period. Insecurity has likely contributed to the low registration uptake, and so many may be excluded from the election from the start. Organizing an election in areas with security challenges is obviously difficult for election administrators. Similarly, campaigning in such areas will be difficult, especially for smaller and less well-resourced parties. Potential voters will also understandably find it hard to focus on an election if they are worried that violence will recur in their communities. When political violence is widespread outside of the electoral process, the security of the vote may not be a foremost consideration for many ordinary people.

Lidet: Maintaining a secure electoral process throughout the country will test the capacity of the security forces. How security agencies discharge their responsibilities now, on election day, and in the post-election period, will test whether recent reforms have improved the institutional independence of the security and justice sector from the governing party, particularly if electoral disputes emerge.

For voters, risks to personal security are linked to the number of actors with the capacity for violence. In some parts of the country, the state does not have a monopoly over the means of violence. To safeguard both voters and the electoral process as a whole, the engagement of Ethiopian civil society, including its religious and traditional institutions is needed, even as Ethiopian civil society still recovers from years of suppression.

With only weeks left until the vote, sticking points persist. NEBE has not managed to establish polling stations in internally displaced person (IDP) camps hosting more than 2 million people across the country, before IDPs in Tigray are even considered. NEBE has also been forced to suspend voter registration in several areas of conflict, and not conduct any registration activities in the Tigray region. These issues risk undermining the voting rights of millions, if not effectively addressed, and could also affect the pluralism of the election in some constituencies.

Given these challenges, what can the United States do to advance political reform in Ethiopia?

Lyons: It is not surprising that the June elections are the focus of considerable external attention but by itself the vote will not determine the potential for future reforms or provide meaningful legitimacy to the incumbent. Washington should recognize that political actors and dynamics within Ethiopia will determine the outcome of this moment of crisis. There are opportunities, however, for the United States and others interested in advancing peace and reform to support longer term processes and political dialogue to develop a new road map to sustain the political opening, decrease polarization and end political violence.

Lidet: This election takes place at a time when Ethiopia confronts surmountable national and regional security and political challenges. The election is but one element of Ethiopia’s political evolution and should not be treated as an end in itself. The United States should therefore take a long-term perspective and support broad-based processes of reconciliation and inclusive and accountable local governance, which could contribute both to the wellbeing of citizens and the future stability of Ethiopia.

Verjee: There is not much time to change the likely course of the election. However, the election is a moment to push for necessary reforms, such as addressing the detention of political party leaders, limitations on the freedom of the press and the ability to freely organize and assemble. With forceful action to change some state boundaries already underway, signalling that all should adhere to Ethiopia’s existing constitutional arrangements on the management of state boundaries — as is happening in southern Ethiopia — is also important.

Lidet Tadesse is ‎a policy officer at the European Centre for Development Policy Management. Terrence Lyons is associate professor at the Carter School for Peace and Conflict Resolution, George Mason University, and author of the 2019 book, The Puzzle of Ethiopian Politics.

FP – The U.N. Must End the Horrors of Ethiopia’s Tigray War

Foreign Policy | Recent human rights investigations confirm the atrocities that journalists reported in November. A strong multilateral push can force an Eritrean withdrawal and put the region on the path to peace.

In November 2020, as war broke out in Ethiopia’s northern Tigray region, the scale of the suffering was already apparent to anyone on the Ethiopian-Sudanese border. As the Ethiopian National Defense Force and allied Amhara militias and Eritrean soldiers swept through the region in a pincer movement, Tigrayans began to flee en masse, walking for days without water to get to safety in neighboring Sudan.

Hundreds of refugees made an almost biblical sight as they traversed the Hamdayet River crossing that separates the two countries. Small boats laden with men, women, and children pushed against the current, ferrying people to safety every few minutes.

On the Sudanese side, middle-class Tigrayan women stood shaded under brightly colored umbrellas, desperately peering into every boat to look for their loved ones they had lost on the other side.

One woman’s anxiety was palpable. She had stood at the river in the beating sun with her baby strapped to her back for several days waiting for her family—and fearing the worst. “Please, help us,” she said. “Take their names and write about them.”

The refugees’ testimonies all pointed to indiscriminate artillery fire on civilian areas, massive looting, machete-wielding ethnic militiamen, and summary executions. 

At one point, dozens of refugees fresh from the desert march and fearful of disclosing their identities started to shout out names of people they’d seen killed. One of us, reporting at the border, wrote down six names before the cacophony became overwhelming.

The refugees’ testimonies all pointed to indiscriminate artillery fire on civilian areas, massive looting, machete-wielding ethnic militiamen, and summary executions.

Around 50,000 people from bordering Tigrayan towns made it into Sudan before the Ethiopian army began stationing men in federal army uniforms at intervals along the border, sealing it off.

Some refugees said they had been threatened with death if they kept going. “They threatened to cut our heads off if we kept trying to leave Tigray,” one mother of five said in late November.

Online trolls and officials in Ethiopia’s capital of Addis Ababa then launched a systematic campaign to discredit refugees’ accounts, claiming that agents of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) had infiltrated the Sudanese camps to spread disinformation about atrocities.

Over the last four months, Tigray’s continued communications blackout has made it incredibly difficult to confirm accusations of potential war crimes committed by forces on both sides. Amnesty International says Eritrean troops systematically killed hundreds of unarmed civilians in the northern city of Axum last November.

Yet information has slowly slipped out from behind the curtain. In December 2020, a news team from Belgium’s VRT News gained rare access to Tigray. They found medical centers ransacked for medication and saw patients, including a small girl, covered in debilitating infections from bullet and shrapnel wounds.

About two dozen photos—far too graphic to publish—sent to journalists by a resident of the regional capital Mekele who escaped Tigray show the bodies of children and adolescents blown to pieces by the government’s artillery barrage of the city.

The United Nations special advisor on the prevention of genocide, Alice Wairimu Nderitu, said she has received reports of extrajudicial killings, sexual violence, looting of property, mass executions, and impeded humanitarian access. Nderitu warned that without taking urgent measures, the risk of atrocity crimes “remains high and likely to get worse.”

In February, the Telegraph was sent four-minute-long video of fighters in Ethiopian federal army uniforms walking past dozens of dead men and boys. The clip is the first video evidence to emerge from Tigray, implicating the Ethiopian army in war crimes.

In the clip, which has been geolocated to a village on the outskirts of the 14th-century Debre Abbay monastery in central Tigray and verified as undoctored by the newspaper, soldiers taunt the few Tigrinya-speaking survivors in Ethiopia’s lingua franca, Amharic.

When one adolescent lying on the ground pleads with the soldiers in Tigrinya, one man shouts at him: “Keep talking, I’ll fuck your mother. Keep talking, you son of a bitch.”

With no action, the dire situation in Tigray will only get worse. Humanitarian agencies have been consistently blocked from working in the region and have issued dire statements saying that tens of thousands of people are now facing starvation. Refugees are reportedly turning up to aid centers emaciated. People are reportedly eating leaves to survive, drinking polluted water, and dying of hunger in their sleep.

“There is an extreme urgent need—I don’t know what more words in English to use—to rapidly scale up the humanitarian response, because the population is dying every day as we speak,” Mari Carmen Vinoles, head of the emergency unit for Doctors Without Borders, told the Associated Press in January.

Aid workers have been consistently obstructed from providing emergency relief, however. Even the Ethiopian Red Cross, which has relatively good access compared to other organizations, said earlier this month that it could only reach 20 percent of the people in need in Tigray.

Hard questions need to be asked: Why is the blackout still largely in place, and why are so few aid workers being allowed in? Does Addis Ababa not want people looking into allegations of massive human rights abuses by federal troops? Or is it trying to hide the true extent to which Eritrea is involved in the conflict? Or maybe the federal government simply cannot allow access because it is not in control of vast stretches of the region? The Ethiopian government declined to reply to specific questions from Foreign Policy.

The conflict has a profound impact on Ethiopian public discourse, civil society, and social cohesion. For many non-Tigrayans, it has been a justifiable—even popular—military operation. There is very little love lost for the minority Tigrayans and their past domination of political and economic life in Ethiopia.

While the TPLF’s reign coincided with stunningly high rates of economic growth, the party and its coalition partners ruled with an iron fist. It arrested opposition leaders on trumped-up charges of corruption and erected an extensive network of citizen-spies, who, in a system known as one to five,” were each responsible for keeping tabs on five other people.

Since the war erupted, triggered by a TPLF strike on the Ethiopian military’s northern command, there has been a deluge of misinformation from online accounts on both sides. In the melee, moderate voices have been squeezed from both sides. If an Ethiopian or international partner has pressed for peace and dialogue, the federal government has denounced them as Tigrayan sympathizers and enemies of the state.

When some have defended Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s response, they have been castigated as warmongers and accused of unwittingly doing Eritrea’s bidding. In this vortex of irreconcilable political differences, ethnic animosities, and regional rivalries, all sides have been accused of perpetrating atrocities.

Ethiopian journalists who dare to report details of the conflict that do not fit the government narrative have been subject to intimidation, hacking attempts, and death threats.

Reporters have been hit hard by the extraordinary outpouring of hatred. Ethiopian journalists who dare to report details of the conflict that do not fit the government narrative have been subject to intimidation, hacking attempts, and death threats.

In recent weeks, Ethiopia granted access to a select few outlets to cover Tigray. But almost immediately, translators and fixers for the Financial Times, Agence France-Presse, the New York Times, as well as the BBC’s Mekele reporter, were arrested. (They have since been released.)

Since the conflict began, several journalists have been arrested and one killed. In February, the freelance journalist Lucy Kassa’s house was raided by unknown attackers, most probably for reporting on allegations of mass rapes in Tigray.

Under the massive pressure, much of the Addis Ababa press corps has quietly moved whatever operations they can to Nairobi. “Tough times for us all … the fire and courage is not there anymore,” one journalist told us.

While Ethiopia’s federal forces are tied down in Tigray, other deep-seated problems are rearing their heads across the nation of 110 million people. Indeed, the civil war in Tigray is a symptom and only the most severe manifestation of Ethiopia’s troubles.

Abiy’s ascent and pledge to address long-standing grievances paradoxically reignited tensions between communities about identities, regional borders, and political representation. While the prior regime had locked communities into ethnically defined regions ruled by pliant leaders who only answered to federal authorities, Abiy promised to free Ethiopians from this rigid and repressive system. He permitted the Sidama zone to secede from the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples region, and stood by as communities formed militias and fought to redraw subnational borders.

His vision for a new Ethiopia, which he couldn’t deliver on fast enough, exposed him to withering critiques and turned adoring crowds into angry mobs. Abiy gradually revealed himself to be as intolerant of dissent as his predecessors, and he lashed out at his former allies-turned-rivals. Government forces surrounded the home of Oromo leader Jawar Mohammed and later arrested him.

A prominent protest singer, Hachalu Hundessa, was murdered over the summer, spurring public demonstrations. Before and since the outbreak of hostilities in Tigray, there have been pockets of violence across the country, including ethnic militias in Benishangul-Gumuz, friction on the Somali-Afar and Oromo-Somali borders, and rebel attacks in Oromia.

The country is rapidly unraveling under the stress of Abiy’s reforms and the strain of his rule. The current trajectory does not just promise more deaths and dislocations—it also imperils prospects for a free and fair election now scheduled for June 2021.

Abiy won plaudits from the Norwegian Nobel Committee and others for granting amnesty to political prisoners and legalizing outlawed parties, but he has been unwilling to extend the same olive branch to his opponents. Several parties, including the Oromo Federalist Congress from Abiy’s home region, have questioned whether they can participate in this year’s planned poll.

The conflict is as much a regional threat as it is a domestic one. The fighting in Tigray has engulfed the rest of the Horn of Africa. Abiy’s alliance with Eritrean leader Isaias Afwerki brought Eritrean troops into Tigray to bring the TPLF to heel. Isaias has harbored ill will toward the TPLF since the late 1990s when they fell out and fought a horrific border war, which was never fully resolved until Abiy’s rise to power. With Eritrea entering the fray, the TPLF fired rockets repeatedly into the neighboring country, in part to inflict some pain on Asmara and in part to rally Tigrayan support against a common enemy.

Ethiopia also has stumbled into a series of border skirmishes with another neighbor: Sudan. The two countries have long disputed their shared border in the Fashqa region, but they previously operated under a compromise of a “soft border.” Clashes first flared up late last year, and tensions have continued to escalate. On Feb. 14, the Sudanese government said Ethiopian forces crossed the border in an act of “aggression.”

U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s recent call with Abiy is a start, but so far, the international response has been tepid. While most governments have expressed alarm at developments, very few have truly stepped up to stop the unfolding tragedy. Only the European Union has suspended direct budgetary support—some $107 million—until humanitarian agencies are granted access.

While the United States and EU have urged Eritrea to withdraw its troops, the international community has failed to speak in one voice and has ignored some overarching challenges, including the threat to Ethiopia’s nascent democracy. The U.N. Security Council is finally set to discuss Ethiopia on March 11 following four months of relegating Ethiopia to “Any Other Business” rather than as a formal agenda item.

If the international community wants to prevent further atrocities and salvage Abiy’s initial vision of an inclusive Ethiopia, it should take the following steps.

First, there should be no wavering on the issue of delivering life-saving assistance. So far, the Ethiopian government has granted authorization for 84 international staff with 53 applications still pending as of late February. It has been too little too late, and it only applies to government-controlled areas.

The U.N. should insist that its humanitarian agencies be given unfettered access, including in areas controlled by the TPLF. It is indefensible that Ethiopian soldiers and the Amhara militias are blocking access, and that Eritrean and Ethiopian forces have targeted refugee camps filled with Eritreans.

The international community has to do more than sit on the sidelines regarding human rights violations and mass atrocities.

Second, the international community has to do more than sit on the sidelines regarding human rights violations and mass atrocities. Blinken in late February reiterated U.S. support for investigations into human rights violations and abuses, as well as full accountability. The U.N. should start issuing unilateral and multilateral sanctions, as well as consider additional steps to isolate Ethiopia and Eritrea if the governments are determined to be culpable.

Third, there is an urgent need to evict the Eritrean forces and deescalate the border tensions between Ethiopia and Sudan. The United States, which holds the Security Council presidency, plans to address conflict-induced starvation and hunger in Ethiopia in mid-March. It should similarly raise these pressing regional conflicts related to the Ethiopian crisis.

The African Union leadership, including the recently elected chairman, Congolese President Félix Tshisekedi, and incoming Political Affairs, Peace, and Security Commissioner Bankole Adeoye should do the same at the AU. This is also an opportunity to tap the Gulf States, which have influence with all three countries and have no interest in a regional conflagration near their doorstep.

Fourth, the prime minister should reopen a dialogue with the country’s regional administration, political parties, and disparate ethnic communities to recommit to an inclusive and tolerant Ethiopia. While the crisis in Tigray requires urgent attention, the root of the problem is considerably deeper and affects all of Ethiopia. A two-sided conversation between Abiy’s government and the TPLF is insufficient.

Fifth, it is imperative to link the aforementioned dialogue to the election process. The dispute between the federal government and Tigray intensified following the region’s decision to hold unilateral local elections. If the prime minister follows through with his plan to hold an election in June, the vote is unlikely to be credible or free and fair when there is fighting in Tigray, millions of people are displaced, and top opposition leaders are under arrest.

The international community should be wary of pressing for and funding an election without renewed support from key actors and access to the ballot box across the country.

Ethiopia’s descent into violence is a stain on the world’s conscience. The international community must not applaud Ethiopia for its promise and recoil when urgent action is required to prevent its implosion. This is Washington’s chance to show that the last four years of isolationism and callous indifference to conflicts abroad was an aberration. It will not be easy to salve what ails Ethiopia, but it will be catastrophic if global powers and regional leaders do not try.

 

Ethiopia: Eritrean Forces Massacre Tigray Civilians – HRW

HRW | UN Should Urgently Investigate Atrocities by All Parties

(Nairobi) – Eritrean armed forces massacred scores of civilians, including children as young as 13, in the historic town of Axum in Ethiopia’s Tigray region in November 2020, Human Rights Watch said today. The United Nations should urgently establish an independent inquiry into war crimes and possible crimes against humanity in the region to pave the way for accountability, and Ethiopian authorities should grant it full and immediate access.

On November 19, Ethiopian and Eritrean forces indiscriminately shelled Axum, killing and wounding civilians. For a week after taking control of the town, the forces shot civilians and pillaged and destroyed property, including healthcare facilities. After Tigray militia and Axum residents attacked Eritrean forces on November 28, Eritrean forces, in apparent retaliation, fatally shot and summarily executed several hundred residents, mostly men and boys, over a 24-hour period.

“Eritrean troops committed heinous killings in Axum with wanton disregard for civilian lives,” said Laetitia Bader, Horn of Africa director at Human Rights Watch. “Ethiopian and Eritrean officials can no longer hide behind a curtain of denial, but should allow space for justice and redress, not add to the layers of trauma that survivors already face.”

The attacks in Axum followed weeks of fighting between the Ethiopian military and allied forces from the Amhara region and Eritrean troops against forces affiliated with the region’s former ruling party, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front.

Between December 2020 and February 2021, Human Rights Watch interviewed by phone 28 witnesses and victims of abuses and their relatives in Axum and examined videos of attacks and their aftermath.

Survivors consistently identified Eritrean troops by the vehicles bearing Eritrean license plates, their distinctive uniforms, the spoken dialect of Tigrinya, and their plastic “congo” shoes, worn by Eritrean forces since the liberation struggle.

On November 19, after Tigrayan forces and militia withdrew from Axum, Ethiopian and Eritrean forces began shelling the town around 4 p.m., continuing into the evening. The next day, witnesses saw Ethiopian and Eritrean forces indiscriminately shoot at civilians, including in the town’s Saint Mary’s hospital.

For about a week, the military forces pillaged. While several residents who spoke to Human Rights Watch saw Ethiopian forces participate, most said the soldiers just stood by and watched. “It was painful,” said one man. “I thought the Ethiopian military stood for Ethiopia and its people… but they did nothing as Eritrean forces looted and killed. They just kept silent.”

The abuses generated considerable anger in the town. On November 28, after 7 a.m., a group of Tigrayan militia and town residents attacked Eritrean forces, triggering fighting. That afternoon, Eritrean reinforcements entered Axum and went on a 24-hour killing spree.

Survivors described the horror of Eritrean soldiers moving through the town, going house to house, searching for young men and boys, and executing them. A student described watching helplessly as Eritrean soldiers led six neighbors, including a 17-year-old the witness knew as “Jambo” and another young man, outside. He said: “They made them take off their belts, then their shoes. They lined them up and walked behind them. The Eritrean soldiers fired their guns. The first three then fell. They fired other shots, and the other three fell.”

Eritrean troops shot other civilians on the street. “A group of soldiers killed a man and then forced a pregnant woman and two children that were with him to kneel on the asphalt street beside his body,” said one witness.

Those retrieving bodies for burial did not escape harm. Several residents said Eritrean forces shot at them while they tried to collect the dead on November 28 and 29.

The massacre left the town’s inhabitants reeling. One man visited a relative who lost her children in the house-to-house killings: “They killed her children and locked the compound door behind them, so no one could get in at first. She was left alone with the bodies of her two dead children for a day and a half. She was numb, unresponsive by the time we saw her.”

Human Rights Watch was unable to determine the number of civilian deaths resulting from the joint Ethiopian-Eritrean offensive on Axum and the ensuing massacre. However, based on interviews with elders, community members collecting identification cards of those killed, and those assisting the retrieval of the dead, Human Rights Watch estimates that over 200 civilians were most likely killed on November 28-29 alone. Human Rights Watch also received a list of 166 names of victims allegedly killed in Axum in November, 21 of which correspond to the names of those killed on November 28 and 29 given by witnesses interviewed.

International humanitarian law, or the laws of war, applicable to the armed conflict in Ethiopia’s Tigray region, prohibits deliberate attacks on civilians and attacks that are indiscriminate or cause disproportionate civilian harm. Indiscriminate attacks strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction, including those not directed at a specific military target. The laws of war also prohibit all violence against captured combatants and civilians, including murder and torture. Pillage and looting are also prohibited. Individuals who commit serious laws-of-war violations with criminal intent, including as a matter of command responsibility, are liable for war crimes.

Crimes against humanity include murder and other unlawful acts committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack on a civilian population.

The late November attacks were documented by media organizations, as well as by Amnesty International. The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission has also begun investigations. Human Rights Watch provided its findings to Ethiopian and Eritrean government officials on February 18 but received no response. On February 26, the Ethiopian government announced it would thoroughly investigate events in Axum and expressed “readiness to collaborate with international human rights experts.”

While the lack of access to conflict areas has hindered reporting on the conflict, Human Rights Watch and others have reported on other massacres, the indiscriminate shelling of towns, widespread pillaging, including destruction of crops, and the apparent extrajudicial executions by Ethiopian and Eritrean forces, as well as forces from the neighboring Amhara region.

Given the presence of multiple armed forces and groups and the poor track record of the warring parties in investigating grave abuses, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) should conduct an urgent, independent inquiry focused on establishing the facts, collecting forensic and other criminal evidence, and investigating war crimes and possible crimes against humanity in Axum and elsewhere, Human Rights Watch said.

“Condemnations are not enough to bring justice to the victims of grave abuses committed by both Ethiopian and Eritrean forces in Tigray,” Bader said. “Attention and action by UN member states is needed now to ensure those responsible for these grave abuses are held accountable. So far, reports of these chilling abuses have been met by shameful silence.”

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9 Things To Know About The Unfolding Crisis In Ethiopia’s Tigray Region

NPR | For months, a conflict in Ethiopia between the government in Addis Ababa and a defiant region has cost thousands of lives and displaced at least a million people.

Despite the increasing brutality of the conflict in Tigray, until now, it has been largely overlooked by the outside world. But attention and concern is growing with news of alleged atrocities and a worsening refugee crisis.

We’ve put together nine things you should know about the situation in the Horn of Africa.

Where is Tigray and what is going on there?

Tigray is Ethiopia’s northernmost region. Bordering Eritrea, it is home to most of the country’s estimated 7 million ethnic Tigrayans. The ethnic group, which accounts for about 6% of Ethiopia’s population, have had an outsized influence in national affairs.

In early November, the regional government — controlled by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, a leftist political party — launched a full-scale siege of a key Ethiopian military base at Sero, using tanks, heavy guns and mortars.

Calling the TPLF assault a “treason that will never be forgotten,” Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed ordered a federal offensive against the region, setting off the conflict.

How bad is the humanitarian crisis?

Bad. But the scope of the problem is still unclear. The United Nations says the humanitarian community has been largely unable to get outside the major cities, such as the regional capital of Mekele, to see what’s happening in the countryside.

So far, the conflict has killed thousands of people, many of whom allegedly died as a result of indiscriminate shelling of cities in Tigray by Ethiopian forces. A local official told Reuters in January that more than two million people have been displaced by fighting, far exceeding previous estimates. The conflict also threatens a regional humanitarian disaster.

In January, the U.N. refugee agency said some 56,000 people had fled the fighting in Tigray, many of whom have ended up in neighboring Sudan.

Last month, The New York Times published a story citing an internal U.S. government report that described a systematic campaign of ethnic cleansing in Tigray.

Fighters supporting Addis Ababa’s side in the conflict were “deliberately and efficiently rendering Western Tigray ethnically homogeneous through the organized use of force and intimidation,” the Times quoted from the report, which also said that, “Whole villages were severely damaged or completely erased.”

What is the Tigray People’s Liberation Front?

The TPLF originally formed in the 1970s to push for Tigrayan self-determination, a goal it later moved away from. In a remarkable twist, it eventually found itself at the center of national politics. It became the dominant player in a coalition of ethnic political parties known as the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front, or EPRDF, which led Ethiopia’s government for nearly three decades.

Abiy came to power in 2018 as the head of the EPRDF. But a year later, he dissolved the party, saying he hoped to put the party’s history of ethnic divisiveness behind it. Instead, Abiy sought to fold the EPRDF’s constituents into a new political party. But the TPLF refused to go along, instead retreating to its power base in Tigray, where it enjoys widespread support.

What led up to the current conflict?

After it was sidelined at the national level, the TPLF was accused by Abiy’s government of seeking to destabilize Ethiopia by orchestrating ethnic violence across the country.

Abiy had promised to hold the country’s first truly democratic elections last summer. However, citing the COVID-19 pandemic, he postponed them.

The TPLF said that delaying the vote amounted to an unconstitutional extension of Abiy’s presidential term. The group then held its own regional elections anyway, claiming a decisive win. Abiy’s government subsequently declared the Tigray elections invalid.

The two sides called each other illegitimate in the lead-up to the TPLF attack on the Sero base. In response, the government sent the Ethiopian National Defense Forces, backed by soldiers from the Amhara region, which borders Tigray.

Who has the upper hand in the fighting?

After fighting commenced in November, the Ethiopian National Defense Forces quickly captured many of Tigray’s main cities, including the regional capital, Mekele, with approximately a half-million people. Abiy declared the main phase of the conflict over; however, the TPLF still controls large swaths of Tigray. Ethiopia has said it is waging a “final offensive” against the group.

What role has Eritrea played?

Eritrea, which was once part of Ethiopia, fought and won a brutal, decades-long war of independence that ended in 1991. The two countries went to war again in 1998 in a territorial conflict that ended inconclusively in 2000, claiming an estimated 100,000 lives.

However, shortly after taking office, Abiy reached out to Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki, and the two forged a historic peace accord aimed at putting the countries’ mutual enmity in the past. Abiy won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2019 for his efforts to resolve the long-standing conflict.

Abiy appears to have won a staunch ally in Isaias. Eritrean forces are reportedly engaged in the Tigray fight, backing Ethiopia. The Associated Press reported that Eritrean soldiers were involved in a massacre of civilians in the town of Axum in the early days of the conflict. Amnesty International has also blamed Eritrea for the mass killing at Axum. Eritrean forces also reportedly carried out a similar attack on civilians at a church in the Tigrayan town of Dengelat.

Both governments have denied that Eritrean troops are even in Ethiopia. In an interview with state media last month, Isaias didn’t comment on the presence of Eritrean forces in Tigray, but he appeared to hint at it. He expressed concern over the Tigray situation and said Eritrea was “trying our level best” to help Ethiopia “in accordance to our obligation,” the BBC reported.

Abiy, speaking to parliament in November, called the Eritrean people “our brothers,” and friends “who stood by our side on a tough day.”

What does the U.N. say?

The U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Michelle Bachelet, has asked Ethiopia for access to Tigray to investigate possible war crimes there, after reports of extrajudicial killings and sexual violence.

Bachelet says her office has verified some atrocities in Tigray, including ones committed by Eritrean forces, as well as the “indiscriminate shelling in Mekele, Humera and Adigrat towns in Tigray region.”

What has the U.S. said?

The Biden administration describes the situation in Tigray as “a deepening humanitarian crisis.”

Secretary of State Antony Blinken, citing “credible reports” of human rights abuses, has pressed Addis Ababa to end the conflict, State Department spokesperson Ned Price said.

“The secretary urged the Ethiopian government to take immediate, concrete steps to protect civilians, including refugees, and to prevent further violence,” he said in a statement.

The Biden administration has repeatedly called for the immediate withdrawal of Eritrean soldiers and Amhara regional forces. It has also asked for the African Union to help resolve the crisis.

Echoing comments made by Blinken, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, the U.S. ambassador to the U.N., said “The onus to prevent further atrocities and human suffering falls squarely on the Ethiopian government shoulders.”

“We urge the Ethiopian government to support an immediate end to the fighting in Tigray,” she said. “To that end, the prompt withdrawal of Eritrean forces and Amhara regional forces from Tigray are essential steps, and we urge the broader region to work fast and together toward a peaceful solution.”

What is at stake in the conflict?

With the apparent involvement of Eritrea, and a flood of refugees into Sudan, the situation threatens to become both a wider conflict and a deepening humanitarian crisis in a part of the world that has seen more than its share of human misery in recent decades.

For Abiy, the Nobel laureate, and Eritrea’s Isaias, their reputations as peacemakers have taken a severe hit. Allegations of atrocities and possible war crimes could effectively end whatever international good will they enjoyed.

Meanwhile, for President Biden, the conflict could prove a difficult balancing act.

On the one hand, the Biden administration has shown an eagerness to reassert the U.S.’s role as an international champion of human rights, after such considerations took a back seat under former President Donald Trump.

But by shunning Addis Ababa, the administration would risk decades of close U.S.-Ethiopia ties and cooperation in fighting regional terrorism. Since the end of its conflicts with Eritrea, Ethiopia has played a stabilizing role in the Horn of Africa region — most notably making up the backbone of the African Union Mission in Somalia, where peacekeeping forces have sought to tamp down a resurgence of the Islamist insurgent group al-Shabab.

Egypt’s Sisi ups pressure for Ethiopia dam deal on Sudan visit

MEMO | Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi called on Saturday for a binding deal by the summer on the operation of a giant Ethiopian hydropower dam, as he made his first visit to neighbouring Sudan since the 2019 overthrow of Omar Al-Bashir, Reuters reports.

Egypt also signalled support for Sudan in a dispute with Ethiopia over an area on the border between the two countries where there have recently been armed skirmishes.

Both Egypt and Sudan lie downstream from the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), which Addis Ababa says is crucial to its economic development.

Ethiopia, which says it has every right to use Nile waters long exploited by Egypt, started filling the reservoir behind the dam last summer after Egypt and Sudan failed to secure a legally binding agreement on how the dam will be operated.

Khartoum fears the dam, which lies on the Blue Nile close to the border with Sudan, could increase the risk of flooding and affect the safe operation of its own Nile dams, while water-scarce Egypt fears its supplies from the Nile could be hit.

Years of diplomatic talks over the project have repeatedly stalled. Egypt and Sudan’s positions have drawn closer as Cairo has engaged in a flurry of diplomacy over the issue in the past two years.

This week Egypt’s chief of staff signed a military cooperation agreement with his Sudanese counterpart during a visit to Sudan.

“We affirmed the necessity of returning to serious and effective negotiations with the aim of reaching, as soon as possible and before the next flood season, a just, balanced and legally binding agreement,” Sisi said after meeting Sudan’s leaders.

Sudan recently proposed that the United States, European Union, United Nations and African Union should actively mediate in the dispute, rather than simply observing talks, a suggestion that Egypt supports.

Ethiopia this week indicated its opposition to adding mediators to an existing African Union-led process.

Sisi’s call came a day after Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry appealed to U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres for a return to “serious” negotiations over the dam, according to Egypt’s foreign ministry.

Meeting with the head of Sudan’s ruling council, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, Sisi also discussed “recent Sudanese moves to extend state sovereignty on its eastern borders with Ethiopia, which come within the context of Sudan’s respect for international agreements”, a statement from Egypt’s presidency said.

Sudan and Ethiopia have blamed each other over unrest in the border area of Al-Fashqa, long settled by Ethiopian farmers. Ethiopia has rejected Sudan’s claims to be asserting its rights to control the area under a border agreement from 1903.

Since Bashir was toppled following mass protests, a military-civilian council has held power in Sudan under a political transition expected to last until the end of 2023.

Ethiopia: Persistent, credible reports of grave violations in Tigray underscore urgent need for human rights access – Bachelet 

OHCHR | GENEVA (4 March 2021) – UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet on Thursday stressed the urgent need for an objective, independent assessment of the facts on the ground in the Tigray region of Ethiopia, given the persistent reports of serious human rights violations and abuses she continues to receive.

“Deeply distressing reports of sexual and gender-based violence, extrajudicial killings, widespread destruction and looting of public and private property by all parties continue to be shared with us, as well as reports of continued fighting in central Tigray in particular,” Bachelet said. “Credible information also continues to emerge about serious violations of international human rights law and humanitarian law by all parties to the conflict in Tigray in November last year.”

“Without prompt, impartial and transparent investigations and holding those responsible accountable, I fear violations will continue to be committed with impunity, and the situation will remain volatile for a long time to come.”

The UN Human Rights Office has been receiving information about ongoing fighting across the region, particularly in the centre of Tigray region, as well as incidents of looting by various armed actors. Reliable sources have shared information about the killing of eight protestors by security forces between 9 and 10 February in Adigrat, Mekelle, Shire and Wukro. More than 136 cases of rape have also been reported in hospitals in Mekelle, Ayder, Adigrat and Wukro in the east of Tigray region between December and January, with indications that there are many more such unreported cases. The Government has said investigations are under way into the cases of sexual violence.

The Office has also managed to corroborate information about some of the incidents that occurred in November last year, indicating indiscriminate shelling in Mekelle, Humera and Adigrat towns in Tigray region, and reports of grave human rights violations and abuses including mass killings in Axum, and in Dengelat in central Tigray by Eritrean armed forces.

A preliminary analysis of the information received indicates that serious violations of international law, possibly amounting to war crimes and crimes against humanity, may have been committed by multiple actors in the conflict, including: the Ethiopian National Defence Forces, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, Eritrean armed forces, and Amhara Regional Forces and affiliated militia.

“With multiple actors in the conflict, blanket denials and finger-pointing, there is a clear need for an objective, independent assessment of these reports – victims and survivors of these violations must not be denied their rights to the truth and to justice. We urge the Government of Ethiopia to grant my Office and other independent monitors access to the Tigray region, with a view to establishing the facts and contributing to accountability, regardless of the affiliation of perpetrators,” Bachelet said.

Bachelet also expressed concern at detentions this week in Tigray of journalists and translators working for local and international media. While the journalists have now been released, there have been worrying remarks by a Government official that those responsible for “misleading international media” would be held responsible.

“Victims and witnesses of human rights violations and abuses must not be hindered from sharing their testimony for fear of reprisals,” the High Commissioner said.

Bachelet welcomed recent statements by the Government on accountability and measures taken on access for humanitarian actors. She urged the authorities to ensure that those commitments are translated into reality, and stressed that the UN Human Rights Office stands ready to support efforts at advancing human rights, including efforts by the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission aimed at ensuring accountability.

For more information and media requests, please contact:
Rupert Colville + 41 22 917 9767 / rcolville@ohchr.org or
Ravina Shamdasani – + 41 22 917 9169 / rshamdasani@ohchr.orgor
Liz Throssell + 41 22 917 9296 / ethrossell@ohchr.org or
Marta Hurtado – + 41 22 917 9466 / mhurtado@ohchr.org

World Bank concerns about ‘unrest in Ethiopia’

Anadolu Agency | It would engage with relevant officials ‘to safeguard the rights and interests of all Ethiopians,’ says World Bank Group-

The World Bank Group (WBG) on Friday expressed “great concern” about unrest in Ethiopia, saying the situation would undermine economic and social development outcomes achieved in the African nation in recent years.

“Ethiopia is currently facing challenging times and the World Bank Group is keenly following the latest developments in the country. The unrest in Ethiopia is unfortunate and of great concern,” it said in a statement. “The World Bank does not have the mandate to get involved in the internal governance issues of its member states. However, human rights principles are prominently embedded in our Environmental and Social Framework through explicit requirements for nondiscrimination, meaningful consultation, effective public participation, property rights, accountability, transparency and good governance.”

It said as a member of the Development Assistance Group, it would keep engaging in dialogue with relevant Ethiopian authorities “to safeguard the rights and interests of all Ethiopians.”

The Tigray region has been the scene of fighting since November when Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed announced military operations against the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), who he accused of attacking federal army camps.

Government troops took control of the regional capital, Mekele, in late November, but the TPLF vowed to fight, and clashes have persisted in the Horn of Africa country, hampering efforts to deliver humanitarian aid.

UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet said on Thursday that her office received information about ongoing fighting across the region, particularly in the center of Tigray region, as well as incidents of looting by “various armed actors.”

Bachelet’s office said it has information about the killing of eight protestors by security forces on Feb. 9-10 in Adigrat, Mekelle, Shire and Wukro.

More than 136 cases of rape have also been reported in hospitals in Mekelle, Ayder, Adigrat and Wukro in the eastern Tigray region between December and January, said the office.

Washington’s United Nations Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield, said on Thursday that the US has deployed a disaster assistance response team to Ethiopia to bolster the humanitarian response, “and our hope is that others will join us in this urgent, necessary life-saving effort.”

Brookings – Investigations into The Deteriorating Situation in Ethiopia Continue

Brookings | On Thursday, March 4, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet called for an independent assessment amid reports of a quickly deteriorating situation for human rights in the conflict in the Tigray region of Ethiopia this year. Justifying the probe, Bachelet said, “Deeply distressing reports of sexual and gender-based violence, extrajudicial killings, widespread destruction and looting of public and private property by all parties continue to be shared with us, as well as reports of continued fighting in central Tigray in particular. … Credible information also continues to emerge about serious violations of international human rights law and humanitarian law by all parties to the conflict in Tigray in November last year.”

On March 3, the government of Ethiopia announced an investigation into an alleged massacre of several hundred people in the city of Axum last November, reversing a firm denial issued just a few days before. The presence of Eritrean troops in Tigray is disputed by the Ethiopian government, though even government-appointed interim Tigray leaders confirmed their presence back in January.

In February, the Eritrean government had rejected a story about the incidents in Tigray reported by the Associated Press as “outrageous lies.” In late February, Amnesty International firmly disputed that account, stating, “The evidence is compelling and points to a chilling conclusion. Ethiopian and Eritrean troops carried out multiple war crimes in their offensive to take control of Axum. Above and beyond that, Eritrean troops went on a rampage and systematically killed hundreds of civilians in cold blood, which appears to constitute crimes against humanity.” Around the same time, the independent Ethiopian Human Rights Commission stated that its preliminary investigations had similarly confirmed lootings and sexual violence in the region.

New U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s call this week for Ethiopian troops to withdraw from Tigray was rejected by the Ethiopian government. The situation has increasingly drawn attention from the new Biden administration: In February, Blinken called on the African Union to investigate the allegations. Around the same time, The New York Times reported that an internal U.S. government report says that the Ethiopian government has engaged in “a systematic campaign of ethnic cleansing” in Tigray.

For more on the complex crisis unfolding in Ethiopia, see the November 2020 event, “Crisis in Ethiopia and its regional repercussions,” as well as Zach Vertin’s Brookings blog, “Averting civil war in Ethiopia: It’s time to propose elements of a negotiated settlement.”

Can the Somali region speak?

Ethiopia Insight | Tobias Hagmann | Ethiopian Somalis must reject politically motivated, shallow historical narratives and produce a new story that accurately captures their lived experiences.

The author dedicates this article to the memory of Ahmed Ali Gedi ‘Borte.’

Many years ago I conducted an interview with a leader of the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). At the time, Ethiopia’s Somali regional state was often referred to as ‘region 5’ or kilil amist.

When I asked the ONLF leader about ‘region 5’, he became irritated and said: “My home is not a number!” I thought he was just being nationalistic as ONLF members often refer to the Somali inhabited parts of Ethiopia as ‘Ogadenia’ rather than the Somali regional state, its official name. Much later, I realised that he was right. Who wants his or her home to be a number? Who wants to live in a place whose name has been externally imposed?

Admittedly, geographical names are never neutral. Most Africans had their names and identities imposed on them by European colonialists. But what if a society or a community never gets to choose its name? This has been and continues to be the case for Somalis living in today’s Somali regional state of Ethiopia.

In the case of Ethiopia’s Somali population, this conundrum goes far beyond geographical or territorial designations. Rather, it reflects a crisis both of representation and self-representation. In spite of ethnic federalism and a constitutionally guaranteed right to political self-determination, Somalis in Ethiopia never had the chance to decide on their political fate. Equally important, they rarely had the opportunity to write or narrate their own lives, history, and experience.

This enduring crisis of self-representation is maybe best formulated as a question, namely: Can the Somali region speak? Here, I am referring to the famous essay by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak with the provocative title ‘Can the subaltern speak?’ published in 1983. Her text is a classic contribution to post-colonial theory, which criticizes the continued dominance of Western knowledge in the representation of non-Westerners.

What does Spivak mean when she asks: ‘Can the subaltern speak?’ By subaltern she refers to social groups – peasants, lower-caste individuals, women, and so on – who have continuously been subordinated. Their history and collective experience have mostly been represented by others – by colonizers, by national elites, by intellectuals.

They are often ‘spoken about’ but are rarely allowed to ‘speak for themselves.’ Their agency and subjectivity are denied because others constantly speak for and about them.

When I ask ‘Can the Somali region speak?’ what I mean is: can the people who live in this part of Ethiopia speak for themselves? Can they represent themselves? Can they define and shape their own narrative? So the question really is: has the Somali region ever spoken for itself? Or, has it mostly been others who have spoken for the Somali region and its inhabitants?

In their modern history, Somalis living in Ethiopia’s southeastern lowlands never had the opportunity to speak for themselves. Instead, it has been outsiders who have named, claimed, and defined the Somali region’s inhabitants. The outsiders speak about Somalis in such a way that goes in line with their political geopolitical interests.

Opposing historiographies

Why is it that Somalis in Ethiopia have struggled to speak for and represent themselves? One reason is that the Somali region has been the object of two opposing national historiographies since the late 19th century.

By historiography I mean both popular stories and academic writings that are told and written about a particular community, society, or nation. In its broadest sense, historiography includes the official history that is taught in schools, but also stories that are passed on from one generation to the next. In essence, I mean the historical interpretations that most members of a given society agree upon, often uncritically.

On the one hand, we have Somali historiography and the Somali studies tradition. Their accounts describe the Somali region – often referred to as Ogaden – as Somali territory colonised by Ethiopian highlanders, but also by British and Italian powers. In this narrative, the ‘Somali region’ is a territory that, in reality, is part of Somalia and the Somali people.

The region is memorised as a place of suffering and repression by successive Ethiopian regimes, from Haile Selassie to the TPLF and the former regional president Abdi Mohamed Omar ‘Iley’. The Somali region is seen as a place of displacement and the home of rich natural resources – from frankincense to oil and gas – which foreigners want to loot. From the viewpoint of Somali historiography, the Somali region of Ethiopia is a space of repeat victimisation.

On the other hand, we have Ethiopian historiography and Ethiopian studies, which for a long time promoted what historians call ‘the great tradition.’ The ‘great tradition’ offers an almost transcendental tale of the Ethiopian monarchy and nation-state, emphasising the country’s past and future glories. Writings by Ethiopian historians, soldiers, and administrators reveal a completely different view of the Ogaden and of today’s Somali region.

Their stories portray the region as a place of hardship for habeshas. They describe Somalis as rebellious people who are “always fighting” and on whose loyalty the Ethiopian state cannot count on.

They saw and often still see the Somali region as a land of nomads who need to be civilised and modernised by the Ethiopian state bureaucracy through sedentarization, development, planning, and administration.

In this narrative, the Somali parts of Ethiopia have to be defended to safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity – in particular against neighbouring Somalia. But its inhabitants can never be fully trusted.

Which one of these two opposing historiographies of Ethiopia’s Somali region should we listen to? Which one is more accurate? Which one captures the past and present of this part of the world better?

Many readers familiar with the region will have their opinions on this. I want to argue that both historiographies make some important points, but both are also seriously deficient, reductionist, and ideological. Neither one of them does justice to the real history of the people of the Somali region.

Both historical traditions treat the Somali region as a periphery, which is of interest only as long as it is relevant to the political centre. The Somali region has been and still is a double periphery – peripheral to both Ethiopia and Somalia. At the end of the day, both historiographies are the by-product of either the Somali or the Ethiopian nationalist project. Too often, they are not based on local people’s lived experiences or family histories. Rather, they tell the story of the Ogaden, now the Somali region, from the vantage point of male leaders with a particular political agenda.

Both historiographies of the Somali region silence the lives and struggles of normal people such as rural folk, women, minorities, and generally less powerful groups. As a result, both have prevented the emergence of a historiography of the Somali region that is thought, written, and told not from the viewpoint of Mogadishu or Addis Ababa, but from the viewpoint of Gode, Jigjiga, Degehabur and Shilabo, Afdheer and Qabridehar, Gora Babagsa, Kelafo, Wardheer, Fiq, Shinile, and so on.

Silencing the ‘Somali region’

Some might argue that history is always contested. Or that what matters most are not historical facts, but how history is used in present-day politics. In other words, what really matters is who can make his or her history count and whose history is being discounted or swept under the rug. My argument here is that both Somali studies and Ethiopian historiography have swept a large part of the lived experiences of Somalis in Ethiopia under the rug.

Like the rest of Ethiopia, the region underwent one regime change after the other – from Haile Selassie to the Derg and then the recent Abdi ‘Iley’ dictatorship under the EPRDF. All regimes created and popularized new political narratives based on a selective and clearly instrumentalist interpretation of the region’s past. These narratives further complicated the writing and telling of local histories that did not comply with these state-sanctioned historiographies. The absence of independent research and academic institution further compounded this problem.

Some examples may highlight how important aspects of the Somali region’s political history have been silenced and overlooked by these two historiographies.

First, both have offered stereotypical accounts of the position of Ethiopian-Somali elites vis-a-vis the Ethiopian state. Rather than simply being for or against the central government, Ethiopian-Somali elites have gone through repeat cycles of compromise, partial acceptance, growing distrust, and full rejection of the Ethiopian state. A good illustration of this is the armed struggle against the Imperial government, which started in 1963 and was led by Makthal Dahir.

The Ogaden leader and his colleagues were former district commissioners working for the Haile Selassie administration before they took up arms. The Somali government of Aden Abdullah Osman supported the rebels initially until it agreed to a truce with Haile Selassie, leaving the insurgents in a limbo. The ONLF underwent a similar pattern of cooperation with the new Ethiopian government in the early 1990s followed by armed opposition between 1994 and 2018 and, today, a reintegration into the political system as a registered regional political party.

Both Somali and Ethiopian historiography have failed to account for this uncomfortable in-betweenness that has been the hallmark of Ethiopian-Somali political elites. When insurgents of the Western Somali Liberation Front started to mobilize against the Derg, the Somali government of Siad Barre again intervened to assist them. But, its agenda did not always align with the priorities of the WSLF.

An eyewitness of the time whom I interviewed in 2012 about the 1977/1978 Ethiopian-Somali or Ogaden war told me: “When the liberation movement reached Degehabur, the Somali army planted the Somali flag. The WSLF lost its temper and told them: ‘Stop planting your flag there and don’t start collecting taxes!’”

Many in the WSLF were eventually frustrated by the Somali government. The latter had helped them, but also internationalised and instrumentalised their rebellion. Somali state media like Radio Mogadishu and Radio Hargeisa covered the Ogaden war with vivid interest. But locals from the region were rarely on the airwaves. Instead, Somali military generals spoke on their behalf. This demonstrates how, historically, both the Ethiopian and the Somali governments have sought to appropriate and speak on behalf of the Ogaden (today, the Somali region).

Internal conflicts and contradictions

A second shortcoming of the Somali and Ethiopian historiographies of Somalis in Ethiopia is their unwillingness to consider internal differences and tensions.

The Somali region does not have a single historical and socio-political narrative. Rather, there are multiple – at times competing –  narratives, which reflect divergent historical trajectories and experiences of its people. The region’s population is not just ‘Somali’. It consists of various social groups: from urbanites to agro-pastoralists, from livestock producers to traders, and from ancient inhabitants to newcomers.

Many of its inhabitants have multiple loyalties, family ties, and allegiances. Communities are thus not homogenous. The northern parts of Somali region, in particular Shinille and the Jigjiga lowlands, have a different political history to the Ogaden heartland. The southern and western parts of the region also have distinct historical features.

Ethno-national discourse always seeks to suppress internal contradictions. The longstanding conflict between the ONLF and the Ethiopian government was often portrayed as the latest edition of an age-old confrontation between Somalis and Ethiopians. This was true at the initial stages of the war when ethnic Somalis predominantly fought against non-Somali troops of the Ethiopian National Defense Forces.

However, for a decade – roughly between 2008 and 2018 – the conflict was between Somali special police members sponsored by the government and ethnic Somali that supported ONLF.

This conflict was in many ways a civil war among members of the Ogaden clan family, pitting supporters of the regional president and strongman Abdi ‘Iley’ against his enemies. These internal conflicts and tensions among the Ogaden, but also between many other clan lineages in the region, are an uncomfortable topic for Somali historiography. They are regularly glossed over given the perceived political imperative to present a unified front vis-à-vis the Ethiopian state and its representatives.

If Ethiopian historiography casually overlooks the repressive legacies of the Ethiopian state in its Somali periphery, Somali historiography ignores the ambiguous agendas of Ethiopian-Somali leaders past and present.

These examples demonstrate that there is a good chunk of Somali region history that contradicts, or at least complicates, both Somali and Ethiopian historiography. Admittedly, political instability, repression, and remoteness have for a long time made independent research very cumbersome. This has rendered the emergence of a more nuanced and more empirically founded historiography very difficult. Basic ethnographic and historical accounts of the Somali region have yet to be written. To this day, the rural histories of the region – the histories of pastoralists, in particular – remain undocumented and unwritten.

Letting the Somali region speak

It is tempting to think that Somalis in Ethiopia have simply been unlucky with regard to their geography, that their home will always be the double-periphery of Somalia and Ethiopia, or that the region will always be stuck in its unfortunate colonial history.

Others will argue that Ethiopian-Somalis’ difficulties in speaking for themselves are largely the product of an oral society with low levels of formal education. Some will point out that much of my critique and analysis is not specific to Somalis in Ethiopia, but that it applies in equal measure to many of Ethiopia’s historically marginalized groups, reflecting imperial legacies of the Ethiopian nation-state that remain unresolved today.

These reservations confirm that the history of Somali region and its people has not been told yet. They call for a paradigm shift in documenting and narrating the experiences of Somalis in Ethiopia. Their histories need to be told again, told anew, told on the basis of solid empirical data, and told from a different vantage point. The Somali region is not a periphery, it is a centre. It is at the heart of the Horn of Africa, connecting highlands and lowlands, sea ports and inland cities, Islam and Christianity, and various ethnic groups.

A new history of the Somali region of Ethiopia needs to be written from this vantage point of centrality. It needs to make the voices of its men, women, children, and elderly heard. It will have to tell the story not of one people, but the stories of many people – of camel herders, female traders, khat sellers, school girls, farmers, administrators, returnees, rebels, investors, daily laborers, poets, and many others. It will have to tell stories of the powerful and the powerless, of joy and grief, of hope and despair. It will have to break free from the tropes of the existing politicised narratives.

Importantly, this new historiography of the Somali region will have to be written by intellectuals from the region and its neighbouring territories. Rewriting the histories of Somalis in Ethiopia is not a purely academic exercise. It can help pave the way for a new political imagination that is liberating. A political imagination that allows Somalis in Ethiopia to finally speak up, to make themselves heard, and to be heard.