From Oslo to The Hague – The journey of Abiy Ahmed Ali

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Solomon Negash

Abiy Ahmed refused dialogue, opted for war, and resisted diplomatic pressure. Make no mistake. This has been his consistent position from day one. He resolved no tension peacefully with any of his major adversaries at home, including Jawar Mohammed, Eskinder Nega, Lidetu Ayalew, Yilkal Getnet, and many more who are languishing in jail on trumped-up charges. Not even with his long-time comrade Lemma Megersa. He has never tried once to resolve his internal political difference peacefully. This says it all, Abiy Ahmed has never been a man of peace. It is not in his nature. Because, as he repeatedly proclaimed publicly and stated in his book, he dreamed of being in power for the next 10 years. Absolute power corrupts absolutely, right?

I was among the hundreds of thousands of Ethiopians who have celebrated the day he was selected as a winner of Nobel Peace Prize in 2019, even if, I believe, he did not do anything notable to deserve such a prize. But we saw it as an opportunity to encourage him to make peace at home, be committed to successful political transition, and to get the attention and support from the international community to help Ethiopia overcome the eminent danger of collapse it was and still is facing. But sadly, he used that opportunity to consolidate his political power at the expense of peace and stability of the country.

I asserted, he didn’t do anything notable to deserve such a prize. It may sound an outrageous assertion but let me clarify.

The “no peace, no war” condition that lasted for two decades was basically a reflection of the deeper conflict that existed for decades between the two dominant political parties: TPLF in Tigray and PDFJ in Eritrea. While in power, TPLF made calls for peace on several occasions, but Eritrea’s PDFJ was not willing to answer to such calls. PDFJ sees TPLF as an eternal enemy who ruined the dream of EPLF (former PDFJ) and young Issaias to become a leading power in the region. For example, the former Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn, made several calls, but President Issaias Afewerki showed no interest. He refused to negotiate with a “puppet” (his word). When Abiy came to power and signaled his interest to make peace with Eritrea (which was decided by EPRDF centrally as part of their reform agenda before Abiy Ahmed came to power), President Issaias did not show any interest and never answered for several weeks. He was not interested until he noticed Abiy entering a new chapter in his power dynamics determined to get rid of TPLF leaders from Menelik palace. Afewerki reconsidered and answered for the call when he witnessed key leaders of TPLF left Addis Ababa for Mekelle. In a way, he was the main player for the two nations to coming to the so-called “peace”, which was later praised by many.

For those who knew the history between these two rivals, there was no genuine peace to celebrate. There was and still is a tactical alliance between two groups who have a common enemy, called TPLF. As Kjetil Tronvoll, a leading expert on Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa, once accurately described it, “the ultimate goal of Isaias Afewerki is to crush TPLF and to inflict revenge upon Tigray”, i.e. not peace. Thus, what seems progress in peace was actually and paradoxically an extended conflict which draws in several new actors into play. The two actors that were in conflict are still in conflict, but this time joined and backed by several other actors (such as, Prosperity Party and the ethnic based militias from the Amhara region) which sided with PDFJ of Eritrea.

It is the alliance of these groups that declared war today not only against TPLF, but also against the people of Tigray. What started by marginalizing and discriminating ethnic Tigrians, for example, banning from national sports, cutting budgets, preventing humanitarian aid from entering Tigray, and refusing to send medical appliances related to COVID19, is now upscaled to a full-fledged war that involves aerial bombardment including in densely populated towns. (And yes, Abiy Ahmed declared and warned about this live on national television.) As such, Abiy Ahmed, the Nobel Peace Laurate, begins to commence on a new road, from Nobel Peace Center in Oslo to ICC in The Hague, in just one year.

ከአርቲስት ሀጫሉ ግድያ በስተጀርባ ….

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… በሆነው ነገር ከማዘን በላይ ተበሳጭቼ፣ ምንም ላለማለት ወስኜ ነበር። ነገር ግን ዝምታዬም ያስወቅሰኝ ጀምሯል። ታድያ … የሚሰማኝን ልጻፍና …

በቅድሚያ አንድ ነገር ልበል። በዚህ እድሜው በሰው እጅ ቀርቶ በበሽታም መሞት የማይገባው ወጣት ነበር አርቲስት ሀጫሉ። በፖለቲካ አመለካከቱ ባንግባባም፣ የሚያወራው ባይጥመኝም፣ ምናምን የሚል ቅራቅንቦ አልደርትም። ምንም ይሁን ምን ግድያውን ፍጹም አወግዛለሁ!! ገዳዮቹና አስገዳዮቹ (ህግ አስከባሪ የለም እንጂ) ለህግ ቀርበው የእጃቸውን ማግኘት እንዳለባቸውም አምናለሁ። በዚህ አጋጣሚ በአርቲስት ሀጫሉ ሞት፣ በሀዘን ልባቸው ለተሰበረ በሙሉ (አስመሳዮች የአዞ እንባ የሚያነቡትን ሳይጨምር) መጽናናትን ከልብ እመኛለሁ። እንዲህውም ከግድያው ብኋላ በተፈጠረ ቀውስ ህይወታቸውን ላጡ ወገኖች ሀዘኔ ጥልቅ ነው። ለቤተሰቦቻቸውና ወዳጅ ዘመዶቻቸው መጽናናትን እመኛለሁ።

እንግዲህ ከሀጫሉ ግድያ በስተጀርባ ማን ሊሆን እንደሚችል ብዙ መላምቶችን ከተለያዩ አቅጣጫዎች እየሰማን ነው። ሞቱን ተከትሎም ሁሉም በየአቅጣጫው ለፖለቲካ ፍጆታው እየተጠቀመበት ነው። ለፖለቲካ ፍጆታ እንደሚውልና አመጽ እንደሚያቀጣጥል የሚጠበቅ ነበር። ለጊዜው መንግስት ነኝ የሚለው የአብይ ቡድን፣ ገዳዮቹ እነማን እንሆኑ እያጣራን ነው ባለበት ቅጽበት፣ ህወሓት ነው፣ ግብጽ ነው፣ የግብጽ ተላላኪዎች ናቸው፣ የሚሉ የተለያዩ ግራ የገባቸው ውንጀላዎችን ሰንዝሯል። ህግ ይዞታል ከተባለ፣ ተጣርቶ ሳያልቅ እንዲህ አይነት ውንጀላ፣ መነሻውና ጥቅሙ ምንድን ነው? የዛሬ ሁለት አመት፣ የምርመራ ውጤቱ ከመታወቁ በፊት ህወሓት ነው ከዚህ በስተጀርባ ያለው ብሎ የከሰሰው መሪ፣ ውጤቱ ሲታወቅ እስከዚች ደቂቃ ድረስ ይፋ እንዳላደረገ ይታወቃል። የዛሬ አመት ለተፈጠረው ግድያ በተመሳሳይ መልኩ ከምርመራው በፊት ጣቱን ሌሎች ላይ ቢቀስርም፣ የሆነው ግን ሌላ ሆኖ የተገኘው። ውጤቱም እስከአሁኗ ደቂቃ ድረስ ለህዝብ አልተነገረም። በመካከላቸው ለተፈጠረው አለመግባባት ተጨማሪ ቤንዚን ሆነ አገለገለ ይበልጥ መካረር ውስጥ ከተታቸው እንጂ የፈየደው ነገር አልነበረም። ዛሬም ምርመራ ከመካሔዱ በፊት ውንጀላው አንድ ቡድን ላይ (ህወሓት ላይ) አድርጎ እያደነ የሚያስረው ደግሞ ሌላ ቡድንን (የእነ ጀዋር) ነው። ህወሓት/ግብጽ ከሆነ ሀጫሉን የገደለው ኦሮሚያ ላይ የብልጽግና ውጋት የሆኑ የፖለቲካ ድርጅቶችን የሚመሩ የፖለቲካ መሪዎችና ጋዜጠኞች ለምን እየታድኑ ታሰሩ?

ተጣርቶ እስኪታወቅ ድረስ መላምት መደረት የሚቻል ከሆነ፣ ከአጫሉ ግድያ በስተጀርባ ህወሓት፣ የኦሮሞ ብሔርተኞቹ፣ የግብጽ ተላላኪዎች ሊኖሩ ከቻሉ፣ አብይ ራሱ ሊኖር የማይችልበት ምክንያት ምንድን ነው? እስኪ በዝርዝር እንመልከተው። በአባይ ግድብ ዙሪያ በተደጋጋሚ እንዳየነው እርሱ የተካፈለበት ድርድር፣ የአገርን ሉአላዊነት አሳልፎ የሚሰጥ ነበር። በመጀመሪያ አሜሪካና የዓለም ባንክ አደራዳሪ እንዲሆኑ የተስማማው አብይ ነው። ሲቀጥል በሁለት ሳምንት ውስጥ ስምምነት ላይ መደረስ አለበት፣ ስምምነት ላይ ከመድረሳችን በፊት ግድቡን መሙላት አንጀምር ብሎ ግብጽን ያስፈነጠዘ ስምምነት የፈጸመው አብይ ነው። አጫሉ በተገደለበት እለት ደግሞ፣ ግድቡን የመሙላት ሂደት የመብት ጉዳይ ሳይሆን፣ የጦርነት ጉዳይ ይመስል፣ የጸጥታው ምክር ቤት አጀንዳ እንዲሆን ያደረገው አብይ ነው። እዛ ደግሞ ምን አይነት ስምምነት አድርጎ እንደመጣ አናውቅም። ምናልባትም ከዛ አጀንዳ ለማስቅየስ የተደረገ፣ ብሎም አገርን በማበጣበጥ፣ ግድቡን የመሙላት ሂደት ለማዘግየት የተቀነባበረ ሴራም ሊሆን ይችላል። በነገራችን ላይ በነዚህ ጉዳዮች ጀዋር ሲያራምድ የነበረው አቋም፣ እንደ አንድ ፖለቲከኛ ሳይሆን እንደ አንድ አገር መሪ ነበር። እንዲያውም መጨረሻ ላይ፣ በዲፕሎማሲው ረገድ ደህና ድል እያገኘን የነበረውን ሁኔታ የቀለበሰው፣ የውጭ ጉዳይ ሚንስቴር ስራውን እንዳይሰራ ስለተደረገ ነው፣ የሚል ስሞታ አሰምቷል። አብይን በአገር ጉዳይ የማያምነው መሆኑ፣ ልክ ብዙዎቻችን የታዘብነውን አይነት ክህደቶችን የታዘበ መሆኑን የሚያሳይ ፍንጭ ጽፎ ነበር። በእርግጥ ግብጽን አልጎዳም ብሎ በማያውቀው ቋንቋ ደጋግሞ የማለውና የተገዘተው ማን እንደሆነ ሁሉም ያውቃል።

ይህን ግድያ አብይ ከግብጽ ጋር ያለውን ጉዳይ ለማለዘብ ብቻ ሳይሆን፣ ተቀናቃኞቹን ለመስበርም እየተጠቀመበት ያለ ይመስለኛል። ከላይ እንዳልኩት ኦሮሚያ ላይ፣ ሰማይ ምድሩ ቢገለበጥ፣ በነጻ ምርጫ ሊያሸንፋቸው የማይችሉ ተቀናቃኞቹ ለማሰር ተጠቀሞበታል። የኦሮሞ ተቀናቃኞቹን ከሰበረ ብኋላ በሙሉ ጉልበት ፊቱን ወደ ህወሓት ማዞር ነው ስሌቱ። ያው የጅል ስሌት ነው። ፊቱን ወደ ሰሜን ከማዞሩ በፊት፣ ኦሮሚያ ላይ በማሰው ጉድጓድ ራሱን ያገኘዋል። የት ድረስ እንደሚያዛልቀው እንኳን በደንብ ያሰላው አይመስልም። ለእርሱ ታማኝ የሆኑ አንድ ሁለት ቀበሌ ማተራመስ የሚችሉ ልዩ ሃይሎች ቢኖሩትም፣ የሚያስመካና ልትተማመንበት የምትችል ጉልበት ያላቸው አይደሉም። ሁሉም የተነሳባቸው እለት ድራሻቸው አይገኝም።
ከዚህ ሁሉ ግን፣ ከተቀናቃኞቹ ጋር ያለውን ችግር በድርድርና በውይይት ቀድሞ ፈትቶ ወይም ለመፍታት ሞክሮ ቢሆን ኖሮ ይህ ሁኔታ ሊፈጠር ይችል ነበር? አይመስለኝም። ምክንያቱም እርሱም ሆኑ ሌሎቹ ችግራቸውን በጠረጴዛ ዙሪያ፣ በሰለጠነ መንገድ ከፈቱ የዚህ አይነት ሴራ ውስጥ መግባት አያስፈልጋቸውም ነበር። ለዚህ እነ ጀዋርም፣ ህወሓትም ሌሎችም ዝግጁ መሆናቸውን በተደጋጋሚ በግልጽ ሲናገሩ ሰምተናል። ለጥሪው ጆሯቸውን የቆለፉበት አብይና የአብይ ድርጅት ብቻ ናቸው። ይህን ባለማድረጉ ለፖለቲካ ፍጆታ ሲባል በሴራ ፖለቲካ ያለ እድሜው መሞት የማይገባው ወጣት እንዲሞት ሆነ። በዛ የተነሳም ሌሎች በርካታ ንጹሃን ዜጎች እንዲሞቱ፣ እንዲቆስሉ፣ አገሪቱ ሌላ ቀውስ እንድታስተናግድ (እግዜር ይሁናትና!) ምክንያት ሆነ። ታድያ ማነው ለዚህ ተጠያቂው? ማን ነበር ይህን ማስቀረት ይችል የነበረው? በማን ውሳኔና እጅ ነበር?

አብይ፣ ሰልፊሽና የስልጣን ጥመኛ በመሆኑ ብቻ፣ አገሪቱን ከማቀራረብ ይልቅ፣ የባሰ ጽንፍ ነው ያስያዛት። ህወሓትን ሲታገሉ መቀራረብ ጀመረው የነበሩትን፣ ያራራቃቸውና ጽንፍ ያስያዛቸው የአብይ መንግስት ነው። ይህንን ቀዳዳ ተጠቅመው የውጭ ሃይሎች አገራችን ውስጥ ሴራ ቢሞክሩ እንኳን አይፈረድባቸውም። የሚያራርቅ እንጂ የሚያቀራርብ መሪና አሰራር እንደሌለን ይታወቃል። በድጋሚ ላንሳውና በድርድር ልዩነቱን ቀርፎ ቢሆን ኖሮ፣ የውጭ ሃይል አገራችንን የማተራመስ እድል ይኖረዋል? ግብጽ ብትሞክር እንኳን፣ መግባባት ካለ፣ በጋራ ያከሽፉት ነበር። ታዋቂ ሰው/ፖለቲከኛ ገድለው አመጽ ለመቀስቀስ ቢሞክሩ፣ ታዋቂ ሰዎች (ተፎካካሪዎች) በጋራ ቆመው፣ ተሰሚነታቸውን ተጠቅመው፣ ህዝባቸውን ያረጋጉ ነበር። አሁን ባለበት ሁኔታ ግን ይህ የሚቻል አልሆነም። ምክንያቱም ሁሉንም ነገር በራሱ መንገድ ብቻ ከማስተናገድ ውጭ ሌላ ነገር ስለማያውቅ።

ሲጠቃለል ከሀጫሉ ግድያ በስተጀርባ ያለው ሀይል ማንም ይሁን ማን፣ የመንግስት ተጠያቂነት ጎልቶ ይታየኛል። ገዳዮ ምንም ፖለቲካል ሞቲቭ የሌለው አንድ ተራ ሰው (ለምሳሌ የምኒሊክ አምላኪ) ሆኖ ቢገኝ እንኳን፣ አገሪቱን እዚህ ቀውስ ውስጥ የከተተው (ምናልባትም የከፋ ቀውስ ውስጥም ሊከታት የሚችለው) ማን በፈጠረው ችግር ምክንያት እንደሆነ ለሁላችንም ግልጽ ነው። ደጋግመን ድርድር፣ ውይይት፣ ድርድር፣ ስንል የነበረው ለዚህ ነው። አሁንም አገሪቱ ከዚህ ውጭ ሌላ መውጫ ቀዳዳ የላትም።

በመጨረሻ አንድ አቋሜን ግልጽ ላድርግ፣ ከሀጫሉ ግድያ በስተጀርባ የነጀዋር እጅ አለበት ብዬ የማላምነውን ያህል፣ የተደራጀ የአማራ ፖለቲከኞች ቡድንም ይኖራል ብዬ አላምንም። እነ ጀዋር አመጽ መቀስቀስ ከፈለጉ፣ ሀጫሉን መግደል አያስፈልጋቸውም። የአመንስቲ ሪፖርት የፈጠረውን አጋጣሚ ተጠቅመው ማቀጣጠል ይችሉ ነበር። ሀጫሉ ካስፈለጋቸውም አብሯቸው እንዲያቀጣጥል ማድረግ ይችሉ ነበር። እንዲህውም ነፍጠኛ የምትሏቸው የተደራጁ የአማራ ብሔርተኞችም ከዚህ ጀርባ አይኖሩም፣ ምክንያቱም የምኒሊክ ስም ከመጥፋት በላይ (ያውም ያልተለመደ አይደለም) የሚያሳስብ ዘርፈ ብዙ ችግር አለ። ለማይረባ ነገር ያን የመሰለ አርቲስት ገድሎ፣ የባሰ ጥፋትና ኪሳራ እንጂ ጥቅም እንደማይገኝ አያውቁም ለማለት አልደፍርም።

 

ሰ.ነ.

ወደ አምባገነናዊ ስርዓት መመለስ አገር ያሳጣል

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ለዚህ  ጽሁፌ መነሻ ምክንያት ወደ ሆነኝ ነጥብ ልምጣና የኢህአዴግ አልጋ ወራሽ የሆነው ብልጽግና ልክ እንደትላንቱ ዛሬም በተመሳሳይ ጎዳና እየገሰገሰ ይገኛል። ኩንትራቱን ሊጨርስ እየተቃረበ ያለው ጠ/ሚ/ር አብይ አሕመድ፣ በኢህአዴግ ውስጥ የተፈጠረውን ክፍፍል በአሸናፊነት ተወጥቶ ስልጣኑን ለማደላደል ሲል ብልጽግናን የመሰረተበት ሒደት፣ ድርጅቱን ለማጠናከርና አባላትን ለማፍራት እየተጓዘበትና ያለው መንገድ ከቀድሞ የኢህአዴግ ባህል ምንም የተለየ አይደለም። ኢህአዴግ የቀድሞ ስሙን ብቻ ቀይሮ በህይወት አለ። ልዩነቱ የቀድሞ ታጋዮች ኮትኩተው ባሳደጓቸው ካድሬዎች በፖለቲካ ጌም መሸነፋቸው ብቻ ነው። ሰዎቹ ተሸነፉ እንጂ የዘረጉት ባህል አልተሸነፈም። ካድሬዎቹ ከህወሓት ካድሬዎች ውጪ ቀሪዎቹ የነበሩት ናቸው። የሚተዳደሩት በለመዱትና በኖሩበት የድርጅት ባህል ብቻ ነው። ለዚህም ነው ብልጽግና ከኢህአዴግ የተለየ ባህል ሊኖረው የማይችለው።

ጠ/ሚ/ሩ በህዝብ ይሁንታ፣ በተሰጠው የሁለት አመት የስልጣን ገደብ ቀድሞ የገባውን ቃል አጥፎ፣ የዴሞክራሲ ተቋማትን ሳይገነባ፣ ነጻና ገለልተኛ ምርጫ ሳያካሒድ፣ ስልጣን በሰላማዊ መንገድ በህዝብ ለተመረጠ አሸናፊ ፓርቲ ማስተላለፍ የሚችልበትን እድል ሳይፈጥር፣ በማንኛውም መንገድ ስልጣን ላይ ለመቆየት የሚያስችሉትን አማራጮች እየዘረጋ ቆይቷል። አንዱ መንገድ የቀድሞ አጋሮቹን ገፍትሮ በአዲስና ታማኝ ካድሬዎች መተካት ነው። እኔ አሻግራችኋለው ከማለት ስልጣን ላይ ካልቆየሁ መታሰራችን ነው ወደ ማለት ተሸጋግሯል። ይህ አፍሪካ ነው፣ ምርጫ ማጭበርበር ብርቅ አይደለም ማለቱም ተሰምቷል። አንድ ሰሞን መተካከት የሚባል የፖለቲካ ዲስኩር ተፈጥሮ ነበረ። አቶ መለስ የቀድሞ ጓዶቹን በመተካካት አሰናብቶ፣ በአዲስ ሀይል ተካቸው። እኔም በቅቶኛል ስልጣን ለአዲሱ ትውልድ አስተላልፋለሁ ሲል ቆይቶ፣ ባለቀ ሰዓት ድርጅቴ መርጦ አዲስ አደራ ስለጣለብኝ፣ ግዴታዬን መወጣት አለብኝ አለ። በ99.96% አሸነፍኩ ብሎ የለየለት አምባገነን ሆኖ ብቅ አለ።

ዛሬም ዶ/ር አብይ እየተጓዘበት ያለው መንገድም ተመሳሳይ ነው። አሻግራለሁ ሲል ቆይቶ፣ ሌላ መሪ ማን አለ እስከማስባልና ዛሬ ስልጣን ላይ ካልቆየን መታሰራችን ነው የሚል አቋም እስከማራመድ ድረስ ዘልቋል።

ምርጫውን መራዘም አለበት የሚል ዘመቻ የተከፈተው አምና ነበር። ከተራዘመ የቅቡልነት ጥያቄ ሊነሳ እንደሚችል ሲገለጽ፣ ነሓሴ እንደሚካሔድ ተገለጸ። ውሳኔው ምርጫው በግፊት የሚራዘምበትን ሰበብ ለመፍጠር ያለመ ይመስል ነበር። የኮቪድ ወረርሽኝ ሲከሰት፣ ጥሩ አጋጣሚ ሆነለትና ምርጫው እንዲራዘም ተደረገ። ምርጫው መራዘሙ ብቻ ሳይሆን፣ ያልተገደበ ስልጣን የሚሰጠው የአስቸኳይ ጊዜ አዋጅ አሳወጀ። አዲስ የአፈና መርበብ ተዘረጋ። ስልጣን ላይ በጉልበት ለመቆየት ርብርቡ ቀጥሏል።

ይህ በዙርያው ላሰባሰባቸው ኪራይ ሰብሳቢዎች ትልቅ ሲሳይ ነው። ከህዝብ ተነጥሎ በካድሬና በድርጅቱ ሰዎት መተማመን ከጀመረ፣ መዝረፍ የፈለገ አሁን እንደልቡ ይዘርፋል። እንደድሮ በግፍ ራሱን ማዝናናት የሚያስፈልግ ካለም አሁን ያን ማድረግ ይችላል። ምክንያቱም ሰውዬው ከህዝብ ተነጥሏል። የሚፈራው ነገር እንዳይደርስበት ካድሬዎቹን ሸክፎ መያዝ አለበት። ሲሰርቁና ግፍ ሲፈጽሙ እየቀጣ ካድሬን ሸክፎ ማቆየት ደግሞ አይቻለውም። ስለሆነም ነጻ ይለቃቸው፣ ከቁጥጥሩ ውጭ ናቸው።

ትላንት በኮረና ስም፣ ትንሽ ሰብሰብ ያሉ ሰዎችን ለመበተን ሲባል፣ ወጣቶችን ገደሉ። እንደገና ቤት አፍርሰው ደግሞ በርካቶችን ለበሽታው ማጋለጣቸው አልቀረም። ከእንግዲህ እንዲህ አይነት ዝብርቅርቁ የወጣን ነገር ማስታረቅም፣ ማረምም አይቻለውም ጋሽ አጃግሬ። ያለው አማራጭ በስልጣኑ እስካልመጡበት ድረስ ጆሮ ዳባ ልበስ ብሎ ማለፍ ነው።

አብይ ብዙ ጊዜ ስቷል። አንኳር ስ ህተቶቹ ግ ን ሁለት ናቸው። አንደኛ ተቋማትን መገንባትና ራሳቸውን ችለው እንዲንቀሳቀሱ ማድረግ ሲገባው፣ እርሱን የሚያወድሱና በስልጣን ላይ ሊያቆዩት የሚሹ አጨብጫቢዎችን አፈራ። ሁለተኛ ስልጣን እየጣፈጠችው ስትሔድ ከህዝብ እየራቀ ሔደ፣ አምባገነናዊ ባህሪ እየተላበሰ ሔደ። አሁን መፍራት ጀመረ። ፍራቻው አገርን እንዳያሳጣን እፈራለሁ።

Amid Red Sea Rivalries, Eritrea Plays for Independence

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Source: Small Wars | Harry Verhoeven

President Isaias proposes a regional bloc to balance the rising influence of Gulf states.

When Eritrea’s president last month hosted the leaders of Ethiopia and Somalia to discuss “regional cooperation,” that initiative drew few global headlines. Still, Eritrea’s move should be noted by policymakers and others working for stability in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea region. For years, President Isaias Afwerki’s disdain for multilateral forums such as the African Union, and his strained relations with many governments in the region, have contributed to caricatures of Eritrea as the “North Korea of Africa.” But his invitation for two neighbors to discuss a new regional bloc reflects an important factor in Eritrea’s foreign policy: its efforts to preserve its independence in a fast-evolving geopolitical environment.

Effectively, Isaias’ proposal is a fine-tuning of Eritrea’s alignments amid the growing influence of Arab Gulf states in Africa and consistent with long-standing efforts to preserve its independence, notes Professor Harry Verhoeven, convenor of the Oxford University China-Africa Network.

Eritrea evolved a reputation as perhaps Africa’s most isolated state.  Hasn’t it historically been hostile to regional integration?

Yes and no. Eritrea’s relationship with the idea of regional cooperation has been complex ever since the country gained its independence from Ethiopia in 1993 following a 30-year war. That same year, Eritrean President Isaias Afewerki stunned his African peers when, at a summit of the Organization of African Unity (now the African Union), he publicly repeated criticisms he had formulated as one of Africa’s most formidable guerrilla commanders: the OAU had utterly failed by closing its eyes to the terror inflicted by Ethiopia’s Soviet-backed military dictatorship (the Derg) and he accused his peers of clinging to power while failing to take any meaningful action to address poverty in Africa. From that starting point, Eritrea never invested significant resources in continent-wide diplomacy. When the African Union (AU) imposed sanctions on Eritrea in 2009 for supporting al-Shabab extremists in Somalia and seeking to overthrow the Somali government, Eritrea suspended its participation in the organization and denounced the AU as a lapdog of U.S. imperialism and a mechanism for the hegemonic aspirations of Ethiopia, its main rival.  In addition, Eritrea has twice withdrawn from the East African regional bloc—the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

Still, Eritrea is not by definition opposed to regional cooperation. In the 1990s, Isaias and his fighters formed the vanguard of the wave of leftist African liberation movements that captured power from the Red Sea to the Cape between 1991 and 1997. Together with “comrade-leaders” in Congo, Ethiopia, Rwanda and Uganda, Isaias dreamed of a “Greater Horn of Africa” of like-minded regimes who could offer an alternative to the much-criticized OAU and jointly develop regional investment opportunities to cement ideological solidarity. The government in Asmara sent Eritrean troops, spies and diplomats to support wars against the military-Islamist regime in Sudan and the dictatorship of Mobutu Seso Seko in the Democratic Republic of Congo (then Zaire). These were concrete sacrifices in blood and treasure made by a fragile, small and newly independent Eritrea to further its preferred form of regional integration.

What might Isaias hope to achieve with this new initiative?

Isaias’ proposal to deepen integration between Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia (the so-called “Cushitic Alliance”) is a continuation of efforts he championed in the 1990s to institutionally anchor alliances between governments with a similar political outlook. Just like in the era of the “Greater Horn,” Asmara appears to be proposing new regional norms and understandings of peace and security as well as infrastructure ties to forge a web of partnerships among the participating states.

This said, the disappointments of the past have not been forgotten—most particularly not since the 1998-2000 “war of brothers” with Ethiopia, which ended the dream of the “Greater Horn.” Eritrean diplomacy, especially since that conflict, has been focused on creating space to maneuver and chart a foreign policy independent of Ethiopian hegemony. For almost 20 years, Isaias sought to undermine the Ethiopian government by supporting its domestic opposition as well as its adversaries in Somalia—policies that contributed to the imposition of international sanctions. Eritrea also aligned itself with Ethiopia’s rival, Egypt, and by establishing partnerships with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in which Isaias offered security cooperation—notably the use of Eritrea’s Red Sea port of Assab for operations in the Yemen war—in exchange for economic support against Ethiopian pressures. While this diplomatic choreography failed to stop Ethiopia’s regional ascendancy, it achieved the chief objective of keeping Isaias’ government in power.

Last month’s summit signals a change in the pattern of Isaias’ maneuvering, caused by recent geopolitical shifts. The Gulf states’ projection of power in the Horn of Africa and the European refugee crisis have provided Isaias with diplomatic and financial leverage to move from isolation to regional influence. In addition, the ascension of Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed side-lined Isaias’ Ethiopian nemesis, the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front. That made it possible for Isaias to cooperate with Abiy in quickly negotiating an end to their countries’ “frozen” war. While that peace accord was a domestic popular triumph for both leaders, the rapprochement has stalled and the hoped-for “peace dividends”—economic and democratic—have been disappointing. The rise of the younger Abiy in Addis Ababa has allowed Isaias to pose as the region’s elder statesman and—in last month’s summit conference—to proffer his own idea for cooperation in the Horn of Africa; Isaias’ proposal will in fact undercut Ethiopia’s historic ambitions to once again dominate efforts toward greater regional integration.

Other players are moving to establish regional organizations in the Red Sea area, as Saudi Arabia just did in January. What are the implications of the Eritrean initiative in light of those efforts?

Recent efforts to establish new regional bodies, such as the Council of the Arab and African States of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, or to reinvigorate IGAD or the AU in the Horn of Africa, are ambivalent developments from Eritrea’s perspective. Its priority remains the preservation of its flexibility to shift policies and alignments as necessary to defend its independence, squeezed as it is among larger neighbors. Sudan, Ethiopia and Saudi Arabia have all had their own designs for the region, which have rarely accounted for Eritrean interests. As seen from Asmara, multilateral organizations under the control of actors with hegemonic ambitions are therefore potentially dangerous and better subverted or, if need be, boycotted altogether.

Eritrea joined the Red Sea Council at Riyadh’s unrelenting insistence but likely has no intention of letting the body circumscribe its sovereignty. Membership served the useful purpose of confirming the Saudi-Eritrea relationship and of reminding Ethiopia (which, at the insistence of Egypt, was not invited to join the council) that, despite the outward expressions of fraternity between Abiy and Isaias, Eritrea has strategic options that do not require Ethiopia’s consent.

Similarly, Isaias’ move toward a new grouping with Ethiopia and Somalia is useful to remind old foes in the Horn of Africa (Djibouti and Sudan) and the Gulf states that Eritrea has alternative friends and will not accept a role as regional proxy for Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates. The growing projection of the Gulf states’ power in the Horn helped Isaias to break out of his isolation. But from the Eritrean perspective, that projection is a trend that requires careful management, rather than further encouragement, and that needs to be assessed in terms of its implications for Eritrea’s autonomy going forward.

The X Factor in China-UAE Relations: The Horn of Africa

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The Diplomat | From port competition to the Somaliland issue, China and the UAE’s conflicting interests in the region are not easy to reconcile.

May 03, 2019

On April 26, Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid al-Makhtoum, the ruler of Dubai, signed $3.4 billion in investment deals between the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and China. These contracts were hailed in Dubai-based news outlet, Khaleej Times, as a catalyst for a UAE role in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Overall, annual trade between China and the UAE is expected to increase to $106 billion by 2022.

While this major boost to the China-UAE economic partnership follows years of strengthening trade links, the foreign policies of both countries are not aligned in numerous respects. The most commonly cited obstacles to a durable China-UAE partnership stem from Beijing’s deepening economic links with Iran and Qatar, but conflicting interests on the Horn of Africa could also emerge as a cleavage between the two countries. The primary areas of contention between China and the UAE in the Horn of Africa relate to trade policy and the status of Somaliland, an autonomous region of Somalia that has independence aspirations.

Latent China-UAE tensions over trade policy have persisted since Djibouti rankled Dubai-based port company DP World by selling a 23.5 percent stake in Doraleh Container Terminal to China Merchants Port Holding Company (CMP) in 2013. Relations between DP World and CMP have since deteriorated considerably. In November 2018, DP World filed a lawsuit against CMP and accused the Chinese port company of breaching its contractual obligations. Frustration with CMP’s conduct caused the DP World chairman, Sultan Ahmed bin Sulayem, to condemn China’s “predatory” trade practices and accuse China of engaging in debt trap diplomacy at the January 2019 Davos World Economic Forum.

While UAE officials have cautiously framed the DP World-CMP incident as an isolated case and insisted that Abu Dhabi will not take sides in the U.S.-China trade dispute, the ambitious trade policies of both countries suggest that China-UAE trade conflicts in the Horn of Africa could become more frequent. As China’s economic interests on the Red Sea continue to grow, the UAE could see the leverage accrued by its investments in critical ports, like Saudi Arabia’s Jeddah and Somaliland’s Berbera, be eroded by Chinese competition, resulting in new sources of tension.

In addition to trade disputes, differing views between China and the UAE on the status of Somaliland could emerge as a future source of friction between the two countries. As UAE-Somalia relations have deteriorated markedly since Mogadishu refused to join the blockade against Qatar in June 2017, Abu Dhabi has deepened its relationship with Somaliland. The UAE plans to have an operational military base in Berbera by June 2019 and has trained Somaliland’s military personnel as part of this basing agreement.

Ali Bakeer, an expert on the Gulf region at Ankara’s ORSAM think tank, told The Diplomat, that the UAE’s investments in Somaliland aim to separate the autonomous region from Somalia and resemble Abu Dhabi’s support for separatist enclaves in other regions, like southern Yemen and northern Syria. This policy is squarely at odds with China’s efforts to promote power centralization in Somalia, and frequently stated opposition to external interference regarding Somaliland’s status. As China strengthens its pivot toward Somalia, due to Somaliland’s objection to Mogadishu’s decision to grant Chinese ships fishing rights in Somaliland ports, this policy divergence could sharpen in the months to come.

In spite of these disagreements, the China-UAE relationship in the Horn of Africa has yet to devolve into a state of strategic competition. The UAE remains focused on restricting Turkey’s influence on the Red Sea, as Ankara’s close ties with Somalia and burgeoning relationship with Sudan threaten to undercut Abu Dhabi’s geopolitical aspirations. China is the UAE’s leading supplier of manufactured goods and industrial materials, and Abu Dhabi’s BRI integration goals also restrict its ability to directly confront China in the Horn of Africa.

The most significant geostrategic risk that could convert latent China-UAE tensions on the Horn of Africa into a more hostile relationship is Abu Dhabi’s continued militarization of the region. The UAE’s takeover of the Yemeni island of Socotra in May 2018 highlighted its willingness to unilaterally use military force to bolster its regional influence. Although the UAE ultimately withdrew from Socotra as a result of Saudi Arabia’s mediation efforts, concerns are growing that the UAE’s aggressive pursuit of new bases in the Horn of Africa will exacerbate regional power rivalries and trigger an accidental interstate conflict.

Although Chinese officials have remained silent about the UAE’s activities in the Horn of Africa, Beijing’s numerous investments in Somalia, Djibouti, and Ethiopia ensure that it does not want the region to become subjected to an interstate conflict. In order to highlight its desire to avoid an interstate war, China has emphasized the stabilizing nature of its base in Djibouti and has offered to mediate border disputes between Eritrea and Djibouti.

To the UAE’s credit, Abu Dhabi played a crucial role in successful resolution of the Ethiopia-Eritrea protracted conflict in June 2018, and these diplomatic actions reflect its interest in preserving collective security on the Horn of Africa. Nevertheless, the UAE’s continued hostility toward Somalia suggests that it is not universally committed to this goal. If Abu Dhabi’s tensions with Mogadishu persist as Ethiopia seeks to mediate a truce between Somalia and Somaliland, the credibility of the UAE’s efforts to frame itself as a stabilizing force in the Horn of Africa could be tarnished and tensions with China might commensurately rise.

Although the China-UAE bilateral relationship is rapidly strengthening, especially in the economic sphere, both countries possess conflicting interests in the Horn of Africa that are not easily reconcilable. While these disagreements are unlikely to threaten the UAE’s aspirations of BRI inclusion or its trade deals with China, they add a layer of tension to the Beijing-Abu Dhabi relationship that could surface in a more significant way in the event of renewed conflict on the Horn of Africa.

Will Ethiopia-Eritrea Peace Last?

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National Interest | Michael Rubin | History warns the relationship between these two countries could suddenly turn sour again.

When Eritrea won its independence in 1993 after a thirty-year struggle against Ethiopia, there was optimism that peace would hold. Long-time dictator Mengistu Haile Mariam resigned on May 21, 1991, and fled into exile in Zimbabwe. Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki and the new Ethiopian leader Meles Zenawi had been comrades-in-arms against Mengistu’s regime. It looked like the two would lead their respective countries into a period of both peace and prosperity. In a book review for the Financial Times, British writer John Ryle recalled a 1995 celebration in the northern Ethiopian town of Mekelle:

“The two guerrilla movements had fought together to defeat the Derg, then – unprecedentedly – agreed to an amicable secession. In western diplomatic circles, Meles and Isaias were being touted as a new breed of African statesman. That evening on the outskirts of Mekelle, I watched as Meles, Isaias and other guests, serenaded by Mahmud Ahmed, a veteran Ethiopian pop star, danced together in the moonlight.”

Such episodes would not last. Just three years later, a series of skirmishes between Eritrea and Ethiopia over relatively minor border disputes would erupt into a full-scale conflict. The land they disputed had no real resources. It seemed so irrelevant that the conflict was often described as “two bald men fighting over a comb.”

Whereas Isaias and Meles once danced at Mekelle, soon Eritrean aircraft were bombing it. Sniper fire, artillery barrages, tank fire, air raids, and land grabs slowed into a stalemate and World War I-like trench warfare replete with human wave assaults. By the time both sides agreed to a ceasefire, at least one hundred thousand Ethiopians and Eritreans had died in combat. The peace was cold, however, and at times it appeared as if hostilities might again erupt.

Both countries used the crisis as an excuse to clamp down. Whereas once diplomats and analysts hoped Eritrea might become a democracy, it quickly descended into autocracy. In 1999, Freedom House lowered its rating to “not free.” Isaias used the conflict to institute near-indefinite conscription—lasting decades and often indistinguishable from slavery. Ethiopia, meanwhile, while never quite as extreme, also slipped back into repression.

That Eritrea and Ethiopia have been a hairs’ trigger away from renewed conflict made their sudden 2018 rapprochement all the more remarkable. Many observers credit the Ethiopian parliament’s appointment of Abiy Ahmed, a young former guerilla fighter and intelligence officer who had previously led Ethiopia’s equivalent of the National Security Agency. His political work—efforts to address both youth unemployment and the plight of the displaced as well as his ability to build cross-ethnic coalitions—shot him to prominence.

Abiy called for peace upon his inauguration and wasted no time to pursue it. Even seasoned veterans in the region, however, were surprised by the speed with which Isaias reciprocated his efforts. In September 2018, the two leaders signed a peace agreement in Saudi Arabia. The rapprochement has been rapid, as Ethiopians and Eritreans reunite families and resume trade. There is widespread speculation that Abiy could win the Nobel Peace Prize.

Alas, while Abiy appears sincere, it is far from clear Ethiopia-Eritrea peace will last. Here’s the problem. The seventy-three-year-old Isaias sees himself less as an equal to the forty-two-year-old Abiy than as a father figure and guide. Even at the best of times, Isaias’ concept of diplomacy is dictating his position and then waiting for opponents to accept it without any compromise. When the adversary or partner is a generational younger, the chances that Isaias will compromise recede from miniscule to nonexistent. Bilateral issues will inevitably arise, and it is unclear whether ordinary Ethiopians—let alone a fictitious political coalition—will back repeated Abiy’s concessions. After all, from the Ethiopian perspective, they are now Africa’s second most populous country after Nigeria and, with more than 100 million, they dominate East Africa. Isaias sees Eritrea and Ethiopia as equal, but Ethiopians will never accept equality with a country whose population is just one-twentieth of their own.

So, when Isaias raises a complaint and Abiy has no room to maneuver, what Isaias do? In the past, Isaias has shown a willingness to subordinate regional security and his country’s economic health for the sake of his own twisted sense of personal honor. Just as Isaias and Meles went from comrades and friends to enemies within just a few months, so too could Isaias and Abiy. Add into the mix that Ethiopia is growing more democratic while Eritrea has become the North Korea of the African continent, and Isaias has personal reasons to put the brakes on or even reverse the peace. Isaias may temporarily welcome the economic infusion that peace brings his devastated and impoverished country, but he will not continue it at the expense of his own power.

Is peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea a good thing? Certainly. But optimism should not cloud diplomats and analysts to reality, nor do dictators like Isaias suddenly change their stripes or behaviors overnight. Realism dictates not only rightly celebrating progress, but also recognizing just how tenuous it may be and planning proactively for the chance that the rapprochement might be fleeting.

Michael Rubin is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute.

ስራ አጥነት፣ አለመረጋጋትና የስደተኞች ከካምፕ መውጣት እንደምታው

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የኢትዮጵያ መንግስት ወደ አንድ ሚልዮን የሚጠጉ ስደተኞች ከካምፕ ወጥተው ወደ ስራ እንዲሰማሩ መፍቀዱ በመገናኛ ብዙሀን ተነግሯል። ከዚህ ጉዳይ ጋር በተያያዘ ዓለማችን ብዙ አስገራሚ ነገሮችን ስታስተናግድ አይተናል። የትራምፕ ፕሬዚደንት ሆኖ መመረጥ፣ የBrexit ህዝበ ውሳኔ፣ እንዲህውም በአውሮፓና በአሜሪካ የኒዮናዚ አቀንቃኞችና ጽንፈኛ ብሔርተኞች ማንሰራራት፣ በቀጥታም ሆነ በተዘዋዋሪ ስደተኞችን ከሚመለከት ፖሊሲና ፖለቲካ ጋር ተያይዞ የመጣ ቀውስ እንደሆነ ይነገራል። የኢትዮጵያ መንግስት የወሰነው ውሳኔ ቀላል የማይባል የፖለቲካ ውሳኔ እንደመሆኑ መጠን ጥቅምና ጉዳቱ ምንድን ነው የሚለውን እንመለከታለን።

1. ጥቅሙ

1.1 ከዲፕሎማሲ አንጻር –

ሀ. ድሀዋ ኢትዮጵያ በግዛቷ ስር ላሉ ስደተኞች የምታደርገው መልካም አያያዝ ለዓለም ዓቀፉ ማህበረሰብና መንግስታት አርአያ የሚሆን በጎ መልእክት ያስተላልፋል።
ለ. ለሌሎች አፍሪካውያን ወንድሞቻችን በራችን ክፍት መሆኑን ያበስራል። ጥሩ ተምሳሌት በመሆን፣ በአፍሪካ በተለያዩ አገራት በስደት ለሚገኙ ኢትዮጵያውያን መልካም አያያዝ እንዲደረግላቸው ጥሩ መልእክት ያስተላልፋል።

1.2 አገር ውስጥ –

ሀ. ጎሰኝነትን ቶሎ ለማርከስ ከኢትዮጵያዊነት በላይ ልቆ ማቀንቀን ያስፈልጋል። ለዚህ ደግሞ ፓን አፍሪካኒዝም ቀዳሚው አማራጭ ነው። ፓን አፍሪካኒዝም በተግባር እውን ሊሆን የሚችለው ደግሞ ኢትዮጵያና ኢትዮጵያውያን ከአህጉራችን ለሚመጡ ሰዎች በራችንንና ልባችንን ክፍት ማድረግ ስንችል ነው። አብረውን ሲሰሩ፣ አብረናቸው ስንኖር፣ በጓደኝነትና በትዳር አጋርነት መተሳሰር ስንጀምር በሂደት ወደ ታች (ወደ ጎሳ) ማየቱን እየተውን ወደ ከፍታው እንድንመለከት ይረዳን ይሆናል።
ለ. ስደተኞቹ ስራ ፈትተው ካምፕ ውስጥ ተጎልተው የመጽዋቾችን እጅ ከሚጠባበቁ፣ ወደ ስራ ተሰማርተው፣ ኢኮኖሚያችን ላይ የራሳቸውን አስተዋጽኦ በማበርከት፣ ለመንግስት ግብር በመክፈል፣ ሸማቹን ማህበረሰባችንን ተቀላቅለው ምርታችንን በመግዛት እንዲህውም ለአገራቸው በማስተዋወቅ (የኤክስፖርት አቅማችንን የማጎልበት ፋይዳ አለው!) ዘርፈ ብዙ ጥቅም ሊያስገኙልን ይችላሉ። በተጨማሪም ከካምፕ የወጣ ሰው ስራ አያማርጥምና ካገኘም ስራ ላይ አይለግምምና፣ ልንማርበት የምንችል የስራ ባህል በማካፈል ረገድ ሊጠቅሙን ይችላሉ።

2. ጉዳቱ (ስራው ከየት ይመጣል?)

ኢትዮጵያ ያልተረጋጋች፣ በሁሉም አቅጣጫ ግጭት የበዛባት፣ መጨረሻው ሊተነበይ በማይችል የለውጥ ማእበል እየተናጠች ያለች አገር ናት።
የለውጥ ማእበሉን የቀሰቀሰው፣ ስራ አጥነትና የኑሮ ውድነት ያሰቃየው ወጣት ነው። ይኽ ወጣት የስርዓት ለውጥ አመጣ እንጂ፣ ኑሮው ላይ ገና ለውጥ አላየም። መንግስት የተጠመደው መሰረታዊ የሚባሉ መዋቅራዊ ሪፎርሞችን በማካሔድ ነው። ስራ የሚፈጥሩ ፕሮግራሞችንና ፕሮጀክቶችን ቀርጾ ስራ አጡን ወጣት የማረጋጋት ስራ ገና አልጀመረም። ባልተረጋጋ አገር ውስጥ የኢኮኖሚ ድቀት ሲታከልበት፣ ወጣቱ ወደ ወንጀል የመሰማራቱ እድል ይጨምራል።
መንግስት ሙሉ ትኩረቱን ሌላ ቦታ ላይ ባደረገበት በአሁኑ ወቅት፣ በመዋቅራዊ ለውጡ ምክንያት ጥቅሙ የተነካበት ኪራይ ሰብሳቢ ኤሊት ለውጡን ለማደናቀፍ ተግቶ እየሰራ እንዳለ ባደባባይ የሚታወቅ ሀቅ ነው። ይህ ሴራም እየተከናወነ ያለው፣ ገንዘባቸውን በመርጨት ስራ አጡን ወጣት ለጥፋትና ለነውጥ ማሰማራት በመቻላቸው ነው። ስለ ሰላም በሚዘመርበት ወቅት ታጣቂና ተደራጅቶ የሚዘርፍ ማፊያ እየጨመረ እንጂ እየቀነሰ አልመጣም። ቀድሞውኑ መንግስት ወጣቱን ወደ ስራ ለማሰማራት ቅድሚያ ሰጥቶ መንቀሳቀስ ሲገባው ቸልተኛ መሆኑ ሳያንስ አሁን ደግሞ አንድ ሚልዮን የሚጠጋ ስራ የሚቀራመት “ተፎካካሪ” ስደተኛ የlabor marketኡን እንዲቀላቀል መወሰኑ አደጋ ያለው አካሔድ ይመስለኛል። ይኽ ያለውን ያለመረጋጋት ሁኔታ ከማባባስ አልፎ በስደተኞቹ ላይ ጥላቻ ለማሳደርና ለግጭት እንዳይጋብዝ ያሰፈራል። ከዚህ በተጨማሪ ከጸጥታና ደህንነት ጋር የተያያዙ ችግሮች ሊፈጠሩ ይችላሉ። እንዴት ለሚለው ጥያቄ በአጭሩ እንመልከት።
የኢትዮጵያ ህዝብ በየዓመቱ በ2.5% ያድጋል። በዓመት ከሁለት ሚልዮን በላይ ማለት ነው። ከአመት በፊት በነበርንበት ሁኔታ ለመቀጠል፣ መንግስት በዚህ ዓመት ቢያንስ ለ2 ሚልዮን ዜጎች ስራ መፍጠር አለበት። 1 ሚልዮን ስደተኛ ከጨመርንበት ደግሞ፣ ቢያንስ ለ3 ሚልዮን ሰው ስራ መፍጠር አለበት። ይህን ማድረግ ካልቻለ ዘርፈ ብዙ ቀውስ ይፈጠራል። ስደተኛው ራሱ ከካምፕ ወጥቶ ስራ ካጣ ወንጀል ውስጥ ሊዘፈቅ ይችላል። ኢህአዴግን ለውድቀት ከዳረጉት ምክንያቶች አንዱ ምናልባትም ግንባር ቀደሙ፣ ከህዝብ ቁጥራችን ጋር መመጣጠን የሚችል ስራ በየዓመቱ መፍጠር ባለመቻሉ ነው። የዘንድሮ ከአምናውና ካካቻምናው እየባሰ ሲሔድ፣ ሲጠራቀም፣ ሞልቶ የፈሰሰ ዕለት ነው፣ ጎርፍ ሆኖ ጠራርጎ የወሰደው። ዛሬም የስራ አጡንና የህዝብ እድገቱን የሚመጥን ስራ መፍጠርና አገሪቱን ማረጋጋት ባልቻለበት ሁኔታ፣ ይህን ውሳኔ መወሰኑ፣ ለ22 ተጫዋችና ለ3 ዳኛ ብቻ በሚፈቀደ ሜዳ ላይ ተመልካቹንም ፈትቶ እንደመልቀቅ ይቆጠራል።