On ‘Rooftop of Africa,’ Ethiopia’s Troops Hunt Fugitive Former Rulers

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NYT | Politicians and military commanders who once led Ethiopia are being tracked down, caught and sometimes killed by their own country’s soldiers in the war in the Tigray region.

By Simon Marks and Declan Walsh

ADDIS ABABA, Ethiopia — For two decades, as foreign minister, Seyoum Mesfin was Ethiopia’s face to the world — a personable and soft-spoken diplomat who brokered peace in neighboring war-torn countries, delivered speeches at the United Nations and helped establish his country as a weighty African power.

That distinguished career came to an ignominious end last week when Ethiopian soldiers tracked down Mr. Seyoum, now labeled an enemy of the state, and killed him in a muddy and remote corner of the mountainous north of the country. The government said he died in a shootout, but Mr. Seyoum’s allies say he was executed.

The former foreign minister Seyoum Mesfin was killed last week by the Ethiopian military. | via NYT | ©Reuters

Mr. Seyoum, 71, was the most prominent casualty yet of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s 11-week-old war in Ethiopia’s northern Tigray region. The main target of Mr. Abiy’s military campaign is not a ragtag group of provincial rebels, but the politicians and generals of Tigray, who ruled Africa’s second-most populous country for much of the past three decades through their political party, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, or T.P.L.F.

Now Ethiopia’s former rulers are on the run in their Tigray heartland, and on the defensive against the forces they once commanded. Since Jan. 7, Ethiopia’s military has killed or captured at least 47 people from a most-wanted list of 167 senior leaders of the T.P.L.F., including four of the party’s nine-member executive committee, according to Ethiopian state media reports.

When Mr. Abiy came to power in 2018, his government quickly unseated many of these T.P.L.F. leaders, who over 27 years had overseen impressive economic growth, but ruled Ethiopia with an iron fist. Several were charged with corruption and human rights abuses, and some of them fled or retreated to their home base in Tigray.

Mr. Abiy has portrayed his military campaign as a law-enforcement drive against Tigray’s fugitive politicians, who are backed by their own seasoned military force. The Tigrayan leaders went ahead with a regional election in September, in defiance of Mr. Abiy’s order to postpone the vote due to the Covid-19 pandemic. He said he launched his military operation on Nov. 4 in response to an attack on a federal military base in Tigray.

“The government is engaged in a stabilizing mission for a month now while it continues to bring to justice perpetrators,” Billene Seyoum, Mr. Abiy’s spokeswoman, said in a statement.

But the T.P.L.F. says that Mr. Abiy, who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2019 for resolving a long-running conflict with Eritrea, is revealing himself as yet another power-hungry autocrat. Thousands of people have died in the fighting, by most estimates, and the handful of aid workers who have been permitted to enter Tigray report human rights abuses, burned refugee camps, looted hospitals and a swelling humanitarian crisis that could lead to mass starvation.

Refugees in Tigray are “emaciated, begging for aid that is not available,” Filippo Grandi, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, said in a statement last week.

Despite Mr. Abiy’s recent military successes, the swift and bloodless victory he once promised in Tigray remains far from his grasp. The T.P.L.F. has retreated to the mountains, alongside thousands of heavily armed fighters.

Fighting has raged across the region in recent weeks, according to U.N. security reports seen by The New York Times. Human rights groups have shared accounts of atrocities against civilians, including plunder, sexual violence and killings.

And as Mr. Abiy ramps up his assault on the T.P.L.F., brushing aside international pleas to start peace talks, experts warn that he risks boosting public support for the rebels inside Tigray, and plunging his country deeper into a protracted conflict with an enemy that is unlikely to give up easily.

The T.P.L.F. “is an organization in which the guerrilla ethos of not bowing to external pressure, even when cornered and pressured, is very much in its DNA,” said Rashid Abdi of Sahan, a Kenya-based conflict analysis group specializing in the Horn of Africa. “They have said they will die to the last person. People should not underestimate that.”

Mr. Abiy’s forces — with the help of Eritrean troops — hold the regional capital, Mekelle, and much of northern and western Tigray. But sporadic fighting has continued in rural areas across Tigray, and on roads leading to Mekelle, according to Western diplomats and U.N. security assessments.

Although analysts initially estimated the T.P.L.F. had 250,000 men under arms, it quickly became clear that its force was much smaller. Government soldiers and allied ethnic militias surrounded the T.P.L.F.’s forces by sealing Ethiopia’s borders with Eritrea and Sudan, effectively severing the rebels’ supply lines.

And the T.P.L.F. received an unexpected blow when soldiers from Eritrea, Ethiopia’s former enemy, crossed into Tigray to fight alongside Mr. Abiy’s forces. In such conditions, experts say, it’s unclear how long the T.P.L.F. can hold out.

Still, the situation is fluid and unpredictable. Border clashes between Ethiopia and Sudan in recent weeks, over a patch of disputed farmland, could play to the advantage of the T.P.LF. if Sudan helps the rebels to resupply.

And the top military commanders of the T.P.L.F. remain at large. Two Western officials and one with the T.P.L.F., who were not authorized to speak publicly, identified Lt. Gen. Tsadkan Gebretensae, a former head of the Ethiopian military, as a senior rebel leader.

General Tsadkan led Ethiopia into combat against Eritrea during the two countries’ brutal border war between 1998 and 2000. In recent years, after retiring from the army, he ran a small brewery. Now 66, he is back in the fight with the newly formed Tigray Defense Forces, battling the Ethiopian army he once commanded.

One T.P.L.F. stronghold, the Western officials said, is in the Tembien mountains, a cluster of jagged hills and narrow winding roads in central Tigray — part of a highland massif often called the “rooftop of Africa.”

Kjetil Tronvoll, an expert on the T.P.L.F. at Bjorknes University College in Oslo, said the party’s leadership has likely dispersed in small groups, to spread the risk of capture.

It was in Tigray’s central hills near the Tekeze River that Mr. Abiy’s force scored a symbolic coup earlier this month, when they captured Sebhat Nega, an octogenarian founding member of the T.P.L.F.

Ethiopian federal troops crossed tributaries of the Tekeze and hiked up steep hillsides in search of Mr. Sebhat, according to accounts on Ethiopian state television and a former T.P.L.F. official who had been in touch with Mr. Sebhat. After scaling a precipitous slope with ropes, they discovered Mr. Sebhat in a cave with his wife and sister.

Footage broadcast on state media showed a disheveled, white-bearded man in a tracksuit, being led in handcuffs off a military transport plane at Addis Ababa International Airport. Ethiopian leaders were jubilant.

“It was difficult to believe a human could live in the mountain where we found him,” said Maj. Gen. Mesele Meseret, who led the operation.

The triumphal capture of Mr. Sebhat contrasted with the more muted announcement of Mr. Seyoum’s death, which was shrouded in recriminations and conflicting accounts.

The Ethiopian government said Mr. Seyoum, a T.P.L.F. leader, died during a gunfight between his bodyguards and government soldiers. But the T.P.L.F. insisted he had been summarily executed, pointing to a photo circulating online that showed Mr. Seyoum, his eyes closed, with blood streaming from a bullet-sized wound in his forehead.

“Seyoum deserved to end his days in comfortable retirement with all the respect due to a statesman and patriot,” said Alex de Waal, a Horn of Africa scholar at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, who knew Mr. Seyoum, and called for an international investigation into his death. “His killing should be a red line.”

But Mr. Abiy shows little sign of backing down. On Tuesday, Ethiopia’s election board formally barred the Tigrayan party from elections that Mr. Abiy has set for June 5. Some had hoped the elections might act as a spur to peace talks.

The government accuses Western media of falsely portraying Mr. Abiy as a warmonger. Critics say he is hewing to the traditions of a political culture that prizes dominance.

“Abiy is buying into an old, aggressive warrior tradition in which you vanquish your enemy,” said Mr. Abdi, the analyst. “In countries like Kenya, you weaken your enemy in order to negotiate with him later. In Ethiopia, you obliterate him.”

U.S. Withdrawal from Somalia — SOF

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Source: SOF News | John Friberg

U.S. Africa Command has announced the formation of Joint Task Force Quartz to oversee Operation Octave Quartz – a mission designated to reposition forces from Somalia and continue the assistance effort in Somalia. In early December President Trump and the Department of Defense announced that the United States would remove some 700 military personnel from Somalia. This is an action that Trump had mentioned several times over the past year but had not directed to take place.

Some national security observers applaud the action believing that the situation in Somalia is unsolvable. They point to decades of corruption and conflict and little to show for the millions of dollars and other sacrifices made in Somalia.

However, others say that we are ceding territory to an insurgent / terrorist group affiliated with al Qaeda. These critics say that the group poses a threat to the U.S. – pointing to the attack on Camp Simba in Kenya where Americans lost their lives and to the recent news of a potential plot by an al Shabaab member to hijack an aircraft to conduct an attack in the United States.

The withdrawal is being presented to the U.S. public as a ‘repositioning of forces’. Apparently some of these forces will move into neighboring countries. Djibouti and Kenya share a border with Somalia and have been hosts of U.S. military units and activities for many years.

Joint Task Force Quartz or JTF-Quartz is built around the headquarters of Special Operations Command – Africa. The mission is to oversee Operation Octave Quartz which will reposition U.S. forces from Somalia to other bases in East Africa. JTF Quartz is commanded by the Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAF) commander Maj. Gen. Dag Anderson.

JTF-Quartz components include:

  • Joint Force Special Operations Component Command
  • Joint Force Maritime Component Command
  • Joint Air Component Coordination Element

JTF-Quartz priorities are:

  • safely reposition U.S. forces
  • protect U.S. forces through coordinated and increased force protection measures
  • continue the mission to support regional partners and keep pressure on violent extremists

U.S. Army General Stephen Townsend, the commander of U.S. Africa Command, met with African partners to provide reassurance of a sustained commitment to East Africa security. He says that the U.S. will continue to support enduring partners while maintaining pressure on violent extremist organizations in the region.

“To be clear, the U.S. is not withdrawing or disengaging from East Africa. We remain committed to helping our African partners build a more secure future. We also remain capable of striking Al-Shabaab at any time and place of our choosing – they should not test us.”

General Stephen Townsend, commander of U.S. Africa Command, Dec 2020.

The U.S. and Somalia – Quick Timeline

Cold War. During the Cold War the Horn of Africa region was a focus of attention when it came to competition between the Soviet Union and the United States for influence and military presence. Somalia was a Soviet client state for many years (1970s).

Humanitarian Mission. In the early 1990s the United States committed US forces (including SOF) to Somalia in support of the United Nations humanitarian mission. This support ended when President Clinton ended the U.S. involvement in Somalia after the “Battle of Mogadishu” where 18 US. troops lost their lives during a raid on Somali militia leaders.

Failed State. Since the early 1990s Somalia has been a ‘failed state‘. It has suffered from famine, civil war, corruption, foreign intrigue and meddling, anarchy, and more. For many years it was the center of piracy operating from the coastal area of Somalia.

Fragile State. In 2012 the formation of a federal government provided a central authority that could provide services and security for the Somalia people. However, Somalia is still afflicted with division, political infighting, and corruption and remains a ‘fragile state’.

Al Shabaab. Somalia has been fighting an insurgency by an al Qaeda-affiliated group known as al Shabaab. The group controls much of Somalia – especially in the central and southern portions of the country. Its goal is to establish an Islamic state in Somalia.

US Support. The United States , along with other international partners, are working to stabilize the country and increase the effectiveness of the security forces. The US has been a key supporter of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), provides advice and training to the Somali security forces, and conducts counterterror (CT) missions within Somalia against al Shabaab and the local ISIS affiliate. U.S. Army Special Forces (and other organizations) have been instrumental in standing up the elite Danab Brigade.

Some Americans have lost their lives in the region including a CIA paramilitary officer (Nov 2020), a soldier assigned to 3rd Special Forces (June 2018), and contract pilots and an Army air traffic controller at Camp Simba (Jan 2020) just across the border in Kenya.

Security and Governance. The war in Somalia between government forces and al Shabaab has lasted almost 15 years. The prospects for peace is dismal. International donors are becoming reluctant to pay the expenses of the African Union forces that are deployed in Somalia to assist the government with security. Relations between Somalia and Kenya have frayed. Internal tensions exist between the different regions of Somalia are not good. The various clans and sub-clans in Somalia are constantly at odds with each other and may likely erupt into violence once again.

Great Power Competition. The Defense Department is now focused on strategic competition with China and Russia. To some, that means a shift to the Pacific and Eastern Europe with an emphasis on large conventional forces with the most modern ships, aircraft, and tanks. But to others, this means the competition is more likely to take place around the world in an environment where irregular warfare (some would say political warfare) is where the real competition is.

What Comes Next?

Future of Danab? The planned withdrawal of US forces will include the Special Forces contingent tasked with supporting the Danab special operations unit. Apparently a very small contingent of the US military will remain. The US has funded, trained, and partnered with this 1,000 man unit. It is commonly known that advisor work is best accomplished with person-to-person interaction. The premise that ‘advisor work’ can be accomplished remotely is largely dismissed by most members of the military that have been advisors. Certainly emails, Zoom sessions, video conferences, and phone calls have utility but nothing compares to an advisor on the ground sharing the battlespace.

It will be interesting (and perhaps disappointing) to observe the effectiveness of Danab over the next few years. There is the possibility that U.S. intelligence organizations will maintain a presence as well as private entities providing support, instruction, and advise through contract mechanisms with the State Department or Department of Defense.

Future Prospects? The Somali government has not met the milestones for the development of its security forces – goals set by the United States and the international community. In addition, it has not taken the steps for effective governance to alleviate the root causes of insurgent and tribal conflict. According to U.S. Africa Command al Shabaab remains adaptive, resilient, and capable of attacking US, Western, and partner interests in Somalia and East Africa.

The 19,000-man multinational African Union force will withdraw by the end of 2021. A withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Somalia accompanied by a reduction of ANISOM will likely increase the opportunity for al Shabaab to increase its influence and make further territorial gains. On January 20th a new president will occupy the White House. He may opt to reverse or adjust priorities in the region.

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References:

Task Force Quartz. “U.S. Africa Command stands up Joint Task Force – Quartz”, United States Africa Command, December 19, 2020.

IG Report on CT in Africa. The Defense Department posted the quarterly report for counterterrorism operations in East, North, and West Africa. This 98-page report provides information on the security situation in much of Africa to include Somalia. November 2020.

Recent Analysis and Commentary on Somalia.

“Why the Somali Danab SOF is Vital to the US and to Defeating Al-Shabaab”, by Steve Balestrieri, SOFREP, January 13, 2021.

“The Way Forward for the United States in Somalia”, by Stephen M. Schwartz, Foreign Policy Research Institute, January 12, 2021. Schwartz is a former U.S. Ambassador to Somalia (2016-2017).

In Somalia, mothers fear sons were sent to Ethiopia conflict

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MOGADISHU, Somalia (AP | Washington Post) — Pressure is growing on Somalia’s government amid allegations that Somali soldiers have been sent to fight in neighboring Ethiopia’s deadly Tigray conflict.

Mothers have held rare protests in Somalia’s capital, Mogadishu, and elsewhere, demanding to know the fate of their children who originally were sent to Eritrea for military training. They fear their children have been deployed to the Tigray region, where Ethiopian forces have been fighting Tigray ones since November in a conflict that threatens to destabilize the Horn of Africa.

“I heard that our children who were sent to Eritrea for military training have been taken and their responsibility was turned over to (Ethiopian Prime Minister) Abiy Ahmed to fight for him,” Fatuma Moallim Abdulle, the mother of 20-year-old soldier Ahmed Ibrahim Jumaleh, told The Associated Press.

“According to the information I gathered, our children were taken straight to Mekele city,” the capital of the Tigray region, she said. “You may understand how I feel, I am a mother who carried her child for nine months in my belly, that’s my blood and flesh.”

Ethiopia this week denied reports of the presence of Somali soldiers in Tigray, and it continued to deny the presence of Eritrean ones.

Abiy made peace with neighboring Eritrea in 2018, for which he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Now critics say Ethiopian and Eritrean forces have teamed up in the conflict against a common enemy in the now-fugitive Tigray leaders, who dominated Ethiopia’s government for nearly three decades before Abiy took office and embarked on around of regional peacemaking that included Somalia.

Somalia President Abdullahi Mohamed Abdullahi has been asked by the head of the country’s parliamentary committee on foreign affairs, Abdulqadir Ossoble Ali, to investigate allegations of participation in the Tigray conflict.

“We have the oversight right to check what our government is doing,” Ali wrote in the letter distributed to media outlets.

And the former deputy director for Somalia’s intelligence agency, Ismael Dahir Osman, has said “it is a question worth asking why these soldiers are not yet back home after more than a year when their training would have concluded long ago.”

Somalia’s information minister, Osman Abokor Dubbe, this week denied the “propaganda” that Somali soldiers who had been outside the country for training have been involved in the Tigray conflict.

“There are no Somali troops requested by the Ethiopian government to fight for them and fight in Tigray,” he said.

The issue has emerged at a sensitive time in Somalia. The country is set to hold national elections in the coming weeks, but two federal states have refused to participate and the opposition accuses the president of trying to push ahead with a partial vote.

“The parents of those children keep calling us and they don’t have any contact with their children, and some of them were told that their boys have died,” one opposition presidential candidate, Abdurahman Abdishakur Warsame, told the AP. “According to the information we’re receiving, those boys were taken to the war in northern Ethiopia. We’re calling for an independent national commission to investigate the matter, and if it is proven to be true, it will amount to treason of national scale.”

‘We don’t want war with Ethiopia,’ Sudan’s Sovereign Council says

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Ahram Online | The spokesperson argued the only way the border conflict can be solved is through resorting to technical committees that will handle the demarcation process.

The spokesperson of Sudan’s Sovereign Council, the transitional civilian-military body which governs the country, said that Khartoum “doesn’t want war with Ethiopia,” amid an ongoing dispute along the 1600-km border between the two countries.

Speaking to Al-Arabiya on Friday, Mohamed Al-Fakki stressed that Sudan is “capable of protecting our lands and restoring those left with Ethiopia,” adding that his country does not seek either a direct or proxy war with Addis Ababa.

“We only want our land,” Al-Fakki explained, adding that “the eruption of war between Sudan and Ethiopia is not in the region’s interest.”

Al-Fakki, moreover, highlighted that Sudan “entered the territories peacefully,” and that “If Sudan wants war, we would have entered Al-Fashqa since day one.”

“Why would Ethiopia accept to demarcate the border with Juba on basis of the 1902 [Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty] deal and refuse to have a similar one with Sudan,” Al-Fakki asked.

He also argued that the only way this border conflict can be solved is through resorting to technical committees that will handle the demarcation process.

Sudan has complained for years about attacks by Ethiopian farmers against its territories, counting on the support of Ethiopian militias to expel Sudanese citizens from their homes and take their possessions.

Last month, Sudan accused Ethiopia forces and militias of attacking Sudanese troops along the border, leaving four dead and more than 20 injured.

Media reports suggest that the conflict has taken place in agricultural land in Al-Fashqa, an eastern border region inside Sudan’s national boundaries, where Khartoum recently deployed troops.

In December, Sudan’s Information Minister Faisal Saleh told Reuters that “our army will do its duty to take back all our land, currently our army has taken back between 60 and 70 percent of Sudanese land.”

Saleh explained that Sudanese forces had clashed and acted defensively for two days against Ethiopian “regular forces” not militias.

“Sudanese intelligence reports confirmed that the organisation, training and arming of the forces that attacked were not militias but regular forces,” said Saleh.

Last month, both sides concluded a two-day meeting with the High-Level Political Committee that took place between top-level officials from the two countries.

The meeting was attended by Ethiopia’s Deputy Prime Minister and Top Diplomat Demeke Mekonnen, while Sudan’s Cabinet Affairs Minister Omar Munis led his country’s delegation.

No settlement has been reached so far on the border dispute, as military tensions along the borders continue to persist.

Could a National Dialogue Solve Ethiopia’s Political Crisis?

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USIP | It is time to talk about the common challenges that every Ethiopian faces.

While the recent conflict in Tigray renewed international focus on Ethiopia, more challenges lie ahead, including elections now scheduled for June 5. The state of Ethiopia’s political transition is contested, and the country remains polarized. However, as Ethiopian scholars Emebet Getachew, Mehari Taddele Maru, and Yohannes Gedamu discuss, a national dialogue process may have the potential to address the country’s dilemmas.

What is the current state of Ethiopia’s political transition?

Emebet: The political transition underway since Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed came to power is not Ethiopia’s first. Transition should be considered a recurrent Ethiopian phenomenon which, unfortunately, has rarely occurred peacefully. As with the 1974 revolution toppling Emperor Haile Selassie and the 1991 overthrow of the Derg military government, the consequences of the 2018 transition claimed many lives, even if the transfer of power itself was generally peaceful.

This transition means different things to different people. The initial euphoria that greeted the transition was short-lived. There was limited consensus to propel change. Critics were left out of the transition process leading to avoidable conflicts. The transition thus faces an uphill battle to stabilize and effectively govern the country, especially since reconciliation has not been high on the agenda.

Mehari: Ethiopia faces a “war of visions” as to its future. One vision is of centralization, the basis of which is to reclaim quasi-unitarist powers that have been—at least de jure—dismantled over decades. This vision recalls Ethiopia’s contested history of forcible assimilation. The same unitarist governance style, albeit with some aspects of decentralization, is now in the making. Proponents of this vision employ both constitutional norms, and when they deem necessary, unconstitutional, oppressive means including war on those who resist. This vision of centralization is undemocratic and antagonistic to multiculturalism.

On the other side is a vision of federalism, greater devolution of power, more autonomy, confederal arrangements, self-determination and even, potentially, secession. There are also middle positions between the two extremes with overlapping visions, based on maintaining the current constitution, with some tweaks. Ethiopia’s current system of multinational federalism still partially addresses the country’s historical problems, although it is also responsible for spawning new local conflicts.

By appointing new regional state presidents and councils, the prime minister’s office is replacing federalism with centralization. Supporters of Abiy back these actions as part of the transition to democracy and the preservation of the state, seemingly even at the cost of political instability, military confrontation, and the death of civilians. Choreographed narratives of national unity undermine the need for the constitutionally guaranteed governance of diversity. Political leaders of the most critical opposition to Abiy are in jail. Ethiopia has shut down independent and critical local media outlets, increased censorship and state propaganda, and reduced academic freedom. As a consequence, the Ethiopian state is in a precarious situation. The recent announcement of the election calendar only makes the state more fragile.

Yohannes: Reforms by Abiy’s administration were initially fast paced, although this has since slowed. But many key promises were fulfilled. In the first year of reforms, prisoners were released, the media revived, and exiled opposition returned to the country. A reformed ruling party has been established, which created inclusive politics by better involving regional political parties than previously. True, there have been serious peace and security challenges: repeated violence in Benishangul-Gumuz, Guji, and Wollega. Sadly, internal displacement and massacres on the basis of identity are now common. The government lost patience and even arrested some opposition leaders. However, the government continued to enact security sector reforms, long-term economic plans and other meaningful development programs, including environmental initiatives such as the Green Legacy Initiative.

Ethno-nationalist political narratives have increased ethnic polarization, inter-communal intolerance and violence, and are antagonistic to Abiy’s hope for unity. Such narratives that pit one group against another were exploited by some of Abiy’s opposition. Now that a date for a vote has been set, the 2021 elections will be another major test for Ethiopia’s future.

Given Ethiopia’s many challenges, is there a place for a national dialogue process?

Mehari: There is no military solution to a war of visions. Any government that fails to recognize the precedence of politics over military action risks facing protracted armed resistance and insurrection.

The Ethiopian government rejected calls for dialogue during the constitutional crisis in Ethiopia, when it became clear that elections would not be held on schedule and that the constitutional term of office of the government would soon expire. The government rejected dialogue to resolve the conflict with the Tigray region. Now, the solution lies in building bridges between communities and narrowing the gulf between the different political visions. Since existing institutions like the reconciliation commission are distrusted, a new process is required. A national dialogue is the best option of all, although it will not necessarily resolve all the problems Ethiopia faces.

Yohannes: Yes, there is always a place for national dialogue, as long as there is genuine commitment. Past Ethiopian regimes, including the one led by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) before 2018, downplayed the need for such dialogue by saying that the timing was not right, and that Ethiopia faced too many challenges at that moment. The Abiy government is the first in Ethiopian history to have established a reconciliation commission to study and recommend solutions. As with his other initiatives, however, some of Abiy’s opponents undermined the idea of this commission. However, I have hope that this is a good place from which dialogue can start, if people agree that reconciliation is also about looking forward rather than just arguing about the past. It is time to talk about the common challenges that every Ethiopian faces, not only concentrate on particular, group-based grievances.

Emebet: Initiatives that foster national dialogue are needed more than ever in Ethiopia. Existing civil society initiatives should not be overlooked. One such initiative is the Multi-stakeholder Initiative for National Dialogue (MIND), a coalition of Yehasab Me’ad (Plate of Ideas), Destiny Ethiopia and the Political Parties’ Joint Council, endorsed and supported by the Ministry of Peace. MIND intends to bring “contentious issues to the table and discuss them one by one to create a common understanding step by step.” Led by civil society, MIND aims to build confidence in the concept of dialogue among participants. An inclusive national dialogue could help MIND strengthen its attempts to resolve challenges to peace and security.

How could a successful national dialogue process for Ethiopia be designed?

Yohannes: Work could start with the reconciliation commission, which could educate the public about the dimensions of reconciliation and what the commission aims to achieve. Some critical differences among groups and parties must be examined, and a task force that involves all stakeholders organized to debate and reach at least partial consensus. The goal should be to arrive at a common national agenda.

Emebet: For a national dialogue to succeed, five aspects must be considered:

  • Credibility of the conveners: Public trust in who convenes a national dialogue is especially critical in a deeply polarized society like Ethiopia. The whole process depends on the integrity, impartiality, and public perception of the convener(s).
  • Inclusivity: If critical participants are excluded from the process, the credibility and legitimacy of the process will be reduced. Inclusion is an ongoing process, and broad-based consultations are necessary if people are to feel they are represented in both the process and the outcomes of the dialogue. A commitment to inclusivity requires both formal (track 1) and informal (track 2) efforts. It also requires being gender and conflict sensitive.
  • Institutional linkages: Dialogue does not occur in a vacuum. Thinking how the process involves, for example, regional governments and processes, such as the elections and the reconciliation commission, will strengthen the coherence of the effort. Critically, it is unlikely that dialogue can be sustained if past grievances and serious human rights violations are ignored, so links to the institutions responsible for these processes is also needed.
  • How dialogue outcomes will be implemented: A dialogue process will not in itself solve the problems of the country. Effective implementation of the dialogue’s outcomes is needed, including of any recommendations to amend policy and legislation as well as on accountability and reconciliation. The high expectations of the process must be managed.
  • Mobilizing resources: Significant technical and financial resources are needed to involve large number of participants and multiple consultations.

Mehari: Dialogue design must be a guided by the goals of the process. Further, the process must account for realities on the ground, in particular, the war in Tigray and conflicts elsewhere in Ethiopia, the detentions and stifling of critical voices in the political opposition, political prisoners, and recent atrocities, assassinations, and displacement.

There should be a pre-dialogue to consult stakeholders and to solicit views on the central issues to be addressed. These consultations should also inform the dialogue’s design. The design of the dialogue needs to consider structure and rules; the core agenda; criteria for determining the participants, who may include, but not be limited to, political parties and armed groups; seating arrangements; and a realistic timeline, all outlined in an implementation roadmap. A sound communications strategy is vital to build and maintain trust, publicize progress, address dis- and misinformation and where necessary, change behavior.

Ultimately, Ethiopian ownership of the process, participants’ political will, and determination to ensure implementation will be intrinsic to the success of any dialogue process.

 

Emebet Getachew is country program manager at the Life & Peace Institute in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Mehari Taddele Maru is a professor at the European University Institute in Florence, Italy. Yohannes Gedamu is a lecturer in political science at Georgia Gwinnett College in Lawrenceville, Georgia.

The views expressed by the authors are their own.

‘Disturbing’ allegations of rape in Ethiopia’s Tigray conflict, UN

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AFP | Yahoo News

The UN says it has received “disturbing” reports of sexual violence and abuse in Ethiopia’s conflict-hit Tigray region, including of individuals forced to rape members of their own family.

Pramila Patten, the UN’s special representative on sexual violence in conflict, said she was greatly concerned by serious allegations from the northern region, including “a high number of alleged rapes” in the Tigrayan capital Mekele.

“There are also disturbing reports of individuals allegedly forced to rape members of their own family, under threats of imminent violence,” Patten said in a statement Thursday.

“Some women have also reportedly been forced by military elements to have sex in exchange for basic commodities.”

Patten called on all parties involved in the hostilities to commit to a zero-tolerance policy for crimes of sexual violence.

Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, winner of the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize, announced military operations in Tigray in early November, saying they came in response to attacks by the regional ruling party on federal army camps.

Abiy declared victory after federal forces entered the regional capital in late November, though leaders of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) remain on the run and have vowed to fight on.

Patten noted that “medical centres have indicated an increase in the demand for emergency contraception and testing for sexually transmitted infections (STIs) which is often an indicator of sexual violence in conflict.”

She called for full humanitarian access to Tigray, including camps for displaced people “and refugee camps where new arrivals have allegedly reported cases of sexual violence.”

– Disease fears –

Patten voiced concern about “more than 5,000 Eritrean refugees in and around the area of Shire living in dire conditions, many of them reportedly sleeping in an open field with no water or food, as well as the more than 59,000 Ethiopians who have fled the country into neighbouring Sudan.”

The caretaker administration in Tigray did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

Earlier this month, state television broadcast footage of a meeting during which an unidentified man in a military uniform expressed concern about rapes in Mekele.

“Why are women being raped in Mekele city?” the man said.

“It wouldn’t be shocking had it been happening during the war, because it is not manageable so it could be expected. But at this moment while federal police and local police are back in town, it is still happening.”

A doctor in Mekele told AFP earlier this month his hospital had treated 15 rape victims in late November and December, though he noted that “most do not come to hospital.”

Thousands have died in the Tigray conflict, according to the International Crisis Group, though a communications blackout and media and humanitarian access restrictions have made it difficult to assess the situation on the ground.

As a result of the fighting in the region “many hospitals and clinics are only partially functioning or had to close” and “health care workers have been displaced,” Dr Ibrahima Soce Fall, assistant director general for emergency response at the World Health Organization (WHO), said during a briefing Friday in Geneva.

“Due to the conflict and disruptions, we are concerned about the potential for a number of diseases to spread in this region, including malaria, COVID-19, measles, cholera, meningitis and yellow fever,” Fall said, adding that access remained a “major” challenge.

After two months of war, Tigray faces starvation

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The Economist | Ethiopia’s government appears to be blocking food deliveries to the region

No image better symbolises the fall from power of the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (tplf), the party that had called the shots in Ethiopia for almost three decades. Sebhat Nega, one of its founders, was pictured this month in handcuffs, wearing a rumpled tracksuit and a single sock. The 86-year-old, long one of Ethiopia’s most powerful men, had been captured by the army. His party, which was pushed out of power amid massive protests in 2018, has been fighting the government led by Abiy Ahmed for the past two months. It is not going well.

Several other senior tplf figures have been killed by the army. Among them was Seyoum Mesfin, Ethiopia’s longest-serving foreign minister. The killings and arrests appear to have left the tplf in disarray. Its leaders, including the ousted president of the Tigray region, Debretsion Gebremichael, have been in hiding for over a month. Although the tplf still controls sizeable swathes of rural Tigray, it holds no towns or cities. Allies of Abiy, who has already declared victory, believe it is only a matter of time before the rest of what he calls the “junta” are captured or killed.

But time is not a luxury Tigrayans can afford. For weeks the vast majority of the region’s roughly 6m people have been without adequate food, water or medicine. According to the interim administration of Tigray, which Abiy appointed last month, more than 2m civilians have been driven from their homes. The state-appointed human-rights commission has warned of a “humanitarian crisis”. According to the Famine Early Warning Systems Network, run by the American government, parts of central and eastern Tigray are probably one step from famine. “We could have a million dead there in a couple of months,” frets a Western diplomat.

It is impossible to know how bad the crisis is because phone lines are down and the government has barred journalists from going to most of Tigray. It also restricts the movement of aid workers. But accounts are trickling out. In some places, especially in the north, crops have been burnt. In others, farmers abandoned their fields before the harvest.

Even where food is still available, many people have no means of getting it. Banks are closed across Tigray (apart from in Mekelle, the region’s capital). So are markets and shops. In many places fuel has run out. Inflation is rampant. “Even if you have the money, you don’t have a bank,” says Kibrom, who fled from Tigray to Addis Ababa, the Ethiopian capital, last month. “If you have grain, you don’t have a mill. If you have a mill, you don’t have power.”

Hospitals are also running out of supplies. In most, such as the one in Humera, a town close to Sudan and Eritrea, staff have not been paid since October. A lack of electricity means medicines are spoiling—if there are any left at all. When Médecins Sans Frontières (msf), an international charity, arrived at the hospital in Adwa earlier this month, its staff found that it had been almost completely looted. “How are we going to do blood transfusions that save lives if we don’t have a refrigerator?” asks Mari Carmen Viñoles, the head of msf’s emergency unit.

The federal government disputes such accounts. “There is no starvation in Ethiopia,” said a spokesman for the federal disaster management agency on January 19th. It claims to have distributed aid to nearly 2m people in northern Ethiopia (though it is unclear how many of those were actually in Tigray).

Muferiat Kamil, the minister of peace, says her ministry is reaching citizens even in the central areas of Tigray, which are largely under the control of the tplf. This is implausible. A senior humanitarian official notes that civilians in these places are “effectively trapped”. tplf forces regularly attack military convoys, which makes it impossible for the government to deliver supplies safely. An agreement signed with the un last month to allow aid groups to travel unhindered throughout the region is not being honoured. This is probably because officials do not want them to expose war crimes or the presence of thousands of troops from neighbouring Eritrea (who are helping the government). Four un staff were shot at and detained last month for entering areas where a government official said “they were not supposed to go”.

Lorries carrying emergency supplies are also being stopped. Despite some recent improvements, the system for getting permits to let them into Tigray is slow and complex. Even when permission is granted by the central government, local authorities in neighbouring regions halt shipments, saying that they too have to give permission. Once the lorries arrive in Tigray, local army commanders stop them, citing security or perhaps because they think the food will end up in rebel hands.

It is possible that Ethiopia’s government is too incompetent to realise that its actions are likely to cause starvation. But it seems more likely that the authorities are deliberately holding back food in an effort to starve the rebels out. “The lack of humanitarian access is part and parcel of the war campaign,” says a un diplomat. Even before the war began there was an effort to blockade Tigray to weaken its leaders. In October the federal government stopped welfare payments to poor farmers.

For decades Ethiopian governments have been guilty of putting politics before people. A famine in 1973 was covered up to avoid embarrassing the government of Emperor Haile Selassie. A decade later a Marxist military dictatorship burned crops and restricted aid to Tigray in an attempt to defeat the tplf, then a ragtag band of guerrillas. There is not yet a fully-fledged famine in Tigray. But there is a real danger that history will repeat itself. ■

Is Egypt behind Sudanese escalation on border with Ethiopia

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Source: Al-Monitor | Khalid Hassan

With the intensifying border conflict between Sudan and Ethiopia and the success of the Sudanese army in controlling the border areas where Ethiopian farmers have been living for decades, Ethiopia has been hurling accusations of a third party planning, funding and executing the recent confrontations on the border between the two countries.

Sudan’s Sovereignty Council Chairman Abdul Fattah Burhan said at a Jan. 16 press conference that deployment of Sudanese troops on the border with Ethiopia and the army’s control of the border areas were driven by domestic willingness, rather than foreign incitement. He denied the presence of any party pitting Sudan against Ethiopia.

Burhan’s comments came in response to Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s statement on Dec. 24 claiming that several parties, which he did not name, seek to undermine the relations between Ethiopia and Sudan and that these parties — in reference to Egypt — plotted, funded and executed the recent border confrontations between the two countries.

The Sudanese-Ethiopian border has been witnessing in the past weeks unprecedented escalation between the Sudanese army and its Ethiopian counterpart over the disputed al-Faqsha border region.

On Jan. 13, the Sudanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that a military Ethiopian aircraft entered Sudanese airspace, warning that such a move could have serious repercussions.

On Jan. 12, Sudan announced that al-Liya and Koli areas in al-Fashqa locality in western Sudan suffered an armed aggression from Ethiopian militias, killing five women and a child.

On Jan. 11, the Ethiopian military aircraft executed its first air sorties on the border areas in the Amhara region near eastern Sundus in the eastern Sudanese Qallabat locality.

The latest Ethiopian escalation comes after Sudanese troops launched a military attack on the border area and took control of al-Faqsha region on Dec. 31. In a Jan. 12 statement, Ethiopian Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Dina Mufti, accused Sudan of infiltrating into Ethiopian territories.

In light of the escalating conflict between the two countries, a high-ranking Sudanese convoy headed to Egypt Jan. 14 in an urgent visit and met with President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. They discussed the border developments between Sudan and Ethiopia.

Directly after the meeting, Sudan announced Jan. 14 a ban on civil aviation and overflights in the airspace of the Gedaref state on the border with Ethiopia, thus prompting questions about the implication of Cairo in the crisis and whether it is using Sudan to pressure Ethiopia in the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) crisis.

Ethiopian writer specializing in Ethiopian affairs Noureddin Abda told Al-Monitor that Sudan has been leaning toward escalation as of late. Its intervention to control the border area, its strict stances and withdrawal from the latest negotiations on the GERD, and its accusation of Ethiopia of being stubborn all prove this. He said that Sudan has adopted a completely different strategy in its relations with Ethiopia lately.

On Nov. 18, Sudan announced its withdrawal from the GERD negotiations between Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan.

On Jan. 11, the Sudanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that it would resort to other options if the African Union (AU) does not play a greater role in the GERD talks.

Abda noted, “The Egyptian role has been clear since the onset of the [border] crisis, when Egypt announced its full support for Sudan, which was followed by unprecedented Sudanese escalation on the borders through military mobilization and Burhan’s repeated visits to the borderline and his refusal of a truce.”

On Jan. 2, Sisi expressed in a phone call with Burhan his country’s complete support for Sudan in various fields, in light of the tight relations between the national security of both Egypt and Sudan.

On Jan. 13, Burhan and senior army commanders headed to the border area with Ethiopia where they stressed the ability of the armed forces to protect the land and maintain the country’s security.

Shifaa Afari, a writer and analyst specialized in African affairs, told Al-Monitor that Ethiopia is in a critical state and is avoiding escalation. For that reason, it is seeking a truce as it would be the biggest loser in the war. He said, “Ethiopia is a disintegrated state, especially following the Tigray war, and any escalation would negatively impact its situation.”

On Nov. 5, Ethiopia waged a military operation on the Tigray region in the north of the country to regain control of it.

On Dec. 24, Ahmed said that his government was intent on halting disputes and stopping clashes between the Ethiopian federal forces and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front for good on the borders.

Afari believes that Egypt will directly intervene if an all-out military confrontation breaks out between Ethiopia and Sudan.

Samir Ghattas, head of the Middle East Forum for Strategic Studies, argued that Egypt does not want to show its support for Sudan publicly. He noted that Egypt will back Sudan militarily, economically and politically, but without being in the spotlight, in an attempt to garner Sudanese support to pressure Ethiopia in the GERD issue.

“Egypt is well aware that Sudan is key for the course of negotiations, given the Ethiopian obstinacy. Therefore it has sought to tighten its military and political ties with Sudan and succeeded,” he said.

On Nov. 1, official spokesperson for the Egyptian army Tamer al-Rifai said that the commanders of the Egyptian and Sudanese armies who met in Khartoum agreed to boost cooperation in the fields of training, exchange of expertise and border security.

On Nov. 14, the Egyptian army launched joint military exercises between Egypt and Sudan, the first such drills between Egyptian and Sudanese special air forces.

On Nov. 20, Egypt’s National Organization for Military Production signed a memorandum of understanding with Sudan’s Military Industry Corporation to boost cooperation across all fields of military production.

Ghattas concluded, “It is true that Egypt played a role in the recent Sudanese escalation, but it does not want to stir a complete military confrontation between them [Sudan and Ethiopia]. It only wants a military escalation to achieve a political solution, which is the delay of the second filling of the GERD until a final solution is reached, since filling the dam has negative repercussions on the flow of water to Egypt.”

On Aug. 20, 2020, Ahmed said that the second phase of filling the GERD’s reservoir would start in August and that Ethiopia will not wait until the negotiations conclude to begin the filling operation. Around 18.4 billion cubic meters are expected to be filled, he added

Ghattas expects Ethiopia to cave in to Egyptian and Sudanese pressure and to delay filling the dam until the negotiations are concluded, especially since Ahmed does not want to open new fronts with the internal elections just around the corner.

On Dec. 25, the Electoral Council in Ethiopia announced its plan to organize parliamentary elections June 5.

UK backs Sudan economic reforms with over $50 million

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Source: AP | Noha Elhennawy 

Britain’s foreign secretary announced Thursday that his government would offer more than $50 million to help poor Sudanese families as their government embarks upon major austerity measures to revive its battered economy, Sudan’s state news agency reported.

On a visit to Khartoum, Dominic Raab and Sudanese Minister of Finance and Economic Planning Heba Mohamed Ali Ahmed signed a memorandum of understanding under which Britain commits to disbursing economic aid worth 40 million British pounds, or about $54.8 million, to the African country, SUNA reported.

Sudan is on a fragile path to democratic rule after a popular uprising led the military to overthrow longtime autocrat Omar al-Bashir in April 2019, after nearly three decades of rule. A military-civilian government is now in power but struggles with a wide range of economic challenges, including crippling debt, widespread shortages of essential goods such as fuel, bread and medicine, and a three-digit inflation rate.

“This is the first visit by a British foreign secretary to Sudan in more than ten years,” said Rosie Diyas, Britain’s spokesperson for the Mideast and North Africa. “The visit aims at supporting Sudan’s transition to democracy and civilian rule.”

The British aid will finance cash handouts to 1.6 million poor Sudanese, said Diyas. Aid recipients are expected to be those most hit by the economic reforms, slashing of subsidies and the reduction of public spending that the Sudanese government is expected to implement in order to reduce its huge public deficit.

Sudan’s transitional government has been racing against the clock to garner economic and political support of Western powers in order to end decades of its pariah status and secure reliefs of its crippling debt.

In the weeks before leaving office, former President Donald Trump removed Sudan from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, a move that allows Khartoum to get international loans. Sudan’s economy has suffered from decades of U.S. sanctions and mismanagement under al-Bashir, who had ruled the country since a 1989 Islamist-backed military coup. The removal of the terror designation came after Sudan followed in the footsteps of other key Arab countries, including the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, by normalizing relations with Israel.

Last year, Western and Arab countries pledged a total of $1.8 billion in aid to back Sudan at a donor meeting in Berlin. At the time, Britain pledged 66 million euros, more than $186 million.

According to Diyas, the U.K. has also offered another $6.87 million in aid to address Sudan’s urgent needs emanating from the influx of more than 50,000 Ethiopian refugees, who have recently fled their country following the eruption of war in Ethiopia’s Tigray province.

Shortly before boarding his Ethiopia-bound plane, Raab told reporters at Khartoum’s airport that his government hopes Ethiopia and Sudan can resolve the ongoing border dispute in “a sensible way”.

In recent weeks, the Sudanese army has deployed thousands of troops along the Ethiopian border and reclaimed territories controlled by Ethiopian militias. The Sudanese advances came on the heels of cross-border attacks that killed and wounded many Sudanese troops. The border tension raised concerns over a potential military conflict between the neighboring countries.

“We have a longstanding friendship with Sudan and likewise a strong partnership with Ethiopia. Our message is, let’s not at this precarious moment for the region see an escalation of tension,” said Raab, adding that he would reiterate the same message to the Ethiopians during his visit there.

SUNA reported that Raab had met with Gen. Abdel-Fattah Burhan, head of Sudan’s ruling sovereign council, Sudan’s prime minister, Abdalla Hamdok, and acting Foreign Minister Omar Qamar al-Din.

Raab had also meant to discuss with Sudanese officials the ongoing water dispute between Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia, SUNA reported earlier. The news agency did not later say if anything came out of those discussions. The dispute is about Ethiopia’s construction of a controversial dam on the Blue Nile River, the main tributary of the Nile, which Egypt says endangers its critical share of the Nile waters.

Situation Report EEPA HORN No. 63 – 22 January 2021

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Europe External Programme with Africa is a Belgium-based Centre of Expertise with in-depth knowledge, publications, and networks, specialised in issues of peace building, refugee protection and resilience in the Horn of Africa. EEPA has published extensively on issues related to movement and/or human trafficking of refugees in the Horn of Africa and on the Central Mediterranean Route. It cooperates with a wide network of Universities, research organisations, civil society and experts from Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Djibouti, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Uganda and across Africa. Key in-depth publications can be accessed on the website.

Reported war situation (as confirmed per 21 January)

● The Economist states that “Ethiopia’s government appears to be wielding hunger as a weapon” as the Tigray region is ”being starved into submission”, citing reports of “horrifying accounts of ethnic killings, mass rapes—and starvation.”

● This is a human made tragedy, with purposeful ‘red tape’ created by the Ethiopian Ministry of Peace, according to the UN, stating that “Plenty of food is available. Charities and UN agencies have been trying to get supplies through for months. But Ethiopia’s Orwellian Ministry of Peace has sent them on a paperchase for permits.”

● UN Humanitarian Chief, Mark Lowcock, states: “For more than two months there has been essentially no access to Tigray. (..) There are 450 tonnes of supplies we’ve been trying to get in that are stuck.”

● Lowcock states that when the federal government is on rare occasions granting permission “for an aid lorry to pass” it is obstructed on the way: “it is typically stopped en route by regional governments, which insist that they, too, need to give permission, or halted by troops inside Tigray.”

● The Economist calls for donors to tie any support to full humanitarian access: “Others, such as America and Britain, should add financial pressure. Ethiopia is desperately short of foreign currency, and depends on loans and grants from the IMF and World Bank. Until its government allows food into Tigray, donors should not give it another dollar.” In other words: no aid until civilians are allowed to eat.

● United Nations Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict and Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations, Pramila Patten said, “I am greatly concerned by serious allegations of sexual violence in the Tigray region of Ethiopia, including a high number of alleged rapes in the capital, Mekelle”.

● Pramilla Patten states that: “There are also disturbing reports of individuals allegedly forced to rape members of their own family, under threats of imminent violence. Some women have also reportedly been forced by military elements to have sex in exchange for basic commodities, while medical centres have indicated an increase in the demand for emergency contraception and testing for sexually transmitted infections. In addition, there are increasing reports of sexual violence against women and girls in a number of refugee camps.”

● Pramilla Patten calls on all parties involved in the hostilities in the Tigray region “to commit to a zero-tolerance policy for crimes of sexual violence, in line with their respective obligations under international humanitarian and human rights law.”

● It is reported that two Generals of Tigray, Major General Mohammed Esha and Brigadier General Mulugeta Berhe, regional forces have surrendered to the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF).

● An Ethiopian spokesperson reports that the two generals were members of the TPLF Central command and coordinated actions against the northern ENDF command post in Nov 2020. However, this is denied by a source who states that: “This is exaggeration. The major commanders are not these.” adding that the generals had retired “a long time ago” and were “not involved in leading operations” as they had “serious health problems.”

● Confirmation that journalist Dawit Kebede Araya was killed by Ethiopian government Security Forces. The journalist was working at Tigray TV. He was killed together with the lawyer Bereket Berhe in the area Adi Hawsi: “Both were shot in their head and their bodies were found in a car they were driving.” at 8 pm EAT (19/1).

● Correction: A witness states that Eritrean troops killed Tigray soldiers, priests, farmers, and burned crops. The Eritrean troops forced farmers and priests to slaughter their own animals and they killed the farmers if they refused to do so.

Reported situation in Tigray (as confirmed per 21 January)

● Ethiopian Broadcasting Corporation (EBC) has reported that Aksum University graduating students will be enrolled at Mekelle University, Kwiha Campus to complete their studies.

● Previous reports indicate that Aksum University was destroyed and looted by Eritrean and Ethiopian forces. There is a report of a male lecturer killed under cruel circumstances in a report by a witness, stating the killing was carried out by Eritrean soldiers. A witness who screamed was also killed in a sadistic act of violence, according to a witness report.

● Water supply in Tigray has been affected as the Gereb Geba clean water dam has stopped operating and workers have left work because of the conflict. The situation is aggravated by the looting of all the offices, money taken from safes, and vehicles, drilling machines and generators taken away.

Reported situation in Ethiopia (as confirmed per 21 January)

● Mr. Dina Mufti, spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, denies allegations that Eritrean and Somali soldiers are among forces fighting in Tigray, speaking to the media today (20/11). The statement came after the head of the Sovereign Council in Sudan, Al-Burhan, stated that Ethiopia and Sudan had discussed tactical issues prior to the war began in Tigray. Other reports also indicated that tactical preparations were made with Eritrea and with Somalia prior to the beginning of hostilities.

● Mr Dina Mufti rejected an offer by South Sudan to mediate between Ethiopia and Sudan.

● Concern that the conflict in Ethiopia’s Tigray region may negatively affect foreign investors in the Ethiopian garment industry, an upcoming market.

● Several settlements in Benishangul Gumz’s Metekel zone have caught on fire since January 1, 2021, with a high likelihood of these being attacks, as part of the ongoing conflict in this part of Ethiopia.

Reported International situation (as confirmed per 21 January)

● UK Foreign Secretary, Dominique Raab, is visiting East Africa to urge Prime Minister Abiy to express the need for unrestricted humanitarian access to provide assistance to the Tigray region.

● Raab, during a visit to Sudan, has also said that the British government would back Sudanese economic reform with 50 million US dollars. Some of the aid would be direct handouts to Sudanese families.

Disclaimer:
All information in this situation report is presented as a fluid update report, as to the best knowledge and understanding of the authors at the moment of publication. EEPA does not claim that the information is correct but verifies to the best of ability within the circumstances. Publication is weighed on the basis of interest to understand potential impacts of events (or perceptions of these) on the situation. Check all information against updates and other media. EEPA does not take responsibility for the use of the information or impact thereof. All information reported originates from third parties and the content of all reported and linked information remains the sole responsibility of these third parties. Report to info@eepa.be any additional information and corrections.

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