Foreign meddling as a source of state fragility in Ethiopia

/0 Comments/in , , , /by

MEMO Opinion | State fragility is a multidimensional concept that is often characterized by deficiencies in one or more areas of the core functions of the state: legitimacy, authority (competing claimants to power), and capacity (weak capacity to provide basic government functions). State fragility poses a serious problem for many developing countries as it leads to human flight and economic decline. Since 2015, for example, only five countries (Afghanistan, Somalia, S. Sudan, and Syria) have generated over 60 per cent of the 15 million refugees.

In many cases, state fragility is not just due to domestic political tensions, but a result of foreign intrusion into the affairs of countries. External intervention includes, but is not limited to, external support for factions opposed to the government, covert operations by foreign forces to destabilize the government, as well as foreign governments’ influence on outside actors such as multilateral agencies to suspend budget support, foreign aid, and other funding.

Negotiations have been underway between Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan to reach a fair and balanced agreement that preserves the water rights of all three countries. This includes agreement on mechanisms for resolving disputes and ways to coordinate and exchange information regarding the operation of water dams in each country. The parties need to depoliticize their argument and use reliable science-based solutions that do not disadvantage the interests of any party.

While these negotiations are underway, Egypt has resorted to clandestine measures to achieve its narrow objectives. One is to destabilize the Ethiopian regime, for example, by providing financial and military support to political opponents, arming and training militants from Benishangul-Gumuz (the area where the dam is located) to carry out incidences of mass violence to create overall instability in the region. There is also increasing evidence that Egypt has also encouraged the Sudanese government’s takeover of several Ethiopian towns on the border (they made a statement that they support Sudan in its border conflict with Ethiopia). This is all because Ethiopia decided to exercise its legal right to build a dam within its domestic borders. This right is consistent with domestic and international law. Even though 85 per cent of Nile river water originates in Ethiopia, nearly all consumption and use occur downstream in Egypt and Sudan.

In many cases, Egypt has been breaking off the negotiations creating abnormal delays, disregarding the agreed procedures, and refusing to consider adverse proposals or interests. These are actions that amount to breaches of good faith and most likely abuse of the rights of states.

International law obliges states to negotiate disputes in good faith that arise in connection with the use and protection of shared natural resources. The essential nature of the obligation is for the parties to make efforts to strive towards an agreement that reconciles their competing rights of use. Good faith negotiations also include not advancing wholly self-serving legal arguments that undermine the rights of other parties, and not resorting to extra-legal measures to advance your goals.

In negotiations, it is essential to realize that successful negotiation is a joint effort. The use of direct or indirect pressure on other parties will harden positions and derail any efforts to reach an agreement.

Egyptian meddling in Ethiopia’s internal affairs to achieve its narrow goals on the dam is likely to have serious ramifications beyond the existing dispute at hand. Firstly, beyond its potential benefit, the dam issue is personal for most Ethiopians. Millions of citizens contributed out of their meager earnings to build the dam. Any effort by other nations that undermines the completion and use of the dam would be treated as an act of war by most people.

Secondly, Egypt and Ethiopia are important countries in the region with centuries of history and civilization. Their actions set a precedent in the region. It sends the message that if you don’t get your way through negotiation, you can bully your negotiating partner into submission.

Thirdly, such meddling will not achieve its objectives. Given Ethiopia’s anti-colonial past and resistance to foreign aggression, it is likely to harden the country’s position on the dam. This may be the most accommodating Ethiopian government that is willing to resolve disputes through negotiation. Future governments are likely to take the hardline position and resist any future negotiations that compromise their autonomy on the dam.

Fourthly, in spite of their long history and civilization, both countries face severe development challenges: high levels of poverty, income inequality, poor governance, and political instability. They are far behind in extending to their citizens the opportunities to fulfil their aspirations for a better life. The Fund for Peace, which prepares the State Fragility Index for 178 countries, ranks Egypt as the 35th most fragile state behind Angola and Mauritania (Ethiopia is ranked 21st) for 2020. The evaluation is based on social cohesion, economic indicators (economic decline, income inequality, human flight, and brain drain), political indicators (human rights, rule of law, state legitimacy, and public services), and social factors such as demographic pressures, refugees and internally-displaced people and external intervention. Such foreign meddling is not without cost for Egypt, which desperately needs these resources to build schools, infrastructure, and healthcare for its people.

Political observers of the Middle East suggest that such foreign meddling is intended to divert attention away from the critical issues facing the country such as poor governance, democracy, and human rights, and help it to gain some political legitimacy by appearing as a defender of the national interest.

Finally, such actions poison the well of Egypt-Ethiopia relations and create a sense of hostility between the two peoples who have lived peacefully for generations. Most people think that these actions do not reflect the will of the Egyptian people and are solely an act of a rogue regime that is out of touch.

It is time to stop foreign meddling and get back to work to bring about a mutually satisfactory solution by way of compromise, even if it means the relinquishment of strongly held positions and a willingness to meet the other side partway. Any attempt to destabilize your negotiating partner to achieve your goals, or insist upon the complete capitulation of your partner, is bad policy and will not work.

Ethiopia’s leader won the Nobel Peace Prize. Now he’s accused of war crimes.

/0 Comments/in , , , /by

Washingtonpost (Opinion)  — FIFTEEN MONTHS ago Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for ending his country’s conflict with neighboring Eritrea. Now he may be perpetrating grave crimes against humanity. After launching an invasion of the rebellious province of Tigray, Mr. Abiy’s regime stands accused of sealing off the region and blocking deliveries of food and other humanitarian aid. International aid officials are warning that millions of people could be at risk of famine.

When he rose to power in 2018, Mr. Abiy displaced politicians and generals from Tigray who had ruled Ethiopia for 27 years under a ruthless autocracy. In addition to ending the war, the new leader released political prisoners and promised democratic elections. Yet the campaign Mr. Abiy launched against Tigray in early November has all the earmarks of Ethiopia’s previous dictators. In occupying the province’s capital and other towns, federal forces, ethnic militias and allied troops from Eritrea have carried out massacres and rapes, according to the sporadic reports emerging from the region. Journalists have been banned, and phone and Internet services are down. Two million of Tigray’s 6 million people are believed to be displaced.

Without food deliveries, many of those people could starve. Yet up until late last week, federal and regional officials were blocking deliveries by the United Nations, even while government troops reportedly burned crops and destroyed livestock. On Friday, U.N. humanitarian relief coordinator Mark Lowcock reported that authorities had finally authorized the movement of 500 metric tons of food to Tigray’s main cities and two out of four refugee camps. But, he tweeted, “we must get more aid workers and life-saving supplies into Tigray so we can scale up operations.” U.N. officials say about 80 aid workers are waiting in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa, for permission to travel to Tigray. Until they can get in, it won’t be clear how serious the food problem remains.

Mr. Abiy’s government claims to be engaged in a “stabilizing mission” after routing the forces of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). In fact, it has been relentlessly hunting down fugitive TPLF leaders — including longtime former Ethiopian foreign minister Seyoum Mesfin, 71, who was gunned down this month in what authorities claimed was a shootout. Though four dozen TPLF leaders have reportedly been killed or captured, scores remain at large, along with thousands of fighters who still control parts of the province.

Mr. Abiy contends his forces have already triumphed in Tigray and the conflict will soon be over. More likely, a guerrilla war with the TPLF will drag on for years, and the humanitarian crisis will deepen, even if an immediate famine is averted. That’s why the United States and the European Union, which heavily fund Ethiopia, should withhold further aid until there is full humanitarian access to Tigray and the government agrees to pursue peace talks.

Ethiopia’s leader must answer for the high cost of hidden war in Tigray

/0 Comments/in , , , /by

The Guardian | Simon Tisdall | Abiy Ahmed should hand back his Nobel peace prize over his actions in the breakaway region that have raised the spectre of famine again.

Seyoum Mesfin, Ethiopia’s long-serving former foreign minister, was one of the foremost African diplomats of his generation. He was gunned down this month in Tigray by the armed forces of a lesser man – Abiy Ahmed, Ethiopia’s prime minister and Nobel peace prize winner. Some suggest it was the Eritrean military, Abiy’s allies, who killed Seyoum, although their presence in Tigray is officially denied. The circumstances of his death remain murky.

As with much of the unreported, unchallenged murder and mayhem currently occurring in northern Ethiopia, murky is what Abiy prefers. When he ordered the army’s assault on the breakaway Tigray region in November, he blocked the internet, shut out aid agencies and banned journalists. It’s a conflict he claims to have won – but the emerging reality is very different. It’s a war fought in the shadows, with the outside world kept in the dark.

After humanitarian workers finally gained limited access this month, it was estimated that 4.5 million of Tigray’s 6 million people need emergency food aid. Hundreds of thousands are said to face starvation. The UN warns that Eritrean refugees in the Mai Aini and Adi Harush camps are in “desperate need of supplies” and harassed by armed gangs. Some are said to have been forcibly, illegally repatriated.

Access continues to be denied to two other camps, Shimelba and Hitsats, which have been set ablaze. Many of the camps’ residents are believed to have fled marauding Eritrean and Amhara militiamen. Satellite images published by UK-based DX Open Network reportedly show damage to 400 structures at Shimelba. Filippo Grandi, head of the UN refugee agency, points to “concrete indications of major violations of international law”.

There are persistent, unconfirmed reports of massacres, torture, rapes, abductions, and the looting or destruction of centuries-old manuscripts and artefacts across Tigray. Last week, EEPA, a Belgium-based NGO, described a massacre of 750 people at a cathedral in Aksum that reputedly houses the Ark of the Covenant. Ethiopian troops and Amhara militia are accused of the killings at the Church of St Mary of Zion, part of a UN World Heritage site. The report has not been independently verified.

Despite Abiy’s claims that the war is over and no civilians have been harmed, sporadic fighting continues, an analyst familiar with government thinking said. Thousands of people have died, about 50,000 have fled to Sudan, and many are homeless, sheltering in caves. Intentional artillery attacks have destroyed hospitals and health centres in an echo of the Syrian war, the analyst said.

Meeting this month in Mekelle, Tigray’s capital, aid workers complained Ethiopia’s government was still hindering relief efforts and demanded full access. “People are dying of starvation. In Adwa, people are dying while they are sleeping. [It’s] the same in other zones,” a regional administrator, Berhane Gebretsadik, was quoted as saying. But there has been scant response from Addis Ababa.

Official Ethiopian and Eritrean denials that Eritrean forces are operating in Tigray are contradicted by eyewitness accounts. Amid the murk, it seems clear Eritrea’s dictator-president, Isaias Afwerki, has made common cause with Abiy. The two met in Addis Ababa in October, shortly before the war was launched, to discuss the “consolidation of regional cooperation”.

Afwerki is an old enemy who runs a brutally repressive regime. But he shares Abiy’s hatred of the Tigrayan leadership that dominated the government of former prime minister Meles Zenawi during Ethiopia’s 20-year border war with Eritrea. Abiy, an Oromo from Ethiopia’s largest ethnic group, made peace with Eritrea in 2018, ousted his Tigrayan rivals, and has been feuding with them ever since.

Further evidence of secret alliances comes from Somalia. The Somali Guardian reported this month that 2,500 Somali recruits were treated as “cannon fodder” after being sent to a military base in Eritrea for training, then deployed in Tigray with Eritrean forces. Dozens are reported to have been killed.

International scrutiny of Abiy’s Tigray war has been largely lacking. An exception is the EU, which has indefinitely suspended €88m in aid to Addis Ababa. “We receive consistent reports of ethnic-targeted violence, killings, looting, rapes, forceful return of refugees and possible war crimes,” Josep Borrell, the EU foreign affairs chief, said.

The UN and EU warnings, coupled with the shocking murder of the internationally respected Seyoum Mesfin, may now bring closer scrutiny. I met Seyoum, a co-founder in 1975 of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, in Addis in 2008. He was a master diplomat. According to Alex de Waal, the Africa specialist, Seyoum was a skilled peacemaker in Rwanda and Sudan who “presided over the rehabilitation of Ethiopia’s international standing” after 1991.

Abiy now risks destroying that standing. “The circumstances of Seyoum’s killing aren’t clear. The Ethiopian government is not a reliable source of information. Eritrea – which may well have carried out the assassinations – is remaining silent. The official report that Seyoum and his colleagues ‘refused to surrender’ is opaque,” De Waal wrote.

He noted that the two other elderly Tigrayans killed alongside Seyoum, aged 71, were Abay Tsehaye, who had just had heart surgery, and Asmelash Woldeselassie, who was blind. This trio hardly posed a physical threat to heavily armed troops.

Abiy seems to have lost control of events. There is anger in Mekelle, where a puppet administration has been installed, about ongoing security issues, including rapes. The threat of rural famine looms large. In the mid-1980s, mass starvation in Ethiopia shocked the world. About 1 million people died. Those horrors were subsequently vanquished by decades of hard work.

To Abiy’s great shame, the spectre of famine now haunts Ethiopia again. The good work of the past is being undone. He should hand back his Nobel peace prize and answer for his actions in Tigray.

የኢትዮጵያ ፍጻሜ: ጉዞ ወደ ዩጎዝላቪያ?

/0 Comments/in , , /by

ኦህዴድ-ብልጽግና፣ መሬት አስመላሹ ብአዴንና ህግደፍ-ሻዕቢያ፣ ህወሓትን ለየብቻ መግጠም ስለማይችሉ፣ ተቧድነው ገጠሙት። ሁሉም የጋራ ጠላት እንጂ የሚያስተሳስራቸው የጋራ ሌላ አጀንዳ የላቸውም። ያሸነፉ በመሰላቸው ማግስት፣ እርስ በእርስ መባላት እንደሚጀምሩ ሳይታለም የተፈታ ነበር። ብዙ ዝርዝር ጽፌያለሁ ስለዚህ ጉዳይ፣ ወደዛ አልመልሳችሁም። ፈትቶ የለቀቀው የአማራ ምልሻ / ልዩ ሀይል የአብይ አሕመድ ዋነኛ ራስ ምታቱ ነው። ይህ ሀይል ለ30 ዓመታት ሲፎክርና ሲሸልል ኖረ እንጂ ተኩሶ አያውቅም። አሁን ተደራጅቶ በቆመህ ጠብቀኝ የመተኮስ እድሉን አገኝቷል። ወልቃይትና ራያን እንዲይዝ ተፈቀደሎታል። ይህ የልብ ልብ ይሰጠውና ፊቱን ወደ ሌላ መሬት የማስመለስ ዘመቻ ያዞራል አልነ። እንሆ፣ በቤንሻንጉል ጉምዝ ልዩ ሀይልና ምልሻውን አሰማርቶ፣ ሲቪሎቹን ለፖለቲካ ትርፍ እየማገደ፣ በሰው ክልል ጦርነት ከፈተ። ኦህዴድና ኦነግም ከጉምዝ ጎን ቆመው እየከተከቱት ይገኛሉ። በጅምላ ተጨፍጭፈው፣ በጭነት መኪና ሬሳቸው እየተነዳ፣ በጅምላ እየተቀበሩ ነው። ሰው ያልዘራውን አያጭድም።

አብይ አሕመድ ያለ የሌለ ጉልበቱን ትግራይ ላይ ጨርሷል። በሌላ ክልል ጸጥታ ሊያስከብር ቀርቶ፣ በትግራይ የጀመረውን መቋጨት አይችልም። ሻዕቢያም ከቁጥጥሩ ውጭ ሆኖ፣ መከላከያ ፈለገ አልፈለገ፤ የትግራይ ጊዜያዊ አስተዳደረ ፈቀደ አልፈቀደ፣ ግድ ሳይሰጠው፣ ያሻውን እያደረገ ነው። ይህ ብልጽግናን ከፈሎታል። መከላከያን ከፈሎታል። በመከላከያና በብልጽግና ቅራኔ ፈጠሯል። አሁን ትግራይ መቀበሪያቸው ብቻ ሳትሆን፣ እርስ በእርስ የሚጫረሱባት የጦርነት አውድም እየሆነች ነው።

የአገር ውስጥ ራስ ምታቱ በቤንሻንጉል ጉምዝና በትግራይ ብቻ አይደለም እየታየ ያለው። በኦሮሚያ ኦነግ ግማሹን ቦታ ተቆጣጥሮታል። የኦህዴድ ተከታዮች ሳይቀሩ፣ ወደ ኦነግ ማዘንበል መርጠዋል። ጃል መሮን የሚከተል ሰራዊት፣ በ10ሺዎች የሚቆጠሩ ሆነዋል። በሺዎች የሚቆጠሩ የኦሮሚያ ክልል ያሰለጠናቸው ምልሻዎች፣ ጃል መሮን እየተቀላቀሉ ነው። ድፍን ኦሮሞ “እስከዛሬ ለኢዮጵያ የሞትነው ይበቃል፣ ለአገሪቱ እየሞትን በአገሪቱ እየተከዳንና እየተገደልን መኖር የለብንም፣ ከእንግዲህ ትግላችን ለነጻነታችን መሆን አለበት” ብሏል። አብይ አሕመድ ለስልጣኑ ሲል፣ ኦሮሞን ክዶ፣ ከሁሉም ተነጥሎ ብቻዉን ቀርቶ፣ የነፍጠኛ ስርዓት ለመመለስና ለማንገስ እያሸረገደ ነው ብሎ የሚከሰው ድፍን ኦሮሞ ነው። ብንፈልግ እንኳን ኢዮጵያ ከእንግዲህ የመትረፍ እድል የላትም በማለት ኦሮሞ የራሱን ህልውና ወደሚያስከብርበት፣ ጥቅሙን ወደሚያስጠብቅበት ትግል አቅንቷል።

በሌላ በኩል ደግሞ ቅርቃር ውስጥ እንደገባ የተረዳው አብይ አሕመድ፣ የአማራ ልዩ ሀይልና ምልሻን በማስቀጥቀጥ፣ ነፍጠኛን ለመስበር በማሴር፣ ሱዳን ጦሯን ድንበር ላይ እንድታሰፍር ከሱዳን ጋር መስማማቱን በየሚዳው እየተነገረ ነው። ይህን ሊያደርግ እንደሚችል ከዴይ ዋን ጀምሮ ገምተን ነበር። የልብ ልብ የሰጠው ነፍጠኛ ከሱዳን ጋርም ይተናኮሳል፣ ቢተናኮስም በአብይ ትዕዛዝ ከመከላከያ ድጋፍ አያገኝም የሚል መላምት አስቀምጠን ነበር። እንደተገመተው ብቻ ሳይሆን ከገመትነው ባላይ ነው እየሆነ ያለው። ራሱ አብይ፣ ጦርነቱን የጀመሩትን የአማራ ምልሻና ልዩ ሀይል በይፋ በማህበራዊ ሚድያ ገጾቹ ኮንኗል። የኛን ሰላም የማይሹና የሁለቱ አገራት ወዳጅነት የማይረዱ ናቸው፣ ሲል በሱዳን ወታደር ክፉኛ መቀጥቀጣቸው ሳያንስ ድርጊታቸውን ኮንኗል። ከዛ ብኋላ ነው መከላከያ ለሁለት የተከፈለው። ከአብይ ትዕዛዝ ውጭና ከብርሃኑ ጁላ እውቀት ውጪ፣ በነፍጠኛው የሚመራ የመከላከያ ብራንች ከሱዳን ጋር መጠነኛ ጦርነት ከፍቶ ቆይቷል። አሁንም እንደተፋጠጠ ነው። ምልሻው ብቻዉን ስላልቻለ፣ ጦርነቱን በሁለት ሉአላዊ አገራት መካከል ለማድረግና ከሌላው ህዝብ የድረሱልኝ ጥሪ ለማሰማት ነው ትንኮሳው። በዚህ የብልጽግና መሪዎች አልተስማሙም። ለበርካታ ቀናት አብይ አሕመድ የገባበት አይታወቅም። አንዴ ተመርዟል፣ ሌላ ጊዜ ታሟል፣ ሌላ ጊዜ ታፍኗል የሚል ወሬ እንደሰማን አለን። ምንም ይሁን ምን፣ አገሪቱን አክቲቭሊ እየመራ እንዳልሆነና ለበርካታ ቀናት ከህዝብ እየታ ርቆ እንዳለ ግልጽ ነው።

ይህ ሁሉ ሔዶ ሔዶ የሚጠናቀቀው በአንድ አስቀያሚ እልቂት ነው። በተለይ በኦሮሚያና በአማራ ክልል የሰለጠኑ ልዩ ሀይሎች፣ እርስ በእርስ የሚጫረሱበት ግዜ እየመጣ ነው። ፊንፊኔ/አዲስ አበባ እየተሰማ ያለው ተኩስና ፍንዳታ፣ እየታየ ያለው የእሳት ቃጠሎ፣ የፍጻሜው መነሻ ምልክቶች ናቸው። ኢዮጵያ ከሞተችና ከተበተነች ሰነባብታለች። ክፋቱ በሰላም መለያየት ሲቻል፣ በደም አፋሳሽ መንገድ እንዲሆን፣ መንጋው መምረጡ ነው ጉዞዋን ወደ ዩጎዝላቪያ እየቃኘ ያለው።

የህወሓት መሪዎችን በማሰርና በመግደል የተወሳሰበና ለክፍለዘመናት የኖረ ችግራቸውን የሚፈቱ መስሏቸው የነበሩ ሰዎች ዛሬ፣ ትግራይ ላይ ቃታቸውን የሳቡባትን ቀን መርገም ጀምረዋል። ገና ነው፣ ጸጸቱ የምትችሉት አይሆንም።

The Trouble With Ethiopia’s Ethnic Federalism

/0 Comments/in , , , /by

The reforms by the country’s new prime minister are clashing with its flawed Constitution and could push the country toward an interethnic conflict.

Source: NYT Opinion | Mahmood Mamdani

Abiy Ahmed, the 42-year-old prime minister of Ethiopia, has dazzled Africa with a volley of political reforms since his appointment in April. Mr. Abiy ended the 20-year border war with Eritrea, released political prisoners, removed bans on dissident groups and allowed their members to return from exile, declared press freedom and granted diverse political groups the freedom to mobilize and organize.

Mr. Abiy has been celebrated as a reformer, but his transformative politics has come up against ethnic federalism enshrined in Ethiopia’s Constitution. The resulting clash threatens to exacerbate competitive ethnic politics further and push the country toward an interethnic conflict.

The 1994 Constitution, introduced by Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front governing coalition, recast the country from a centrally unified republic to a federation of nine regional ethnic states and two federally administered city-states. It bases key rights — to land, government jobs, representation in local and federal bodies — not on Ethiopian citizenship but on being considered ethnically indigenous in constituent ethnic states.

The system of ethnic federalism was troubled with internal inconsistencies because ethnic groups do not live only in a discrete “homeland” territory but are also dispersed across the country. Nonnative ethnic minorities live within every ethnic homeland.

Ethiopia’s census lists more than 90 ethnic groups, but there are only nine ethnically defined regional assemblies with rights for the officially designated majority ethnic group. The nonnative minorities are given special districts and rights of self-administration. But no matter the number of minority regions, the fiction of an ethnic homeland creates endless minorities.

Ethnic mobilization comes from multiple groups, including Ethiopians without an ethnic homeland, and those disenfranchised as minorities in the region of their residence, even if their ethnic group has a homeland in another state.

Ethnic federalism also unleashed a struggle for supremacy among the Big Three: the Tigray, the Amhara and the Oromo. Although the ruling E.P.R.D.F. is a coalition of four parties, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front representing the Tigray minority has been in the driving seat since the 1991 revolution. The Amhara, dominant before 1991, and the Oromo, the largest ethnic group in the country, complained they were being treated as subordinate minorities.

When the government announced plans to expand Addis Ababa, the federally run city-state, into bordering Oromo lands, protests erupted in 2015. The Amhara joined and both groups continued to demand land reform, equal political representation and an end to rights abuses.

Prime Minister Haile Mariam Desalegn, who took office in 2012 after the death of the long-term premier and Tigray leader Mr. Zenawi, responded brutally to the protests. Security forces killed between 500 and 1,000 protesters in a year. Faced with a spiraling crisis, the ruling E.P.R.D.F. coalition appointed Mr. Abiy, a former military official and a leader of the Oromo People’s Democratic Organization — a constituent of the ruling coalition — as prime minister.

Mr. Abiy’s reforms have been applauded but have also led to greater ethnic mobilization for justice and equality. The E.P.R.D.F.’s achievement since 1991 was equal education for girls and boys, rural and urban, leading to greater prominence of women, Muslims and Pentecostal groups.

The recent reforms of Mr. Abiy, who was born to a Muslim Oromo father and an Orthodox Amhara mother and is a devout Pentecostal Christian, have further broadened political participation to underprivileged groups.

Mobilization of ethnic militias is on the rise. Paramilitaries or ethnic militias known as special police, initially established as counterinsurgency units, are increasingly involved in ethnic conflicts, mainly between neighboring ethnic states. A good example is the role of the Somali Special Force in the border conflict with the Oromia state, according to Yonas Ashine, a historian at Addis Ababa University. These forces are also drawn into conflicts between native and nonnative groups.

Nearly a million Ethiopians have been displaced from their homes by escalating ethnic violence since Mr. Abiy’s appointment, according to Addisu Gebregziabher, who heads the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission.

Fears of Ethiopia suffering Africa’s next interethnic conflict are growing. Prime Minister Abiy himself is constantly invoking religious symbols, especially those linked to American Protestant evangelical megachurches, and has brought a greater number of Pentecostals into the higher ranks of government.

Ethiopians used to think of themselves as Africans of a special kind, who were not colonized, but the country today resembles a quintessential African system, marked by ethnic mobilization for ethnic gains.

In most of Africa, ethnicity was politicized when the British turned the ethnic group into a unit of local administration, which they termed “indirect rule.” Every bit of the colony came to be defined as an ethnic homeland, where an ethnic authority enforced an ethnically defined customary law that conferred privileges on those deemed indigenous at the expense of non-indigenous minorities.

The move was a response to a perennial colonial problem: Racial privilege for whites mobilized those excluded as a racialized nonwhite majority. By creating an additional layer of privilege, this time ethnic, indirect rule fragmented the racially conscious majority into so many ethnic minorities, in every part of the country setting ethnic majorities against ethnic minorities. Wherever this system continued after independence, national belonging gave way to tribal identity as the real meaning of citizenship.

Many thought the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, representing a minority in the dominant coalition, turned to ethnic federalism to dissolve and fragment Ethiopian society into numerous ethnic groups — each a minority — so it could come up with a “national” vision. In a way it replicated the British system.

But led by Mr. Zenawi, the T.P.L.F. was also most likely influenced by Soviet ethno-territorial federalism and the creation of ethnic republics, especially in Central Asia. Ethiopia’s 1994 Constitution evoked the classically Stalinist definition of “nation, nationality and people” and the Soviet solution to “the national question.”

As in the Soviet Union, every piece of land in Ethiopia was inscribed as the ethnic homeland of a particular group, constitutionally dividing the population into a permanent majority alongside permanent minorities with little stake in the system. Mr. Zenawi and his party had both Sovietized and Africanized Ethiopia.

Like much of Africa, Ethiopia is at a crossroads. Neither the centralized republic instituted by the Derg military junta in 1974 nor the ethnic federalism of Mr. Zenawi’s 1994 Constitution points to a way forward.

Mr. Abiy can achieve real progress if Ethiopia embraces a different kind of federation — territorial and not ethnic — where rights in a federal unit are dispensed not on the basis of ethnicity but on residence. Such a federal arrangement will give Ethiopians an even chance of keeping an authoritarian dictatorship at bay.

Mahmood Mamdani is the director of Makerere Institute of Social Research in Uganda, a professor of government at Columbia University and the author of “Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism.”

 

Mr. Mamdani is the director of the Institute of Social Research at Makerere University in Kampala, Uganda, and a professor at Columbia University.

Ethiopia in Turmoil

/0 Comments/in , , , /by

The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) | Ann M. Fitz-Gerald

The northern region of Tigray is challenging Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s reform agenda. The prospects for peace are dim.

Distortions and misinformation have added further complexities to an already fraught confrontation between the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the federal government of Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. Two weeks after the clashes begun, a resolution to the current crisis is far from clear.

A FRAUGHT LEGACY

The challenge of pursuing transformative leadership and political change was always a tall order for Abiy. When he came to power in 2018, he inherited a model of federalism including nine ethnic-based regions spanning a population of approximately 110 million. His immediate focus was to open political space, pursue market-based reforms and make peace with neighbouring Eritrea.

Enhanced multi-ethnic representation across government dealt a blow to TPLF-heavy hierarchies. Abiy’s determination to depart from the socialist underpinnings of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front’s (EPRDF) ethnic federalist doctrine amounted to a sudden and unsavoury change of direction for a party which had not only liberated the country from the Derg, an oppressive military junta, but which had poured years of efforts into the development and implementation of a model of revolutionary ‘democratic developmental statebuilding’.

But Abiy’s administration persevered, reversing many of the former policies, systems and narratives. This irritated those who considered themselves national defenders and ‘guardians’ of visionary thinking. In the absence of any immediate reconciliation and reintegration scheme for TPLF leaders, a backlash from a bruised and unappreciated TPLF became inevitable.

SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

Within the security sector more specifically, Abiy deconstructed past practices which had retained senior TPLF officers beyond compulsory retirement. He also introduced a policy which prevented more than one member of any ethnic group from being present in every level of the military’s command structure. The implication was that many Tigrayans at mid-senior levels would not become eligible for career enhancing roles which, together with the limit on staying in one military rank for no more than 10 years, would support a gradual exodus of many mid- and senior-level officers and soldiers. While jobs were offered to those who could stay, and short-term support provided to those who departed in the form of additional months’ pay as well as allowing senior officers to retain military vehicles, this was no consolation for what the TPLF felt it deserved. Abiy subsequently issued arrest warrants for a number of these commanders who stood accused of corruption and human rights abuses. This caused further alienation from the Abiy administration.

The awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to Abiy only intensified the TPLF’s indignation. Abiy’s view was that the significant military build-up in the country’s eastern and northern commands – the latter in Tigray – was expensive and required dismantling now that peace with Eritrea had been achieved. The TPLF perceived the situation with Eritrea differently, and resisted the removal of this equipment. When crowds blocked returning equipment convoys in protest, federal troops were instructed by Abiy to stand down to avoid violence.

THE LOOMING CRISIS

The loose thread holding the TPLF to Abiy’s government was finally broken in 2019 when the government rebranded the ruling coalition as the ‘Prosperity Party’ – a move which sought to involve representatives from all nine regional states, five of which had not been encompassed by the previous EPRDF coalition party. The TPLF severed all ties and gradually focused more on the region.

When the country’s electoral commission took a decision to postpone the federal elections because of the pandemic, the TPLF challenged Abiy’s legitimacy. But the electoral commission exercised an independent decision, which was supported by a unanimous vote in parliament, citing challenges of the country’s weak capacity to manage the pandemic while supporting, what was anticipated to be, an election with the highest voter turnout in the country’s history. Still, Tigray forged ahead with what the federal government deemed an illegal regional election which excluded the two main regional opposition parties and produced a landslide victory for the TPLF.

Refusing to accept the decision taken by parliament and the constitutional inquiry bodies to postpone the election, the TPLF called all its government employees, ministers and parliamentarians back to their region on 5 October – the date, prior to these decisions, of the end of Abiy’s first term in office. Added to the mix was the TPLF’s demand that any dialogue with the federal government be overseen by a caretaker administration which did not include Abiy.

The move of governance capacity back to Tigray’s capital, Mekelle, meant that prospects for a negotiated arrangement were fast disappearing. Refusing to afford any legal basis to Tigray’s newly elected regional assembly, the House of Federation (the upper house of the federal parliament) unanimously passed a bill calling for regional funding disbursements to be routed to more local Tigrayan authorities, bypassing the TPLF-controlled central regional government in Mekelle. The TPLF described this as a ‘declaration of war’ by the federal government.

THE BREAKDOWN

On 4 November, following a discussion between Abiy and the Tigray regional president Debretsion Gebremichael, a government cargo plane carrying monthly army rations, and billions of new birr currency to furnish regional banks and support the salaries of personnel in the northern command, landed in Mekelle. What followed were synchronised attacks on all levels of command posts under the federal northern command. Government reports indicate that insiders loyal to the TPLF cooperated with regional militia in killing non-Tigrayan officers and soldiers and demanding that others surrender their weapons.  A senior associate of the TPLF leadership later claimed responsibility for the attack in a video which has since been withdrawn from the internet. Hours following the attack, Abiy deployed federal defence forces to ‘secure law and order in the region and to apprehend those implicated in mass corruption and gross human rights violations’.

Whereas one could ask whether or not the attack on the barracks constituted the crossing of a ‘red line’ – and whether there was scope to avoid confrontation – the federal government’s decision to deploy troops appeared to be based on what it felt had been the exhaustion of all other non-military instruments of power in efforts to appease the TPLF. Citing TPLF links to instability elsewhere in the country, conscious of the northern command’s heavy artillery and long-range weapons, and the scope for further casualties, it was clear that Abiy felt compelled to authorise the use of force. Hundreds of combatants and civilians have died, a flood of refugees has moved towards Sudan, political prisoners have been taken hostage and humanitarian corridors have become threatened.

AN INTERNATIONAL ROLE?

The TPLF’s latest rocket attacks on the Eritrean capital of Asmara appear to be an attempt to internationalise the conflict and lay the ground for an international response. Calls for a ceasefire, mediation, dialogue and negotiations have all been made. The Ethiopian government has stated that it will not sit down to negotiations with what it describes as ‘criminals’. The situation leaves only two options for an international response: calls for a swift and peaceful resolution of differences, or external intervention. While the former would be in the context of Ethiopia’s internal mechanisms of conflict resolution, the latter would involve taking sides – which, at this stage, should be avoided at all costs.

Any option moving forward, including weapons decommissioning, would need to consider the country’s important traditional and cultural dialogue processes, deep inter-federal issues, trust deficiencies and linguistic differences. Above all, the voice of the Tigrayan people is key.

Still, inaction is not without its merits as well. For if it becomes clear that the TPLF will be afforded no standing by the international community, they may agree on an internal ceasefire arrangement, and possibly an independent truth and reconciliation commission, perhaps overseen by traditional and religious leaders.

However, with both sides now facing the inevitability of further civilian casualties, and as long as the TPLF believes that there is a way of forcing the hand of both the international community and the federal government, prospects for a peaceful solution remain bleak.

The views expressed in this Commentary are the author’s, and do not represent those of RUSI or any other institution.

ከአርቲስት ሀጫሉ ግድያ በስተጀርባ ….

/0 Comments/in , , /by

… በሆነው ነገር ከማዘን በላይ ተበሳጭቼ፣ ምንም ላለማለት ወስኜ ነበር። ነገር ግን ዝምታዬም ያስወቅሰኝ ጀምሯል። ታድያ … የሚሰማኝን ልጻፍና …

በቅድሚያ አንድ ነገር ልበል። በዚህ እድሜው በሰው እጅ ቀርቶ በበሽታም መሞት የማይገባው ወጣት ነበር አርቲስት ሀጫሉ። በፖለቲካ አመለካከቱ ባንግባባም፣ የሚያወራው ባይጥመኝም፣ ምናምን የሚል ቅራቅንቦ አልደርትም። ምንም ይሁን ምን ግድያውን ፍጹም አወግዛለሁ!! ገዳዮቹና አስገዳዮቹ (ህግ አስከባሪ የለም እንጂ) ለህግ ቀርበው የእጃቸውን ማግኘት እንዳለባቸውም አምናለሁ። በዚህ አጋጣሚ በአርቲስት ሀጫሉ ሞት፣ በሀዘን ልባቸው ለተሰበረ በሙሉ (አስመሳዮች የአዞ እንባ የሚያነቡትን ሳይጨምር) መጽናናትን ከልብ እመኛለሁ። እንዲህውም ከግድያው ብኋላ በተፈጠረ ቀውስ ህይወታቸውን ላጡ ወገኖች ሀዘኔ ጥልቅ ነው። ለቤተሰቦቻቸውና ወዳጅ ዘመዶቻቸው መጽናናትን እመኛለሁ።

እንግዲህ ከሀጫሉ ግድያ በስተጀርባ ማን ሊሆን እንደሚችል ብዙ መላምቶችን ከተለያዩ አቅጣጫዎች እየሰማን ነው። ሞቱን ተከትሎም ሁሉም በየአቅጣጫው ለፖለቲካ ፍጆታው እየተጠቀመበት ነው። ለፖለቲካ ፍጆታ እንደሚውልና አመጽ እንደሚያቀጣጥል የሚጠበቅ ነበር። ለጊዜው መንግስት ነኝ የሚለው የአብይ ቡድን፣ ገዳዮቹ እነማን እንሆኑ እያጣራን ነው ባለበት ቅጽበት፣ ህወሓት ነው፣ ግብጽ ነው፣ የግብጽ ተላላኪዎች ናቸው፣ የሚሉ የተለያዩ ግራ የገባቸው ውንጀላዎችን ሰንዝሯል። ህግ ይዞታል ከተባለ፣ ተጣርቶ ሳያልቅ እንዲህ አይነት ውንጀላ፣ መነሻውና ጥቅሙ ምንድን ነው? የዛሬ ሁለት አመት፣ የምርመራ ውጤቱ ከመታወቁ በፊት ህወሓት ነው ከዚህ በስተጀርባ ያለው ብሎ የከሰሰው መሪ፣ ውጤቱ ሲታወቅ እስከዚች ደቂቃ ድረስ ይፋ እንዳላደረገ ይታወቃል። የዛሬ አመት ለተፈጠረው ግድያ በተመሳሳይ መልኩ ከምርመራው በፊት ጣቱን ሌሎች ላይ ቢቀስርም፣ የሆነው ግን ሌላ ሆኖ የተገኘው። ውጤቱም እስከአሁኗ ደቂቃ ድረስ ለህዝብ አልተነገረም። በመካከላቸው ለተፈጠረው አለመግባባት ተጨማሪ ቤንዚን ሆነ አገለገለ ይበልጥ መካረር ውስጥ ከተታቸው እንጂ የፈየደው ነገር አልነበረም። ዛሬም ምርመራ ከመካሔዱ በፊት ውንጀላው አንድ ቡድን ላይ (ህወሓት ላይ) አድርጎ እያደነ የሚያስረው ደግሞ ሌላ ቡድንን (የእነ ጀዋር) ነው። ህወሓት/ግብጽ ከሆነ ሀጫሉን የገደለው ኦሮሚያ ላይ የብልጽግና ውጋት የሆኑ የፖለቲካ ድርጅቶችን የሚመሩ የፖለቲካ መሪዎችና ጋዜጠኞች ለምን እየታድኑ ታሰሩ?

ተጣርቶ እስኪታወቅ ድረስ መላምት መደረት የሚቻል ከሆነ፣ ከአጫሉ ግድያ በስተጀርባ ህወሓት፣ የኦሮሞ ብሔርተኞቹ፣ የግብጽ ተላላኪዎች ሊኖሩ ከቻሉ፣ አብይ ራሱ ሊኖር የማይችልበት ምክንያት ምንድን ነው? እስኪ በዝርዝር እንመልከተው። በአባይ ግድብ ዙሪያ በተደጋጋሚ እንዳየነው እርሱ የተካፈለበት ድርድር፣ የአገርን ሉአላዊነት አሳልፎ የሚሰጥ ነበር። በመጀመሪያ አሜሪካና የዓለም ባንክ አደራዳሪ እንዲሆኑ የተስማማው አብይ ነው። ሲቀጥል በሁለት ሳምንት ውስጥ ስምምነት ላይ መደረስ አለበት፣ ስምምነት ላይ ከመድረሳችን በፊት ግድቡን መሙላት አንጀምር ብሎ ግብጽን ያስፈነጠዘ ስምምነት የፈጸመው አብይ ነው። አጫሉ በተገደለበት እለት ደግሞ፣ ግድቡን የመሙላት ሂደት የመብት ጉዳይ ሳይሆን፣ የጦርነት ጉዳይ ይመስል፣ የጸጥታው ምክር ቤት አጀንዳ እንዲሆን ያደረገው አብይ ነው። እዛ ደግሞ ምን አይነት ስምምነት አድርጎ እንደመጣ አናውቅም። ምናልባትም ከዛ አጀንዳ ለማስቅየስ የተደረገ፣ ብሎም አገርን በማበጣበጥ፣ ግድቡን የመሙላት ሂደት ለማዘግየት የተቀነባበረ ሴራም ሊሆን ይችላል። በነገራችን ላይ በነዚህ ጉዳዮች ጀዋር ሲያራምድ የነበረው አቋም፣ እንደ አንድ ፖለቲከኛ ሳይሆን እንደ አንድ አገር መሪ ነበር። እንዲያውም መጨረሻ ላይ፣ በዲፕሎማሲው ረገድ ደህና ድል እያገኘን የነበረውን ሁኔታ የቀለበሰው፣ የውጭ ጉዳይ ሚንስቴር ስራውን እንዳይሰራ ስለተደረገ ነው፣ የሚል ስሞታ አሰምቷል። አብይን በአገር ጉዳይ የማያምነው መሆኑ፣ ልክ ብዙዎቻችን የታዘብነውን አይነት ክህደቶችን የታዘበ መሆኑን የሚያሳይ ፍንጭ ጽፎ ነበር። በእርግጥ ግብጽን አልጎዳም ብሎ በማያውቀው ቋንቋ ደጋግሞ የማለውና የተገዘተው ማን እንደሆነ ሁሉም ያውቃል።

ይህን ግድያ አብይ ከግብጽ ጋር ያለውን ጉዳይ ለማለዘብ ብቻ ሳይሆን፣ ተቀናቃኞቹን ለመስበርም እየተጠቀመበት ያለ ይመስለኛል። ከላይ እንዳልኩት ኦሮሚያ ላይ፣ ሰማይ ምድሩ ቢገለበጥ፣ በነጻ ምርጫ ሊያሸንፋቸው የማይችሉ ተቀናቃኞቹ ለማሰር ተጠቀሞበታል። የኦሮሞ ተቀናቃኞቹን ከሰበረ ብኋላ በሙሉ ጉልበት ፊቱን ወደ ህወሓት ማዞር ነው ስሌቱ። ያው የጅል ስሌት ነው። ፊቱን ወደ ሰሜን ከማዞሩ በፊት፣ ኦሮሚያ ላይ በማሰው ጉድጓድ ራሱን ያገኘዋል። የት ድረስ እንደሚያዛልቀው እንኳን በደንብ ያሰላው አይመስልም። ለእርሱ ታማኝ የሆኑ አንድ ሁለት ቀበሌ ማተራመስ የሚችሉ ልዩ ሃይሎች ቢኖሩትም፣ የሚያስመካና ልትተማመንበት የምትችል ጉልበት ያላቸው አይደሉም። ሁሉም የተነሳባቸው እለት ድራሻቸው አይገኝም።
ከዚህ ሁሉ ግን፣ ከተቀናቃኞቹ ጋር ያለውን ችግር በድርድርና በውይይት ቀድሞ ፈትቶ ወይም ለመፍታት ሞክሮ ቢሆን ኖሮ ይህ ሁኔታ ሊፈጠር ይችል ነበር? አይመስለኝም። ምክንያቱም እርሱም ሆኑ ሌሎቹ ችግራቸውን በጠረጴዛ ዙሪያ፣ በሰለጠነ መንገድ ከፈቱ የዚህ አይነት ሴራ ውስጥ መግባት አያስፈልጋቸውም ነበር። ለዚህ እነ ጀዋርም፣ ህወሓትም ሌሎችም ዝግጁ መሆናቸውን በተደጋጋሚ በግልጽ ሲናገሩ ሰምተናል። ለጥሪው ጆሯቸውን የቆለፉበት አብይና የአብይ ድርጅት ብቻ ናቸው። ይህን ባለማድረጉ ለፖለቲካ ፍጆታ ሲባል በሴራ ፖለቲካ ያለ እድሜው መሞት የማይገባው ወጣት እንዲሞት ሆነ። በዛ የተነሳም ሌሎች በርካታ ንጹሃን ዜጎች እንዲሞቱ፣ እንዲቆስሉ፣ አገሪቱ ሌላ ቀውስ እንድታስተናግድ (እግዜር ይሁናትና!) ምክንያት ሆነ። ታድያ ማነው ለዚህ ተጠያቂው? ማን ነበር ይህን ማስቀረት ይችል የነበረው? በማን ውሳኔና እጅ ነበር?

አብይ፣ ሰልፊሽና የስልጣን ጥመኛ በመሆኑ ብቻ፣ አገሪቱን ከማቀራረብ ይልቅ፣ የባሰ ጽንፍ ነው ያስያዛት። ህወሓትን ሲታገሉ መቀራረብ ጀመረው የነበሩትን፣ ያራራቃቸውና ጽንፍ ያስያዛቸው የአብይ መንግስት ነው። ይህንን ቀዳዳ ተጠቅመው የውጭ ሃይሎች አገራችን ውስጥ ሴራ ቢሞክሩ እንኳን አይፈረድባቸውም። የሚያራርቅ እንጂ የሚያቀራርብ መሪና አሰራር እንደሌለን ይታወቃል። በድጋሚ ላንሳውና በድርድር ልዩነቱን ቀርፎ ቢሆን ኖሮ፣ የውጭ ሃይል አገራችንን የማተራመስ እድል ይኖረዋል? ግብጽ ብትሞክር እንኳን፣ መግባባት ካለ፣ በጋራ ያከሽፉት ነበር። ታዋቂ ሰው/ፖለቲከኛ ገድለው አመጽ ለመቀስቀስ ቢሞክሩ፣ ታዋቂ ሰዎች (ተፎካካሪዎች) በጋራ ቆመው፣ ተሰሚነታቸውን ተጠቅመው፣ ህዝባቸውን ያረጋጉ ነበር። አሁን ባለበት ሁኔታ ግን ይህ የሚቻል አልሆነም። ምክንያቱም ሁሉንም ነገር በራሱ መንገድ ብቻ ከማስተናገድ ውጭ ሌላ ነገር ስለማያውቅ።

ሲጠቃለል ከሀጫሉ ግድያ በስተጀርባ ያለው ሀይል ማንም ይሁን ማን፣ የመንግስት ተጠያቂነት ጎልቶ ይታየኛል። ገዳዮ ምንም ፖለቲካል ሞቲቭ የሌለው አንድ ተራ ሰው (ለምሳሌ የምኒሊክ አምላኪ) ሆኖ ቢገኝ እንኳን፣ አገሪቱን እዚህ ቀውስ ውስጥ የከተተው (ምናልባትም የከፋ ቀውስ ውስጥም ሊከታት የሚችለው) ማን በፈጠረው ችግር ምክንያት እንደሆነ ለሁላችንም ግልጽ ነው። ደጋግመን ድርድር፣ ውይይት፣ ድርድር፣ ስንል የነበረው ለዚህ ነው። አሁንም አገሪቱ ከዚህ ውጭ ሌላ መውጫ ቀዳዳ የላትም።

በመጨረሻ አንድ አቋሜን ግልጽ ላድርግ፣ ከሀጫሉ ግድያ በስተጀርባ የነጀዋር እጅ አለበት ብዬ የማላምነውን ያህል፣ የተደራጀ የአማራ ፖለቲከኞች ቡድንም ይኖራል ብዬ አላምንም። እነ ጀዋር አመጽ መቀስቀስ ከፈለጉ፣ ሀጫሉን መግደል አያስፈልጋቸውም። የአመንስቲ ሪፖርት የፈጠረውን አጋጣሚ ተጠቅመው ማቀጣጠል ይችሉ ነበር። ሀጫሉ ካስፈለጋቸውም አብሯቸው እንዲያቀጣጥል ማድረግ ይችሉ ነበር። እንዲህውም ነፍጠኛ የምትሏቸው የተደራጁ የአማራ ብሔርተኞችም ከዚህ ጀርባ አይኖሩም፣ ምክንያቱም የምኒሊክ ስም ከመጥፋት በላይ (ያውም ያልተለመደ አይደለም) የሚያሳስብ ዘርፈ ብዙ ችግር አለ። ለማይረባ ነገር ያን የመሰለ አርቲስት ገድሎ፣ የባሰ ጥፋትና ኪሳራ እንጂ ጥቅም እንደማይገኝ አያውቁም ለማለት አልደፍርም።

 

ሰ.ነ.

ወደ አምባገነናዊ ስርዓት መመለስ አገር ያሳጣል

/0 Comments/in , , /by

ለዚህ  ጽሁፌ መነሻ ምክንያት ወደ ሆነኝ ነጥብ ልምጣና የኢህአዴግ አልጋ ወራሽ የሆነው ብልጽግና ልክ እንደትላንቱ ዛሬም በተመሳሳይ ጎዳና እየገሰገሰ ይገኛል። ኩንትራቱን ሊጨርስ እየተቃረበ ያለው ጠ/ሚ/ር አብይ አሕመድ፣ በኢህአዴግ ውስጥ የተፈጠረውን ክፍፍል በአሸናፊነት ተወጥቶ ስልጣኑን ለማደላደል ሲል ብልጽግናን የመሰረተበት ሒደት፣ ድርጅቱን ለማጠናከርና አባላትን ለማፍራት እየተጓዘበትና ያለው መንገድ ከቀድሞ የኢህአዴግ ባህል ምንም የተለየ አይደለም። ኢህአዴግ የቀድሞ ስሙን ብቻ ቀይሮ በህይወት አለ። ልዩነቱ የቀድሞ ታጋዮች ኮትኩተው ባሳደጓቸው ካድሬዎች በፖለቲካ ጌም መሸነፋቸው ብቻ ነው። ሰዎቹ ተሸነፉ እንጂ የዘረጉት ባህል አልተሸነፈም። ካድሬዎቹ ከህወሓት ካድሬዎች ውጪ ቀሪዎቹ የነበሩት ናቸው። የሚተዳደሩት በለመዱትና በኖሩበት የድርጅት ባህል ብቻ ነው። ለዚህም ነው ብልጽግና ከኢህአዴግ የተለየ ባህል ሊኖረው የማይችለው።

ጠ/ሚ/ሩ በህዝብ ይሁንታ፣ በተሰጠው የሁለት አመት የስልጣን ገደብ ቀድሞ የገባውን ቃል አጥፎ፣ የዴሞክራሲ ተቋማትን ሳይገነባ፣ ነጻና ገለልተኛ ምርጫ ሳያካሒድ፣ ስልጣን በሰላማዊ መንገድ በህዝብ ለተመረጠ አሸናፊ ፓርቲ ማስተላለፍ የሚችልበትን እድል ሳይፈጥር፣ በማንኛውም መንገድ ስልጣን ላይ ለመቆየት የሚያስችሉትን አማራጮች እየዘረጋ ቆይቷል። አንዱ መንገድ የቀድሞ አጋሮቹን ገፍትሮ በአዲስና ታማኝ ካድሬዎች መተካት ነው። እኔ አሻግራችኋለው ከማለት ስልጣን ላይ ካልቆየሁ መታሰራችን ነው ወደ ማለት ተሸጋግሯል። ይህ አፍሪካ ነው፣ ምርጫ ማጭበርበር ብርቅ አይደለም ማለቱም ተሰምቷል። አንድ ሰሞን መተካከት የሚባል የፖለቲካ ዲስኩር ተፈጥሮ ነበረ። አቶ መለስ የቀድሞ ጓዶቹን በመተካካት አሰናብቶ፣ በአዲስ ሀይል ተካቸው። እኔም በቅቶኛል ስልጣን ለአዲሱ ትውልድ አስተላልፋለሁ ሲል ቆይቶ፣ ባለቀ ሰዓት ድርጅቴ መርጦ አዲስ አደራ ስለጣለብኝ፣ ግዴታዬን መወጣት አለብኝ አለ። በ99.96% አሸነፍኩ ብሎ የለየለት አምባገነን ሆኖ ብቅ አለ።

ዛሬም ዶ/ር አብይ እየተጓዘበት ያለው መንገድም ተመሳሳይ ነው። አሻግራለሁ ሲል ቆይቶ፣ ሌላ መሪ ማን አለ እስከማስባልና ዛሬ ስልጣን ላይ ካልቆየን መታሰራችን ነው የሚል አቋም እስከማራመድ ድረስ ዘልቋል።

ምርጫውን መራዘም አለበት የሚል ዘመቻ የተከፈተው አምና ነበር። ከተራዘመ የቅቡልነት ጥያቄ ሊነሳ እንደሚችል ሲገለጽ፣ ነሓሴ እንደሚካሔድ ተገለጸ። ውሳኔው ምርጫው በግፊት የሚራዘምበትን ሰበብ ለመፍጠር ያለመ ይመስል ነበር። የኮቪድ ወረርሽኝ ሲከሰት፣ ጥሩ አጋጣሚ ሆነለትና ምርጫው እንዲራዘም ተደረገ። ምርጫው መራዘሙ ብቻ ሳይሆን፣ ያልተገደበ ስልጣን የሚሰጠው የአስቸኳይ ጊዜ አዋጅ አሳወጀ። አዲስ የአፈና መርበብ ተዘረጋ። ስልጣን ላይ በጉልበት ለመቆየት ርብርቡ ቀጥሏል።

ይህ በዙርያው ላሰባሰባቸው ኪራይ ሰብሳቢዎች ትልቅ ሲሳይ ነው። ከህዝብ ተነጥሎ በካድሬና በድርጅቱ ሰዎት መተማመን ከጀመረ፣ መዝረፍ የፈለገ አሁን እንደልቡ ይዘርፋል። እንደድሮ በግፍ ራሱን ማዝናናት የሚያስፈልግ ካለም አሁን ያን ማድረግ ይችላል። ምክንያቱም ሰውዬው ከህዝብ ተነጥሏል። የሚፈራው ነገር እንዳይደርስበት ካድሬዎቹን ሸክፎ መያዝ አለበት። ሲሰርቁና ግፍ ሲፈጽሙ እየቀጣ ካድሬን ሸክፎ ማቆየት ደግሞ አይቻለውም። ስለሆነም ነጻ ይለቃቸው፣ ከቁጥጥሩ ውጭ ናቸው።

ትላንት በኮረና ስም፣ ትንሽ ሰብሰብ ያሉ ሰዎችን ለመበተን ሲባል፣ ወጣቶችን ገደሉ። እንደገና ቤት አፍርሰው ደግሞ በርካቶችን ለበሽታው ማጋለጣቸው አልቀረም። ከእንግዲህ እንዲህ አይነት ዝብርቅርቁ የወጣን ነገር ማስታረቅም፣ ማረምም አይቻለውም ጋሽ አጃግሬ። ያለው አማራጭ በስልጣኑ እስካልመጡበት ድረስ ጆሮ ዳባ ልበስ ብሎ ማለፍ ነው።

አብይ ብዙ ጊዜ ስቷል። አንኳር ስ ህተቶቹ ግ ን ሁለት ናቸው። አንደኛ ተቋማትን መገንባትና ራሳቸውን ችለው እንዲንቀሳቀሱ ማድረግ ሲገባው፣ እርሱን የሚያወድሱና በስልጣን ላይ ሊያቆዩት የሚሹ አጨብጫቢዎችን አፈራ። ሁለተኛ ስልጣን እየጣፈጠችው ስትሔድ ከህዝብ እየራቀ ሔደ፣ አምባገነናዊ ባህሪ እየተላበሰ ሔደ። አሁን መፍራት ጀመረ። ፍራቻው አገርን እንዳያሳጣን እፈራለሁ።