Canada Should Support Ethiopia

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The conflict between Tigray and Ethiopia could cause rifts with other African regions. Canada’s truth and reconciliation experience could help.

Source: Policy Options Politiques | Ann Fitz-Gerald, Hugh Segal

The conflict between the Ethiopian federal government and a group from within its northern state of Tigray has ended according to the Ethiopian government. The view of some analysts is that in this post-conflict phase, there remain risks of insurgency from peripheral regions of Tigray. Rather than any organized armed conflict, or armed regrouping by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the more likely outcome is ongoing sporadic violence leading up to delayed federal elections in Ethiopia, now scheduled for June 2021.

Ethiopia is a significant player in Africa’s future. Canada should support its efforts to limit further violence by considering its experience in other similar international challenges. In the wake of its newly brokered partnership with Ethiopia following Prime Minister’s Justin Trudeau’s visit to Addis Ababa in 2020, it’s time for Canada to use its experience in support of peace and progress in Ethiopia, and across the African continent more generally.

Border tensions could bring other countries into the fray

Of increasing concern for the resolution of conflict in Tigray are recent border tensions between Ethiopia and neighbouring Sudan regarding land that has long been inhabited by Ethiopian farmers in the agricultural region of al-Fashqua. Although precise borders in this area have been contested peacefully since the 1896-1902 Ethiopian-British negotiations, otherwise cordial relations between the two allied countries now appear threatened.

Any new Sudanese hostility towards Ethiopia’s border region could compel Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed to act militarily. This in turn could spur Egypt to become involved to protect its interests vis-à-vis the Ethiopian Grand Renaissance Dam. The dam draws from the Abay River or Blue Nile, which is the main tributary of the Nile River, on which Egypt depends. Heightened Ethiopia-Sudan tensions, and the prospect of Egypt backing Sudan’s position, risks magnifying regional instability. Having these tensions become an international issue will further complicate matters for Prime Minister Ahmed, and potentially undermine and distract from the urgent internal healing and rebuilding processes in Tigray.

Internationalization of Sudan-Ethiopia tensions could realign interests of some groups and create wider internal cracks in an already challenging federalist arrangement in Ethiopia. This is why the international community must keep front and centre the peacebuilding process in Tigray – which requires the confidence and commitment of the Tigrayan people.

Ethiopia’s close partners have concerns about the conflict, which is constraining any unconditional offers of help. Disabled network communications and a lack of access to the conflict area have restricted reliable and verified situational analyses. This suggests that a wide range of perceptions could be influencing the international position on the conflict. International concerns include the role of Eritrea, which neighbours Tigray to its north, and the Amhara Regional State of Ethiopia, neighbouring to the south, in the conflict; media arrests and detentions; and issues concerning humanitarian access and alleged civilian casualties. That some Ethiopia-based advocacy organizations and international actors are not viewed as free from bias is further obscuring clarity around the situation.

Post-conflict dialogue and regional security structures

To heal from the past, there needs to be a post-conflict dialogue, which considers lessons learned from past Truth and Reconciliation Commissions held in other countries. A wider national dialogue has always been planned in Ethiopia, but because there has been so much dispute over the facts of the conflict, this dialogue process may become challenged. To an extent, this is understandable in a diverse and internally competitive, ethnic federalist system which leaves little, if any, room for perceived impartiality and independence, particularly with nine regional ethnic states and two federally administered city-states. It will, however, be essential to establish the truth regarding the facts of the conflict in order to navigate through the national dialogue process that the government seeks to facilitate.

But even if the details surrounding the conflict are established and agreed upon, the challenge then becomes the reform of the regional security structures. If this is not addressed in parallel to dialogue processes, governance and national stability will continue to be undermined.

While the constitution permits the formation of regional security forces to protect the interests of regional states, the relative strength of these security forces has amplified over the years to levels and conduct beyond the scope of the constitution. These regional militia forces have included a “Liyu Hail” (special force) capability which, like the broader regional force, is accountable directly to the regional president.

Precedent for this “Liyu” paramilitary wing was set in Ethiopia’s eastern Somali regional state. Set up originally to defend the region against the threat of an Ogaden National Liberation Front-led insurgency, the loosely structured force subsequently committed grave atrocities and human rights abuses. This Liyu concept of policing was copied in the regional states of Oromia and Amhara, and continued to grow in capacity after Prime Minister Abiy came to power.

Tigray’s regional security architecture is no exception to this setup. It was already quite expansive due to the northern region’s lead role in supporting the armed insurgency which, in 1991, overthrew the Derg military dictatorship. Tigray further increased its militia capacity following both forced and voluntary 2018 retirements of senior Tigrayan officers of the national defence forces, which brought an influx of experienced and knowledgeable operational leaders back to the region.

Truth and clarity are also required on issues concerning regional security structures, not only in Tigray but also in other regions with large militia build up. A recently reformed legal proclamation restricting the development of civil society groups with an interest in security studies has, since 1991, limited useful national data on this issue.

There is ambiguity surrounding the number of sworn members of regional and special forces, the types of weapons they can use, and the circumstances in which force can be deployed. The prospect for future regional-federal tensions will only increase if regional militia and special forces, with different lines of authority than federal forces, are maintained.  Clarity around these issues is particularly important for a pluralist democratic federalist system, which could benefit from different political party affiliations co-existing between regional and federal jurisdictions in the future.

The Ethiopian government should consider inviting a respected, independent and impartial adjudicator to assist with post-conflict dialogue and strategic communications. This would add legitimacy to the country’s reporting on key issues – clarity which is vital to the relationship between the Tigrayan population and the federal government. Too much of the federal government’s focus is on fire-fighting less-than-substantiated allegations, which only legitimizes the allegations and dilutes the progress required on the key priorities of healing and reconciliation.

Based on its view that outside mediation was neither desired nor appropriate, the Ethiopian government declined the African Union’s arbitrary appointment of three former presidents as mediators. The government has initiated a broader national dialogue involving a Reconciliation Commission and an independent committee of facilitators. Independent adjudication to verify alleged facts on the ground from the Tigray conflict is necessary to give traction to this homegrown dialogue process.

Drawing from international lessons learned

There is a long history of truth and reconciliation commissioners in South Africa, Australia and Canada. In South Africa, the process involved creating a forum where victims and perpetrators could testify without fear of prosecution on the cruelty of Apartheid. In Canada, the process was initiated by Prime Minister Stephen Harper following his apology to Indigenous Peoples for the cruelty and trauma of Residential schools. The process helped establish the truth and form a basis for reparations for survivors. The lack of commonly shared “truth” in Ethiopia between some groups creates a need for a commission. The commission would investigate the legitimate concerns that moderate and non-violent Tigrayans might have, allowing Abiy’s government to make progress towards strengthening the Ethiopian federation.

A commission could specify the nature of its mission and the questions it would consider before preparing its recommendations. Two co-chairs, perhaps a prominent and respected Ethiopian academic or judicial figure well-versed in the unique structures of Ethiopian federalism, and an external eminent person, could – together with regional religious and traditional leaders — oversee the data collection, data processing and subsequent dialogue concerning conflict-related issues.

Canada’s contribution to the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning of paramilitary weapons, as part of the Northern Ireland peace process, has relevance to this proposal. Former Chief of Defence Staff, John de Chastelain, supported by reputable Finnish and American representatives, was chosen to chair the commission. The appointment of a Catholic bishop to work with General Chastelain as co-chair for the commission resonates with the integral role of traditional and religious leaders in supporting Ethiopia’s conflict resolution tradition.

An active or retired military leader may be a good choice for co-chairing the Ethiopian commission, because of the non-partisan nature of the military. Such a leader would bring knowledge and insight when developing a workable solution for Ethiopia’s regional security structures.

Knowledge of the country, its federal dynamics, as well as experience with the Tigrayan people, matters. A reputable individual who served with the UN Mission in Eritrea and Ethiopia (UNMEE) following the 1998-2000 Ethiopian-Eritrea conflict could be of value. Canada played a very positive role in that UN mission.

For Canada, beyond the implicit value of supporting democratic federalism in Ethiopia, and contributing to peace, stability and opportunity across the African continent, there is an opportunity to make real the professed global engagement implicit in the “Canada is back” slogan. Foreign policy is about principles, values and interests, and how competently a government advances them in complex global contexts. With recent events in the United States impacting on the perception of its own soft power equity, Canada should not reduce its own soft power projection – one supported by a strong commitment to democratic norms.

Canada’s impact in the past – in Cyprus, in the Middle East and Suez, in Sri Lanka, in Bosnia, on the ending of Apartheid in South Africa – has been real because Canadian leaders and diplomats engaged in situations where Canada could play a constructive role.

Ethiopia plays a major role in the future of Africa. Its legitimate effort at addressing, what appears to have been, an attempted armed attack from some TPLF elements, could benefit from Canadian support and involvement. Canada has genuine experience in similar contexts in other international challenges. It is time to offer that experience in support of peaceful resolution, conciliation and progress in Ethiopia.

Situation Report EEPA HORN No. 57 – 16 January 2021

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Europe External Programme with Africa is a Belgium-based Centre of Expertise with in-depth knowledge, publications, and networks, specialised in issues of peace building, refugee protection and resilience in the Horn of Africa. EEPA has published extensively on issues related to movement and/or human trafficking of refugees in the Horn of Africa and on the Central Mediterranean Route. It cooperates with a wide network of Universities, research organisations, civil society and experts from Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Djibouti, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Uganda and across Africa. Key in-depth publications can be accessed on the website.

Reported war situation (as confirmed per 15 January)

● During the last three days, there has been heavy fighting in Daero Hafash (East of Axum) where four battalions of Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) and Eritrean Defense Forces (ErDF) were “totally destroyed” by Tigray forces. It is reported that Tigray forces captured “lots of weapons”.

● It is reported that in a place called Dairo Hafash, Tigray forces overtook 4.000 troops of the ENDF/EriDF.

● Fighting is going on in Tsigereda around Wukro between ENDF/ErDF and Tigray forces.

● Reported that one battalion of ENDF/ErDF was “eliminated” by Tigray forces in Ruwa Gered on the way from Adwa to Edaga Arbi two days ago.

● Reported fighting is ongoing in “various locations”.

● Video circulating with shooting and people running in Addis Ababa. No further information.

● In a meeting at Mekelle University staff with the appointed chief of the Tigray provisional government, Mulu Nega, a number of ‘difficult questions’ were raised during a hot debate. Mulu Nega told participants that he had called on the federal government to pull Eritrean troops out of Tigray. However, the country lacked the military power to force the troops to leave Tigray.

● In a nervous response to a question of what would happen to those dissenting, Mulu Nega answered: “if you don’t listen to what we’re telling you? You’d better go into the deserts and join the fight.”

● A UN team reports that it has encountered uniformed troops from neighbouring Eritrea.

● Message circulated of the relatives of a female Eritrean refugee, Eyasu Hagos, who was kidnapped from the Hitsats refugee camp in Tigray and has disappeared. When she was abducted her children Adyam Kesete, 12, and Merhawi Mebrahtom, 8 were left behind on their own.

● Reported that Hitsats camp was under Eritrean military control from end November/December. Eritrean soldiers killed people, including 2 priests that protested when soldiers tried to enter into the church. Tigray troops started shooting on 17 November in a fight with the Eritrean troops, and 9 Eritrean refugees were killed in the crossfire. Shimelba and Hitsats have not been accessible since.

● Wife and two children of Tsadkan Gebretinsae, former chief of staff of the army, have been detained.

● The Tigray regional government issued a statement today: “The government of Tigray has confirmed that Tegadalay Syoum Mesfin, Abay Tsehaye and Asmelash Weldeselassie were not in the war front due to their ages and health issues. Therefore, they are assassinated by Abiy Ahmed and Eritrean forces, very likely at the order of Isayas.”

Reported situation in Ethiopia (as confirmed per 15 January)

● In a video circulating on social media of PM Abiy addressing a church group, the Ethiopian PM states that his mother predicted that he would be the 7th king of Ethiopia and that he had achieved this.

● Brigadier-General Tesfaye Ayalew, Head of the ENDF Deployment Department, states: “Even if there may be good people amongst them (Tigrayans) we can’t differentiate the good from the bad. To save the country we made it so that they (Tigrayans) were excluded from doing the work.”

● Reported that the chairman of Asimba Democratic Party (ADP) Dori Asegdom is arrested. Earlier, Dori had rejected an invitation from the Prosperity Party to be part of Tigray provisional Administration.

Reported regional situation (as confirmed per 15 January)

● The ambassador of Ethiopia in Khartoum has stated that Sudan took over disputed land as it was taking advantage of the war in the Tigray. Ethiopian military warplane crossed over the disputed border area.

● Sudan has accused Ethiopia of a “dangerous and unjustified escalation”.

● The Sudanese Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) imposed restrictions on air traffic over El-Gadarif province and the greater and lower areas of Al-Fashaga in the east of the country.

● Ambassador of Ethiopia to The UAE, Suleiman Dedefo, points out that the GERD dam is located in the areas of Matema and Benishangul and that Sudan, by implication of its claim to these areas, is claiming the GERD dam. The ambassador states Ethiopia is able to protect its sovereign claim to the area.

● Sudan’s head of the Sudanese military, Lieutenant General Abdel-Fattah al-Burhan, visited the disputed area, meeting Sudanese troops guarding the borders and stated that Ethiopia had started the war when militia killed civilians in the al-Fashaga area.

Reported International situation (as confirmed per 15 January)

● EU suspends 88 million€ in budget support to Ethiopia until it opens access to Tigray for humanitarian aid organisations.

● EU Diplomat Josep Borrell states: “We are ready to help, but unless there is access for humanitarian aid operators, the EU cannot disburse the planned budget support to the Ethiopian government.”

● Borrell says it is no longer credible to describe the Tigray conflict as an internal “law and order” operation and that the conflict threatens stability of the whole region. He stated: “We receive consistent reports of ethnic-targeted violence, killings, massive looting, rapes, forceful returns of refugees and possible war crimes.”

● Borrell also pointed to the impact of the Eritrean participation in the war: “there are regional spill-over effects of the conflict, with for instance Eritrean troops being involved in the military operations in Tigray and with Ethiopian troops being withdrawn from Somalia”.

● Referring to the refugee camps in Tigray for Eritrean refugees, Un High Commissioner for Refugees, Fillipo Grandi states: “These are concrete indications of major violations of international law.”

● Reported that Beijing is “extremely angry” at PM Abiy for the killing of Seyoum Mesfin, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia. Seyoum “was respected in policy circles. He was the architect of Ethiopia’s strategic partnership with China that spawned a vast infrastructure renewal in Ethiopia.”

Disclaimer:

All information in this situation report is presented as a fluid update report, as to the best knowledge and understanding of the authors at the moment of publication. EEPA does not claim that the information is correct but verifies to the best of ability within the circumstances. Publication is weighed on the basis of interest to understand potential impacts of events (or perceptions of these) on the situation. Check all information against updates and other media. EEPA does not take responsibility for the use of the information or impact thereof. All information reported originates from third parties and the content of all reported and linked information remains the sole responsibility of these third parties. Report to info@eepa.be any additional information and corrections.

Links of interest

Will Somalia Be Collateral Damage of Ethiopia’s Tigray Conflict?

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Source: World Politics Review | Peter Kirechu

In November, as the Ethiopian government escalated its military campaign against the northern Tigray region, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed quietly ordered a drawdown of Ethiopian peacekeepers from neighboring Somalia. The scale of the move is still unconfirmed, but as many as 3,000 Ethiopian troops were reportedly redeployed to fight against the regional ruling party in Tigray, the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front, or TPLF. Around 200 to 300 ethnic Tigrayan soldiers in Somalia were also disarmed, and some may have even been purged from the ranks.

The Ethiopian troops’ departure injects additional uncertainty into Somalia’s already precarious security situation, as it struggles to hold federal elections that were scheduled for this month, while containing a long-running insurgency by the violent extremist group al-Shabab. The situation is further complicated by escalating tensions between the federal government, based in Mogadishu, and Somalia’s semiautonomous regional states—a standoff that bears similarities to Ethiopia’s conflict between the federal government and Tigray. Both Abiy and his Somali counterpart, Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed—who is more commonly known by his nickname, Farmajo—have sought to centralize executive authority within their respective federal governments despite sustained and increasingly violent opposition by powerful rivals.

Although Tigrayans make up only around 7 percent of Ethiopia’s population, the TPLF has played an outsized role in Ethiopian politics for decades, largely due to its leadership of the military campaign to overthrow the old communist dictatorship, the Derg, in the 1980s and early 1990s. In 2006, the TPLF-led government sent troops to Somalia to help secure the country’s nascent transition to a federal government after decades of civil war. Ethiopia later joined the African Union mission against al-Shabab as a troop-contributing country in 2014. These deployments helped foster ties between the TPLF and regional state leaders in Somalia, particularly in the south, where al-Shabab is most active.

When Abiy took office in 2018, however, he promptly began sidelining the TPLF, including by dissolving the old ethnic federalist coalition, known as Ethiopian People’s Democratic Front, and replacing it with a single, pan-Ethiopian political party that the TPLF refused to join. Abiy’s campaign to create a strong central government resonated with Farmajo, who has similarly sought to curb the authority of Somalia’s semiautonomous states. Abiy’s efforts to defang the TPLF and remove ethnic Tigrayans from the ranks of peacekeepers in Somalia can thus be seen as part of a burgeoning partnership between the Somali and Ethiopian leaders, united by their mutual desire to centralize federal power and weaken the political influence of domestic rivals in both countries.

Abiy and Farmajo share a mutual suspicion of the TPLF’s enduring influence within the Ethiopian military and security services. This deep-seated mistrust likely informed the disarming of Tigrayan peacekeepers in Somalia in November, which Abiy’s government defended as an effort to root out the “infiltration of TPLF elements in various entities.” Prior to the recent drawdown, Ethiopia had nearly 4,000 troops assigned to the United Nations Mission in Somalia, or AMISOM, targeting al-Shabab, and an additional 4,000 troops supporting a separate bilateral security agreement between the Somali and Ethiopian governments.

Farmajo is running for a second term in a presidential election that is scheduled for next month, but is likely to be delayed. If his reelection bid is successful—not a certain prospect—his political survival would be influenced by the outcome of the Ethiopian offensive in Tigray. Sporadic fighting is continuing despite Abiy’s declaration of victory in late November, after federal troops captured the regional capital, Mekelle. A decisive defeat of the heavily armed and well-trained TPLF troops would strengthen Abiy’s grip on the military, and may also weaken the TPLF’s historical ties to allies in Somalia, especially those in its southern and central federal member states.

An enduring guerrilla insurgency in Tigray will likely stress Ethiopia’s military resources and raise the prospect of additional drawdowns from the Somalia mission.

Here, Farmajo’s efforts to marginalize his political opponents have been bolstered by Ethiopia’s military presence. It is also in these Somali heartland regions, the epicenter of the al-Shabab insurgency, where Farmajo’s efforts to expand federal authority have faced the most resistance. In 2018, he intervened in a local election in Somalia’s South West state to prevent a former al-Shabab leader and defector, Mukhtar Robow, from competing in the state’s presidential election. Farmajo’s federal government reportedly orchestrated Robow’s arbitrary arrest and detention by Ethiopian security forces, leading to his withdrawal from the race, and the subsequent election of a Farmajo ally.

And last March, Farmajo unsuccessfully tried to intervene to prevent the reelection of Ahmed Madobe, a key political opponent who serves as president of Somalia’s southernmost regional state, Jubaland. Here, again, Farmajo leveraged Ethiopia’s military presence and political support in a bid to unseat an incumbent and expand the federal government’s writ of authority. This effort sparked violent clashes between federal troops and Jubaland’s forces, and drew in both Kenya and Ethiopia—two troop-contributing countries in the AMISOM mission that stand on opposite sides of the fractious dispute in Jubaland.

Kenya has long supported the Jubaland administration of Madobe, a former ally of al-Shabab who now opposes the group. Madobe led the 2012 military campaign that ousted al-Shabab from Kismayo, the regional capital, and has since enjoyed Kenya’s military and political backing. Madobe also has historical ties to the former TPLF-led government in Addis Ababa, dating back to Ethiopia’s military campaign against Islamist extremists in southern Somalia during the 2000s.

Today, al-Shabab has been beaten back from Jubaland’s cities, but it still maintains a presence in rural parts of the state. Kenya, which has suffered from deadly al-Shabab attacks in the past, views Jubaland—and therefore Madobe—as an essential security buffer on its northeastern border with Somalia. Abiy, on the other hand, is suspicious of Madobe’s historical links with the TPLF, as well as other Ethiopian groups that are opposed to Abiy’s agenda.

These tensions imperil AMISOM’s already beleaguered campaign against Al-Shabab, which took a hit from the sudden withdrawal of U.S. troops that President Donald Trump ordered last month. National interests have long driven countries’ decisions on participation in the AMISOM mission, but the rift between Kenya and Ethiopia—and each country’s divergent support for rival domestic factions inside Somalia—fundamentally weakens the AMISOM mission. These tensions may not spill into direct confrontation, but they create an additional wedge that the resurgent al-Shabab can exploit to advance its military and political objectives.

The conflict in Tigray only exacerbates these exigent rifts. An enduring guerrilla insurgency in Tigray will likely stress Ethiopia’s military resources and raise the prospect of additional drawdowns from the Somalia mission. A conclusive TPLF defeat, on the other hand, would embolden Abiy’s centralization campaign—an outcome that would resonate in Somalia and strengthen Farmajo’s like-minded agenda.

While prospects for a negotiated settlement in Tigray are still uncertain, it presents the best opportunity to mediate the Ethiopian federal government’s rivalries with the TPLF and other regional state rivals. Such an outcome could also provide a viable blueprint for the negotiation to ease federal-regional tensions in Somalia, where the effects of the Tigray conflict will likely reverberate for many months to come.

Peter Kirechu is the former director of the Conflict Finance and Irregular Threats Program at the Center for Advanced Defense Studies (C4ADS). He is a specialist on illicit transnational networks in the Middle East and Africa.

Massacre ‘of 750’ reported in Aksum church complex, Tigray, Ethiopia

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Source: Church Times | Rebecca Paveley

Reports of a massacre of 750 people in the cathedral complex that reputedly houses the Ark of the Covenant have emerged from the Tigray region of Ethiopia.

Accounts have come from those who fled the town of Aksum and walked more than 200km to the regional capital, Mekelle.

The massacre was first reported in dispatches from the Belgium-based NGO European External Programme with Africa (EEPA). The area is sealed off to journalists, but many reports of massacres have nevertheless emerged, some of which have been documented by Amnesty International.

The former BBC World Service Africa editor and Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, Martin Plaut, said that those who escaped the Aksum massacre had reported that the attack began after Ethiopian federal troops and Amhara militia approached the Church of St Mary of Zion.

Up to 1000 people were believed to be sheltering in the church complex. One of the chapels, the Chapel of the Tablet, is believed by Ethiopian Christians to contain the Ark of the Covenant, which is hidden from the view of everyone, apart from a single priest who never leaves the compound.

Mr Plaut said: “People were worried about the safety of the Ark, and when they heard troops were approaching feared they had come to steal it. All those inside the cathedral were forced out into the square.”

EEPA’s latest dispatch on the situation in Tigray, on Tuesday, reports that 750 people were shot in Aksum, although this has not been verified. It says that the massacre was carried out by Ethiopian federal troops and Amhara militia.

The Church is not thought to have been damaged, and Mr Plaut said that the Ark is likely to have been hidden before troops arrived, although it has not been possible to confirm this.

The Ark is believed by Ethiopian Orthodox Christians to have been hidden in Aksum by Menelik I, the son of King Solomon of Israel. The kingdom of Aksum was one of the four great powers of the ancient world, and the town of Aksum is a UNESCO World Heritage Site.

Fighting broke out in Tigray in November, after the Ethiopian Prime Minister, Abiy Ahmed, sent federal troops, supported by militia and troops from Eritrea, to fight the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), which he accused of holding illegitimate elections (News, 20 November 2020). The TPLF was part of the governing coalition of Ethiopia until 2019.

The government declared that the conflict was over after it captured Mekelle, in late November, but the TPLF continues to fight a guerrilla war.

The Ethiopian government has admitted shelling an ancient mosque in Tigray, and has promised to repair it. The al-Nejashi mosque in northern Tigray was hit by shells, and its dome, minaret, and ancient tombs, reputedly of 15 disciples of the Prophet Muhammad, were damaged. A church near by was also damaged in the attack, and the government has pledged that it will also repair it.

EEPA reported that, after the shelling, the mosque had been looted by Ethiopian and Eritrean troops, and that some civilians had died trying to protect it.

Humanitarian aid has been unable to get to the region, despite pleas from the United Nations, which estimates that 2.3 million children have been cut off from food and aid (News 1 January). More than one million people have been displaced by the fighting, and more than 50,000 have fled into Sudan. There are also concerns for the safety of many Eritrean refugees in camps in Tigray.

EU suspends Ethiopian budget support over Tigray crisis

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Source: Reuters

The European Union has suspended budget support for Ethiopia worth 88 million euros ($107 million) until humanitarian agencies are granted access to people in need of aid in the northern Tigray region.

In a blog post published on Friday, the EU’s top diplomat Josep Borrell said Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed now needed to live up to the Nobel Peace Prize he was awarded in 2019 by doing all it takes to end the conflict in Tigray.

“We are ready to help, but unless there is access for humanitarian aid operators, the EU cannot disburse the planned budget support to the Ethiopian government,” Borrell said.

Abiy’s office did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

In December, the government’s task force for Tigray said it had reached a deal with the United Nations in which Addis Ababa would call the shots on access for aid agencies.

Conflict erupted in Tigray on Nov. 4 between Ethiopian federal forces and the party ruling the northern region. Thousands have been killed, millions displaced and more than 50,000 refugees have fled to Sudan.

Abiy’s government declared victory over the rebellious leaders in at the end of November but they vowed to fight on. The United Nations has said there are reports fighting is still going on in various parts of Tigray.

Reuters reported in December that the EU was delaying budget support to Ethiopia over the Tigray crisis, according to internal documents.

Borrell said the Tigray conflict had become far more than an internal “law and order” operation and was now a direct threat to the stability of the whole region.

“We receive consistent reports of ethnic-targeted violence, killings, massive looting, rapes, forceful returns of refugees and possible war crimes,” he said.

Reuters was unable to independently verify events in Tigray as the government is restricting journalists’ access.

“Moreover, there are regional spill-over effects of the conflict, with for instance Eritrean troops being involved in the military operations in Tigray and with Ethiopian troops being withdrawn from Somalia,” Borrell said.

‘SMEAR CAMPAIGNS’

The EU has provided 815 million euros of development aid to Ethiopia over the past seven years, on top of 409 million euros of projects focused mainly on supporting refugees and host communities in the country.

The United Nations said on Thursday there had been major violations of international law in Tigray at two refugee camps, home to people who fled repression in neighbouring Eritrea long before the latest conflict.

It said satellite imagery showed fires burning and fresh signs of destruction at the Shimelba and Hitsats camps.

The U.N. refugee agency, which decried the lack of humanitarian access to the camps, did not say who was responsible, but said there had been additional military incursions over the past 10 days.

“UNHCR seems to indulge, yet again, in another bout of gratuitous & irresponsible smear campaigns against Eritrea,” Eritrea’s Information Minister, Yemane Meskel, tweeted on Friday.

After repeated denials of the presence of Eritrean troops in Tigray by both countries, a senior Ethiopian general has since said they had crossed into the northern region uninvited.

Borrell also said there needed to be a de-escalation of tension between Ethiopia and Sudan.

Ethiopia has said it is running out of patience with Sudan’s continued military build-up in an area populated by Ethiopian farmers on the Sudanese side of their disputed border.

Sudan’s foreign ministry said this week that an Ethiopian military aircraft had crossed the border in a “dangerous and unjustified escalation”.

($1 = 0.8252 euros)

 

Mysterious Wheat Deals Complicate Hunger Fight in Ethiopia

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Source: Bloomberg | Samuel Gebre, Agnieszka de Sousa and Simon Marks

Nation scrapped import tenders for grain after no progress
Ethiopia is seeking outside assistance to help feed its people

Back in November, Ethiopia unveiled two deals to buy deeply discounted wheat from suppliers that seasoned traders had never heard of. A website named for one of the companies listed a German address that didn’t exist and appeared to use stock photos of models.

Two months on, it remains a mystery who was behind the deals or what their motivation was, especially as Ethiopia says it hasn’t lost any money. One thing is clear though: no wheat has been delivered. The government has now canceled the tenders and plans to start over.

It’s an embarrassing blunder that could have ramifications for a country in desperate need of food. Ethiopia relies on more than 1 million tons of wheat imports a year to feed its people; the two canceled tenders together represented 600,000 tons. Global wheat prices have risen since the deals were initially awarded, meaning it will probably have to pay more now.

Ethiopia’s grain-tender process has for years been dogged by cancellations and corruption allegations, as well as putting strain on much-needed foreign-exchange reserves. The nation had already postponed or canceled tenders over the course of last year. That’s especially a problem for a country where some 11 million people were seen in need of food aid by the end of last year.

Ethiopia’s farming industry last year suffered from the worst desert-locust infestations in decades as well as the Covid-19 pandemic. At the same time, conflict in parts of the country displaced tens of thousands of people, adding to widespread food shortages.

“There is no doubt that there is a major food security crisis,” said Tedd George, founder at Kleos Advisory, a U.K.-based adviser on African markets. “Ethiopia has lost a number of tenders beforehand. It may have been that they have had difficulty finding more established, more respected traders to provide wheat.”

A spokesperson for the Ministry of Finance this week said that while the two tenders were canceled, the nation has been able to meet its needs through other purchases and domestic supply, though couldn’t comment further.

Major grain merchants have largely shunned Ethiopia’s tenders due to unfavorable terms such as requiring offers to be valid for 30 days, exposing traders to losses should prices change. However, there are a handful of smaller suppliers that regularly participate in the tenders.

The two tenders awarded in November were for the purchase of 400,000 tons from Rosentreter Global Food Trading and 200,000 tons from Martina Mertens, at a combined value of about $117 million. However, the companies were unknown to nine experienced international grain traders surveyed by Bloomberg.

The Public Procurement and Property Disposal Service this month said it canceled the tenders because the companies didn’t follow through with the deals and plans to reissue them. Since the tenders were awarded in early November, benchmark futures have climbed about 10% to $6.72 a bushel in Chicago.

When asked about Rosentreter’s authenticity in November, PPPDS Director-General Tsewaye Muluneh said that while it was the first time the new company had participated in tenders, it had passed the PPPDS’s checks.

Two Companies

There are reasons to question the firms’ legitimacy. Rosentreter and Martina Mertens offered wheat much cheaper than other tender participants. The German address that was stated on a website for Rosentreter doesn’t exist, phone numbers wouldn’t connect, an email failed to deliver and personal biographies used what seems are stock photos of models.

Rosentreter’s website no longer works, and Bloomberg couldn’t identify one, or locate contact details, for Martina Mertens.

It’s not clear who would stand to benefit from the failed tenders. Tsewaye said Ethiopia hasn’t lost any money in the two tenders, with the companies even putting up a bond payment to participate. She wouldn’t elaborate further.

The Ministry of Finance didn’t respond to phone calls, emails and text messages over the past two months seeking comment on the authenticity of the companies involved and whether the awards were a blunder.

The government held a monopoly on wheat purchases until early last year when, as part of new state reforms, it started allowing some private companies to import as long as they use their own foreign currency. There’s no public list of who is eligible to import.

It seems the country still needs more food. The Catholic Relief Services said Ethiopia has asked it for assistance, with distribution already underway. The World Food Programme also confirmed it’s assisting the government in procuring wheat.

Ethiopia’s National Disaster Risk Management Commission said 11.1 million people needed food aid last year and that it’s working on figures for 2021. The country is currently buying about 700,000 tons of wheat and plans to purchase another 300,000 tons later this year, said Mitiku Kassa, head of the agency.

“It is inevitable they are going to need support from the World Food Programme,” Kleos Advisory’s George said. “At least this will be wheat, not a tender someone will cancel.”

 

— With assistance by Megan Durisin

In Memoriam: Seyoum Mesfin, Ethiopian Peacemaker and Patriot

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Source: World Peace Foundations | Alex de Waal

Seyoum Mesfin, who was killed in Tigray this week at the age of 71, was Ethiopia’s longest-serving foreign minister. His untimely death robs Ethiopia of a man who exemplified the country’s tradition of enlightened and progressive patriotism. Under other circumstances we would expect a national day of mourning and a state funeral, including national and international recognition of Seyoum’s exceptional contribution to the norms, principles and practices of peace in Africa.

As a radical student activist, Seyoum was one of the founders of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front in 1975. Like many of his generation, he was an avid debater of different revolutionary ideas, and was one of the first to articulate the agenda of self-determination for the diverse nations, nationalities and peoples within the Ethiopian empire. He was appointed as head of foreign relations for the TPLF and became well-known internationally as the face of the Tigrayan struggle. I first met him in 1988, travelling within the TPLF-held areas of the country, and recall well the vigorous discussions we had about the challenges of the revolution and what should be their agenda when they took power. One of the things that most struck me about Seyoum was his lack of any personal bitterness towards the members of the military regime that was, at that time, waging unlimited war against the people of Tigray. The leaders of the Dergue, he assured me, would face justice.

Three years later, when he was in the Foreign Minister’s office in Addis Ababa as a leader of the transitional EPRDF government, he reminded me of this promise, and sent me to visit the Dergue leaders. They were all detained in a university dormitory, with just two guards on the gate—to deter angry citizens from breaking in and attacking them. General Legesse Asfaw, who had ordered the most murderous aerial assault of the war when fighter jets bombed the market town of Hausien and killed about 1800 civilians, was kept in a special room for his own protection. The TPLF could easily have executed him. But for Seyoum and his comrades, ‘revolutionary justice’ meant a transformation in the practice of killing your defeated enemies.

The dictator Mengistu Haile Mariam had executed 61 senior officials of the overthrown imperial government in November 1974 in his seizure of power. Among them was Seyoum’s predecessor in the foreign ministry, Aklilu Habtewold, shot dead within earshot of the headquarters of the Organisation of African Unity, an institution he had done so much to create—without any international condemnation. The EPRDF would not follow that path of arbitrary revenge: instead, officials of the military regime were to be brought to court and charged according to due process of law. By a quirk of the Ethiopian Penal Code, the definition of genocide under domestic law included attempts to eliminate not just national, ethnical, racial or religious groups, but political groups as well, and so it was possible to convict (in absentia) Mengistu for acts of genocide for crimes perpetrated during the ‘Red Terror’ of 1977-78.

Mengistu himself fled to Zimbabwe with his family. When his children’s passports expired, the Ethiopian ambassador in Harare asked for advice. Seyoum responded without hesitation. He said that the sins of the father should not be visited on the children: they were Ethiopians entitled to passports and should be issued with them at once.

In the same spirit, Foreign Minister Seyoum was a driving force behind the setting up of the International Panel of Eminent Personalities to investigate the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. The IPEP report was the first formulation of the doctrine of ‘non-indifference’: the responsibility of countries to intervene to prevent genocide. The United Nations later reconfigured this as the ‘Responsibility to Protect.’ Had he been a less modest man, Seyoum might have clamoured for international prizes to reflect his contribution. Instead, he invested his efforts in making sure that African nations adopted the norm and incorporated it into the Constitutive Act of the African Union.

Another example of Seyoum’s quietly principled diplomacy is the Declaration of Principles for the resolution of the conflict in Sudan. In 1993-94, when the north-east African regional grouping the InterGovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) was mandated with taking forward the mediation of Sudan’s war, Seyoum convened the IGAD foreign ministers and made the case that their efforts needed to be guided by principles that would ensure a just and lasting peace. Among them he identified the right of southern Sudanese to self-determination, should the Sudanese government fail to respect the ethnic diversity and democratic rights of all Sudanese. This was a radical innovation: never before had an African intergovernmental organization formally recognized the right to self-determination of an oppressed minority in a sovereign country. It is no exaggeration to say that the IGAD Declaration of Principles, penned by Seyoum in his office in Addis Ababa, surmounted the single biggest legal and political hurdle in the southern Sudanese road to independence.

Indeed, during his nineteen years in office, Seyoum presided over the rehabilitation of Ethiopia’s international standing. From being a pariah under the Dergue, Ethiopia became widely respected. Ethiopia succeeded in making friends with the United States, Europe and China, with Africa and with the Middle East. Long-running rivalry with Sudan was peaceably resolved. The countries that Ethiopia saw as long-term rivals and potential threats—Egypt and the Gulf States—were kept at bay. Under Seyoum’s guiding hand, Ethiopia became admired as Africa’s biggest contributor to peace and security, a reliable contributor of high-quality troops to peacekeeping operations, and a partner in conflict resolution.

In some ways, Seyoum returned Ethiopia’s foreign policy to the traditions of Emperor Haile Selassie: seeking to be on good terms with all but dependent on none, using soft power to build alliances that allowed the country to chart a path all of its own. In his ministry, he retained the most professional and capable officials from the previous government, arguing that the country needed both their skills and also respect for an institution of state. Like Aklilu bringing Ethiopia’s foreign policy skills to bear on building the OAU, Seyoum was a discreet but influential architect of the creation of the African Union.

The big exception to the ‘friendship with all’ strategy was Eritrea, and Seyoum resisted calls for Ethiopia to seek a military solution to the dispute, opting instead for containing and isolating Eritrea in the hope that time would bring about an end to ruthless regime of President Isseyas Afewerki. I recall Seyoum lamenting that the most progressive and democratically-minded members of the Eritrean political elite—such as his former counterparts in the Eritrean foreign ministry, Petros Solomon and Haile ‘Duru’ Woldensae, had been first sidelined and then destroyed. Like Mengistu during the darkest days of the Red Terror, Isseyas’s approach to any political challenge was total elimination, and that included his closest comrades in arms, consigned to incommunicado imprisonment without charge, trial or contact with even their closest families. Isseyas made his move on September 18, 2001, knowing that world attention was elsewhere and he could act without international scrutiny. ‘Duru’ is feared to have died; Petros’s fate, along with so many others, isn’t known. Seyoum mourned his colleagues’ demise. And he insisted that the culture of systematic elite murder—politicide, or genocide of political groups—was something that should never be allowed to re-enter Ethiopia.

After retiring as foreign minister, Seyoum served as ambassador to China and as chief mediator for the peace talks in the conflict in South Sudan. The civil war erupted in South Sudan on December 13, 2013 and within a week, a delegation of foreign ministers of IGAD countries was in Juba insisting that the fighting should cease and a political solution should be found. Overruling the predictable objections that it was an internal affair and the opposition were traitors, IGAD and the African Union put the welfare of the country above the anger and ambition of South Sudan’s warring politicians. Seyoum was the mediator: patient and fair, continually frustrated by the mercenary callousness of his interlocutors.

As the EPRDF began the process of liberalization in Ethiopia three years ago, leading to the selection of Abiy Ahmed as prime minister, Seyoum was prominent among a small group of Tigrayans who stayed on within the highest levels of government, trying to steer the transition towards consensus. He remained in a post as advisor within the Prime Minister’s Office until late 2019, though the extent to which the PM called upon his experience and wisdom isn’t at all clear. Certainly, Abiy’s readiness to partner with autocratic Eritrea disturbed him.

As a person, Seyoum was always warm and accessible, and ready to talk without regard for rank or protocol. He had a well-deserved reputation for treating all his staff with care and respect, for keeping his door open.

Seyoum became less active in politics, planning to spend more time reflecting on the lessons learned from his unparalleled career, and building up the think tank, the Centre for Dialogue, Research and Cooperation that he founded. His health also suffered: he had a serious back problem and had difficulty walking more than short distances.

The circumstances of Seyoum’s killing aren’t clear. The Ethiopian government is not a reliable source of information. Eritrea—which may well have carried out the assassinations—is remaining silent. The official report that Seyoum and his colleagues ‘refused to surrender’ is opaque. The other two elderly Tigrayans killed in the same incident were Abay Tsehaye, who just had heart surgery, and Asmelash Woldeselassie, who is blind.

Seyoum is survived by his wife and sons. His wife and one son were recently arrested and are now out on bail.

The circumstances of the killing of Seyoum, Abay and Asmelash warrant an immediate high-level international investigation. It is hard to see how these three men posed a military threat. Their killing is part of a pattern of systematic targeting of Tigrayans, which goes beyond removing their political influence in Ethiopia to the wholesale elimination of a political class representing an ethnic or national group. It is consistent with the politics of genocide practiced by Mengistu Haile Mariam and his generals and by Isseyas Afewerki inside Eritrea and in his ongoing military operations inside Tigray today.

Seyoum deserved to end his days in comfortable retirement with all the respect due to a statesman and patriot. His killing should be a red line. The world should not repeat the error of its silence over the extra-judicial execution of his predecessor Aklilu. The killing must stop today.

 

Alex de Waal is the Executive Director of the World Peace Foundation at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. Considered one of the foremost experts on Sudan and the Horn of Africa, his scholarly work and practice have also probed humanitarian crisis and response, human rights, HIV/AIDS and governance in Africa, and conflict and peace-building.

Situation Report EEPA HORN No. 56 – 15 January 2021

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Europe External Programme with Africa is a Belgium-based Centre of Expertise with in-depth knowledge, publications, and networks, specialised in issues of peace building, refugee protection and resilience in the Horn of Africa. EEPA has published extensively on issues related to movement and/or human trafficking of refugees in the Horn of Africa and on the Central Mediterranean Route. It cooperates with a wide network of Universities, research organisations, civil society and experts from Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Djibouti, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Uganda and across Africa. Key in-depth publications can be accessed on the website.

Reported war situation (as confirmed per 14 January)

● Asena TV shows images of four to six explosions outside the municipality offices in the centre of Addis Ababa, which were followed with a few shots.

● New Eritrean troops have entered Mekelle, roaming the city along with many intelligence agents.

● Tigray news reports that Al Shebaab fighters are entering western regions of Ethiopia and may even be controlling parts of the Somali region of Ethiopia.

● A video emerged of the massacre at the Aksum Church of Maryam Zion, where at least 750 civilians were allegedly killed by Eritrean troops. The video shows a body taken away by a priest and shows the I.D. cart found on the body. EEPA reported that the massacre took place on 15 Dec., that civilians were hiding in the church and had been ordered out onto the square, before being executed.

● A second video has emerged of the Maryam Zion Church in Aksum, which was filmed on 29th November. The commentator states that the square should have been full on the eve of the annual Maryam Zion celebration, but it is showing an empty square without any people.

● In this video it is explained that the square is empty because Eritrean soldiers had arrived on the 27th Nov. evening in vehicles with an Eritrean military number plate (with red slash). Regional Tigray troops and youth tried to defend the town but could not hold it.

● The video comments that subsequently, the soldiers were shooting anyone they found on the road including those who tried to open shops in the early morning of 28 Nov. ENDF had entered Aksum around the 22nd November, but they did not stop the shooting, and Eritrean soldiers were killing hundreds of people and looting properties.

● The Catholic Bishop of Adigrat (Tigray), Abune Tesfaselassie Medhin, sent an appeal (dated 5 Jan 2021) stating that the people, including Eritrean refugees, have “run out of food items, basic life-saving medicines, water, etc., and have no access to essential services.”

● The Bishop states “millions” of people have been displaced, most of them women and children without food and water to escape from “heavy artillery and air-strikes.” The Bishop calls on humanitarian assistance to respond to the “war-induced” humanitarian crisis in Tigray. Many of the areas have still not been reached by aid organisations.

● In the last days, there has been fighting again around the Hitsats camp for Eritrean refugees. Eritrean soldiers killed many Eritrean refugees and took some of them to Eritrea. Some refugees escaped to the Adi Harush camp. A woman testified that in the flight from Hitsats to Adi Harush, 3 persons died.

● Eritrean refugees in Tigray are taken to Shiraro, others to Badme. There are at least 10.000 refugees, and they are slowly taken to Eritrea. What happens with them in Eritrea, is not known.

● The refugees held in Shiraro and Badme are held by Eritrean soldiers. They have no food, and they are forced to contact their family to send money. However, the refugees are dependent on the Eritrean soldiers to be able to phone relatives.

●The refugees held by Eritrean troops are using mobile phones from the Eritrean soldiers to contact relatives. These are Eritrean mobile phones. The soldiers are making a business out of this, so that they get paid for this ‘service’. Soldiers take a part of this money, and in some cases all of it.

● Mulu Nega, the chief of the Interim government in Tigray has cancelled a meeting with Mekelle University staff due to emergency operations in the area today.

● It is reported that banks are the first target to be looted by Eritrean soldiers.

● The US embassy warns against ‘strong-armed’ robberies of hiking American citizens in Entoto and Yeka parks and Guellele Botanical gardens. The hikers were surrounded by multiple armed men.

● US embassy sets a negative travel advise to

  1. Border area with Somalia due to potential for terrorism, kidnapping, and landmines;
  2. Border areas with Kenya, Sudan, South Sudan, and Eritrea due to crime, armed conflict, and civil unrest;
  3. Somali Regional State due to potential for terrorism;
  4.  Ethiopia’s Southern Nations, Nationalities, and People’s Region (SNNPR) due to civil unrest;
  5. The East Hararge region and the Guji zone of Oromia State due to armed conflict and civil unrest;
  6. Benishangul Gumuz and the western part of Oromia State due to armed conflict and civil unrest.

Reported International situation (as confirmed per 14 January)

● UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Filippo Grandi appeals to the Ethiopian government to give unimpeded access to Tigray “in whatever way possible” and that “all options should be explored” to safely provide desperately needed assistance.

● Grandi stated his teams were distressed by what they saw in Tigray: “Equally distressing to UNHCR teams on the ground has been our inability to assist thousands of Eritrean refugees who continue to flee the camps in search of safety and support. Refugees arriving on foot to Shire town in Tigray are emaciated, begging for aid that is not available. Refugees who reached Addis Ababa are being returned to Tigray, some against their will.” (Ep/013/Em)

● The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (GCRP) releases an atrocity alert delivering a sobering report on the situation in Tigray, Ethiopia, backed up with satellite imagery.

● GCRP Director, Simon Adams, said that, Ethiopia should “guarantee unfettered humanitarian access to all vulnerable populations in Tigray and ensure their full protection.”

● Simon Adams called on states with significant ties to Ethiopia to “withhold all military support to the government until independent investigations take place regarding the alleged destruction of refugee camps and other potential war crimes.”

● Adams states that “The international community has to increase the political cost of ongoing human rights violations in Tigray.”

● Ethiopian Chief of Staff, General Birhanu Jula, received the highest military medal from Djibouti Army Chief of Staff, General Zekaria Shiek, ordered by Djibouti President Ismail Omar Guelleh for his “effective military leadership in the completed law enforcement operation in Tigray and his great contribution to peace and stability in the country and the region as well”.

● Alex Dewaal from the World Peace Foundation writes in an obituary of Seyoum Mesfin, Ethiopia’s longest-serving foreign minister who was killed in Tigray at the age of 71: “Under Seyoum’s guiding hand, Ethiopia became admired as Africa’s biggest contributor to peace and security, a reliable contributor of high-quality troops to peacekeeping operations, and a partner in conflict resolution.”

Disclaimer:

All information in this situation report is presented as a fluid update report, as to the best knowledge and understanding of the authors at the moment of publication. EEPA does not claim that the information is correct but verifies to the best of ability within the circumstances. Publication is weighed on the basis of interest to understand potential impacts of events (or perceptions of these) on the situation. Check all information against updates and other media. EEPA does not take responsibility for the use of the information or impact thereof. All information reported originates from third parties and the content of all reported and linked information remains the sole responsibility of these third parties. Report to info@eepa.be any additional information and corrections.

Links of interest

Trump’s Withdrawal From Somalia Is a Security Threat. Biden Should Reverse It

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Source: Foreign Policy | Abdi Yusuf

U.S. troops are scheduled to leave the country on Jan. 15, opening the door for al-Shabab terrorists to step up their attacks. The new administration should recommit to protecting the country.

Years of hard-fought gains to stabilize Somalia and defeat the al-Shabab terrorist group are now endangered by President Donald Trump’s threat to withdraw U.S. forces. Not unlike the fragile gains the United States achieved defeating the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, Somalia’s future rests on sound judgment and Washington’s continued engagement. Without persistent pressure from U.S. forces, al-Shabab’s leaders will be able to emerge from hiding, reorganize, and conduct attacks not just in Somalia but across the region, including against key U.S. allies such as Ethiopia and Kenya. However, there’s still time to change course. The current administration’s Jan. 15 deadline to withdraw U.S. troops from Somalia is rapidly approaching.

In all likelihood, the Trump administration will not reverse course on any major policy decision in the lead-up to President-elect Joe Biden’s inauguration on Jan. 20, and the withdrawal will continue as planned. If this is indeed the case, Biden must move swiftly after inauguration to redeploy troops back to their original bases in Somalia.

Biden must move swiftly after inauguration to redeploy troops back to their original bases in Somalia.

Not doing so risks Somalia falling back into the hands of al-Shabab and endangers the lives of not only Somalia’s citizens but those from Western countries residing in the region.

Since 1991, the ongoing civil war in Somalia has killed more than 300,000 people and injured countless others. As the country recovers, a continuing U.S. presence will be crucial to maintaining stability.

Currently, Somalia is showing signs of recovery and gradually becoming a popular destination for business, mainly due to its enhanced security situation in recent years. The persistent efforts of the international community, led by the United States, have made this possible. For decades, the U.S. government has provided training and equipment to Somalia’s armed forces. The U.S.-trained unit Danab conducted many successful operations against al-Shabab, which has killed more than 4,000 people, including Americans.

Two months ago, a CIA paramilitary officer was killed while fighting alongside Danab. In early 2020, al-Shabab launched an attack against U.S. forces in Kenya, killing three Americans and destroying a U.S. surveillance plane.

These sacrifices have not been in vain. Thanks to U.S. involvement in Somalia, a 9/11-style attack against the U.S. homeland was recently foiled—a reminder of the mutually beneficial relationship between the two countries.

This relationship is now at risk. On Dec. 4, Trump ordered the removal of U.S. soldiers from Somalia by early 2021.

The proposed withdrawal comes at an especially critical time and is a risk to the stability of the entire region. Indeed, Ethiopia is in the middle of a civil war and has withdrawn thousands of its troops who had been helping the Somali army fight against al-Shabab. Kenya-Somalia relations are at their lowest point in years, and domestic tensions are high over the upcoming elections and a string of attacks and assassinations. If the United States goes ahead with its withdrawal, it could have a huge impact on stability in Somalia, deal a major blow to morale among Somalia’s armed forces, and raise questions about U.S. credibility.

The proposed withdrawal comes at an especially critical time and is a risk to the stability of the entire region.

U.S. Defense Department officials claim the United States will “retain the capability to conduct targeted counterterrorism operations in Somalia, and collect early warnings and indicators.” However, in the eyes of many Somalis, Washington is abandoning the country. “Al-Shabab will frame this as a victory,” said Omar Mahmood, a senior Somalia analyst at the International Crisis Group. “They will use it as evidence of their ability to take on a world power like the United States and force them to leave Somalia.”

U.S. officials claim that moving troops to neighboring countries such as Kenya and Djibouti will have no major consequences. Somali officials disagree; former Danab chief Col. Ahmed Abdullahi Sheikh criticized the move, saying that the U.S. military “can launch and stage operations from countries like Djibouti and Kenya, but it’s not the same as being in the country. … You can’t train a force remotely.” U.S. support in planning and launching raids in Somalia is a critical component of the fight against al-Shabab—one that cannot easily be replaced.

It is true that a permanent U.S. military presence in Somalia is not a long-term solution. However, this transition should happen with the help of the international community. The Somali government has started to see success toward building an effective security force, thanks in large part to Washington’s unwavering support for Somalia and its people. With U.S. support, the Somali army was able to reduce al-Shabab’s military capabilities, diminish its territorial control, and bring peace back to large areas of Somalia. But the group remains a persistent threat to the region.

Now more than ever, Somalia needs the support of the United States. Leaving Somalia to fend for itself would risk erasing years of progress. Al-Shabab could reconquer territory, strengthen its military capabilities, and increase its stranglehold over the Somali people. “It’s my hope therefore that the U.S. government will reevaluate its decision and hopefully change,” one Danab officer—who prefers to remain anonymous—told me.

The Biden administration needs to increase U.S. efforts in Somalia in order to strengthen the government’s capabilities to contain the threat posed by al-Shabab. The first step Biden can take would be an immediate redeployment, followed by concrete assurances of future U.S. support. Otherwise, America’s hard-fought efforts to bring peace and stability to Somalia will have been in vain.

Abdi Yusuf is an international affairs researcher and a freelance writer based in Nairobi.

 

Dozens Die in Ethnic Massacre in Troubled Ethiopian Region

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Source: The New York Times | Simon Marks and Declan Walsh

It was the latest of several bloody outbursts over the past year in the western region of Benishangul-Gumuz, along the border with Sudan, where ethnic tensions are running high.

At least 80 people were killed on Tuesday when unidentified gunmen stormed through a village in western Ethiopia in the latest of a series of ethnically driven massacres in the area, the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission and witnesses said on Wednesday.

The massacre in Benishangul-Gumuz region, along the border with Sudan, is the latest challenge to the regime of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, who came to power in 2018 promising to unite Ethiopia but has struggled to contain a growing wave of ethnic violence.

The attacks further threaten the stability of Africa’s second-most populous nation at a time when Mr. Abiy is already embroiled in an escalating conflict in the northern Tigray region, where he launched a major military operation on Nov. 4 that he said was intended to capture defiant local leaders.

Analysts say the campaign in Tigray has hampered Mr. Abiy’s ability to stem clashes like the recent one in Benishangul-Gumuz, because it has forced him to divert soldiers from across Ethiopia to Tigray. As a result, ethnic clashes that had already been growing for months have only gotten worse.

In the latest episode, witnesses said that men of the Gumuz ethnic group, armed with rifles and swords, stormed into Daletti village early Tuesday. Photos from the aftermath of the attack, provided by local activists, showed bloodied bodies of women and children strewn on the ground, many with horrific wounds. They said that many of the victims were ethnic Amharas and Agaws, who are a minority in that region.

“A group of Gumuz men came to our village chanting ‘leave our land,’” said Sebsibie Ibrahim, 36, a shop owner in Metekel district, speaking by phone. “They fired their guns and used swords to attack anyone they came across — women, children, elderly people.”

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In the chaos that followed, houses were torched and an old man was beheaded outside his house, Mr. Sebsibie said. “Blood was flooding from his neck,” he said.

On Dec. 22, Mr. Abiy took time out from the campaign in Tigray to visit Benishangul-Gumuz and calm tensions in the area. But a day later, armed men attacked a village, leaving at least 100 people dead, according to human rights groups.

Aaron Maasho, a spokesman for the government-funded Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, which reported the killings on Wednesday, urged Mr. Abiy to deploy extra security forces to keep the peace in the troubled region.

“For the umpteenth time, we call on the federal and regional authorities to scale up security in Metekel,” he said, referring to the district of Benishangul-Gumuz where the killings took place.

Mr. Abiy’s decision to open up Ethiopian politics after he came to power in 2018, releasing political prisoners and allowing exiles to return, was widely acclaimed. But it also unleashed simmering ethnic tensions.

Benishangul-Gumuz, for example, is home to five major ethnic groups, mostly from the Berta and Gumuz peoples. But the region is also home to minority Amharas, Oromos, Tigrayans and Agaws — a source of escalating tension.

Billene Seyoum, a spokeswoman for Prime Minister Abiy, did not respond to questions about the violence.

Dessalegn Chanie, an Amhara opposition politician, said there had been signs in recent days that armed men from the Oromo and Gumuz ethnic groups were preparing an attack, particularly in areas where there was little federal security presence.

“These attacks were premeditated and highly prepared,” he said.

Although Mr. Abiy declared victory in Tigray last month, United Nations officials say the fight continues.

On Wednesday, Ethiopia said its military had killed three senior members of Tigray’s former ruling party, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, including Seyoum Mesfin, a former foreign minister of Ethiopia.