Ethiopia in Turmoil

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The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) | Ann M. Fitz-Gerald

The northern region of Tigray is challenging Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s reform agenda. The prospects for peace are dim.

Distortions and misinformation have added further complexities to an already fraught confrontation between the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the federal government of Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. Two weeks after the clashes begun, a resolution to the current crisis is far from clear.

A FRAUGHT LEGACY

The challenge of pursuing transformative leadership and political change was always a tall order for Abiy. When he came to power in 2018, he inherited a model of federalism including nine ethnic-based regions spanning a population of approximately 110 million. His immediate focus was to open political space, pursue market-based reforms and make peace with neighbouring Eritrea.

Enhanced multi-ethnic representation across government dealt a blow to TPLF-heavy hierarchies. Abiy’s determination to depart from the socialist underpinnings of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front’s (EPRDF) ethnic federalist doctrine amounted to a sudden and unsavoury change of direction for a party which had not only liberated the country from the Derg, an oppressive military junta, but which had poured years of efforts into the development and implementation of a model of revolutionary ‘democratic developmental statebuilding’.

But Abiy’s administration persevered, reversing many of the former policies, systems and narratives. This irritated those who considered themselves national defenders and ‘guardians’ of visionary thinking. In the absence of any immediate reconciliation and reintegration scheme for TPLF leaders, a backlash from a bruised and unappreciated TPLF became inevitable.

SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

Within the security sector more specifically, Abiy deconstructed past practices which had retained senior TPLF officers beyond compulsory retirement. He also introduced a policy which prevented more than one member of any ethnic group from being present in every level of the military’s command structure. The implication was that many Tigrayans at mid-senior levels would not become eligible for career enhancing roles which, together with the limit on staying in one military rank for no more than 10 years, would support a gradual exodus of many mid- and senior-level officers and soldiers. While jobs were offered to those who could stay, and short-term support provided to those who departed in the form of additional months’ pay as well as allowing senior officers to retain military vehicles, this was no consolation for what the TPLF felt it deserved. Abiy subsequently issued arrest warrants for a number of these commanders who stood accused of corruption and human rights abuses. This caused further alienation from the Abiy administration.

The awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to Abiy only intensified the TPLF’s indignation. Abiy’s view was that the significant military build-up in the country’s eastern and northern commands – the latter in Tigray – was expensive and required dismantling now that peace with Eritrea had been achieved. The TPLF perceived the situation with Eritrea differently, and resisted the removal of this equipment. When crowds blocked returning equipment convoys in protest, federal troops were instructed by Abiy to stand down to avoid violence.

THE LOOMING CRISIS

The loose thread holding the TPLF to Abiy’s government was finally broken in 2019 when the government rebranded the ruling coalition as the ‘Prosperity Party’ – a move which sought to involve representatives from all nine regional states, five of which had not been encompassed by the previous EPRDF coalition party. The TPLF severed all ties and gradually focused more on the region.

When the country’s electoral commission took a decision to postpone the federal elections because of the pandemic, the TPLF challenged Abiy’s legitimacy. But the electoral commission exercised an independent decision, which was supported by a unanimous vote in parliament, citing challenges of the country’s weak capacity to manage the pandemic while supporting, what was anticipated to be, an election with the highest voter turnout in the country’s history. Still, Tigray forged ahead with what the federal government deemed an illegal regional election which excluded the two main regional opposition parties and produced a landslide victory for the TPLF.

Refusing to accept the decision taken by parliament and the constitutional inquiry bodies to postpone the election, the TPLF called all its government employees, ministers and parliamentarians back to their region on 5 October – the date, prior to these decisions, of the end of Abiy’s first term in office. Added to the mix was the TPLF’s demand that any dialogue with the federal government be overseen by a caretaker administration which did not include Abiy.

The move of governance capacity back to Tigray’s capital, Mekelle, meant that prospects for a negotiated arrangement were fast disappearing. Refusing to afford any legal basis to Tigray’s newly elected regional assembly, the House of Federation (the upper house of the federal parliament) unanimously passed a bill calling for regional funding disbursements to be routed to more local Tigrayan authorities, bypassing the TPLF-controlled central regional government in Mekelle. The TPLF described this as a ‘declaration of war’ by the federal government.

THE BREAKDOWN

On 4 November, following a discussion between Abiy and the Tigray regional president Debretsion Gebremichael, a government cargo plane carrying monthly army rations, and billions of new birr currency to furnish regional banks and support the salaries of personnel in the northern command, landed in Mekelle. What followed were synchronised attacks on all levels of command posts under the federal northern command. Government reports indicate that insiders loyal to the TPLF cooperated with regional militia in killing non-Tigrayan officers and soldiers and demanding that others surrender their weapons.  A senior associate of the TPLF leadership later claimed responsibility for the attack in a video which has since been withdrawn from the internet. Hours following the attack, Abiy deployed federal defence forces to ‘secure law and order in the region and to apprehend those implicated in mass corruption and gross human rights violations’.

Whereas one could ask whether or not the attack on the barracks constituted the crossing of a ‘red line’ – and whether there was scope to avoid confrontation – the federal government’s decision to deploy troops appeared to be based on what it felt had been the exhaustion of all other non-military instruments of power in efforts to appease the TPLF. Citing TPLF links to instability elsewhere in the country, conscious of the northern command’s heavy artillery and long-range weapons, and the scope for further casualties, it was clear that Abiy felt compelled to authorise the use of force. Hundreds of combatants and civilians have died, a flood of refugees has moved towards Sudan, political prisoners have been taken hostage and humanitarian corridors have become threatened.

AN INTERNATIONAL ROLE?

The TPLF’s latest rocket attacks on the Eritrean capital of Asmara appear to be an attempt to internationalise the conflict and lay the ground for an international response. Calls for a ceasefire, mediation, dialogue and negotiations have all been made. The Ethiopian government has stated that it will not sit down to negotiations with what it describes as ‘criminals’. The situation leaves only two options for an international response: calls for a swift and peaceful resolution of differences, or external intervention. While the former would be in the context of Ethiopia’s internal mechanisms of conflict resolution, the latter would involve taking sides – which, at this stage, should be avoided at all costs.

Any option moving forward, including weapons decommissioning, would need to consider the country’s important traditional and cultural dialogue processes, deep inter-federal issues, trust deficiencies and linguistic differences. Above all, the voice of the Tigrayan people is key.

Still, inaction is not without its merits as well. For if it becomes clear that the TPLF will be afforded no standing by the international community, they may agree on an internal ceasefire arrangement, and possibly an independent truth and reconciliation commission, perhaps overseen by traditional and religious leaders.

However, with both sides now facing the inevitability of further civilian casualties, and as long as the TPLF believes that there is a way of forcing the hand of both the international community and the federal government, prospects for a peaceful solution remain bleak.

The views expressed in this Commentary are the author’s, and do not represent those of RUSI or any other institution.

Are Emirati Armed Drones Supporting Ethiopia from an Eritrean Air Base?

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Source: Billing Cat | November 19, 2020

Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed declares that the war in the Tigray Region has entered its “final phase”.

The conflict broke out on November 4 when the country’s central government accused the region’s local authorities of holding “illegal” elections and seizing a military base. Thousands of civilians have fled to neigbouring Sudan as the federal army advances towards the regional capital of Mekelle.

Tigray politicians have claimed that they are under attack “on several fronts” — including neighbouring Eritrea, with which the region shares a long border. As Regional President Debretsion Gebremichael recently told Reuters, “our country is attacking us with a foreign country, Eritrea. Treason!”

Getachew Reda, a senior advisor to Gebremichael, made more detailed claims about the use of drones:

The Ethiopian Prime Minister has only stated that the Air Force conducted ‘targeted strikes’  against the militants without specifying the weapons used.

Could Emirati drones or other drones have been used in these airstrikes?

So far, there’s no evidence for that particular claim.

Satellite imagery obtained by Bellingcat suggests that the United Arab Emirates air base in Assab, Eritrea is indeed home to drones consistent with China’s Wing Loong II model of armed uncrewed aerial vehicles.

The imagery, provided by Planet Labs, shows a drone with a wingspan of just over 20 metres, matching the features of the drone model produced by China’s Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group.

The UAE acquired Wing Loong II drones in 2017. They have also used the drones to conduct operations in Yemen in the war against various militant groups, including the Houthis.

Satellite imagery from Planet Labs. Used with permission

The drones seen in these images are consistent with those operated by the UAE. Furthermore, the recently built drone hangars at the base suggest a larger presence of drones in the area, though their active deployment over Ethiopia is not yet confirmed. However, the imagery provides a strong indication of the possibility for their use. However, the Ethiopian Air Force also operates Russian-made MiG-23 and Sukhoi-27 jet fighters and attack helicopters that could also have been used in the strikes.

Footage uploaded via Facebook and shared Deutsche Welle’s Amharic-language service indicated that jet fighters have been active around Mekelle, where they are claimed to be involved in airstrikes:

The birth of a drone base

Drones aren’t new to this region. In 2015, what is likely a Chinese-produced Wing Loong I drone was spotted at the Assab airbase. This model is the predecessor of the Wing Loong II, which only entered service after 2018.

In 2016 an analysis by Stratfor detailed the construction of the base and its growth for both aerial and naval capabilities, providing the UAE with operational capability for its campaign in Yemen. Once again, satellite imagery shows a Wing Loong I drone standing outside two drone shelters at the north side of the tarmac.

A Sentinel-2 timelapse of the base comparing January 2017 with November 2020 reveals the large scale expansion of the base’s infrastructure.

Timelapse image: Sentinel Hub / Creative Commons

Two drone hangars were constructed sometime in April 2018, but in November 2019, a third hangar appeared on Sentinel-2 imagery.

The construction and lease of the base to the UAE by Eritrea has been condemned by the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea as a violation of the UN arms embargo on the two Horn of Africa states.

The current Planet Labs imagery also shows three crates next to the hangars at Assab Airbase, which could be evidence of shipping. Similar crates are used for the US-produced MQ-9 Reaper drones, as shown in an image released by the British Ministry of Defence.

According to the Twitter OSINT investigator Obretix, similar containers have also been noticed at other bases with confirmed Wing Loong II drones, such as in Egypt:

Furthermore, similar crates are visible on satellite imagery from this airbase in Iraq, which hosts US MQ-1 Grey Eagle and MQ-9  Reaper drones:

The UAE have also operated Wing Loong II drones over Libya in support of the opposition Libyan National Army (LNA) lead by the warlord Khalifa Haftar. According to the UN, at least 800 drone strikes in support of the LNA had taken place by November 2019, some of which had claimed civilian casualties. Satellite imagery confirms their presence on bases both in Libya as well as in Egypt.

The UAE also operates the US-produced General Atomic Predator XP unarmed drones. Moreover, the outgoing Trump administration has just approved the sales of MQ-9 Reaper drones to the UAE, provoking protest from human rights groups due to the Emirates’ poor human rights record and the relentless airstrikes by a Saudi and UAE led coalition in Yemen, which has caused high numbers of civilian casualties.

There are also media reports that Ethiopia has procured Chinese CH-4 armed drones, yet so far no open-source confirmation has been found which might indicate the presence of drones at known bases of the Ethiopian airforce. However, other clues could take the form of information from communications stations or satellite imagery showing the aforementioned shipping containers, as explained here by the Bard Center for the Study of the Drone.

Possible, but improbable

In sum, the claims made by the Tigray forces are not impossible, but so far they seem improbable.

Satellite imagery confirms the presence of Chinese-produced drones at the UAE’s military base in Assab, but that is all it confirms. There is currently no further evidence that these same drones have been involved in operations in support of the Ethiopian airforce, though there have been confirmed sightings of Ethiopian jet fighters in the conflict zone.

With thanks to Adam Rawnsley @arawnsley and Frank Slijper @FrankSlijper for feedback

Russia Opening Major Military Base in Sudan

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Source: Military Watch Magazine

The announcement of plans for the establishment of a Russian naval base on Sudan’s east coast, which has reportedly been under consideration since 2017 but is thought to have been delayed by a Western backed coup in the African country in April 2019, has given are grounds for speculation that Russia could be planning to reestablish a stronger naval presence overseas by opening further facilities in other vital theatres. Late in 2017 the Head of the Russian Defense and Security Committee Viktor Bondarev suggested that Moscow could consider restoring its military presences in Cuba and Vietnam, referring to these countries as Russia’s “historical partners” on the basis that both hosted Soviet military facilities during the Cold War and relied heavily on Soviet support to counter Western threats. Bondarev stated that restoring the country’s military presence was in the “interests of international security,” as a result of “intensified U.S. aggression.”

Russia’s only foreign military facilities outside the former Soviet Union are in Syria, where the country maintains both a key naval base on the Mediterranean Sea in Latakia province, and the nearby Khmemim Airbase which was established in September 2015 to facilitate a contribution to the Syrian government’s war effort. Facilities in Sudan are expected o be ambitious in size, according to the recently released plans, and will have a capacity for 300 military and civilian personnel and four ships including nuclear vessels, indicating that Moscow is willing to invest in such projects to enhance its maritime power projection capabilities and boost its overseas presence. Facilities in Vietnam and Cuba however would allow Russia to project power to strategically critical regions, the former being the most hotly contested and arguably the most strategically critical in the world today, and the latter placing Russian assets near the American coast – and in a strong position to support nearby Venezuela and Bolivia which are important strategic partners. With Russia gently rebalancing its military towards a greater focus on East Asia, Vietnam is a potentially ideal host for historical, political and geographic reasons. Neither China nor North Korea are expected to allow any permanent foreign military presence on their soil, and facilities on Russian territory are effectively boxed in by the Japanese islands, where there is a heavy U.S. presence, which impede open access to the Pacific.

Regarding to the potential for future foreign military facilities, Victor Bondarev stated: “I believe under the condition of increased tension in the world and frank intervention in the internal affairs of other countries – Russia’s historical partners – our return to Latin America is not ruled out. Of course, this should be coordinated with the Cubans… We should also think about our Navy’s return to Vietnam with the permission of the [Vietnamese] government.” He stressed that such steps would be effective responses to increased U.S. assertiveness in both regions. Bondarev has been far from alone in calls for such action, with his statement coming just hours after the first deputy chairman of the Russian parliament’s upper chamber’s Defense and Security Committee, Frants Klintsevich, called for a reopening of military facilities in Cuba specifically. Given the generally low endurance of post-Soviet Russian surface warships, which are no heaver than frigates, the existence of overseas bases is particularly highly valued. Russia’s most heavily armed Soviet era warships, the Kirov Class nuclear powered battlecruisers, are currently undergoing a comprehensive and very ambitious refurbishment which will allow them to deploy considerable force for port visits across much of the world as required – with these having a higher endurance than any surface combatant fielded by any other country.

In 2016 Russian lawmakers Valery Rushkin and Sergei Obukhov submitted a letter to Russian President Vladimir Putin, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu calling on them to consider the restoration of overseas military bases. This development came two years after the Crimean crisis and the sharp deterioration of relations with the West, and following the establishment of Khmeimim Airbase and beginning of a successful military campaign in Syria in 2015. Amid growing tensions with the Western Bloc, and in light of Russia’s expanding roles in both the Pacific and South America, such plans may well come to fruition – in particular if the upcoming U.S. administration recommits the United States to the Pivot to Asia initiative. A Russian military presence would shift the balance of power in both regions significantly against the favour of Western interests, and whether the facilities are naval or air bases they are likely to deploy a number asymmetric military assets such as hypersonic missiless to compensate for a smaller presence. In Vietnam in particular, it would also provide opportunities for more joint military exercises and potentially increase the appeal of more Russian arms purchases for the Vietnamese military – which is considered a leading client for several next generation weapons systems.

 

Russia Planning Major Naval Base in Sudan

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Source: Military Watch Magazine

New Facility to Service Nuclear Assets

The Russian Defence Ministry is planning to build a naval base on Sudan’s east coast, which would provide the Navy with its second overseas facility after the one on Syria’s  Tartus following the closure of bases in Cuba and Vietnam. The facility was referred to as a “logistical support centre” where “repairs and resupply operations and rest for crew members” can take place, with a draft agreement already having been signed. The facility would have a capacity for 300 military and civilian personnel and four ships, and would be able to accommodate nuclear vessels, making it significantly larger than the Syrian facility at least before its wartime expansion after 2016. It remains uncertain what kind of warships the facility is deigned to accommodate, and whether heavier warships such as battlecruisers will also be accommodated. The base will be located on the northern outskirts of Port Sudan, and Russia will also gain the right to transport “weapons, ammunition and equipment” for the base through Sudanese ports and airports.

Russian Navy Slava Class Missile Cruiser | Military Watch Magazine

 

Sudan’s military establishment has maintained close defence ties with Russia, despite a Western-backed coup in the country in April 2019 ousting the longtime President Omar Al Bashir who was closely aligned with Moscow. Under Al Bashir’s rule Sudan and Russia were discussing the possibility of a naval base from at least late 2017, alongside the potential sale of advanced Su-30SM and Su-35 fighters to the Sudanese Air Force. Al Bashir had personally appealed to Russian President Vladimir Putin in a visit to Moscow in 2017 to help support Sudan against ongoing Western efforts to partition the country through subversion. Sudan has faced serious political and economic crises since the coup, with the country’s political future highly uncertain. The draft agreement for the naval facility stipulates that its establishment “meets the goals of maintaining peace and stability in the region, is defensive and is not aimed against other countries,” with Sudanese forces maintaining the right to use the mooring area. The deal will stand for 25 years after its signing, and could represent a game changer for the balance of power in the Red Sea as Russia establishes a sizeable military presence in the area. Such a development could also give more clout to Sudan’s military establishment, which is thought to be seeking to contain the empowerment of pro-Western elements in the country

Egypt Deploys its Most Advanced Fighters to Sudan For Joint Exercises Amid Political Uncertainty

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Source: Military Watch Magazine

The Egyptian Air Force has deployed a contingent of its most capable fighter aircraft, the MiG-29M, to neighbouring Sudan for the Protectors of the Nile 2020 military exercises. This follows a Western-backed coup in Khartoum in 2019 which saw the administration of longstanding Western adversary Omar Al Bashir toppled, with Sudan’s political future still uncertain as nationalist, pro-Western, Islamist and other factions continue to vie for influence. The MiG-29M deployments has been met with a number of different interpretations, including a sign of support for the Sudanese Military amid growing instability internally. The Sudanese Air Force itself operates the MiG-29 as its primary frontline fighter, albeit the older but still relatively modern MiG-29SE variant, which until 2015 had a significant qualitative edge over anything in the Egyptian fleet due largely to its use of active radar guided R-77 missiles. Egypt itself was able to acquire the R-77 from 2015 alongside its MiG-29M jets – providing the most advanced air to air missile in both fleets and Egypt’s only active radar guided missile with a range exceeding 100km.

Sudanese Air Force MiG-29 Fighters Escort Su-24M Strike Fighter | Military Watch Magazine

 

Interoperability between Egyptian and Sudanese air units is expected to be high, and could improve considerably as the two carry out more joint exercises. With Cairo aligning itself closely with Russian since the overthrow of its Western backed Islamist government in 2013, and opposing Western designs in both Syria and Libya, greater Egyptian involvement in Sudan has the potential to tip the balance against of Western interests in the country, reversing many of the gains made since the coup against the Bashir government. While relations between the two East African states have historically been far from positive, with territorial disputes surrounding the Egyptian-held Hala’ib triangle area ongoing, the emergence of common perceived threats to both countries could well lead to the forging of a robust partnership.

What’s Happening in Ethiopia Is a Tragedy

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By Tsedale Lemma for ©The New York Times

Much of the blame must be laid at the door of the prime minister.

The announcement last week that the government was about to launch a military operation into one of the country’s regions came, to put it lightly, as a shock.

Not only was it very far from the emollient statecraft that won Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed the Nobel Peace Prize last year, it also seemed to shatter the purpose of his premiership. When he rose to power in 2018, Mr. Abiy promised to guide Ethiopia into a new era of peace, prosperity and national reconciliation.

But on Nov. 4, he dispatched the Army to Tigray, one of the country’s 10 semiautonomous regions and home to roughly 6 percent of the population, accusing its leaders — with whom he has increasingly sparred — of attacking a government defense post and attempting to steal military equipment.

And in the days since, Mr. Abiy imposed a six-month state of emergency on the Tigray region, declared its legislature void and approved a provisional replacement. As fighting raged, the internet and telephone networks have been shut down. Hundreds are reported to be dead.

This is a tragedy. Ethiopia stands on the cusp of civil war, bringing devastation to both the country and the wider region. While the situation is volatile and uncertain, this much is clear: Mr. Abiy’s political project, to bring together the nation in a process of democratization, is over. And much of the blame must be laid at his door.

After years of persistent anti-government protests, economic troubles and widespread unrest, Mr. Abiy took over a country on the brink of collapse. At least one million people were internally displaced in 2017, according to the United Nations, as the country was shaken by protests from Oromo and Amhara ethnic groups, who together make up nearly two-thirds of the population. Presenting himself as a reformer, the avalanche of changes promised by Mr. Abiy, who took over in April 2018, seemed to avert the worst of the country’s problems.

But Mr. Abiy overreached. His first cardinal mistake was to sideline the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, for decades the most powerful political force in the country, in the peace he brokered between Ethiopia and Eritrea. By pushing the Tigrayan leadership aside as he sealed his signature achievement, Mr. Abiy made clear the limits to his talk of unity.

That was a taste of what was to come. Last year, Mr. Abiy moved to dismantle the old political order. Going beyond his original remit, he proposed reconfiguring the coalition that had ruled the country for 27 years — the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Front, or E.P.R.D.F., which itself comprised a gamut of regional parties — into a new, single party.

The T.P.L.F., which founded and dominated the coalition, was not keen on the change — but Mr. Abiy went ahead with it regardless, creating a rift with the Tigrayans and undermining the country’s delicate political settlement. Far from minimizing the fallout, Mr. Abiy exacerbated it, removing all ministers from the T.P.L.F. from his cabinet.

By the time the new party was announced, in November 2019, the damage was done. The T.P.L.F., angered by the whittling away of its power and concerned that the country’s federal system was under threat, had not joined. They weren’t alone in their disquiet. In Mr. Abiy’s own region, Oromia, many were skeptical of the new order, while southern Ethiopia splintered into disorder, as multiple administrative zones demanded self-rule. After coming to power on the promise of unity, Mr. Abiy had alienated and frustrated key components of his coalition. Suddenly, he looked vulnerable.

The coronavirus changed the calculus. The all-important national election, scheduled for August, was postponed; the focus became how to mitigate the damage wrought by the pandemic. But the political problems didn’t go away.

In the summer, the killing of a popular Oromo musician — whose perpetrators the government claims were acting under the orders of an armed opposition group, the Oromo Liberation Army, and the T.P.L.F. — set off widespread violence against minorities in Oromia and police killings of protesters, in which at least 166 people died. It also led to a major crackdown against opposition political leaders, including Mr. Abiy’s former ally and now fierce critic, Jawar Mohammed.

Then in September, the Tigray region went ahead with its elections, in defiance of the government’s orders. Since that act of subversion, tensions between the government and the leaders in Tigray, simmering for two years, have been high. Last week, they spilled out into open conflict.

Whether or not it escalates into a civil war, it will leave an indelible mark on Ethiopian politics. What was already a deeply polarized country will become more divided still. But most importantly, it could crush the hopes of a democratic transition. Free speech, civil liberties and due process may fall afoul of the turn to militarism and repression.

In Tigray, the possibility of civilian casualties, indiscriminate attacks and protracted conflict could further deepen grievances; in a region with a long history of resistance to the central state, that might lead to an insurgency. The consequences for the wider region, if the conflict were to spill out to Eritrea, Sudan and Djibouti, could be severe.

Judging by Mr. Abiy’s moves over the past week, not least the replacement of the foreign minister and the leaders of the entire security sector with trusted loyalists, he is not inclined to de-escalate. The leader who once committed “to toil for peace every single day and in all seasons” has been acting more like a commander in chief than a prime minister.

Mr. Abiy has come a long way. War, he memorably said as he accepted the Nobel Peace Prize, was “the epitome of hell.” Now he looks ready to meet it.

Tsedale Lemma (@TsedaleLemma) is the editor in chief of the Addis Standard.

Ethiopia is about to cross the point of no return

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©Mail&Guardian – Rashid Abdi  & Tobias Hagmann

With the world’s attention fixated on the United States elections, Ethiopia embarked on a civil war last week. In a time span of five days Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, who won the 2019 Nobel peace prize after making peace with Eritrea, ended the democratic transition that he had initiated two years before.

In the early hours of Wednesday last week, Abiy ordered federal troops to launch an offensive against the northern region of Tigray, which borders Eritrea and is home to about 6% of the population. Government airstrikes on military positions in Tigray and a telecommunication shutdown began the same day.

Since then, Abiy’s government has purged Tigrayan officials from government positions, mobilised ethnic militias to join the war and rejected international calls for dialogue with leaders of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF).

On Saturday, Ethiopia’s parliament replaced Tigray’s elected leadership with a caretaker administration. On Sunday, the prime minister appointed some of his close allies as the new heads of national defence, intelligence and the federal police. Until recently, Abiy preached national unity and forgiveness. So why did he start a civil war?

Abiy’s casus belli is an alleged raid on the headquarters of the Northern Command in Mekelle during which, it is claimed, arms were looted and scores killed. The truth is more complicated. First, the war preparations had been underway for weeks. Federal forces and allied troops from other federal states were in fact massed on the border between Tigray and Amhara as early as late October.

Second, the officer corps of the Northern Command is predominantly Tigrayan and Oromo. The command has been in Mekelle for more than a decade. It had put down deep social roots and developed close ties with the TPLF. When Abiy issued the order for an offensive, the command rejected it and reaffirmed its loyalty to the elected leadership in Tigray. A brief firefight between loyalist and dissident troops ensued, which was quickly suppressed.

The Oromo members of the command are believed to be predominantly supportive of the TPLF. Most are disenchanted with the prime minister’s arrest of Oromo leaders and the heavy-handed crackdown in Oromia.

Third, Tigray is estimated to hold the bulk of Ethiopia’s military hardware. The region has enough helicopter gunships, heavy field guns, tanks and armoured personnel carriers to mount a conventional war. The idea they would raid the command armoury and depots for weapons and ammunition is spurious, fantastical, even.

The role of distrust

Abiy distrusts the professional national army. His relations with the rank and file are brittle. His stint in the army as a radioman in the signals corps and cyber-security department was brief and had not given him the depth and network needed to effectively influence it.

This partly explains why he is increasingly reliant on ethnic forces drawn from other regional states to prosecute the campaign in Tigray. So far, the bulk of the federal fighting force is drawn from a plethora of ethnic armies from the regional states. They include Amhara State special forces and liyu paramilitary police from Oromia.

By outsourcing the war to ethnic units — some with axes to grind against Tigrayans — Abiy is playing a dangerous game almost certain to aggravate the conflict and transforming, potentially, what is a centre-periphery contest into a wider ethnic conflagration.

Both the Tigray leadership and the federal government deserve blame for the current crisis, but it is important to understand the wider context.

The speed at which Abiy evolved from political reformer to war prime minister has astonished his friends and foes alike. When he came to power amid popular unrest in March 2018, Abiy gained overwhelming acclaim as a reformer. He released prisoners, welcomed back the opposition and promised to open up the economy. Yet political liberalisation backfired as pent-up ethnic tensions spiralled out of control, destabilising a nation that has long been considered an anchor of stability in the Horn of Africa region.

Opposition arrests

“Abiymania” dissipated rapidly when it became clear that the new federal leadership was unable to manage these conflicts. Abiy faced serious political opposition from the outgoing TPLF guard, which had dominated the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front for decades. After he broke with his former colleagues of the Oromo Democratic Party, Abiy faced increasing criticism from Oromo nationalists. They accused him of selling out the Oromo cause; he had many of them arrested in return. Repositioning himself as an Ethiopian nationalist who transcends ethnic cleavages, Abiy created the multi-ethnic, but unitary Prosperity Party that controls all levers of power.

Ethiopia has taken a fatal step towards a full-blown civil war. Armed clashes are now raging on multiple battle fronts. Hundreds of soldiers have died on both sides in less than a week.

Expectations of a swift and clean victory are misplaced. The most likely outcome is a messy and grinding stalemate; and, worse, a protracted insurgency for which TPLF is well-suited. A prolonged conflict is bound to have dire implications. It elevates the prospect of a regionalised and multi-ethnic conflict, risks reversing the economic and development gains made in the past 20 years, and is almost certain to trigger large-scale displacement. Most crucially, it diminishes prospects for furthering democratisation and reduces the chances for credible elections in 2021.

The window for international intervention and mediation is closing very fast. Without a quick, robust and concerted international response to stop the fighting, Ethiopia runs the real risk of crossing the point of no return.

 

Rashid Abdi is a Horn of Africa analyst based in Nairobi, Kenya. Tobias Hagmann is an associate professor in international development at Roskilde University in Denmark. 

From Oslo to The Hague – The journey of Abiy Ahmed Ali

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Solomon Negash

Abiy Ahmed refused dialogue, opted for war, and resisted diplomatic pressure. Make no mistake. This has been his consistent position from day one. He resolved no tension peacefully with any of his major adversaries at home, including Jawar Mohammed, Eskinder Nega, Lidetu Ayalew, Yilkal Getnet, and many more who are languishing in jail on trumped-up charges. Not even with his long-time comrade Lemma Megersa. He has never tried once to resolve his internal political difference peacefully. This says it all, Abiy Ahmed has never been a man of peace. It is not in his nature. Because, as he repeatedly proclaimed publicly and stated in his book, he dreamed of being in power for the next 10 years. Absolute power corrupts absolutely, right?

I was among the hundreds of thousands of Ethiopians who have celebrated the day he was selected as a winner of Nobel Peace Prize in 2019, even if, I believe, he did not do anything notable to deserve such a prize. But we saw it as an opportunity to encourage him to make peace at home, be committed to successful political transition, and to get the attention and support from the international community to help Ethiopia overcome the eminent danger of collapse it was and still is facing. But sadly, he used that opportunity to consolidate his political power at the expense of peace and stability of the country.

I asserted, he didn’t do anything notable to deserve such a prize. It may sound an outrageous assertion but let me clarify.

The “no peace, no war” condition that lasted for two decades was basically a reflection of the deeper conflict that existed for decades between the two dominant political parties: TPLF in Tigray and PDFJ in Eritrea. While in power, TPLF made calls for peace on several occasions, but Eritrea’s PDFJ was not willing to answer to such calls. PDFJ sees TPLF as an eternal enemy who ruined the dream of EPLF (former PDFJ) and young Issaias to become a leading power in the region. For example, the former Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn, made several calls, but President Issaias Afewerki showed no interest. He refused to negotiate with a “puppet” (his word). When Abiy came to power and signaled his interest to make peace with Eritrea (which was decided by EPRDF centrally as part of their reform agenda before Abiy Ahmed came to power), President Issaias did not show any interest and never answered for several weeks. He was not interested until he noticed Abiy entering a new chapter in his power dynamics determined to get rid of TPLF leaders from Menelik palace. Afewerki reconsidered and answered for the call when he witnessed key leaders of TPLF left Addis Ababa for Mekelle. In a way, he was the main player for the two nations to coming to the so-called “peace”, which was later praised by many.

For those who knew the history between these two rivals, there was no genuine peace to celebrate. There was and still is a tactical alliance between two groups who have a common enemy, called TPLF. As Kjetil Tronvoll, a leading expert on Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa, once accurately described it, “the ultimate goal of Isaias Afewerki is to crush TPLF and to inflict revenge upon Tigray”, i.e. not peace. Thus, what seems progress in peace was actually and paradoxically an extended conflict which draws in several new actors into play. The two actors that were in conflict are still in conflict, but this time joined and backed by several other actors (such as, Prosperity Party and the ethnic based militias from the Amhara region) which sided with PDFJ of Eritrea.

It is the alliance of these groups that declared war today not only against TPLF, but also against the people of Tigray. What started by marginalizing and discriminating ethnic Tigrians, for example, banning from national sports, cutting budgets, preventing humanitarian aid from entering Tigray, and refusing to send medical appliances related to COVID19, is now upscaled to a full-fledged war that involves aerial bombardment including in densely populated towns. (And yes, Abiy Ahmed declared and warned about this live on national television.) As such, Abiy Ahmed, the Nobel Peace Laurate, begins to commence on a new road, from Nobel Peace Center in Oslo to ICC in The Hague, in just one year.

The Nobel committee disappointed by Mr Abiy?

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The decision to grant an organisation the Nobel peace prize might be seen in some quarters as a retreat from controversy by the Nobel committee. Last year the award was given to Abiy Ahmed, the prime minister of Ethiopia, for making peace with Eritrea and seeming to open up space for democratic dissent. But a year later Ethiopia remains deeply troubled and Mr Abiy is not as popular as he was. Bestowing the prize on the WFP, which is less likely to disappoint than any political leader, is a safe option.

The Economist | International | Oct 9th 2020. A Nobel cause.