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Ethiopias military offensive in Tigray accompanied by atrocities and internal repression

January 23, 2021/0 Comments/in Analysis, English, External, Politics/by Solomon

Source: IPIS Research Briefing | Arms Trade Bulletin November – December 2020

On 4 November 2020 the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF) launched a military offensive against the Tigray regional government. Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed dubbed it a “law enforcement operation” reportedly “to restore the rule of law and the constitutional order”. The military intervention by the ENDF was a retaliation for an alleged surprise attack by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), in the early morning of November 4, against the ENDF’s Northern Command bases in Tigray. The federal government declared a six-month state of emergency in Tigray, blocking all internet, mobile and landline communications, claiming “illegal and violent activities” were threatening the country’s sovereignty.

Internal Repression and Possible War Crimes

Meanwhile the Ethiopian News Agency announced that the House of People’s Representatives had lifted the immunity of 39 members of the House, including the President of Tigray Regional State. On 7 November police arrested two journalists. One of the editors of the Addis Standard was accused of “attempts to dismantle the constitution through violence,” and “outrage against the constitution”, while journalist Bekalu Alamirew of online Awlo Media was accused of “interviewing Tigray region officials, producing reports undermining the government, producing articles in order to defame the government and undermine its credibility in collaboration with foreign forces, producing articles photographs aimed at inciting inter-communal violence, and inciting a civil war”. Several days later the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission reported the arrest of 4 more journalists.

In the days that followed calls for dialogue were dismissed by the Prime Minister. Air strikes continued to hit Tigray. Reports of possible war crimes emerged from the region. One of which took place in Mai Kadra. Two alternative accounts have been presented for the Mai Kadra massacre. One blamed a local militia linked to the TPLF, others blame Amhara militia with assistance from the ENDF. The Ethiopian army and the regional Amhara “Fano” militia have allegedly killed civilians and looted the hospital, banks, businesses, supermarkets and private houses while reportedly taking control of Humera. Tens of thousands Tigrayans fled to Sudan. The Ethiopian army chief of staff alleged that the Director-General of the World Health Organization (WHO), who is Tigrayan and a member of the TPLF, had attempted to obtain weapons for the TPLF. This strongly denied by the WHO Director-General.

An internal U.N. security report seen by Reuters alleged that Ethiopian police visited a World Food Programme office in Amhara region to request a list of ethnic Tigrayan staff. Ethnic profiling of Tigrayans seems to have begun before the recent conflict. The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission said it was “gravely concerned” at reports of ethnic profiling of Tigrayans, “most notably manifested in forced leave from work and in stopping people from travelling overseas including on work missions, for medical treatment or studies”. According to William Davison, an analyst at the International Crisis Group, “the ethnic profiling demonstrates that despite the government’s stated intention to target only the TPLF leadership, this conflict is also having a much broader negative impact on Tigrayans outside of Tigray”.

The Tigrayan regional government accused Eritrea of attacking Tigray’s northern border. This was strongly denied by both the Ethiopian and Eritrean governments. But when Hitsats Refugee Camp was captured by troops fighting for the Ethiopian government on 21 November, witnesses claimed that the armed men who entered the camp were Eritrean. The New York Times was told by aid workers that the Eritrean soldiers looted aid materials and vehicles, and burnt crops. Meanwhile multiple witnesses in Humera had told AFP that during the battle for Humera they witnessed mortar bombs coming from the direction of Eritrea. In December the U.S. government cited satellite images, intercepted communications and anecdotal reports from Tigray region as evidence of Eritrean involvement.

“There Will Be No Mercy”

On 22 November the Ethiopian forces had reached Mekelle, the capital of Tigray. Earlier the ENDF warned Mekelle’s 500,000 residents that the army would “encircle” the city and attack it with artillery fire. “There will be no mercy,” a spokesman reportedly said. On 28 November PM Abiy Ahmed announced the fall of Mekelle.

On 8 December the Ethiopian government admitted that federal troops had fired at and detained United Nations workers, proclaiming it did not need a “baby-sitter”. In Geneva U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet reported that her office had received substantiated reports of human rights violations: “We have corroborated information of gross human rights violations and abuses – including indiscriminate attacks against civilians and civilian objects, looting, abductions and sexual violence against women and girls. There are reports of forced recruitment of Tigrayan youth to fight against their own communities”.

Meanwhile the Tigray regional state interim administration, installed on 7 November by the House of Federation of Ethiopia, cautioned residents of Mekelle to hand over their firearms to federal forces until December 15. It was claimed that there would be a door-to-door search and whoever was found with firearms would be held accountable. Eritrean troops in Mariam Dengelat reportedly killed 37 civilians. Ethiopian ENDF soldiers reportedly shot at unarmed civilians, and looting by Amhara militia was reported.

The UNHCR has reported the displacement of millions. Tension along the Sudan-Ethiopia border has risen due to clashes between Sudanese and Ethiopian forces.

Prelude

Ethiopia is a federation of regional ethnic states, and constitutionally large autonomy is granted to the regions. Until 2018 all regional governments were linked directly or indirectly to the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), an alliance of four regional parties [the Oromo Democratic Party (ODP), the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the Southern Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement (SEPDM) and the Amhara Democratic Party (ADP)], which used to govern Ethiopia. The TPLF was the dominant force until being displaced by an alliance of the two largest Ethiopian ethnicities, the Oromo and the Amhara.

Shortly after becoming Prime Minister in April 2018 Abiy Ahmed had begun to accuse the TPLF of trying to destabilise the country. In the media the TPLF were scapegoated for all the wrongs in the country. Which led to complaints from Tigrayans that they are persecuted in a crackdown on corruption and past abuses. “It has become fashionable to blame TPLF for everything that goes wrong in the country,” said a TPLF spokesperson. In November 2019 three of the four regional parties under direction of Abiy, with the exception of the TPLF, merged into a single national party – the Prosperity Party. The 2020 elections were postponed by the Ethiopian government, due to covid-19. The TPLF saw this as a means for the PM to hold on to power, and declared to hold elections anyway. The Ethiopian government ruled the Tigray government was unlawful and in return Tigray said it no longer recognised Abiy’s administration.

According to the United Nations Comtrade database the major exporters of armaments to Ethiopia in the last decade have been Slovakia, Israel, India, Sudan and Russia.

Exports arms and ammunition to Ethiopia 2010-2019

Country	Value (usd)	Description
India	3.9 million	Various munitions
Israel	4.8 million	Civilian firearms, various munitions
Russia	22.4 million	Various munitions
Slovakia	8.4 million	Armoured vehicles, various munitions
Sudan	4.5 million	Military weapons, various munitions

Source: Comtrade HS 87.10 & HS 93

The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms adds Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary and Ukraine to that list. In August 2020 trade publication Janes published that Turkish armoured vehicles worth USD20.7 million had been offloaded in Djibouti with likely end destination Ethiopia.

United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, exports to Ethiopia 2010-2019

Year	Exporter	Item	Quantity
2010	Russia	Attack Helicopter	8
2012	Ukraine	Main battle tank (T-72)	99
2012	Bulgaria	Large calibre artillery system (122mm howitzer)	64
2012	Czech Rep.	Large calibre artillery system	64
2013	Bulgaria	Combat aircraft (MiG-23)	12
2013	Hungary	Attack Helicopter (Mi-24)	12
2019	Czech Rep.	Small arms	7,742

Peter Danssaert

Further Reading

The secret war in Tigray, Ethiopia Insight, 23 December 2020.

Did Ethiopia’s attack on Tigray violate international laws?, The Conversation, 9 December 2020.

Instant Non-international Armed Conflict? Classifying the situation in Northern Ethiopia under IHL, Armed Groups and International Law, 9 December 2020.

Five reasons why Ethiopia ended up at war, Ethiopia Insight, 1 December 2020.

Ethiopia’s Tigray Crisis: Escalating Violence and Mass Displacement Threaten Ethiopian and Regional Security, Just Security, 25 November 2020.

Teflon TPLF, Ethiopia Insight, 12 December 2019.

The Republic of Tigray?, Ethiopia Insight, 28 September 2019.

Is Tigray really a drop in the bucket for Abiy’s administration?, Ethiopia Insight, 17 January 2019.

Silencing of guns in Africa remains a pipe dream

January 23, 2021/0 Comments/in Analysis, English, External, Politics/by Solomon

IOL | The African Union set itself a goal of silencing guns on the continent by 2020 but has failed to achieve that goal dismally. Guns are still blazing in the DRC, CAR, Libya, South Sudan, Somalia, Nigeria, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Nigeria.

Instead, there is the potential of new wars coming on board in 2021 between Sudan and Ethiopia, and Western Sahara-Morocco, where we could see much bloodshed soon. Why is Africa constantly under such pressures of war?

A closer look at the situations in each country tells us a story of foreign interference and manipulations, so that they gain access to our resources and loot. Our enemies are willing to sponsor some of these wars so that in the midst of the chaos created by them, they can steal our resources.

If we are to examine each situation prevailing in any of these countries, we will notice that the real problem is resources. Instead of a country having pride in their God-given resources, it has now become a curse on them. This is very true with the DRC, for example, Africa’s richest country in terms of resources, which has never known any peace from independence up to this day. I mean, how do we explain the lack of development in the DRC?

Some western countries and their proxies on the continent have joined hands to exploit the DRCs resources. Countries that have no recorded diamonds deposits on their territories are selling the mineral on the world market. Where are they getting the diamonds from is the question?

The same can be said of what is going on in the Central African Republic (CAR). The country, as poor as it is, does possess a lot of natural resources. It was ruled by a man called Emperor Bokassa. This man was one of the richest on the continent. He lived more affluently than some of the European leaders.

The truth is that, like the DRC, CAR is one of the richest countries in terms of natural resources. It has diamonds, gold, and other western sought-after minerals in abundance. As a result of that, the French and the Russians have all lined up deploying their militaries to the CAR on the side of the government under the guise of fighting the rebels when in actual fact, they also bolster the different rebels’ groups inciting them to cause chaos.

Amid the chaos, it gives them the chance to loot in daylight. Over the weekend, the UN troops in CAR, had to retake control of a city in the Central African Republic captured two weeks ago by armed groups waging an offensive against the government of President Faustin-Archange Touadera. Rebels abandoned their positions in Bangassou, 750km east of the capital, Bangui, and fled the city following an ultimatum on Friday from the UN peacekeeping force MINUSCA, the mission’s spokesperson Vladimir Monteiro said late on Saturday.

The incumbent, who is mainly supported by the Russians and the French, is their chosen puppet giving them free access to the country’s resources. Where on earth does the CAR find the money to buy all those expensive weaponry that is being supplied by the Russians and the French? This puppet leader has mortgaged the country’s natural resources, and the people of CAR may never enjoy their God-given resources. Its just absurd to see a naturally rich country live in perpetual poverty forever.

The same is true with regards to Mozambique. Immediately after oil and LNG was discovered in Cabo Delgado, ISIS appeared. All of a sudden, it was Jihadists wanting to set up a caliphate ruled by Islamic shari’ah.

There is also a new wave of instability being imposed on Africa. This is coming from the so-called normalisations going on the continent and in the Gulf countries. Whether people agree with me or not, I remain convinced that, the normalisations are, in themselves, instabilities. The reason being that they are not based on truth and fairness, so, they are bound to collapse, sooner or later.

Their collapse will certainly not just happen in a vacuum, it will bring a lot of instabilities, wherever it happens. You cannot build peace based on falsehood and unfairness. How can a man pretend to have peace with his neighbours when, in reality, he doesn’t have peace in his own house?

The silencing of guns on the continent will not come about until our leadership really look close at what its real causes are. I believe most of our leaders are aware of the real causes of instability on our continent, but the problem is the nature of politics that they practice.

The politics of lies and deceit are the real problem. Ten or 20 years from now, when the lies are declassified, it is when the people get to know the truth, that is unacceptable. Why not let the people know the truth now? It affects them now, and must be solved now.

My advice to our leaders in Africa is, break away from western toxic politics and practice the truth period! As a warning, the new crop of youth rising is aware of these things, and if you do not change the way you are doing things, it will be a disaster. Stand up to these powers and announce your break away from the way they do things. Aluta Continua! (The struggle continues).

* Dr Mustafa Mheta is a senior researcher and head of the Africa Desk at the Media Review Network.

On ‘Rooftop of Africa,’ Ethiopia’s Troops Hunt Fugitive Former Rulers

January 22, 2021/0 Comments/in Analysis, English, External, Politics/by Solomon

NYT | Politicians and military commanders who once led Ethiopia are being tracked down, caught and sometimes killed by their own country’s soldiers in the war in the Tigray region.

By Simon Marks and Declan Walsh

ADDIS ABABA, Ethiopia — For two decades, as foreign minister, Seyoum Mesfin was Ethiopia’s face to the world — a personable and soft-spoken diplomat who brokered peace in neighboring war-torn countries, delivered speeches at the United Nations and helped establish his country as a weighty African power.

That distinguished career came to an ignominious end last week when Ethiopian soldiers tracked down Mr. Seyoum, now labeled an enemy of the state, and killed him in a muddy and remote corner of the mountainous north of the country. The government said he died in a shootout, but Mr. Seyoum’s allies say he was executed.

The former foreign minister Seyoum Mesfin was killed last week by the Ethiopian military. | via NYT | ©Reuters

Mr. Seyoum, 71, was the most prominent casualty yet of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s 11-week-old war in Ethiopia’s northern Tigray region. The main target of Mr. Abiy’s military campaign is not a ragtag group of provincial rebels, but the politicians and generals of Tigray, who ruled Africa’s second-most populous country for much of the past three decades through their political party, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, or T.P.L.F.

Now Ethiopia’s former rulers are on the run in their Tigray heartland, and on the defensive against the forces they once commanded. Since Jan. 7, Ethiopia’s military has killed or captured at least 47 people from a most-wanted list of 167 senior leaders of the T.P.L.F., including four of the party’s nine-member executive committee, according to Ethiopian state media reports.

When Mr. Abiy came to power in 2018, his government quickly unseated many of these T.P.L.F. leaders, who over 27 years had overseen impressive economic growth, but ruled Ethiopia with an iron fist. Several were charged with corruption and human rights abuses, and some of them fled or retreated to their home base in Tigray.

Mr. Abiy has portrayed his military campaign as a law-enforcement drive against Tigray’s fugitive politicians, who are backed by their own seasoned military force. The Tigrayan leaders went ahead with a regional election in September, in defiance of Mr. Abiy’s order to postpone the vote due to the Covid-19 pandemic. He said he launched his military operation on Nov. 4 in response to an attack on a federal military base in Tigray.

“The government is engaged in a stabilizing mission for a month now while it continues to bring to justice perpetrators,” Billene Seyoum, Mr. Abiy’s spokeswoman, said in a statement.

But the T.P.L.F. says that Mr. Abiy, who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2019 for resolving a long-running conflict with Eritrea, is revealing himself as yet another power-hungry autocrat. Thousands of people have died in the fighting, by most estimates, and the handful of aid workers who have been permitted to enter Tigray report human rights abuses, burned refugee camps, looted hospitals and a swelling humanitarian crisis that could lead to mass starvation.

Refugees in Tigray are “emaciated, begging for aid that is not available,” Filippo Grandi, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, said in a statement last week.

Despite Mr. Abiy’s recent military successes, the swift and bloodless victory he once promised in Tigray remains far from his grasp. The T.P.L.F. has retreated to the mountains, alongside thousands of heavily armed fighters.

Fighting has raged across the region in recent weeks, according to U.N. security reports seen by The New York Times. Human rights groups have shared accounts of atrocities against civilians, including plunder, sexual violence and killings.

And as Mr. Abiy ramps up his assault on the T.P.L.F., brushing aside international pleas to start peace talks, experts warn that he risks boosting public support for the rebels inside Tigray, and plunging his country deeper into a protracted conflict with an enemy that is unlikely to give up easily.

The T.P.L.F. “is an organization in which the guerrilla ethos of not bowing to external pressure, even when cornered and pressured, is very much in its DNA,” said Rashid Abdi of Sahan, a Kenya-based conflict analysis group specializing in the Horn of Africa. “They have said they will die to the last person. People should not underestimate that.”

Mr. Abiy’s forces — with the help of Eritrean troops — hold the regional capital, Mekelle, and much of northern and western Tigray. But sporadic fighting has continued in rural areas across Tigray, and on roads leading to Mekelle, according to Western diplomats and U.N. security assessments.

Although analysts initially estimated the T.P.L.F. had 250,000 men under arms, it quickly became clear that its force was much smaller. Government soldiers and allied ethnic militias surrounded the T.P.L.F.’s forces by sealing Ethiopia’s borders with Eritrea and Sudan, effectively severing the rebels’ supply lines.

And the T.P.L.F. received an unexpected blow when soldiers from Eritrea, Ethiopia’s former enemy, crossed into Tigray to fight alongside Mr. Abiy’s forces. In such conditions, experts say, it’s unclear how long the T.P.L.F. can hold out.

Still, the situation is fluid and unpredictable. Border clashes between Ethiopia and Sudan in recent weeks, over a patch of disputed farmland, could play to the advantage of the T.P.LF. if Sudan helps the rebels to resupply.

And the top military commanders of the T.P.L.F. remain at large. Two Western officials and one with the T.P.L.F., who were not authorized to speak publicly, identified Lt. Gen. Tsadkan Gebretensae, a former head of the Ethiopian military, as a senior rebel leader.

General Tsadkan led Ethiopia into combat against Eritrea during the two countries’ brutal border war between 1998 and 2000. In recent years, after retiring from the army, he ran a small brewery. Now 66, he is back in the fight with the newly formed Tigray Defense Forces, battling the Ethiopian army he once commanded.

One T.P.L.F. stronghold, the Western officials said, is in the Tembien mountains, a cluster of jagged hills and narrow winding roads in central Tigray — part of a highland massif often called the “rooftop of Africa.”

Kjetil Tronvoll, an expert on the T.P.L.F. at Bjorknes University College in Oslo, said the party’s leadership has likely dispersed in small groups, to spread the risk of capture.

It was in Tigray’s central hills near the Tekeze River that Mr. Abiy’s force scored a symbolic coup earlier this month, when they captured Sebhat Nega, an octogenarian founding member of the T.P.L.F.

Ethiopian federal troops crossed tributaries of the Tekeze and hiked up steep hillsides in search of Mr. Sebhat, according to accounts on Ethiopian state television and a former T.P.L.F. official who had been in touch with Mr. Sebhat. After scaling a precipitous slope with ropes, they discovered Mr. Sebhat in a cave with his wife and sister.

Footage broadcast on state media showed a disheveled, white-bearded man in a tracksuit, being led in handcuffs off a military transport plane at Addis Ababa International Airport. Ethiopian leaders were jubilant.

“It was difficult to believe a human could live in the mountain where we found him,” said Maj. Gen. Mesele Meseret, who led the operation.

The triumphal capture of Mr. Sebhat contrasted with the more muted announcement of Mr. Seyoum’s death, which was shrouded in recriminations and conflicting accounts.

The Ethiopian government said Mr. Seyoum, a T.P.L.F. leader, died during a gunfight between his bodyguards and government soldiers. But the T.P.L.F. insisted he had been summarily executed, pointing to a photo circulating online that showed Mr. Seyoum, his eyes closed, with blood streaming from a bullet-sized wound in his forehead.

“Seyoum deserved to end his days in comfortable retirement with all the respect due to a statesman and patriot,” said Alex de Waal, a Horn of Africa scholar at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, who knew Mr. Seyoum, and called for an international investigation into his death. “His killing should be a red line.”

But Mr. Abiy shows little sign of backing down. On Tuesday, Ethiopia’s election board formally barred the Tigrayan party from elections that Mr. Abiy has set for June 5. Some had hoped the elections might act as a spur to peace talks.

The government accuses Western media of falsely portraying Mr. Abiy as a warmonger. Critics say he is hewing to the traditions of a political culture that prizes dominance.

“Abiy is buying into an old, aggressive warrior tradition in which you vanquish your enemy,” said Mr. Abdi, the analyst. “In countries like Kenya, you weaken your enemy in order to negotiate with him later. In Ethiopia, you obliterate him.”

U.S. Withdrawal from Somalia — SOF

January 22, 2021/0 Comments/in Analysis, English, External, Politics/by Solomon

Source: SOF News | John Friberg

U.S. Africa Command has announced the formation of Joint Task Force Quartz to oversee Operation Octave Quartz – a mission designated to reposition forces from Somalia and continue the assistance effort in Somalia. In early December President Trump and the Department of Defense announced that the United States would remove some 700 military personnel from Somalia. This is an action that Trump had mentioned several times over the past year but had not directed to take place.

Some national security observers applaud the action believing that the situation in Somalia is unsolvable. They point to decades of corruption and conflict and little to show for the millions of dollars and other sacrifices made in Somalia.

However, others say that we are ceding territory to an insurgent / terrorist group affiliated with al Qaeda. These critics say that the group poses a threat to the U.S. – pointing to the attack on Camp Simba in Kenya where Americans lost their lives and to the recent news of a potential plot by an al Shabaab member to hijack an aircraft to conduct an attack in the United States.

The withdrawal is being presented to the U.S. public as a ‘repositioning of forces’. Apparently some of these forces will move into neighboring countries. Djibouti and Kenya share a border with Somalia and have been hosts of U.S. military units and activities for many years.

Joint Task Force Quartz or JTF-Quartz is built around the headquarters of Special Operations Command – Africa. The mission is to oversee Operation Octave Quartz which will reposition U.S. forces from Somalia to other bases in East Africa. JTF Quartz is commanded by the Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAF) commander Maj. Gen. Dag Anderson.

JTF-Quartz components include:

Joint Force Special Operations Component Command
Joint Force Maritime Component Command
Joint Air Component Coordination Element

JTF-Quartz priorities are:

safely reposition U.S. forces
protect U.S. forces through coordinated and increased force protection measures
continue the mission to support regional partners and keep pressure on violent extremists

U.S. Army General Stephen Townsend, the commander of U.S. Africa Command, met with African partners to provide reassurance of a sustained commitment to East Africa security. He says that the U.S. will continue to support enduring partners while maintaining pressure on violent extremist organizations in the region.

“To be clear, the U.S. is not withdrawing or disengaging from East Africa. We remain committed to helping our African partners build a more secure future. We also remain capable of striking Al-Shabaab at any time and place of our choosing – they should not test us.”

General Stephen Townsend, commander of U.S. Africa Command, Dec 2020.

The U.S. and Somalia – Quick Timeline

Cold War. During the Cold War the Horn of Africa region was a focus of attention when it came to competition between the Soviet Union and the United States for influence and military presence. Somalia was a Soviet client state for many years (1970s).

Humanitarian Mission. In the early 1990s the United States committed US forces (including SOF) to Somalia in support of the United Nations humanitarian mission. This support ended when President Clinton ended the U.S. involvement in Somalia after the “Battle of Mogadishu” where 18 US. troops lost their lives during a raid on Somali militia leaders.

Failed State. Since the early 1990s Somalia has been a ‘failed state‘. It has suffered from famine, civil war, corruption, foreign intrigue and meddling, anarchy, and more. For many years it was the center of piracy operating from the coastal area of Somalia.

Fragile State. In 2012 the formation of a federal government provided a central authority that could provide services and security for the Somalia people. However, Somalia is still afflicted with division, political infighting, and corruption and remains a ‘fragile state’.

Al Shabaab. Somalia has been fighting an insurgency by an al Qaeda-affiliated group known as al Shabaab. The group controls much of Somalia – especially in the central and southern portions of the country. Its goal is to establish an Islamic state in Somalia.

US Support. The United States , along with other international partners, are working to stabilize the country and increase the effectiveness of the security forces. The US has been a key supporter of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), provides advice and training to the Somali security forces, and conducts counterterror (CT) missions within Somalia against al Shabaab and the local ISIS affiliate. U.S. Army Special Forces (and other organizations) have been instrumental in standing up the elite Danab Brigade.

Some Americans have lost their lives in the region including a CIA paramilitary officer (Nov 2020), a soldier assigned to 3rd Special Forces (June 2018), and contract pilots and an Army air traffic controller at Camp Simba (Jan 2020) just across the border in Kenya.

Security and Governance. The war in Somalia between government forces and al Shabaab has lasted almost 15 years. The prospects for peace is dismal. International donors are becoming reluctant to pay the expenses of the African Union forces that are deployed in Somalia to assist the government with security. Relations between Somalia and Kenya have frayed. Internal tensions exist between the different regions of Somalia are not good. The various clans and sub-clans in Somalia are constantly at odds with each other and may likely erupt into violence once again.

Great Power Competition. The Defense Department is now focused on strategic competition with China and Russia. To some, that means a shift to the Pacific and Eastern Europe with an emphasis on large conventional forces with the most modern ships, aircraft, and tanks. But to others, this means the competition is more likely to take place around the world in an environment where irregular warfare (some would say political warfare) is where the real competition is.

What Comes Next?

Future of Danab? The planned withdrawal of US forces will include the Special Forces contingent tasked with supporting the Danab special operations unit. Apparently a very small contingent of the US military will remain. The US has funded, trained, and partnered with this 1,000 man unit. It is commonly known that advisor work is best accomplished with person-to-person interaction. The premise that ‘advisor work’ can be accomplished remotely is largely dismissed by most members of the military that have been advisors. Certainly emails, Zoom sessions, video conferences, and phone calls have utility but nothing compares to an advisor on the ground sharing the battlespace.

It will be interesting (and perhaps disappointing) to observe the effectiveness of Danab over the next few years. There is the possibility that U.S. intelligence organizations will maintain a presence as well as private entities providing support, instruction, and advise through contract mechanisms with the State Department or Department of Defense.

Future Prospects? The Somali government has not met the milestones for the development of its security forces – goals set by the United States and the international community. In addition, it has not taken the steps for effective governance to alleviate the root causes of insurgent and tribal conflict. According to U.S. Africa Command al Shabaab remains adaptive, resilient, and capable of attacking US, Western, and partner interests in Somalia and East Africa.

The 19,000-man multinational African Union force will withdraw by the end of 2021. A withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Somalia accompanied by a reduction of ANISOM will likely increase the opportunity for al Shabaab to increase its influence and make further territorial gains. On January 20th a new president will occupy the White House. He may opt to reverse or adjust priorities in the region.

**********

References:

Task Force Quartz. “U.S. Africa Command stands up Joint Task Force – Quartz”, United States Africa Command, December 19, 2020.

IG Report on CT in Africa. The Defense Department posted the quarterly report for counterterrorism operations in East, North, and West Africa. This 98-page report provides information on the security situation in much of Africa to include Somalia. November 2020.

Recent Analysis and Commentary on Somalia.

“Why the Somali Danab SOF is Vital to the US and to Defeating Al-Shabaab”, by Steve Balestrieri, SOFREP, January 13, 2021.

“The Way Forward for the United States in Somalia”, by Stephen M. Schwartz, Foreign Policy Research Institute, January 12, 2021. Schwartz is a former U.S. Ambassador to Somalia (2016-2017).

Could a National Dialogue Solve Ethiopia’s Political Crisis?

January 22, 2021/0 Comments/in Analysis, English, External, Politics/by Solomon

USIP | It is time to talk about the common challenges that every Ethiopian faces.

While the recent conflict in Tigray renewed international focus on Ethiopia, more challenges lie ahead, including elections now scheduled for June 5. The state of Ethiopia’s political transition is contested, and the country remains polarized. However, as Ethiopian scholars Emebet Getachew, Mehari Taddele Maru, and Yohannes Gedamu discuss, a national dialogue process may have the potential to address the country’s dilemmas.

What is the current state of Ethiopia’s political transition?

Emebet: The political transition underway since Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed came to power is not Ethiopia’s first. Transition should be considered a recurrent Ethiopian phenomenon which, unfortunately, has rarely occurred peacefully. As with the 1974 revolution toppling Emperor Haile Selassie and the 1991 overthrow of the Derg military government, the consequences of the 2018 transition claimed many lives, even if the transfer of power itself was generally peaceful.

This transition means different things to different people. The initial euphoria that greeted the transition was short-lived. There was limited consensus to propel change. Critics were left out of the transition process leading to avoidable conflicts. The transition thus faces an uphill battle to stabilize and effectively govern the country, especially since reconciliation has not been high on the agenda.

Mehari: Ethiopia faces a “war of visions” as to its future. One vision is of centralization, the basis of which is to reclaim quasi-unitarist powers that have been—at least de jure—dismantled over decades. This vision recalls Ethiopia’s contested history of forcible assimilation. The same unitarist governance style, albeit with some aspects of decentralization, is now in the making. Proponents of this vision employ both constitutional norms, and when they deem necessary, unconstitutional, oppressive means including war on those who resist. This vision of centralization is undemocratic and antagonistic to multiculturalism.

On the other side is a vision of federalism, greater devolution of power, more autonomy, confederal arrangements, self-determination and even, potentially, secession. There are also middle positions between the two extremes with overlapping visions, based on maintaining the current constitution, with some tweaks. Ethiopia’s current system of multinational federalism still partially addresses the country’s historical problems, although it is also responsible for spawning new local conflicts.

By appointing new regional state presidents and councils, the prime minister’s office is replacing federalism with centralization. Supporters of Abiy back these actions as part of the transition to democracy and the preservation of the state, seemingly even at the cost of political instability, military confrontation, and the death of civilians. Choreographed narratives of national unity undermine the need for the constitutionally guaranteed governance of diversity. Political leaders of the most critical opposition to Abiy are in jail. Ethiopia has shut down independent and critical local media outlets, increased censorship and state propaganda, and reduced academic freedom. As a consequence, the Ethiopian state is in a precarious situation. The recent announcement of the election calendar only makes the state more fragile.

Yohannes: Reforms by Abiy’s administration were initially fast paced, although this has since slowed. But many key promises were fulfilled. In the first year of reforms, prisoners were released, the media revived, and exiled opposition returned to the country. A reformed ruling party has been established, which created inclusive politics by better involving regional political parties than previously. True, there have been serious peace and security challenges: repeated violence in Benishangul-Gumuz, Guji, and Wollega. Sadly, internal displacement and massacres on the basis of identity are now common. The government lost patience and even arrested some opposition leaders. However, the government continued to enact security sector reforms, long-term economic plans and other meaningful development programs, including environmental initiatives such as the Green Legacy Initiative.

Ethno-nationalist political narratives have increased ethnic polarization, inter-communal intolerance and violence, and are antagonistic to Abiy’s hope for unity. Such narratives that pit one group against another were exploited by some of Abiy’s opposition. Now that a date for a vote has been set, the 2021 elections will be another major test for Ethiopia’s future.

Given Ethiopia’s many challenges, is there a place for a national dialogue process?

Mehari: There is no military solution to a war of visions. Any government that fails to recognize the precedence of politics over military action risks facing protracted armed resistance and insurrection.

The Ethiopian government rejected calls for dialogue during the constitutional crisis in Ethiopia, when it became clear that elections would not be held on schedule and that the constitutional term of office of the government would soon expire. The government rejected dialogue to resolve the conflict with the Tigray region. Now, the solution lies in building bridges between communities and narrowing the gulf between the different political visions. Since existing institutions like the reconciliation commission are distrusted, a new process is required. A national dialogue is the best option of all, although it will not necessarily resolve all the problems Ethiopia faces.

Yohannes: Yes, there is always a place for national dialogue, as long as there is genuine commitment. Past Ethiopian regimes, including the one led by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) before 2018, downplayed the need for such dialogue by saying that the timing was not right, and that Ethiopia faced too many challenges at that moment. The Abiy government is the first in Ethiopian history to have established a reconciliation commission to study and recommend solutions. As with his other initiatives, however, some of Abiy’s opponents undermined the idea of this commission. However, I have hope that this is a good place from which dialogue can start, if people agree that reconciliation is also about looking forward rather than just arguing about the past. It is time to talk about the common challenges that every Ethiopian faces, not only concentrate on particular, group-based grievances.

Emebet: Initiatives that foster national dialogue are needed more than ever in Ethiopia. Existing civil society initiatives should not be overlooked. One such initiative is the Multi-stakeholder Initiative for National Dialogue (MIND), a coalition of Yehasab Me’ad (Plate of Ideas), Destiny Ethiopia and the Political Parties’ Joint Council, endorsed and supported by the Ministry of Peace. MIND intends to bring “contentious issues to the table and discuss them one by one to create a common understanding step by step.” Led by civil society, MIND aims to build confidence in the concept of dialogue among participants. An inclusive national dialogue could help MIND strengthen its attempts to resolve challenges to peace and security.

How could a successful national dialogue process for Ethiopia be designed?

Yohannes: Work could start with the reconciliation commission, which could educate the public about the dimensions of reconciliation and what the commission aims to achieve. Some critical differences among groups and parties must be examined, and a task force that involves all stakeholders organized to debate and reach at least partial consensus. The goal should be to arrive at a common national agenda.

Emebet: For a national dialogue to succeed, five aspects must be considered:

Credibility of the conveners: Public trust in who convenes a national dialogue is especially critical in a deeply polarized society like Ethiopia. The whole process depends on the integrity, impartiality, and public perception of the convener(s).
Inclusivity: If critical participants are excluded from the process, the credibility and legitimacy of the process will be reduced. Inclusion is an ongoing process, and broad-based consultations are necessary if people are to feel they are represented in both the process and the outcomes of the dialogue. A commitment to inclusivity requires both formal (track 1) and informal (track 2) efforts. It also requires being gender and conflict sensitive.
Institutional linkages: Dialogue does not occur in a vacuum. Thinking how the process involves, for example, regional governments and processes, such as the elections and the reconciliation commission, will strengthen the coherence of the effort. Critically, it is unlikely that dialogue can be sustained if past grievances and serious human rights violations are ignored, so links to the institutions responsible for these processes is also needed.
How dialogue outcomes will be implemented: A dialogue process will not in itself solve the problems of the country. Effective implementation of the dialogue’s outcomes is needed, including of any recommendations to amend policy and legislation as well as on accountability and reconciliation. The high expectations of the process must be managed.
Mobilizing resources: Significant technical and financial resources are needed to involve large number of participants and multiple consultations.

Mehari: Dialogue design must be a guided by the goals of the process. Further, the process must account for realities on the ground, in particular, the war in Tigray and conflicts elsewhere in Ethiopia, the detentions and stifling of critical voices in the political opposition, political prisoners, and recent atrocities, assassinations, and displacement.

There should be a pre-dialogue to consult stakeholders and to solicit views on the central issues to be addressed. These consultations should also inform the dialogue’s design. The design of the dialogue needs to consider structure and rules; the core agenda; criteria for determining the participants, who may include, but not be limited to, political parties and armed groups; seating arrangements; and a realistic timeline, all outlined in an implementation roadmap. A sound communications strategy is vital to build and maintain trust, publicize progress, address dis- and misinformation and where necessary, change behavior.

Ultimately, Ethiopian ownership of the process, participants’ political will, and determination to ensure implementation will be intrinsic to the success of any dialogue process.

Emebet Getachew is country program manager at the Life & Peace Institute in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Mehari Taddele Maru is a professor at the European University Institute in Florence, Italy. Yohannes Gedamu is a lecturer in political science at Georgia Gwinnett College in Lawrenceville, Georgia.

The views expressed by the authors are their own.

Ethiopia’s Oromia conflict: Why a teacher was killed ‘execution-style’

January 16, 2021/0 Comments/in Analysis, English, Politics/by Solomon

Source: BBC

The shooting dead of Kitilaa Guddata has left his family in shock.

The 32-year-old high school teacher was among the latest casualties in the conflict between government forces and rebels in Ethiopia’s Oromia region.

The violence centres around demands by an insurgent group for the “liberation” of Oromia – a vast swathe of land that is home to Ethiopia’s largest ethnic group, the Oromo – and the subsequent security crackdown.

It has led to civilians being caught in the crossfire – including Mr Kitilaa. His family allege that he was killed after about 10 police officers took him from his home in Sekela town on the night of 19 November.

Frantic search

“His wife – the mother of his two children – begged them to take her instead, but they told her he would be back after some questioning,” said a relative, who spoke to BBC Afaan Oromoo on condition of anonymity for fear of reprisals.

The teacher never returned. His family said that after a frantic search they found his body, along with those of two other people, a couple of days later.

“There was a river and they killed him on a rock next to it. He was shot from behind; his hands were tied at the back. It looks like they used him as a target for shooting practice,” the relative alleged.

Attempts to obtain comment from the Oromia Special Police Force were unsuccessful, but Oromia regional government spokesman Getachew Balcha said he was unaware of the security forces falsely accusing people of being allied with the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA).

“Measures are taken only against those whose crimes are known and exposed by the people,” he told BBC Afaan Oromoo.

“But anyone found to have committed a crime, including police members and government officials, would be held accountable,” he added.

The Oromia Special Police Force has increasingly become involved in operations aimed at quelling the insurgency in the southern and western parts of Oromia after an unspecified number of soldiers were hastily redeployed to the Tigray region following the outbreak of conflict there in early November.

It highlights the mounting security challenges in Ethiopia, ending the euphoria that had gripped the nation when Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed rose to power in April 2018 and won the Nobel Peace Prize the following year.

He introduced sweeping reforms to end decades of authoritarian rule, including unbanning political parties and rebel groups, releasing thousands of detainees, and allowing exiles to return.

As Ethiopia’s first Oromo prime minister, Mr Abiy’s premiership was particularly welcomed in Oromia, with the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), the biggest rebel group, turning into an opposition party.

But one of its top military commanders, Kumsa Diriba, who is also known as “Jaal Maro”, failed to reach a deal with the government over the disarmament of fighters.

After also falling out with the OLF, he continued the insurgency for what he calls the “liberation” of Oromia under the banner of the OLA from his forest hide-out in the west.

At the time in 2018, the security forces promised to crush his group within two weeks, but more than two years later they are still battling the insurgents.

‘Buried without family knowing’

Meanwhile, reports of civilian casualties mount. Another case is that of Galana Imana, a father of two.

In a BBC Afaan Oromoo interview, his younger sister Chaltu Imana said he was arrested by nearly 20 armed officers at his home in Ambo town, about 100km (60 miles) west of Addis Ababa, in November.

Ms Chaltu said she desperately searched for him for four days until she received news that police had found a body by a river. She then went to a local police station, where officers confirmed they had found a body and buried it.

“After some deliberations they asked us to bring his photo and describe how he was dressed the night he was arrested. Later they confirmed to us that the man they buried matched the photo and the description we gave them.

“They told us to go home and mourn him in the absence of his body. We had no option,” she said, adding that the officers confirmed that her brother had died of a gunshot wound.

“We only know about his arrest. We don’t know what his crime was, we don’t know why they preferred to kill him rather than take him to court,” Ms Chaltu said.

Her brother had only been politically active in the OLF, having served on a committee to welcome leaders who had returned from exile in 2018, she said.

Ethnic Amharas killed

The exact number of casualties from the conflict is unclear, but the state-linked Ethiopian Human Rights Commission said it had recorded the alleged killing of 12 civilians by the security forces in Oromia in November alone.

“Political disagreements are costing civilians dearly,” commission adviser Imad Abdulfetah told BBC Afaan Oromoo.

He emphasised that OLA fighters have also been accused of targeting civilians.

Their victims include Amharas, the second largest ethnic group in Ethiopia and its historic rulers. More than 50 of them have been killed in western Oromia’s Horro Guduru zone since November, in an apparent attempt to drive them out of the region.

The zone had been largely peaceful. The attacks suggest that the OLA has now moved in, and the killings have shocked people and raised fears of causing ethnic tensions.

According to government accounts, 13 Amharas were reportedly killed in the zone’s Amuru district in November. In a deadlier attack in the same month, at least 34 Amharas were gunned down after OLA fighters called them to a meeting in a school compound in Guliso district.

The BBC also spoke to two residents of Abbay Choman district, who witnessed the killing of seven Amharas in December.

Competing political visions

Residents said the gunmen, whose identities they were unsure of, used a loudhailer to summon both Oromos and Amharas to a meeting on the evening of 8 December.

“There were eight armed men, they had long hair, their faces were covered, they asked for residents who were Amharas to identify themselves. They told the rest of us to go home and took away about 10 of those who stood up,” an Oromo resident said.

“We were waiting for their release the whole night, they didn’t come. We found seven bodies the next morning,” he added.

While it is unclear what exactly the OLA means by the “liberation” of Oromia, the main opposition parties in Oromia are demanding greater regional autonomy, believing it to be the best way to guarantee the political, cultural and language rights of different ethnic groups.

But their critics, especially urban elites with a more cosmopolitan outlook, fear this could result in ethnic identities becoming more entrenched, and Ethiopia disintegrating into ethnic fiefdoms.

Many Oromos feel Mr Abiy is leaning towards the latter view and wants to centralise power. This perception grew especially after he dissolved the ethnically based ruling coalition in 2019 and gave his newly formed Prosperity Party (PP) power at both the centre and in Ethiopia’s 10 regions.

The same argument is part of the conflict in Tigray.

‘Enemy of the people’

In Oromia, the security forces have also arrested almost the entire leadership of the two main opposition parties, the OLF and Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC), accusing them of fuelling violence to advance their cause for greater autonomy. They deny instigating violence.

Their detention has led to many opposition supporters concluding that the political space Mr Abiy opened in 2018 had now closed. This has resulted in sympathy, if not support, for the OLA growing, especially among youths impatient for change.

The OLA has mainly attacked government officials and police officers – including commanders – in small towns and villages as part of a strategy to make them ungovernable for Mr Abiy.

However, it has also created a culture of fear among Oromos. Armed men raided two banks in Hagamsaa village in December and set ablaze an ambulance, which was taking a pregnant woman to a medical facility to deliver her baby, and a private vehicle in nearby Shambu town. Locals suspect that the rebels were trying to obtain money and vehicles for their insurgency.

The OLA is strongest in southern Oromia, which borders Kenya. The group suffered a major blow there in December when a powerful traditional leader in the region, Kura Jarso, denounced it as an “enemy of the people” after accusing its fighters of killing civilians, raping women and stealing cattle.

The conflict has also spilled into Kenya, where tens of thousands of Oromos live and are loyal to Mr Kura. In November, residents in the Kenyan town of Moyale said Ethiopian troops had crossed the border ransacking neighbourhoods and taking away 10 people they accused of sheltering members of the OLA, also referred to as OLF-Shane.

Mr Abiy visited the Kenyan side of the border with Kenya’s President Uhuru Kenyatta in December.

In his speech, he lumped the Oromo rebels with Somalia-based militant Islamist group al-Shabab, which is the main security threat in Kenya. He said both should be “eliminated”, although there is no evidence linking the ethnic nationalists to the Somali militants.

It was a further sign that Mr Abiy intends to continue taking a hard-line approach to tackling conflicts in Ethiopia.

Canada Should Support Ethiopia

January 16, 2021/0 Comments/in Analysis, English, External, Politics/by Solomon

The conflict between Tigray and Ethiopia could cause rifts with other African regions. Canada’s truth and reconciliation experience could help.

Source: Policy Options Politiques | Ann Fitz-Gerald, Hugh Segal

The conflict between the Ethiopian federal government and a group from within its northern state of Tigray has ended according to the Ethiopian government. The view of some analysts is that in this post-conflict phase, there remain risks of insurgency from peripheral regions of Tigray. Rather than any organized armed conflict, or armed regrouping by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the more likely outcome is ongoing sporadic violence leading up to delayed federal elections in Ethiopia, now scheduled for June 2021.

Ethiopia is a significant player in Africa’s future. Canada should support its efforts to limit further violence by considering its experience in other similar international challenges. In the wake of its newly brokered partnership with Ethiopia following Prime Minister’s Justin Trudeau’s visit to Addis Ababa in 2020, it’s time for Canada to use its experience in support of peace and progress in Ethiopia, and across the African continent more generally.

Border tensions could bring other countries into the fray

Of increasing concern for the resolution of conflict in Tigray are recent border tensions between Ethiopia and neighbouring Sudan regarding land that has long been inhabited by Ethiopian farmers in the agricultural region of al-Fashqua. Although precise borders in this area have been contested peacefully since the 1896-1902 Ethiopian-British negotiations, otherwise cordial relations between the two allied countries now appear threatened.

Any new Sudanese hostility towards Ethiopia’s border region could compel Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed to act militarily. This in turn could spur Egypt to become involved to protect its interests vis-à-vis the Ethiopian Grand Renaissance Dam. The dam draws from the Abay River or Blue Nile, which is the main tributary of the Nile River, on which Egypt depends. Heightened Ethiopia-Sudan tensions, and the prospect of Egypt backing Sudan’s position, risks magnifying regional instability. Having these tensions become an international issue will further complicate matters for Prime Minister Ahmed, and potentially undermine and distract from the urgent internal healing and rebuilding processes in Tigray.

Internationalization of Sudan-Ethiopia tensions could realign interests of some groups and create wider internal cracks in an already challenging federalist arrangement in Ethiopia. This is why the international community must keep front and centre the peacebuilding process in Tigray – which requires the confidence and commitment of the Tigrayan people.

Ethiopia’s close partners have concerns about the conflict, which is constraining any unconditional offers of help. Disabled network communications and a lack of access to the conflict area have restricted reliable and verified situational analyses. This suggests that a wide range of perceptions could be influencing the international position on the conflict. International concerns include the role of Eritrea, which neighbours Tigray to its north, and the Amhara Regional State of Ethiopia, neighbouring to the south, in the conflict; media arrests and detentions; and issues concerning humanitarian access and alleged civilian casualties. That some Ethiopia-based advocacy organizations and international actors are not viewed as free from bias is further obscuring clarity around the situation.

Post-conflict dialogue and regional security structures

To heal from the past, there needs to be a post-conflict dialogue, which considers lessons learned from past Truth and Reconciliation Commissions held in other countries. A wider national dialogue has always been planned in Ethiopia, but because there has been so much dispute over the facts of the conflict, this dialogue process may become challenged. To an extent, this is understandable in a diverse and internally competitive, ethnic federalist system which leaves little, if any, room for perceived impartiality and independence, particularly with nine regional ethnic states and two federally administered city-states. It will, however, be essential to establish the truth regarding the facts of the conflict in order to navigate through the national dialogue process that the government seeks to facilitate.

But even if the details surrounding the conflict are established and agreed upon, the challenge then becomes the reform of the regional security structures. If this is not addressed in parallel to dialogue processes, governance and national stability will continue to be undermined.

While the constitution permits the formation of regional security forces to protect the interests of regional states, the relative strength of these security forces has amplified over the years to levels and conduct beyond the scope of the constitution. These regional militia forces have included a “Liyu Hail” (special force) capability which, like the broader regional force, is accountable directly to the regional president.

Precedent for this “Liyu” paramilitary wing was set in Ethiopia’s eastern Somali regional state. Set up originally to defend the region against the threat of an Ogaden National Liberation Front-led insurgency, the loosely structured force subsequently committed grave atrocities and human rights abuses. This Liyu concept of policing was copied in the regional states of Oromia and Amhara, and continued to grow in capacity after Prime Minister Abiy came to power.

Tigray’s regional security architecture is no exception to this setup. It was already quite expansive due to the northern region’s lead role in supporting the armed insurgency which, in 1991, overthrew the Derg military dictatorship. Tigray further increased its militia capacity following both forced and voluntary 2018 retirements of senior Tigrayan officers of the national defence forces, which brought an influx of experienced and knowledgeable operational leaders back to the region.

Truth and clarity are also required on issues concerning regional security structures, not only in Tigray but also in other regions with large militia build up. A recently reformed legal proclamation restricting the development of civil society groups with an interest in security studies has, since 1991, limited useful national data on this issue.

There is ambiguity surrounding the number of sworn members of regional and special forces, the types of weapons they can use, and the circumstances in which force can be deployed. The prospect for future regional-federal tensions will only increase if regional militia and special forces, with different lines of authority than federal forces, are maintained. Clarity around these issues is particularly important for a pluralist democratic federalist system, which could benefit from different political party affiliations co-existing between regional and federal jurisdictions in the future.

The Ethiopian government should consider inviting a respected, independent and impartial adjudicator to assist with post-conflict dialogue and strategic communications. This would add legitimacy to the country’s reporting on key issues – clarity which is vital to the relationship between the Tigrayan population and the federal government. Too much of the federal government’s focus is on fire-fighting less-than-substantiated allegations, which only legitimizes the allegations and dilutes the progress required on the key priorities of healing and reconciliation.

Based on its view that outside mediation was neither desired nor appropriate, the Ethiopian government declined the African Union’s arbitrary appointment of three former presidents as mediators. The government has initiated a broader national dialogue involving a Reconciliation Commission and an independent committee of facilitators. Independent adjudication to verify alleged facts on the ground from the Tigray conflict is necessary to give traction to this homegrown dialogue process.

Drawing from international lessons learned

There is a long history of truth and reconciliation commissioners in South Africa, Australia and Canada. In South Africa, the process involved creating a forum where victims and perpetrators could testify without fear of prosecution on the cruelty of Apartheid. In Canada, the process was initiated by Prime Minister Stephen Harper following his apology to Indigenous Peoples for the cruelty and trauma of Residential schools. The process helped establish the truth and form a basis for reparations for survivors. The lack of commonly shared “truth” in Ethiopia between some groups creates a need for a commission. The commission would investigate the legitimate concerns that moderate and non-violent Tigrayans might have, allowing Abiy’s government to make progress towards strengthening the Ethiopian federation.

A commission could specify the nature of its mission and the questions it would consider before preparing its recommendations. Two co-chairs, perhaps a prominent and respected Ethiopian academic or judicial figure well-versed in the unique structures of Ethiopian federalism, and an external eminent person, could – together with regional religious and traditional leaders — oversee the data collection, data processing and subsequent dialogue concerning conflict-related issues.

Canada’s contribution to the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning of paramilitary weapons, as part of the Northern Ireland peace process, has relevance to this proposal. Former Chief of Defence Staff, John de Chastelain, supported by reputable Finnish and American representatives, was chosen to chair the commission. The appointment of a Catholic bishop to work with General Chastelain as co-chair for the commission resonates with the integral role of traditional and religious leaders in supporting Ethiopia’s conflict resolution tradition.

An active or retired military leader may be a good choice for co-chairing the Ethiopian commission, because of the non-partisan nature of the military. Such a leader would bring knowledge and insight when developing a workable solution for Ethiopia’s regional security structures.

Knowledge of the country, its federal dynamics, as well as experience with the Tigrayan people, matters. A reputable individual who served with the UN Mission in Eritrea and Ethiopia (UNMEE) following the 1998-2000 Ethiopian-Eritrea conflict could be of value. Canada played a very positive role in that UN mission.

For Canada, beyond the implicit value of supporting democratic federalism in Ethiopia, and contributing to peace, stability and opportunity across the African continent, there is an opportunity to make real the professed global engagement implicit in the “Canada is back” slogan. Foreign policy is about principles, values and interests, and how competently a government advances them in complex global contexts. With recent events in the United States impacting on the perception of its own soft power equity, Canada should not reduce its own soft power projection – one supported by a strong commitment to democratic norms.

Canada’s impact in the past – in Cyprus, in the Middle East and Suez, in Sri Lanka, in Bosnia, on the ending of Apartheid in South Africa – has been real because Canadian leaders and diplomats engaged in situations where Canada could play a constructive role.

Ethiopia plays a major role in the future of Africa. Its legitimate effort at addressing, what appears to have been, an attempted armed attack from some TPLF elements, could benefit from Canadian support and involvement. Canada has genuine experience in similar contexts in other international challenges. It is time to offer that experience in support of peaceful resolution, conciliation and progress in Ethiopia.

Trump’s Withdrawal From Somalia Is a Security Threat. Biden Should Reverse It

January 14, 2021/0 Comments/in Analysis, English, External, Politics/by Solomon

Source: Foreign Policy | Abdi Yusuf

U.S. troops are scheduled to leave the country on Jan. 15, opening the door for al-Shabab terrorists to step up their attacks. The new administration should recommit to protecting the country.

Years of hard-fought gains to stabilize Somalia and defeat the al-Shabab terrorist group are now endangered by President Donald Trump’s threat to withdraw U.S. forces. Not unlike the fragile gains the United States achieved defeating the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, Somalia’s future rests on sound judgment and Washington’s continued engagement. Without persistent pressure from U.S. forces, al-Shabab’s leaders will be able to emerge from hiding, reorganize, and conduct attacks not just in Somalia but across the region, including against key U.S. allies such as Ethiopia and Kenya. However, there’s still time to change course. The current administration’s Jan. 15 deadline to withdraw U.S. troops from Somalia is rapidly approaching.

In all likelihood, the Trump administration will not reverse course on any major policy decision in the lead-up to President-elect Joe Biden’s inauguration on Jan. 20, and the withdrawal will continue as planned. If this is indeed the case, Biden must move swiftly after inauguration to redeploy troops back to their original bases in Somalia.

Biden must move swiftly after inauguration to redeploy troops back to their original bases in Somalia.

Not doing so risks Somalia falling back into the hands of al-Shabab and endangers the lives of not only Somalia’s citizens but those from Western countries residing in the region.

Since 1991, the ongoing civil war in Somalia has killed more than 300,000 people and injured countless others. As the country recovers, a continuing U.S. presence will be crucial to maintaining stability.

Currently, Somalia is showing signs of recovery and gradually becoming a popular destination for business, mainly due to its enhanced security situation in recent years. The persistent efforts of the international community, led by the United States, have made this possible. For decades, the U.S. government has provided training and equipment to Somalia’s armed forces. The U.S.-trained unit Danab conducted many successful operations against al-Shabab, which has killed more than 4,000 people, including Americans.

Two months ago, a CIA paramilitary officer was killed while fighting alongside Danab. In early 2020, al-Shabab launched an attack against U.S. forces in Kenya, killing three Americans and destroying a U.S. surveillance plane.

These sacrifices have not been in vain. Thanks to U.S. involvement in Somalia, a 9/11-style attack against the U.S. homeland was recently foiled—a reminder of the mutually beneficial relationship between the two countries.

This relationship is now at risk. On Dec. 4, Trump ordered the removal of U.S. soldiers from Somalia by early 2021.

The proposed withdrawal comes at an especially critical time and is a risk to the stability of the entire region. Indeed, Ethiopia is in the middle of a civil war and has withdrawn thousands of its troops who had been helping the Somali army fight against al-Shabab. Kenya-Somalia relations are at their lowest point in years, and domestic tensions are high over the upcoming elections and a string of attacks and assassinations. If the United States goes ahead with its withdrawal, it could have a huge impact on stability in Somalia, deal a major blow to morale among Somalia’s armed forces, and raise questions about U.S. credibility.

The proposed withdrawal comes at an especially critical time and is a risk to the stability of the entire region.

U.S. Defense Department officials claim the United States will “retain the capability to conduct targeted counterterrorism operations in Somalia, and collect early warnings and indicators.” However, in the eyes of many Somalis, Washington is abandoning the country. “Al-Shabab will frame this as a victory,” said Omar Mahmood, a senior Somalia analyst at the International Crisis Group. “They will use it as evidence of their ability to take on a world power like the United States and force them to leave Somalia.”

U.S. officials claim that moving troops to neighboring countries such as Kenya and Djibouti will have no major consequences. Somali officials disagree; former Danab chief Col. Ahmed Abdullahi Sheikh criticized the move, saying that the U.S. military “can launch and stage operations from countries like Djibouti and Kenya, but it’s not the same as being in the country. … You can’t train a force remotely.” U.S. support in planning and launching raids in Somalia is a critical component of the fight against al-Shabab—one that cannot easily be replaced.

It is true that a permanent U.S. military presence in Somalia is not a long-term solution. However, this transition should happen with the help of the international community. The Somali government has started to see success toward building an effective security force, thanks in large part to Washington’s unwavering support for Somalia and its people. With U.S. support, the Somali army was able to reduce al-Shabab’s military capabilities, diminish its territorial control, and bring peace back to large areas of Somalia. But the group remains a persistent threat to the region.

Now more than ever, Somalia needs the support of the United States. Leaving Somalia to fend for itself would risk erasing years of progress. Al-Shabab could reconquer territory, strengthen its military capabilities, and increase its stranglehold over the Somali people. “It’s my hope therefore that the U.S. government will reevaluate its decision and hopefully change,” one Danab officer—who prefers to remain anonymous—told me.

The Biden administration needs to increase U.S. efforts in Somalia in order to strengthen the government’s capabilities to contain the threat posed by al-Shabab. The first step Biden can take would be an immediate redeployment, followed by concrete assurances of future U.S. support. Otherwise, America’s hard-fought efforts to bring peace and stability to Somalia will have been in vain.

Abdi Yusuf is an international affairs researcher and a freelance writer based in Nairobi.

ISIS, Reborn: The Islamic State’s African Revival is a Lethal Blind Spot

January 13, 2021/0 Comments/in Analysis, English, External, Politics/by Solomon

Source: National Interest | Jordan Cope

With four burgeoning safe havens, ISIS has revived in Sub-Sahara and could be deadlier than ever.

ISIS –

Before 9/11, many forget that Osama Bin Laden largely made a name for himself in Sub-Saharan Africa. In Sudan, he conceived his Islamic Army Shura, laying “the groundwork for a true global terrorist network” known as Al Qaeda.

There, Bin Laden largely began to call for jihad against Western forces and gained the prowess to export terrorism against American targets, hence Al Qaeda’s attacks on U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, just two years after his expulsion.

History might just be repeating itself as the West forgets its lessons and again neglects Sub-Sahara’s intensifying terrorism.

The consequences could be grave. Just cue 2019, when a Kenyan Al Qaeda affiliate plotted to hijack a plane and execute a 9/11-style attack.

While the attack was foiled, its scare overshadows a troubled decade, in which Sub-Saharan Africa witnessed an unprecedented resurgence in Islamist groups, with Islamic State (ISIS) affiliates displacing millions while seeking to establish bases in six African countries, and at times, hosting territory the size of Belgium.

Raising further alarm, experts have described 2020 as a breakout year for ISIS affiliates, an unsurprising reality given the attacks that recently claimed fifty in Mozambique and 100 in Niger.

While history echoes, ISIS’s pivot to Africa and new festering hotspots therein could prove more dangerous than those of its Middle Eastern past.

There, ISIS has strategically established territory in cross-border zones. This tactic has allowed it to conduct attacks and disappear across borders, rendering it effectively untouchable to all affected countries—which are amongst the world’s most impoverished and unprepared to dislodge ISIS. Some hotspots also approximate natural resource basins, whose wealth, if seized, could enormously enrich the ISIS network and its capabilities.

Given the implications of inaction—an emboldened ISIS network with multiple safe havens from which it can attack the West—ISIS’s African presence commands greater attention as a top security concern.

Four hot spots warrant attention. First is West Africa, which endures multiple internal insurgencies. Most concerning is that governing Boko Haram whose presence envelopes Nigeria, Chad, Niger, and Cameroon.

Since 2009, Boko Haram has killed 36,000 and displaced 2.5 million civilians while seeking to establish a caliphate and depose Nigeria’s government. While it coordinated with Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb post-2010, in 2016, the group splintered, with one faction continuing with allegiance to the Islamic State West Africa Province, and the other remaining steadfast to Abubakar Shekau’s faction.

While Boko Haram’s territory once matched Belgium in size, the group’s division cost territory. Nevertheless, its presence in Nigeria’s Borno state looms large, and its positioning couldn’t be more conveniently located at the crossroads of four countries.

Such positioning has allowed Boko Haram to disappear into Chad. Last year it conducted perhaps the deadliest terrorist attack in the country’s history—killing ninety-two. It also infiltrated Niger, where it claimed twenty-eight lives and razed 800 homes, and Cameroon, where in one attack it killed seventeen.

With Nigeria unable to contain Boko Haram, it remains questionable whether any of the aforementioned countries can do so, especially given their military and economic inferiority. Whereas Nigeria’s military ranks 42nd out of 138 surveyed countries, those of the others rank no higher than 87th.

They also lack financial resources, ranking amongst the world’s poorest. Out of 190 surveyed geographic entities, Nigeria and Cameroon ranked 141st and 145th, while Chad and Niger ranked below 174th in GDP per capita.

Not to mention, Chad, the next best militarily after Nigeria, overcame a recession and had to rely on France to subvert a coup—all just in the last four years. Chad cannot afford this vulnerability as ISIS festers and its southern oil fields beckon, posing a potential lifeline and revenue source for ISIS if captured.

West Africa’s other great insurgency engrosses Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. There, the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara has conquered “ungoverned space” where the three “failing” states meet.

With Mali and Burkina Faso ranking no higher than 165th in terms of GDP per capita and 96th in military might, the two likely will not fare better in preempting another impending ISIS safe-haven.

ISIS’s next major hot spot situates East Africa, particularly Mozambique’s northern border with Tanzania, where ISIS affiliates have killed 2,000 and displaced 430,000 civilians since 2017.

In Mozambique, the Islamic State in the Central African Province has captured “four tourist islands,” and Mocimboa da Praia, a port in the state of Cabo Delgado, which straddles Tanzania and boasts tremendous resource wealth—natural gas and ruby reserves approximating $50 billion in value—that if seized could enrich ISIS’s network.

ISIS has also used this position to infiltrate Tanzania, hence its October invasion, where 300 fighters killed twenty before retreating to Mozambique.

Mozambique and Tanzania’s economies and militaries rank inferior to those of Nigeria’s, suggesting that the two might struggle to suppress this third prospective safe-haven.

Quickly deserving mention is the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)—a group with suspected ISIS-links—and its stronghold over the mountains straddling the DRC and Uganda, from Rwenzori to Ituri, where “[m]uch of the [DRC’s] gold is mined.”

While the Salafist organization has existed since 1995, it has become rather deadly recently, killing 800 Congolese civilians in 2020. While the DRC’s military ranks 71st, its economy ranks amongst the poorest, 185th.

If left unchecked, the ADF could become another asset in ISIS’s portfolio, granting ISIS pivotal access to another cross-border zone, to invaluable gold mines, and to a foothold in the DRC—the world’s most endowed per resource wealth.

With four burgeoning safe havens, ISIS has revived in Sub-Sahara and could be deadlier than ever. Embedding at the cross borders of failing countries, ISIS has achieved near untouchability. With no Sub-Saharan government able to contain its expansion in a resource-rich area, the West, whatever its response, must urgently react before ISIS can multiply its capabilities and international reach to an unparalleled degree. Let us not forget the lessons of Sudan.

Jordan Cope is a fellow for Middle East Forum’s Islamist Watch project. He is also regarded as an expert in the Middle East. Follow him on Twitter.

Image: Nigerian soldiers hold up a Boko Haram flag that they had seized in the recently retaken town of Damasak, Nigeria, March 18, 2015. Reuters/Emmanuel Braun.

Ethiopia’s worsening crisis threatens regional, Mideast security

January 13, 2021/0 Comments/in Analysis, English, External, Politics/by Solomon

Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed (C-L) meets with members of Sudan’s ruling military council after his arrival at Khartoum International Airport, Sudan, June 7, 2019. Photo by Ashraf Shazly/AFP via Getty Images.

Source: Al-Monitor | Payton Knopf and Jeffrey Feltman

With the Horn of Africa increasingly becoming an integral part of the Middle East’s security landscape, the fallout from Ethiopia’s current crisis will have a significant impact on states of the region.

The Gulf Arabs recognize a strategic reality that has eluded the stove-piped US foreign and security policy bureaucracy for too long: The Horn of Africa is an integral part of the Middle East’s security landscape, and increasingly so. No country demonstrates this more clearly than Ethiopia. That country’s escalating internal crises pose an increasingly grave threat not only to the country’s citizens but to international peace and security and to the interests of the United States and its partners in the Middle East, principally Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

As a recent bipartisan study group convened by the US Institute of Peace (USIP) concluded, developments in the Horn of Africa are not only shaped by the states of the Middle East “but also have a direct impact on [these states’] political, economic, and security environments.” Ethiopia’s internal and external borders are being changed violently, and the centrifugal forces of nationalism that now dominate Ethiopian politics are indicative of the weakness of the central state, not the strength of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed or the federal government. These intrastate fissures are undermining the country’s territorial integrity and morphing into interstate conflicts involving, to date, Eritrea and Sudan.

The armed confrontation that erupted Nov. 3 between the federal government and the regional government in Tigray state precipitated what Abiy characterized as a “domestic law enforcement operation.” The involvement of Eritrean combat forces, however, as well as the federal government’s use of airstrikes, mechanized ground units and ethnic militias undermines the credibility of that characterization. Similarly, assertions that the operation has succeeded in stabilizing Tigray is belied by the persistent violence in the region; a worsening humanitarian emergency; the government’s unwillingness to allow adequate access for a humanitarian response; and reports of severe human rights abuses, including of Eritrean refugees in Tigray being killed or forcibly returned to Eritrea.

The war in Tigray is symptomatic of a national political crisis in Ethiopia, which preceded Nov. 3 but has been exacerbated by the nationalist rivalries that have been unleashed since then. Much of western Tigray may now be occupied by Amhara regional state forces, and a border war has erupted between Amhara militias and the Sudanese military. Ethnically motivated killings of Amhara, Oromo and others in Benishangul-Gumuz regional state have precipitated the intervention of Amhara security forces, an unprecedented military deployment by one of Ethiopia’s states into another. In addition, the federal government has been engaged in an intensifying campaign against insurgents in Oromia regional state for months. While each of these conflicts involve historic and complex claims over territory, resources, identity and political representation, the pursuit of those claims by force of arms has set the country on a trajectory toward fragmentation.

The fallout for the states of the Middle East is significant

First, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have both made considerable political and economic investments in the leadership in Addis Ababa, Cairo and Khartoum, investments that will be undermined by bourgeoning conflict among the three. Egyptian-Ethiopian relations have long been strained by the dispute over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), and Ethiopian-Sudanese relations have become increasingly toxic due not only to the GERD but to the border conflict. The recent spike in violence in Benishangul-Gumuz, where the dam is located, could also pose a threat to the control and function of the dam itself. The Nile is an emotive and sensitive issue in Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan, and the crisis facing Abiy’s government makes any realistic compromise even more difficult.

Second, Ethiopia’s fragmentation could portend displacement on a scale not seen in modern times. In 2018-19, approximately 300,000 people — the vast majority of whom were Ethiopian and Eritrean — fled the Horn of Africa for Yemen, in spite of that country’s civil war. As the USIP senior study group report warned, the breakdown of Ethiopia — a country of over 110 million people — would “result in a refugee crisis that could easily dwarf that figure.” Over 56,000 refugees have already fled from Tigray into Sudan since November. Large-scale refugee outflows could destabilize Sudan’s delicate transition, and the consequences of state collapse in Ethiopia would also certainly extend across the Red Sea.

Third, calls for the secession of one or more of Ethiopia’s states are gaining steam, which would put additional strain on the already fraying state system in the Middle East, wracked as it is by the ongoing wars in Libya, Syria and Yemen. Somewhat unique among world regions, the Horn of Africa has several recent experiences with secession — Eritrea from Ethiopia in 1993, South Sudan from Sudan in 2011 and the self-declared independence of Somaliland from Somalia in 2001. The prospects and ramifications of further changes to the regional order should not be underestimated.

Fourth, the risk of radicalization is real should extremist groups exploit the political and security crises inside Ethiopia, particularly if Abiy and his supporters continue to reject dialogue as a means of channeling political grievance. For example, al-Shabab, the Islamic State or al-Qaeda could play for advantage inside Ethiopia’s Somali region or among disaffected and disenfranchised Muslim communities in Oromia and elsewhere.

Brute force is no more likely to be successful in Ethiopia than it has been in Syria in preserving the integrity of the state or in mitigating threats to its neighbors or to the states of the Middle East. Nor can elections that Abiy has announced for June be credible, free or fair in the current political and security climate and therefore able to reconcile the competing visions for the country’s future. The political transitions that have unfolded in Ethiopia and Sudan in the last two years in fact illustrate that the restive and youthful body politics of the Horn of Africa are too diverse, pluralistic and eager for political change for authoritarian repression to result in stability.

Ethiopia’s recent history provides a sobering precedent. In 2015-16, large-scale protests against Ethiopia’s federal government, which was then dominated by Tigray’s ruling party, was met by a military crackdown that both failed to quell the unrest and led to expanding violence. The widening political and security catastrophe only abated with the resignation of former Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn, the promise of a new political dispensation heralded by Abiy’s accession to the premiership and his articulation of a reform agenda that included a loosening of restrictions on civic space and the prospect of a more inclusive political discourse.

Similarly, when a junta deposed Omar al-Bashir following months of nationwide protests in Sudan, there were those within the security services and among their supporters abroad who argued that stability could be achieved through military rule. This proved elusive, however, amid the massacre of protesters at a sit-in in Khartoum and continued mass demonstrations demanding civilian rule. Following talks between the junta and the umbrella group representing the protesters, an agreement was reached to form a transitional government based on a cohabitation arrangement between a civilian-led Cabinet and a council chaired by the military until elections in 2022 — an agreement due, in part, to diplomatic coordination between the United States and the Gulf. While fragile, this negotiated arrangement has so far averted fears of a slide into civil war akin to that of Libya, and Sudan is now a more responsible member of the international community than it has been at any time in the last three decades.

The Gulf states’ policies toward the Horn of Africa are undoubtedly rooted in their own strategic and political calculations. They understand that the two sides of the Red Sea comprise an integrated region that transcends the geographic distinctions between Africa and the Middle East. The close bilateral relationships that Saudi Arabia and the UAE have cultivated with Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia, alongside Abu Dhabi’s historic ties with Asmara, can be strong assets in stabilizing the Horn of Africa in the long term. The long-awaited reconciliation among the Gulf Cooperation Council countries could also alleviate competitive pressures in Somalia, where Qatar has supported the federal government and the UAE has backed the federal member states.

US-Gulf coordination is needed most urgently, however, in the case of Ethiopia. The Gulf states’ explicit or implicit support for Abiy’s shortsighted approach or for Eritrean military intervention not only risks implicating the Gulf in the humanitarian emergency in Tigray but damaging their own strategic interests as the Ethiopian state deteriorates. While Abiy and the federal government continue to prejudice military action over dialogue — not just with Tigrayan leaders but across the political spectrum — there is an urgent need for a process that provides an opportunity to build a new national consensus in Ethiopia, including an understanding of the electoral calendar. The United States and its Gulf partners must cooperate in promoting and supporting such an effort.