A humanitarian disaster stares Ethiopia’s Tigray in the face

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Hunger stalks region of six million people as federal government’s offensive against rebels enters its fourth month

Over a million people could starve if aid is not allowed into conflict zone, says Famine Early Warning Systems Network

Arab News | DUBAI: With their few hurriedly packed belongings wrapped tightly in fabric, entire families, many with young children, are traversing vast distances on foot these days to escape fighting in northern Ethiopia between federal armed forces and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF).

Since the conflict erupted three months ago, nearly two million Ethiopians have been forced to flee the country’s Tigray region, many arriving in neighboring Sudan with axe and knife wounds, others with broken bones and severe mental trauma.

Those who have chosen to stay behind — the vast majority of Tigray’s six million inhabitants — now face shortages of food, medicine and drinking water. Ethiopia is facing accusations of blocking aid and the specter of mass hunger haunts the region.

Most concerning of all is the imminent risk of mass hunger, a phenomenon Ethiopians are tragically familiar with. The Great Famine that afflicted the country between 1888 and 1892 killed roughly one-third of its population. Another in 1983-85 left 1.2 million dead.

According to the Famine Early Warning Systems Network, presided over by the US government, parts of central and eastern Tigray are just a step away from famine, with fears more than a million could die of starvation if aid is not allowed in soon.

In a recent statement, a trio of Tigray opposition parties said that at least 50,000 civilians had been killed in the conflict since November. Aid agencies and journalists have not been permitted access to the region to verify the death toll.

Ethiopian authorities insist aid is being delivered and that nearly 1.5 million people have been reached. But experts on the Horn of Africa believe one of the worst humanitarian disasters in modern history is unfolding in the conflict zone.

“If the world averts its eyes, it is a bystander to one of the most grievous mass atrocities of our era,” Alex de Waal, executive director of the World Peace Foundation and a research professor at The Fletcher School at Tufts University, told Arab News.

“It will be an unforgivable ethical stain. It is also a matter of interest. Do the countries of the Arabian Peninsula want to see another Yemen-like calamity on the southern shores of the Red Sea — a little further away, but even bigger.”

The TPLF, which had dominated Ethiopian politics after the fall of the military dictatorship in 1991 until Abiy’s election victory in 2018, had been in coalition with the current government until the two sides fell out in 2019.

In direct defiance of the federal government’s decision to postpone all votes until the COVID-19 pandemic was under control, Tigray authorities pressed ahead with their own parliamentary election in September. Federal authorities said the vote was illegal.

Tensions escalated further in November when Abiy accused the TPLF of seizing a military base in the regional capital Mekelle. His government responded by declaring a state of emergency, cutting off electricity, internet and telephone services, and designating the TPLF as a terrorist organization.

Although Abiy claimed victory when federal troops entered Mekelle on Nov. 28, the bloodshed has continued as Tigrayan leaders have vowed to fight on.

“The federal government called the conflict a law enforcement operation (intended) to remove from office the Tigray region’s rogue executive,” William Davison, International Crisis Group’s senior analyst for Ethiopia, told Arab News.

“The reality was that Tigray’s defenses were overwhelmed by the full power of the Ethiopian federal military and allied forces.”

FASTFACTS
UN REPORT HIGHLIGHTS
* Reports from aid workers on the ground indicate rise in acute malnutrition across Tigray region.

* Only 1% of the nearly 920 nutrition treatment facilities are reachable.

* Aid response is drastically inadequate, with little access to rural population off the main roads.

* Some aid workers have to negotiate access with armed actors, even Eritrean ones.

After presenting the TPLF as a treasonous entity that had attacked the military and violated the constitutional order, the Ethiopian government said it was left with no choice but to act.

The Ethiopian government has also moved against those who questioned whether the intervention would be as quick and painless as it first claimed — including Davison, who was deported on Nov. 20 without an official reason.

“If you now say things critical of the government then you will be perceived as doing the bidding of the opponent, the TPLF,” said Davison, who is now based in Kenya.

“Myself and others were perceived to be doing the work of the TPLF and the government was doing its utmost to convince everyone that the TPLF was a treasonous entity that had attacked the military and violated the constitutional order.”

Abiy, who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2019 for restoring relations with Ethiopia’s long-time foe Eritrea, is now being accused by some of war crimes in Tigray.

Seyoum Mesfin, a former Ethiopian foreign minister, peacemaker and an elder statesman of Africa, was among three TPLF leaders killed by the military in early January in a move that sparked an international outcry.

Pramila Patten, the UN envoy on sexual violence in conflict. has said there are “disturbing reports of individuals allegedly forced to rape members of their own family, under threats of imminent violence.”

Recently, the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission said 108 cases of rape had been reported over the last two months in the whole of Tigray. It admitted that “local structures such as police and health facilities where victims of sexual violence would normally turn to report such crimes are no longer in place.”

All this amounts to a sharp reversal of fortune for a country that just months ago was being feted as Africa’s fastest growing economy. Now, Ethiopian journalists and human-rights activists are afraid to speak out, many of them avoiding the border areas and letting military atrocities go unreported.

“We’ve been on our toes for months now. You need to be very careful with your comments,” one Addis Ababa-based political analyst, who did not wish to be identified, told Arab News.

“Human-rights abuses are being committed on all sides: the Amhara militias (one of the two largest ethnic groups in Ethiopia), the federal troops themselves and the Eritreans too.

“The humanitarian aspect of the conflict is frightening and especially the lack of indication from the government’s side in providing aid. They say they will, publicly. But large sections of Tigray are still inaccessible. It’s very difficult to say how long they intend to keep it this way, which is of great concern.”

Eritrean soldiers have compounded the problem by reportedly attacking the TPLF on behalf of Abiy’s government, prompting calls from Joe Biden’s administration for their immediate withdrawal. (Both Asmara and Addis Ababa deny that Eritrean forces are present in Tigray.)

Reports say many of the estimated 100,000 Eritrean refugees residing in the region are at risk of getting caught in the crossfire or being forcibly returned. Filippo Grandi, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, has said he is “deeply alarmed by reports of refugees being killed, abducted and forcibly returned to Eritrea that would constitute a major violation of international law.”

De Waal of the World Peace Foundation says if the war causes a humanitarian catastrophe and the economic collapse of Ethiopia, there is no doubt that the consequences will be felt far and wide.

“The human and economic price will be paid by the people of the Horn of Africa, but those people will also start moving en masse towards Europe, and the humanitarian cum economic bailout bill will be presented to Europe and the US,” he told Arab News.

“At a time of austerity and reduced aid budgets, this presents aid donors with a terrible dilemma.”

Summing up the Tigray crisis and its potential solution without mincing words, De Waal said: “With every passing day there is more suffering, killing, starvation, deeper bitterness and wider repercussions. Withdraw Eritrean troops. Then start political talks.”

Ethiopia’s Tigray conflict and the battle to control information

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Al Jazeera | Warnings about deterioration of press freedom as independent journalists endure harassment, denied access to embattled northern region

The eruption of fighting in Ethiopia’s Tigray region 100 days ago has pitted journalists wanting to report on the conflict against a government seeking to maintain total narrative control.

The government-imposed lockdown of the northern region and communications blackout affecting the internet, mobile phones and landlines has made access and assessment for aid agencies dealing with the unfolding humanitarian crisis extremely difficult. It has also made it next to impossible for media seeking entry to investigate artillery attacks on populated areas, deliberate targeting and massacres of civilians, extrajudicial killings, widespread looting and rape, including by suspected Eritrean soldiers.

At the same time, journalists in the country have been detained, faced threats and harassment – and even attacks.

“This is the worst period in my 10-plus years of journalism,” said one Addis Ababa-based Ethiopian freelance journalist, who, like every journalist contacted for this article, insisted on anonymity due to fear of reprisals, both professional and physical.

The journalist noted that even before Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed ordered the November 4 offensive to remove the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) after attacks of federal army bases, the government was already using new anti-hate speech and fake news legislation against critical journalists. “The risk was mainly restricted to imprisonment and verbal harassment. Now, you have the extra risk of losing your life or having your house ransacked as well as vicious social media trolling.”

The journalist said they have had to abandon several writing projects, including one on the plight of a small ethnic group caught up in the secretive Tigray conflict, due to fears about “plain old thuggery and intimidation of journalists”.

‘Regressing signs’

The list of attacks on and intimidation of journalists in Ethiopia is growing. After the Addis Standard, one of Ethiopia’s most influential independent publications, issued a statement in early November urging the government to open channels of communication, Medihane Ekubamichael, a senior editor, was arrested at his home for “attempts to dismantle the Constitution through violence” and “outrage against the Constitution”. He was soon released – but then arrested again and held for about a month. Responsible for much of the paper’s day-to-day operations, his absence meant it had to reduce its journalistic output.

On January 19, Dawit Kebede Araya, a reporter with broadcaster Tigray TV, was found dead with gunshot wounds to his head in his car near Mekelle, Tigray’s regional capital. The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) has urged an independent investigation into whether his killing was motivated by his work.

On February 8, Ethiopian freelance journalist Lucy Kassa, who has reported about Tigray for several foreign media including the Los Angeles Times and Al Jazeera, said armed intruders broke into her Addis Ababa home. She said men knocked her to the ground, raided her apartment and took a laptop and other items related to her reporting, accusing her of “spreading lies” and supporting “the Tigray junta”.

Three leading Democratic US senators recently wrote to Abiy expressing concerns about the erosion of press freedoms and the government’s “draconian tactics”, while calling for the release of detained journalists.

Now, rights groups said the continuing clash about freedom of the press is rolling back gains made by the country’s long-suffering media, signalling a swing back towards authoritarian intolerance.

“The imprisonment of journalists, many of whom were held for weeks without formal charges, are an indicator of the deterioration of press freedom in Ethiopia and a sign that the government is regressing despite the positive reforms made in 2018 when Abiy became prime minister,” said Muthoki Mumo, CPJ’s representative for sub-Saharan Africa.

“Ethiopian journalists should feel free to publish critical reports and commentary, and this cannot happen in an environment where police can arrest and hold them for weeks without charge, blatantly weaponising the judicial system to intimidate the media.”

The press secretary for the Office of the Prime Minister of Ethiopia did not respond to several requests for comment.

Media landscape challenges

When Abiy was awarded the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize, the committee praised his “discontinuing media censorship” among his achievements during his first 100 days in power. Positive changes to Ethiopia’s media landscape, including the country ending its block of more than 260 websites and lifting a ban on media outlets forced to work in exile, saw Ethiopia rise in the World Press Freedom Index compiled by Reporters Without Borders (RSF) from 150 out of 180 countries in 2018 to the 99th rank in 2020. The CPJ’s 2018 annual Prison Census report on journalists imprisoned for their work around the world included no Ethiopians – a first in 14 years.

But as Abiy’s tenure has progressed, so has criticism of his lack of transparency – the prime minister announced the Tigray offensive, in effect a declaration of war, on Facebook – and for repeating what has always happened in Ethiopia when a fresh administration arrives promising reform and freedom of speech: initially new media flourish as restrictions are lifted, but within a few years, the situation returns to the old ways of previous Ethiopian governments.

The CPJ’s 2020 Prison Census published in December 2020 included seven Ethiopian journalists, the third-most among sub-Saharan African countries, after Eritrea and Cameroon (six Ethiopian journalists have been released since the report was published).

Monitors do acknowledge that the government has to deal with a media landscape that is institutionally weak, in which freedom of expression is abused by some media to foment tension and partisanship, even ethnic violence.

“There are legitimate concerns from state and non-state actors about misinformation, disinformation and incitement, particularly during times of political tension,” Muthoki said. “However, these concerns should not be used as pretext to harass the media for critical reporting; to criminalise dissenting views; or as justification to throw journalists behind bars.”

It has long been understood that Ethiopian journalists have it tougher than Ethiopia-based foreign journalists who can more easily seek backup from international agencies or embassies. Ethiopian journalists from Tigray face even more difficulties from the conflict’s fallout. Ethnic Tigrayan journalists have reportedly been collectively suspended from state media outlets, while several anchors of state-owned Ethiopian television were suspended from work for objecting to the wording of news about the Tigray war, according to a source in the industry.

Commenting on an RSF statement about the attack on Kassa, who is Tigrayan, the government’s Ethiopia State of Emergency Fact Check said “all individuals need to be free from any form of harm” but added the press watchdog was wrong in describing her as working for foreign organisations because she did not have the necessary press authorisation.

CPJ condemned the government unit’s statement as “disgraceful”. “Instead of identifying these attackers and holding them to account, authorities have instead sought to discredit Lucy Kassa by saying she’s not a legally registered journalist, exposing growing hostility to the [press],” it said.

‘Extreme intolerance’

But the screw seems to be turning also on foreign journalists, too. Even while being denied access in Tigray, journalists have said that members of foreign media are also portrayed by the Ethiopian state as “traitors” and enemies of Ethiopia, “paid by Western governments to destabilise Ethiopia”. Foreign reporters also report difficulties renewing work visas, while some have been threatened with deportation. Just quoting the TPLF, the region’s former governing party that has clashed with Abiy, will get you in trouble, journalists have said.

“The level of intolerance around Tigray is as extreme as anything I have seen,” said one long-term commentator on Ethiopia who recently visited the country after working there for nearly a decade, and who described Abiy as displaying “classic dictatorial tendencies”.

There have also been suggestions by journalists the government is employing a coordinated strategy to oppress and undermine journalists through social media, state media and the Ethiopian diaspora. Al Jazeera could not independently verify these claims.

But just as the government is being accused of firing out reams of propaganda and leveraging claims of fake news, so, too, have its opponents. The anti-government strategy appears to be focused on increasing activity on social media – in particular, on Twitter – with supporters encouraged to create new accounts and respond to content about the conflict while also spreading hashtags and tweeting at influential Twitter users. The government has countered by positioning itself in the role of fact-checker and provider of reliable information, usurping the job that the media should be doing.

The result is an extremely confusing information environment compounded by a general sense of suspicion about the information coming out about the conflict – all of which journalists must contend with and try to make sense of, while being impeded by the government.

“The government needs to understand the media is an important component to building a strong democratic society that can inform the public and serve as a platform for dialogue,” said Tewodrose Tirfe, chair of the Amhara Association of America, a US-based advocacy group for the Amhara, Ethiopia’s second-largest ethnic group.

“The government needs to view the Ethiopian media as a partner and not limit journalists access to conflict areas and government officials.”

Finding a Path to Peace in Ethiopia’s Tigray Region War has devastated Ethiopia’s northernmost region.

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International Crisis Group | Pending comprehensive national dialogue, Addis Ababa should ease Tigray’s immediate predicament, engaging elements of the authorities it unseated to govern the area and ensure that aid reaches the millions in need.

What’s new? After weeks of fighting in Ethiopia’s Tigray region, federal troops removed the regional government and declared victory. Yet thousands have died, hundreds of thousands are at risk of starvation and the conflict continues. Addis Ababa has established an interim administration, but ousted Tigrayan politicians say they will fight back.

Why did it happen? Relations between Addis Ababa and Mekelle tanked after Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed took office in 2018 and Tigray’s leaders lost federal power. Tensions spiked when Tigray defied central authority by holding regional elections in September, culminating when Tigrayan forces captured the national military command in the region, triggering federal intervention.

Why does it matter? The conflict has poisoned relations between Tigrayan and other Ethiopian elites and inflamed public opinion in Tigray against the federal authorities, who may well struggle to administer a restive region. If Addis Ababa’s energies are drained by enforcing its rule on Tigray, other Ethiopian ethno-nationalist forces may be emboldened.

What should be done? To get Tigray’s public on side, Ababa Ababa should ensure that Eritrean and Amhara regional forces that participated in the intervention withdraw. It also should urgently allow aid to reach all Tigrayans who need it. Ultimately, inclusive dialogue is needed to address federal-Tigray disagreements and wider disputes over regional autonomy. Read more

The Conflict in Ethiopia’s Tigray Region: What to Know

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Council on Foriegn Relations | Michelle Gavin | The military campaign has resulted in a humanitarian crisis and fears of regional instability. A path forward will require international cooperation, careful diplomacy, and an inclusive political process that restores confidence among the country’s diverse population.

Where does the conflict between Tigray’s leadership and the federal government stand?
In November, long-rising tensions between the federal government and the leadership of the northern Tigray region exploded into military confrontation. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed launched what he called a “law-and-order operation” targeting domestic terrorists, but it involved large deployments of the Ethiopian National Defense Forces and aerial bombardments—a far cry from a domestic law enforcement operation. By November 28, federal forces had taken control of the region’s capital and declared victory, but the security situation is unstable in parts of Tigray, and many analysts are concerned about the prospect of a drawn-out insurgency.

Meanwhile, over sixty thousand refugees have fled the country, nearly half a million people have been displaced and are in desperate need of assistance, critical infrastructure has been destroyed, and credible reports of atrocities and war crimes continue to trickle out of the region. Eritrean troops intervened in Tigray on the side of the federal forces, and it appears that they remain in Ethiopian territory.

What are they fighting about?

For decades, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) was the dominant party in Ethiopia’s ruling coalition, but Abiy’s ascent in 2018 heralded a recalibration of power. This change was an attempt to address domestic dissatisfaction with political repression, concerns about access to resources and opportunity, and the perception that an ethnic minority held outsized power and influence. (Tigrayans constitute roughly 6 percent of Ethiopia’s population.)

But the TPLF felt threatened by the new government’s personnel and policy choices, and it declined to join the successor party to the old ruling coalition. In September, it chose to proceed with its own regional elections in defiance of a federal decision to postpone elections due in part to the COVID-19 crisis. A reported TPLF attack on federal forces stationed in the region was the immediate trigger for the conflict, but it was clear that both sides were preparing for confrontation for some time.

A UN expert on genocide prevention warned last week that without urgent action, the risk of atrocities in Tigray is likely to increase. What is it like for Tigrayans now and how could it worsen?

First, it’s important to understand that the world does not have a complete picture of the situation in Tigray. A communications blackout persists in parts of the region, and journalists and humanitarian organizations cannot access many areas due to security and bureaucratic obstacles. Although, the World Food Program recently reached an agreement with the Ethiopian government that should improve access if it is honored.

What has been reported is extremely alarming. Refugees and others have said that forces on the ground—Ethiopia’s military, Eritrean troops, and ethnic militias—are responsible for sexual violence, ethnic-based targeted attacks, and large-scale looting. The United Nations estimates that nearly three million Tigrayans urgently need assistance. They may lack access to water, food, and health care. If these issues are not resolved, there exists a real prospect of famine, a horror that is particularly historically resonant and politically charged in Ethiopia.

What are the implications for the Horn of Africa?

An Ethiopia at war with itself is distracted and unreliable, and spoilers in this volatile region will be quick to take advantage of a security vacuum.

Ethiopia has long been a provider of security in the region, helping to stabilize Somalia and South Sudan and offering important diplomatic support during Sudan’s transition. Already, a border dispute between Ethiopia and Sudan has flared up and threatens to escalate, while Sudan continues to teeter uncertainly between the military and civilian elements of its transitional government. Meanwhile, Somalia is in the midst of a constitutional crisis that could undo hard-won gains. The future of both these states will be affected by Ethiopia’s stability and by the example of Eritrea’s ability to flout international law with impunity.

The worst may be yet to come. If Ethiopia fails to consolidate a new political arrangement that accommodates its diverse population of 110 million and ensures basic measures of security and justice, it could be riven by further conflict that prompts a massive and destabilizing refugee crisis. An important voice for African interests on the global stage would be lost, and external actors who view the strategically important region as a venue for proxy conflict would be empowered.

What should be done, both by the parties involved and internationally?

The Ethiopian government should immediately provide access to humanitarian agencies. Eritrean forces should leave Ethiopian territory; their destabilizing presence undermines international and regional norms. Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia should be accounted for and protected. The Ethiopian government should lift the communications blackout to help curb misinformation, and it should support a credible and independent investigation into allegations of atrocities.

Moreover, since the origins of this crisis are political, the Ethiopian government should seek a broadly inclusive dialogue about the way forward for the country’s many restive constituencies. With national elections slated for June, it is particularly important to seek broad consensus on protections for minorities, access to power and resources, and the rules governing political contestation. For such a dialogue to be credible and useful, it cannot be limited to allies of the current government in Addis Ababa.

At the same time, the international community should redouble its diplomatic efforts to help resolve the border conflict with Sudan through rule-governed negotiations. It should also encourage an agreement among Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan regarding the Nile waters and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.

From Ethiopia’s Tigray region to Yemen, the dilemma of declaring a famine

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BBC | Every day, more and more reports of starvation trickle out of the Tigray region of Ethiopia that has been hit by conflict.

On Wednesday, Mark Lowcock, chief of humanitarian affairs at the United Nations, warned of a deteriorating humanitarian crisis in which aid still wasn’t reaching many affected people.

Earlier in the week, his predecessor Jan Egeland, now head of the Norwegian Refugee Council, was more blunt: “In all my years as an aid worker, I have rarely seen a humanitarian response so impeded and unable to deliver in response for so long, to so many with such pressing needs.”

Mr Egeland went on to say: “The entire aid sector . . . must also recognise our failure to define the scale of the crisis.”

In other words, will the United Nations call out “famine” and if so when?

Farming in Tigray’s rocky soils has long been a precarious endeavour, made worse over the last year by a plague of locusts. At the close of the growing season in September last year, international food security assessments were that 1.6 million of Tigray’s seven million people were relying on food aid to survive.

Conflict broke out on 4 November between forces from the region’s now-ousted ruling party, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), and federal troops following sharp differences over the political make-up of the federal government.

The TPLF opposed the 2019 decision of Prime Minister Aibiy Ahmed to dissolve the ruling coalition, of which it was a part, leading to tensions that spiralled out of control.

The UN is now quietly admitting what others – including the United States – have been saying for weeks, which is that Eritrean troops control much of Tigray. The Ethiopian and Eritrean governments continue to deny this.

Most of Tigray has been sealed off from the world since then. Aid agencies are beginning to send their staff back in, and what they describe is disturbing: hospitals ransacked, people living in fear unable to obtain food or money, deaths from hunger and treatable illnesses.

Some Tigrayans who are able to make phone calls tell of massive looting, burning of crops, and literally millions of people beyond the reach of humanitarian aid.

In a leaked internal memo from 8 January, humanitarian staff from the UN, aid agencies and local government warned that hundreds of thousands were at risk of starving to death. They reported that they could not reach 99% of those in need – a number that aid agencies estimate is 4.5 million – more than 60% of Tigray’s population.

The Ethiopian government insists that these reports are exaggerated at best, and that it has the humanitarian crisis under control. It says that only 2.5 million people are in need and says it can reach almost all of them.

Ethiopia’s history of famine denial

It asks the European Union – its biggest donor – not to be distracted by the “transient challenge” of emergency aid to Tigray, and to continue its generous development aid to the country.

However, there is a history of Ethiopian governments hiding their famines.

In 1973, Jonathan Dimbleby’s film The Unknown Famine exposed mass starvation, hidden from the world by Emperor Haile Selassie. About 200,000 people died in the famine.

The emperor’s callous indifference brought Ethiopians on to the streets to protest and he was overthrown the next year.

In 1984, Tigray and the next-door province of Wollo were the epicentre of another famine, this time caused by a combination of drought and war, that led to between 600,000 and one million deaths.

The Ethiopian government at the time denied the existence of that famine until it was exposed by a BBC film crew, led by Michael Buerk and Mohamed Amin. That news report moved pop star Bob Geldof to record Do They Know Its Christmas? and provoke a global outpouring of charity.

That famine discredited the military government of Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam at home and abroad. Ethiopians hated being seen as beggars by the rest of the world.

In 2001, Ethiopia, then led by the TPLF, disputed the existence of famine conditions in the south-east of the country, where it was fighting an insurgency. An estimated 20,000-25,000 died in what was officially designated a “humanitarian emergency”.

Over the decades, the international humanitarian system has become far larger and more professional. There are sophisticated systems for monitoring child nutrition and food availability in African countries to give timely warning of food crises, to prevent famine.

Five years ago, the Ethiopian government and foreign donors responded to nationwide drought, setting up a relief programme that helped 10.2 million people.

Instead of old-fashioned food handouts, aid was designed to reach villagers before they were forced to sell their cattle and sheep, and to help them stay on their farms to plant for the next year.

But there are two big differences between the 2015-2016 emergency programme and the situation today: information and politics.

There simply isn’t enough information for the UN to declare a famine.

About 15 years ago, humanitarian professionals in the UN developed a standardized metric for measuring food insecurity. They came up with the “integrated food security phase classification” system, known as the IPC.

It has five levels, from “minimal food insecurity” through increasing degrees of severity to the worst level, “famine”. The IPC uses a standard set of indicators including food consumption, numbers of malnourished children, and death rates.

‘No data, no famine’

This official definition of famine is much more precise than its everyday use as “large numbers of people suffering life-threatening hunger”.

But in solving one problem, the IPC system set up another. Now the UN can only cry “famine” when it has certain very specific information.

And, determined to avoid getting a “famine” designation, governments often conceal or manipulate data to achieve their goal – and downplay the severity of hunger. Meanwhile, in the next levels down, “emergency” and “crisis”, people are still dying – just at a slightly lower rate.

The UN has encountered this problem recently in other humanitarian disasters. In Yemen, the Saudi-led coalition, its client government and the Houthi authorities have denied humanitarian agencies access to hungry areas, meaning they can’t conduct surveys.

Without data on malnutrition, child deaths and food consumption, the members of the IPC committee arrive at the cautious conclusion that it’s an emergency, but they can’t say “famine” because they don’t have the information to prove it.

In South Sudan, the government couldn’t stop the data gathering. But it intervened in the IPC food assessment in December to downgrade the “famine likely” finding.

We shouldn’t be quibbling over definitions. According to a study by the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, over 380,000 people died of hunger and violence over the five years of South Sudan’s civil war – but only around 1% of these died in places that met the official threshold of “famine” in Unity State in 2017.

‘Dilemma for aid agencies’

The other big problem is politics. When the cause of mass starvation is military policy, humanitarian agencies face a terrible dilemma. Will they denounce the abuses and risk getting thrown out of the country? Or will they stay silent and become complicit in starvation crimes?

The Ethiopian government admits only to “sporadic fighting”. However, reports from the affected area show that vast swathes of rural Tigray are either battlefields or are controlled by the insurgent TPLF.

Under the definition of international humanitarian law, this is an armed conflict, and the Tigray rebels constitute a belligerent party. Getting aid to the hungry needs negotiations for a ceasefire with the TPLF – it simply can’t be done with the co-operation of one side only.

Up to now, the TPLF hasn’t offered a ceasefire or access to aid agencies. And there’s always a risk that the rebels will misuse the aid to feed their own troops. That’s why international monitoring is essential.

The starvation in Tigray poses the humanitarians’ dilemma in its sharpest form. How can they challenge the official story about the crisis without endangering their limited but essential operations?

There’s an old truism among aid workers: humanitarian crises don’t have humanitarian solutions. What’s needed is high-level political action.

Recognizing this as a problem that recurs in crises as diverse as Syria and Congo, three years ago the UN Security Council passed resolution 2417 on armed conflict and hunger.

As well as reiterating that the use of hunger as a weapon may constitute a war crime, the resolution, which has not been activated up to now, requires the UN Secretary General to alert the Security Council quickly whenever there is a possibility that armed conflict will lead to widespread food insecurity or famine.

The resolution could almost have been designed with the Tigray crisis in mind.

But humanitarian agencies are nervous about invoking it, because they don’t want to offend the Ethiopian government.

We can’t put reliable numbers on the hunger, sickness and death in Tigray, but we know enough to be sure that an immense tragedy is unfolding.

Alex de Waal is the executive director of the World Peace Foundation at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University in the US.

Five Steps the Biden Administration Needs to Take on the Crisis in Tigray

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Just Security | The unfolding crisis in northern Ethiopia bears all the hallmarks of a human rights and humanitarian catastrophe. Since November, more than 6 million people have been trapped between the guns of Ethiopia’s military forces, marauding Eritrean troops, Amharan militia, and the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). The vast majority are now in urgent need of assistance. Yet the Ethiopian government continues to present a narrative that all is well in the north while effectively blocking relief aid. The Biden administration will need to move quickly to avoid further devastation in Tigray.

Much of Tigray remains under an information blackout. But not total. MSF has exposed the situation in Adigrat, a city in eastern Tigray. Witnesses speak of mass atrocities, of wanton extra-judicial killings, and gender violence. Ethiopian and Eritrean forces stand accused of targeting refugees and of deliberately razing their camps to the ground. The United States has demanded that Eritrea withdraw its troops from the region, but to little effect.

The humanitarian toll is already staggering. Two-plus million people have been internally displaced. Over four and a half million desperately need aid. A leaked government document quoted a regional government official acknowledging that people were starving. Medical doctors were said to be pleading for supplies, and body bags. Other reports highlight the fears of an exploding number of COVID-19 cases. In private, a senior United Nations official warned, “It is so bad, I can’t believe what I’ve seen. And there is no capacity, there are no supplies, and even if we had both of those there is no access.”

One hesitates to surmise what is happening across vast swathes of the region where journalists and aid workers cannot go. Ethiopia has a troubled history of blockading relief assistance to civilian populations in the midst of conflict. In decades past, the central government in Addis Ababa destroyed humanitarian stockpiles or otherwise prevented aid from reaching the people of Tigray as part of its counterinsurgency strategy against the TPLF. In the end, it was the people living there that starved – not the insurgents. History is once again at risk of repeating itself.

So far, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, who won the Nobel Peace Prize for ending the conflict with Eritrea, has been largely impervious to outside pressure, as has Debretsion Gebremichael and the TPLF rebels he leads. The African Union sought to curb the slide to war in November, then largely disengaged. The Trump administration weighed in late in the game and in muted tones. European leaders have denounced atrocities in Tigray and have suspended $100 million in budget support for Ethiopia. But these efforts have yet to be sequenced into a coordinated diplomatic strategy to pressure Abiy to do the right thing.

All this must change – and quickly. The good news is that the Biden administration has already been more engaged and outspoken than its predecessor. The United States must now move swiftly and in concert with its partners and allies to prevent Ethiopia from fully collapsing and the country falling into the abyss. Key members of the Biden’s Cabinet have important roles to play.

First, incoming U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., Linda Thomas-Greenfield, can call on the U.N. Emergency Relief Coordinator and the U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to provide the U.N. Security Council with frank and comprehensive briefings on the humanitarian and human rights situation in areas under the control of the Ethiopian army and forces allied with it, as well as areas under the control of the TPLF. The briefings must then be followed by concrete action. To date, the U.N. Security Council has taken up the situation in Tigray three times, but its members have failed to issue even so much as a statement.

Second, Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield can also push the U.N. Emergency Directors to meet and declare Tigray an “L3 Emergency” – the highest level of urgency that allows the U.N. humanitarian agencies to quickly mobilize staff and resources. This move should also trigger a special urgent donor appeal for the crisis in Tigray outside of the annual country Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP), which do not include those who have sought refuge in neighboring Sudan. To be effective, this appeal will require early and urgent funding to make a difference.

Third, it’s time to send in the humanitarians. In recent years, the government, donors, U.N., and NGOs in Ethiopia used development frameworks and systems to respond to short-term needs caused from drought, flood, and the like. It would be easy to fall back on that model for this crisis, but that would be a mistake. Aid agencies need to flip the emergency switch and bring in dedicated humanitarian teams with the requisite skillsets and capacities. To this end, incoming USAID Administrator Samantha Power should send a DART team – America’s premier crisis response tool – to address the situation in Tigray. The scale, urgency, and complexity of the crisis certainly justify – if not require – the deployment of a DART.

Fourth, the White House must continue to press Eritrea to pull its forces back across the border. It also needs to push for the Ethiopian government to set the conditions in which relief groups can save lives. This means unfettered and blanket access to all affected communities. Ethiopia should issue 6-month visas for relief groups and expedite customs clearances for humanitarian supplies. In addition, humanitarians must be allowed to communicate in the information blackhole Tigray has become. The Ethiopian government must allow aid agencies to deploy telecommunications, including cell towers, sat phones, and HF/VHF radio.

Fifth, Secretary of State Antony Blinken must urgently appoint a special envoy for the Horn of Africa to help oversee a regional diplomatic strategy. Blinken has already told senators that he would consider such a move. A special envoy could also help coordinate efforts of the African Union, the European Union, and Ethiopia’s bilateral benefactors to bring concerted pressure to bear on Abiy and all parties to the conflict to make progress on the humanitarian situation and invest in a national political dialogue in advance of elections now scheduled for June of this year.

There is still time to pull back from the brink, but not much. Without an immediate infusion of assistance, to all areas of Tigray, a humanitarian crisis will become a humanitarian catastrophe the likes of which Ethiopia has not seen in a generation.

Rising tension as Ethiopia and Sudan deadlocked on border dispute

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Al Jazeera | Bickering over contested farmland along the border has in recent weeks deteriorated into armed clashes.

Age-old territorial claims are threatening to embroil Ethiopia and Sudan into armed conflict, as bickering over disputed strips of farmland in recent weeks has boiled over into the most serious escalation of border tensions in years.

The uptick in skirmishes initially involving militias from the two countries saw the neighbours’ national armies intervene – and by mid-December, both countries had massed soldiers along the frontier in the al-Fashaga region.

Last month, Sudan closed its airspace over the region alleging that an Ethiopian fighter jet had infiltrated Sudanese airspace.

Al-Fashaga, where the contested farmlands at the heart of the dispute lie, runs about 100 square miles (259 square kilometres) along the joint border of Ethiopia’s northwestern frontier and eastern Sudan.

For decades, farmers from both countries have harvested crops with little care for border markings in the area amid sporadic flare-ups.

Attempts to properly demarcate the border date back to a treaty signed in 1902 between then British-ruled Sudan and Ethiopia. But the ambiguity along certain border points left the issue unresolved and demarcation has remained a sticking point between the two countries, particularly since Sudan gained independence in 1955.

The flashpoint of the recent bickering was a December 15 ambush, reportedly carried out in the area by Ethiopian militia backed by Ethiopian soldiers.

The attack is said to have killed several Sudanese military officers, and it provoked a rare condemnation from Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, who said on Twitter Sudan’s forces would be prepared to “repel” military aggression.

With his country already engulfed in a brutal war in its northern Tigray region, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed responded with a reconciliatory call for calm. “Such incidents will not break the bond b/n our two countries as we always use dialogue to resolve issues,” he said in a tweet.

But Sudan struck back, mobilising soldiers towards contested areas and announcing that it had retaken them by New Year’s day.

“Our military is engaged elsewhere, they took advantage of that,” Ethiopian military chief General Birhanu Jula said of Sudan’s recent military manoeuvres.

“This should have been solved amicably. Sudan needs to choose dialogue, as there are third party actors who want to see our countries divided,” he added, strongly hinting at Egypt, with whom Ethiopia is engaged in a diplomatic spat over the construction of a massive hydroelectric power dam on the Blue Nile River.

Egypt says the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) project threatens the water supply and livelihood of its farmers downstream. Thinly veiled accusations that Egypt coerced Sudan into its heavy-handed military approach were largely fuelled by Egypt’s issuing a statement last month backing Sudan in the affair.

Despite Sudan finding itself at odds with Ethiopia over GERD amid seemingly stonewalled tripartite efforts on reaching an agreement on the dam’s construction, Khartoum and Addis Ababa have generally enjoyed warm ties. In 2019, Abiy acted as a mediator between Sudan’s military and pro-democracy leaders in an attempt to ease the political crisis that gripped the country in the wake of the removal of longtime ruler Omar al-Bashir.

Since early November, Sudan has allowed more than 50,000 Ethiopians fleeing the country’s war in Tigray to shelter at refugee camps in its territory.

But both countries have made notable shifts in policy regarding the border dispute.

Previous Ethiopian administrations were far more accommodating of Sudan’s territorial claims. In 2009, Ethiopia’s former Prime Minister Meles Zenawi relinquished control of strips of land on the border to Sudan, as part of agreements that caused an uproar in Ethiopia when made public.

Despite Ethiopia’s concessions, Sudan’s al-Bashir made no concrete effort to militarise its border and prevent the odd raid into its territory by Ethiopian militia.

But under Abiy, Ethiopia appears to have backtracked on past agreements and could yet stake a claim for some of the coveted farmland. Sudan’s tolerance, meanwhile, has thinned considerably amid the rising tensions, which have sparked calls for de-escalation.

Saudi Arabia has reportedly offered to help reconcile the feuding parties, while UK Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab recently met officials from both sides and urged them to sort out their differences.

“The UK is a friend to both countries,” Raab’s office said in a statement sent to Al Jazeera. “We want to see the tensions settled not just for Ethiopia and Sudan, but also for the region as a whole.”

While the diplomatic community’s efforts are yet to be exhausted, Raab’s call for roundtable talks has received a lukewarm response.

“We are thankful for the mediation offers, but Sudanese forces needs to vacate our land and return to their territory,” Ethiopia’s Foreign Ministry Spokesman Dina Mufti told assembled press in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa, last week. “When this occurs, we will gladly attend roundtable talks.”

Sudan denies it is occupying Ethiopian territory.

Gridlocked, the two states remain perilously close to a breakout of fresh hostilities. Experts believe that domestic political wrangling in both countries might be behind their somewhat uncompromising stances. Meanwhile, the possibility of domestic political foes interpreting any concessions on al-Fashaga as weakness and the odds of provoking the ire of each country’s nationalist camp could further fuel the standoff.

“Ethiopia is reticent about the al-Fashaga crisis because it touches on Prime Minister Abiy’s grip on power and the interests of the Amhara [Ethiopian region bordering al-Fashaga], his only ethnic support base,” said Rashid Abdi, a researcher and Horn of Africa analyst.

“Whereas in Sudan, a new conflict could complicate the political transition and sow divisions. The army can use war as excuse to reconsolidate power and edge out the civilians,” he added.

Through Eritrea, China Quietly Makes Inroads Near the Red Sea

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The Diplomat | China is finding an eager partner in Eritrea, an autocratic state generally overlooked entirely by world powers.

As Iran continues to dominate headlines across the Western world, China’s far quieter quest to influence Africa and Asia has escaped the news media’s attention of late. The many examples of this Chinese strategy include the world power’s relationship with Eritrea, a country on the Horn of Africa that rarely features in geopolitical discussions. Nonetheless, officials in Beijing intend to turn what some analysts still label “Africa’s North Korea” into a centerpiece of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China’s costly economic megaproject inspired by the Silk Road.

In May 2019, Eritrean Foreign Minister Osman Saleh Mohammed and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met in Beijing to laud what Eritrean officials dubbed “a healthy and strong partnership for the benefit of their two peoples.” Just five months later, Chinese Ambassador to Eritrea Yang Zigang said in an interview with Eritrea’s state-owned media that “China has consistently supported Eritrea’s nation-building endeavors by providing Eritrea with many kinds of assistance.”

The months of diplomatic niceties between China and Eritrea preceded a much more substantive development barely noticed by Western news agencies. In early November, the China Shanghai Corporation for Foreign Economic and Technological Cooperation — known as “China SFECO Group” — began building a 134-kilometer road in coordination with ranking Eritrean officials, an initiative heralded by Yang. He has displayed a keen interest in Eritrean infrastructure, noting on the embassy webpage, “Eritrea is endowed with two great natural harbors, Massawa and Assab.”

Eritrea has long expressed its enthusiasm for the Belt and Road Initiative, China’s bid to expand its sphere of influence by investing in countries across the Global South. A representative from Eritrea’s ruling party traveled to Beijing’s Belt and Road Forum in 2017. The Eritrean Information Ministry, meanwhile, praised China’s effort in 2019, calling it a step toward “open, inclusive, and balanced regional economic cooperation” and “integration of markets.”

t first glance, a little-known one-party state with an ailing economy would seem an odd choice for Chinese investment. Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki has only succeeded at turning his country into a pariah state during 27 years of brutal rule, and the World Bank Group considers Eritrea “one of the least developed countries in the world.” Even so, Chinese President Xi Jinping likely sees his investment in Afwerki’s regime as an opportunity to secure an ally on the Red Sea.

Chinese tacticians have been eyeing the strategic region for some time. In early 2016, China concluded a deal with Djibouti, one of Eritrea’s neighbors on the Red Sea, to construct a military base – China’s first overseas military facility. The much-discussed Chinese outpost, which itself borders a similar American facility, became operational a year later. China has deployed soldiers throughout East Africa, even sending peacekeepers to secure Chinese-staffed oil wells in South Sudan.

Chinese-Eritrean relations appear focused on economics for the time being, but the possibility of militarization looms on the horizon. China and Eritrea cooperate in a variety of sectors, including energy and public health. The East Asian world power has a long history with its East African partner, arming Eritrea not only during its 30-year war of independence from Ethiopia but also during its second war with Ethiopia in the late 1990s. In more recent years, China has offered to mediate territorial disputes between Eritrea and Ethiopia, a sign of China’s wider ambitions.

In Africa and Eritrea in particular, China’s distinct foreign policy has given it a critical advantage over its Western rivals. Xi is more than willing to ignore Afwerki’s well-known abuses of human rights, such as conscripting tens of thousands of Eritreans and forcing them into what the United Nations terms “slave-like” labor. Though Eritrea has a population of just 6 million, only Syrian applicants for asylum outnumber Eritreans in Europe. Fifty thousand live in Germany alone.

While some Western countries have tried to engage with Eritrea in the last few years, they have faced backlash. European officials suffered significant embarrassment when The New York Times revealed that an Eritrean project funded by the European Union and facilitated by the UN relied on the labor of conscripts. Many European countries view Eritrea as a source of mass migration and a key front in their bid to stop it. Unlike China, which Afwerki has tried to court through his emphasis on Eritrea’s “strategic location,” Europe seems to have few long-term goals there.

The United States, China’s main rival in Africa, has indicated little interest in Eritrea. The State Department has admitted that “[t]ensions related to the ongoing government detention of political dissidents and others, the closure of the independent press, limits on civil liberties, and reports of human rights abuses contributed to decades of strained U.S.–Eritrean relations.”

As long as China keeps overlooking Eritrea’s dismal record on human rights, the two countries’ relationship seems likely to blossom. Despite a remarkable increase in goodwill toward the East African autocracy following Eritrea’s conclusion of a peace treaty with its longtime adversaries in Ethiopia, Afwerki has few friends in the international community. For its part, China has long stated its reluctance to interfere with or even comment on other countries’ internal affairs. That position has endeared Beijing to autocrats around the world.

For now, China only has one opponent in the race to establish a sphere of influence in Eritrea: the United Arab Emirates. The UAE operates an air base and a military port in the East African country in addition to its military base in Somalia. In a sign of China’s growing reach, however, the UAE is participating in the Belt and Road Initiative. Considering that China’s ambassador to the Middle Eastern regional power vaunted their relationship as “at its best period in history” in 2019, the prospect of a confrontation between the two countries over Eritrea seems dim.

SFECO Group’s project in Eritrea marks a new level of cooperation with China. As American and European officials turn their attention to the Middle East, China’s staying power in the Horn of Africa is growing. The Chinese presence in Djibouti sparked alarm across the West. In Eritrea, though, China is reaping the benefits of other world powers’ lack of interest in a rogue state. Unlike its Western counterparts, China has its sights set on the Red Sea.

How War in Ethiopia Impacts Red Sea and Horn of Africa Power Politics: The Battle in Tigray and Beyond

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Terrorism Monitor | Michael Horton

Ethiopia is a key prize in the scramble for influence and power in the Horn of Africa and broader Red Sea region. With its natural resources, population of 110 million, and well-equipped military, Ethiopia has become an African power. The nation’s capital, Addis Ababa, moreover, hosts the African Union headquarters, and the country is one of the few African nations never to be colonized. [1] Ethiopia has accordingly long played an outsized role in African and sub-regional politics.

For much of the last decade, successive Ethiopian governments have navigated treacherous regional and global politics by maintaining relations with diverse geopolitical actors. On the global level, Ethiopia has been—and remains—an important U.S. ally, while China accounts for the largest volume of foreign direct investment into Ethiopia. [2] At the regional level, Ethiopia has avoided becoming entangled in the Gulf’s acrimonious power politics between Saudi Arabia and the UAE and their two main adversaries, Qatar and Turkey. All four of those countries nevertheless provide Ethiopia with financial aid and private investment across multiple areas, especially its important agricultural sector. Turkey and the UAE, despite being regional rivals, also both maintain high-level military-to-military relations with Ethiopia.

The ongoing war in Ethiopia’s northernmost Tigray region will test Ethiopia’s strategy of balancing the interests of outside powers with its own need for domestic investment. At the same time, the war, which began on November 4, will present these same outside powers with new opportunities to enhance their relationship with Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali (East African, November 7). However, those and other outside powers will also have ample opportunity to create instability in Ethiopia if they so choose.

Ethiopian Foreign Policy from Balancing to Entanglement

The war in Tigray pits the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) against the Ethiopian government. The TPLF, which dominated Ethiopian politics for much of the last three decades, is a formidable political and military power in its own right. While the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) has made quick progress in capturing major cities in the Tigray region, this was likely due to strategic withdrawals by the TPLF (Nazret, November 19). Such a strategy aligns with the TPLF’s long history of guerrilla warfare.

Barring some negotiated settlement between the TPLF and the Ethiopian government, the war in Tigray will likely evolve into an insurgency that will spill beyond the borders of Tigray. At the same time, the war in Tigray, even if it is contained to TPLF redoubts in the mountains, will attract the interest of outside powers. This is already the case with Eritrea, which has deployed troops within Ethiopia’s borders to help the ENDF bottle up the TPLF. In addition to its three decade-long battle for independence from Ethiopia, Eritrea and Ethiopia fought over disputed border towns from 1998-2000. Eritrea, which was once allied with the TPLF, is now supporting Abiy Ahmed, who signed a peace agreement with Eritrean president Isaias Afewerki in 2018 that ended the two countries’ longstanding border conflict (Addis Fortune, September 22, 2018).

The involvement of Eritrean forces in Ethiopia’s war in Tigray could be a harbinger of things to come. The UAE, which maintains military bases in Eritrea, may also be aiding Abiy Ahmed’s government. Conflicting and unconfirmed reports, for example, indicate the possible deployment of UAE-operated drones from the UAE base in Assab, Eritrea to Tigray. [3] The UAE, which is locked in a cold war with Qatar and Turkey, could try to enhance its relationship with Ethiopia by supporting its fight against the TPLF at the cost of Ethiopia’s relationship with Qatar and Turkey.

Turkey, however, like the UAE, enjoys excellent military-to-military relations with Ethiopia. Due to Ethiopia’s involvement in Somalia, with which it shares a long and largely unguarded border, Turkey works closely with the Ethiopian military and intelligence services. Turkey also regards Somalia, where it maintains its largest overseas military base, as the lynchpin in its strategy to preserve and grow its influence in the Horn of Africa and Red Sea region (Terrorism Monitor, November 20). In mid-November, Ethiopia withdrew large numbers of troops it had deployed in its ethnically Somali Ogaden region and Somalia itself to redeploy them to Tigray (Somali Affairs, November 3). Somalia-based al-Shabaab, therefore, will benefit from gaps left by the Ethiopian forces, and the relationship between Ethiopia and Turkey may deepen as Ankara seizes on opportunities to help Addis Ababa bolster security along its border with Somalia. Turkey also has greater ability than either the UAE or Saudi Arabia to offer the Ethiopian military what it lacks and most desires: drone technology and the expertise to use it (Terrorism Monitor, October 13).

Further afield, China, which has invested billions of dollars in almost every economic sector in Ethiopia, will act to protect those investments. China will make every effort to support stability in Ethiopia. Given China’s pragmatic foreign policy in Africa and in Ethiopia in particular, this support will be cost-effective and possibly covert. There is little doubt that China will aid Abiy Ahmed’s efforts to contain and defeat the TPLF. However, such aid will, as is customary with Chinese foreign policy, come with strings attached. [4]

Water Wars and Instability

On the other side of the equation, Ethiopia’s regional rivals will view limited instability in Ethiopia as a benefit. Ethiopia has completed its Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and, as of July 2020, began filling the dam’s immense reservoir (Nazret, July 16). Egypt views the dam, which impedes the flow of water into the Nile’s primary tributary, the Blue Nile, as an existential threat. [5] Thus far, the two governments have failed to reach an agreement over how they will share the Nile’s water resources.

Over this summer, Egypt reportedly proposed to build a base in the unrecognized Republic of Somaliland (The East African, July 28). It is unlikely the government of Somaliland will accept the proposal. However, it reflects Egypt’s interest in enhancing its relations with other nations in the Horn of Africa and expanding its military’s regional reach as a way of checking what it sees as growing Ethiopian power.

For its part, Sudan, which will benefit from cheap electricity and flood control provided by the GERD, has been more willing to negotiate with Ethiopia on the dam. However, Egypt wields considerable influence in Sudan. The war in Tigray, especially if it is prolonged, may undermine the Ethiopian government’s ability to press forward with what Egypt views as an uncompromising agreement on GERD and hinder Sudan’s possible accommodation with Ethiopia on the dam.

Ethiopia’s Outlook

Ethiopia’s successful foreign policy, which is based on balancing the interests of rival countries in its natural resources and strategic position in exchange for access and investment, could be compromised by sustained war in Tigray. The TPLF is a sophisticated political and military organization that possesses the knowledge and institutional memory that will allow it to engage rival internal and outside powers. Abiy Ahmed’s government will find it requires more and new types of aid to deal with the challenges posed by the TPLF. Receipt of this aid, be it military or financial, will constrain Ethiopia’s nimble and independent foreign policy.

Notes

[1] Ethiopia was occupied by the Italians from 1936-1941. See Jeff Pearce, Prevail: The Inspiring Story of Ethiopia’s Victory over Mussolini’s Invasion (Skyhorse Publishing, 2014).

[2] In 2019, China accounted for the largest volume of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Ethiopia, followed by Saudi Arabia and Turkey.

[3] There are conflicting and unconfirmed reports in Western media on the possible deployment of UAE-operated drones from the UAE’s base in Assab, Eritrea to Tigray. See, for example: https://www.voanews.com/africa/expert-no-evidence-uae-drones-are-being-used-ethiopias-tigray-conflict; https://www.bellingcat.com/news/rest-of-world/2020/11/19/are-emirati-armed-drones-supporting-ethiopia-from-an-eritrean-air-base/; and https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-conflict-idUSKBN27V05M. While deployment of UAE-operated and Chinese-manufactured Wing Loong II drones would be consistent with the UAE’s deployment of drones over Yemen and Libya, it is unlikely at this stage. What is more likely is that the UAE is using surveillance drones within Eritrean territory to monitor incursions into Eritrean territory by TPLF forces.

[4] This is not to say that other countries providing aid, like the United States, do not also expect some kind benefit in return. However, China is particularly adept at incorporating countries into its financial and political web at relatively minimal expense to the Chinese treasury. See Tom Burgis, The Looting Machine: Warlords, Oligarch, Corporations, Smuggler, and the Theft of Africa’s Wealth (Public Affairs, 2016).

[5] For an overview of the complexity surrounding GERD and downstream riparian environments, see: https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-020-19089-x

The Three-Country Alliance Against Tigray Might Jeopardize Ethiopia’s Future – Analysis

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Eurasia Review | Martin Plaut

The Tigray war has turned into an all-out conflict, pitting Tigrayan forces loyal to the Tigray People’s Liberation front (TPLF) against Ethiopian federal troops, the Eritrean army, Amhara militia and – as revealed last week – Somali soldiers.

Despite what would seem to be overwhelming odds against them, the Tigrayans appear to be holding their own in large areas of the region.

Both Eritrea and Somalia routinely deny any involvement in the war, but the evidence of their presence is strong.

On December 8, Reuters reported that “a U.S. government source and five regional diplomats” told them the US believes Eritrean soldiers have crossed into Ethiopia. The EU and UK support this assessment.

A senior Ethiopian general confirmed that Eritrean troops were in Tigray. Major General Belay Seyoum, head of the Northern Command, described the presence of foreign forces on Ethiopian soil as “painful”.

The Eritrea-Ethiopia-Somali alliance

The alliance has its origins in the ending of hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Much of the groundwork for this rapprochement was done by the United States, with Donald Yamamoto playing a critical role behind the scenes, although Washington could hardly have envisaged where this would lead.

On July 8-9, 2018 Prime Minister Abiy visited Asmara to seal the peace between Eritrea and Ethiopia. In the same month, the ice between Eritrea and Somalia was broken, with a three-day visit by Somali President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed to Asmara. It was the first visit by a Somali president to Eritrea since it gained independence from Ethiopia in 1993. The two nations have not had diplomatic ties in nearly 15 years.

Abdinur Mohamed, a spokesman for the Somali president, said on Twitter that the country “is ready to write a new chapter of its relations with Eritrea.” Economic and security concerns are at the top of the agenda, as well as “regional issues of interest to both countries,” Eritrea’s information ministry said.

There were further bilateral visits in August 2018 and April 2019. This culminated in a summit between the leaders of Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia on January 27, 2020, held in Asmara.

The communique committed the three leaders to consolidate “peace, stability, and security as well as promoting economic and social development. They also agreed to bolster their joint efforts to foster effective regional cooperation.”

There was no press conference at which the details of the agreement might be explained. The public was left in the dark about what the leaders were planning.

Further meetings took place in the run-up to the outbreak of war in Tigray:

  • Prime Minister Abiy made a rare visit to the Eritrea main training base at Sawa in July 2020.
  • Somali President Farmajo arrived in Asmara on 4 October.
  • President Isaias went to Ethiopia on October 14-15. This trip included seeing the Ethiopian air-force base at Bishofu.

Within three weeks, on November 4, 2020, the Tigray war erupted. Is it credible that the war was not discussed, and a strategy agreed between the three leaders at these meetings?

War aims

The first priority of the alliance is to remove the Tigrayan administration from Tigray. President Isaias has long loathed the TPLF. This goes back to the 1970’s and 80’s when the Eritreans and Tigrayans fell out over ideology, tactics and strategy.

Prime Minister Abiy also wants to rid himself of the vestiges of power of the previous Ethiopian government, which the TPLF controlled. He is attempting to reverse their policy of “ethnic federalism.”

Beyond this, outlines of a plan were revealed when information was leaked about a meeting held by President Isaias just prior to the outbreak of the war.

According to reports citing well-placed sources, President Isaias brought together his closest confidantes on the eve of the Tigray war. He said that Eritrea had to accept that it had a small economy and a lengthy Red Sea coast that it cannot patrol on its own. He suggested forming some sort of “union” with Ethiopia, at least in terms of economic co-operation and maritime security.

If accurate, President Isaias appeared to have echoed Abiy’s grandiose dream of re-establishing the old empire-state of Ethiopia. This includes suggestions that the Ethiopian navy could be reconstructed – a proposal supported by France. This would require the use of Eritrean ports which were once home to the Imperial Ethiopian Navy.

The idea of some form of union may not be as far-fetched as it would appear, despite the fact Isaias previously led Eritrea’s decades-long war to gain independence from Ethiopia.

It should not be forgotten that when President Isaias made his first visit to Addis Ababa in July 2018 he made what many Eritreans regarded as an extraordinary offer: for a joint administration of both countries.

“This is a historic day for all of us,” President Isaias Afwerki said. “Anyone who thinks the people of Eritrea and Ethiopia are separated is considered as naïve from now on.”  In a speech, Abiy said the countries had agreed to develop together and that Isaias had offered to help “lead this great nation.” He added that “we have finally found our sister nation after many years of hiding.”

This vision – of co-suzerainty – or a revised form of federation, appears to be behind the current conflict.

Regional blocs

In September 2020 Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia held their third trilateral meeting. They proposed to form a new regional bloc, which has been referred to as the “Horn of Africa Cooperation”.

The flaw in this proposal was commented on at the time. “Creating an economic and political bloc may seem a solution to bring peace and boost trade. But it risks sparking distrust from other East African countries, and with the other regional body, IGAD,” the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, which Eritrea has long distrusted.

The Horn of Africa Cooperation could be linked to the wider ambition of the Saudis to extend their influence in the Horn of Africa. The “Council of the Arab and African States bordering the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden” was launched in January 2020. This new Arab-African alliance has eight members: Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Jordan and Yemen.

Conclusion

These plans depend on succeeding to crush the Tigrayans. At the moment this appears a distant prospect, despite Prime Minister Abiy’s assertion in November that it was little more than a “law enforcement”  operation that would soon be over.

If the war goes badly, and Eritrea, Somalia and the rest of Ethiopia becomes sucked into the conflict, the conflict could threaten the future of Ethiopia itself.  This was the warning from senior African experts at the US Institute of Peace.

“As members of the bipartisan senior study group on peace and security in the Red Sea arena, we are watching with grave concern the situation in Ethiopia. While many of the facts remain unclear, the risks of escalation are certain: Intrastate or interstate conflict would be catastrophic for Ethiopia’s people and for the region and would pose a direct threat to international peace and security.

The acceleration of polarization amid violent conflict would also mark the death knell for the country’s nascent reform effort that began two years ago and the promise of a democratic transition that it heralded.

As we cautioned in the study group’s Final Report and Recommendations released on October 29, the fragmentation of Ethiopia would be the largest state collapse in modern history. Ethiopia is five times the size of pre-war Syria by population, and its breakdown would lead to mass interethnic and interreligious conflict; a dangerous vulnerability to exploitation by extremists; an acceleration of illicit trafficking, including of arms; and a humanitarian and security crisis at the crossroads of Africa and the Middle East on a scale that would overshadow any existing conflict in the region, including Yemen.

As Ethiopia is currently the leading Troop Contributing Country to the United Nations and the African Union peacekeeping missions in Sudan, South Sudan and Somalia, its collapse would also significantly impact the efforts by both to mitigate and resolve others conflicts in the Horn of Africa.”